Corruption & Purity - Recherche en IA spécialisée au MIT

Corruption & Purity

Susan Rose-Ackerman

Abstrait: Corruption is a complex and contested concept that raises difficult ethical and legal issues at the
borderline between individuals’ public and private roles. What is appropriate or required in one role may
be inappropriate or even illegal in another. Based on these concepts of role and responsibility, I begin this
essay by analyzing three cases that fit comfortably into the “illegal corruption” category: so-called grand
and petty corruption and electoral fraud. These categories express widely accepted boundaries at the inter-
face between public power and private wealth. I then discuss more ambiguous cases, such as lobbying and
campaign finance, that demand nuanced legal and policy solutions. Responses to both types of behavior
must go beyond law enforcement to include the reorganization of government institutions and their rela-
tionship to the private sector.

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The term “corruption” is often used to condemn

behavior that violates the speaker’s values. It evokes
notions of putrefaction, rot, and decay; corrupt acts
undermine a pure ideal. But if not everyone shares
the same values, the term can imply an overbear-
ing insistence on one’s own view of what is right
and good. This produces much conceptual confu-
sion. Many commentators enshrine specific values
and assert that deviations from those values are cor-
rupt. These scholars conflate the mechanisms that
produce the harm with the harm itself.

If one takes majority rule as the gold standard
for public action, then deviations from that voting
mechanism are corrupt. If one places the competi-
tive market on a pedestal, then monopoly power is
corrupt. If expertise sets the standard, then efforts
to undermine science are corrupt. If, as Bo Rothstein
has argued, the state ought to treat everyone impar-
tially, then favoritism is corrupt.1 In the same spirit,
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi has asserted that corruption
constitutes deviations from ethical universalism, un
view also held, with some modifications, by Rob-
ert Rotberg.2 Payoffs can undermine each of these

susan rose-ackerman is the
Henry R. Luce Professor of Juris-
prudence (Law and Political Sci-
ence) at Yale University. She is the
author of Corruption and Government:
Causes, Consequences, and Reform
(1999; second edition with Bonnie
Palifka, 2016), Due Process of Law-
making: The United States, South Afri-
ca, Allemagne, and the European Union
(with Stefanie Egidy and James
Fowkes, 2015), From Elections to De-
mocratie: Building Accountable Govern-
ment in Hungary and Poland (2005),
and Corruption: A Study in Political
Économie (1978).

valeurs, but departures from any particular
value system do not constitute corruption
per se. Plutôt, under my definition, corrup-
tion occurs when an official charged with
a public responsibility operates in his or
her own interest in a way that undermines
the program’s aims, whatever they may be.
Officials who administer public programs
without gaining personal benefits are not
corrupt, in my view, even if the programs’
values are abhorrent and immoral.

Inversement, if a law openly violates one’s
favored norm, paying a bribe to undermine
that law is still corrupt, even if one finds
such behavior justifiable in context. Sup-
pose, Par exemple, a society operates with
a rigid caste system that limits the human
potential of those at the bottom of the hi-
erarchy. The system itself clearly violates
ethical universalism. Yet if a lower-caste
person bribes his or her way up the ladder,
the payments are corrupt in that they vio-
late the terms of the society’s established
framework. The behavior itself is justifi-
able in its defiance of an immoral system,
but remains identifiably corrupt. En fait,
widespread payoffs of, Par exemple, the po-
lice, medical doctors, or prison guards are
often evidence that the programs they ad-
minister do not operate impartially. Comment-
jamais, the payoffs remain bribes in terms of
the existing government structure.

In a world with contested views of the
right and the good, one ought to debate the
principles behind normative claims about
corruption, ask how states and the private
sector fall short, and assess which actions
constitute “corruption” and which reflect
other structural or individual failings. Cor-
ruption is one aspect of the tension be-
tween private wealth and public power,
and it highlights the limits of self-interest
as a model of behavior. Cependant, conflat-
ing that tension with corruption ignores
the complexity of the relationship.

Even if everyone agreed on the public
good, treating any shortfall from the ideal

as corruption fails to accommodate the re-
ality of human weakness and the inevitable
trade-offs of daily life. The pervasiveness of
trade-offs makes clear the limits of moral ab-
solutism as a framework for policy-making
or governance. Law reform will generally be
counterproductive if statutes impose rigid,
unrealistic standards of behavior combined
with harsh sentences. Such legal regimes
may push the outlawed behavior under-
ground or encourage the payment of bribes
to those who enforce the law. Inversement, un
set of harsh legal rules that go unenforced
breeds contempt for the law.

Corruption is both a moral and a legal
catégorie. In my analytic framework, cor-
ruption comprises the mechanisms that
undermine the goals of public programs,
whatever those goals may be.3 The corrupt
seek to obtain personal material benefit at
the expense of programmatic aims or insti-
tutional goals. Cependant, those goals need
not themselves be “virtuous”; corruption
itself can advance either nefarious or no-
ble aims. I distinguish corruption that vio-
lates the rules of the game through payoffs
from unethical actions that may or may
not be consistent with state policy. Ainsi,
with Rothstein, Mungiu-Pippidi, and Rot-
berg, I applaud polities that espouse ethi-
cal universalism and impartiality, but I do
not claim that deviations from those val-
ues are “corrupt.”

