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Collective Resilience

Collective Resilience Victor D. Cha

Deterring China’s Weaponization of
Economic Interdependence

When Speaker of the
U.S. House of Representative Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in 2022 to meet with
President Tsai Ing-wen, it was the response by the People’s Republic of China
(RPC)1 in the form of military exercises that captured international attention.2
Of equal signiªcance, cependant, was a package of subtle economic measures
against the island. The Chinese government banned imports from Taiwan of
citrus fruits (grapefruit, lemons, and oranges) and ªsh, allegedly for “pest
control” and “COVID-19 prevention.”3 It also stopped exports of natural
sand, which is a key component for producing semiconductor chips, a vital
Taiwanese export. Enfin, it suspended the licenses of about 2,000 (out of
plus que 3,000) Taiwanese food producers that export their goods to China.4

Victor D. Cha holds the Distinguished University Professorship in Georgetown University’s Department of
Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, where he is also the Vice Dean for Faculty
and Graduate Affairs.

The author thanks the participants and hosts for comments during seminar presentations at the
Université de Californie, Berkeley, Princeton University, Université Harvard, Université de Stanford,
the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Paciªc Center for
Security Studies. The author appreciates invaluable critiques and reviews of earlier iterations
of this article from Nicholas Anderson, Jude Blanchette, Kurt Campbell, Sungmin Cho, Zachary
Tonnelier, Christina Davis, Bonnie Glaser, Brad Glosserman, Matthew Goodman, Michael Green,
John Ikenberry, David Kang, Ellen Kim, John Park, Laura Rosenberger, Richard Samuels, Sue Mi
Terry, Dennis Wilder, Tom Wright, and the anonymous reviewers. For research assistance, the au-
thor is indebted to Junah Jang, Andy Lim, Anthony Park, and Joshua Park. An online appendix is
available at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/FDJCJX.

1. The Chinese government’s economic coercion against states and companies started around
2008, but this mercantilist strategy escalated under Xi Jinping. In this article, I therefore use
“Xi Jinping regime,” “Chinese government,” and “Beijing” to identify the primary actor behind
these policies, and in any other contexts I use “China.”
2. See Chris Buckley et al., “Chinese Missiles Strike Seas off Taiwan, and Some Land Near Japan,»
New York Times, Août 3, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/03/world/asia/taiwan-
china-military-exercises.html; Vivian Wang, “Chinese Military Drills Aim to Awe, Both Abroad
and at Home,” New York Times, Août 6, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/06/world/
asia/china-exercises-taiwan.html.
3. Laura He, “China Hits Taiwan with Trade Restrictions after Pelosi Visit,” CNN, Août 3, 2022,
https://www.cnn.com/2022/08/03/economy/china-suspends-imports-taiwan-products-intl-hnk/
index.html.
4. See Amy Chang Chien, “First Pineapples, Now Fish: To Pressure Taiwan, China Flexes Eco-
nomic Muscle,” New York Times, Juin 22, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/22/business/
china-taiwan-grouper-ban.html; Tim McDonald, “China and Taiwan Face Off in Pineapple War,»
BBC News, Mars 19, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-56353963; Amanda Lee, “Main-

International Security, Vol. 48, Non. 1 (Été 2023), 91–124, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00465
© 2023 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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International Security 48:1 92

The purpose of these trade sanctions is to remind the Taiwanese that the
Chinese government under Xi Jinping could inºict considerable economic
distress. The Chinese government’s actions are discriminatory, they do not
conform to World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, and they have become a
regular tool of diplomacy since the 2010s. En effet, the government’s leveraging
of China’s market is a form of what I call “predatory liberalism” that weapon-
izes the networks of interdependence created by globalization.5 This practice
has been used against many Western and Asian countries, usually much
smaller than China, and its economic toll is hundreds of billions of dollars.

The policy debate about how to contend with the predatory actions of this
rising hegemon has centered largely on “de-risking” measures aimed at identi-
fying economic security vulnerabilities, practicing trade diversiªcation,
and devising impact-mitigation measures. Newly created institutions such as
the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or Quad), the Indo-Paciªc Economic
Framework, the Minerals Security Partnership, the Chip 4 alliance, et le
Clean Network try to secure supply chains through “reshoring” and “friend-
shoring.”6 These measures are designed to reduce dependence on China and
thereby minimize vulnerability to its economic coercion.

But these policies are largely piecemeal and defensive. D'abord, they provide
protection in certain key sectors, but they do not stop or deter the Chinese gov-
ernment’s economic predatory behavior overall. Deuxième, fears of economic re-
taliation prevent many countries from willingly participating in building such
supply chain networks outside China or restricting semiconductor technology

