Paul K. MacDonald - Recherche en IA spécialisée au MIT

Paul K. MacDonald

Rebalancing American foreign policy

The United States faces unprecedent-
ed foreign policy and national security
challenges.1 Conflicts in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan, the global war on terrorism,
the proliferation of nuclear weapons,
the increasing assertiveness of Russia,
the growth of Chinese military power,
global climate change, not to mention
the spread of poverty, infectious dis-
eases, and ethnic and religious strife
around the world: the challenges aren’t
limited; the resources to meet them are.
The high operational tempo of the wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan has stretched
the military to the breaking point. Le
ongoing ½nancial crisis and economic
recession will severely limit the ability
of the federal government to sustain
or increase expenditures for defense
and foreign aid.

The Obama administration has a
unique opportunity to reorient Amer-
ican foreign policy and lay out a new
national security strategy that more
effectively strikes a balance between
the ends we seek and the means we
possess. Such a strategy would recog-
nize that the United States faces con-
siderable constraints in the realm of
foreign policy. Some of these are self-

inflicted: the war in Iraq, Par exemple,
proved to be a costly undertaking that
has severely burdened the U.S. military.
Other constraints stem from develop-
ments outside of Washington’s control.
The rise of new regional powers and the
erosion of the liberal consensus will in-
creasingly limit the exercise of Ameri-
can power. Given these developments,
Washington must not only scale back
American ambitions, but also demon-
strate prudence with the nation’s lim-
ited resources.

In his classic book on the subject, Lid-

dell Hart de½ned strategy as “the art
of distributing and applying military
means to ful½ll the ends of policy.”2
While armchair generals often focus
on the application of force, identify-
ing and prioritizing the “ends of pol-
icy” are of equal, if not greater, impor-
tance. For without a clear sense of the
ends, foreign policy will not only be in-
coherent, but often ineffective. More-
over, without realistic prioritization,
foreign policy will attempt everything
alors que, souvent, accomplishing nothing.
Elected on a foreign policy platform
that preached modesty, the Bush admin-
istration came to de½ne the goals of the
United States in broad and lofty terms.
In its 2006 National Security Strategy, pour

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Paul K.
MacDonald

example, the White House boldly argued
that the “ultimate goal” of U.S. politique
would be to “end tyranny in our world”
by creating “a world of democratic,
well-governed states that can meet the
needs of their citizens and conduct
themselves responsibly in the interna-
tional system.”3 Among the speci½c
tasks listed as essential to realizing this
vision were strengthening alliances to
defeat global terrorism, working with
others to defuse regional conflicts, pre-
venting the spread of weapons of mass
destruction, encouraging the develop-
ment of democratic societies, and pro-
moting free trade and open markets.

In the abstract, each of these goals is
laudable, and to its credit, the Bush ad-
ministration did make selective prog-
ress toward realizing its vision. But as
a guide to practical planning, there are
serious limitations with this vision of
America’s place in the world. To begin
avec, there is little sense of which of
these goals should be prioritized. Le
lack of a clear hierarchy of objectives
is particularly problematic given that
many of these abstract policy objec-
tives are in tension with one another.
Par exemple, efforts to strengthen al-
liances to defeat global terrorism in
countries such as Saudi Arabia or Pak-
istan were frequently at odds with at-
tempts to champion human dignity
or promote democracy. De la même manière, dans-
couraging countries to open their
economies to global trade and invest-
ment may pay dividends in the long
term, but in the short term these pol-
icies often have the effect of exacer-
bating inequality and generating do-
mestic strife. The strategy also lacks
clarity on how achieving the goals it
outlines will directly protect the Unit-
ed States. The spread of democracy
may encourage the emergence of
friendly regimes, but it is also possi-

ble that militant groups will use the bal-
lot box to achieve power, as was the case
with Hamas in the 2006 Palestinian elec-
tion. Working to defuse regional con-
flicts might promote peace and stability
in some cases, but it could also embroil
the United States in distant conflicts of
little direct interest.