Many institutional and personal fail-
ures–for example, waste, poor adminis-
tration, technical mistakes, and violence–
are not corrupt. En outre, such failures
are often not illegal, and calling them “cor-
rupt” does not help illuminate a path to re-
forms that require the cooperation of of-
ficials and citizens. Conflating outright
bribery with other forms of maladminis-
tration and self-seeking is likely to antago-
nize rather than motivate officials and cit-
izens. Cependant, the study of corruption
ought to go beyond the assessment of laws
against bribery, extortion, and fraud to cov-

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147 (3) Summer 2018Susan Rose- Ackerman

er analogous forms of self-seeking. If some
questionable behavior is legal or widely tol-
erated, one needs to ask whether and how
it should be outlawed or punished. Simply
calling it “corrupt” does not answer these
questions.

Applying the “corruption” label is not al-
ways controversial. Difficulties arise at the
margins where values conflict and ideals
must accommodate a messy reality. I con-
centrate on polities that differentiate roles
and responsibilities. Difficult ethical and le-
gal issues arise at the borderlines between
roles. Those who hold government or polit-
ical positions as legislators, ministers, par-
ty functionaries, juges, presidents, prime
ministers, or civil servants also have oth-
er roles as devoted family members, busi-
nessmen, tribal elders, religious leaders, ou
even members of organized crime groups.
Individuals change roles over days, weeks,
or years. What is appropriate or required in
one role may be inappropriate or even illegal
in others. As Rothstein and Mungiu-Pippidi
have argued, public roles require a level of
objectivity, evenhandedness, and transpar-
ency not imposed on one’s personal life,
where favoring one’s family is the norm.

Based on the concepts of role and respon-
sibility, I begin with three cases that fit com-
fortably into the “illegal corruption” cate-
gory: so-called grand and petty corruption
and electoral fraud. These categories may
overlap with each other, but each express-
es widely accepted boundaries at the inter-
face between the public and private spheres.
I then discuss the more ambiguous cases of
campaign finance, lobbying, and conflicts
of interest, which demand more nuanced
legal and policy responses. I emphasize re-
sponses that go beyond law enforcement,
particularly policies that reorganize govern-
ment institutions and their relationship to
the private sector.

Direct monetary payoffs to secure gov-

ernment contracts, purchase state-owned

enterprises, and obtain concessions for re-
source extraction are corrupt by almost any
definition. The explicit quid pro quo dis-
torts government choices and imposes costs
on citizens. Government officials may seek
bids for contracts that fit poorly with the
needs of the country and instead maximize
the rents to be shared between public offi-
cials and private firms. Corrupt deals can
limit competition even for otherwise valid
purchases, driving up prices. For privat-
izations and concessions, lack of competi-
tion drives down prices, undermining so-
cial benefits. A corrupt firm might influence
bidding specifications in order to become
the only qualified bidder, making the for-
mal bidding process look clean because the
illicit behavior took place earlier.

Corrupt deals may also permit infrastruc-
ture contracts that violate laws pertaining
to the environment, pay and working con-
ditions, or treatment of local communities.
Firms that obtain concessions through pay-
offs are also vulnerable to extortion, et
those threats may affect project timelines,
leading investors to speed up resource ex-
traction or to use production processes
that are easy to shut down or move away
on short notice. The benefits to a country’s
citizens are lower than they would be un-
der an honest system, sometimes by a great
deal. Even if the winning firm turns out to
be the most efficient, the gains of the trans-
action are shared between the corrupt offi-
cial and the firm and lost to the population.
Monopoly power on its own may be as cost-
ly as corruption; competitive pressures are
essential to produce contracts that operate
in citizens’ best interests.

Recipients of kickbacks are corrupt so
long as the law distinguishes between the
personal interests of officials and those of
the state.4 For example, a ruler who choos-
es projects to maximize bribes could by
chance end up supporting projects that
are superior to those he or she would oth-
erwise select. The deals remain corrupt,

100

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cependant, because of the bribe-maximizing
selection method. To assess the impact of
corruption, behaviors and methods must
be separated from outcomes.

If accepting kickbacks for major con-
tracts, privatizations, or concessions is un-
ambiguously corrupt, what about the firms
that make such payments? Firms excuse
payoffs by claiming that they cannot other-
wise do business in a country where corrup-
tion is the norm. This excuse is often a non-
starter under the law: in international con-
tracts, such behaviors might be prohibited
by the laws of the host country, a corpora-
tion’s home country, or both. Legal instru-
ments outlawing corruption in internation-
al business deals include the U.S. Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (fcpa) and the Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and
Développement (oecd) Anticorruption Con-
vention. Even bribes paid to finalize deals
in deeply corrupt environments fall under
these legal strictures. Nevertheless, quelques
see these payoffs as “necessary payments”
(notwendigen Ausgaben, the term once used
by German firms to account for such pay-
ments in their financial records). No one
disputes that a system of kickbacks impos-
es higher costs to host countries’ citizens
compared with an honest system, but par-
ties to these contracts argue that the only al-
ternative is no investment at all. The Unit-
ed States has been an aggressive enforcer of
the fcpa under the umbrella of the oecd
Convention. Par conséquent, some U.S. busi-
nesses claim that enforcing the fcpa harms
America’s economic interests. That claim
is deeply misleading; it overstates the case
and denies the importance of ethical busi-
ness dealings. D'abord, the fcpa applies not
only to U.S. companies but also to all com-
panies that are listed on U.S. capital markets
or are otherwise linked to the U.S. economy.
Deuxième, most international companies are
subject to anticorruption regimes in their
home countries if those jurisdictions have
ratified the oecd Convention–meaning

