Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System

Network Connections
and the Emergence of
the Hub-and-Spokes
Alliance System in
East Asia

Yasuhiro Izumikawa

Why did the hub-
and-spokes alliance system emerge in East Asia? Why did a multilateral alli-
ance system not form there during the Cold War, while the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) was created in Europe? During the early 1950s,
the United States successively concluded bilateral alliances in East Asia; it did
so with Japan in September 1951, with the Republic of Korea (hereafter ROK
or South Korea) in October 1953, and with the Republic of China (hereafter
Taiwan) in December 1954. Ever since John Foster Dulles, the U.S. secretary of
state during the Dwight Eisenhower administration, referred to these allies as
“spokes on a wheel,” the term hub-and-spokes has become a popular meta-
phor to describe the U.S. alliance system in East Asia.1

Scholars of international relations theory have been trying to explain the ab-
sence of an alliance system in Asia similar to NATO.2 This article joins the
efforts to address this question, focusing on three U.S. bilateral alliances that

Yasuhiro Izumikawa is Professor at the Faculty of Policy Studies at Chuo University, Japan.

The author thanks the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments. He is also grateful to
the following individuals for their helpful comments on the earlier versions of this article: Nicho-
las Anderson, Victor Cha, Timothy Crawford, Yong Deng, Iain Henry, Sean Lynn-Jones, Tongª
Kim, Evan Resnick, Yuan-kang Wang, David Wolff, and Toshio Yamagishi. And for support and
advice regarding archival research in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States, he thanks
Masaya Inoue, Ayako Kusunoki, Jong-won Lee, Haruka Matsumoto, and Shingo Yoshida. The re-
search for this article was partially funded by Grants-in-Aid for Scientiªc Research, provided by
the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (Non. 19H00575 and No. 15K03333).

1. David W. Mabon, “Elusive Agreements: The Paciªc Pact Proposals of 1949–1951,” Paciªc Histor-
ical Review, Vol. 57, Non. 2 (May 1988), p. 164, doi.org/10.2307/4492264.
2. Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective
Identité, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,” International Organization, Vol. 56, Non. 3
(Été 2002), pp. 575–607, doi.org/10.1162/002081802760199890; Amitav Acharya, Whose Ideas
Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2009);
Victor D. Cha, “Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia,” International Security,
Vol. 34, Non. 3 (Hiver 2009/10), pp. 158–196, doi.org/10.1162/isec.2010.34.3.158; Victor D. Cha,
Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Presse, 2016); Kai He and Huiyun Feng, “‘Why Is There No NATO in Asia?’ Revisited: Prospect
Theory, Balance of Threat, and US Alliance Strategies,” European Journal of International Relations,
Vol. 18, Non. 2 (Juin 2012), pp. 227–250, doi.org/10.1177/1354066110377124; and Arthur A. Stein,
“Recalcitrance and Initiative: US Hegemony and Regional Powers in Asia and Europe after World
War II,” International Relations of the Asia-Paciªc, Vol. 14, Non. 1 (Janvier 2014), pp. 147–177, https://
www.jstor.org/stable/26156009.

International Security, Vol. 45, Non. 2 (Fall 2020), pp. 7–50, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00389
© 2020 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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International Security 45:2 8

constituted the core of the hub-and-spokes system: the U.S.-Japan alliance,
the U.S.–South Korea alliance, and the U.S.-Taiwan alliance. Why did these al-
liances not evolve into a multilateral alliance despite the existence of common
communist threats from the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China
(hereafter China), and North Korea?

Realists and constructivists offer explanations for the emergence of East
Asia’s hub-and-spokes alliance system. The most prominent explanations in
both schools emphasize that the system emerged because it was what the
dominant actor—the United States—wanted.3 It is true that the hub-and-
spokes system served U.S. interests better than a multilateral alliance would
have, given that the latter could have enabled relatively small U.S. allies to
constrain U.S. behavior more effectively than the former.4 These arguments are
fundamentally ºawed, cependant, because, as discussed below, the historical rec-
ord reveals that the United States desired and sought a multilateral alliance in
East Asia until the early 1960s. C'est, East Asia’s hub-and-spokes alliance
system persisted despite the U.S. preference for a multilateral alliance. Le
other arguments, which emphasize the role of the U.S. allies, offer only par-
tially accurate explanations as well.

This study shows that social exchange theory, rather than realism or con-
structivism, is the most promising approach to explain the puzzle of why a
multilateral alliance did not emerge in East Asia.5 More precisely, I argue that
the interaction dynamics through which East Asia’s hub-and-spokes alli-
ance system emerged can be best captured by the social exchange network
approach—a speciªc type of social network analysis (SNA) based on social ex-
change theory.6 This approach emphasizes the role of both system-level and

3. Hemmer and Katzenstein, “Why Is There No NATO in Asia?»; Cha, “Powerplay”; Cha,
Powerplay; Donald Crone, “Does Hegemony Matter? The Reorganization of the Paciªc Political
Économie,” World Politics, Vol. 45, Non. 4 (Juillet 1993), pp. 501–525, doi.org/10.2307/2950707; et
Galia Press-Barnathan, Organizing the World: The United States and Regional Cooperation in Asia and
Europe (New York: Routledge, 2003).
4. Daniel H. Nexon and Thomas Wright, “What’s At Stake in the American Empire Debate,»
American Political Science Review, Vol. 101, Non. 2 (May 2007), pp. 253–271, doi.org/10.1017/
S0003055407070220; Steve Weber, “Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power: Multilateralism in
NATO,” International Organization, Vo. 46, Non. 3 (Été 1992), pp. 633–680, doi.org/10.1017/
S0020818300027855; and G. John Ikenberry, “Multilateralism and U.S. Grand Strategy,” in Stewart
Patrick and Shepard Forman, éd., Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement
(Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 121–140.
5. For social exchange theory, see George C. Homans, Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms (Nouveau
York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1961); and Peter M. Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life
(New York: Wiley, 1964). Donne la vie. Baldwin noted more than four decades ago the applicability of
social exchange theory to international relations. Baldwin, “Power and Social Exchange,” American
Political Science Review, Vol. 72, Non. 4 (Décembre 1978), pp. 1229–1242, doi.org/10.2307/1954536.
6. Stephen Borgatti and Virginie Lopez-Kidwell argue that the social exchange network approach

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Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System 9

agent-level factors in shaping a network structure, and posits that the form of a
social network is shaped by the exchange patterns that develop among actors.7
I derive from this approach a theoretical model that explains how a speciªc
form of network may emerge among potential allies, and apply the model to
explain the emergence of East Asia’s hub-and-spokes alliance system.

The result of my analysis demonstrates that the preferences and behavior of
U.S. allies in the region proved at least as consequential as those of the United
States in shaping the hub-and-spokes alliance system, which emerged as an
unintended consequence of interactions among them. It was the U.S. allies that
actively, and aggressively when necessary, sought strong bilateral security ties
with the United States because such ties could provide far more security
than security ties formed among themselves. Par conséquent, the degree to
which the three U.S. allies felt the need to develop security ties among
themselves—the very element that would have transformed the hub-and-
spokes system into a multilateral alliance—was inversely inºuenced by the
strength of their respective ties with the United States. Such a linkage consti-
tutes what social exchange theorists call “negative connections” between the
United States’ security ties with its allies and the security ties among its allies;
the stronger the U.S. security ties with its ally developed and the more the
ally’s security needs were satisªed, the weaker the incentives the ally felt for
strengthening security ties with the other U.S. allies.8

This study makes three contributions to the study of alliance politics and
East Asian security. D'abord, it adds to the hotly contested debate on the origin

is one distinct type of theoretical underpinning for SNA. Stephen P. Borgatti and Virginie Lopez-
Kidwell, “Network Theory,” in John Scott and Peter J. Carrington, éd., The SAGE Handbook of So-
cial Network Analysis (Londres: Sage, 2011), pp. 46–47. For the works that introduce the basics of
SNA and its applicability to international relations, see Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Miles Kahler,
and Alexander H. Montgomery, “Network Analysis for International Relations,” International Or-
ganization, Vol. 63, Non. 3 (Été 2009), pp. 559–592, doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309090195; Miles
Kahler, éd., Networked Politics: Agency, Power, and Governance (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Presse, 2009); and Zeev Maoz, Networks of Nations: The Evolution, Structure, and Impact of International
Networks, 1816–2001 (New York: la presse de l'Universite de Cambridge, 2011).
7. For the social exchange network approach, see Linda D. Molm, “Theories of Social Exchange
and Exchange Networks,” in George Ritzer and Barry Smart, éd., Handbook of Social Theory (Lon-
don: Sage, 2001), pp. 260–272.
8. For the concept of network connection, see Karen S. Cook and Richard M. Émerson, “Power,
Equity and Commitment in Exchange Networks,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 43, Non. 5 (Oc-
tober 1978), pp. 721–739, doi.org/10.2307/2094546; Karen S. Cook et al., “The Distribution of
Power in Exchange Networks: Theory and Experimental Results,” American Journal of Sociology,
Vol. 89, Non. 2 (Septembre 1983), pp. 275–305, doi.org/10.1086/227866; and Toshio Yamagishi,
Mary R. Gillmore, and Karen S. Cook, “Network Connections and the Distribution of Power in Ex-
change Networks,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 93, Non. 4 (Janvier 1988), pp. 834–836,
doi.org/10.1086/228826.

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International Security 45:2 10

of East Asia’s hub-and-spokes system. It highlights the weaknesses of both
realist and constructivist explanations, and provides a more historically accu-
rate explanation.9 Second, it demonstrates the utility of SNA—the social ex-
change network approach, in particular—to alliance politics. Regarding an
alliance as an exchange of security goods and focusing on how alliance ties are
connected, this study demonstrates that the social exchange network approach
can highlight aspects of alliance politics that are overlooked by existing alli-
ance theories. Troisième, from a practical policy perspective, understanding the
origin of East Asia’s hub-and-spokes system enables scholars and decision-
makers to identify how and why the U.S. alliance system in the region is
changing and to devise appropriate policy responses. Properly understanding
the dynamics of alliance politics in East Asia is all the more important now be-
cause how to conduct U.S. alliance policy will be an urgent task for the next
administration, regardless of the outcome of the November 2020 presidential
election. As elsewhere, the constant attacks against alliances by President
Donald Trump have made the future of U.S. alliances in East Asia increas-
ingly uncertain.10

Dans la rubrique suivante, I examine the existing explanations for the absence
of a multilateral alliance in East Asia and discuss their limitations. I then pres-
ent a theoretical model based on the social exchange network approach
and derive from it hypotheses on the preferences and behavior of the United
States and its allies. Suivant, I test these hypotheses by analyzing the policies
of the United States and its allies during the early Cold War period. In the sub-
sequent section, I show how their interactions led to the emergence of East
Asia’s hub-and-spokes alliance system. I conclude by discussing this study’s
theoretical and policy implications.

Existing Explanations and Their Limitations

There are generally two categories of explanations for East Asia’s hub-and-
spokes alliance system. One is based on a constructivist approach, which em-
phasizes the role of ideational and normative factors.11 Christopher Hemmer

9. For a discussion on the importance of explaining a historically important case, see Stephen
Van Evera, Guide to the Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Presse, 1997), p. 74.
10. For a recent, systemic assessment of the virtues and vices of U.S. alliances, see Mira Rapp-
Hooper, Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America’s Alliances (Cambridge, Mass.: Har-
vard University Press, 2020).
11. Pierre J. Katzenstein, éd., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of

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Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System 11

and Peter Katzenstein argue that the lack of a collective identity between the
United States and its Asian allies has been an important cause of the absence of
a multilateral alliance.12 Using social identity theory, Hemmer and Katzenstein
claim that, while U.S. policymakers felt comfortable enough to develop a multi-
lateral alliance with their European allies given their sense of shared collective
identité, they were reluctant to do so with Asian allies because they regarded
Asians as different or even inferior. Criticizing Hemmer and Katzenstein’s
view as U.S.-centric, Amitav Acharya argues that a region-speciªc, Asian
norm that prioritizes the nonintervention aspect of state sovereignty has made
Asian states reluctant to accept institutionalized collective security arrange-
ments and, thus, has made a NATO-type multilateral alliance in Asia impossi-
ble.13 He claims that Asian states were averse to great power intervention as a
result of the experience of Western colonialism and that they viewed a collec-
tive security arrangement as a new form of control by the Western powers.
This hypersensitivity to any sign of infringements by the West on their
newly attained sovereignty doomed the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization
(SEATO), a multilateral alliance that never functioned properly from its incep-
tion in 1954.14 The other constructivist explanation emphasizes the role of his-
torical memory.15 John Dufªeld, Par exemple, argues that
the historical
memories of Japan’s atrocities before and during World War II made other
states in the Asia-Paciªc reluctant to endorse the creation of a multilateral alli-
ance that would include Japan.16

In contrast to constructivists, realists offer explanations that focus on the
material capabilities and intentions of the United States. The most inºuential
realist explanation posits that the United States preferred the hub-and-spokes

Il: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 46, Non. 2 (Spring
1992), pp. 391–425, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858; and Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of
International Politics (Cambridge: la presse de l'Universite de Cambridge, 1999).
12. Hemmer and Katzenstein, “Why Is There No NATO in Asia?»
13. Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter?
14. Ibid.. For the failure of the SEATO, see Leszek Buszynski, SEATO: The Failure of an Alliance
Strategy (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983); and Ji-Young Lee, “Contested American
Hegemony and Regional Order in Postwar Asia: The Case of Southeast Asia Treaty Organization,»
International Relations of the Asia-Paciªc, Vol. 19. Non. 2 (May 2019), pp. 237–267, est ce que je.org/10.1093/
irap/lcx016.
15. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa and Kazuhiko Togo, éd., East Asia’s Haunted Present: Historical Memories
and the Resurgence of Nationalism (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2008); and Gi-Wook Shin and Daniel
Sneider, Divergent Memories: Opinion Leaders and the Asia-Paciªc War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 2016).
16. John S. Dufªeld, “Why Is There No APTO? Why Is There No OSCAP? Asia-Paciªc Security In-
stitutions in Comparative Perspective,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 22, Non. 2 (Août 2001),
pp. 69–95, doi.org/10.1080/13523260512331391148; and Mabon, “Elusive Agreements,” pp. 163–
164, 169–170.

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International Security 45:2 12

system because it, rather than a multilateral alliance, maximized U.S. inºuence
over its allies.17 This argument is articulated theoretically by Victor Cha, OMS
puts forward the “powerplay” thesis.18 In line with the argument that great
powers use alliances to constrain small powers,19 this thesis posits that the
United States created the bilateral alliances to restrain South Korea and Taiwan
from initiating actions that might entrap the United States in an undesired war
with the communist bloc. Cha is careful to point out that the United States did
seek to create a multilateral alliance in 1950–51—the Paciªc Ocean pact, lequel
would have included Australia, Japan, Nouvelle-Zélande, and the Philippines—
but portrays the United States as primarily interested in “winning Japan” as an
ally and claims that “the Paciªc Ocean pact was window dressing.”20

While various constructivist and realist perspectives offer plausible explana-
tion, they have serious limitations. D'abord, Hemmer and Katzenstein’s argu-
ment does not stand up to empirical tests, because U.S. archival records clearly
show that the United States did pursue the creation of a multilateral alliance
even after the hub-and-spokes system had emerged. As elaborated below, le
Eisenhower administration seriously considered creating a multilateral sys-
tem, dubbed the Western Paciªc Collective Security initiative, during the
1950s.21 The administration’s National Security Council (NSC) documents
frequently referred to the goal of realizing the initiative, indicating the sig-
niªcance of this aspiration. This fact suggests that the lack of common identity
between the United States and its allies was insufªcient to stop Washington
from seriously seeking to create a multilateral alliance in Asia.

