Leading Dragon Phenomenon: - Recherche en IA spécialisée au MIT

Leading Dragon Phenomenon:
New Opportunities for Catch-up
in Low-Income Countries
∗
VANDANA CHANDRA, JUSTIN YIFU LIN, AND YAN WANG

Modern economic development is accompanied by the structural transformation
from an agrarian to an industrial economy. Since the 18th century, all countries
that industrialized successfully have followed their comparative advantages and
leveraged the latecomer advantage, including emerging market economies such
as the People’s Republic of China (RPC), India, and Indonesia. The current
view is that Chinese dominance in manufacturing hinders poor countries from
developing similar industries. We argue that rising labor cost is causing the
PRC to graduate from labor-intensive to more capital-intensive and technology-
intensive industries. This will result in the relocation of low-skill manufacturing
jobs to other low-wage countries. This process, which we call the “leading dragon
phenomenon,” offers an unprecedented opportunity to low-income countries.
Such economies can seize this opportunity by attracting the rising outward
foreign direct investment ﬂowing from Brazil, la RPC, India, and Indonesia
into the manufacturing sectors. All low-income countries can compete for the
jobs spillover from the PRC and other emerging economies, but the winner must
implement credible economic development strategies that are consistent with its
comparative advantage.

Mots clés: structural transformation, Asia, Africa, People’s Republic of China,
ﬂying geese
Codes JEL: B10, O10, O14, O25

je. Introduction

Many developing economies have tried to catch up with industrialized coun-
tries but only a handful of countries, mostly in East Asia, have succeeded. Entering
into the 21st century, Brazil, the People’s Republic of China (RPC), India, Indonésie,
and a number of other large developing countries achieved dynamic growth and
emerged as the drivers of global growth in a new multipolar world.

∗Vandana Chandra (Vchandra@worldbank.org) is Senior Economist at the World Bank, Justin Yifu Lin (Justinlin@
ccer.pku.cn) is founding Director and Professor of the China Centre for Economic Research at Peking University,
and Yan Wang (Ywang2005b@gmail.com) is Visiting Professor at George Washington University. This paper was
led by Justin Yifu Lin during his tenure as the Senior Vice President and Chief Economist of the World Bank. Le
authors are grateful to Shahrokh Fardoust, Zia Qureshi, Changyong Rhee, Maria Socorro Gochoco-Bautista, and two
anonymous referees for their helpful comments and Kwang Park and Jian Zhang for their input. The views expressed
in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect those of the institutions they are afﬁliated with.

Revue du développement en Asie, vol. 30, Non. 1, pp. 52–84

C(cid:3) 2013 Banque asiatique de développement
et Institut de la Banque asiatique de développement

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LEADING DRAGON PHENOMENON 53

Lin (2010) and Lin and Monga (2011) show that a developing country can
achieve dynamic growth and catch up by exploiting the latecomer advantage and
developing industries that are aligned with its comparative advantage. In this paper,
we build on this theme and use historical and comparative perspectives to show
that because of similarity in the comparative advantage of low-income countries,
the dynamic emerging economies, when they upgrade their industrial sectors, will
create a huge space for low-income countries. In contrast to the conventional think-
ing that the PRC’s dominance in manufacturing export dooms poor countries to
economic backwardness, we argue that its growth spiral may in fact be a boon. Comme
the PRC upgrades its labor-intensive industries and cedes market shares, millions of
labor-intensive jobs will be relocated to low-wage countries and can accelerate their
industrialization. This process, which we call the “leading dragon phenomenon,»
offers an unprecedented opportunity to low-income countries. To the skeptics, nous
point to current trends in South–South foreign direct investment (FDI) ﬂows as
drivers of industrialization in low-income countries. If other emerging market coun-
tries such as Brazil, India, and Indonesia follow the PRC’s growth trajectory, ils
will create even more labor-intensive jobs in low-income countries.

Section II motivates the analysis by reviewing the evidence on structural
transformation and its role in industrialization in the world. Section III examines the
experiences of the Industrial Revolution, the post-World War (WW) II period, et
the more recent East Asian successes in catching up. Section IV ﬁrst discusses the
failures to catch-up in various countries that followed protectionist strategies. It then
analyzes the PRC’s meteoric rise in the context of its “comparative advantage follow-
ing” strategy. Section V investigates the impact of the PRC’s rising labor costs on its
employment structure and the industrial upgrading and job relocation currently being
facilitated through outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). Section VI concludes.

II. Structural Transformation and Catch-up

UN.

Catch-up in a Multipolar World

Sustained and rapid income growth is a modern phenomenon that appeared
only after the Industrial Revolution in the 18th century. Before that time, for a long
period, almost all countries in the world had agrarian economies and were poor
relative to today. The income gap among countries was very small. The richest
country’s per capita income was only about ﬁve times greater than the poorest
country’s per capita income (Maddison 2010). The Industrial Revolution led to
accelerated growth in the Western European countries, the United States (NOUS), et
other western offshoots, but most other countries failed to do so. As a consequence,
there has been great divergence in income levels between developed and developing
countries and between developing countries with dynamic growth and those trapped

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54 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW

Chiffre 1. Emergence of Multipolar World in the 21st Century

Contribu(cid:2)on to World GDP Growth

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

-20%

1980-1984

1985-89

1990-94

1995-1999

2000-2004

2005-2011

High income

People’s Republic of China

Developing excl BRIC

India

Brazil

Russian Federa(cid:2)sur

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DCs ex-BRICS = developing countries excluding Brazil, la RPC, India, and Russian Federation; HICs = highly

industrialized countries; PRC = People’s Republic of China.

Source: World Bank. 2012. World Development Indicators 2012. Washington, CC.

in low-income or middle-income status (Lin 2011). By the end of the 20th century,
the gap had signiﬁcantly widened, with per capita income of industrialized high-
income countries at more than 50 times that of low-income economies (Maddison
2010). Among the set of developing countries, only a handful were successful in
transforming their aspirations for catching up into reality. Among them were Japan
and the East Asian tigers (Hong Kong, Chine; la République de Corée; Singapore;
and Taipei,Chine).

The growth poles in the past were all high-income countries such as Germany,
Japan, the United Kingdom (ROYAUME-UNI), and the US. In the 1980s and 1990s, among
the top ﬁve contributors to global growth, all but the PRC were G7 industrial
des pays. Par 2009, all except the US were emerging economies. The replacement
of G7 by G20 as the primary global forum since the eruption of the global crisis
dans 2008 underscores the emergence of a multipolar world. The sheer size of the
large emerging economies combined with their dynamic and sustained growth has
elevated Brazil, la RPC, India, and the Russian Federation (known as BRICs) à
become the largest contributors to economic growth in the world (Chiffre 1). During
2006–2010, presque 45% of global GDP growth was generated in the BRICs. Le
era of a multipolar world seems to have been ﬁrmly established.

Structural Transformation and Catch-up

The path to prosperity in the developed countries was marked by a pro-
cess of structural transformation as reﬂected in employment and value-added of

LEADING DRAGON PHENOMENON 55

primaire, secondaire, and tertiary industries. Long-term economic trends from the
pre-industrial stage of development in a large number of developed countries con-
ﬁrm that at the end of each episode of catch-up, the fast grower’s economy had
a structure closer to that of a developed country as opposed to a low-income one
(Syrquin 1988, p. 206; Chenery 1979, XVI; Abramowitz 1983, 85; Lin 2009, 2010,
2011, and 2012b).

Simon Kuznets sought to understand and document long-run transformation
through a series of stylized facts, though he was reluctant to offer a theory of
development. His empirical studies identiﬁed four features of modern economic
growth.1 According to the ﬁrst Kuznets fact, structural transformation occurs when
the share of the nonagricultural sectors in an economy increases. A reconstruction
of national accounts from a variety of sources for western countries shows that such
a transformation raised overall productivity and increased the returns to workers and
capital. From 1800–1849 to 1951–1960, Par exemple, agriculture as a share of gross
domestic product (PIB) declined from 30% to only 5% in the UK and from 20% à
4% in the US. The share of industry inclusive of manufacturing meanwhile increased
depuis 23% à 56% in the UK and from 33% à 43% in the US (Kuznets 1966). Deuxième,
this sectoral shift is mirrored in the structure of employment. Troisième, the population
is redistributed from rural to urban areas. And fourth, the capital–labor ratio in the
nonagricultural sectors of the economy rises.