that the competition often faces the same
ethical and legal obstructions as U.S. firms.
Enfin, even if a kickback helps win an indi-
vidual deal, systemic corruption introduc-
es inefficiencies and reduces competitive-
ness and private-sector development. Ce,
à son tour, hampers economic growth and lim-
its opportunities for investment and trade
that arise from better economic conditions.
Corruption can initiate downward spi-
rals of bribery, extortion, and escalating
bureaucratic demands.5 Abetting corrupt
officials in their search for private gain will
encourage them to ramp up their extor-
tionate behavior going forward. The long-
term losses for global business and for the
citizens of kleptocratic states will arguably
cancel out the short-term gain from indi-
vidual contracts.

Consider next so-called petty corruption,

wherein bribes to low-level officials induce
them to override regulatory rules, reduce
taxes, limit fines, and allocate scarce public
benefits in ways that advantage the briber.
The label “petty” is not intended to imply
that the backhanders are unimportant or
tolerable, but rather to highlight the dif-
ference in scale between the corruption of
large deals and situations in which a large
proportion of those demanding a service or
avoiding a cost make payoffs. These bribes
distort the allocation of benefits and costs,
and they signal underlying weaknesses in
public programs.

Apologists for small bribes see them as
the grease that makes the operations of pri-
vate businesses and the administration of
public programs run. For them, the ideal of
unfettered market trades and sale of public
goods to the highest bidder ought to trump
legal rules. Anything that furthers that ideal
is not corrupt, but rules that are inconsis-
tent with the free-market ideal are. Note the
arrogance of this view. The commentator
asserts the right to evaluate the rules in the
light of his or her own values, privileging

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147 (3) Summer 2018Susan Rose- Ackerman

quid pro quo transfers and labeling behav-
ior that seeks to restrict them as corrupt.
To assert that some payoffs are acceptable
because they mimic the free market, or that
some rules are illegitimate because they do
pas, closes the door to genuine debate about
how to regulate market failures, preserve
individual rights, and deal with social and
economic inequities.

The evaluation of petty corruption be-
gins with distinctions between licit and il-
licit behavior. What can be legally bought
and sold? What trades are illegal and sub-
ject to punishment? Has that boundary
been set appropriately? Should the law
permit more or fewer trades? Should gov-
ernments redesign programs to change fi-
nancial incentives or to influence choices?
I focus on three reform measures against
petty corruption: legalizing payments, concernant-
forming programs to limit incentives for
payments, and eliminating programs in-
filtrated with self-seeking.

The first solution is to legalize payments.
Legal market trades would then allocate
goods and services to purchasers who val-
ue them the most in material terms. High
earners could thus satisfy more of their
needs and desires than those with low in-
come and wealth. Is such an allocation ac-
ceptable for a particular public program?
The answer depends upon its underlying
justification. The easy cases for legalization
of payments are regulatory initiatives that
attempt to enhance efficiency. For exam-
ple, a government may decide to limit the
import of capital goods through a quota.
Legally selling these quotas in auction to
the highest bidders would minimize their
economic costs.

Bribe payments can undermine public
goals, which is why reducing incentives for
payments is also an important second op-
tion. An initiative may target the needy or
the worthy. The goal may be Rothstein’s
impartiality, but scarce resources imply
that not everyone can obtain the benefit. If

officials allocate the program’s benefits ac-
cording to payoffs received, their behavior
violates the underlying purposes of these
programs. Payoffs, even if “petty,” distort
official criteria and are thus corrupt.

Corruption also undermines public pur-
poses if bribes become substitutes for qual-
ifications for access to benefits. If the qual-
ifications relate to the underlying purpose
of the program (Par exemple, if a program is
reserved for the neediest candidates), pay-
offs distort the programs, directing bene-
fits away from the intended recipients. Un
can make similar arguments about govern-
ment-imposed costs to citizens in the form
of taxes, customs duties, fines, regulatory
shutdowns, and criminal arrests: those who
pay bribes to avoid such costs undermine
the legal framework that keeps the govern-
ment functioning.

Enfin, si, in practice, the administra-
tion of a public program is arbitrary and
unfair, it is likely that the laws themselves
are discriminatory or their administration
is faulty, meaning that the programs them-
selves may need to be modified or elimi-
nated. In that case, legalizing or overlook-
ing private payments would only give offi-
cials incentive to impose arbitrary red tape
or threaten citizens to generate more pay-
offs. Reform must limit the cause of the
bribes, whether it is self-seeking behavior
or citizens’ frustration with a discrimina-
tory system. Bribes paid to convince au-
thorities to overlook rule violations or per-
mit access to services without the required
qualifications are also corrupt. These cas-
es involve dysfunctional bureaucrats who
either do little work without payoffs or ac-
tively extort them.