17. Vieille femme, “Does Hegemony Matter?” p. 504; and Press-Barnathan, Organizing the World.
18. Cha, “Powerplay”; and Cha, Powerplay.
19. Paul W. Schroeder, “Alliances, 1815–1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management,” in
Klaus Knorr, éd., Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems (Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 1976), pp. 227–262; James D. Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the
Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, Non. 4
(Novembre 1991), pp. 904–933, doi.org/10.2307/2111499; Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Di-
lemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics, Vol. 36, Non. 4 (Juillet 1984), pp. 461–495, doi.org/10.2307/
2010183; Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 180–
186; and Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alli-
ance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization, Vol. 44. Non. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137–168,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706792.
20. Cha, “Powerplay,” pp. 189–193, at p. 189.
21. Jong-won Lee, Higashiajia Reisen to Kanbeinichi Kankei [The Cold War in East Asia and South
Korean-U.S.-Japanese relations] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan, 1996), pp. 24–29; and Yasuyo
Sakata, “The Western Paciªc Collective Security Concept and Korea in the Eisenhower Years: Le
U.S.-ROK Alliance as an Asia-Paciªc Alliance,” Kanda Gaigo Daigaku Kiyo [The Journal of Kanda
University of International Studies], Non. 20 (Spring 2008), https://kuis.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action
(cid:2)pages_view_main&active_action(cid:2)repository_view_main_item_detail&item_id(cid:2)1264&item_no
(cid:2)1&page_id(cid:2)13&block_id(cid:2)17.

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Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System 13

Acharya’s argument also contradicts historical evidence, which suggests
that some East Asian states were, and are still, willing to accept serious limita-
tions on their sovereign rights in return for U.S. security guarantees. South
Korea agreed to allow the United States to retain command authority over its
military after the cease-ªre that halted the Korean War, and Japan remains
willing to host a number of U.S. bases. As for the historical memory explana-
tion, although it explains why some states, such as Australia and South Korea,
opposed including Japan in a multilateral alliance, it does not explain why oth-
ers supported Japan’s inclusion despite their experiences of Japan’s imperial-
ism before and during World War II. Arguably, Nationalist China suffered
Japan’s atrocities as severely as any because it had been ªghting a war of sur-
vival on its own soil since the 1930s. The United States also suffered severely
from the war with Japan. Néanmoins, they remained highly tolerant toward
Japan and desired its inclusion in an Asian multilateral alliance.

The realist argument proves as empirically problematic as the construc-
tivist explanations. D'abord, Cha’s powerplay argument, just as Hemmer and
Katzenstein’s, overlooks the Eisenhower administration’s continued efforts to
create a multilateral alliance even after the three bilateral alliances were estab-
léché. The powerplay argument underappreciates this aspect of U.S. politique
because it pays attention only to the U.S. archival documents before the com-
pletion of the hub-and-spokes system in 1953, but not to those after that.
Deuxième, the powerplay argument downplays the signiªcant role that U.S. allies
played in creating the hub-and-spokes system in East Asia. David Mabon
shows that Australia’s and Britain’s objections were serious obstacles to the
Paciªc Ocean pact proposal in 1950–51.22 Hideki Kan and Tatsuya Nishida em-
phasized that the failure of the proposal resulted less from the U.S. rational cal-
culation of its interests than from Japan’s reluctance.23

The Social Exchange Network Approach to Alliance Politics

Instead of constructivist or realist explanations, I propose a social exchange
network approach to explain the emergence of East Asia’s hub-and-spokes al-

22. Mabon, “Elusive Agreements.”
23. Hideki Kan, “America no Ajia niokeru Shudananzenhosho Koso to Nihon Saigunbi Mondai,
1948–51 (2)» [The idea of U.S. collective security arrangement in the Asia-Paciªc region, 1948–51,
Non. 2], Kitakyushu Daigaku Gaikokugogakubu Kiyo [Bulletin of Kitakyushu University Faculty of For-
eign Studies], Non. 62 (Mars 1988), pp. 19–21; and Tatsuya Nishida, “Ajiataiheiyo Chiiki niokeru
Anzenhosho Shisutemu no Hitotsu no Opushon” [An option to build an international security
system in the Asia-Paciªc], Kokusaiseiji [International Politics], Non. 158 (Janvier 2010), pp. 25–40,
https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/kokusaiseiji/2009/158/2009_158_158_25/_article/-char/ja.

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International Security 45:2 14

liance system. Below, I brieºy discuss the characteristics of SNA and introduce
a speciªc type of network analysis, the social exchange network approach.
Alors, I derive from the approach the hypotheses on the preferences and be-
havior of states.

the characteristics of the social exchange network approach

Au cours de la dernière décennie, SNA has become a popular tool in the ªeld of interna-
tional relations.24 A network is a set of interconnected actors or nodes, lequel
can be individuals, ªrms, states, or any other actor. They are linked through
various types of relations or ties, such as cultural links, international trade
ºows, or alliance ties. SNA regards the shape of networked relations among
actors as a social structure, analyzing how actors’ behavior is inºuenced by the
structure and, à son tour, how their behavior may shape the structure.

Although an alliance system can be easily conceived of as a network, the ap-
plication of SNA to alliance politics began only recently. Most of the relevant
works focus on testing such concepts as balance, the idea that if state X has alli-
ance ties with state Y and state Z, Y and Z are likely to become allies with each
other.25 Other international relations scholars utilize SNA’s insights to analyze
power relations in hub-and-spokes networks. Par exemple, Daniel Nexon
shows how a hub-and-spokes network allowed its hub state, Austria, to main-
tain the Hapsburg Empire consisting of its subordinate states (spokes), et
how the development of ties among the spokes enabled them to revolt against
the hub.26 Nexon and his coauthors also point out that the existing U.S. alli-
ance system resembles a typical empire system, as they both exhibit the char-
acteristics of a hub-and-spokes network between the hub state and its allies.27
The existing studies remain silent, cependant, on how such networks emerge
in the ªrst place.

24. Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and Montgomery, “Network Analysis for International Relations”;
Miles Kahler, “Networked Politics: Agency, Power, and Governance,” in Kahler, éd., Networked
Politique, pp. 1–20; and Maoz, Networks of Nations.
25. Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
Presse universitaire, 1997), pp. 210–232; and Zeev Maoz et al., “What Is the Enemy of My Enemy?
Causes and Consequences of Imbalanced International Relations, 1816–2001,” Journal of Politics,
Vol. 69, Non. 1 (Février 2007), pp. 100–115, doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00497.x; and Skyler J.
Cranmer, Bruce A. Desmarais, and Justin H. Kirkland, “Toward a Network Theory of Alliance For-
mation,” International Interactions, Vol. 38, Non. 3 (Juillet 2012), pp. 295–324, doi.org/10.1080/
03050629.2012.677741.
26. Daniel H. Nexon, The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conºict, Dynastic Em-
pires, and International Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009).
27. Nexon and Wright, “What’s At Stake in the American Empire Debate”; and Alexander Cooley
and Daniel H. Nexon, “‘The Empire Will Compensate You’: The Structural Dynamics of the U.S.
Overseas Basing Network,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 11, Non. 4 (Décembre 2013), pp. 1034–1050,
doi.org/10.1017/S1537592713002818.

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Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System 15

The social exchange network approach may ªll this gap.28 Social exchange
theory posits that actors are not self-sufªcient, and that relations among them
develop as they exchange the resources they need from one another.29 In gen-
eral, the theory assumes that any exchange entails an opportunity cost, et
that actors rationally seek to optimize the net beneªts through exchanges.30
This assumption suggests that an actor must carefully choose an exchange
partner who can offer the largest net beneªts—the sum of beneªts gained from
the partner minus the resources that it may offer in return—while forgoing less
rewarding exchange opportunities with other partners. The theory also as-
sumes that the law of decreasing marginal utility applies to any exchangeable
ressources, indicating that actors are highly motivated to obtain the resources
that they lack, whereas they are less motivated to do so when sufªcient in such
ressources. Applying these building-block notions to network analysis, the so-
cial exchange network approach points to two factors that shape an emergent
network among actors. One is the distribution of reward resources among ac-
tors. Because actors seek to maximize their net gains through exchanges, ce
factor tends to induce denser exchanges among resource-rich actors and to di-
minish those among others.31 The other factor is an actor’s attempt to shape
the network structure surrounding it. Not all actors may be satisªed with the
network structure likely to emerge as a result of the distribution of reward
ressources, and they may take actions, using carrots or sticks, to shape the net-
work structure in their own favor.32 Richard Emerson and his students extend
these logics to analyze relations among three or more actors and demon-

28. Social exchange theory and network analysis, although originating from different back-
grounds, share some important characteristics, and exchange theorists have increasingly paid at-
tention to the analysis of networked relations rather than that of simple dyadic relations. Karen S.
Cook and J.M. Whitmeyer, “Two Approaches to Social Structure: Exchange Theory and Net-
work Analysis,” Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 18 (Août 1992), pp. 109–127, doi.org/10.1146/
annurev.so.18.080192.000545.
29. Homans, Social Behavior; and Blau, Exchange and Power. The resources exchanged can be either
tangible or intangible, depending on the contexts or frameworks in question. This study focuses
on the exchange of tangible resources.
30. For a detailed discussion on optimization and its difference from maximization, see David A.
Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 23, Non. 1 (Janvier 1997),
pp. 18–22, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20097464.
31. Richard M. Émerson, “Exchange Theory, Part I: A Psychological Basis for Social Exchange,»
and Richard M. Émerson, “Exchange Theory, Part II: Exchange Relations and Network Struc-
photos,” in Joseph Berger, Morris Zelditch Jr., and Bo Anderson, éd., Sociological Theories in Progress,
Vol. 2 (Boston: Houghton Mifºin, 1972), pp. 38–57, 58–87, respectivement.
32. Cook et al., “The Distribution of Power in Exchange Networks”; Yamagishi, Gillmore, et
Cook, “Network Connections”; Linda D. Molm, “Risk and Power Use: Constraints on the Use of
Coercion in Exchange,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 62, Non. 1 (Février 1997), pp. 113–133,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2657455?seq(cid:2)5#metadata_info_tab_contents; and Linda D. Molm,
Coercive Power in Social Exchange (New York: la presse de l'Universite de Cambridge, 1997).

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International Security 45:2 16

strate that the approach can explain the development of a complex network
of relations.33

As Glenn Snyder explicitly states that “an alliance is an exchange,” relations
among allies can be conceptualized as exchanges of various security-related
resources.34 Such resources include defense commitments, military aid, arms
transfers, basing rights, access to geostrategically signiªcant locations, et
control over allies, all of which constitute a state’s capability to provide secu-
rity for other states.35 Thus, the social exchange network approach is highly
applicable to explaining the formation of a network among allies.

hypotheses and research design

Assume that there exist four potential allies—A, B, C, and D—that face com-
mon external threats, although to different degrees. Among them, A possesses
by far the dominant military and economic resources that enable it to provide
security for the others. Assume also that B possesses the second highest
amount of resources, whereas C and D are endowed with fewer resources
than B. These assumptions are adopted to make the model similar to the situa-
tion in East Asia. All four states try to meet their security needs by exchanging
various kinds of security-related resources. The more security exchanges they
conduct, the stronger are the security ties that develop among them.

Given the distribution of capabilities to provide security among the four, B,
C, and D prioritize developing security ties with A rather than among them-
selves, and they all desire to establish security ties with A more strongly than
A would desire to do so with any one of the three (spoke’s preference hypothe-
sis). This is because B, C, and D could beneªt much more from security ties
with A than A could with any of the three. On the other hand, A prioritizes de-
veloping security ties with B, which can provide the largest security beneªts
among the three (hub’s preference hypothesis). Par conséquent, it is highly likely
that the strongest bilateral security ties are likely to emerge between A and B.
Once security ties emerge between A and B, the strength of A’s security ties
with C and D is inversely related to, or negatively connected with, to borrow
the term from social exchange theory,36 the strength of its security ties with B

33. Émerson, “Exchange Theory, Part II”; and Cook et al., “The Distribution of Power in Exchange
Networks.”
34. Snyder, Alliance Politics, p. 166.
35. Tongª Kim also focuses on a state’s ability to provide security as an important variable in alli-
ance politics. Kim, The Supply Side of Security: A Market Theory of Military Alliances (Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 2016).
36. Émerson, “Exchange Theory, Part II,” pp. 70–71; and Karen S. Cook, “Emerson’s Contributions

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Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System 17

(hub-spoke negative connection hypothesis). This is because A becomes less
willing to strengthen security ties with C and D when it obtains sufªcient secu-
rity beneªts from B, but becomes more willing to do so when it cannot obtain
sufªcient security beneªts from B.37

Even when A remains unwilling to strengthen security ties with C and D,
the latter two will not simply give up. Plutôt, obtaining A’s security commit-
ments is so important for C and D that they are likely to initiate actions, ou
what international relations scholars call “binding strategies,” to do so.38 Al-
though a state usually uses “carrots” (reward binding) to obtain stronger de-
fense commitments from its potential ally, C and D may have no choice but to
use “sticks” (coercive binding) despite the risk of infuriating and further alien-
ating A (coercive binding hypothesis).39 According to social exchange theo-
rists, an actor highly dependent upon another but lacking the resources that
may induce the latter’s cooperation—just like C and D in this situation—
becomes willing to use coercive means to obtain the latter’s cooperation be-
cause the success of coercion can greatly improve the existing situation, alors que
its failure may worsen the prevailing situation only marginally.40

As for security ties among B, C, and D, their willingness to strengthen such
ties among themselves is negatively connected with the strength of their re-
spective security ties with A; the more security commitments B, C, or D ob-
tains from A, the less willing each of them becomes to strengthen security ties
with the other two, and vice versa (inter-spoke negative connection hypothe-
sis). A simple cost-beneªt calculus explains this logic. When each of the three
obtains sufªcient security commitments from A, the value of the additional se-
curity that each of them obtains from the other two is marginal, while the cost
of providing security for the other two tends to be substantial for each of the
three, given its limited capabilities to provide security. When B, C, or D cannot
obtain sufªcient security commitments from A, in contrast, its incentives to

to Social Exchange Theory,” in Cook, éd., Social Exchange Theory (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1987),
pp. 216–217.
37. The concept of network connection is different from what Robert Jervis calls interconnection,
which merely refers to connections among variables that comprise a complex system. Jervis, Sys-
tem Effects, pp. 17–28.
38. Daniel H. Nexon, “The Balance of Power in the Balance,” World Politics, Vol. 61, Non. 2 (Avril
2009), p. 346, doi.org/10.1017/S0043887109000124; and Yasuhiro Izumikawa, “Binding Strategies
in Alliance Politics: The Soviet-Japanese-US Diplomatic Tug of War in the Mid-1950s,” International
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 62, Non. 1 (Mars 2018), pp. 108–120, doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqx070.
39. Izumikawa, “Binding Strategies in Alliance Politics,” p. 110.
40. Hubert M. Blalock Jr., “A Power Analysis of Conºict Process,” in Edward J. Lawler and Barry
Markovsky, éd., Advance in Group Process: A Research Annual, Vol. 4 (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press,
1987), pp. 12–13; Molm, “Risk and Power Use”; and Molm, Coercive Power in Social Exchange.