History points to the critical role of industrialization as an engine of sustained
growth in the long term. Since productivity growth is associated with technological
change and industrial upgrading, it can be said that continuous structural change in
technologies and industries is the main feature of modern economic growth (Kuznets
1966, Maddison 2010). In Western Europe, the annual per capita income growth
before the 18th century was about 0.05%, accelerated to about 1% in the 18th and
19th centuries, and reached 2% in the 20th century. The required time for doubling
per capita income thus fell from 1,400 years before the 18th century to 70 years in
the 18th and 19th century and further to 35 years in the 20th century (Maddison
2010).

History also demonstrates that in the ﬁrst stage of catch-up, manufacturing
was instrumental in the transfer of new technologies to nonmanufacturing sec-
tors of the economy. Manufacturing has contributed to the modernization of the
agricultural and mining sectors, which provide raw materials through backward
linkages, and spawning services through forward linkages. En outre, manufac-
turing can serve as an indirect source of demand and thus spur catch-up. Because
there is a tight nexus with the services sector, technological progress and growth
in manufacturing lead to a larger demand for services, propelling overall economic
growth.

1Kuznets (1966, 1971).

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56 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW

Chiffre 2. Manufacturing and Income Growth, 1993–2007—Industrialization
as Growth Engine

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Source: World Bank. 2011. World Development Indicators 2011. Washington, CC.

Except for a few oil-exporting countries, no country has achieved high-
income status without dynamic industrial upgrading. En général, a change in GDP
per capita is strongly and positively correlated with growth in value-added in the
manufacturing sector (Chiffre 2). If countries rich in natural resources or land coun-
tries have achieved a middle-income status without a large manufacturing sector,
they rarely succeeded in sustaining growth. More importantly, growth in the re-
sources sector does not create much employment.

III. Industrialization, The Flying Geese Pattern, and Catch-up

in a Historical Perspective

History shows that following comparative advantage to tap the latecomer
advantage is the best way for developing countries to start and sustain a dynamic
growth path for diversiﬁcation and industrialization (Lin 2009, Lin and Monga
2011). The spread of industrialization in Western Europe in the 19th century, rapid
catch-up in the post WWII period, and the East Asian miracle starting in the 1980s
are all reminiscent of the ﬂying geese pattern. Dans cette section, we provide evidence
on this assertion.

In the 1930s, economists researching “catch-up growth models” argued that
catch-up was not random. Kuznets and Akamatsu explored the conditions under
which the Industrial Revolution occurred in the UK and how it spread only to those
countries that had sufﬁcient accumulation of capital and skilled labor, among other

LEADING DRAGON PHENOMENON 57

conditions (Kuznets 1930). The focus on structural transformation and industrial
upgrading (Rostow 1960) and cross-country catch-up (Gerschenkron 1962) can be
found in Akamatsu’s work (1935, 1961, et 1962) on Japan, a country that started
from a much lower level of income than the Western European countries. In a
seminal paper in the 1930s, Akamatsu documented what he called the “wild-geese
ﬂying pattern” in economic development and noted that “wild geese ﬂy in orderly
ranks forming an inverse V, just as airplanes ﬂy in formation” (Akamatsu 1962,
p. 11).

The ﬂying geese pattern describes the sequential order of the catch-up pro-
cess of industrialization of latecomer economies. It focuses on three dimensions
or stages: (je) the intra-industry dimension; (ii) the inter-industry dimension; et
(iii) the international division of labor dimension. The third element in particular
involves the process of relocation of industries across countries, from advanced
to developing countries, during the latter’s process of convergence.2 A prominent
feature of this stage is that exports of consumer goods start declining and capital
goods begin to be exported. In this stage, a group of economies advance together
through emulation and learning-by-doing. The focus of this paper is on the second
and third dimensions of the ﬂying geese model as illustrated in Figure 3 from a
note prepared by the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo for the
GRIPS Development Forum in 2002.

A weakness in Akamatsu’s model is that it only describes the ﬂying geese
pattern without linking it to a country’s endowment structure and comparative ad-
vantage. He did not recognize that the market mechanism is a necessary condition
for a country to follow its comparative advantage successfully. Cependant, he noted
that the accumulation of capital, technological adaptability of people, and govern-
ment’s protection policy to promote the consumer goods industries matter for the
ﬂying geese pattern (Akamatsu 1962, p. 3).

There is a fundamental difference between the traditional Structuralist views
and the New Structural Economics (NSE) (Lin 2010). NSE contends that the ﬂying
geese model can be used by latecomers to catch up only if they follow the comparative
advantage of their own countries. This is called the comparative advantage following,
or CAF, approche. Autrement dit, with the CAF strategy, latecomers can follow the
lead goose, whose income levels and endowment structure are not too different,
and can tap into their comparative advantage and reduce their risk and cost of
innovation.3 As long as industrialization is CAF, there is no need for government

2There is an extensive literature on the ﬂying geese pattern, including Kiyoshi Kojima’s seminal work (2000)
and Ozawa 2004, who have contributed to the dissemination of the model outside Japan, and applied it in country-level
analyse. Being a strategic think piece, a full literature review is beyond the scope of this paper.

3There is an extensive literature on the spatial patterns of production and vertical disintegration of supply
chains (Helleiner 1973, Jones and Kierzkowski 2004, and Kimura 2010). This is consistent with the NSE framework.
A country has certain natural and factor endowments which determine the comparative advantage of the country. Dans
any stage of its development, the country would naturally attract those products, parts and components, and processes
that utilize the factors that are abundant and less expensive in this country (par exemple., labor-intensive parts of a supply chain,

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58 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW

Chiffre 3. International Dimensions—Asian Wild-Geese
Flying Pattern

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Source: GRIPS (On-line). Available: http://www.grips.ac.jp/module/prsp/FGeese.htm

to adopt protectionist policies as ﬁrms are able to withstand market competition.
Plutôt, the government’s role is limited to facilitating ﬁrms’ entry into new industries
where the country has latent comparative advantage by overcoming externalities
and coordination issues inherent in the industrial upgrading and diversiﬁcation
process.4

UN.

The Spread of the Industrial Revolution: Leaders and Latecomers

The Industrial Revolution started in the UK in the 1700s, but for about 50
années, it did not spread to other countries because the British government forbade

such as assembly lines). As the country’s factor endowment upgrades, the components or processes attracted to this
country would upgrade to more capital- or technological–intensive parts of the supply chain (such as manufacturing
of electronic components). Evidence is provided in Section IV as Taiwanese investors upgrade their investment in the
PRC to manufacturing (not assembly) electronic parts and components and to services (voir la figure 10 in section IV).
4An industry is an economy’s latent comparative advantage if, based on the factor costs of production which
are determined by the economy’s endowment structure, the economy could be competitive in this industry. Cependant,
due to high transaction costs (which are determined by infrastructure), logistics, and other business conditions, le
economy may not yet be competitive in the global market in this industry.

LEADING DRAGON PHENOMENON 59

the export of machinery, manufacturing techniques, and skilled workers. Eventually,
in the 19th century, it gradually spread to other countries in Western Europe. Le
earliest center of industrial production in continental Europe was Belgium where
production of coal, iron, textile, glass, and armaments ﬂourished. Par 1830, French
ﬁrms had employed many skilled British workers to help establish the textile in-
dustry, and railroad lines began to appear across Western Europe. Germany was a
latecomer in developing industry mainly because no centralized government existed
là.

The ﬁrst steam locomotive was invented in the UK in 1804, but other European
countries did not start building railroads until the 1830s. Allemagne, Par exemple,
produced its ﬁrst locomotive in 1835, but railway construction lagged due to the
lack of an integrated central government. After the 1840s, German coal and iron
production skyrocketed and by the 1850s, construction began on a rail network.
After its political uniﬁcation in 1871, Germany exceeded the UK in terms of the
length of new railroads, and there was a rapid catch-up process in the production of
pig iron and other industries (Chiffre 4).