land China Bans Taiwan Wax and Sugar Apple Imports as Cross-Strait Relations Continue to
Worsen,” South China Morning Post, Septembre 19, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/poli-
tics/article/3149339/mainland-china-bans-taiwan-wax-and-sugar-apple-imports-cross.
5. Victor Cha, “The NBA [National Basketball Association] and China’s Predatory Liberal-
ism,” Lawfare, Décembre 8, 2019, https://www.lawfareblog.com/nba-and-chinas-predatory-
liberalism.
6. Janet Yellen and Ursula von der Leyen use the terms “friend-shoring” and “de-risking.” See
Janet L. Yellen, “Remarks by Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen on Way Forward for the
Global Economy,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, Avril 13, 2022, https://home.treasury.gov/
news/press-releases/jy0714; Finbarr Bermingham, “EU Racing to Devise New China Strategy
with ‘De-risking’ at Its Core,” South China Morning Post, Avril 29, 2023, https://www.scmp.com/
news/china/diplomacy/article/3218859/eu-racing-devise-new-china-strategy-de-risking-its-
core. On “reshoring,” see Paolo Barbieri et al., “What Can We Learn about Reshoring after Covid-
19?,” Operation Management Research 13 (Décembre 2020): 131–136, https://doi.org/10.1007/
s12063-020-00160-1; Weifeng Zhai, Shiling Sun, and Guangxing Zhang, “Reshoring of American
Manufacturing Companies from China,” Operations Management Research 9 (Décembre 2016):
62–74, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12063-016-0114-z.

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Collective Resilience 93

exports to China. No country can truly decouple from one of the largest econo-
mies in the world. What is needed is a strategy that can stop the Xi Jinping
regime’s economic predation, and not just insulate the world from its behavior.
“Collective resilience” is a peer competition strategy that promises a multi-
lateral response in the trade space to the prospect of economic bullying by the
Chinese government. What informs this strategy is the understanding that in-
terdependence, even unbalanced interdependence, is a two-way street. La plupart
targets of economic coercion are asymmetrically trade-dependent on China.
But China is also highly if not fully dependent on some export items from
these same countries. Original trade data presented in this article show that
the previous and current targets of the Xi Jinping regime’s economic coercion
export over $46.6 billion worth of goods on which China is more than 70 par- cent dependent as a proportion of its total imports of those goods. These coun- tries also export over $12.7 billion worth of goods on which China is more than
90 percent dependent as a proportion of its total imports of those goods. These
states could band together and practice an Article 5–type of collective eco-
nomic deterrence strategy by promising to retaliate should China act against
any alliance member. Forcing China to either ªnd a new supplier or pay a
higher price for one item is, bien sûr, not enough to change behavior. Ainsi,
operating alone against China would be foolhardy. Yet sanctions on an
aggregation of these high-dependence items would sufªciently inconve-
nience China that it might deter future predatory behavior. I deªne a high-
dependence item as an imported good that constitutes more than 70 percent of
China’s total trade in that good (measured in total value of trade). The barri-
ers to collective action of this sort are undeniably high. But overcoming
them is necessary if countries want to stop the Chinese government’s eco-
nomic bullying.

Dealing with the Xi regime’s weaponization of interdependence is critical to
competing successfully against China. The willingness of countries to join
U.S.-led supply chain coalitions, challenge China’s militarization of the South
China Sea, safeguard against Huawei’s access to domestic 5G markets, sup-
port Taiwan’s defense, and speak out for democracy in Hong Kong or against
genocide in Xinjiang ultimately depends on how fearful countries and compa-
nies are of China’s economic retaliation. Economic decoupling is not a realistic
solution because no country can completely sever its trade ties to the expan-
sive Chinese market. A strategy of collective resilience could neutralize the
Xi regime’s coercive behavior without decoupling.

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International Security 48:1 94

Collective resilience borrows from traditional deterrence theory and builds
on the literature on the weaponization of interdependence.7 The latter litera-
ture argues that globalized networks of ªnance, information, and trade can ac-
centuate power differentials, especially for countries and companies that
dominate key nodes in the network.8 Although the Chinese government has
weaponized trade interdependence, other actors in the network are not neces-
sarily powerless. En effet, even if they do not control a key node, they can exer-
cise leverage over the hegemon if they: (1) hold something of value to the
hegemon for which exit options are costly; et (2) band together in a multilat-
eral, economic Article 5–type of defense framework that can shape the hege-
mon’s behavior. I argue that collective resilience is a necessary competitive
strategy to protect the liberal international order. En effet, sometimes peer com-
petition is illiberal.9 Collective resilience does not advocate starting a trade war
or decoupling; instead, the strategy seeks to shape Chinese conformity with
the liberal trading order.

7. The term “collective resilience” ªrst appeared in Eric Sayers and Brad Glosserman, “‘Collective
Resilience’ Is the Way to Address China Challenge,” Japan Times, Août 14, 2020, https://www
.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/08/14/commentary/world-commentary/collective-resilience-
way-address-china-challenge/. Their formulation of a strategy differs from the one offered in this
article, both empirically and theoretically. Bonnie Glaser argues for a counter-sanctions strategy by
victims of Chinese government coercion but largely as a symbolic measure and embedded in a
broader strategy of challenging Chinese actions in the World Trade Organization (WTO), among
other steps. See Bonnie S. Glaser, “Time for Collective Pushback against China’s Economic Coer-
cion,” Global Forecast 2021 essay series, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Janvier 13,
2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/time-collective-pushback-against-chinas-economic-coercion.
For deterrence theory, see Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign
Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Patrick M. Morgan, Deter-
rence Now (New York: la presse de l'Universite de Cambridge, 2003); T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, et
James J. Wirtz, Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2009); Robert Powell, “Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile De-
fense,” International Security 27, Non. 4 (Spring 2003): 86–118, https://est ce que je.org/10.1162/
016228803321951108; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Inºuence (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Presse, 1966); and Robert Jervis, “Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence,” World Politics 41,
Non. 2 (Janvier 1989): 183–207, https://doi.org/10.2307/2010407.
8. Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Eco-
nomic Networks Shape State Coercion,” International Security 44, Non. 1 (Été 2019): 42–79,
https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00351; Anne-Marie Slaughter, “America’s Edge: Power in the Net-
worked Century,” Foreign Affairs, Janvier 1, 2009, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
united-states/2009-01-01/americas-edge; Daniel W. Drezner, Henry Farrell, and Abraham L.
Neuman, éd., The Uses and Abuses of Weaponized Interdependence (Washington, CC: Brookings Insti-
tution Press, 2021); Margaret M. Pearson, Meg Rithmire, and Kellee S. Tsai, “China’s Party-State
Capitalism and International Backlash: From Interdependence to Insecurity,” International Security
47, Non. 2 (Fall 2022): 135–176, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00447.
9. Daniel W. Drezner, “The Uses and Abuses of Weaponized Interdependence in 2021,”
Washington Post, Mars 2, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/03/02/uses-
abuses-weaponized-interdependence-2021/.