Although one may sympathize with cit-
izens facing extortionate demands, few
would hesitate to label such systems cor-
rupt. Payoffs contribute to societal dysfunc-
tion, even if those who pay bribes are bet-
ter off in the short term than those who do
pas. If the state tolerates “petty” bribes, un

102

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vicious cycle can develop that may escalate
and undermine all public programs. Comment-
jamais, cracking down on payoffs is insuffi-
cient and may be unfair to those caught in
a web of petty corruption. The state must
reform the programs to limit corrupt incen-
tives facing both those who pay and those
who receive payoffs or, in the extreme case,
to cancel dysfunctional programs. Reforms
might, Par exemple, increase the supply of
scarce public services, set clearer qualifi-
cation standards, add transparency about
beneficiaries, or streamline bureaucratic
processing of applications. Admittedly,
such reforms require reform-minded offi-
cials in positions of power; implementing
them is not always possible where bureau-
cratic corruption is pervasive.6
The third type of unambiguously corrupt

behavior I will examine is election fraud,
including vote buying and electoral ma-
nipulation. In such scenarios, politicians
and political parties pay individual vot-
ers for their support. Voters may not ob-
ject because they benefit from candidates’
largesse. In some cases, the distribution of
state resources and patronage jobs creates
webs of obligation such that voters may
overlook or even encourage illegal contri-
butions from the wealthy if some benefits
flow to them. These personalized benefits
can make it difficult for credible opposi-
tion candidates to arise. The government
becomes a site for a mutual exchange of fa-
vors that ultimately benefits those with the
most resources and political power.

Even in elections with secret ballots, vote
buying can occur. In especially blatant cas-
es, political operatives mark ballots for
voters. Politicians may employ other tech-
niques, such as paying election officials and
monitors to manipulate voter registration
rolls, miscount or misreport votes, “lose”
ballot boxes, limit the opening times of
polling stations in contested voting juris-
dictions, or fail to publicize balloting loca-

tion. Sometimes partisan electoral offi-
cials misuse their positions to fraudulent-
ly elect favored candidates. Incentives for
vote buying and electoral fraud are stron-
ger the more competitive the election.7 If a
party or candidate is certain to win or lose,
fraud is unnecessary; hence, the absence
of voter fraud does not necessarily imply
stronger democratic institutions. Reform
requires political parties and leaders to es-
pouse honest elections, support election
monitors (perhaps from outside the coun-
try), and encourage the creation of inde-
pendent domestic institutions to organize
and monitor elections. Concerned citizens
can provide decentralized oversight.

Not all corruption fits within these three

catégories; in some cases “corruption” is a
problematic or ambiguous label. I reject an
expansive notion of corruption that cov-
ers all cases in which private wealth affects
public choices, either directly or indirect-
ly. That is an impossibly broad definition,
especially if we operate under the under-
standing that corrupt acts should be ille-
gal. Few commentators advocate this ap-
proach, but why label an action “corrupt”
if not to call for its sanctioning under crim-
inal or civil law? If calling something “cor-
rupt” is merely a way of signaling its im-
morality, why not just criticize it as such
and engage in public debate about what the
standard of behavior ought to be? “Politi-
cal corruption” is an especially ambiguous
category that can refer both to explicit quid
pro quos and to broader pathways through
which private wealth affects elections and
policy choices. Campaign finance, lobby-
ing, favoritism, and conflicts of interest–
all behaviors that under some circum-
stances and for some commentators have
been deemed corrupt–illustrate the con-
ceptual and policy difficulties of this term.

I will first discuss campaign finance. Dem-

ocratic political systems must finance politi-

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147 (3) Summer 2018Susan Rose- Ackerman

cal campaigns without encouraging the sale
of politicians to contributors. Well-funded
candidates may be more likely to win elec-
tion, after which they can pursue the do-
nors’ favored policies. Politicians may base
their policy positions around the goal of ob-
taining more funding, creating a feedback
loop of ever-increasing devotion to donor
interests. Cependant, the simple act of donat-
ing to those with similar policy positions
is not obviously corrupt. Election dona-
tions are, as the U.S. Supreme Court argues,
a form of “speech.”8 Even if biased in fa-
vor of the wealthy or well-organized inter-
est groups, donations support and provide
data to candidates and incumbents.

Governments have drawn the line be-
tween legal and illegal gifts in quite dif-
ferent ways, and laws vary with respect to
the limits placed on quid pro quo deals by
politicians. Even though the U.S. Supreme
Court has struck down many campaign-
finance regulations as unconstitutional lim-
its on free speech, the justices still accept
corruption (or its appearance) as a consti-
tutional justification for regulation.9

Groups that donate to elected officials
often expect special consideration in leg-
islative or administrative processes or as-
sistance in obtaining contracts and conces-
sions. The interests of wealthy groups or in-
dividuals can easily conflict with those of
the general public. In an ideal democracy,
the electoral process disciplines politicians
to represent the interests of their constit-
uents, with voters able to penalize candi-
dates who are beholden to special interests.
But voters cannot act unless they know both
how their representatives behave and who
has given them money. Legal gifts can have
a corrupting effect, especially if the quid pro
quo is not obvious to voters.

Sometimes expectations of a quid pro
quo are quite straightforward. In other
cases the effects of the exchange are sub-
tle and difficult to document. Some contri-
butions are long-term investments in de-

veloping relationships of mutual trust de-
signed to get sympathetic candidates into
office. In practice, it is difficult to distin-
guish between politicians who modify
their positions to favor contributors and
those who simply share their contributors’
points of view. Private contributions in-
fluence who runs for office, as well as how
politicians behave once elected. Even if do-
nations only buy access, they can influence
legislative outcomes.

