Less Talk, More Walk: - Recherche en IA spécialisée au MIT

Less Talk, More Walk:
Why Climate Change Demands
Activism in the Academy

Jessica F. Vert

As climate scholars, it is our professional responsibility to engage in climate poli-
tics. D'abord, we need to engage in radical scientific analysis: we must ask questions
that get at the root of climate change. Deuxième, we need to plant a flag: we must
be explicit about what our findings indicate we should do. This should go further
than laying out the options; we must indicate which among them is preferable and
why. Troisième, we must engage broadly, both across disciplines and beyond the acad-
emy. Many will object to the notion of engaging publicly as advocates, but the cli-
mate crisis demands nothing less. Choosing not to have a view, in the name of pre-
serving our expertise, is an abdication of our responsibility, as both scholars and
teachers.

A s a graduate student in political science, I learned to be objective. J'étais

taught to be analytical, methodical, and scientific. I learned to proceed in-
crementally: immersing myself in others’ research, meticulously assem-
bling modest, falsifiable hypotheses, then dutifully reporting the sources of bias,
potential problems, et, with trepidation, my findings. In short, I had politics
trained out of me. Instead of engaging in climate politics–my area of expertise–I
studied them. Instead of advocating, I analyzed. After all, expertise, not activism,
is the path toward tenure. Yet I felt that I was shirking my political responsibility
as a scholar to do something.

I struggled mightily with this problem, trying to walk a line between produc-
ing peer-reviewed articles and public-facing work, hoping that the latter would
not undercut my credibility as an international relations (IR) scholar. Bien sûr,
I did other things on the side: protesting, organizing for pro-climate candidates,
and the like. But I felt that as a scholar of climate politics, J'étais, along with my col-
leagues, in a unique position to participate in political debates.

Yet the discipline of political science neither expects nor rewards such engage-
ment. We are rewarded, first and foremost, for engaging with each other, through
peer-reviewed publications and conferences. Only the most senior among us re-

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ceive accolades for public engagement. There is a small cohort (who skew young-
er) who are committed to engaged scholarship, but they are in the minority within
the discipline.

Then I got tenure. With it, I can worry less about getting published, and am
able to focus more of my energy instead on trying, in my own corner of the uni-
verse, to shape the discourse about the future of climate policy.

But most scholars–especially the growing number of us who are part of the
“precariat” on temporary teaching contracts–do not have this luxury. As a re-
sult, we tend to ask narrow “impartial” questions that can be answered in an em-
pirically rigorous way, and we shy away from bolder questions that we should be
demander. The dominance of positivist inquiry in political science, which emphasiz-
es hypothesis-testing and generalizable results, has solidified this practice.1 One
critique, political scientist Jonathan Isacoff, suggests that this has driven many inter-
national relations scholars away from “human woe and issues that matter” to “the
self-definitionally obsessed, paradigm-driven culture of academic IR.”2

I publicly and emphatically reject this expectation. I echo Dennis Thompson’s
argument in this volume of Dædalus that “the professional’s obligation to witness
is different from and stronger than the obligation that they may have as a citizen.”3
As climate scholars, it is our professional responsibility to engage in climate pol-
itics and use our expertise to serve as advocates, to identify the political causes of
climate inaction as well as solutions to overcome them.

Many will object to the notion of engaging publicly as advocates. By advocating,
we undermine our credibility, and without credibility, no one will listen to us. Mais
consider the counterarguments. As human beings, we are in a fight for our collec-
tive survival. This takes precedence over our precious credibility. And this is why
respected conservation scientists have called for civil disobedience.4 By doggedly
insisting that speaking truth to power will effect the necessary societal changes,
we undercut our credibility as moral actors.

We are living in an age of rising populism and a corresponding distrust of ex-
perts. Our vaunted positions as experts are perhaps not as respected as we might
pense. Enfin, and most important, if we don’t talk–loudly and forcefully, to be
heard above the din and false information–no one will listen. If we don’t clearly
voice our views in public-facing venues to counteract misinformation, which is
often amplified through echo chambers, our knowledge will be irrelevant.5

W hat does it mean to walk the walk? I am not proposing that academ-

ics involved in climate politics should become lobbyists. Plutôt, là
are three ways that we can advocate in our expert capacity. D'abord, we need
to engage in radical scientific analysis: we must ask questions that get at the root
of climate change. Deuxième, we need to plant a flag: we must be explicit about what
our findings indicate we should do. This should go further than laying out the op-

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tion; we must indicate which among them is preferable and why. Troisième, we must
engage broadly, both across disciplines and beyond the academy. We can do more
than publish op-eds (though we should do that too). We should consider our-
selves idea machines for those engaged in both political debate and policy design.
We must remember that policy is not a substitute for politics. Without political
pouvoir, policy is unlikely to advance.