The so-called “global war on terror-
ism” epitomizes the drawbacks of cast-
ing the core goals of American foreign
policy in such abstract and contradic-
tory terms. Various Bush-era planning
documents describe the United States
as engaged in a conflict in which “the
enemy is terrorism” and “building and
maintaining a united global front against
terrorism” is an important component
of victory.4 These statements are not
particularly useful as guides for public
politique. According to the State Depart-
ment, some forty-two groups around
the globe employ terrorism as a strat-
egy to accomplish their speci½c aims.5
To lump these groups together is to de-
½ne the threat in a way that is overly
broad: it conflates Islamic extremists
in Algeria with Marxist rebels in Co-
lombia, Shiite fundamentalists in Leb-
anon with Sunni radicals in Pakistan.
To claim that we can or should ½ght
terrorism in all of these locations, ou
that these conflicts comprise some co-
herent war in which a single strategy
will prove effective, is unhelpful.

Trying to undermine particular ter-
rorist groups can be an appropriate for-
eign policy goal of the United States.
But formulating policies based on tran-
scendental goals or vague threats mud-
dies what we clearly know to be more
urgent: that the influence of Al Qaeda
is a greater priority than Basque sepa-
ratists or splinter factions of the Irish
Republican Army; or that the influence
of Islamic fundamentalists in Pakistan
is a much more pressing danger than

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terrorist cells in Central or Southeast
Asia. Given limited resources and the
multifaceted nature of the threat, le
United States must de½ne its needs in
precise and direct terms.

What, alors, should be the main for-

eign policy goals of the United States?
In many respects, it is easier to iden-
tify what the goals shouldn’t be. D'abord,
the United States should abandon the
notion that it can or should seek to dis-
courage others from challenging its
political leadership or military prima-
cy. As recently as September 2002,
the White House declared that an im-
portant bene½t of America’s military
might was its ability to “dissuade po-
tential adversaries from pursuing a
military build-up in hopes of surpass-
ing, or equaling, the power of the Unit-
ed States.”6 The global distribution of
pouvoir, cependant, is already beginning
to shift away from one de½ned by U.S.
predominance and toward one that is
much more multipolar, regionalized,
and complex.7 Rising powers such as
Chine, India, and Brazil are becoming
major players in the global economy.
Potential adversaries such as Russia
and Iran are assertively challenging
American influence within their re-
spective neighborhoods. The Nation-
al Intelligence Council (nic) recently
concluded that in the future “the Unit-
ed States’ relative strength . . . will
decline and US leverage will become
more strained.”8 American power
won’t evaporate overnight, nor will
Washington cease to play a leading
role in global affairs. Mais, as the nic
report makes clear, the unrivaled dom-
inance of American power can no
longer be taken for granted.

Deuxième, the United States needs
to moderate its attempts to spread de-
mocracy around the globe. Promoting

democracy is laudable, but it is not
clear that U.S. efforts have produced,
or can produce, their intended effects.
Attempts by the United States to bolster
moderate Muslim politicians often have
the reverse consequence of decreasing
their legitimacy in the eyes of local pop-
ulations. De plus, new democracies
or countries undergoing political transi-
tion are rarely bastions of stability and
political moderation, as was evidenced
by Georgian President Saakashvili’s
clumsy and ill-fated attempts to provoke
Russia for domestic political gain. Le
increasing prevalence of semi-authori-
tarian regimes–those that adopt demo-
cratic practices, such as elections, along-
side authoritarian ones, such as one-
party rule–suggests that it is not clear
that liberal, multiparty democracy re-
mains the most attractive model of do-
mestic governance.

Not just democratic institutions,
but many of the major elements of the
postwar liberal order are being called
into question. The collapse of the latest
round of the Doha trade talks, for ex-
ample, raised doubts about the contin-
ued viability of the global trade regime.
The credibility of the United Nations
has been tarnished by recent peacekeep-
ing failures in Darfur and the Congo.
The nonproliferation treaty regime is
in crisis following North Korea’s test-
ing of a nuclear device and Iran’s con-
tinued intransigence over its nuclear
program. Russia has taken advantage
of its role as one of the world’s leading
oil and gas exporters to bully and in-
timidate its neighbors, while China
has proven willing to undermine global
human rights regimes to protect its eco-
nomic interests in Africa. Even the Unit-
ed States’ traditional allies in Europe ap-
pear reluctant to contribute to multilat-
eral efforts such as nato’s operations
in Afghanistan. In short, the spirit of ac-

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Dædalus Spring 2009

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Paul K.
MacDonald

commodation and multilateral coopera-
tion that Washington had encouraged
and exploited in the past appears in lim-
ited supply today. Recently, leading pow-
ers have approached core issues so diver-
gently that it is unlikely that the Obama
administration will be able to rebuild
quickly or easily the foundations of the
international system around a new mul-
tilateral consensus.