Relative to the UK, industrialization was delayed in the US because the coun-
try at that time lacked the basic factor endowments—labor and capital—to invest
in business. When it ﬁnally picked up in the 1820s, its growth was explosive. La-
borers and capital came from Europe where political revolutions sent immigrants
to the US. The ﬁrst locomotive emerged in 1826, and the ﬁrst railroad in 1827.
The length of the railroad surpassed that of the UK in 1850, reaching 9,021 miles,

Chiffre 4. Spread of the Industrial Revolution—Latecomers Catching Up, 1800–1914

Length of Railroad Lines Open (in kilometers, 1 km = 5/8 mile)

60000

50000

40000

30000

20000

10000

G.Britain,
the leader

Latecomers
Allemagne

Great Britain

France

Allemagne

Belgium

Italy

The Netherlands

Espagne

Sweden

1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900

Source: Statistical Appendices, “Fontana Economic History of Europe,” Vol. 4, from Modern History Sourcebook

(On-line). Available: http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/indrevtabs1.asp

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60 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW

and expanded rapidly to the west in 1890 to reach 129,774 miles, longer than
the length of railroads in the entire continental Europe (Depew 1895, p. 111).
Rapid industrialization and structural transformation then followed. Dans 1800, farm-
ers comprised 85% of the US population, but the proportion declined to 50% dans
1860.

Gerschenkron (1962) observed that rapid industrialization could start from
vastly different levels of “economic backwardness.” In fact, “the more backward a
country’s economy, the greater was the part played by special institutional factors
(organismes gouvernementaux, banks) designed to increase the supply of capital to the
nascent industries” (Gerschenkron 1962, p. 354).

Like Akamatsu, a weakness of Gerschenkron’s theory is that he did not stress
that for the latecomer to be competitive, it must identify industries consistent with
its comparative advantage or which are CAF. Industrialization can start from a
low level of economic development, but if the level of development is too low,
industries that are too advanced will be comparative advantage defying (CAD) et
may require heavy subsidies and protection from the state. With government support,
it is possible to set up advanced industries—however, as long as they are CAD, ils
will be neither viable nor competitive.

Japan’s Catch-up in the Meiji Period: Apprentissage
by Importing then Exporting

Starting with an income level that was only one-third of that in the West
during the 1850s, Japan achieved rapid catch-up in 50 years to become the ﬁrst
industrial country in Asia in 1904. After opening up trade in 1854, its government
encouraged learning from western technology and institutions by sending high-level
missions including about half of the ministers to the US and Europe for nearly 2 années
(Shimposha 2000, p. 48). After signing the Ansei Treaty in 1858, Japan lost con-
trol of its tariff policy but the government provided facilitation by building Japan’s
modern infrastructure and encouraging learning-by-doing. Telegraph services be-
tween Tokyo and Yokohama began in 1870. The ﬁrst Japanese railroad connecting
Yokohama and Shinbashi was built in 1872, and by 1900, Japan had 3,875 miles
of railroad (Ito 1992). The government also actively introduced foreign technology
by importing modern machines and hiring thousands of foreign experts to instruct
Japanese workers and managers in the late 1800s (Ozawa 2004).

Throughout the Meiji period (1868–1912) Japan’s top exports were raw silk
yarn, tea, and marine products, which were consistent with Japan’s comparative
advantage. As Japan’s cotton industry grew, its imports fell steadily, et en 1890, it
began to export large quantities of cotton, yarn, and cloth to neighboring Asian coun-
tries (intra-sector upgrading as in Akamatsu 1962). On the institutional side, a bank-
ing system was organized and a central bank was established in 1882 (Ito 1992, p. 21).

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LEADING DRAGON PHENOMENON 61

Tableau 1. Catch-Up in the Prewar and Postwar Era (Per capita GDP,
par 1990 international GK dollars)

Europe Targeted
the UK, Gaps
Were Small

Japan Targeted
Germany during the
Meiji Restoration

Japan Targeted
the US after
WWII

France
Allemagne
ROYAUME-UNI
NOUS
Japan

1870

1,876
1,839
3,190
2,445
737

% de
the UK 1890

% de

1900 Allemagne

1950

1960

59
58
100
77

2,376
2,428
4,009
3,392
1,012

2,876
2,985
4,492
4,091
1,180

100

40%

5,186
3,881
6,939
9,561
1,921

7,398
7,705
8,645
11,328
3,986

% de
the US

100%
35%

Asian NIEs (4 dragons)
incl. the Republic
of Korea Targeted Japan
in the 1960s–1980s

China Targeted
East Asian NIEs
incl. the Republic
of Korea

Latecomers Started
to Target PRC
after 2000

1960

1970

% de
Japan

1980

1990

% of the
Republic
of Korea

2000

2008

% de
RPC

8,645 10,767
11,328 15,030
9,714
2,167
778
868
735

ROYAUME-UNI
20,353 23,742
NOUS
28,467 31,178
Japan
20,738 22,816
Rep. of Korea
14,375 19,614
RPC
6,725
India
2,975
Viet Nam
2,970
GK = Geary-Khamis, PRC = People’s Republic of China, UK = United Kingdom, US = United States.
Note: Highlighted countries are the targeted countries.
Sources: Angus Maddison Database, authors’ calculations.

12,931 16,430
18,577 23,201
13,428 18,789
8,704
1,871
1,309
1,025

3,986
1,226
662
753
799

4,114
1,061
938
757

3,421
1,892
1,809

100
25

100
23

100
44
44

Historical experiences of the Industrial Revolution offer several insights. D'abord,
countries that are on the technological frontier can play the role of the “lead geese”
as Britain did.5 Latecomers have the economic advantage of “backwardness," et
under certain conditions, they can catch up quickly and even overtake the lead geese.
Deuxième, capital accumulation was necessary but not sufﬁcient for success. Political
stability, openness to trade, and labor mobility were also important for the country
to acquire new technology and develop new industries. En outre, governments
were required to play a facilitating role, as in the case of Germany, Japan, et le
NOUS. Without the existence of a centralized state in Germany since 1871, there would
have been no railroad or Industrial Revolution.

More importantly, selecting the right target country is critical for catching
en haut. Some European countries could catch up with Britain relatively quickly because
their stages of development were not too far from the leader (Tableau 1). According to

5Britain rather than the United Kingdom is used following the convention of the literature on the Industrial

Revolution.

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62 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW

the estimate of Maddison (2010), per capita incomes of France, Allemagne, et le
US were about 60%–75% of Britain in 1870.6 During the Meiji restoration, Japan
targeted the industries of Prussia (plus tard, Allemagne) and its per capita income was
à propos 40% of the latter. Ainsi, it was realistic for Japan to target Germany rather
than Britain or the US which were too far ahead in terms of relative stages of
development. Even though many nation states tried to catch up, Japan succeeded
and became the ﬁrst industrialized nation from the East because it chose the right
country to target.

Post-WWII Era: The US Showing the Way to Japan and Others

The economies of Western Europe and Japan have enjoyed unprecedented
growth and technological upgrading in the decades since WWII in the so-called
“golden age of capitalism” (1950–1974). During this period, nearly all developing
countries pursued dirigiste capitalism but, except for Japan, la République de Corée
and other East Asian tigers, they did not succeed. Why? The NSE contends that
the crux of Japan’s and East Asia’s success was that their development followed
closely their comparative advantage (or was CAF) and their governments played the
facilitator’s role (Lin 2010, Lin and Monga 2011).

Just before WWII, textiles and other light industrial goods accounted for
60%–75% of all Japanese exports and Japan’s textile industry was at its peak (Ito
1992, p. 24). In the 1960s, when its per capita GDP was about 40% of the US and
it had established a strong industrial base, Japan targeted US industries (Tableau 1).
Japan’s historical labor statistics record that a rising share of labor in Japan’s man-
ufacturing sector coincided with a declining share of labor in the manufacturing
sectors of the US. In the 1960s–1970s, Japan supported its heavy manufacturing
sectors, including machinery and automobiles. In the 1980s–1990s, just as the US
was upgrading its industrial base, Japan expanded its shares in the home appliance,
electronics, and computer markets (Figures 5–6).