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International Security 45:2 18

strengthen security ties with the other two increase. This is partly because its
insecurity makes the additional security beneªts that it obtains from the other
two highly valuable, and partly because strengthening ties with the other two
enhances its relative bargaining position vis-à-vis A in persuading the latter to
provide more security for itself.41 That is, B, C, and D will become willing
to develop a collective security mechanism when their security is not assured
by A.42

It is important to note that this theoretical model does not predict that A will
oppose the strengthening of security ties among B, C, and D. A’s attitude to-
ward security ties among the other three is determined by the likelihood that
such ties will generate security beneªts for A. C'est, A supports stronger ties
among B, C, and D if such ties create positive security externalities for A,
whereas A opposes such ties if they reduce the overall security beneªt
for itself.

Below, I analyze the process through which East Asia’s hub-and-spokes alli-
ance system emerged and stabilized during the 1950s and the early 1960s to
show how the observations obtained from the case studies ªt the hypotheses
stated above.43 By doing so, this study also serves as a plausibility probe for
the social exchange network approach as a potential tool to explain alliance
politics.44 In conducting case studies, I use both process tracing and congru-
ence methods. Process tracing is an ideal method to examine the underlying
causes of state behavior, and I make the most of it to reveal the preferences and
intentions of the four states.45 The method may not generate sufªcient evi-
dence, cependant, because available sources may be limited. Dans de tels cas, j'utilise
the congruence method and examine the degree of ªtness between the values

41. Small powers are expected to gain disproportionate inºuence in them. Robert O. Keohane, Af-
ter Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1984); John Gerard Ruggie, éd., Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an
Institutional Form (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); and Cha, “Powerplay.”
42. This logic is similar to that of the so-called quasi-alliance theory, which posits that quasi al-
lies—states that are not in alliance but share a common ally—enhance their security cooperation
when they both fear abandonment by their common ally. Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antago-
nism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999). Ce
theory can be subsumed into the logic of social exchange network.
43. The Kennedy administration did not abandon the goal of multilateralizing the alliance system
in East Asia and emphasized the creation of “the New Paciªc Community.” It was the Lyndon
Johnson administration that admitted the impracticality of transforming the existing alliance sys-
tem in East Asia. Yang-hyeon Jo, Ajia Chiikishugi to Amerika: Betonamu Sensoki no Ajiataiheiyo
Kokusaikankei [Asian regionalism and the United States: international relations in the Asia-Paciªc
during the Vietnam War era] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 2009), p. 47.
44. Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sci-
ences (Cambridge, Mass.: AVEC Presse, 2005), p. 75.
45. Ibid., pp. 205–224.

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Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System 19

of causes and effects expected by the hypotheses.46 More precisely, I ªrst assess
whether and why the United States preferred the hub-and-spokes alliance sys-
tem or a multilateral alliance in East Asia. I also analyze U.S. behavior to-
ward its allies, and whether or how U.S.-Japan bilateral relations inºuenced
Washington’s policies toward South Korea and Taiwan. I then analyze the be-
havior of the three U.S. allies toward the United States and one another. In do-
ing so, I utilize archival materials collected in the United States, Japan, et
Taiwan, as well as Korean archival materials available online, while making
use of recent secondary sources that employ non-U.S. archival materials.

The United States: Seeking a Defensive Multilateral Alliance

Both major realist and constructivist explanations posit that the United States
preferred a hub-and-spokes alliance system to a multilateral system. This view
is fundamentally ºawed, as U.S. archival documents show that Washington
preferred a multilateral alliance to the hub-and-spokes system in East Asia
even after the latter emerged.

the hub’s initial attitudes toward the spokes

When the Cold War required the United States to revise its East Asian security
strategy, U.S. policymakers’ main focus was Japan. By the summer of 1947,
George Kennan, the director of the Department of State Policy Planning Staff,
keenly recognized Japan’s geostrategic signiªcance and opposed what he
viewed as an outdated policy of Japan’s complete disarmament. He argued
that Japan should be defended by the United States to deny it to the Soviet
bloc.47 The leaders of the U.S. military shared this opinion and went even fur-
ther than Kennan’s assessment. According to NSC 49, which was prepared
by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in June 1949, Japan was “of high strategic
importance to United States security interests in the Far East . . . because of [its]
geographic location” and its “manpower and . . . industrial potentials.”48 The
document further stated that “Japan [pourrait] be expected, with planned initial
U.S. assistance, at least to protect herself and . . . to contribute importantly to

46. Ibid., pp. 181–192.
47. George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925–1950 (Boston: Atlantic-Little, Brun, 1967), pp. 375–381; et
Ayako Kusunoki, Yoshida Shigeru to Anzenhosho Seisaku no Keisei [Shigeru Yoshida and the forma-
tion of security policy] (Kyoto: Minerva, 2009), pp. 60–65.
48. NSC 49, Juin 15, 1949, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1949, Vol. 7: Le
Far East and Australasia, Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Ofªce [GPO], 1976),
pp. 774–775.

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International Security 45:2 20

military operations against the Soviets in Asia.”49 Accordingly, the United
States contemplated making some form of security arrangement with Japan
even before the outbreak of the Korean War.50

In contrast, the U.S. government originally recognized only limited strategic
value in South Korea and Taiwan. In September 1947, the JCS conªrmed its
earlier assessment that “the United States ha[d] little strategic interest in
maintaining the present troops and bases in Korea” and that “the with-
drawal of these forces would not impair the military position of the Far East
Command.”51 Accordingly, the U.S. government pursued the establishment of
a neutral and uniªed Korea through the United Nations (UN), and completed
the withdrawal of its troops there by July 1949. The U.S. government also as-
sessed that the strategic value of Taiwan was not sufªcient to make U.S. de-
fense commitments there. NSC 48/2 stated that “the strategic importance of
Formosa [c'est à dire., Taiwan] does not justify overt military action” and that “the
United States should make every effort to strengthen the over-all U.S. position
with respect to the Philippines, the Ryukyus, and Japan.”52 These assessments
were behind the famous speech by Secretary of State Dean Acheson in January
1950, in which he excluded both Korea and Taiwan from the U.S. defense pe-
rimeter in the Paciªc.53

u.s. pursuit of a “western paciªc collective defense”

It is important to note, cependant, that U.S. policymakers did not regard bilat-
eral security cooperation with Japan as an end in itself. NSC 125/2, approved
in August 1952 under Harry Truman’s administration, stated that a “strong,
stable, and independent Japan restored to an inºuential position in Asia could
be the most effective ally of the United States in Asia.” This assessment was ac-
cepted because “Japan’s military strength,” when developed, “can contribute
to the security of the free nations of the Paciªc area and of the northern portion

49. Ibid., p. 774; and Kusunoki, Yoshida Shigeru, pp. 61–62.
50. Meticulously analyzing U.S. archival documents, Ayako Kusunoki argues that both the Penta-
gon and the Department of State considered the necessity of security arrangements with Japan,
but could not agree on how to secure the U.S. bases after Japan restored its sovereignty. Kusunoki,
Yoshida Shigeru, pp. 92–96, 99–102. Also see Futoshi Shibayama, Nihon no Saigunbi [Rearming
Japan] (Kyoto: Minerva, 2010), pp. 254–255.
51. Memo by the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State, Septembre 26, 1947, FRUS, 1947,
Vol. 6: The Far East (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1972), pp. 817–818.
52. NSC 48/2, Décembre 30, 1949, FRUS, 1949, Vol. 7, Part 2, pp. 1219–1220.
53. Warren I. Cohen, “Acheson, His Advisors, and China, 1949–1950,” and John Lewis Gaddis,
“The Strategic Perspective: The Rise and Fall of the ‘Defensive Perimeter’ Concept, 1947–1951,” in
Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs, éd., Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations, 1947–1950
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), pp. 13–52 and 61–118, respectivement.

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Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System 21

of the off-shore island chain,” thereby reducing U.S. security burdens in the re-
gion.54 Furthermore, NSC 125/2 states that “the United States should encour-
age and where desirable participate in collective security arrangements in the
Paciªc area which would include Japan as an important member. Such ar-
rangements would facilitate Japan’s contribution to the security and economy
of the free nations of the area.”55 These statements reveal the U.S. desire for de-
veloping a multilateral security system in East Asia, and that Japan’s sig-
niªcance for the United States lay in its ability to contribute to regional
security in East Asia.

The U.S. desire for a multilateral alliance in East Asia became more evident
under the Eisenhower administration. NSC 5416, prepared by the JCS in April
1954, lamented that “too little [effort was made] upon the development of the
collective military capabilities of the Asiatic non-Communist countries” and
expressed that “the emergence of a regional security pact” was required to ac-
complish U.S. security objectives “without ever-increasing demands upon
United States resources.”56 The document stipulated that the critical piece of
the regional security pact was “the healthy development of the Japanese mili-
tary,” which would enable Japan to “become capable of providing for her own
security and of becoming a contributor to collective security in the Western
Paciªc.”57 This view was accepted by the NSC and reºected in NSC 5429/5,
the administration’s comprehensive Asia policy approved in December 1954.
It stipulated that the United States should “encourage the conditions necessary
to form as soon as possible and then participate in a Western Paciªc collective
defense arrangement
the Republic of
Chine, and the Republic of Korea, eventually linked with the Manila Pact
and ANZUS.”58

including the Philippines,

Japan,

What the United States envisioned was a defensive multilateral system that
was expected to reduce its security burdens in the region. In accordance with
the “New Look” policy, the Eisenhower administration aimed to limit military
spending to an acceptable level, and it planned to allow its local allies to as-
sume more costs and defense obligations, the provision of land troops in par-

54. NSC 125/2, Août 7, 1952, FRUS, 1952–54, Vol. 14: China and Japan, Part 2 (Washington, D.C.:
GPO, 1985), pp. 1303–1304.
55. Ibid., p. 1305.
56. NSC 5416, Avril 10, 1954, FRUS, 1952–54, Vol. 12: East Asia and the Paciªc, Part 1 (Washington,
D.C.: GPO, 1984), pp. 415–416.
57. Ibid., p. 418.
58. NSC 5429/5, Décembre 22, 1954, FRUS, 1952–54, Vol. 12, Part 1, p. 1066. The Manila Pact is
the treaty that formed SEATO. ANZUS is the alliance among Australia, Nouvelle-Zélande, et le
États-Unis.

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International Security 45:2 22

ticular.59 A multilateral security framework, in which U.S. allies contributed to
each other’s security, was thus considered more desirable than a hub-and-
spokes system.60 On the other hand, the U.S. government recognized that the
negative effects of promoting such an alliance were the heightened risk of en-
trapment into undesired wars triggered by anti-communist states such as
South Korea and Taiwan, and the resulting divergence between those anti-
communist states and neutral states.61 How to manage these potential prob-
lems would complicate the U.S. pursuit of a multilateral alliance in East Asia,
as discussed below.

To achieve the goal of forming a multilateral alliance, the Eisenhower ad-
ministration undertook concrete initiatives. One was the Mutual Security
Assistance Agreement with Japan signed in March 1954. By concluding the
agreement, the United States aimed to encourage Japan to accelerate its
military buildup. Another initiative was the U.S. attempt to promote a Seoul-
Tokyo rapprochement. The Eisenhower administration regarded the rap-
prochement between the two countries as the ªrst step for enhancing
multilateral security cooperation in East Asia, and actively encouraged them
to normalize relations. Its efforts did not bear fruit, cependant, as U.S. diplo-
macy met strong resistance from both states. Par exemple, when President
Eisenhower invited South Korean President Syngman Rhee to the White
House in July 1954 and asked him to normalize relations with Japan, Rhee ada-
mantly refused, making Eisenhower angry.62 The John F. Kennedy administra-
tion invigorated the efforts to bridge the gap between Seoul and Tokyo, but it
was only in 1965 that the U.S. government ªnally succeeded in getting its two
allies to normalize relations.63

59. Marc S. Gallicchio, “The Best Defense Is a Good Offense: The Evolution of American Strategy
in East Asia, 1953–1960,” in Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye, éd., The Great Powers in East Asia,
1953–1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. 68–70; and John Lewis Gaddis, Strat-
egies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 1982), pp. 147–153.
60. Lee, Higashiajia, pp. 16–20, 24–29; Nishida, “Ajiataiheiyo,” pp. 30–31; and John Welªeld, Un
Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System: A Study in the Interaction of Domestic
Politics and Foreign Policy (Londres: Athlone, 1988), pp. 50–51.
61. Yasuyo Sakata, “Aizenhawa Seiken no Nishitaiheiyo Shudananzenhosho Koso to Beikan-
kankei” [The Eisenhower administration’s Western Paciªc collective security concept and U.S.-
Korea relations], Hogaku Kenkyu [Journal of Law, Politique, and Sociology], Vol. 83, Non. 12 (De-
cember 2010), p. 452, http://koara.lib.keio.ac.jp/xoonips/modules/xoonips/detail.php?koara_id
(cid:2)AN00224504-20101228-0445.
62. Pyo-wook Han, “Li Shoban to Kanbei Gaiko (5)» [Syngman Rhee and South Korean–U.S. di-
in Kantogakuin Hogaku
plomacy no. 5],
[Kantogakuin Legal Studies], Vol. 13, Non. 1 (Juillet 2003), pp. 92–93.
63. Jong-wong Lee, “Nikkan Kaidan no Seiji Ketchaku to Beikoku: ‘Ohira-Kim Memo’ heno
Michinori” [Political settlement of South Korean–Japanese negotiations and the United States:

translated by Sun-won Soh and Yasuyo Sakata,

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Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System 23

Japan: Advocating Security Bilateralism

Victor Cha argues that controlling Japan bilaterally was a persistent goal for
the United States after World War II.64 It was not the United States but Japan,
cependant, that revealed a strong preference for security bilateralism, and it
strongly resisted U.S. efforts to multilateralize East Asia’s alliance system.
Ironically, what enabled Japan to free-ride on U.S. security efforts was the
strong U.S. alliance commitments to Japan and U.S. alignments with South
Korea and Taiwan.

toward the hub: searching for a bilateral alliance

Japan ªrst indicated its desire for a U.S.-Japan bilateral alliance as early as
Septembre 1947, when Foreign Minister Hitoshi Ashida handed to the U.S.
side the so-called Ashida Memorandum, which signaled Tokyo’s willingness
to conclude a bilateral security treaty.65 While the Japanese government had
believed that it would have to accept a restrictive and punitive security ar-
rangement at the beginning of the U.S. occupation, the steadily intensifying
Cold War encouraged Japan to explore various options for its post-occupation
security. Although Ashida’s message did not solicit a meaningful U.S.
response, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs concluded by December 1949
that some form of security arrangement with the United States would best
serve its needs, according to studies based on Japanese archives.66

An important impetus for a U.S.-Japan alliance came from Tokyo in May
1950, when Japan’s prime minister, Shigeru Yoshida, instructed his protégé,
Finance Minister Hayato Ikeda, to secretly inform the U.S. government that
Japan was prepared to conclude a security treaty.67 Signiªcantly, Yoshida indi-
cated his willingness to keep U.S. bases in Japan after the end of the U.S. occu-
pation, even offering “to ask the United States to retain its bases in Japan from

path to the Kim-Ohira Memorandum], in John-wong Lee, Tadasi Kimiya, and Toyomi Asano, éd.,
Rekishi toshiteno Nikkan Kokkoseijoka [History of South Korean–Japanese Diplomatic Normalization]
(Tokyo: Hosei Daigaku Shuppankai, 2011), pp. 83–114.
64. Cha, Powerplay, pp. 122–160.
65. Kusunoki, Yoshida Shigeru, pp. 149–154.
66. Ibid., pp. 136–142, 164–166; and Hiroshi Nakanishi, “Kowa nimuketa Yoshida Shigeru no
Anzenhosho Koso” [Shigeru Yoshida’s security policy vision for the peace treaty], in Yukio Ito and
Minoru Kawada, éd., Kantaiheiyo no Kokusaichitsujo no Mosaku to Nihon [Quest for international or-
der in the Paciªc Rim and Japan] (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1999), p. 286.
67. Kusunoki, Yoshida Shigeru, pp. 116–118; and John Swenson-Wright, Unequal Allies? Uni
States Security and Alliance Policy toward Japan, 1945–1960 (Stanford, Calif.: Université de Stanford
Presse, 2005), p. 56.