Although empirical research has not con-
clusively determined the impact of cam-
paign donations on electoral success, poli-
ticians and contributors behave as if mon-
ey matters. Incumbents have a fundraising
advantage, and those in powerful positions
in the legislature are especially favored for
reelection. A study of roll-call votes in the
U.S. Congress found no statistically signif-
icant relationship between votes and con-
tributions, but other routes to influence are
more subtle.10 Although the evidence that
donations influence behavior is mostly an-
ecdotal, the link between campaign funds
and influence remains a persistent concern
of critics worldwide.

The difficulty of articulating a legal defi-
nition of corruption that is applicable to
elected politicians and those seeking in-
fluence is illustrated by McDonnell v. U.S.,
un 2016 Supreme Court decision interpret-
ing the federal bribery statute.11 The opin-
ion overturned the corruption conviction
of then–Virginia governor Robert McDon-
nell, who had arranged meetings between
state officials and a donor seeking econom-
ic advantages. The Court held that the gov-
ernor’s efforts were part of the routine ac-
tions expected of elected officials, even if
some of those actions were “distasteful.”
Unlike the earlier Citizens United case, free-
dom of speech was not at issue, because
the case targeted the governor, not the
businessman. The Court also heard Caper-
ton v. UN. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., in which an
elected state judge had received large do-

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nations from one of the parties in the case:
gifts that could have had a “significant and
disproportionate influence” on his objec-
tivité. The Supreme Court required the
state judge to recuse himself from the case
because of the high “probability of actu-
al bias.”12 As lawyer Joel Ramirez argues,
this decision provides an opening for cam-
paign-finance regulations directed at can-
didates rather than donors, avoiding both
First Amendment challenges and bribery
prosecutions.13

If McDonnell implies that prosecutors
must prove an explicit quid pro quo to se-
cure a bribery conviction, that would raise
the bar for conviction. Caperton, cependant,
holds that circumstantial evidence can
be sufficient to limit the effect of private
wealth on public choices. Because links be-
tween donations and favors can undermine
electoral democracy, campaign funding
should be regulated directly, not as a subset
of antibribery law. State statutes could the-
oretically outlaw both giving and accepting
substantial gifts, even if these actions do not
violate the federal bribery law.14
Reform proposals for election law range

from strict proposals employing a broad le-
gal definition of corruption to more permis-
sive ones that rely on disclosure to increase
transparency. Neither extreme seems ap-
propriate. In a highly competitive system
with informed voters who do not expect
personal favors, prompt and complete dis-
closure might be sufficient. Politicians who
rely too heavily on special interest money
–and voted accordingly–would be defeat-
éd. More direct restrictions should hold if
the system is not competitive and if voters
are poorly informed; without spending lim-
its, politicians can favor large contributors
and gifts can be used to mislead voters re-
garding candidates’ positions and behavior.
Campaign-finance reform must avoid
laws that are so strict as to encourage il-
legality. Although laws in many countries

are overly permissive, in others the regu-
lations practically require off-the-books
transfers for candidates to fund their cam-
paies. Strict legal limits can also encour-
age unreported corrupt transfers. Scan-
dals point to the importance of both clear
rules governing the solicitation of pri-
vate money and sufficient legal sources of
funds. En outre, the impact of corpo-
rate gifts depends on politicians’ abilities
to provide individualized favors to firms. If
such favors are not outlawed or controlled,
the distinction between bribes and legal
campaign contributions will be blurred
and will depend upon reporting require-
ments and the reaction of voters.

Societies must reach a consensus about
the degree to which a democratic govern-
ment can or should interfere with its citi-
zens’ wishes to express their political in-
terests through donations to political par-
ties or individual candidates. Once a polity
has agreed on a norm of behavior, solu-
tions can be pursued along four dimen-
sions. D'abord, the costs of political cam-
paigns can be reduced by limiting cam-
paign length and restricting the range of
acceptable fundraising methods. Deuxième,
stronger disclosure rules can be imple-
mented. Troisième, laws can limit individu-
al donations or candidates’ spending. Dans
the United States, although the Supreme
Court has limited the regulation of cam-
paign spending, the justices have so far
accepted existing restrictions on direct
contributions to candidates and parties.
Fourth, public budgets can provide alter-
native sources of funds. Many proposals
for more extensive public funding in the
United States have been advanced; comment-
jamais, opponents worry that public fund-
ing and spending limits will protect in-
cumbents and unduly disadvantage mi-
nority parties. Public funding formulas
could overcome the incumbency advan-
tage, but finding a workable system may
be difficult in the United States given the

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147 (3) Summer 2018Susan Rose- Ackerman

Supreme Court’s aggressive stance against
efforts to level the playing field.

Alternativement, candidates who demon-
strate substantial public support could ob-
tain funding, Par exemple, through gov-
ernment-funded vouchers (called “de-
mocracy dollars” when implemented by
the Seattle government) given to voters
to support the candidates of their choice.
One plan would combine a voucher pro-
gram with anonymous private donations,
resulting in “a secret donation booth.”15 In
promoting democratic values, a voucher
plan would reduce the influence of wealthy
interests. If not well-monitored, cependant,
it could increase illegal corruption; peut-
didates might bribe voters in exchange
for assigning vouchers to them; et le
wealthy might finance independent cam-
paigns to influence the voucher system.