Chiffre 6 shows the employment shares in the US during 1958–2005 for
ﬁve subsectors selected from 99 manufacturing industries, ranked from most labor
intensive to most capital intensive. Dans l'ensemble, as the capital–labor ratio increases
au fil du temps, industrial and employment structures change dramatically. Speciﬁcally,
the share of labor employed in the most labor-intensive sectors such as fabrics
declined monotonically. In sectors such as computer manufacturing, the share of
labor employed ﬁrst increased and then declined, showing a hump or inverse V-shape.
In industries such as aircraft and automobile manufacturing, which are capital-
intensive but subject to labor-saving scale economies, the share of labor showed a

6Britain’s per capita income in 1830 était 3,190 dans 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars. Those of most

countries in Western Europe were in the range of 1,500–2500 IGK dollars.

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LEADING DRAGON PHENOMENON 63

Chiffre 5. Structural Transformation in Japan—Manufacturing Increase Followed
by Slow Decline as Services Expanded (%)

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

Services

Agriculture, forestry, and ﬁsheries

Manufacturing

0
2
9
1

5
3
9
1

0
5
9
1

5
5
9
1

8
5
9
1

1
6
9
1

4
6
9
1

7
6
9
1

0
7
9
1

3
7
9
1

6
7
9
1

9
7
9
1

2
8
9
1

5
8
9
1

8
8
9
1

1
9
9
1

4
9
9
1

7
9
9
1

0
0
0
2

3
0
0
2

6
0
0
2

Note: Figures refer to shares of employment by sector.
Source: Authors based on Historical Statistics of Japan (On-line). Available: http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/

chouki/index.htm

Chiffre 6. The US as Leader of Transformation—Shares in Total Employment
in Selected Subsectors, 1958–2005

0.03

0.02

0.01

0.03

0.025

0.02

0.015

0.01

0.005

Fabric Mills

Computer and
Manufacturing

0.015
0.01
0.005
0

8
5
9
1

2
6
9
1

6
6
9
1

0
7
9
1

4
7
9
1

8
7
9
1

2
8
9
1

6
8
9
1

0
9
9
1

4
9
9
1

8
9
9
1

2
0
0
2

8
5
9
1

3
6
9
1

8
6
9
1

3
7
9
1

8
7
9
1

3
8
9
1

8
8
9
1

3
9
9
1

8
9
9
1

3
0
0
2

Aircra(cid:3) and Automobiles

Other Plas(cid:2)c Products and
Fiber Op(cid:2)cs

Aircra(cid:3) mfg

Automobile mfg

0.04

0.03

0.02

0.01

8
5
9
1

2
6
9
1

6
6
9
1

0
7
9
1

4
7
9
1

8
7
9
1

2
8
9
1

6
8
9
1

0
9
9
1

4
9
9
1

8
9
9
1

2
0
0
2

8
5
9
1

3
6
9
1

8
6
9
1

3
7
9
1

8
7
9
1

3
8
9
1

8
8
9
1

3
9
9
1

8
9
9
1

3
0
0
2

Note: The subsectors, selected from the 99 industrial sectors, are ranked by their capital–labor ratio. These are the:
(je) labor-intensive sector (industry 313210, broadwoven fabric mills), (ii) mid-level capital/labor intensity (dans-
dustry 334111, electronic computer manufacturing), (iii) high capital intensity (industry 336411, aircraft &
industry 336111, automobile), et (iv) high technical intensity (industry 326199, other plastic products manu-
facturing including ﬁber lens, windshield, and optics). Le 1997 6-digit NAICS codes (473 industries) were used.

Source: Ju, Lin, and Wang (2011). Based on NBER-CES manufacturing industry data for 1958–2005.

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64 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW

slow and declining trend. In the most technology-intensive sectors such as plastics
including ﬁber optics and lens, the share of employment shows a monotonic increase
indicating that the US still maintains a comparative advantage in these industries.
En général, the manufacturing sectors started to shed labor in the 1970s, tandis que le
services sector created more jobs throughout the period. This process accelerated in
les années 1990.

Why is the employment structure in the US changing so rapidly? D'abord, le
simultaneous improvements in education, financier, and legal institutions as well
as in hard infrastructure has allowed ﬁrms to constantly innovate and create new
industries and exhaust the set of production possibilities (Harrison and Rodriguez-
Clare 2010). Deuxième, this process has been accelerated by globalization. Because
the US maintained an open trade regime and a liberal investment policy, industriel
transformation that started in the 1970s–1980s exceeded that of other countries
(McMillian et al. 2011). Troisième, the behavior of multinational corporations has played
an important role. Using ﬁrm-level data related to outward FDI from the Ministry
of International Trade and Industry (MITI) of Japan and the US, Lipsey and his
co-authors (Lipsey, Ramstetter, and Blomstrom 2000) found that:

(je) “A Japanese parent’s employment, given the level of its production, tends to be
higher, the greater the production abroad by the ﬁrm’s foreign afﬁliates.” This
is similar to that of Swedish ﬁrms but contrasts with that of US ﬁrms.

(ii) US ﬁrms appear to reduce employment at home by allocating labor-intensive
parts of their production to afﬁliates in developing countries. “Among US ﬁrms,
production in developing countries is associated with lower parent employment
at home, given the level of parent output.” This could be interpreted as US
multinationals being “footloose,” allocating the more labor-intensive parts of
their output to developing countries and keeping the more capital-intensive or
skill-intensive parts in the parent facilities.

Why was economic growth in Japan not sustained after the 1970s? Depuis
the mid-1950s to 1973, Japan for a variety of reasons, was able to sustain rapid
growth for nearly 20 années. Dans 1973, Japan’s rapid growth started declining for three
raisons: oil crises, the decline in investment, and the slowdown in technological
progress. “Japan ﬁnally caught up with the US and the Western European countries
technologically in the mid-1970s . . . (et) since it was harder to develop a country’s
own new technology compared to merely obtaining a license, Japan’s growth rate
then had to fall” (Ito 1992, p. 72). Autrement dit, Japan’s advantage of backwardness
had been exhausted. The Japanese economy was then constrained mainly by the
speed of indigenous innovations on the global technology frontier. Japan had to
relocate some of its production base to the Republic of Korea; Taipei,Chine; et

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LEADING DRAGON PHENOMENON 65

other NIEs due to rising domestic labor costs leading to the loss of its comparative
advantage in the labor-intensive sectors.

The Flying Geese Pattern in East Asia

It has been well documented that several generations of lead geese played
signiﬁcant roles in the rapid development of the East Asian economies. Depuis 1965
à 1990, Japan emerged as the world’s biggest exporter of manufactured goods,
increasing its share of the world market from about 8% to almost 12%. Japan’s
success was followed by a second generation of economies in the 1970s (Hong Kong,
Chine; la République de Corée; Singapore; and Taipei,Chine), a third generation in
the 1980s (Indonésie, Malaisie, the Philippines, et la Thaïlande, or ASEAN4), et
a fourth generation in the 1990s (the PRC and Viet Nam) (Gill and Kharas 2007,
p. 81).

What is less well studied, cependant, is how this ﬂying geese pattern evolved at
the subsector level, how the “jumping” of an industry from one country to another
took place, and how the Republic of Korea ceded its dominance in labor-intensive
subsectors to the third generation of geese—ASEAN4, la RPC, and Viet Nam.
Using UN Comtrade data, we show graphically that:

(je) There is an inverse U-shape in some subsectors where the lead goose loses
comparative advantage to its followers (as in Akamatsu 1962). Since Akamatsu’s
transformation cycle could last for over 100 années, the inverse U-shape emerges
only when simple measures such as shares of exports in the sector are used
to illustrate the pattern. Each speciﬁc sector may have several generations of
countries playing the role of lead goose sequentially in different periods as each
country’s endowment structure changes. This is reminiscent of Akamatsu’s
theory on the international dimensions of the ﬂying geese model (Chiffre 3).

(ii) In textiles, an upstream but labor-intensive industry, ﬁve generations emerged
sequentially. Japan ceded to the Republic of Korea in the 1980s, after which the
PRC emerged in the 1990s, though its textile exports are now losing steam as
labor costs are rising and employment shares declining. ASEAN4, particularly
Indonesia and Viet Nam, and countries which can expand market share rapidly
would have a better chance to beneﬁt by following the PRC (Figure 7a).