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International Security 45:2 24

the Japanese side if the U.S. side ªnd it difªcult to make such a request.”68
Yoshida knew that the status of U.S. bases in Japan had been the stumbling
block that plagued U.S. policymakers. Although a consensus had already
emerged within the U.S. government that some kind of security arrangement
with an independent Japan was necessary, U.S. policymakers disagreed on
how to proceed because they believed that once sovereignty was restored,
leaders in Tokyo would oppose the retention of U.S. bases on Japanese terri-
tory.69 Yoshida’s offer thus served as the ice breaker, enabling the Department
of State to persuade the Department of Defense to sign the memorandum sup-
porting Japan’s independence on June 23.70

From October 1950 to January 1951, senior diplomats, Yoshida’s security
policy advisers, and Yoshida himself held a series of meetings to decide how
Japan should present its post-independence security policy to the U.S. delega-
tion scheduled to arrive in late January 1951. During the process, the group’s
focus was on how to secure the strongest possible U.S. security commitments
to Japan. Early on, Yoshida expressed skepticism of the United Nations and in-
structed diplomats to create “a framework that would completely satisfy
Japan’s security,” meaning a U.S.-Japan bilateral security framework.71
Yoshida’s advisers frequently expressed the fear that the United States might
abruptly withdraw its troops from Japan. Ainsi, they argued that Japan should
“bind the United States [to defending Japan] via a treaty in order to prevent
U.S. unilateral disengagement,”72 and that “the treaty should be designed to
provide as many beneªts as possible to the United States.”73 Ministry of
Foreign Affairs ofªcials took this advice and wrote up a draft U.S.-Japan treaty.
When the U.S. delegation led by John Foster Dulles, the consultant to the
secretary of state on the peace treaty with Japan, came to Tokyo, the Japanese
negotiating team presented the aforementioned draft on February 1, 1951.
The U.S. side responded favorably, and they decided to pursue a bilateral se-
curity arrangement based on this proposal. When a U.S. delegation member
“inquired as to whether Japan was willing to contribute to such a regional col-
lective defense pact,” the Japanese side immediately dismissed it, maintaining

68. Kiichi Miyazawa, Tokyo to Washington no Mitsudan [Secret communication between Tokyo and
Washington] (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1999), p. 55.
69. Kusunoki, Yoshida Shigeru, pp. 115–116.
70. Ibid., p. 118.
71. Gaimusho Joyakukyoku Hokika, “Heiwajoyaku no Teiketsu nikansuru Chosho III” [The re-
cord on the conclusion of the peace treaty no. 3], in Gaimusho, Nihon Gaiko Bunsho: Heiwajoyaku no
Teiketsu nikansuru Chosho [Japan’s diplomatic documents: the record on the conclusion of the peace
treaty] (henceforth Choso], Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Gaimusho, 2002), pp. 570–572, 574. Hereafter, the original
Japanese texts were translated by this author.
72. This phrase was used by two of Yoshida’s advisers. Ibid., p. 579.
73. Ibid., pp. 578–579.

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Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System 25

that Japan “[pourrait] not go beyond what it would do under the U.S.-Japan co-
operative accord that had been discussed.”74 Reºecting on the entire negotia-
tions for the peace treaty and the security treaty, Kumao Nishimura, Japan’s
senior diplomat involved in every aspect of the preparations and negotiations
for the peace and security treaties, claimed that the bilateral security treaty
was Japan’s initiative.75

tokyo’s relative satisfaction with u.s. security commitments

While the U.S.-Japan security treaty, signed in September 1951, had some prob-
lems from Japan’s perspective, the Japanese government was generally con-
tent with the level of U.S. security commitments. The treaty guaranteed the
United States the right to intervene to quell domestic disturbances within
Japan, d'un côté, but did not clearly stipulate a U.S. obligation to de-
fend Japan.76 The opposition parties criticized Yoshida for these shortfalls, call-
ing the treaty “unequal.” While the Japanese ofªcials who had negotiated the
treaty with the United States recognized these problems, neither they nor
Yoshida considered these problems as reºecting the weakness of U.S. commit-
ments. They were fully aware that the U.S. government evaluated Japan’s
geopolitical value as signiªcant.
En effet, NSC 125/2, as well as many
other documents, states that Japan was so signiªcant for U.S. security that
“the United States would ªght to prevent hostile forces from gaining control of
any part of the Japanese territory,” and Japanese ofªcials were well aware
of the U.S. policy.77 Thus, for Japanese ofªcials, it was unthinkable that the
United States would not respond militarily if Japan, where U.S. forces
were stationed, were attacked.78 After all, these shortfalls were resolved
when the security treaty was replaced in 1960 by a new treaty, which stipu-
lated the U.S. defense obligation toward Japan while omitting the U.S. right to
intervene domestically.

resisting multilateralism

In contrast to its willingness to develop bilateral security ties with the United
États, Japan consistently opposed joining any regional security system. Prime
Minister Yoshida’s well-known reluctance to develop Japan’s military capabili-

74. Gaimusho, Chosho, Vol. 4, p. 42.
75. Kumao Nishimura, Anzenhosho Joyakuron [Analyzing the Security Treaty]
Tsushinsha,1959), p. 27.
76. Ibid., pp. 31–32, 41–49; and Kusunoki, Yoshida Shigeru, pp. 239–240.
77. NSC 125/2, FRUS, 1952–54, Vol. 14, Part 2, p. 1302.
78. Shigeru Yoshida, Kaiso Junen [Recollecting ten years], Vol. 3 (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1957),
pp. 117–118.

(Tokyo:

Jiji

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International Security 45:2 26

ties was one reºection of such attitudes. During the negotiation process of
le 1954 U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Assistance Agreement, par exemple, le
Japanese government repeatedly demanded the elimination of the term “col-
lective defense” from the agreement, thereby irritating the U.S. side, dont
primary goal for the agreement was precisely to encourage Japan to develop
its military capabilities for regional collective defense.79 When U.S. ofªcials in-
quired about the possibility of Japan’s joining a northeast Asian collective alli-
ance in July 1954, a senior Japanese diplomat stated that “Japan would not
be able to participate in a collective defense organization since Article 9 de
the Japanese Constitution [était] generally interpreted to prohibit the sending
of Japanese forces abroad.”80 U.S. Ambassador to Japan John Allison assessed
that “there [était] practically no possibility that Japan at present would consid-
er joining any collective security organization.”81

Japan’s reluctance to contribute to regional security was most vividly re-
vealed in its attempt to revise the U.S.-Japan security treaty in 1955. In July
1955, Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu handed a draft of a revised U.S.-
Japan security treaty to Ambassador Allison and proposed to discuss it during
his coming visit to Washington.82 The draft was remarkable in that it stipulated
that Japan would “act to meet the common danger” in the case of an armed at-
tack against areas such as Guam while requiring the eventual U.S. military
withdrawal from Japan.83 The Japanese side subsequently clariªed that this
treaty “would obligate Japan to send its troops overseas” when conditions
were met.84 The U.S. government welcomed Japan’s initiative as the ªrst sign
that Tokyo had become willing to contribute to regional collective defense.85 In
fact, this was the only occasion during the entire Cold War period that the

79. Shintaro Ikeda, Nichibeidomei no Seijishi: Allison Taishi to “1955nen Taisei” no Seiritsu [Political
history of the U.S.-Japan alliance: U.S. Ambassador Allison and the establishment of the 1955 sys-
tem] (Tokyo: Kokusai Shoin, 2004), p. 62.
80. Memo from Walter Drew, Juillet 21, 1954, FRUS, 1952–54, Vol. 12, Part 1, p. 649 n. 1.
81. Allison to the Department of State, Août 4, 1954, FRUS, 1952–54, Vol. 12, Part 1, p. 695.
82. Kazuya Sakamoto, Nichibeidomei no Kizuna [The U.S.-Japan alliance ties] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku,
2000), pp. 142–151; and Shingo Yoshida, Nichibei Domei no Seidoka [Institutionalization of the U.S.-
Japan alliance] (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 2012), pp. 38–41.
83. “Tentative Draft of Mutual Defense Treaty between Japan and the United States of Amer-
ica,” July 20, 1955, in File Code 0611-2010-0791-08, Nichibei Anzenhosho Joyakuka, “Nichibei
Anpojoyaku no Kaisei niitaru Keii No. 8» [The sequence of events concerning the revision of the
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty no. 8], CD Vol. H22-003, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affaires (hereafter DA), Tokyo, Japan.
84. “Shimoda-Parsons Kaidan, First Meeting,” ibid.
85. Telegram from Allison to Dulles, Juillet 25, 1955, 794-5/8-1055, Central File, RG59, National Ar-
chives at College Park, Maryland (hereafter NA).

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Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System 27

Japanese government expressed its intention to join its ally in collective mili-
tary actions abroad.

It soon turned out that the Japanese proposal fell far short of U.S. expecta-
tion, cependant. When the U.S. side asked if the revised treaty would cover
areas surrounding the Korean Peninsula or Taiwan, the Japanese side replied
negatively. The Japanese side even stated that it would not defend U.S. mili-
tary vessels or aircraft in these areas, expressing its desire to avoid the risk
of entrapment in crisis situations similar to the Taiwan Strait crisis from
Septembre 1954 to April 1955. When the U.S. side inquired as to whether Japan
would consider joining a multilateral defense pact in the area, the Japanese
side expressed its ambivalence.86 The U.S. government concluded that Japan’s
true intention was to expedite the withdrawal of U.S. forces in Japan rather
than to enhance Japan’s contribution to regional security and thus decided
not to respond favorably to the proposal.87 Japan’s negative attitude toward a
multilateral alliance persisted even after the revision of the U.S.-Japan security
treaty in 1960. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ internal document prepared in
Avril 1960 stated that Japan could contribute to regional security only through
the provision of base facilities for the United States, and that “it was impossi-
ble for Japan to join a collective security organization such as a northeast Asian
treaty organization.”88

Japan also took negative positions toward strengthening security ties
with South Korea and Taiwan. During the peace settlement negotiations with
Taiwan in early 1952, the Japanese negotiators had been explicitly instructed
not to agree to any kind of security arrangement.89 When the Taiwanese am-
bassador to Japan, Dong Xian-guang, met Prime Minister Yoshida and re-

86. “Shimoda-Parsons Kaidan, First Meeting”; and Telegram from Allison to Secretary Dulles, Au-
gust 10, 1955, 794.5/8-1055, Central File, RG59, NA.
87. Telegram from Allison to Secretary Dulles, Août 10, 1955; and Yoshida, Nichibei Domei,
pp. 41–42.
88. “Ikeda Sori Hobei Kaidangidai (Un)» [Draft meeting agendas for Prime Minister Ikeda during
his visit to the United States], Avril 14, 1961, in Ikeda Sori Beika Homon Kankei Ikken Kaidan Kankei
[Documents concerning meetings during Prime Minister Ikeda’s U.S. and Canada visits],
A’1.5.2.10-1, DA; and Shingo Nakajima, Sengonihon no Boeiseisaku: “Yoshida Rosen” womeguru Seiji,
Gaiko, Gunji [Japan’s postwar defense policy: politics of “Yoshida’s policy direction”] (Tokyo:
Keiogijuku Daigaku Shuppankai, 2006), p. 178.
89. Ryuji Hattori, “Ushiroku Torao Ajiakyoku Dai2 Kacho Kenshusho Koen Sokki
‘Nikka
Heiwajoyaku Kosho Keii’” [A lecture on the treaty of peace between Japan and the Republic of
China by Torao Ushiroku], Chuo Daigaku Ronshu [Chuo University Bulletin], Non. 34 (Febru-
et 2013), p. 4, https://chuo-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action(cid:2)pages_view_main&active_action(cid:2)repository
_view_main_item_detail&item_id(cid:2)5695&item_no(cid:2)1&page_id(cid:2)13&block_id(cid:2)21. Ushiroku was
the head of the Japanese delegation negotiating the peace treaty with Taiwan. See also Masaya
Inoué, Nichu Kokoseijoka no Seijishi [Political history of China-Japan diplomatic normalization]
(Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 2010), p. 42.