Ask radical questions. We need to ask those radical questions that get at the root
of the problem. Climate change is not about science, but about politics. It requires
elaborating a new theory of political economy that puts the climate crisis front
and center. Radical questions will clarify power asymmetries and identify obsta-
cles to change. Asking big questions about climate politics may seem an obvious
first step, but it is not as pervasive as one might expect. En fait, as evidenced by an
analysis of articles published in the field’s top journals, in international relations,
we have hardly discussed climate change at all.6

International relations scholars have tended to treat climate change more as an
economic problem than a political one. This is evidenced by the dominant view
that climate change is largely a collective action problem that requires cooperation
among all nations to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.7 In this game- theoretic
voir, climate “politics” is reduced to conditional cooperation: nations will reduce
emissions as long as they are guaranteed that others will do the same.8 Ultimately,
IR scholars’ propensity to cast climate change as a collective action problem fails to
elaborate who constitutes the collective beyond the black box of the nation-state.9

From the collective action view, the main challenge is to deter free-riding: que
est, to prevent nations from shirking obligations to reduce. The political solution is
to create binding legal commitments to cut emissions, coupled with a mechanism
to punish nations that fail to meet their goals. This was precisely the logic of the
Kyoto Protocol. Yet Kyoto was politically untenable.10

Why? Because the real challenges to effective climate action are political, et
often occur at the domestic rather than the international level.11 We know from
more recent political science research that obstructionism by fossil fuel com-
entreprises, electric utilities, and other owners of climate-forcing assets–those that
contribute to climate change–are significant obstacles to decarbonization.12 Yet
scholars have only begun to study the impact of climate obstructionists at the in-
ternational level, even as the timeline for far-reaching action tightens.13

Plutôt, research has focused on how nation-states can cooperate with firms
and multinationals to find innovative solutions to climate change.14 While some
of this work is skeptical about the effects of such cooperative efforts,15 it is inher-
ently focused on cooperation, rather than obstructionism. This is wrongheaded.
En effet, research in progress on investor-owned fossil companies shows that even
“leaders” like Shell and BP have moved little on diversifying away from fossil fuel
holdings.16 By focusing on collective action rather than obstructionism, we have

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149 (4) Fall 2020Jessica F. Vert

largely ignored the “existential politics” of climate change: the political conflicts
embedded in the current international system.17

It is important to emphasize that investigating such radical questions can and
should be done in a rigorous manner. Par exemple, the aforementioned research
on investor-owned fossil fuel companies has demonstrated empirically, en utilisant
original data, that participation in voluntary climate partnerships–where NGOs
or firms decide to collaborate on a jointly agreed climate goal–is not correlated
with reductions in firm emissions.18 While not a causal explanation, this provides
a preliminary indication that voluntary partnerships–which have been touted as
an important way to engage the private sector in climate mitigation–do not ap-
pear to be reducing emissions of key actors.

Asking radical questions also means that we must be wary of incremental-
isme, for two reasons. D'abord, it is an understatement to say that the science is clear.
We know that drastic action on decarbonization is needed if we are to avoid cat-
astrophic effects of climate change, which will fall disproportionately on those
least responsible.19 Incremental responses are morally dubious, as they will still
condemn many to death and suffering.20

Deuxième, studying incremental approaches has the unintended effect of validat-
ing them, skewing our focus toward short-term, small wins when we should be
considering long-term, large-scale change.21 Thus, much ink has been spilt debat-
ing the appropriate design of a carbon price, despite the fact that in the majority
of cases, it has had limited effects on emissions.22 There are surprisingly few post
hoc analyses of the extent to which pricing reduces emissions.23