If the United States cannot retain its
leading position or easily reconstruct
the postwar liberal order, what options
does it possess? One possibility would
be for Washington to accept the erosion
of its hegemony and simply withdraw
from global affairs. But the short-term
challenges facing the United States, tel
as the worsening insurgency in Afghan-
istan, political instability in Pakistan,
and the Iranian nuclear crisis, limit the
attractiveness of a rapid retreat from
global affairs. En outre, just because
the United States will face a more com-
plicated and fractious international
environment does not mean that its
leadership will always be ineffective.
As Fareed Zakaria has argued, the chal-
lenge is not one of American decline,
but managing the “rise of the rest.”9
There may be distinct limits to Amer-
ican power in the future, en particulier dans
regions where new economic or mili-
tary rivals are increasing in strength.
But the United States will still be able
to work with these new regional pow-
ers on select issues of common interest.
By developing more robust bilater-
al economic and security relationships
with regional partners, the United States
can cultivate relationships that have the
potential to endure despite a weakening
of American economic and political in-
fluence. American foreign policy would,
as a result, move away from the urge to
reconstruct some grand liberal bargain
and instead focus on speci½c threats,

whether the proliferation of nuclear
weapons, instability in Iraq, terrorist
attacks launched by global jihadist net-
works such as Al Qaeda, or increased
Russian assertiveness. Such a policy
should be comprised of three core
principles. D'abord, the United States
must possess willingness to compro-
mise on issues of limited importance.
Washington should indeed continue
to draw bright lines with regard to in-
terests it considers vital to defend. Mais
by accepting and acquiescing to the pre-
rogatives of rising powers in areas of
minor importance, the United States
can signal its moderation while also
garnering more support on issues of
major importance. Deuxième, Washing-
ton should strive to restore its position
as a good faith broker in world politics,
rather than play the role of global po-
liceman or moral arbiter. In this con-
text, standing alliances and multilateral
institutions will be of less importance
than impromptu diplomacy arrange-
ments through which the United States
works with ad hoc coalitions of major
powers to resolve particular crises. Fi-
enfin, the United States must develop
the ability to anticipate new threats be-
fore they emerge and respond to them
in a flexible manner once they do–not
least of all for the bene½ts this sort of
preventative approach will yield in the
long run.

What might this alternative approach
look like in practice? Consider nuclear
proliferation, one of the top foreign
policy priorities of the new administra-
tion. The issue turns on whether the
emerging multipolar international sys-
tem should be one with only a handful
of nuclear powers, or one in which a sig-
ni½cant number of states, both great and
petit, possess nuclear arsenals. While all
of the major powers have an incentive to
avoid the proliferation of nuclear weap-

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ons, the inherent uncertainty and ambi-
guity of the emerging international en-
vironment create signi½cant incentives
for mid-range states or aspiring region-
al powers to embark on a nuclear weap-
ons program, or to hedge their bets by
acquiring the technical infrastructure
to construct a weapon if necessary. Dans
the past, the United States has met this
challenge through multilateral diploma-
cy, but the nonproliferation regime is
under serious strain. Non-nuclear weap-
ons states increasingly question wheth-
er the nuclear weapons states intend to
ful½ll their nonproliferation treaty obli-
gations, whether ensuring the supply of
peaceful nuclear technology as guaran-
teed by Article Four or working toward
eventual disarmament as required by Ar-
ticle Six. De plus, the recent cases of
North Korea and Iran have raised ques-
tions about the ability of the major pow-
ers to enforce the regime reliably and
equitably.