(iii) In the 1970s, Japan lost its leading position in the apparel and clothing sector
to the Republic of Korea, whose clothing exports show a clear hump shape as
it ceded its leading position to the PRC in 1989. The PRC emerged later than
ASEAN4, but its low wages and efﬁcient industrial clusters in many provinces
enabled it to gain dominance. After many years in the dominant position, le

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66 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW

Chiffre 7. Share of Sector Exports in Total Merchandise Exports—Several Generations of
Flying Geese

Figure 7a: Share of Textile Exports, 5 Generations
(Japan, la République de Corée, la RPC, Indonésie, and Viet Nam)

Rep. of Korea

RPC

Japan

Indonésie

Viet Nam

2
6
9
1

5
6
9
1

8
6
9
1

1
7
9
1

4
7
9
1

7
7
9
1

0
8
9
1

3
8
9
1

6
8
9
1

9
8
9
1

2
9
9
1

5
9
9
1

8
9
9
1

1
0
0
2

4
0
0
2

0
1
0
2

Figure 7b: Share of Clothing Exports, 2 Generations

Hong Kong, Chine

Turkey

Rep. of Korea

RPC

Viet Nam

Thaïlande

Indonésie

Malaisie

Japan

2
6
9
1

5
6
9
1

8
6
9
1

1
7
9
1

4
7
9
1

7
7
9
1

0
8
9
1

3
8
9
1

6
8
9
1

9
8
9
1

2
9
9
1

5
9
9
1

8
9
9
1

1
0
0
2

4
0
0
2

7
0
0
2

0
1
0
2

Figure 7c: Share of Toy Exports, 2 Generations

Hong Kong, Chine

RPC

Japan

0.045

0.04

0.035

0.03

0.025

0.02

0.015

0.01

0.005

0.35

0.3

0.25

0.2

0.15

0.1

0.05

0.08

0.07

0.06

0.05

0.04

0.03

0.02

0.01

2
6
9
1

5
6
9
1

8
6
9
1

1
7
9
1

4
7
9
1

7
7
9
1

0
8
9
1

3
8
9
1

6
8
9
1

9
8
9
1

2
9
9
1

5
9
9
1

8
9
9
1

1
0
0
2

4
0
0
2

0
1
0
2

Note: Figures based on SITC rev 1, 3–4 digits.
Source: UN Comtrade data via WITS.

RPC

Hong Kong, Chine

Indonésie

Japan

Thaïlande

Rep. of Korea

Singapore

Malaisie

Viet Nam

Philippines

RPC

Hong Kong, Chine

India

Indonésie

Japan

Thaïlande

Turkey

Rep. of Korea

Malaisie

Viet Nam

Hong Kong, Chine

Indonésie

Japan

Thaïlande

Rep. of Korea

Singapore

Malaisie

Philippines

RPC

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LEADING DRAGON PHENOMENON 67

PRC is now losing its comparative advantage due to rising wages and will
gradually cede its market shares to ASEAN4, Viet Nam, and countries that can
seize the opportunity to rapidly expand exports (Figure 7b).

(iv) In toys, the PRC has recently been losing market share in the European Union
and US markets. Shares of toys in total exports have been declining (Figures 7c).
This is consistent with what other studies have observed, though shares vacated
by the PRC have not yet been taken up by African countries (Maswana 2011).
There are large opportunities for other low-income countries to beneﬁt from
the PRC’s graduation from these labor-intensive industries.

The Republic of Korea—An Example of Successful Industrial Upgrading7

The industrial upgrading of the Republic of Korea since 1962 is often de-
scribed as a good example of ﬂying geese catch-up.8 The share of manufactures in
GDP rose from merely 9% dans 1953 à 30.1% dans 1988, while that of the agriculture
and mining sector shrunk to single digits in the 1990s.

During this phase of industrial upgrading guided by export-oriented indus-
trialization, the beneﬁts of economic backwardness were exploited with sequential
structural transformation from labor-intensive industries (c'est à dire., wood manufactures
and clothing) to capital-intensive industries (c'est à dire., machinery and transport equip-
ment). Until the early 1980s, labor-intensive products, primarily wood manufactures
and clothing, had a combined share of about 60% and accounted for the majority
of total exports. Since 1983, capital-intensive machinery and transport equipment
products have accounted for the majority of exports. After the mid-1990s, their share
exceeded half of total exports.

We argue that the Republic of Korea’s success was due in part to its adherence
to its comparative advantage which evolved over time with changes in its factor
endowments, suggesting ﬂying geese catch-up patterns.9 For example, Figure 8a
shows the intra-industrial and inter-industrial dimension of “Flying Geese Catch-up”
motifs. The Republic of Korea successfully moved up the value chain from exports
of clothing to exports of textiles and to production of synthetic ﬁbers (Lim 2011).
In the electronics industry, a comparative advantage recorded by the net trade index

7The authors thank Kwang Park for this section on the Korean experience.
8The Republic of Korea’s industrial upgrading process between the 1960s and the 1980s can be roughly
divided into three phases: (je) the “takeoff” phase (1962–1973), (ii) the Heavy and Chemical Industry (HCI) drive
phase (1973–1979), et (iii) the liberalization phase (1980–later) (World Bank 1987). For details of Korea’s industry
policies, see World Bank (1987), Krueger (1997), Suh (2007), and Lim (2011).

9Some critics have argued that the Republic of Korea adopted a Comparative Advantage Defying (CAD)
strategy, and there is a heated debate. For the debate on whether the HCI drive in the 1970s is CAF or CAD, see Lin
and Chang (2009). We consider Republic of Korea’s policies as being consistent with the New Structural Economics
and Growth Identiﬁcation and Facilitation (GIF) framework where government plays a strong role based on market
signals to identify the latent comparative advantages.

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68 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW

Figure 8a. Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) of the Republic of Korea’s Industries

Clothing

Footwear

Tex(cid:2)les

t
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RCA = share of an industry in the economy’s exports/its share in global exports.
Note: Based on SITC rev 1, 2 digits.
Source: UN Comtrade data via WITS, authors’ calculations.

reveals industrial upgrading from simple goods to more sophisticated goods (Lin
and Chang 2009). Starting with the assembly of radios from imported components,
the Republic of Korea obtained a comparative advantage in the home appliance
industry (World Bank 1987). The country started to gain comparative advantage in
electronic parts and components (c'est à dire., transistors and semiconductors) in the mid-
1980s, and later on in information, communication, and industrial electronics in the
1990s (Figure 8b).

Figure 8b. Trade Specialization Index (TSI) of the Republic of Korea’s Electronics

Home Appliance

Comm. and Industrial

Parts and Components

74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06

1.00

0.80

0.60

0.40

0.20

0.00

0.20

0.40

0.60

Note: TSI = (export − import)/(export + import) for each industry.
Source: Korea Electronic Association.

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LEADING DRAGON PHENOMENON 69

In terms of the inter-industrial dimension, the Republic of Korea maintained
a high revealed comparative advantage (RCA) in clothing exports until the end of
the 1960s, followed by footwear until the 1980s. In the 1990s, it rapidly developed
a high RCA in electronics exports, which was more recently replaced by transport
equipment exports.

The Republic of Korea’s ﬂying geese catch-up also had an international
dimension involving the relocation of an industry from one country to another. Pour
example, it gained a sharp increase in RCA in footwear in the mid-1960s partly as
a result of manufacturing alliances and technology cooperation between local and
Japanese ﬁrms prompted by increasing wages in Japan which had been weakening
the latter’s competitiveness in the sector. A steep decrease in its RCA in the mid-
1990s indicates that higher wages in the Republic of Korea had led to a relocation
of factories to the PRC, Indonésie, and Viet Nam (The Committee for the 60-year
History of the Korean Economy 2010). Since the end of the 1980s when a liberal
policy was adopted, outward foreign investment from the Republic of Korea’s labor-
intensive industries has increased with its main destination being Asian countries.10

IV. Successes and Failures: CAD versus CAF

UN.

Import Substitution in the 1950s–1970s

In the post-WWII period, most developing countries were keenly aware of the
role that industrialization played in accelerating structural transformation and catch-
up in Europe, Japan, and the US. Keen to emulate them, developing countries adopted
the prevailing Structuralist paradigm, which advocated an import-substitution-led
(IS-led) industrialization strategy to develop advanced industries similar to those in
the industrial countries. Examples include heavy industries such as iron and steel,
chemicals, machinery, and transport equipment in countries as diverse as Brazil,
Egypt, Ghana, India, and the Republic of Korea.