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International Security 45:2 28

quested that Japan participate in joint anti-communist campaigns in October
1953, Yoshida dismissed the request immediately.90 Japan’s attitude toward
Taiwan did not change even under the leadership of Prime Minister Nobusuke
Kishi, arguably the most pro-Taiwanese Japanese prime minister during the
Cold War period.91 During the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958, for in-
position, the Kishi administration repeatedly indicated to the U.S. government
its wish to avoid the use of U.S. forces deployed in Japan. Foreign Minister
Aiichiro Fujiyama even testiªed in a Diet session that the Japanese govern-
ment would restrain U.S. military actions toward the offshore islands in the
Taiwan Strait to avoid the risk of entrapment.92

Japan was even less sympathetic toward South Korea. The negotiations to
normalize relations between the two states faltered soon after they began in
Octobre 1951 and would not resume until 1958. Although the United States re-
garded the normalization of Japanese–South Korean relations as a vital prereq-
uisite for creating a regional multilateral alliance, it was unable to bridge the
gap between Tokyo and Seoul.93 Even when the South Korean government be-
came willing to normalize relations with Japan after the change of govern-
ments in Seoul in 1960, the Japanese government under Prime Minister Hayato
Ikeda remained wary about pursuing a diplomatic breakthrough.94

It is noteworthy that Japan took this stance toward Taiwan and South Korea
dans
despite its recognition of their geopolitical signiªcance. Par exemple,
Mars 1946, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs viewed that an international secu-
rity arrangement for the Korean Peninsula was an important element for
Japan’s post-occupation security policy.95 During the process of formulat-
ing Japan’s security policy plan that Tokyo would later present to Dulles,
Yoshida also expressed his view that the Korean Peninsula was strategically
signiªcant.96 As for Taiwan, around the mid-1950s, the Japanese government

90. Susumu Sato, “Taiwan Kaikyo womeguru Joho to Seisaku, 1952–1964” [Japan’s intelligence ac-
tivities during the Taiwan Strait ‘Crisis,’ 1952–1964], Higashiajia Gakujutsusogo Kenkyusho Shukan
[The Institute for East Asian Studies Bulletin], Vol. 42 (Mars 2012), p. 83. Yoshida later indicated
that by taking a cautious stance on security cooperation with Taiwan, he was trying to avoid
getting involved in the conºict between Taiwan and China. Shigeru Yoshida, Sekai to Nihon [Le
world and Japan] (Tokyo: Bancho Shobo, 1963), p. 146.
91. Chen Zhao-bin, Sengo Nihon no Chugokuseisaku [Postwar Japan’s China policy] (Tokyo: Univer-
sity of Tokyo Press, 2000), pp. 201–298; Inoué, Nichu, pp. 165–167; and Sato, “Taiwan Kaikyo,»
p. 89.
92. Sato, “Taiwan Kaikyo,” p. 93.
93. NSC 5514, Février 25, 1955, FRUS, 1955–57, Vol. 23: Korea, Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1993), p. 47.
94. Lee, “Nikkan Kaidan no Seiji Ketchaku,” pp. 94–100.
95. Kusunoki, Yoshida Shigeru, p. 141.
96. Gaimusho, Chosho, Vol. 3, pp. 571, 680; and Kusunoki, Yoshida Shigeru, pp. 141, 198, 203.

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Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System 29

reached a policy consensus that the separation of Taiwan from China was vital
for Japan’s security.97 One archival document expressing Japan’s position on
Taiwan states that “the acquisition of Taiwan by the Chinese Communists
must be absolutely prevented to ensure the security of Japan and the Free
world.”98 Foreign Minister Shigemitsu re-emphasized what was written in this
document to Ambassador Allison when they discussed policy toward China in
Novembre 1955.99 Ironically, it was U.S. security commitments to South Korea
and Taiwan that made it unnecessary for Japan to contribute to the security of
the two anti-communist states. Shigeru Yoshida explained that despite the ab-
sence of a Korean-Japanese rapprochement, Japan remained secure because of
the UN forces’ presence in South Korea.100

the lowering of u.s. expectations for japan

Facing Japan’s reluctance to contribute to regional security and fearing that
pressuring Japan to do so would strengthen Japan’s rising nationalism and
neutralism, the United States lowered its expectations for Japan. NSC 5913/1,
adopted in September 1959, downplayed the possibility of creating a West
Paciªc collective security body and merely called for the development of
“wider understandings of common purposes among all” U.S. allies in the re-
gion.101 Although neither the Eisenhower nor the Kennedy administration
completely gave up the hope of making Japan assume more security responsi-
bilities for regional defense, the U.S. government began to readjust its security
strategy for East Asia.102

South Korea: Ambivalent Quest for a Multilateral Alliance?

Conventional wisdom posits that the United States signed an alliance treaty
with South Korea to constrain the latter from taking risky actions that could

97. Wu Rui-yun, “Sengo Chukaminkoku no Hankyorengo Seisaku: Tainichikan Hankyo
Kyoryoku no Jitsuzo” [Postwar anti-communist coalition policy by the Republic of China: reality
of Taiwanese-Japanese-South Korean cooperation against communism], Academia Sinica Northeast
Area Studies Paper Series, Non. 1 (Taipei: 2001), pp. 29–35; Inoué, Nichu, pp. 156–163; and Sato, “Tai-
wan Kaikyo,” pp. 78–79.
98. Asiakyoku, “Chugoku Mondai Taishohoshin noken” [Guidelines for dealing with problems
concerning China], Avril 20, 1956, Nihon-Chukyo Kankei Zakken [Miscellaneous materials on Japan–
Communist China relations], Vol. 2, A.’ 1.2.1.8, DA.
99. Chen, Sengo Nihon no Chugokuseisaku, pp. 158–160.
100. Yoshida, Sekai to Nihon, pp. 148–149.
101. NSC 5913/1, Septembre 25, 1959, FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. 16: East Asia-Paciªc Region (Washing-
ton, D.C.: GPO, 1992), p. 139.
102. As for an analysis of the Kennedy administration’s policy toward Japan, see Nakajima,
Sengonihon no Boeiseisaku, pp. 171–222.

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International Security 45:2 30

trigger a conºict on the Korean Peninsula.103 This view, while partially true,
misses the important fact that it was South Korea that created the situation in
which the United States only reluctantly offered a bilateral alliance with Seoul.
En même temps, Seoul’s willingness to accept the U.S. retention of command
over the South Korean armed forces contradicts the regional norm argument
emphasizing East Asian states’ sensitivity to sovereignty. South Korea’s objec-
tion to including Japan in a regional alliance appears to support the historical
memory hypothesis. A close examination of the case, cependant, reveals that
other factors, which the social exchange network approach highlights, étaient
also in play.

coercive binding and the making of the u.s.–south korean alliance

When the Korean War armistice negotiations came close to a conclusion in the
spring of 1953, the South Korean government reinvigorated its efforts to obtain
a bilateral security treaty with the United States. On April 3, 1953, South
Korean Foreign Minister Y.T. Pyun, while expressing Seoul’s opposition to the
armistice, indicated that a security pact “would be the price of ROK coopera-
tion with armistice efforts.”104 President Syngman Rhee more explicitly re-
quested, in his April 14 letter to President Eisenhower and in the April 30 letter
to UN Cmdr. Mark Clark, that a bilateral defense pact should be concluded as
a precondition for Seoul’s cooperation with the armistice.105 Han Pyo-wook, un
South Korean diplomat deeply involved in U.S.-South Korean relations,
recollected that Rhee had considered the armistice to be inevitable and that
he desired that an alliance treaty be concluded before the signing of the armi-
stice agreement.106

South Korea found the U.S. responses utterly disappointing, as the U.S. gov-
ernment still considered South Korea to be geopolitically insigniªcant even at
the end of the Korean War. NSC 157/1, adopted in July 1953, is revealing
in this regard.107 The document shows that the U.S. government compared the
desirability of two alternatives: “Korea divided . . . with the Republic of Korea

103. Cha, Powerplay, pp. 104–120.
104. Quoted in John Kotch, “The Origins of the American Security Commitment to Korea,” in
Bruce Cumings, éd., Child of Conºict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943–1953 (Seattle: Univer-
sity of Washington Press, 1983), pp. 241–242.
105. Ibid., p. 242; and Rhee to Clark, Avril 30, 1953, FRUS, 1952–54, Vol. 15: Korea, Part 1 (Washing-
ton, D.C.: GPO, 1984), pp. 955–956.
106. Pyo-wook Han, “Li Shoban to Kanbei Gaiko (3)» [Syngman Rhee and South Korean–U.S. di-
plomacy no. 3], translated by Soh Sun-won and Yasuyo Sakata, in Kantogakuin Hogaku, Vol. 12,
Non. 4 (Mars 2003), pp. 383, 387.
107. NSC 157/1, Juillet 7, 1953, FRUS, 1952–54, Vol. 15: Korea, Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1984),
pp. 1344–1346; and Lee, Higashiajia, pp. 42–44, 47.

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Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System 31

tied into the U.S. security system and developed as a military ally,” or
“uniªed, neutralized Korea under a substantially unchanged ROK” with U.S.
forces removed from Korea. After elaborating the costs and beneªts of both al-
ternatives, the document concluded that the latter was more desirable for the
United States than the former. On May 22, Eisenhower rejected South Korea’s
request for a bilateral security treaty while offering alternative plans to address
Rhee’s concerns.108

Unable to persuade the United States to form an alliance, Rhee resorted
to a risky unilateral action.109 On June 18, 1953, he ordered the release of
27,000 North Korean prisoners of war (POWs), whose repatriation had been
demanded by the communist side in the armistice negotiations.110 Rhee’s ac-
tion shocked U.S. policymakers because it could derail the armistice negoti-
ations. They also feared that Rhee might even withdraw the South Korean
troops from the UN command and take unilateral military actions against
North Korea. The U.S. government contemplated two undesirable options:
offering something that would satisfy Rhee in return for his compliance with
the armistice, or arranging a coup to replace Rhee with a more controllable
leader. After exploring the possibility of the second option, the U.S. govern-
ment decided to choose the ªrst option and proposed to Seoul a security treaty
in July 1953.111 Through a difªcult bargaining process, the bilateral security
treaty was signed in October 1953.

Although no direct evidence exists on Rhee’s motive for releasing commu-
nist POWs, at least one of his motives was to force the United States to sign an
alliance treaty with South Korea. That South Korea repeatedly demanded a
U.S.–South Korea alliance as a precondition for its acceptance of an armistice
agreement reºects Rhee’s intention. Par exemple, soon before the release of the
POWs, Rhee put forward another urgent request that the United States con-
clude an alliance with South Korea before the armistice agreement.112 In addi-

108. Kotch, “The Origins of the American Security Commitment,” p. 244; and Acting Secretary of
State to the Embassy in Korea, May 22, 1953, FRUS, 1952–54, Vol. 15, Part 1, pp. 1086–1090.
109. Stephen Jin-Woo Kim, Master of Manipulation: Syngman Rhee and the Seoul-Washington Alliance,
1953–1960 (Séoul: Yonsei University Press, 2001), pp. 95–99, 106–114, 112–113; Chang Jin Park,
“Inºuence of Small States upon the Superpowers: United States–South Korean Relations as a Case
Étude, 1950–53,” World Politics, Vol. 28, Non. 1 (Octobre 1975), pp. 105–106, doi.org/10.2307/
2010031; and Cha, “Powerplay,” pp. 173–177.
110. Yoo Seon-hee, Park Chung-hee no Tainichi-Taibei Gaiko [Park Chung-hee’s policies toward Japan
and the United States] (Kyoto: Minerva, 2012), pp. 17–21; and Kim, Master of Manipulation, pp. 287,
291–294.
111. Kotch, “The Origins of the American Security Commitment,” pp. 253–258; and Kim, Master of
Manipulation, pp. 97, 104–112.
112. “Statement by President Syngman Rhee,” June 6, 1953, History and Public Policy Program
Digital Archive [hereafter HPPPDA], B-379-014, Papers Related to the Korean American Mutual

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International Security 45:2 32

tion, both South Korean and U.S. ofªcials point out that Rhee’s real goal was a
U.S.–South Korean alliance. Han Pyo-wook recollects that Rhee believed that
simply following the United States and cooperating with the armistice negoti-
ation would lead only to South Korea’s suicide. He argues that “by releasing
the communist POWs, Rhee demonstrated what he could do to the United
States because it had not responded positively to his request for concluding a
security treaty.”113 U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Ellis Briggs argued that
Rhee’s risk-taking behavior stemmed from his fear that “Korea might be
sacriªced to some great power as happened in 1950” without a security pact
with the United States.114 Judging from these observations, it is reasonable to
conclude that Rhee’s risk-taking behavior was at least partly a coercive bind-
ing attempt aimed at the United States.

seoul’s partial satisfaction with the u.s. security commitments

For South Korea, the security treaty was an incomplete victory. On the one
main, the treaty guaranteed U.S. security commitments to South Korea’s sur-
vival. On the other hand, the treaty made clear that U.S. commitments were
merely defensive, obligating the United States to defend South Korea only
when the latter was attacked. The South Korean government also had to ac-
cept the U.S. retention of operational control over its forces as a means of
ensuring that South Korea would not initiate conºict with North Korea unilat-
erally.115 The U.S.–South Korean alliance thus met Seoul’s primary need for
survival, but was insufªcient for achieving Seoul’s ultimate purpose of
unifying Korea, by force if necessary. What Seoul needed, alors, was an addi-
tional security system that would enable it to achieve its offensive purpose
without sacriªcing the existing U.S. security commitments.

searching for an offensive multilateral alliance

After the Korean War cease-ªre in July 1953, South Korea renewed its pursuit
of multilateral security systems. In November 1953, Syngman Rhee visited
Chiang Kai-shek in Taipei, and together they proposed the creation of an “anti-
communist united front” in East Asia.116 After the meeting, the South Korean

Defense Treaty, Papers Related to Treaty-Making and International Conferences, Syngman Rhee
Institut, Yonsei University, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119372.
113. Han, “Li Shoban to Kanbei Gaiko (3),” pp. 385, 387.
114. Telegram from Briggs to Secretary of State, Juillet 6, 1953, Department of State Central Files,
795.00/7-653, in Armistice Negotiation File, John Kotch Papers, National Security Archive, Wash-
ington, D.C. UN Comdr. Mark Clark expressed a similar view. Kotch, “The Origins of the Ameri-
can Security Commitments,” p. 243.
115. Kim, Master of Manipulation, p. 87; and Cha, Powerplay, pp. 117–120.
116. Wu, “Sengo Chukaminkoku,” pp. 11–23. Various documents in the following Taiwanese ar-

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Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System 33

government collaborated with the Taiwanese government to develop an Asian
anti-communist collective organization and hosted the meeting among them-
selves and six other Asian states or entities in June 1954, resulting in the cre-
ation of the Asian People’s Anti-Communist League (APACL).117 According
to South Korea’s secret instructions to its delegate at the June 1954 meet-
ing, its government considered that “all the Free Nations of Asia should join
in guaranteeing eternal security for each other” through a collective secu-
rity arrangement.118

South Korea also sought an alliance among Taiwan, South Vietnam, et
lui-même. When the South Vietnamese President, Ngo Dihn Diem, visited Seoul in
Septembre 1957, President Rhee proposed the creation of “a United Free Asia,»
which South Korea expected to be a collective security system consisting of
anti-communist states willing to take actions against the communist bloc. Rhee
argued that if China took aggressive actions, South Vietnam, Taiwan, et
South Korea would retaliate, and thus “a United Free Asia” would be able to
defeat and destroy the communist bloc. Diem, cependant, did not express his
consent to the idea, stating that the Geneva Peace Accords prohibited South
Vietnam from forming any military alliance.119 Rhee sought another multilat-
eral system in the late 1950s. Under his direction, the South Korean Foreign
Ministry sent telegrams, en août 29, 1959, to its embassies in Taiwan, le
Philippines, and South Vietnam urging its diplomats to discuss with their host
governments the creation of the Organization of East Asian Nations. Accord-
ing to the South Korean documents, this organization was supposed to unite

chival record demonstrate close communications between Seoul and Taipei. 11–EAP–05168, Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs Archives (hereafter MFAA), Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica,
Taipei.
117. Haruka Matsuda, “Higashiajia ‘Zenshokokka’ niyoru Shudananzenhosho Taisei Koso to
Amerika no Taio” [“Paciªc Pact” and “The Asian People Anti-Communist League”; American re-
actions to the proposals of the two security pacts by “outpost” countries in East Asia], Amerika
Taiheiyo Kenkyu [Paciªc and American Studies], Vol. 5 (Mars 2005), pp. 140–145, 148–149, https://
repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/?action(cid:2)pages_view_main&active_action(cid:2)repository_view_main
_item_detail&item_id(cid:2)37260&item_no(cid:2)1&page_id(cid:2)28&block_id(cid:2)31.
118. “Asian Peoples’ Anti-Communist Conference, Top Secret Instructions to the ROK Delega-
tion,” June 1954, HPPPDA, B-389-064, Documents Related to the Asian Anti-Communist League
Conference, Papers Related to Treaty-Making and International Conferences, Syngman Rhee Insti-
tute, Yonsei University, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118344.
119. Haruka Matsuda, “1950nendai Kankoku no Tai-Minamibetonamu Gaiko” [South Korea’s
policy toward South Vietnam during the 1950s], Ohtsuma Joshi Daigaku Kiyo [Ohtsuma Women’s
University Bulletin], Non. 43 (Mars 2011), pp. 4–6, https://otsuma.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action(cid:2)pages
_view_main&active_action(cid:2)repository_view_main_item_detail&item_id(cid:2)169&item_no(cid:2)1
&page_id(cid:2)29&block_id(cid:2)56. A Taiwanese archival document shows that South Korea and Taiwan
were discussing the creation of a trilateral security system among themselves and South Vietnam
in September 1958. Note of conversation between South Korean Foreign Minister and Taiwanese
Ambassador in Seoul, Septembre 2, 1958, 019.2/0004, EAP-01571, MFAA. See also Wu, “Sengo
Chukaminkoku,” pp. 20–21.