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Collective Resilience 95

I begin with an analysis of the Chinese government’s predatory liberalism.
Section two looks at how governments have responded to this challenge and
why these de-risking measures, albeit necessary, do not deter future acts of
economic coercion. Employing original data on China’s trade vulnerabilities, je
then build the theoretical and empirical argument for collective resilience and
its application to two groupings: (1) past targets of the Chinese government’s
coercion, et (2) the Group of Seven and Australia (what I call “G-7 (cid:2) A”).
I conclude with policy implications of the collective resilience strategy.

Predatory Liberalism

The Chinese government’s practice of economic coercion weaponizes trade
networks to compel the target state to either reverse or withhold actions
deemed contrary to Chinese interests. Beijing uses economic coercion in two
general ways. In the Global South, it uses ªnancial capital to exercise inºuence
through initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). By funding
the construction of seaports, railways, highways, stadiums, and other high-
proªle projects of cash-needy developing economies, China captures the
loyalty of local political and business elites to ensure respect for Chinese inter-
ests.10 The Chinese government complements its BRI strategy with extensive
disinformation campaigns in Africa, Latin America, the South Paciªc, et
Southeast Asia to manipulate the public narrative in ways that favor China
and criticize the West.11

10. Xue Gong, “China’s Economic Statecraft: The Belt and Road in Southeast Asia and the Impact
on the Indo-Paciªc,” Security Challenges 16, Non. 3 (2020): 39–46, https://www.jstor.org/stable/
26924338; Henryk Szadziewski, “A Search for Coherence: The Belt and Road Initiative in the
Paciªc Islands,” in Graeme Smith and Terence Wesley-Smith, éd., The China Alternative: Changing
Regional Order in the Paciªc Islands (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2021), 283–318;
Michael Clarke, “The Belt and Road Initiative: China’s New Grand Strategy?,” Asia Policy 24 (Juillet
2017): 71–79, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26403204; Gerard M. Acosta, “China’s One Road, Un
Belt Grand Strategy: Founded on the Weaponization of the Global Supply Chain,” Defense Trans-
portation Journal 76, Non. 6 (2020): 17–22, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27054095; Sophie Wintgens,
“China’s Footprint in Latin America,” European Union Institute for Security Studies, Brief 9, Sep-
tember 2022, https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/ªles/EUISSFiles/Brief_9_China%20in%20
Latin%20America_web.pdf.
11. Joshua Kurlantzick, Beijing’s Global Media Offensive: China’s Uneven Campaign to Inºuence Asia
and the World (New York: Presse universitaire d'Oxford, 2022); Kenton Thibaut, Chinese Discourse Power:
Aspirations, Reality, and Ambitions in the Digital Domain, éd. Iain Robertson (Washington, CC: Atlan-
tic Council, 2022); Kechang Feng, “‘Rumor-Debunking’ as a Propaganda and Censorship Strategy
in China: The Case of the COVID-19 Outbreak,” in Herman Wasserman and Dani Madrid-
Morales, éd., Disinformation in the Global South (New York: John Wiley & Fils, 2022): 108–122;
Daniel Kliman et al., Dangerous Synergies: Countering Chinese and Russian Digital Inºuence Opera-

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International Security 48:1 96

In the Global North, the Chinese government uses a different form of eco-
nomic coercion. These countries are not as poor as developing economies and
their media industries are not as easily penetrable, so Beijing instead weapon-
izes trade dependence to get what it wants. This weaponization could entail
sudden stoppages of imports from a particular country, reduced ºows of
Chinese tourists to target states, consumer boycotts, embargoes on exports, ou
any number of nontariff barriers based on contrived health and safety stan-
dards.12 Beijing does not discriminate among its targets, which range from
states to private sector actors. In each case, its goals are rarely economic; dans-
stead, the Chinese government aims to achieve political and security goals.13
While plaintiffs can take China to WTO arbitration for patent protection in
Chinese courts, they have little recourse if tourists suddenly stop showing up
in their country, or if the Chinese stop eating bananas for so-called health rea-
sons. Tableau 1 depicts the widespread practices of the Chinese government’s
predatory liberalism.14