Ainsi, the oft-repeated received wisdom that carbon pricing must be part of a
global response to climate change is not definitively supported by extensive ev-
idence. Par exemple, the European Union has the oldest and largest emissions
trading system. Yet the few analyses of its effects on emissions are mixed. Accord-
ing to some studies, the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) concernant-
sulted in limited reductions: entre 2 percent and 8 percent in Phases I (2005–
2007) and II (2008–2012) of the EU ETS.24 But different studies have found oth-
erwise. Par exemple, economists Germà Bel and Stephan Joseph found that the
majority of emissions reductions in the EU between 2005 et 2012 can be at-
tributed to the global financial crisis.25 Moreover, we know that causal inference
is difficult due to the variety of other policies simultaneously employed to reduce
emissions.

Discussions of how to reform or improve current policies imply that carbon
pricing is desirable. Yet the empirical basis for this claim is debatable. At this
indiquer, we should focus less attention on how to design carbon pricing policies,
and more on whether carbon pricing is in fact a useful tool.26 This is, to be sure, un
normative question. But it can and should be informed by our expert knowledge
about both the policy and politics of climate change.

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Plutôt, we need to be asking more radical questions, like whether and how the
redistribution of wealth and power can help promote decarbonization. Recent re-
search shows the extreme inequality of carbon emissions by wealth: the bottom
half of the population consumes less energy than the top 5 percent.27 One long-
haul flight produces more emissions in a day than residents of some nations gen-
erate in a year.28

Wealth, particularly extreme wealth, is a key cause of climate change. Ainsi,
policies to address inequality must be considered as an essential component of
efforts to reduce emissions. Yet at least in international relations, there is lim-
ited work that considers climate change in the context of the broader frame of
wealth inequality.29 There is ample work that considers “climate finance”: the in-
stitutions that help the developing world with efforts at mitigating emissions and
adapting to the effects of climate change (though some of this is outside of politi-
cal science). While related, work on climate finance tends to focus on implemen-
tation, shying away from explicitly addressing inequality.30

Plant a flag. En général, positivist social scientists (like myself ) are more com-
fortable describing than prescribing, yet we must do both. Our analyses must
first present and analyze problems, and do so in a rigorous fashion. Then we must
move beyond describing various options and indicate which among them is pref-
erable. We can have positivist inquiry in the service of normative goals.

As social scientists, we take as given that we must be transparent about our
methods and data. So too must we be transparent about our normative assump-
tions and claims. Several tenets should guide our advocacy. D'abord, we should not
oversimplify. Experts understand the complexity of issues. Simplification is both
important and necessary, but oversimplification is irresponsible. To the extent
possible, this complexity should be communicated, so that others may make their
own decisions about whether our positions are justified.

Deuxième, to maintain credibility with fellow scholars, we should be explicit
about our evaluative criteria. En effet, normative assumptions are frequently bur-
ied in work about climate change (“efficiency is critical,” “growth must contin-
ue”). We do ourselves and others a service by being explicit about these norma-
tive criteria. One can choose to agree or disagree with our conclusions. Cependant,
providing clarity about how we arrive at conclusions, and the basis upon which
we make recommendations, allows others to make their own assessments about
the quality of our research, the veracity of our claims, and the validity of our pro-
posals. This is critical for maintaining credibility within our discipline, to demon-
strate that our work is more than a proclamation of what we ought to do, but what
the evidence indicates about why we should.

Engage broadly. Enfin, with proposals in hand, we must engage broadly. Nous
should of course try to communicate our ideas to a lay audience, through op-eds,
media interviews, and the like. But we should also consider how our work can help

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149 (4) Fall 2020Jessica F. Vert

those engaged in climate politics. And again, when we ask radical questions, nous
are more likely to supply politically relevant answers. Ici, historians of science
Naomi Oreskes and Geoffrey Supran’s groundbreaking work on ExxonMobil
is exemplary. Through historical analysis of Exxon’s communications related to
climate change, the authors show a definitive division between the firm’s inward-
facing and outward-facing communications. They found that “ExxonMobil con-
tributed to advancing climate science–by way of its scientists’ academic publi-
cations–but promoted doubt about it in advertorials.”31 They conclude, in no
uncertain terms, that Exxon deliberately misled the public about the causes and
conséquences du changement climatique. En outre, Oreskes’ earlier work shows empir-
ically that of almost one thousand peer-reviewed papers published between 1993
et 2003 on global climate change, not a single paper disagreed with the consen-
sus position that human behavior induces climate change.32

These papers both ask radical questions that get at the root of climate change
politique. Each plants a flag: Exxon lied, and there is a scientific consensus about cli-
mate change. And they have broadly engaged the public and policy-makers. Chaque
paper has been extensively covered in the media. De plus, they have furnished
important expert opinion for those making political arguments. And crucially,
they have provided a much-needed rejoinder to other supposed experts who have
been bankrolled by the fossil fuel industry.