In spite of a large variety of protectionist measures including high tariffs, même
the most well-intended policy interventions failed in sustaining CAD industries. Dans
many countries, most tariffs on manufactures led to effective rates of protection
(ERP) well in excess of 100%. In a sample of 10 countries chosen for a special
étude, Krueger (1983) found that all except the Ivory Coast and the Republic of Korea
pursued IS-led strategies in the 1960s and 1970s. The average ERP on manufactured
products varied from 356% in Pakistan to 384% in Uruguay.

Governments following CAD were not indifferent to the type of industries
they were protecting. Autrement dit, they also “picked winners.” Brazil is notable
for starting out with high ERPs in the late 1950s but gradually shifting to a strategy

10See Section IV on FDI.

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70 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW

where protection for CAF industries was reduced but protection for CAD industries
remained high. Examples are: (je) the plastics industry, where the ERP declined
depuis 489% à 332%; (ii) textiles, where ERP declined from 298% à 232%; et
(iii) clothing, where ERP changed from 481% à 321% (Fishlow 1983, p. 58un). Dans
Pakistan, during 1970–1971, the ERPs on most consumer and intermediate goods
were between 100%–200%, except for motor vehicles which had an ERP of 595%
(Guisinger 1978).

The Indian government had an elaborate brand of IS. At the start of the second
5-year plan (1957–1962), policymakers in India envisioned a country that was not
dependent on imports of either consumer or producer goods. This was achieved by
using IS to make machines as well as to make consumer products—i.e., imposing
import licensing requirements and tariffs on capital and consumer goods. As late as
1991, the Indian economy was one of the most heavily protected economies globally
with ERPs averaging 125%, where the highest was 355% (Krueger 2002).

In contrast to Japan and East Asia which followed their comparative ad-
vantage, well-intended governments across Africa, Latin America, and South Asia
adopted IS and protection in the 1960s and 1970s to achieve dynamic growth in
industries that were CAD. They assigned a high priority to the development of
capital-intensive heavy industries when in fact capital was scarce. To compensate
for the absence of private ﬁrms in capital-intensive sectors, governments leveraged
large state-owned enterprises to produce capital-intensive products. Examples of
such strategies include Indonesia’s launch of a shipbuilding industry in the 1960s
when its GDP per capita was only 10% of its main competitor, the Netherlands, et
the attempt of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) to build an automobile
industry in the 1970s when the country’s GDP per capita was only 5% of the US,
then the industry leader (Lin 2011).

The Republic of Korea and Japan, on the other hand, had selected target
countries that were appropriate to their income levels during their catch-up phase.
As reﬂected in Table 1, Japan targeted Germany whose income was 2.5 times Japan’s
in the Meiji period, while the Republic of Korea targeted Japan whose income was
4 times that of the Republic of Korea’s in the 1970s. Countries ﬂourish because they
have followed their comparative advantages. They fail to catch up if they do not.

The PRC as a Follower: Learning and Industrial Upgrading

The PRC’s success over the past 3 decades is the result of a two-pillar strat-
egy: (je) adopting a dual-track approach to reforms, giving transitory protection to
CAD capital-intensive sectors, and liberalizing entry to CAF labor-intensive sectors,
thereby achieving stability and dynamic transformation simultaneously; et (ii) as a
latecomer, choosing an economic development strategy that tapped into the potential
advantage of backwardness along the lines of the ﬂying geese pattern.

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LEADING DRAGON PHENOMENON 71

Figure 9a. PRC’s Rapid Transformation in Export Structure Following
Comparative Advantage

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Misc.
Manufactured
Ar(cid:2)clés

Machinery
et
Transport
Equipment

Crude
Fuels and
Minerals
Food and
Animals

Manufactured
Materials

4
8
9
1

7
8
9
1

0
9
9
1

3
9
9
1

6
9
9
1

9
9
9
1

2
0
0
2

5
0
0
2

8
0
0
2

Source: UN Comtrade; Lin and Wang (2008), updated by the authors.

Industrial development in the PRC after reforms in 1979 has basically fol-
lowed the country’s comparative advantage or is CAF. The PRC was an exporter
of primary products. Dans 1984, presque 50% of the PRC’s exports were crude oil and
agricultural products (Figure 9a). The ﬁrst industrial upgrade from resources to
labor-intensive products happened in 1986, when exports of textiles and clothing
exceeded crude oil. The second upgrade happened in 1995, when Chinese exports
of machinery and electronics exceeded textiles and clothing. This indicated that the
PRC has started the transition from exporting traditional labor-intensive exports to
nontraditional labor-intensive processes (assembly lines). The third upgrade hap-
pened after 2001 following the PRC’s accession to the World Trade Organization,
locking in liberalization of trade in goods and services and making PRC laws and

Figure 9b. . . . . But Slow Transformation of the Employment Structure

Ter(cid:2)ary sector

Secondary sector

Primary sector

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

2
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9
1

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1

2
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9
1

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2
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1

7
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1

2
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1

7
8
9
1

2
9
9
1

7
9
9
1

2
0
0
2

7
0
0
2

Source: UN Comtrade; Lin and Wang (2008), updated by the authors.

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72 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW

regulations conform to international standards. Regulatory reforms led to rapidly
rising FDI inﬂows, bringing in new technologies and processes. Par conséquent, the level
of product sophistication increased.11

The evolution of the PRC’s export structure in the last three decades reﬂects
signiﬁcant structural transformation in the ﬂying geese style that has enabled the
country to graduate from being an exporter of labor-intensive products such as
apparel, textiles, and leather to producing more sophisticated items such as home
appareils électroménagers, ofﬁce machines, and electric machinery (Chiffre 9).12 Unlike the case of
la République de Corée, FDI played a critical role in the PRC’s industrial upgrading.
The following points about this can be made:

(je) Inward FDI helps industrial upgrading. Many studies have pointed out that for-
eign investors are quick to identify a country’s comparative advantage and serve
as the most dynamic forces in industrial development and upgrading (Harrison
and Rodr´ıguez-Clare 2010; Aghion et al. 2011). In our view, foreign investors
serve as identiﬁers of growth sectors, providing advanced technology and help-
ing reduce ﬁrst-mover risks and transaction costs when ﬁrms attempt to enter
a new product or market. The PRC’s capital–labor ratio in the manufacturing
sector increased from 0.4 dans 1985 to nearly 4.0 dans 2007. Foreign-invested en-
terprises accounted for about 20% of tax revenue, 55% of imports and exports,
et plus 80% of high-tech exports (MOFCOM 2011).

(ii) In the last 5 années (2005–2009), FDI inﬂows have been shifting towards higher
value-added products, parts and components, and subsectors including services,
as shown by Figure 10. Investors from Taipei,China have provided much-needed
technology and managerial skills that ﬁrms need in electronics and information
technologie. These ﬁrms are moving the manufacturing of electronic parts and
components to the PRC. Wholesale and retailing have shown the fastest growth
rate in recent years, as the PRC moved toward promoting domestic consumption.

(iii) The process of three-stage upgrading shows the importance of learning-by-
exporting from lower-end manufacturing goods to higher-value-added goods
and subsequently to services. Initial learning activities occurred within sectors,

11There is, cependant, a myth on the level of export sophistication which was discussed at length in Koopman,
Wang, and Wei (2008) and Lin and Wang (2008). En fait, over 50% of exports in terms of value-added were foreign
value-added—i.e., goods and services produced by foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs). Among high-technology
goods, over 80% were exported by foreign-invested ﬁrms.

12In the context of vertical disintegration of supply chains, the ﬂying geese pattern still exists as multinationals
move the labor-intensive part of their production (often the assembly line) to the PRC and other low-wage countries,
keeping the critical components and parts at home. This does not change the fundamental premise of our paper. Comme
wages and salaries increase in the PRC, the labor intensive assembly lines will shift to other lower-income countries,
and the PRC will upgrade to higher value added components and parts, as well as higher tech products, as shown in
Chiffre 10.