Rather than focusing solely on multi-
lateral solutions, the United States needs
to approach nonproliferation questions
on a case-by-case basis. Given the lim-
itations of the global nonproliferation
regime, Washington should instead seek
to work together with regional powers
and local allies to bring pressure on as-
piring proliferators. Such an approach
has produced modest success in the case
of North Korea and could be possible
with Iran, if the United States were to
engage seriously in diplomacy with Iran
instead of delegating that responsibility
to the European Union. De plus, le
United States should demonstrate great-
er flexibility in the types of bargains it
is willing to accept. Par exemple, là
may be very justi½able reasons to limit
the spread of enrichment and reprocess-
ing technology, but it may be impossible
to do so in each and every case. Wash-
ington should consider accepting com-

promises on access to the fuel cycle
for countries such as Iran. The United
States could allow a limited research-
scale enrichment program, provided
it could be coupled with a robust veri-
½cation regime. Not only would this
create possible ground for a long-term
compromise with Iran, it would also
generate international support for ag-
gressive action should Tehran divert
material to a weapons program. Final-
ly, the United States should consider
negotiating agreements outside of
the nonproliferation regime in appro-
priate cases. The recent bilateral U.S.-
India nuclear deal, Par exemple, était
criticized in some quarters for legiti-
mizing India’s nuclear program, lequel
was pursued outside of the multilater-
al treaty framework. While there are
certainly problems with the deal, surtout-
cially as it relates to U.S.-Pakistani re-
lations, the arrangement helps draw
New Delhi closer to Washington and
reaf½rms India’s general commitment
to nonproliferation. Washington might
even consider a similar bilateral agree-
ment with Pakistan, could it be tied to
important guarantees regarding the ex-
port of nuclear material and technolo-
gies.

There are similar opportunities to
develop tailored solutions to speci½c
policy challenges in other areas. In the
case of Iraq, Par exemple, the United
States reached an agreement with the
Iraqi government in November 2008
to draw down its combat forces over
the next three years, but it remains to
be seen whether this plan will produce
a stable regime or lead to a renewal of
sectarian violence. The answer is not
solely dependent upon politicians in
Baghdad: the policies adopted by Iraq’s
neighbors, such as Iran, Syria, Saudi
Arabia, and Turkey, matter, aussi. Wash-
ington should build upon bilateral talks

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Dædalus Spring 2009

119

Paul K.
MacDonald

it has previously held with foreign dip-
lomats in Baghdad and work toward a
formal agreement among the regional
powers that would commit Iraq’s neigh-
bors to policies designed to foster po-
litical stability during this critical tran-
sitional period. As in the case of man-
aging nuclear proliferation, this may re-
quire the United States to accept some
unsavory outcomes, such as a height-
ened degree of Iranian influence in
Iraq’s internal affairs. But this coopera-
tion is vital to achieve the more impor-
tant goal of the prevention of a renew-
al of sectarian violence, which would
threaten to draw Iraq’s neighbors into
a broader regional conflict.

De la même manière, much has been made of
Russia’s recent aggression against Geor-
gia and the possibility of a “new cold
war.” But the solution to rising tensions
with Russia lies in ½nding areas of com-
mon interest, and not in political brinks-
manship. To this end, the United States
should seek to accommodate Russian
interests in areas of minor importance
while articulating to Moscow the cost
of renewed competition. Par exemple,
as is presently being considered, le
Obama administration could seek to
arrange a deal with Moscow to cancel
the planned deployment of missile de-
fense systems to Eastern Europe in ex-
change for renewed progress on bilater-
al arms control. A similar compromise
could be struck on the planned expan-
sion of nato, with the United States
agreeing to moderate the scale or speed
of enlargement in exchange for a public
commitment from Russia to cease med-
dling in the internal affairs of countries
in the near abroad, such as Georgia and
Ukraine. Even while striving to be mod-
erate, Washington nevertheless should
be clear about what bright lines must not
be crossed, whether aggression against
allies or the coercive manipulation of

oil and gas shipments to Europe. Tel
a strategy will not transform Russia into
a friend or ally, and it is entirely likely
that Russia will continue to behave like
a regional bully. But given Russia’s in-
creasing power, the United States must
be modest in its goals. Occasional coop-
eration with Moscow on vital issues re-
lating to arms control may not lay the
groundwork for unending friendship,
but it can help moderate the conse-
quences of competition.