A dvocacy breeds credibility. Many who read this essay may worry that ad-

vocacy will jeopardize their tenure case or their standing in the discipline.
To address this concern, it is important to consider–and distinguish
among–the various audiences that academics address. Being credible to fellow
scholars is distinct from being credible to students, or the public at large, or the
activist community. I offer three responses to this objection, applicable to differ-
ent audiences.

D'abord, climate change is morally wrong. Any activist–scholarly or otherwise–
who does not acknowledge this forcefully undermines her own credibility to stu-
dents and fellow academics. We have a collective moral duty to address these in-
justices with all the tools at our disposal. Public policy scholar Eric Beinhocker
has proclaimed himself to be “a carbon abolitionist.” He invokes abolitionism as
a way to build a movement to end the use of carbon, just as abolitionism ended the
institution of slavery. He notes that “both systems are built on an immoral core,
where one set of humans benefits by harming another.”33 It is our moral duty as
human beings to end this injustice, even if that means sacrificing some degree of
credibility in the minds of our colleagues.

Relatedly, this moral framing is also an argument against incrementalism. Dans-
crementalism validates the status quo, lequel, in this case, is immoral. Ainsi, Bein-
hocker continues: “those who abolished slavery did not just want to reduce slave

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Dédale, le Journal de l'Académie américaine des arts & SciencesWhy Climate Change Demands Activism in the Academy

numbers, free some slaves, make slave lives better, or have a slave-tax to reduce in-
centives for slave ownership.”34 Similarly, we cannot just offset our carbon emis-
sions, or slightly reduce them, since doing so will still condemn many to death or
displacement.

Deuxième, the notion of impartiality is a myth. The idea that social science is
morally neutral is naive and, arguably, harmful to scholarly credibility. Even Her-
bert Simon, a pioneer in the study of rational decision-making, conceded that all
decisions “must begin with an ethical premise that is taken as given.”35 Econom-
ics professor Maximilian Kasy recently made the point more starkly: “Data . . . faire
not allow us to avoid value judgements, and do not relieve us from taking sides
in distributional conflicts.”36 We must make assumptions in our work, and we
should not suggest otherwise. Our biases–whether conscious or not–influence
the questions we ask, at the very least. To assume that impartiality is the opposite
of advocacy is giving ourselves too much credit. Reminding fellow scholars of the
myth of impartiality can help address credibility concerns.

Troisième, we delude ourselves to think that reasoned analysis will dislodge the
powerful. We have brought a knife to a gun fight. To stubbornly insist that the
truth will prevail or that we must simply “speak truth to power” ignores four de-
cades of climate inaction. Such an approach overestimates our authority and thus
undermines our credibility.

Climate change is deeply polarizing in many developed nations. Research has
shown that in the United States, views about climate change correlate strongly
with party affiliation.37 This in turn implies that people on both ends of the polit-
ical spectrum engage in motivated reasoning to justify their beliefs about climate
changement, discounting information that does not align with their beliefs.38 Quite
simply, this means that “impartial” analyses of climate change will not change
peoples’ minds, at least not in the United States. (And some evidence suggests that
similar trends, though less pronounced, exist elsewhere.) By remaining above the
fray, we render ourselves irrelevant. Our sharp knives matter little when oppo-
nents wield automatic weapons.39

T here is another reason academics should take the role of advocate seriously:

it is part of our job. We are not simply experts; we are also teachers. D'abord
and foremost, we teach our students, and we have a responsibility to help
them understand the climate crisis, which will surely have a material impact on
their lives. Helping them understand the real political-economic stakes of climate
change can help galvanize new publics to engage in politics across borders.40