Beijing’s predatory actions are carefully designed to inºict the greatest
amount of damage on its targets. Par exemple, le 2010 ban on Norwegian
salmon over the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the Chinese dissi-
dent Liu Xiaobo collapsed sales by over 60 percent year-on-year.15 The 2016
targeted campaign against South Korean conglomerate Lotte (owner of
the land where a U.S. missile defense system has been deployed) forced the
corporation to close all its stores in China, resulting in more than $7.5 billion in economic damage. The Chinese government also withheld group tours to Korea, causing an estimated $15.6 billion loss to South Korea’s tourism

tion (Washington, CC: Center for a New American Security, 2020); Vivian Marsh, Dani Madrid-
Morales, and Chris Paterson, “Global Chinese Media and a Decade of Change,” International Com-
munication Gazette 85, Non. 1 (2023): 3–14, https://doi.org/10.1177/17480485221139459.
12. For a full taxonomy of coercive economic practices by the Chinese government, see Fergus
Hunter et al., Countering China’s Coercive Diplomacy: Prioritising Economic Security, Sovereignty and
the Rules-Based Order, Policy Brief 68 (Washington, CC: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2023),
https://ad-aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/2023-02/Countering%20Chinas%20coercive
%20diplomacy_1.pdf.
13. Audrye Wong, “How Not to Win Allies and Inºuence Geopolitics: China’s Self-Defeating Eco-
nomic Statecraft,” Foreign Affairs, Avril 20, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/
2021-04-20/how-not-win-allies-and-inºuence-geopolitics.
14. Victor D. Cha and Andy Lim, “Flagrant Foul: China’s Predatory Liberalism and the NBA,»
Washington Quarterly 42, Non. 4 (2019), 23–42, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2019.1694265.
15. In contrast, the Xi regime did not impose such controls on Scottish salmon. See Mark Lewis,
“Norway’s Salmon Rots as China Takes Revenge for Dissident’s Nobel Prize,” Independent,
Octobre 6, 2011, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/norway-s-salmon-rot-as-
china-takes-revenge-for-dissident-s-nobel-prize-2366167.html.

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Tableau 1. Chinese Government’s Predatory Liberalism (selected list)

Type of Chinese government
economic coercion

Issue (noneconomic)

Year

Target

2008

France

2010

Japan

2010

Norway

street demonstrations and
public boycott (against
Carrefour)
export embargo (rare earth
minerals)
import embargo (salmon)

2011
2012

Estonia
Philippines

import embargo (dairy)
import embargo (bananas)

2016 Mongolia

nontariff actions (new border
fees on commodity imports
from Mongolia; cancellation of
loan negotiations)

2016

South Korea discriminatory regulations;

2017

Palau

2019

Czech
Republic
National
Basketball
Association
Nouveau
Zealand

2019–
2020

Sweden

2020

Australia

2020

Canada

2020
2021

Allemagne
Lithuania

2022

Estonia and
Latvia
Taiwan

2022 Walmart

2023

Uni
États

other nontariff actions (against
Lotte)
nontariff actions (tourism ban)

nontariff actions (cancellation
of Prague Philharmonic tour)
discriminatory actions (ban on
sale of merchandise; ban on
streaming)
nontariff actions (tourism ban;
withdrawal of tourism
partnership agreement)
nontariff actions (cancellation
of trade talks); discriminatory
actions (Ericsson 5G contract
awards reduced)
discriminatory tariffs (barley,
beef, wine, and other exports)

nontariff actions (detention of
two Canadian citizens); import
embargo (soybeans, canola
seed, and meat)
import embargo (pork)
import embargo (all EU
imports with parts made in
Lithuania)
action undeªned

import embargo (fruits, ªsh);
discriminatory regulations
(suspension of export licenses);
export embargo (natural sand)
discriminatory regulatory
action

export controls on gallium and
germanium (for making
semiconductors); ban on use of
U.S.-based micron chips in
China infrastructure projects

Tibet (pro-Tibet activists disrupted
Paris leg of Beijing Olympic torch
relay)
sovereignty dispute (Senkaku/
Diaoyutai)
droits de l'homme (Nobel Prize
awarded to Chinese dissident)
droits de l'homme (Dalai Lama visit)
sovereignty dispute (Scarborough
Shoal)
droits de l'homme (Dalai Lama visit)

politique (emplacement of U.S.
missile defense system in Korea)

Taiwan (Palau refuses to break its
diplomatic ties)
Taiwan (sister-city agreement)

Hong Kong (support of
democracy)

politique (exclusion of Huawei
from market)

droits de l'homme (Tucholsky Prize to
dissident Gui Minhai jailed in
Chine); politique (exclusion of
Huawei and ZTE from market)

COVID-19 (Australia calls for
independent investigation);
politique (exclusion of Huawei
from 5G market)
politique (Canadian arrest of
Huawei executive)

droits de l'homme (Xinjiang)
Taiwan (opening a representative
ofªce)

Russia (leaving the China–CEEC
Cooperation)
Taiwan (Pelosi visit)