The law should require disclosure of the
relations between politicians and wealthy
interests. Restrictions on outside earnings
and lobbying by retired politicians–such
as “cooling-off periods” in which former
legislators or officials are barred from lob-
bying the offices in which they worked–
are more controversial, but will be impor-
tant in political systems in which the elector-
ate is poorly informed or less educated. Le
more the electorate demands accountabili-
ty, the less restrictive legal rules need to be.

Lobbying is another ambiguous form of

influence. Legislators, presidents, and oth-
er public officials need information from
outside experts and need to gauge the opin-
ions and policy preferences of both ordi-
nary citizens and organized groups. Pro-
active efforts by private individuals and or-
ganizations to influence public choices–
what we call lobbying– are sometimes crit-
icized as being inherently corrupt. But one
should avoid easily equating lobbying with
corruption. Lobbying gives wealthy inter-
ests clout; cependant, well-organized civil so-
ciety groups in such fields as environmental

politique, consumer protection, and education,
as well as labor unions and associations of
beneficiaries (like pensioners and veterans),
also lobby. Lobbying is a necessary aspect
of the relationship between lawmakers and
the public, but it is fraught with the poten-
tial to facilitate corrupt deals. Souvent, lobby-
ists cultivate long-term relationships of mu-
tual assistance, meaning that individual do-
nations may not have immediately visible
consequences. This affects the integrity of
democratic politics. Cependant, entirely out-
lawing lobbying–a multibillion-dollar in-
dustry in the United States alone–is not a
plausible response. If a state tried to bar all
contacts with lobbyists, it would likely drive
the practice underground, transforming it
into outright corruption. Aujourd'hui, bien que
they are not “corrupt” per se, lobbying and
political pressure challenge the egalitarian
values of democracy. Particularly trouble-
some are situations in which lobbying and
campaign finance complement each other,
as is arguably the case in the United States.16
But the answer is some form of campaign
finance reform, not a wholesale ban on
lobbying.

The routes to political influence in a giv-
en society depend upon its underlying lev-
els of both corruption and political compe-
tition. If personal connections matter and
major shake-ups in elite power are uncom-
mon, those seeking political influence will
curry favor with incumbents. They may stay
within the law or pay politicians off out-
droite, depending upon local conditions.
Cependant, these connections can backfire
if powerful politicians extort firms and ap-
propriate their profits, shifting monopoly
rents to politicians and generating a long-
run negative impact on private investment.
In contrast, if a polity enjoys competitive
elections and alternations in power, strate-
gic actors are more likely to seek routes to
influence that are independent of the par-
tisan composition of government at a par-
ticular point in time.17

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In either case, corrupt payoffs are less
necessary in states with better rule of law
and other routes to influence via lobbying
and connections. These states are also likely
to have strong conflict-of-interest laws pro-
hibiting certain kinds of explicit business/
political connections. Par conséquent, politique
connections are more necessary in states
that are not riddled with outright bribery,
such as the United States. Although person-
al ties theoretically make it easier to arrange
illegal quid pro quo arrangements, they of-
ten also make them less necessary, as indi-
viduals respond to interpersonal rather
than monetary obligations. En outre,
lobbyists do play a significant role in edu-
cating politicians about policy issues and
about constituencies’ needs: evidence from
the United States finds that lobbyists’ con-
tacts and expertise matter to members of
the U.S. Congrès. Ainsi, even if most pub-
lic officials do not take kickbacks and do not
use their power to extort private firms, ils
may favor firms that actively lobby them.18
Lobbyists seek to benefit their clients and
will concentrate their efforts on politicians
capable of affecting outcomes. My model
of lobbying identifies four stylized possi-
bilities: 1) lobbyists’ access to politicians is
heavily rationed and skews toward wealthy
interests, and lobbyists provide personal or
campaign-linked benefits to politicians;
2) access is similarly skewed toward lob-
byists representing wealthy and powerful
clients, but the lobbyists provide informa-
tion and expertise that favor the interests of
their clients; 3) access is open regardless of
moneyed interests but the benefits to pol-
iticians are personal or campaign-related;
et 4) access is open and lobbyists provide
information and expertise on all sides of the
issue. The fourth vision of lobbying is ob-
viously most consistent with the view that
lobbying enhances democratic account-
ability and improves the quality of stat-
utes, while the first is very close to outright
corruption. In most democracies, the real-

ity falls somewhere in the middle. Policies
should encourage the fourth model (c'est,
open access and objective expertise) by low-
ering barriers to those seeking to provide in-
formation and by requiring influence-seek-
ers to register and report publicly on their
activités.

Conflicts of interest, the third issue I will

discuss, are a related but distinct question.
They arise when an official mixes public and
private roles, furthering, say, the interests
of her family or business when acting as
a bureaucrat, judge, or politician.19 In the
most extreme cases, the same elite actors
control both the state and the economy. Ex-
plicit payoffs are unnecessary because pub-
lic officials advance their own private finan-
cial interests with no need for an interme-
diary. Illegal corruption and fraud are a
subset of this concept, but not all conflicts
are corrupt. The challenge for policy-mak-
ers is twofold. D'abord, they need to consid-
er whether some conflicts are so inherent-
ly harmful that they ought to be outlawed,
even if they do not constitute corruption or
fraud. Deuxième, the state may need to adjust
its mixture of ex-ante prohibitions and ex-
post penalties for conflict-of-interest sce-
narios. Requirements for financial disclo-
sure, divestiture, and recusal may be too lax
or too stringent. Do they discourage other-
wise qualified people from taking public po-
sitions, thus limiting the pool of talent? Are
they too easy for politicians to circumvent
par, Par exemple, transferring assets to their
children or moving assets abroad? Do the
rules favor wealthy private interests with-
out the need for outright payoffs?