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International Security 45:2 34

anti-communist states in Asia and to promote military, politique, et autre
types of cooperation among them.120 As a result of the Rhee administration’s
collapse in 1960, cependant, no such cooperation materialized.

South Korea also sought to enhance military cooperation with like-minded
states in East Asia. In October 1953, Foreign Minister Yung-tai Pyun proposed
to the Taiwanese ambassador in Seoul, Dong-yuan Wang, the creation of a se-
cret joint military plan in which South Korean forces would advance into
northeast China and Taiwanese forces would attack the Chinese coastal area if
a renewed conºict occurred in the Korean Peninsula.121 During his visit to
Taipei, Rhee discussed bilateral military collaboration with Chiang Kai-shek
and orally agreed with Chiang that South Korean forces would advance into
North Korea in the event of a Taiwan counterattack against mainland China.122
Rhee also repeatedly expressed his willingness to send South Korean troops to
Indochina in 1954, only to be rebuffed by France, which feared that accepting
Seoul’s offer would instead lead to greater Chinese interventions.123

South Korea’s initiatives, cependant, had a fundamental problem detrimental
to the creation of a multilateral security system in East Asia: Seoul adamantly
refused to include Japan in any such system. President Rhee consistently op-
posed the U.S. policy of inducing Japan to contribute militarily to regional se-
curity. When Secretary of State Dulles broached the possibility of a multilateral
security system including Japan during Rhee’s visit to Washington in July
1954, par exemple, Rhee immediately opposed the idea, and expressed his frus-
tration about the U.S. policy that, in his view, excessively stressed Japan’s
signiªcance in contrast with that of South Korea.124 Rhee also refused to in-
clude Japan in the APACL even though the United States and Taiwan advo-
cated its inclusion.125 Rhee’s position was not without cost; the United States,

120. Hee-sik Choi, “1960nendai Joban no Kankoku no Ajia Gaishokaigi Koso to Sore womeguru
Nikkankankei” [The relationship between Korea and Japan over the idea of Asia foreign minister
conference in the early 1960s], Hogaku Seijigaku Ronkyu [Journal of Law and Political Studies],
Non. 69 (Juin 2006), pp. 102–103, http://koara.lib.keio.ac.jp/xoonips/modules/xoonips/detail.php
?koara_id(cid:2)AN10086101-00000069-0099; and Jo, Ajia Chiikishugi to Amerika, p. 165.
121. Wu, “Sengo Chukaminkoku,” pp. 13–14.
122. “Entry on November 27, 1953,” Chiang Kai-shek Diary, Box No. 50, File No. 12, the Hoover
Institution, Université de Stanford. I thank Haruka Matsumoto for making this portion of Chiang’s
diary available.
123. Lee, Higashiajia, pp. 94–98; and Matsuda, “1950nendai Kankoku,” pp. 2–4.
124. Han, “Li Shoban to Kanbei Geiko (5),” pp. 82–83, 89–90. Rhee often complained that the U.S.
policy toward East Asia was centered on the role of Japan. See Rhee’s letter to Eisenhower, Juillet 11,
1953, and Rhee’s letter to Eisenhower, Décembre 29, 1954, in FRUS, 1952–54, Vol. 15, Part 2,
pp. 1368–1369, 1937–1941, respectivement.
125. Matsuda, “Higashiajia ‘Zenshokokka,’” pp. 142–143, 145; and Wu, “Sengo Chukaminkoku,»
pp. 16–17.

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Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System 35

because it considered Japan’s participation in a multilateral security system to
be of vital importance, declined to participate in the APACL.126 Because other
states also declined to join the APACL or did so half-heartedly, it remained an
ineffective institution.

While Rhee’s and South Koreans’ anti-Japanese sentiments resulting from
Japan’s colonial rule over Korea surely played a role in Seoul’s refusal to in-
clude Japan in regional security systems, other factors from the social ex-
change network perspective also account for South Korea’s attitude toward
Japan. D'abord, as many scholars point out, South Korea did not urgently need to
strengthen its security ties with Japan because it had already attained the alli-
ance with the United States.127 Indeed, Han Pyo-wook conªrmed that Rhee
was in no hurry to restore relations with Japan.128 Moreover, South Korean
ofªcials feared that strengthening security ties with Japan might encourage the
United States to reduce its security commitments to South Korea.129 This con-
cern was far from misguided because shifting security burdens to Japan was
precisely what the Eisenhower administration had in mind. On September 14,
1954, when John Hull, the commander in chief of the UN Command in Korea,
brought up with Kim Yong-shik, a South Korean diplomat, the idea of creating
a regional security system in which Japan would play the central role, Kim ad-
amantly opposed it, arguing that what was critical for South Korea was a
clear security commitment by no state other than the United States.130 Even
South Korean President Park Chung-hee, who normalized relations with
Japan in 1965, worried about U.S. disengagement after normalizing relations
with Japan. President Park expressed such a concern to President Kennedy in
his letter dated February 12, 1962, and demanded U.S. reassurance that
Washington would not let Japan assume more security responsibility for the
Korean Peninsula.131

Deuxième, South Korea sought to create an offensive multilateral security sys-

126. Matsuda, “Higashiajia ‘Zenshokokka,” p. 146.
127. Junghyun Park, “Frustrated Alignment: The Paciªc Pact Proposals from 1949 à 1954 et
South Korea-Taiwan Relations,” International Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 12, Non. 2 (Juillet 2015),
p. 230, doi.org/10.1017/S1479591415000157; Tu-sung Kim, Ikeda Hayato Seiken no Taigaiseisaku to
Nikkankosho [The Ikeda Hayato administration’s foreign policy and South Korean-Japanese negoti-
ations] (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2008), pp. 48–49; and Chong-Sik Lee, Japan and Korea: The Political
Dimension (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1985), pp. 41–42.
128. Han, “Li Shoban to Kanbei Geiko (5),” pp. 89–90.
129. Yoo, Park Chung-hee, pp. 49–50.
130. Yun Sokujon, Li Shoban Seiken no Tainichi Gaiko: “Nihon Mondai” no Shitenkara [The Syngman
Rhee administration’s diplomacy toward Japan: from the perspective of “Japan Problem”], Ph.D.
dissertation, Keio University, Tokyo, 2016, pp. 71–72.
131. Choi, “1960nendai,” p. 110; and Yoo, Park Chung-hee, p. 27.

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International Security 45:2 36

tem and regarded the inclusion of Japan as an impediment. Not completely
satisªed with the U.S.–South Korean alliance, which was defensive in nature,
South Korea desired to use multilateral security systems to achieve an addi-
tional goal of confronting the communist bloc.132 To do so, South Korea needed
to cooperate with like-minded, anti-communist states, such as Taiwan and
South Vietnam, but was reluctant to include Japan and other moderate states
because doing so would require toning down the offensive purpose of such a
body. En fait, Rhee conveyed to President Eisenhower in December 1954
his openness to a security pact comprising the United States, South Korea,
and Japan, but indicated that Japan must be strongly committed to anti-
communist causes.133

One episode nicely demonstrates that the factors stated above inºuenced
Seoul’s alliance policy. In late October 1953, Taiwan’s ambassador to Japan,
Xian-guang Dong, visited Seoul under Chiang Kai-shek’s instructions and
handed a draft of a South Korean–Taiwanese defense treaty to President Rhee.
Chiang intended to expand this bilateral treaty to later include other noncom-
munist states in Asia. Fait intéressant, Rhee declined Taiwan’s proposal.134 Hav-
ing just signed the alliance treaty with the United States, Rhee argued that the
proposed treaty would not have practical effects and that the two states should
pursue more aggressive aims against the communist bloc. Donc, il
emphasized the need for an offensive alliance between South Korea and
Taiwan and promised that South Korea would support a Taiwanese attack on
Chine. Cependant, he also asked Taiwan to act ªrst because his hands were tied
by the security treaty with the United States.135

u.s. reassessment of south korea

Washington’s attitude toward Seoul gradually changed in a more favorable di-
rection once the U.S.–South Korean alliance formed. Particularly because
Japan remained reluctant to contribute to regional security, U.S. policymakers
began to ªnd more value in South Korea’s potential, its capabilities to commit
land troops in particular.136 NSC 5514, approved in March 1955, clearly shows
that the U.S. expectations for South Korea’s role in Asia had risen; it set a U.S.
policy goal “to enable it to make a substantial contribution to free world
strength in the Paciªc area” and to include South Korea in a Western Paciªc

132. Matsuda, “1950nendai,” pp. 5, 7.
133. Sakata, “Aizenhawa Seiken,” p. 457; and Wu, “Sengo Chukaminkoku,” p. 18.
134. Wu, “Sengo Chukaminkoku,” pp. 13–14; and Park, “Frustrated Alignment,” p. 228.
135. Wu, “Sengo Chukaminkoku,” pp. 14–15; and Park, “Frustrated Alignment,” p. 231.
136. Lee, Higashiajia, pp. 43, 48–53; and Sakata, “Beikoku,” pp. 305–312.

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Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System 37

collective defense arrangement.137 Secretary of State Dulles, one of the early
skeptics of concluding an alliance with South Korea, declared in the NSC
meeting on May 28, 1954, that “if an additional division were needed in Indochina
he would prefer to have a ROK division go there rather than U.S. ground forces," et
JCS Chairman Arthur Radford immediately agreed.138 By 1954, South Korean
forces had grown to 650,000 troops in twenty divisions, vastly outnumbering
those of Japan, which was claiming that 180,000 troops was the maximum it
was willing to develop.139 Under such circumstances, the U.S. government
concluded that “Korea must be looked on as our ‘force’ in the Far East while
no signiªcant increase in support of U.S. objectives can be expected.”140

Taiwan: Endless Quest for a Multilateral Alliance

In many aspects, Taiwan was situated in a position similar to South Korea;
both were divided states, aligned with the United States, and ruled by strong-
minded, anti-communist leaders. In contrast with South Korea, cependant,
Taiwan displayed a more tolerant attitude toward Japan, contradicting the ex-
pectation of the historical memory hypothesis. This contrast reºects an oft-
overlooked difference between Taiwan and South Korea in terms of their
security environments.

from abandonment to an alliance

Taiwan reinvigorated its quest for U.S. alliance commitments after the victory
of Dwight Eisenhower in the 1952 U.S. presidential election. Before the Korean
War erupted, the Truman administration literally abandoned Taiwan; in his
Janvier 1950 speech, Secretary of State Acheson declared that the island was
outside of the U.S. defense perimeter.141 Although the outbreak of the Korean
War prompted the Truman administration to place the Seventh Fleet in the
Taiwan Strait, it did so not to defend Taiwan but to neutralize the strait.
Chiang Kai-shek therefore regarded the victory of the pro-Taiwan Republican
Party as an opportunity to strengthen security ties with the United States and,

137. NSC 5514, Février 25, 1955, FRUS, 1955–57, Vol. 23, Part 2, pp. 44, 47; and Lee, Higashiajia,
p. 66.
138. Memorandum of a Conversation, May 28, 1954, FRUS, 1952–54, Vol. 12, Part 1, p. 525 (em-
phasis in the original).
139. Taik-young Hamm, Arming the Two Koreas: State, Capital, and Military Power (Londres:
Routledge, 1999), pp. 67–70; and Miyazawa, Tokyo to Washington no Mitsudan, pp. 234–237.
140. The comment is made by a JCS member quoted in Gallicchio, “The Best Defense Is a Good
Offense,” p. 70.
141. Cohen, “Acheson, His Advisors, and China”; and Gaddis, “The Strategic Perspective.”

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International Security 45:2 38

in December 1952, set two goals vis-à-vis the United States: an alliance treaty
and the continuation of U.S. military aid.142 In March 1953, Taiwan’s ambassa-
dor to the United States, Wellington Koo, proposed to Secretary of State
Dulles the idea of signing an alliance treaty. Not having received mean-
ingful responses from Washington despite Taiwan’s repeated requests for a
U.S.-Taiwan alliance, Chiang himself presented the idea to U.S. Ambassador to
Taiwan Karl Rankin on June 28, 1954.143

Although the Eisenhower administration reversed Truman’s policy and in-
tegrated Taiwan into the U.S. defense perimeter, it remained reluctant to sign
an alliance treaty with Taiwan.144 When Koo broached the idea of a formal alli-
ance in March 1953, Secretary of State Dulles expressed reservations while
touting the need for a regional security arrangement for Asia. Citing the ex-
pected complications that might arise by signing a U.S.-Taiwan alliance before
the Geneva Conference scheduled for the spring of 1954, the Eisenhower ad-
ministration decided to postpone discussions on the issue.145 The Department
of State remained reluctant to move forward even after Chiang’s request
in June 1954, and Dulles decided on September 1 to delay setting a date
for the treaty negotiations with Taiwan.146 This reluctance was shared by the
Pentagon, which opposed increasing defense obligations in the Paciªc.
Although the U.S. military found some utility in using the Taiwanese military
to pressure China along its coastal areas, it estimated that the prospective cost
of increasing the United States’ security burdens would outweigh the prospec-
tive beneªts.147
The crucial

trigger for the U.S.-Taiwan alliance came from neither
Washington nor Taipei, but from Beijing. In September 1954, China’s People’s
Liberation Army started the shelling of the offshore islands held by Taiwan,
initiating the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. Chiang took this opportunity to pres-
sure the United States to sign an alliance treaty. When he met Secretary of State
Dulles on September 9, he ªrst raised the issue of an alliance and requested

142. Hsiao-Ting Lin, “U.S.-Taiwan Military Diplomacy Revisited: Chiang Kai-shek, Baituan, et
le 1954 Mutual Defense Pact,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 37, Non. 5 (Novembre 2013), p. 979, est ce que je.org/
10.1093/dh/dht047.
143. Ibid., p. 982; and Robert Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy toward Taiwan,
1950–1955 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), pp. 121–123.
144. NSC 146/2, Novembre 6, 1953, FRUS, 1952–54, Vol. 14: China and Japan, Part 1, pp. 308, 318.
145. Lin, “U.S.-Taiwan Military Diplomacy Revisited,” p. 983; and Qiang Zhai, The Dragon, le
Lion, and the Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations, 1945–1958 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University
Presse, 1994), pp. 156–157.
146. Zhai, The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle, pp. 157–158.
147. John W. Garver, The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold War Strategy in
Asia (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 55.