Xinjiang (removal of Xinjiang-
sourced merchandise from
website)
Chip 4 alliance

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International Security 48:1 98

industry.16 In 2018, the Xi regime forced more than forty airlines, including ma-
jor U.S. international carriers, to remove references on their websites to Taiwan
as a separate country.17 The regime sanctioned online merchandising and
game broadcasts of the National Basketball Association’s Houston Rockets be-
cause a team staff member tweeted support for Hong Kong democracy in
2019.18 The Chinese government instituted a ªve-year ban on Columbia Tristar
Pictures after it released “Seven Years in Tibet” (starring Brad Pitt) because the
movie’s portrayal of government suppression “hurt the feelings of the Chinese
people.”19 After Taiwan opened a representative ofªce in Vilnius in 2021, Lith-
uania’s exports to China dropped by 91 percent.20 In 2022, the Xi government
put Walmart under regulatory investigation because it allegedly removed
Xinjiang-sourced items from “the virtual shelves of its local Sam’s Club app”
in China.21 Xi Jinping has even leveraged China’s beloved pandas as a tool
of coercion.22

Bien sûr, China is not the only country that uses these methods. The weap-
onization of economic interdependence is an outgrowth of globalization and
the creation of information and ªnance networks that can be leveraged as a
source of power by actors with dominant access and control over key hubs. Dans
2009, scholars such as Anne-Marie Slaughter suggested that these networks
gave the United States a distinct advantage in shaping the global agenda, ensemble-
ting the networks’ rules, and unlocking innovation and growth.23 Yet when the
United States started to enact ªnancial sanctions and other “smart sanctions”
to counter terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
some observed that these globalized networks were not just benign generators

16. See Victoria Kim, “When China and U.S. Spar, It’s South Korea That Gets Punched,” Los An-
geles Times, Novembre 19, 2020, https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-11-19/south-
korea-china-beijing-economy-thaad-missile-interceptor; “THAAD Row with China Costs S. Korea
Dear: Report,” Yonhap News Agency, Septembre 15, 2017, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN2017
0915008300320.
17. Sui-Lee Wee, “Giving In to China, U.S. Airlines Drop Taiwan (in Name at Least),” New York
Times, Juillet 25, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/25/business/taiwan-american-airlines-
china.html.
18. Cha and Lim, “Flagrant Foul.”
19. Sharon Waxman, “China Bans Work with Film Studios,” Washington Post, Novembre 1, 1997.
20. Dominique Patton and Andrius Sytas, “China Suspends Lithuanian Beef, Dairy, Beer Imports
as Taiwan Row Grows,” Reuters, Février 10, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/
china-suspends-lithuanian-beef-imports-taiwan-row-grows-2022-02-10/.
21. Pete Sweeney, “Walmart Gets Taste of the Lotte Treatment in China,” Reuters, Janvier 7, 2022,
https://www.reuters.com/breakingviews/walmart-gets-taste-lotte-treatment-china-2022-01-07/.
22. Matej Šimalcík and Adam Kalivoda, “Sister-City Relations and Identity Politics: The Case of
Prague, Beijing, Taipei, and Shanghai,” Diplomat, Février 25, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/
2020/02/sister-city-relations-and-identity-politics-the-case-of-prague-beijing-taipei-and-shanghai/.
23. Slaughter, “America’s Edge”; Farrell and Newman, “Weaponized Interdependence.”

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Collective Resilience 99

of cooperation among trading states or levelers of income differentials among
rich and poor economies.24 As some scholars argue, weaponization of interde-
pendence has long been a trait of U.S. policy.25 Recent examples include the
widespread Western sanctions against Russia for invading Ukraine in 2022,
and U.S. ªnancial sanctions against North Korea and Iran for their nuclear pro-
liferation. But U.S. sanctions are transparent, they have a clear legal basis, et
the United States is generally unambiguous about the targets and the behav-
iors that it sanctions. Even the 2022 U.S. call for export controls on certain tech-
nologies to China, as anathema as they may appear to free-traders, is legally
justiªed and clear about its purpose.26

Par contre, the Chinese government’s economic coercion is opaque and
does not conform to WTO rules, and it is not based on any legal and legitimate
authority. At best, Beijing obfuscates the purpose of the measures, citing un-
substantiated health or safety standards. For this reason, table 1 probably
underestimates the extent of Beijing’s coercive measures. Beijing is probably
taking other actions against countries and companies that are afraid to report
such predation for fear of escalation. De plus, the Chinese government uses
economic coercion as a regular tool of diplomacy to achieve its foreign policy
goals rather than as a sanction against threatening behaviors such as war, illicit
activités, or nuclear proliferation.

As table 1 shows, Chinese predation in all cases since 2008 was triggered by
political objectives rather than trade or commercial disputes. Studies show a
direct correlation between Chinese foreign policy goals and Beijing’s weapon-
ization of trade interdependence. Par exemple, Andreas Fuchs and Nils-
Hendrik Klann ªnd that the Xi regime’s punitive actions against countries
whose leaders met with the Dalai Lama caused their exports to decline.27 A