Moderating U.S. goals in the face of

a changing international environment
is especially important given the limits
of America’s military capabilities. Le
high operational tempo of the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan has degraded the
current capabilities of the U.S. military.
Nearly two-thirds of home active-duty
army brigades are rated as not ready for
service, largely because they lack the
equipment to train properly between
overseas deployments.10 Inhospitable
operating environments and lengthy
deployments have also contributed to
the decline in the reliability of hard-
ware and equipment, as well as soaring
maintenance costs. The army has also
had a dif½cult time retaining mid-career
of½cers and meeting elevated recruiting
goals.11 The cost of recruiting and re-
taining active-duty military personnel
has skyrocketed, both because of the
need to increase pay and because of ris-
ing health care expenses for veterans.12
Rebuilding America’s military capabil-
ities in the wake of these two conflicts
is an important priority for the new
administration.

Adding to this challenge, the Pentagon
is in the midst of an ambitious program
to transform the military.13 The navy is
committed to developing a new genera-
tion of surface ships, while the air force
is in the process of modernizing its fleet

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of tactical ½ghters and tanker aircraft.
Such efforts have been complicated,
cependant, by the fact that many of the
next-generation weapons systems have
been plagued by cost overruns and de-
lays. Par exemple, the army’s Future
Combat System is an estimated 48 par-
cent over budget and more than four
years behind schedule.14 This example
is not unique: since the end of the cold
war, the acquisition costs of major weap-
ons programs have increased an estimat-
éd 120 percent while the funding provid-
ed for these programs has increased only
57 percent.15 According to John Christie,
the inability of the military to continue
to ½nance its acquisition needs raises
the gloomy prospect that “the U.S. mil-
itary will cease being a signi½cant influ-
ence in world events because of a shrink-
ing force structure.”16 This impending
shortfall is even more alarming given the
rapid growth of military budgets in the
past eight years. Under the Bush admin-
istration, spending on defense almost
doubled, depuis $294 billion in fy 2000 to more than $647 billion in fy 2008.
Given a weak economy, shrinking tax
receipts, and a ballooning federal bud-
get de½cit, it is unlikely that the Obama
administration will be able to increase
the size of the Pentagon budget to meet
the escalating costs of defense acquisi-
tion.

Further complicating matters is the
uncertainty about what missions the
U.S. military will be asked to perform
in the coming years and whether the
Pentagon should focus on acquiring
new capabilities relevant to ½ghting ter-
rorists and insurgents or focus on mod-
ernizing weapons systems designed to
meet threats from potential state com-
petitors.17 The military could, in theory,
develop multiple competencies, inclure-
ing both counterinsurgency operations
and conventional maneuver warfare, à

meet these multifaceted challenges.
In practice, cependant, there are impor-
tant tradeoffs. Par exemple, the bur-
dens of the Iraq and Afghanistan oper-
ations have already eroded traditional
war-½ghting capabilities. A recent army
white paper estimates that more than
90 percent of soldiers in ½eld artillery
units are operating outside their occu-
pational specialties and thus are uncer-
ti½ed to perform their artillery support
role.18

The growing emphasis on ½ghting
insurgencies and unconventional wars
has also muddied defense acquisition.
Par exemple, the Pentagon has invest-
ed billions of dollars to develop and ac-
quire new surface ships that the navy
had claimed would enhance its ability
to support counterinsurgency missions
in inshore waters. Critics charge that
these new ships, which include the Zum-
walt-class “stealth” destroyer and the
Littoral Combat Ship, may be too large
to accomplish the inshore missions for
which they are intended, yet too vul-
nerable to contribute to the navy’s tra-
ditional mission of maintaining blue-
water supremacy. En effet, after an es-
timated $11 billion in research and de- velopment, the navy recently reversed course and recommended scaling back the Zumwalt destroyer program, citing evidence that these ships could not con- duct traditional blue-water missions such as area air defense and anti-subma- rine warfare.19 Thus, in the absence of clear direction, the Department of De- fense may ½nd that in an effort both to maintain a traditional war-½ghting capa- bility and to acquire the capabilities to meet new threats, it might end up with costly weapons systems that can do nei- ther. What type of military capabilities should the United States seek to rebuild Rebalancing American foreign policy l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / direct . m je t . / e d u d a e d a r t i c e – pd / l f / / / / / 1 3 8 2 1 1 5 1 8 2 9 6 2 3 d a e d 2 0 0 9 1 3 8 2 1 1 5 pd . . . . . f par invité 0 8 Septembre 2 0 2 3 Dædalus Spring 2009 121 Paul K. MacDonald in the period of diminished resources? The typical answer to this question be- gins by listing a number of expensive and allegedly irrelevant weapons sys- tems that should be cut. The usual sus- pects include Ballistic Missile Defense, the F/A-22 Raptor advanced ½ghter, the aforementioned Zumwalt-class de- stroyer, and the army’s Future Combat System. Assuming cuts to these speci½c weapons systems would be prudent, they make up only a relatively small portion of the defense budget. A recent report by the Institute for Policy Stud- ies recommended the elimination or re- duction of eleven different defense pro- gram areas, but the combined savings of these cuts would have been $48.7 bil-
lion–about 8 percent of total military
spending.20 While this is an important
start, policies to scale back unnecessary
systems and reform the acquisition pro-
cess alone are not durable solutions to
increased budgetary pressure.