Most mature democracies seek to limit
the influence of private economic interests
on elected politicians or, at the very least,
require them to report their financial in-
terests. Elected officials are generally reg-
ulated less stringently than other public of-
ficials, presumably because they write the
rules that apply to them. Especially in new

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democracies, revealing conflicts of inter-
est and maintaining financial transparency
have not been high priorities. Yet if uncon-
trolled, politicians with widespread busi-
ness interests can undermine governmen-
tal legitimacy as surely as do those who
serve the interests of large contributors.
At a minimum, disclosure of politicians’
financial interests and those of their fam-
ilies seems necessary for democratic ac-
countability. Once lobbying is added to the
mix, the benefits of openness to outside
sources of information must be balanced
against the risk of improper influence,
leading to difficult trade-offs. Cependant,
simply labeling all conflicts of interest as
corruption conflates too many different
types of public-private interactions.

Private wealth distorts the exercise of pub-

lic power, directing it away from majoritar-
ian preferences and values. But to label all
such distortions “corrupt” sets an ideal-
ized standard of purity, implying that vir-
tually all politicians and officials are guilty
of corruption. A rigid and uncompromis-
ing stance would likely discourage almost
everyone from seeking public office, leaving
the field to zealots and ideologues.

But even if the corruption is not in doubt,
the best remedy may not be a law-enforce-
ment crackdown. If bribes are endemic to
a dysfunctional system, efforts to combat
them should focus on institutional re-
forms. The goal should be to change the
expectations of both officials and of citi-
zens and businesses, and to avoid vicious
cycles where the corruption of some en-
courages more and more to turn corrupt
over time as they observe the actions of
others. Reformers need to distinguish be-
tween clearly unacceptable practices such
as grand corruption, petty corruption, et
vote buying, d'un côté, and more
ambiguous cases such as lobbying, con-
flicts of interest, and campaign finance,
on the other.

As Bonnie J. Palifka and I discuss in our
recent book Corruption and Government:
Causes, Consequences, and Reform, reform-
ers need to ascertain which vulnerabilities
in their society have the greatest impact on
citizens and businesses.20 This can be done
through surveys of the public and target-
ed research into sectors subject to grand
corruption or organized crime influence.
With such a road map in place, reforms can
take several forms.

D'abord, reforms should modify the incen-
tives motivating both those who pay and
those who accept or solicit bribes. To count-
er grand corruption, reforms should in-
crease the competitiveness and transpar-
ency of bidding processes for government
contracts and favor purchases of products
sold in the private market over tailor-made
products suitable only for government
utiliser. Such reforms can limit both monop-
oly power and corruption. Convictions for
corruption should be possible on the evi-
dence of payoffs alone. To limit low-level
kickbacks, public programs should stream-
line and clarify rules and application pro-
cesses. Some public programs may need to
be redesigned to limit discretion and reduce
scarcity. Civil servants must be adequate-
ly trained and compensated, including re-
wards for competent service.

Campaign-finance laws need to prevent
the de facto “sale” of votes and political
support. En même temps, voter fraud can
be reduced through improved voting tech-
nology in conjunction with better internal
and external monitoring.

Deuxième, reformers may need to change
criminal law so that its coverage and pen-
alties are sufficient both to deter corrup-
tion and encourage honest and competent
enforcement. The use of independent anti-
corruption agencies has a mixed record be-
cause they often either lack sufficient pow-
er or are not truly independent. Recent ex-
amples, such as that of Brazil, suggest that
good models do exist. Even so, strong law

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enforcement is never sufficient if the un-
derlying institutions of government are
riddled with payoff incentives. This may
make it tempting for reformers simply to
shrink government, but this is not the an-
swer. Rules that are only “red tape” can en-
courage corruption, as we have seen, et
should be repealed. But anticorruption ef-
forts should recognize the positive role of
regulations that serve the public interest.
Privatizing public programs may create
private monopolies that earn excess prof-
its without the need for payoffs; smaller
government is not necessarily better gov-
ernment.

Troisième, civil society must be engaged in
the anticorruption effort. Civil-society
groups can be an important source of sup-
port, helping citizens resist corrupt de-
mands and push for systemic reform. Donc-
cial media, aussi, can serve as a platform for
reformers and concerned citizens and pro-
vide a means to encourage whistleblowing
and investigative journalism. Institutions
of public oversight, from competitive elec-
tions to specialized institutions such as om-
budsmen and whistleblower protections,
can empower anticorruption movements
that operate outside of government.