24. Daniel W. Drezner, “Introduction: The Uses and Abuses of Weaponized Interdependence,” in
Drezner, Farrell, and Neuman, The Uses and Abuses of Weaponized Interdependence; Thomas Wright,
“Sifting through Interdependence,” Washington Quarterly 36, Non. 4 (2013): 7–23, https://est ce que je.org/
10.1080/0163660X.2013.861706; Mark Leonard, éd., Connectivity Wars: Why Migration, Finance and
Trade Are the Geo-Economic Battlegrounds of the Future (Londres: European Council on Foreign Rela-
tion, 2016).
25. Juan C. Zarate, Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare (New York:
PublicAffairs, 2013); Drezner, “Introduction,» 4; Pete Harrell and Elizabeth Rosenberg, Economic
Dominance, Financial Technology and the Future of U.S. Economic Coercion (Washington, CC: Centre
for a New American Security, 2019).
26. Michael Schuman, “Why Biden’s Block on Chips to China Is a Big Deal,” Atlantic, Octo-
ber 25, 2022, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/10/biden-export-control-
microchips-china/671848/.
27. Andreas Fuchs and Nils-Hendrik Klann, “Paying a Visit: The Dalai Lama Effect on Interna-
tional Trade,” Center for European Governance and Economic Development Research Paper 113
(Göttingen, Allemagne: Center for European Governance and Economic Development Research,

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International Security 48:1 100

2022 study by the Mercator Institute for China Studies identiªes 123 cases of
coercion since 2010, ªnding that the Chinese government follows a two-
pronged strategy: It uses popular boycotts targeting products and services
against private companies; and against governments, it uses a combination of
restrictions on trade and tourism.28 Whether it is through tariffs, nontariff bar-
riers, embargos, or other discriminatory actions that are inconsistent with
WTO rules, Beijing has practiced predatory liberalism against many targets for
territorial gain, national security goals, and to isolate Hong Kong and Taiwan.
The Chinese government denies that its actions violate global trading norms,
and it remains unapologetic about and undeterred from continuing its preda-
tory practices.

Beijing’s weaponization of interdependence is a source of power for four
raisons. D'abord, leveraging access to China’s expansive market is a tool of coer-
cion. Deuxième, all of China’s trade partners are asymmetrically dependent on its
marché. Troisième, China executes its strategy dyadically to maximize its advan-
tage over any one target government or company. Fourth, China’s illiberal po-
litical system allows the government to implement directives restricting the
public’s trade or tourism with little pushback from consumers or civil society.

The purpose of the government’s economic coercion is to achieve what
scholars call the “third face of power” by shaping how states view their own
interests.29 That is, Beijing’s economic punishments may not always succeed at
changing the target state’s behavior. Over time, cependant, this bullying creates
“an environment of self-censorship” among government and corporate lead-
ers.30 Beijing’s actions set a precedent that other potential targets of coercion
can anticipate so that they avoid retaliation. But given the size and importance
of the Chinese market, there is little that these targets can do on their own but
accept the regime’s threat of economic coercion as the new reality.

Predatory liberalism, from Beijing’s perspective, is working. Par exemple,
democracies such as South Korea and Germany remained silent and did not

University of Göttingen, Octobre 20, 2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id(cid:3)1694602.
28. Aya Adachi, Alexander Brown, and Max J. Zenglein, “Fasten Your Seatbelts: How to Manage
China’s Economic Coercion,” Mercator Institute for China Studies, Août 25, 2022, https://
merics.org/en/report/fasten-your-seatbelts-how-manage-chinas-economic-coercion.
29. Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 2nd ed. (Londres: Red Globe Press, 2005). See also David
UN. Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies,” World Poli-
tics 31, Non. 2 (Janvier 1979): 161–194, https://doi.org/10.2307/2009941; Michael Barnett and
Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” World Politics 59, Non. 1 (Hiver 2005): 39–75,
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818305050010.
30. Hunter et al., Countering China’s Coercive Diplomacy, 2.

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Collective Resilience 101

advocate sanctions when China passed the 2020 National Security Law of
Hong Kong suppressing democracy.31 Germany also apologized for Foreign
Minister Heiko Maas’s meeting with a Hong Kong democracy activist.32 Brazil
did not exclude Huawei from its 5G auction for fear of losing billions in busi-
ness.33 To preempt Chinese sanctions, The Gap Inc. clothing company issued a
public apology in 2018 and stopped selling a t-shirt design with a map of
China that did not include Taiwan and Tibet.34 The Marriott International hotel
chain also preemptively issued a public statement against separatism in China
and took down its website that listed Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan as sepa-
rate countries.35 After the salmon ban in 2010, Norwegian leaders refused to
meet with the Dalai Lama when he visited in 2015. Hollywood will not pro-
duce ªlms that cast China in a negative light.36 In the case of the ban on the
Houston Rockets, the team’s then star player, James Harden, refused to speak
out about Hong Kong, saying that he would “stay out of it.”37 China seeks def-
erence by routinely warning countries about what it can do to them. The re-
marks by China’s ambassador to New Zealand in 2022 are typical: “An
economic relationship in which China buys nearly a third of the country’s ex-
ports shouldn’t be taken for granted.”38

In each of these cases, actors justify their choices to act in deference to China
as rational economic decisions. But these choices are only deemed rational be-