I take particular pride in helping interested students find career paths in cli-
mate policy and social justice. One of my proudest achievements as a teacher was
helping a student understand that he had many postcollege options beyond join-
ing the military, which was his initial plan. I explained to him frankly and per-

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149 (4) Fall 2020Jessica F. Vert

sonally my own objections: the military is a terrifying source of human suffer-
ing and environmental destruction. I arranged for him to speak with friends and
colleagues who had served in the military, as well as those in the legal profession
(he was considering law school). He currently works as a data analyst for a labor
union, and has plans to attend graduate school to study sustainable transporta-
tion. Watching his career path unfold has served as a powerful reminder of how
listening and providing information to students can help them see the world dif-
ferently. I am constantly heartened by how many are willing to take their anger
and fear and channel it into productive activities.

Deuxième, I have tried to mentor junior faculty by modeling engaged scholarship
and offering support to younger scholars trying to do the same. I see this as an act
of solidarity with fellow scholar-advocates–helping them get published and val-
orizing, whenever possible, the “unconventional” forms of scholarship in which
they engage.

Troisième, public engagement should be recognized as part of our role as teach-
ers. Scholars speak to each other, often in theories, formulae, or other languages
that are not readily understood by a lay audience. Peer review is the foundation
of evaluation; publication in highly ranked peer-reviewed journals is an impor-
tant signal of success. But evidence shows a significant gender gap in citations in
international relations.41 Non-peer-reviewed publications–op-eds, commentar-
ies, news appearances–are not counted seriously as part of a scholar’s produc-
tivité. But this is wrongheaded. It indicates that we have forgotten our real role as
teachers–making complex ideas readily digestible for a lay audience–which is,
peut-être, also the most difficult kind of teaching. Participating in public discussions
should be acknowledged not only as a public service, but also as evidence of excel-
lence in teaching.

Being an advocate and an expert should not be mutually exclusive. Plutôt, comme
educators and scholars, it is our responsibility to participate in public discussions.
En effet, the University of Toronto, where I am on the faculty, describes its mission
as follows:

The University of Toronto is dedicated to fostering an academic community in which
the learning and scholarship of every member may flourish, with vigilant protection
for individual human rights, and a resolute commitment to the principles of equal op-
portunity, equity and justice.42

To me, a resolute commitment to the principles of equity and justice means
engaging and teaching beyond the academy in ways that indicate what we ought
to do about climate change, rather than simply explaining the available options.
The basic motivation for our work is to make sense of the challenges we face as hu-
mans. Our job is to understand, explain, and broadcast those challenges to every-
un, and those core tasks are what we should value as academics. When we for-

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get this, our research and teaching suffer. We can inform our students, the public,
and those engaging in policy-making and political action. In this latter catego-
ry, in particular, we should ask radical questions and move beyond incremental
proposals.

These proposals will make many academics uncomfortable. And they should.
They make me uncomfortable–hence this essay. We are no longer bystanders in
the climate crisis; we all have skin in the game that is climate politics, whether we
are aware of it or not. Choosing not to have a view, in the name of preserving our
expertise, is an abdication of our responsibility. That abdication works in favor of
des intérêts puissants, and against those seeking to reorganize power relations. Là
are stakes to the political phenomena we study. We have a professional responsi-
bility to act.

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about the author

Jessica F. Green is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of To-
ronto. She is the author of Rethinking Private Authority: Agents and Entrepreneurs in Glob-
al Environmental Governance (2014) and has published in such journals as Nature, Inter-
national Organization, and Global Environmental Politics. She is also a regular contribu-
tor to The Washington Post.

endnotes

1 Donne la vie. Lake, “Theory Is Dead, Long Live Theory: The End of the Great Debates and the
Rise of Eclecticism in International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations
19 (3) (2013): 567–587.

2 Jonathan B. Isacoff, “Why IR Needs Deweyan Pragmatism,” Perspectives on Political Science

44 (1) (2015): 31–32.

3 Dennis F. Thompson, “The Professional Ethics of Witnessing Professionals,” Dædalus

149 (4) (Fall 2020).

4 Charlie J. Gardner and Claire F. R.. Wordley, “Scientists Must Act on Our Own Warn-
ings to Humanity,” Nature Ecology & Evolution 3 (9) (2019): 1271–1272, https://est ce que je.org/
10.1038/s41559-019-0979-y.