Rather than simply tinker with exist-
ing programs, the United States needs
to rethink fundamentally what it hopes
to accomplish with its military forces in
the coming decades. Without any gen-
uine military competitor at this exact
moment, the United States misdirects
its resources by investing in expensive
weapons systems designed to ensure
dominance against every imaginable
adversary, everywhere around the globe.
En même temps, building a military
that is designed exclusively to combat
asymmetric threats posed by insurgents
and terrorist groups risks degrading the
ability of the United States to respond
to more assertive rising regional powers
in the medium to long term. Plutôt, un
force must be created that can respond
to the diversity of missions that will be
faced in the coming decades.

In doing so the military should seek
½rst to create a hybrid force capable of

meeting diverse threats across a variety
of areas of operations. Rather than train-
ing individual units broadly, the military
should allow for greater specialization
and the development of forces tailored
to meet speci½c challenges. En outre,
this force should consist of units that
are more tightly integrated across servic-
es and with civilian agencies. Individual
military branches should not be viewed
as isolated instruments and should be
coordinated more closely with all of the
elements of American power.

What might this look like in practice?
Take the U.S. Army, Par exemple. At the
moment, the army is focused on train-
ing units for “full-spectrum” operations,
whether counterinsurgency or tradition-
al high-intensity combat.21 However,
the expectation that individual units can
do everything is unrealistic, especially
when high operational tempo leaves
little time for training and has thinned
the ranks of skilled of½cers. This poli-
cy also encourages a “one force ½ts all”
approche, with only a single option
to meet any challenge. Going forward,
army leadership should consider pro-
posals to develop a more specialized
force consisting of a mix of units of dif-
ferent sizes, each with a different core
competency.22 Some units could be
tasked with preparing to ½ght conven-
tional wars against regional competitors
while others could train to perform non-
traditional tasks such as counterinsur-
gency or post-conflict reconstruction.
In developing this specialized force, le
army should focus on improving the par-
ticular skills of its soldiers, plutôt que
the technological sophistication of their
armored vehicles. Advanced technology
is no substitute for soldiers who can in-
terface effectively with a local popula-
tion. To this end, the army should con-
tinue to invest in developing critical lan-
guage skills and in expanding training

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for non-combat roles, including military
advisors and reconstruction teams. À
the same time, the army cannot become
too intellectually focused on any one re-
gion or any one particular threat. In an
unpredictable world, with multiple re-
gional powers, the army must be special-
ized for particular roles but not overly
speci½c.

There are similar opportunities in the

other military branches. The air force
needs to develop a correspondingly hy-
brid force that is not simply dominat-
ed by advanced tactical ½ghter aircraft.
Developing advanced airlift capabilities
to move American forces quickly to hot
spots is a pressing need, as is meeting
the growing demand for unmanned aeri-
al vehicles to support counterinsurgen-
cy and counterterrorism missions. Simi-
larly, despite occasional rhetorical state-
ments to the contrary, the navy remains
committed to a blue-water fleet organ-
ized around the carrier strike group. Giv-
en the potential threats posed by subma-
rines and anti-ship cruise missiles to ex-
pensive platforms such as aircraft carri-
ers, there may be reasons to shift empha-
sis toward a more diverse fleet with sur-
face ships capable of operating in a vari-
ety of different contests, including hos-
tile and contested waters closer in-
shore.23