31. Chris Buckley, Keith Bradsher, and Tiffany May, “New Security Law Gives China Sweeping
Powers over Hong Kong,” New York Times, Juin 29, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/29/
world/asia/china-hong-kong-security-law-rules.html.
32. “China Scolds Germany over Meeting with Hong Kong Activist,” Voice of America, Septem-
ber 11, 2019, https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-paciªc_china-scolds-germany-over-meeting-
hong-kong-activist/6175623.html.
33. Jamie McGeever, “Brazil’s Bolsonaro to Allow China’s Huawei in 5G Auctions: Newspa-
par,” Reuters, Janvier 16, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-huawei-tech/brazils-
bolsonaro-to-allow-chinas-huawei-in-5g-auctions-newspaper-idUSKBN29L0JM; Anthony Boadle
and Lisandra Paraguassu, “Brazil Regulator Approves 5G Spectrum Auction Rules, No Huawei
Ban,” Reuters, Février 25, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/brazil-
regulator-approves-5g-spectrum-auction-rules-no-huawei-ban-2021-02-26/.
34. “Gap Sorry for Selling T-Shirt with ‘Incorrect’ Map of China,” Guardian, May 14, 2018, https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/15/gap-sorry-t-shirt-map-china.
35. Benjamin Haas, “Marriott Apologizes to China over Tibet and Taiwan Error,” Guardian, Janu-
et 12, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/12/marriott-apologises-to-china-
over-tibet-and-taiwan-error.
36. Aynne Kokas, Hollywood Made in China (Berkeley: Presse de l'Université de Californie, 2017).
37. Matt Eppers, “Rockets’ James Harden on NBA-China Dispute: ‘I’m Staying Out of It,’” USA
Aujourd'hui, Octobre 13, 2019, https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nba/rockets/2019/10/13/
james-harden-nba-china-dispute/3971503002/.
38. Stephen Wright, “China Warns New Zealand against Squandering Trade Ties,” Wall
Street Journal, Juin 2, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-warns-new-zealand-against-
squandering-trade-relationship-11654147681.

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International Security 48:1 102

cause (1) China’s market is immense, et (2) weaponized interdependence has
been accepted as the price of doing business with China. China exercises
power without having to wield it. China’s third face of power is a threat to the
liberal international order.

The New Imperative of Economic Security

Countries have responded to weaponized interdependence in four ways. D'abord,
they have prioritized economic security and developed capabilities to detect
disruptions in advance. Par exemple, China-induced urea shortages caught
South Korea by surprise in November 2021, paralyzing its retail, shipping,
transport, and construction industries.39 Everyone was caught by surprise
when the pandemic-induced lockdown in China led to worldwide shortages
of critical personal protective equipment (PPE) such as surgical masks, hospi-
tal gowns, gloves, respirators, and face shields.40 Governments have created
new point people and early warning systems for such economic disruptions.
In October 2021, Japan established a new cabinet position for economic secu-
rity and enacted new legislation to guard critical supply chains and technolo-
gies.41 Korea activated an early warning system for nearly four thousand key
industry materials and created a new economic security position in the presi-
dential ofªce.42 In March 2023, the European Union announced a new plan to
secure critical raw materials against unforeseen disruptions and shortages.43

39. Urea is used in fertilizers and for emission control in diesel vehicles, which account for most of
South Korea’s cargo trucks and buses. See Kim Da-sol, “Korea’s Urea Crisis,” Korea Herald, Non-
vember 9, 2021, https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud(cid:3)20211109000809; Steven Borowiec,
“Urea Shortage Threatens to Paralyze South Korea’s Economy,” Nikkei Asia, Novembre 17, 2021,
https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Urea-shortage-threatens-to-paralyze-South-Korea-s-economy.
40. Chad P. Brun, “How COVID-19 Medical Supply Shortages Led to Extraordinary Trade and
Industrial Policy,” Asian Economic Policy Review 17, Non. 1 (2022): 114–135, https://www.ncbi.nlm
.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8441910/.
41. Mary Hui, “Japan Minted a New Economic Security Minister to Fix Supply Chain Disrup-
tion,” Quartz, Octobre 8, 2021, https://qz.com/2070498/japan-has-a-new-economic-security-
chief-to-secure-supply-chains/; “Japan Passes Economic Security Bill
to Guard Sensitive
Technologie,” Reuters, May 11, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-paciªc/japan-passes-
economic-security-bill-guard-sensitive-technology-2022-05-11/; Sheila A. Forgeron, “Japan Turns Its
Attention to Economic Security: Japan’s Economic Security Legislation Has Been Passed,” Asia
Unbound (blog), Council on Foreign Relations, May 16, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/blog/japan-
turns-its-attention-economic-security.
42. Yonhap, “S. Korea Launches ‘Early Warning System’ on Supply Chains of 4,000 Key Industry
Items,” Korea Herald, Novembre 26, 2021, https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud(cid:3)2021
1126000471; Kim Sung-hoon and Minu Kim, “Korea’s Yoon Gov’t to Create Presidential Secretary
for Economic Security Affairs,” Pulse, Avril 22, 2022, https://pulsenews.co.kr/view.php?année(cid:3)
2022&Non(cid:3)358656.
43. “Critical Raw Materials: Ensuring Secure and Sustainable Supply Chains for EU’s Green