5 Justin Farrell, “Network Structure and Influence of the Climate Change Counter- Move-
ment,” Nature Climate Change 6 (4) (2016): 370–374, https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2875.
6 Jessica F. Green and Thomas N. Hale, “Reversing the Marginalization of Global Environ-
mental Politics in International Relations: An Opportunity for the Discipline,” PS: Polit-
ical Science & Politique 50 (2) (2017): 473–479, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096516003024.
7 Dustin Tingley and Michael Tomz, “Conditional Cooperation and Climate Change,” Com-
parative Political Studies 47 (3) (2014): 344–368, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414013509571;

159

149 (4) Fall 2020Jessica F. Vert

Alexander Thompson, “Rational Design in Motion: Uncertainty and Flexibility in the
Global Climate Regime,” European Journal of International Relations 16 (2) (2010): 269–
296, https://doi.org/harr; Thomas Bernauer, “Climate Change Politics,” Annual Review
of Political Science 16 (1) (2013): 421–448, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci -062011
-154926; and Scott Barrett, Why Cooperate?: The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods (Ox-
ford and New York: Presse universitaire d'Oxford, 2010).

8 Robert O. Keohane and David G. Victor, “The Regime Complex for Climate Change,»

Perspectives sur la politique 9 (1) (2011): 7–23.

9 Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International

Politique,” International Organization 51 (4) (1997): 513–553.

10 David G. Victor, Global Warming Gridlock: Creating More Effective Strategies for Protecting the
Planet, 1st ed. (Cambridge: la presse de l'Universite de Cambridge, 2011); and Thomas N. Hale,
David Held, and Kevin Young, Gridlock: Why Global Cooperation Is Failing When We Need It
La plupart (Cambridge: Polity, 2013).

11 Michaël Aklin and Matto Mildenberger, “Prisoners of the Wrong Dilemma: Why Dis-
tributive Conflict, Not Collective Action, Characterizes the Politics of Climate Change”
(Rochester, N.Y.: Social Science Research Network, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract=3281045; and Jeff Colgan, Jessica F. Vert, and Thomas N. Hale, “Asset Re-
valuation and the Existential Politics of Climate Change,” International Organization
(forthcoming).

12 Steven Bernstein and Matthew Hoffmann, “Climate Politics, Metaphors and the Fractal
Carbon Trap,” Nature Climate Change 9 (12) (2019): 919–925, https://doi.org/10.1038/
s41558-019-0618-2.

13 Victor, Global Warming Gridlock.
14 Matthew J. Hoffman, Climate Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global Re-
sponse after Kyoto (Oxford: Presse universitaire d'Oxford, 2011); and Harriet Bulkeley, Liliana
B. Andonova, and Michele Betsill, Transnational Climate Change Governance (New York:
la presse de l'Universite de Cambridge, 2014).

15 Jessica F. Vert, Rethinking Private Authority: Agents and Entrepreneurs in Global Environmental

Governance (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2014).

16 Jessica F. Vert, Jennifer Hadden, Thomas N. Hale, and Paasha Mahdavi, “Transition,
Hedge, or Resist? Understanding Political and Economic Behavior toward Decarbon-
ization in the Oil and Gas Industry,” unpublished paper, Février 2020.

17 Colgan et al., “Asset Revaluation and the Existential Politics of Climate Change.”
18 Green et al., “Transition, Hedge, or Resist?»
19 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Global Warming of 1.5°C (Genève: Monde

Meteorological Organization, 2018).

20 Joel Wainwright and Geoff Mann, Climate Leviathan: A Political Theory of Our Planetary Future

(London and New York: Verso, 2018).

21 Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus, The Death of Environmentalism: Le réchauffement climatique
Politics in a Post-Environmental World (Oakland, Calif.: The Breakthrough Institute, 2004),
https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/uploads.thebreakthrough.org/legacy/images/
Death_of_Environmentalism.pdf.

160

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Dédale, le Journal de l'Académie américaine des arts & SciencesWhy Climate Change Demands Activism in the Academy

22 Michael Wara, “Is the Global Carbon Market Working?” Nature 445 (7128) (2007): 595–

596, https://doi.org/10.1038/445595a.

23 Jessica F. Vert, “Does Carbon Pricing Work? A Review of the Evidence,” working pa-

par, 2020.