To a certain extent these recommen-
dations echo those made by Secretary
of Defense Robert Gates, who in a re-
cent Foreign Affairs article encouraged
the United States to develop a “better
balance in the portfolio of capabilities
it has” and to “institutionalize capabili-
ties such as counterinsurgency and for-
eign military assistance.”24 This is an
important step in the right direction.
Over the long term, cependant, the mili-
tary must go beyond simply shifting
priorities. The distinction between the
services is becoming increasingly obso-

lete; operations on land, at sea, et
in the air are not easily separated from
one another. In the short term, the four
branches need to work more closely
with each other to increase the effec-
tiveness of military operations, what-
ever their speci½c purpose. Over the
long terme, the military should move to-
ward an integrated force divided more
by specialized role than by branch or
service.25 One could imagine the devel-
opment of standing forces with integrat-
ed components: a counterinsurgency
rapid reaction force consisting not sim-
ply of army trainers and advisors, mais
also of air force unmanned aerial vehi-
cles to provide intelligence and navy
vessels to interdict arms smuggling
and combat piracy in littoral waters.

Enfin, the United States should pro-
mote greater coordination between the
military and civilian agencies, especial-
ly in the context of counterinsurgency
and nation-building efforts. A promis-
ing model is the Provincial Reconstruc-
tion Team, ½rst used in Afghanistan,
in which a small military contingent
works closely with civilian experts and
host government representatives to en-
courage governance, provide security,
and deliver targeted assistance to a local
population.26 Going forward, the mili-
tary should formalize this cooperation,
encouraging the development of units
tasked for nation-building and advisory
missions in which there is a dedicated
civilian contribution.27 By combining
hard and soft power, the United States
can maintain its influence despite con-
straints on available resources.

The United States is at a crossroads in

its foreign and national security policy.
The national security challenges are ex-
tensive while the capabilities available
to meet them are under severe strain.
New political and economic powers are

Rebalancing
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Dædalus Spring 2009

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Paul K.
MacDonald

emerging across a variety of regions,
and the United States can no longer
be assured of unrivaled power and
influence. These trends suggest that
Washington cannot wield its power in-
discriminately in pursuit of ambiguous
and wide-ranging goals. Plutôt, it must
marshal its limited means to accomplish
speci½c goals in vital areas, working in
conjunction with long-standing allies,
emerging powers, even potential ene-
mies. To help accomplish these limit-
ed goals, the U.S. military must become
a much different institution. It can no
longer remain a collection of branches
dedicated to ½ghting large-scale conven-
tional wars against rival states, but must
transform itself into a hybrid force that
can meet specialized challenges in a di-
verse and chaotic world in coordination
with its civilian counterparts.

Observers have anticipated Ameri-
ca’s decline numerous times before and
have been proven wrong: just think of
the military rebuilding itself in the after-
math of Vietnam or following post–cold
war trimming of the defense budget. Mais
the argument presented here is not an-
other simple, overly pessimistic exercise

in what Samuel Huntington has called
“declinism.”28 The rise of new region-
al powers has not eliminated America’s
influence; it has simply attenuated and
complicated it. The wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan have not destroyed Amer-
ican military power; they have simply
exposed certain limits to its effective
application. But while it would be a
mistake to prophesy the imminent de-
cline and fall of America in the world,
it would be just as erroneous to engage
in American triumphalism. There is
no more certain way to accentuate the
limits in American power or to acceler-
ate the erosion of American influence
than by adopting policies designed to
prolong American dominance. Dans ce
respect, the United States is its own
worst enemy. As evidenced by the com-
plications in Iraq and Afghanistan, avec
great power comes the opportunity to
make great mistakes. By moderating its
ends and relying on specialized means,
the United States can be prepared for
whatever uncertainties await it in the
coming decades while acclimating it-
self to a world where it has much to
lose and little to gain.