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LEADING DRAGON PHENOMENON 73

Chiffre 10. Changing Structure of FDI Flows to the PRC—From Manufacturing to Services

Growth of Approved Outward FDI from Taipei,China to the PRC, 2005–2009 (%)

Fabricated Metal Products Manufacturing
Chemical Material Manufacturing

Electrical Equipment Manufacturing
Basic Metal Manufacturing
Non-metallic Mineral Products …

Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing

…
…
Electronic Parts and Components …

High Value Added
Highh Valuee Addeed

Wholesale and Retail Trade

Se
Service sector
Servvice secctor

Source: MOEA, Taipei,Chine; Rosen and Wang (2011), p. 35. Note that the manufacturing (rather than assembly) de

electronic parts and components is not labor intensive; they belong to higher value added class.

then gradually spilled over horizontally to new sectors, and eventually diversi-
ﬁed through outward FDI to other countries (Lin and Wang 2008).

Sub-Saharan Africa—Trailing Far Behind

There are several signs of a slow deindustrialization in Africa in the last
decades, when the PRC and India were emerging as large industrial countries and
African countries were undertaking structural reforms and liberalizing and integrat-
ing with global markets. An overview of Africa’s industrial performance during
1990–2010 indicates that 40 out of 45 countries had manufacturing value-added
(MVA) per capita of less than $200 and almost half experienced negative growth in MVA per capita (UNIDO 2011, p. 46). The report by UNIDO (2011) also shows how the share of labor in the man- ufacturing sector has declined, suggesting that employment in light manufacturing industries (par exemple., textiles, apparel, and leather products), which are labor intensive, de- clined after 1990. A large part of the employment losses had been due to a decline in the share of textiles, from about 7% dans 2000 à 5% dans 2009 (UNIDO 2011, p. 27). The fact that Africa is increasingly dependent on other regions for light manufactures is signiﬁcant for three reasons. D'abord, the trade deﬁcit indicates that African economies have a sizeable domestic market for light manufactures. Deuxième, light manufacturing sectors are a stepping-stone towards more technologically sophisticated manufac- turing industries (UNIDO 2011). Troisième, given the size of global demand for light manufactures, there is signiﬁcant potential for African exports of light manufactures which can facilitate structural transformation into more advanced sectors. l Téléchargé à partir du site Web : / / direct . m je t . / e du a d e v / art – pdlf / / / / / 3 0 1 5 2 1 6 4 0 7 3 2 a d e v _ a _ 0 0 0 0 3 pd . f par invité 0 8 Septembre 2 0 2 3 74 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW Figure 11. Labor Productivity and Average Wage Rates in the PRC’s Manufacturing ($)

oui
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(cid:2)
c
toi
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P.
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o
b
un
L

s
‘
C
R.
P.

$70,000 $60,000

$50,000 $40,000

$30,000 $20,000

$10,000 $0

$5,000 $4,720
$4,500 s r a l l o D n i s e g a W $4,000

$3,500 $3,000

$2,500 $2,000

$1,500 $1,000

$500 $0

9
7
9
1

0
8
9
1

1
8
9
1

2
8
9
1

3
8
9
1

4
8
9
1

5
8
9
1

6
8
9
1

7
8
9
1

8
8
9
1

9
8
9
1

0
9
9
1

1
9
9
1

2
9
9
1

3
9
9
1

4
9
9
1

5
9
9
1

6
9
9
1

7
9
9
1

8
9
9
1

9
9
9
1

0
0
0
2

1
0
0
2

2
0
0
2

3
0
0
2

4
0
0
2

5
0
0
2

6
0
0
2

7
0
0
2

8
0
0
2

9
0
0
2

PRC’s Labor Produc(cid:2)vity

Wages in Dollars

Sources: UNIDO; National Bureau of Statistics of China. 2010. China Statistical Yearbook. Beijing.

V. The Emergence of Leading Dragons

UN.

The Phenomenon of Relocating Manufacturing Jobs is Not New

The PRC is at a stage where the western countries and Japan had been during
the 1970s and where other Asian economies (Hong Kong, Chine; the Republic of
Korea; Singapore; and Taipei,Chine) found themselves in during the 1980s. Comme
labor-intensive industries matured, wages increased, and ﬁrms moved into more
technologically sophisticated industries in accordance with the upgrading of the
underlying endowment structure. In the western countries and the Asian tigers,
as the capital intensity of production in manufacturing increased, there was an
overall contraction in manufacturing jobs and a reallocation of resources towards
the services sectors. For example the share of manufacturing employment in the US
reduced from 17% in the 1980s to 9% dans 2004, in Japan from 18% à 12% pendant
the same period. When labor-intensive industries in the high-wage countries shut
down, their jobs relocated to other lower-wage economies such as the East Asian
tigers.

The PRC’s labor cost is rising rapidly, while the structure of its industries,
exportations, and employment is changing. Many Chinese economists argue that the

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LEADING DRAGON PHENOMENON 75

country has already absorbed its surplus labor and approached the Lewisian turning
indiquer (Cai et al. 2009un, Huang and Jiang 2010). Recent data indicates that wages in
the PRC’s manufacturing sector grew rapidly, rising from just over $150 per month in 2005 to around $350 per month in 2010 (Chiffre 11).13 More precisely, the wage
gap between the PRC and other high middle-income countries is closing, a trend
that will likely continue with certainty over the coming decade.

The PRC’s 12th Five-Year Plan projects that during the period 2011–2015, le
economy will grow at 7% per year on average. It also proposes that real wages will
grow as fast as GDP. Both growth rates are likely to be achieved which implies that
real monthly wages will double from around $350 per month to $700 per month over
the next decade. When combined with continued currency appreciation, the PRC’s
real wages could approach $1,000 per month within a decade or about the level of some of the higher middle-income countries (par exemple., Turkey and Brazil) et $2,000
per month by 2030 or the level of the Republic of Korea and Taipei,China today.

Signiﬁcant Changes in Employment Patterns and Location

Spillovers from the leading dragon phenomenon spurred by rising Chinese
wages are already helping to relocate its labor-intensive jobs to other lower-wage
countries.14 This is happening in several ways.

(je) The most evident is the ongoing transformation in the PRC’s manufacturing
sector. Following the ﬂying geese pattern of development, the country is tran-
sitioning from labor-intensive industries towards more advanced ones, avec
machinery becoming increasingly dominant in manufactured exports.14 New
evidence shows that urban manufacturing industries had restructured during
2002–2009. Par conséquent, the largest decline in manufacturing employment is
currently unfolding in textile, chemical ﬁber, printing and record media, à-
bacco processing, and nonmetallic mineral product industries (Chiffre 12).

(ii) The PRC’s restructuring could accelerate. D'abord, with rapid urbanization, expan-
sion of tertiary education, and greater labor market ﬂexibility, young workers
may be unwilling to stay locked in low-skill manufacturing jobs and may begin
to seek upward mobility. Although it will remain a “labor surplus” economy
jusqu'à 2014, the growing demand for service sector employees will gradually
stretch the Chinese job market (McMillan 2011). Deuxième, with gross domestic

13From Oxford Analytica, sur 28 Mars 2011. During 2010–2011, the PRC’s minimum wage for 30 munici-

palities rose by 25% ou plus.

14There is a possibility of relocating labor-intensive manufacturing from coastal regions to inland regions,
but the wage rate difference between the two regions is only 30%, and transportation and transaction costs are higher
in inland regions. Multinationals will be the ﬁrst to relocate to other low-income countries, and Chinese enterprises
will follow. Labor-intensive manufacturing will move to other low-income countries sooner or later, depending on
external and internal factors.

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76 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW

Chiffre 12. Sunset Manufacturing Sectors in the PRC—Change in Employment
in 2002–2009 (%)

15.00

10.00

5.00

0.00

–5.00

–10.00

–15.00

–20.00

–25.00

Note: This chart shows only those subsectors where employment is declining or rising more slowly than the average

for the urban manufacturing sector in the PRC.

Source: Banister and Cook 2011 and NBS, China Labor Statistical Yearbook 2010 (pour 2009 data).

savings as high as 45% for over 25 years and gross capital formation of over
50%, capital availability has increased substantially, with the channels for ex-
porting this capital largely open. The government encourages enterprises in
labor-intensive sectors to go global by providing guidance and incentives in-
cluding, but not limited to, setting up 19 industrial zones outside the PRC.