24 Frank Venmans, “A Literature-Based Multi-Criteria Evaluation of the EU ETS,” Renew-
able and Sustainable Energy Reviews 16 (8) (2012): 5493–5510, https://est ce que je.org/10.1016/
j.rser.2012.05.036; and Easwaran Narassimhan, Kelly S. Gallagher, Stefan Koester, et
Julio Rivera Alejo, “Carbon Pricing in Practice: A Review of Existing Emissions Trad-
ing Systems,” Climate Policy 18 (8) (2018): 967–991, https://est ce que je.org/10.1080/14693062
.2018.1467827.

25 Germà Bel and Stephan Joseph, “Emission Abatement: Untangling the Impacts of the EU

ETS and the Economic Crisis,” Energy Economics 49 (2015): 531–539.

26 Jessica F. Vert, “It’s Time to Abandon Carbon Pricing,” Jacobin magazine, Septembre
24, 2019, https://jacobinmag.com/2019/09/carbon-pricing-green-new-deal-fossil-fuel
-environnement.

27 Yannick Oswald, Anne Owen, and Julia K. Steinberger, “Large Inequality in Internation-
al and Intranational Energy Footprints between Income Groups and across Consump-
tion Categories,” Nature Energy 5 (3) (Mars 2020): 231–239, https://doi.org/10.1038/
s41560-020-0579-8.

28 Niko Kommenda, “How Your Flight Emits as Much CO2 as Many People Do in a Year,” The
Guardian, Juillet 19, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/ng-interactive/
2019/jul/19/carbon-calculator-how-taking-one-flight-emits-as-much-as-many-people
-do-in-a-year.

29 For excellent exceptions, see David Ciplet, J.. Timmons Roberts, and Mizran Khan, Power
in a Warming World: The New Global Politics of Climate Change and the Remaking of Environmen-
tal Inequality (Cambridge, Masse.: La presse du MIT, 2015); and Wainwright and Mann, Cli-
mate Leviathan.

30 Richard B. Stewart, Benedict Kingsbury, and Bryce Rudyk, Climate Finance: Regulatory and
Funding Strategies for Climate Change and Global Development (New York: NYU Press, 2009).
31 Geoffrey Supran and Naomi Oreskes, “Assessing ExxonMobil’s Climate Change Com-
munications (1977–2014),” Environmental Research Letters 12 (8) (2017): 084019, https://
doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aa815f.

32 Naomi Oreskes, “The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change,” Science 306 (5702)

(2004): 1686–1686, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1103618.

33 Eric Beinhocker, “I Am a Carbon Abolitionist,” Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, Juin 24, 2019,

https://democracyjournal.org/arguments/i-am-a-carbon-abolitionist/.

34 Ibid..
35 Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, 4th ed. (New York: Free Press, 1997), 50.
36 Maximilian Kasy, “No Data in the Void: Values and Distributional Conflicts in Empirical
Policy Research and Artificial Intelligence,” Economics for Inclusive Prosperity, 2019, https://
econfip.org/policy-brief/no-data-in-the-void-values-and-distributional-conflicts-in
-empirical-policy-research-and-artificial-intelligence/#.

37 Riley E. Dunlap, Aaron M. McCright, and Jerrod H. Yarosh, “The Political Divide on Cli-
compagnon Changer: Partisan Polarization Widens in the U.S.,” Environment: Science and Policy

161

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149 (4) Fall 2020Jessica F. Vert

for Sustainable Development 58 (5) (2016): 4–23, https://doi.org/10.1080/00139157.2016
.1208995.

38 Charles S. Taber and Milton Lodge, “Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political

Beliefs,” American Journal of Political Science 50 (3) (2006): 755–769.

39 Felix Biederman, Matt Christman, Will Menaker, et coll., The Chapo Guide to Revolution:

A Manifesto Against Logic, Facts, and Reason (New York: Atria Books, 2018).

40 Henry Farrell and Jack Knight, “Reconstructing International Political Economy: UN

Deweyan Approach,” unpublished working paper (Novembre 2019).

41 Daniel Maliniak, Ryan Powers, and Barbara F. Walter, “The Gender Citation Gap in In-

ternational Relations,” International Organization 67 (4) (2013): 889–922.

42 Kasy, “No Data in the Void.”

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