ENDNOTES
1 I would like to thank Stacie Goddard, Mike Glosny, Joe Parent, James McAllister, and Alex
Montgomery for their helpful comments. Any errors are my own.
2 B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: Manchot, 1991), 321; see also Richard K. Betts, “Is
Strategy an Illusion?” International Security 25 (2) (Autumn 2000): 5.
3 maison Blanche, National Security Strategy of the United States (Mars 2006), 1.
4 See White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Février 2003), 1; and White
Maison, Progress Report on the Global War on Terrorism (Septembre 2003), 2.
5 Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2007 (Avril 2008), 267–268.
6 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Septembre
2002), 30.
7 Voir, Par exemple, Robert A. Pape, “Empire Falls,” The National Interest (January/February
2009).
8 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World (Novembre
2008), vi.

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9 Fareed Zakaria, “The Future of American Power: How America Can Survive the Rise of
the Rest,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2008).

10 Andrew Feickert, “U.S. Army and Marine Corps Equipment Requirements: Background
and Issues for Congress,” crsReport for Congress (Décembre 20, 2006), 8-dix, 22–23.
11 Government Accountability Of½ce, “Military Personnel: Preliminary Observation on Re-
cruiting and Retention Issues within the U.S. Armed Forces” (Mars 16, 2005), 6–8.
12 Between fy 1999 and fy 2005, the per-service-member cost grew by 33 percent above in-
flation. Pat Towell, Stephen Daggett, and Amy Belasco, “Defense: fy2008 Authorization
and Appropriations,” crsReport for Congress (Janvier 23, 2008), 15.

13 See Richard K. Betts, “A Disciplined Defense: How to Regain Strategic Solvency,” Foreign

Affaires (November/December 2007).

14 Government Accountability Of½ce, “Defense Acquisitions: Major Weapons Systems Con-
tinue to Experience Cost and Schedule Problems under DoD’s Revised Policy” (Avril
2006), 9-dix.

15 Government Accountability Of½ce, “Defense Acquisitions: Better Weapon Program Out-
comes Require Discipline, Accountability, and Fundamental Changes in the Acquisition
Environment” (Juin 3, 2008), 3.

16 John D. Christie, “DoD on a Glide Path to Bankruptcy,” Proceedings of the United States

Naval Institute 134 (2008): 23.

17 See Michele A. Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, “The Defense Inheritance: Challenges and

Choices for the Next Pentagon Team,” Washington Quarterly 31 (4) (Autumn 2008): 59–76.

18 Sean MacFarland, Michael Shields, Jeffrey Snow, “The King and I: The Impending Cri-
sis in Field Artillery’s Ability to Provide Fire Support to Maneuver Commanders” (U.S.
Army, 2008).

19 Mackenzie M. Eaglen, “Changing Course on Navy Shipbuilding: Questions Congress
Should Ask Before Funding,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder (Octobre 7, 2008), 3–4.
20 Institute for Policy Studies, A Uni½ed Security Budget for the United States, fy2009 (Septem-

ber 2008), 21–26.

21 U.S. Army, Army Posture Statement: A Campaign Quality Army with Join and Expeditionary

Capabilities (Février 26, 2008), 14.

22 For various speci½c proposals, see Congressional Budget Of½ce, Options for Restructuring

the Army (May 2005).

23 For a similar proposal, see W. P.. Hughes, Jr., “A Bimodal Strategy for the National Mar-

itime Strategy,” Naval War College Review 60 (2) (Spring 2007): 29–47.

24 Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,»

Foreign Affairs (January/February 2009).

25 Voir, Par exemple, various proposals in Andrew R. Hoehn, Adam Grissom, Donne la vie. Och-

manek, Donne la vie. Shlapak, and Alan J. Vick, A New Division of Labor: Meeting America’s Secu-
rity Challenges Beyond Iraq (Santa Monica: rand Corporation, 2007), esp. 51–59.

26 See discussion in Michael J. McNerney, “Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan:

Are prts a Model or a Muddle?” Parameters (Hiver 2005/06): 32–46.

27 For initial efforts, see Thomas Baltazar and Elisabeth Kvitashvili, “The Role of usaid and

Development Assistance in Combating Terrorism,” Military Review 87 (2) (2007).
28 Samuel P. Huntington, “The U.S.–Decline or Renewal?” Foreign Affairs (Hiver 1988/

1989).

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