(iii) Evidently, rising wages in labor-intensive industries have already triggered re-
location of low wage jobs overseas. Many lower-wage countries in the PRC’s
neighborhood such as Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, et
Viet Nam, and even Bangladesh are emerging as the new growth nodes for gar-
ment, footwear, and other labor-intensive industries. The number of jobs each
country can attract depends on the incentives package it offers to investors.

(iv) Perhaps the most critical channel is outward FDI ﬂows from the PRC and other
emerging market economies to manufacturing sectors in lower-wage countries,
as explained in the next section.

Signiﬁcant Potential for Relocation of Jobs to Low-Wage Countries

Due to the sheer size of the PRC’s labor market, the number of jobs that the
ongoing industrialization will create for low-income countries is potentially huge.
As employment statistics for manufacturing is extremely sparse and tentative, nous
cannot provide any estimates of potential job relocation. Cependant, rough calculations

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LEADING DRAGON PHENOMENON 77

Tableau 2. Employment in Manufacturing, Potential Dragons, 2009–2010

Employment in Manufacturing (million)
Population (million)
Outward FDI ($ milliard 2010) Source: ILO, Penn World Tables, UNCTAD (2011). Brazil 13.1 192 11.5 RPC 85 1,324 68 India 8.7 1,140 14.6 Indonésie 12.5 277 2.7 Total 119.3 2,934 96.8 are informative and sufﬁcient. Actuellement, the PRC employs about 85 million workers nationwide in its manufacturing sector. Rising wages will force the PRC to upgrade to higher value-added and more capital-intensive and technology-intensive sectors and to relocate jobs in the existing sectors to countries that have a lower wage rate. India currently employs about 9 million workers and Brazil employs about 13 million (Tableau 2). These emerging market countries employ about 120 million workers whose jobs could be relocated to other developing countries in the coming decades. It seems reasonable to suggest that the leading dragon phenomenon alone can create sufﬁcient labor-intensive manufacturing jobs for developing sub-Saharan African countries to bring them to par with most industrial countries. Even if the PRC’s manufacturing sector sheds 10% of its total employment in the next few years, a pool of 8.5 million jobs will be ready to relocate overseas. The number could almost double employment in manufacturing in African countries in a few years, jumpstarting its process of industrialization. D. Accelerating the Leading Dragon Phenomenon in Sub-Saharan Africa—The Role of FDI Asian and African countries are not alone in competing for the millions of jobs relocating from the PRC. En particulier, in sub-Saharan Africa, the scarcity of local entrepreneurial skills and investment capital are invariably the top two constraints for a competitive manufacturing sector. Evidently, availability of outward FDI can enable them to overcome these constraints and take advantage of the leading dragon phenomenon to ﬁnally participate in the global production of labor-intensive products. Outward FDI from developing and transition economies reached $442
billion in 2011 (UNCTAD 2012). At the helm were the Russian Federation in
2011 and the PRC in 2010, while Brazil, India, Indonésie, and the Republic of
Korea (collectively, BRIICK) followed as the other key sources of FDI (Chiffre 13).
Roughly 60% of outward FDI from developing countries went into other developing
des pays, mostly in the form of greenﬁeld investments that can typically open
the door for South–South relocation of various industries from the PRC and other
emerging economies.

A large share of the PRC’s outward FDI is ﬂowing to Africa, growing from
a few hundred million dollars in 2002 to a cumulative amount of $13 billion by the end of 2010, accounting for 4% of the total stock of outward FDI (MOFCOM l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / direct . m je t . / e du a d e v / art – pdlf / / / / / 3 0 1 5 2 1 6 4 0 7 3 2 a d e v _ a _ 0 0 0 0 3 pd . f par invité 0 8 Septembre 2 0 2 3 78 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW Figure 13. Outward FDI from BRIICK Countries, 2000–2011 ($ billions)

70.0

60.0

50.0

40.0

30.0

20.0

10.0

0.0

–10.0

RPC 65.1

Russian Federation
67.3
Rep. of Korea
20.4

India 14.8

Brazil–1.0

Indonésie 7.8

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Brazil
Indonésie

RPC
Rep. of Korea

India
Russian Federation

Note: Indonesia was added to the BRIICK countries to meet the interest of readers.
Source: UNCTAD, data accessed 27 Août 2012.

2011). About 22% of outward FDI from the PRC is presently concentrated in
the manufacturing sectors, second only to mining which accounts for 29%. Dans 2010,
Chinese ﬁrms also increased the number of jobs created overseas by 10% and capital
investment by 2.5%. The PRC ranked eighth in the world according to job creation
overseas (FDI Intelligence 2011). Two recent papers found that the PRC’s outward
FDI has played a signiﬁcant role in the growth of African countries (Weisbrod
and Whalley 2011, Mlachila and Takebe 2011). India currently invests over 40%
of its outward FDI in manufacturing. In addition to a booming economy, India’s
liberalization reforms during the 1990s also facilitated the global spread of Indian
ﬁrms (Athukorala 2009, p. 146). A recent World Bank survey shows that over 64%
of Chinese ﬁrms operating in Ethiopia engage in manufacturing, creating 15,910
jobs (World Bank 2012, p. 12).

VI. Summary and Implications

The emergence of large middle-income countries such as Brazil, la RPC, et
India as new growth poles in the world and their dynamic growth and ascent up the
industrial ladder offer an unprecedented opportunity to all lower-income developing
économies, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, to accelerate industrialization and
catch-up. This paper tried to explain why.
En outre, this paper argues that:

(je) Economic development is a process of continuous industrial and technological
upgrading, and modern economic development is accompanied by structural

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LEADING DRAGON PHENOMENON 79

transformation. Nearly all countries that industrialized successfully adopted
CAF strategies to tap the latecomer advantage in a ﬂying geese pattern. Suc-
cessful industrialization in Japan before 1900, the “passing of the torch” from
the US to Japan after WWII, rapid catch-up of East Asian NIEs, the ASEAN4,
and latecomers such as the PRC and Viet Nam have all followed the ﬂying
geese pattern, albeit to varying degrees.

(ii) This paper provides evidence that not only are industries jumping across borders,
but those jumping industries are also upgrading. In the late 1970s and 1980s, le
lead geese for the PRC were the East Asian tigers. As the Republic of Korea and
Taipei,China are upgrading, industries that have relocated to the PRC are now
also ascending to higher-end products. In a fraction of the time it took Japan and
the East Asian tigers, the PRC has been able to replace simple labor-intensive
products with more sophisticated ones. This is enabled by a government that
fosters CAF industries.

(iii) Dynamic growth, high savings, and substantial investments in education have
triggered a rapid upgrading of the PRC’s factor endowments for more techno-
logically advanced industries. This has pushed up wages at an amazing rate since
2002, causing labor-intensive industries to contract. The PRC has an estimated
85–100 million workers in manufacturing, with most of them in labor-intensive
industries or labor-intensive segments of supply chains. As these industries shed
labor, they will create a huge opportunity for lower-wage countries to start labor-
intensive manufacturing production. This process, which we call the leading
dragon phenomenon, will offer millions of labor-intensive job opportunities
to developing countries. If Brazil, India, Indonésie, and other large middle-
income countries maintain their current pace of growth, a similar pattern and
employment space will arise.

(iv) Labor cost is only one of many factors for the ﬂying geese and leading dragon
phenomenon, governments in both leading and following countries have crit-
ical roles to play, as indicated in the Growth Identiﬁcation and Facilitation
Framework (Lin 2011 and 2012b). Low-income countries must compete to
gain access to capital, technologie, and capacity development opportunities. If
they have the right policy framework, the industrial upgrading in large emerg-
ing market economies, especially in the PRC, would provide them a golden
opportunity for dynamic manufacturing-sector-led growth in the years to come.

In an increasingly globalized world, opportunities for economic transfor-
mation abound. The emergence of a multi-polar world is a blessing even for the
most backward economies because it provides them a chance to enter a new age
of rapid industrialization and structural transformation. Clairement, the opportunities

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80 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW

that lie ahead for labor-abundant economies in Asia and Africa, which are cur-
rently exporting mostly minerals, are enormous—provided that they quickly formu-
late and implement credible economic development strategies consistent with their
comparative advantage. Cependant, the actual beneﬁt for countries and regions
depends very much on the right policy environment, institutions, and implemen-
tation capacities. Countries must still compete to gain access to capital, technologie,
and capacity development opportunities.

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