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Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System 39

its early conclusion.148 He followed up his message in a meeting with U.S.
Ambassador Rankin on September 21 and “gave [un] unusually strong impres-
sion of impatience” about U.S. indecision.149 To prevent China from attacking
Taiwan and to obtain Taiwan’s cooperation for U.S. diplomacy to de-escalate
the crisis, the Eisenhower administration decided to conclude a security treaty
with Taipei.150 The two sides quickly began the treaty negotiation, and the mu-
tual defense treaty was signed on December 2, 1954, in the midst of the crisis in
the Taiwan Strait.

dissatisfaction with the u.s. security commitments

Although Chiang expressed his sense of “marvelous achievement” in his diary
when the alliance treaty was concluded, the Taiwanese side soon became frus-
trated with the terms, ªnding them too restrictive and insufªcient.151 To con-
clude the U.S.-Taiwan security treaty, Taiwan had to promise not to conduct
large-scale military actions against the mainland without prior consultation
with Washington. En outre, the treaty left the U.S. obligation to defend the
so-called offshore islands ambiguous even though they were under Taiwan’s
effective control.152 The latter point posed a serious problem for Taipei in par-
particulier; the loss of the islands would undermine the credibility of Taiwan’s
claim that it would ultimately return to the Chinese mainland, which would
potentially be detrimental to the Chinese Nationalists’ rule of Taiwan.153 In ad-
dition, the power asymmetry between China and Taiwan was far more serious
than that between North and South Korea. It is fair to assess, donc, that the
security situation facing Taiwan was even worse than that of South Korea,
and Taiwan desperately needed to improve it.

Taiwan’s frustration with the terms of the alliance was displayed soon after
its conclusion. Toward the end of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, the U.S. gov-
ernment requested that the Taiwanese forces withdraw from two offshore is-
lands, Quemoy and Matsu, given the fear of logistical difªculties in the case of
Chinese attack. Chiang adamantly refused to comply, cependant, and insisted

148. Rankin to the Department of State, Septembre 9, 1954, FRUS, 1952–54, Vol. 14, Part 1, pp. 581–
582.
149. Rankin to the Department of State, Septembre 21, 1954, FRUS, 1952–54, Vol. 14, Part 1, p. 652;
and Lin, “U.S.-Taiwan Military Diplomacy Revisited,” pp. 984–985.
150. Lin, “U.S.-Taiwan Military Diplomacy Revisited,” p. 986; Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment,
pp. 174–175; and Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 2009), p. 475.
151. Quoted in Lin, “U.S.-Taiwan Military Diplomacy Revisited,” p. 971.
152. Garver, The Sino-American Alliance, pp. 57–58.
153. Ibid., pp. 57–58; and Taylor, The Generalissimo, pp. 480–481, 499–500.

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International Security 45:2 40

that Taiwan would risk a direct clash with China even without U.S. support.154
After the crisis de-escalated without a major incident, Chiang decided to de-
ploy even more troops on these two islands, the decision that Dulles later
called “foolish” when the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis occurred in the summer
de 1958.155 Even then, Taiwan continued to demand that the United States com-
mit itself to defending the islands while refusing to reduce the Nationalist
Chinese troops there.

taipei’s earnest quest for a multilateral alliance

Among the three U.S. allies, Taiwan was the most earnest proponent of a
multilateral security system in East Asia. In October 1953, the Taiwanese gov-
ernment presented to the South Korean government a draft of a mutual de-
fense pact, which it hoped would later expand to include other states in the
Paciªc region.156 In 1954, Taiwan closely coordinated with South Korea to es-
tablish APACL. Taiwan also expressed a great interest in joining SEATO and
maintained its interest in joining the organization even after its membership
had been denied initially.157 Taiwan also showed an interest in creating a col-
lective defense system among South Korea, South Vietnam, and itself. Pour dans-
position, a policy memorandum, dated March 16, 1956, states that “the positions
of China, Korea, and Vietnam, who are vanguards against Communism, sont
more or less identical. It is necessary and possible that these three countries be
united in an alliance.”158

Taiwan was also willing to commit its troops to contribute to regional secu-
rity. When the Korean War broke out in 1950, Chiang Kai-shek offered to send
33,000 troops to the Korean Peninsula, although the offer was declined by the
États-Unis, which feared that accepting it would lead to an expansion of
the ªghting.159 This did not stop Taiwan from seeking to support South
Korea during the war; the Taiwanese government helped South Korea and the

154. Taylor, The Generalissimo, pp. 480–482.
155. Ibid., pp. 497–502; and Lin, “U.S.-Taiwan Military Diplomacy Revisited,” p. 993.
156. Wu, “Sengo Chukaminkoku,” p. 14. As discussed, this met unexpected rejection by South
Korea.
157. France and Britain opposed the inclusion of Taiwan in SEATO. Dulles, cependant, insisted on
opening a possibility for including Taiwan as well as Japan in the organization in the future. Kan
Matsuoka, Dulles Gaiko to Indoshina [Dulles’s diplomacy and Indochina] (Tokyo: Dobunkan, 1988),
p. 182.
158. Memorandum, Mars 16, 1956, 412.4–0096, 11-NAA-04610, MFAA. The watered-down ver-
sion of this memo was later sent from Chiang to U.S. President Eisenhower. Letter from Chiang to
Eisenhower, Avril 16, 1956, FRUS, 1955–1957, Vol. 3: Chine (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1986),
pp. 341–349.
159. Taylor, The Generalissimo, p. 437; and Garver, The Sino-American Alliance, pp. 42–44.

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Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System 41

UN Command in Korea to conduct psychological warfare and encourage
the communist POWs to “repatriate” to Taiwan.160 Taiwan also indicated sev-
eral times its willingness to aid the South Vietnamese militarily during the
Vietnam War.161

It is also noteworthy that Taiwan stepped up its efforts to create a multilat-
eral security system when it perceived the weakening of U.S. security commit-
ments. Around the time the Kennedy administration came to power in 1961,
its high-ranking ofªcials made a series of comments that signaled that the new
U.S. administration was contemplating improving relations with China.162
Alarmed by the prospect of weakening U.S. security commitments, le
Taiwanese government launched initiatives to weave the United States into a
regional multilateral security system. In January 1961, Taiwan collaborated
with the Philippines, South Korea, and South Vietnam to convene the foreign
ministers conference, where it sought to lay the foundation for a regional secu-
rity mechanism under U.S. leadership.163 In May 1961, during Vice President
Lyndon Johnson’s visit to Taipei, Chiang proposed the formation of a NATO-
like organization among the United States and its allies.164 From late July
to early August, Vice Premier Chen Chen met with President Kennedy and
proposed the creation of a joint multilateral military organization under the
U.S. commander in chief in the Paciªc. This organization would facilitate intel-
ligence sharing and military training among U.S. allies under the leadership
of the United States.165 On August 15, Taiwan’s ambassador to the United
États, George Yeh, handed to U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk “An Outline

160. Taylor, The Generalissimo, pp. 454–455. For Taiwan’s involvement in the handling of Chinese
Communist POWs in the Korean War, see David Cheng Chang, The Hijacked War: The Story of Chi-
nese POWs in the Korean War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2020).
161. These proposals were turned down in the end by the U.S. government, which concluded that
the introduction of Taiwanese forces into the war could further provoke China into more serious
intervention. Garver, The Sino-American Alliance, pp. 201–204.
162. Several high-ranking ofªcials in the Kennedy administration, such as Undersecretary of State
Chester Bowles, U.S. Representative to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson, and Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Roger Hilsman, opined to revisit the U.S.-China policy. Voir, pour
example, Chester Bowles, “The ‘China Problem’ Reconsidered,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 38, Non. 3
(Avril 1960), pp. 476–486, doi.org/10.2307/20029434; and Kevin Quigley, “A Lost Opportunity:
A Reappraisal of the Kennedy Administration’s China Policy in 1963,” Diplomacy & Statecraft,
Vol. 13, Non. 3 (Septembre 2002), pp. 175–198, doi.org/10.1080/714000332.
163. Makoto Ishikawa, “Kokufu no Chiikiteki Shudananzenhosho Soshikisosetsu no Mosaku”
[Nationalist China’s quest for a regional collective security organization in East Asia], Rikkyo
Hogaku [St. Paul’s Review of Law and Politics], Non. 76 (Mars 2009), pp. 254–256, https://
rikkyo.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action(cid:2)pages_view_main&active_action(cid:2)repository_view_main_item
_detail&item_id(cid:2)4783&item_no(cid:2)1&page_id(cid:2)13&block_id(cid:2)49.
164. Taipei to Hong Kong, May 15, 1961, FRUS, 1961–63, Vol. 22: Northeast Asia (Washington, D.C.:
GPO, 1996), pp. 58–62.
165. Ishikawa, “Kokufu,” pp. 264–265.

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International Security 45:2 42

for a Collective Security Organization of

Proposal
the Anti-Communist
Countries in the Western Paciªc Asia.” According to the proposal, Taiwan,
South Korea, Thaïlande, South Vietnam, and the Philippines would contribute
troops to create a joint land force under U.S. command, while the United States
would provide naval and air power and logistical support.166

Unlike South Korea, Taiwan demonstrated its desire to include Japan in a re-
gional collective security system. Taiwanese archival documents indicate that
its government considered the inclusion of Japan to be crucial for creating a vi-
able regional alliance.167 When Chiang Kai-shek met U.S. Vice President
Richard Nixon in November 1953, he argued that “a pact between the
Republic of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea [était] necessary," et
elaborated that he took this position despite the damage that his country suf-
fered during the war with Japan.168 Chiang accordingly tried to mediate be-
tween South Korea and Japan and to persuade South Korean President Rhee to
admit Japan into a multilateral alliance in Asia.169 Given the difªculty in per-
suading Rhee, Chiang even proposed in his meeting with Nixon that Taiwan
could sign two bilateral security treaties, one with Japan and the other with
South Korea, in order to bypass Rhee’s anti-Japanese stance.170

Why did Taiwan take a more pragmatic attitude toward Japan than South
Korea, given that both had suffered under Japanese imperialism and desired
offensive actions against the communist bloc? An answer lies in the security
environment with which Taiwan had to cope. As discussed above, même
after the conclusion of the U.S.-Taiwan alliance, U.S. commitments to Taiwan
were not ªrm, as symbolized by the lukewarm U.S. attitude toward the de-
fense of the offshore islands. That the United States began the so-called
Ambassadorial Talks with China after the end of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis
ampliªed Taiwan’s concern that Washington might soon abandon Taiwan and
reach out to China.171 Given these factors, Taiwan felt it more urgent than
South Korea did to boost its security by joining a multilateral security system.
This preference was reºected in the comment made by Ambassador Koo, OMS

166. Ibid., pp. 267–268.
167. Wu, “Sengo Chukaminkoku,” p. 17.
168. The Record of the Fourth Chiang-Nixon Meeting, Novembre 11, 1953, 407.1-0185, 11-NAA-
01920, MFAA; and Taylor, The Generalissimo, p. 453.
169. Taylor, The Generalissimo, p. 461; and Sakata, “The Western Paciªc Collective Security,»
pp. 22–23.
170. The Record of the Fourth Chiang-Nixon Meeting, Novembre 11, 1953.
171. For Taiwan’s serious concerns about the Ambassadorial Talks, see Taylor, The Generalissimo,
pp. 488–489.

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Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System 43

stated in July 1954 that “of course if Free China were included in a multilateral
security pact, this would be even better than a bilateral pact.”172

u.s. reassessment of taiwan

The geopolitical value of Taiwan for the United States had increased since the
breakout of the Korean War. NSC 166/1, adopted in November 1953, stated
that “the Chinese government on Taiwan [était] a considerable asset to the U.S.
position in the Far East” and that “the military forces of the Nationalists consti-
tute[d] the only readily available strategic reserve in the Far East.”173 In 1953,
Taiwan possessed almost 500,000 troops including an army of 422,000.174 Dans
addition, unlike South Korea, Taiwan is surrounded by water, and its home-
land defense could be accomplished with a relatively small force. Ainsi, le
U.S. government evaluated that Taiwanese forces “constitute[d] the only visi-
ble source of manpower,” should Chinese interventions in Indochina or Korea
“make large-scale U.S. action against China necessary.”175

U.S. policy documents reveal that one of the factors that enhanced Taiwan’s
geopolitical signiªcance for the United States was Japan’s reluctance to re-
arm.176 In one paragraph before emphasizing Taiwan’s importance, NSC 166/1
expressed a pessimistic view of Japan’s military capabilities. It states, “There
are no immediate prospects of rapid development of strength in the two coun-
tries which, potentiellement, can contribute most to a restoration of balance of
power in Asia—Japan and India,” and “it will be some time even under opti-
mum conditions, before Japan possesses the capability of exercising leadership
in Asia.”177 Given these conditions, the U.S. government decided to keep send-
ing its military aid to Taiwan “under continuing review in light of the develop-
ment of Japanese forces.”178 The U.S. assistance for the development of
Taiwanese forces continued in the second half of the 1950s; NSC 5723, adopted
in October 1957, stipulates that one of the U.S. goals toward Taiwan was to
help it develop its military “to contribute to collective non-Communist
strength in the Far East.” The document also notes that the United States

172. Memo by McConaughy, Juillet 16, 1954, FRUS, 1952–54, Vol. 14, Part 1, p. 493. The multilateral
security system here refers to SEATO.
173. NSC 166/1, Novembre 6, 1953, FRUS, 1952–54, Vol. 14, Part 1, p. 300.
174. “National Intelligence Estimate: Probable Developments in Taiwan through Mid-1956,” Sep-
tember 14, 1954, FRUS, 1952–54, Vol. 14, Part 1, pp. 636–640.
175. NSC 146/2, FRUS, 1952–54, Vol. 14, Part 1, p. 318.
176. Garver, The Sino-American Alliance, pp. 63–65; and Lee, Higashiajia, pp. 34–35.
177. NSC 166/1, pp. 300–301.
178. NSC 146/2, p. 308.