Fourth, cross-border responses need to
regulate financial flows and confront orga-
nized crime. The international community
must take concerted action to stem mon-
ey laundering and to limit the reach of or-
ganized crime and the impunity of cor-
rupt multinationals. The United States
is at the forefront of enforcing the oecd

Anticorruption Convention, which targets
corrupt overseas investments. Cependant,
all international financial centers need to
strengthen laws that mandate documenta-
tion of the beneficial owners of shell com-
panies, as well as legislation making it dif-
ficult to hide corrupt proceeds in fixed as-
sets, such as real estate.21

The ambiguous cases of campaign dona-
tion, lobbying, favoritism, and conflicts
of interest present serious challenges, mais
calling them uniformly corrupt simply fu-
els public cynicism. Citizens need to de-
bate the relative benefits and costs of the
available options, not shut down debate
with broad labels. There are several ways
to increase government transparency and
public accountability. Most obvious is the
disclosure of budgets, contracts, and gov-
ernment rules and ordinances. Provisions
for public input into policy, suivi de
public statements laying out the reasons
for reforms, can help lend legitimacy to ex-
ecutive actions. Freedom of information
laws can encourage honest and competent
administration by requiring public access
to government documents.

None of these reform proposals is a pan-
acea, and all require civil-society pressure
and leaders committed to reform. Leader-
ship is necessary but is never sufficient on
its own. Reformers must understand how
corruption and other forms of self-deal-
ing work at an institutional level in order
to construct reforms with some chance of
success.

endnotes
1 Bo Rothstein and Jan Teorell, “What is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Gov-

ernment Institutions,” Governance 21 (2008): 165–190.

2 Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, The Quest for Good Governance: How Societies Develop Control of Corruption
(Cambridge: la presse de l'Universite de Cambridge, 2015), 14–17, 27–30, 57–82; and Robert I. Rot-
berg, The Corruption Cure: How Citizens & Leaders Can Combat Graft (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
Presse universitaire, 2017), 196–222.

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3 Susan Rose-Ackerman and Bonnie J. Palifka, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences
and Reform, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: la presse de l'Universite de Cambridge, 2016), 3–11; and Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Corruption; A Study in Political Economy (New York: Academic Press, 1978), 1–14.
4 Officials pursuing their self-interest with complete impunity resemble something like Michael
Johnston’s “Official Moguls” corruption syndrome, outlined in Michael Johnston, Syndromes
of Corruption: Wealth, Power and Democracy (Cambridge: la presse de l'Universite de Cambridge, 2005),
155–185; and Michael Johnston, Corruption, Contention and Reform: The Power of Deep Democrati-
zation (Cambridge: la presse de l'Universite de Cambridge, 2014), 16–28, 86–118.

5 Susan Rose-Ackerman and Sinéad Hunt, “Transparency and Business Advantage: The Impact
of International Anti-Corruption Policies on the United States National Interest,” New York
University Law School Annual Survey of American Law 3 (67) (2012): 433–466.

6 In his essay in this volume, Bo Rothstein stresses the vicious cycles that perpetuate corruption.
He recommends an indirect approach focusing “on reciprocity, changing perceptions about
‘the rules of the game,’ and breaking a corrupt equilibrium.” Bo Rothstein, “Fighting System-
ic Corruption: The Indirect Strategy,” Dædalus 147 (3) (Été 2018): 43.

7 Fabrice Lehoucq, “Electoral Fraud: Causes, Types and Consequences,” Annual Review of Political

Science 6 (2003): 233–256.

8 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
9 See Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). On legal corruption, see Lawrence
Lessig, Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress–and a Plan to Stop It (New York: Grand Central
Édition, 2011), 226–247; and Zephyr Teachout, Corruption in America: From Benjamin Franklin’s
Snuffbox to Citizens United (Cambridge, Mass.: Presse universitaire de Harvard, 2014), 46–50, 251–253.
10 Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder, Jr., “Why is There So Little

Money in U.S. Politique?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 (2003): 105–130.

11 McDonnell v. U.S., 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
12 Caperton v. UN. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
13 Joel J. Ramirez, “Beyond Quid Pro Quo: Caperton and Anticorruption by Anti-Transparency,»

supervised analytic writing paper (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Law School, May 2017).

14 Virginia has taken modest steps toward capping gifts from lobbyists to state lawmakers. Voir
Jim Nolan and Marcus Schmidt, “Legislature Approves Ethics Bill with $100 Aggregate Gift
Cap,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, Avril 17, 2015, http://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/
government-politics/legislature-approves-ethics-bill-with-aggregate-gift-cap/article_1d1225c8
-3929-5099-8ce5-eace700186c9.html.

15 Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres, Voting with Dollars: A New Paradigm for Campaign Finance (Nouveau

Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2012).

16 Richard Hasen, “Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution,” Stanford Law Review 64 (2012):

191–253.

17 Raymond J. Fisman, “Political Connections and Commerce–A Global Perspective,” in Greed,
Corruption, and the Modern State: Essays in Political Economy, éd. Susan Rose-Ackerman and Paul
Lagunes (Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, 2015), 71–91.

18 Marianne Bertrand, Matilde Bombardini, and Francesco Trebbi, “Is It Whom You Know or
What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process,” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 122 (4) (2014): 1639–1676.

19 Susan Rose-Ackerman, “Corruption and Conflicts of Interest,” in Corruption and Conflicts of In-
terest: A Comparative Law Approach, éd. Jean-Bernard Auby, Emmanuel Breen, and Thomas Per-
roud (Cheltenham, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar, 2014), 3–11.

20 Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, Corruption and Government, 3–11.
21 Ibid., 294–315, 446–519.

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