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International Security 45:2 44

Tableau 1. Evaluation of the Alternative Hypotheses

The United States
Japan
South Korea
Taiwan

Powerplay

Non
Non
partially yes
yes

Collective
Identité

Historical
Mémoire

Régional
Norm

Non
N/A
N/A
N/A

Non
N/A
yes
Non

N/A
Non
Non
Non

Tableau 2. The Order of Four States’ Security Preferences

Order of Preferences

State

États-Unis
Japan
South Korea
Taiwan

defensive multilateral
hub-and-spokes
offensive multilateral
offensive multilateral

hub-and-spokes
defensive multilateral
hub-and-spokes
defensive multilateral

offensive multilateral
offensive multilateral
defensive multilateral
hub-and-spokes

should “encourage conditions which [would] make possible the inclusion of
the GRC in a Western Paciªc collective defense arrangement.”179

Summary of the Analysis

Tableau 1 shows whether and to what extent the evidence from the case studies
ªts the existing explanations for East Asia’s hub-and-spokes alliance system.
D'abord, the United States’ preference and pursuit of a multilateral security alli-
ance strongly contradict the powerplay and collective identity hypotheses
that emphasize the U.S. intention to create the hub-and-spokes system. Comme
NSC 5429/5 and other documents reveal, the Eisenhower administration con-
sidered that a defensive multilateral alliance would serve U.S. interests best
because it would reduce U.S. security burdens while maintaining stability in
East Asia (table 2). The powerplay hypothesis also fails to explain Japan’s be-
havior; despite its prediction that Japan, as a weaker ally, should pursue a mul-
tilateral alliance which could more effectively constrain the United States than
a bilateral one, Tokyo’s preference proved to be the complete opposite. Le
historical memory hypothesis, although it could explain South Korea’s refusal

179. NSC 5723, Octobre 4, 1957, FRUS, 1955–57, Vol. 3, pp. 622–623. “GRC” stands for the govern-
ment of the Republic of China. See also Garver, The Sino-American Alliance, p. 65.

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Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System 45

Chiffre 1. The Ideal and Actual Alliance Systems for the United States

UN. Ideal Alliance System

B. Actual Alliance System

South Korea

Taiwan

South Korea

Taiwan

Japan

États-Unis

NOTE: The width of lines indicates the strength of security ties.

to include Japan in a multilateral alliance, cannot explain why Taiwan and the
United States willingly established and tried to enhance security ties with
Japan. The regional norm hypothesis explains none of the cases of the three
U.S. allies, which were willing to accept signiªcant limitations on their sover-
eignty in return for formal U.S. alliances.

In contrast with the existing explanations, the hypotheses derived from the
social exchange network approach match the evidence from the case studies.
As expected by hub’s preference hypothesis, the United States initially prior-
itized and sought an alliance with Japan, whose geostrategic values and poten-
tial capabilities were more highly evaluated than those of South Korea or
Taiwan, while being reluctant to do so with South Korea and Taiwan initially.
Washington did so not merely to form an alliance with Japan, but also to en-
courage Japan to contribute to regional security in East Asia. In the U.S. voir,
the ideal security architecture was one in which Japan, closely aligned with the
États-Unis, played a central role in contributing to regional security while
the United States provided supplemental support for South Korea and Taiwan
(ªgure 1A). Japan’s contributions to regional security, cependant, proved much
less than Washington had wished. Tokyo’s insufªcient security contributions
prompted Washington to reevaluate South Korea’s and Taiwan’s geopolitical
signiªcance, reinforcing its bilateral ties with both. This policy change by the
United States is consistent with the hub-spoke negative connection hypothesis.
The non-U.S. cases support the spoke’s preference hypothesis that the U.S.
allies prioritized security ties with the United States rather than those among
themselves. Japan sought and clung to a bilateral alliance with the United
States more persistently than the United States did. South Korea and Taiwan
clearly regarded security ties with the United States as vital for their sur-

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International Security 45:2 46

vival. En fait, obtaining a formal alliance with the United States was so
important that South Korea resorted to coercive binding—releasing the com-
munist POWs and threatening to withdraw from the UN command—when
Washington remained reluctant to formalize an alliance with Seoul at the end
of the Korean War. Seoul’s behavior ªts the coercive binding hypothesis,
which provides a more complete explanation for the formation of the U.S.-
South Korea alliance than the powerplay hypothesis that only emphasizes
the U.S. efforts to prevent Seoul’s unilateral actions. The Taiwan case,
though not explicitly supporting the coercive binding hypothesis, provides in-
direct conªrming evidence for the hypothesis. Because China’s initiation of the
First Taiwan Strait Crisis prompted Washington to formalize an alliance with
Taiwan, Taipei needed not use coercive binding. Cependant, Taiwan’s willing-
ness to accept risk, such as its deªance of the repeated U.S. requests to with-
draw or reduce its troops from the offshore islands, can be interpreted as a
way to prevent the further weakening of U.S. alliance commitments.

The three non-U.S. cases also support the inter-spoke negative connection
hypothèse, which posits that the degree to which the U.S. allies pursue secu-
rity ties among themselves is negatively connected with the strength of their
respective security ties with the United States. Japan succeeded in obtaining
strong U.S. security commitments by and large, and its sense of security, fur-
ther boosted by the U.S. signing of bilateral alliances with South Korea and
Taiwan, minimized Japan’s incentives to develop security ties with South
Korea and Taiwan. Taiwan remained most dissatisªed with the level of U.S. avec-
curity commitments. To address its insecurity, Taiwan became the strongest
advocate of a multilateral alliance among the three U.S. allies, reºected by its
efforts to include Japan in such a system despite suffering from Japan’s past
imperialism. Although its most desirable option was an offensive multilateral
alliance, even a defensive one would have served its interests by stabilizing
U.S. security commitments (table 2). South Korea’s pursuit of a multilateral al-
liance excluding Japan also ªts this hypothesis. Given that the alliance with the
United States ensured South Korea’s survival, Seoul sought an offensive rather
than defensive multilateral alliance (table 2), to which Japan was an impedi-
ment. Seoul also feared that strengthening security ties with Japan might lead
Washington to disengage from South Korea.

All in all, why did the United States, despite its overwhelming power, fail to
create its preferred multilateral alliance (ªgure 1A), resulting in the persistence
of the hub-and-spokes alliance system (ªgure 1B)? One impediment to a de-
fensive multilateral alliance desired by the United States was Japan’s unwill-
ingness to provide security regionally. Although the United States succeeded

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Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System 47

in creating an alliance with Japan, its strong security commitments to the ally,
plus its alignments with the other two “spokes,” ironically weakened Tokyo’s
incentives to develop security ties with Seoul and Taipei. South Korea’s refusal
to include Japan in a multilateral system made the creation of the U.S. desired
system even more difªcult. Taiwan was the most earnest advocate of a multi-
lateral alliance, but its efforts to create one were inconsequential given Japan’s
and South Korea’s policies stated above. Under such circumstances, the United
States had to make the most of the existing alliances and upgraded the role of
South Korea and Taiwan, further stabilizing the hub-and-spokes system. Con-
sidering these observations, the hub-and-spokes system was an unintended
consequence produced through the interactions among the United States and
its three allies.

Conclusion

In this article, I explored why East Asia’s hub-and-spokes alliance system has
persisted. Ce faisant, I pointed out the inadequacies of the existing explana-
tions and proposed the social exchange network approach to explain the puz-
zle. The empirical analysis showed that this approach can effectively explain
the preferences and behavior of the United States and its South Korean,
Taiwanese, and Japanese allies, and how the interactions among them gener-
ated the hub-and-spokes system.

If this study is any guide to the origin of East Asia’s hub-and-spokes alliance
système, what does it indicate for East Asia’s future alliance system? What are
the impacts of China’s rise and the United States’ relative decline on the hub-
and-spokes system? D'une part, these trends have been inºuencing the
existing system in a way that the United States had originally desired. Fearing
the relative decline in U.S. capabilities to provide security, Japan has become
more willing to contribute to regional security. After scuttling numerous self-
imposed restrictions on its military policies, the Japanese government changed
the long-held interpretation of Japan’s constitution in July 2014, making it pos-
sible to use force to contribute to U.S. military actions even when Japan is
not under direct attack.180 Japan has also been upgrading its security ties
with other “spokes” by intensifying maritime security assistance for several
Southeast Asian states, by upgrading security ties with Australia, and seeking

180. Michael J. Vert, “U.S.-China Relations in 2019: A Year in Review,” Testimony before the
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Septembre 4, 2019, Washington, D.C.,
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/ªles/Panel%20II%20Green_Written%20Testimony.pdf.

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International Security 45:2 48

to do the same with India.181 With South Korea, with which Japan continues to
have seriously troubled relations resulting from historical issues, Japan re-
mains willing to maintain security cooperation.182 Even on the question of
Taiwan, Japanese leaders have become more willing to play a role in boosting
the island nation’s security against China.183 The leadership that Japan dem-
onstrated in ªnalizing the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Paciªc
Partnership after the U.S. withdrawal from its original agreement was un-
thinkable during the Cold War.184 Although Japan can certainly do more,
Japan experts regard these changes in Japan’s security policy as a departure
from its “paciªst” past.185

On the other hand, China’s rise has dramatically increased not only its
threats but also its capability to provide beneªts for others, and such a capabil-
ity has caused, and will continue to cause, complexities for U.S. relations with
some other “spokes,” such as South Korea and Taiwan. Although South Korea
still beneªts from U.S. security commitments, it increasingly believes that it
also needs better security ties with China to control North Korea. This security
requirement makes South Korea’s position between the United States and
China more ambivalent.186 In the case of Taiwan, the problem may lie not so
much with Taipei as with Washington. Public opinion polls show that despite

181. Ibid.; Satoru Nagao and Koh Swee Lean Collin, “Japan’s Southwest Pivot: How Tokyo Can
Expand Its Eyes and Ears in the Ocean,” National Interest, Avril 3, 2017, https://nationalinterest
.org/feature/japans-southwest-pivot-how-tokyo-can-expand-its-eyes-ears-20001;
and Michael
MacArthur Bosack, “Blazing the Way Forward in Japan-Australia Security Ties,” Japan Times, Avril
15, 2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/04/15/commentary/japan-commentary/
blazing-way-forward-japan-australia-security-ties/#.XXsXkW5uJPY.
182. Although the South Korean government decided not to renew the General Security of Mili-
tary Intelligence Agreement in September 2019, Japan expressed its willingness to extend the
agreement if Seoul changed its mind. Seoul ultimately decided to keep the agreement in Novem-
ber 2019.
183. Benjamin Schreer and Andrew T.H. Tan, “New Dynamics in Taiwan-Japan Relations,” in
Schreer and Tan, éd., The Taiwan Issue: Problems and Prospects (Londres: Routledge, 2019), pp. 123–
137; and Howard Wang, “Japan Considers a New Security Relationship via ‘Networking’ with Tai-
wan,” China Brief, Vol. 19, Non. 10, May 29, 2019, Jamestown Foundation, https://jamestown.org/
program/japan-considers-a-new-security-relationship-via-networking-with-taiwan/.
184. Yoichi Funabashi, “In America’s Absence, Japan Takes the Lead on Asian Free Trade,” Wash-
ington Post, Février 22, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/
2018/02/22/in-americas-absence-japan-takes-the-lead-on-asian-free-trade/.
185. Andrew L. Oros, Japan’s Security Renaissance: New Policies and Politics for the Twenty-First Cen-
tury (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017); Sheila A. Forgeron, Japan Rearmed: La politique de
Military Power (Cambridge, Mass.: Presse universitaire de Harvard, 2019); and Karl Gustafsson, Linus
Hagström, and Ulv Hanssen, “Japan’s Paciªsm Is Dead,” Survival, Vol. 60, Non. 6 (Décembre 2018/
Janvier 2019), pp. 137–158, doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2018.1542803.
186. Vert, “U.S.-China Relations in 2019: A Year in Review”; and Scott A. Snyder, South Korea at
the Crossroads: Autonomy and Alliance in an Era of Rival Powers (New York: Columbia University
Presse, 2018).

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Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System 49

signiªcant economic dependence on China, Taiwan retains its strong prefer-
ence for the status quo or even a more distinctly Taiwanese identity.187 Because
of the increasing estimated cost of defending Taiwan against China, cependant,
U.S. willingness to provide security for Taiwan has been weakening. Some
elites have begun to support disengaging from Taiwan.188 A recent survey by
the Chicago Council on Global Affairs also shows that 59 percent of Americans
oppose U.S. military intervention if China attacks Taiwan.189 U.S. security ties
with these two allies may be further weakened if China effectively uses
wedge strategies.190

Under such circumstances, Washington must take two steps if it desires to
preserve or facilitate the evolution of the hub-and-spokes system in a way that
is conducive to its interests. D'abord, it needs to retain its capabilities to provide
security for its allies to ensure their desire to continue security exchanges with
the United States. Although pessimists are quick to argue that China will be a
hegemon in East Asia in the near future, the United States still retains, et
should be able to maintain, the combination of resources that enables it to pro-
vide security for its allies if it adjusts its policy to face China’s increasing anti-
access, area denial capabilities.191 Instead, if Washington stops doing so and
tries to strike a “grand bargain” with China, the U.S. allies, South Korea
and Taiwan in particular, are more likely to gravitate toward China.192

Deuxième, the United States should encourage its allies to strengthen security
ties among themselves, preferably with “carrots” but with “sticks” if neces-

187. Gary Sands, “Taiwanese, Chinese, or Both?” Asia Times, Juillet 22, 2019, https://www.asiatimes
.com/2019/07/opinion/taiwanese-chinese-or-both/.
188. John J. Mearsheimer, “Taiwan’s Dire Straits,” National Interest, Non. 130 (March/April 2014),
pp. 29–39, https://www.jstor.org/stable/44153277; and Charles L. Glaser, “A U.S.-China Grand
Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Se-
curity, Vol. 39, Non. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00199.
189. Dina Smeltz et al., Rejecting Retreat: Americans Support US Engagement in Global Affairs (Chi-
cago: Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2019), p. 20, https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/
default/ªles/report_ccs19_rejecting-retreat_20190909.pdf.
190. For wedge strategies, see Timothy W. Crawford, “Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge
Strategies Shape Power Politics,” International Security, Vol. 35, Non. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 155–189,
doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00036; and Yasuhiro Izumikawa, “To Coerce or Reward? Theorizing
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International Security 45:2 50

sary. Such efforts must be aimed especially for facilitating security cooperation
between South Korea and Japan. As this study shows, mistrust between Tokyo
and Seoul made the U.S. goal of creating a multilateral alliance in East Asia ex-
tremely difªcult to achieve, and the relations between them have become even
more hostile, as historical issues have recently heightened mutual antagonism.
This study also shows, cependant, que, in the past, U.S. security ties with its al-
lies weakened their incentives to reconcile their past animosities. Now that
both Seoul and Tokyo have begun to doubt the durability of U.S. security guar-
antees, the United States can more credibly use the threat of reducing its secu-
rity commitments to persuade them to cooperate with each other.

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