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Collective Resilience 103

The second way that countries have responded to weaponized interdepen-
dence is by practicing trade diversiªcation. When China disrupts trade with
the target state, the target state ªnds alternative export markets for those same
goods. This strategy has seen some success. When the Chinese government
embargos imports of certain goods from country X, China must meet domestic
demand by sopping up the international supply of that good in other markets,
thus allowing country X to backªll the global supply displaced by China’s de-
mand. When the Xi regime enacted tariffs against Australian barley, beef, et
wine because of Canberra’s calls for an independent inquiry into the origins
of the COVID-19 virus, Australia redirected these goods to the rest of the
world.44 Although China’s sanctions were expected to cost Australia more
que $19 milliard, it lost just $1 billion in these sectors by relying on altern-
ative export markets.45 When the Xi regime restricted rare earth mineral ex-
ports to Japan because of a territorial dispute in 2010, Japan diverted its
sourcing of critical minerals to other suppliers and reduced its dependence on
China from 90 percent to 58 percent in a decade by investing more in domestic
seabed exploration.46

Troisième, countries have opted for reshoring and friend-shoring, moving key
elements of the production chain out of China or from places where China ex-
ercises inordinate inºuence. The supply chain is either brought home or
directed to trusted partner economies. One example of friend-shoring is
the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad (Australia, India, Japan, et le
États-Unis), which concentrates on building resilient supply chains for
COVID-19 vaccines, semiconductors, emerging and critical technologies, comme

and Digital Future,” European Commission, Mars 16, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_1661.
44. For China’s tariffs on Australian goods, see Su-Lin Tan, “Explainer: What Happened over the
First Year of the China-Australia Trade Dispute?,” South China Morning Post, Octobre 28, 2020,
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3107228/china-australia-relations-
what-has-happened-over-last-six. For data on Australian exports after Chinese actions, see Roland
Rajah, “The Big Bark but Small Bite of China’s Trade Coercion,” Interpreter, Lowy Institute, Avril 8,
2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/big-bark-small-bite-china-s-trade-coercion.
45. Daniel Hurst, “How Much Is China’s Trade War Really Costing Australia?,” Guardian, Octo-
ber 27, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/oct/28/how-much-is-chinas-
trade-war-really-costing-australia; Michael Smith, “China’s Sanctions against Australia Have Been
a Spectacular Failure,” Australian Financial Review, opinion, Décembre 21, 2022, https://www.afr
.com/world/asia/china-s-sanctions-against-australian-have-been-a-spectacular-failure-20221220-
p5c7vl.
46. Roni Dengler, “Global Trove of Rare Earth Metals Found in Japan’s Deep-Sea Mud,” Science,
Avril 13, 2018, https://www.science.org/content/article/global-trove-rare-earth-metals-found-
japans-deep-sea-mud; Mary Hui, “Japan’s Global Rare Earths Quest Holds Lessons for the U.S.
and Europe,” Quartz, Avril 23, 2021, https://qz.com/1998773/japans-rare-earths-strategy-has-
lessons-for-us-europe/.

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International Security 48:1 104

well as for clean energy.47 In May 2022, the Joe Biden administration also
launched the Indo-Paciªc Economic Framework to build a resilient economy
among member countries by “establishing an early warning system, mapping
critical mineral supply chains, improving traceability in key sectors, and coor-
dinating on diversiªcation efforts.”48 Launched in June 2022, the Minerals
Security Partnership aims to reinforce critical mineral supply chains, y compris
nickel, lithium, and cobalt.49 Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United
States are formulating a Chip 4 alliance to consolidate the semiconductor sup-
ply chain.50 Even though these measures raise production costs and lower
efªciency gains, they are necessary to be protected from the Chinese govern-
ment’s predatory practices.

The fourth response to weaponized interdependence includes mitigation
measures (c'est à dire., ad hoc trade support, monetary assistance, and investment
funds) to blunt the impact of economic coercion against smaller countries. Af-
ter Lithuania was targeted by the Xi regime in 2021 with undeclared sanctions,
its Central Bank estimated that it could lose up to 1.3 percent of its gross do-
mestic product (PIB) dans 2023. In response, the European Union and the
United States provided a $130 million support package and a $600 million ex-
port credit agreement, respectivement, to support Lithuanian ªrms.51 According
to Melanie Hart, a senior State Department ofªcial working on countering

47. “Fact Sheet: Quad Leaders’ Summit,” White House, Septembre 24, 2021, https://www
.whitehouse.gov/brieªng-room/statements-releases/2021/09/24/fact-sheet-quad-leaders-sum-
mit/; “Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement,” White House, May 24, 2022, https://www.whitehouse
.gov/brieªng-room/statements-releases/2022/05/24/quad-joint-leaders-statement/.
48. “Fact Sheet: In Asia, President Biden and a Dozen Indo-Paciªc Partners Launch the Indo-
Paciªc Economic Framework for Prosperity,” White House, May 23, 2022, https://www
.whitehouse.gov/brieªng-room/statements-releases/2022/05/23/fact-sheet-in-asia-president-
biden-and-a-dozen-indo-paciªc-partners-launch-the-indo-paciªc-economic-framework-for-
prosperity/.
49. The Minerals Security Partnership is a coalition between Australia, Canada, Finlande, France,
Allemagne, Japan, South Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, as well as the Eu-
ropean Commission. See “Minerals Security Partnership,” press release, U.S. Department of State,
Juin 14, 2022, https://www.state.gov/minerals-security-partnership/. Also see Doina Chiacu,
“U.S. and Partners Enter Pact to Secure Critical Minerals Like Lithium,” Reuters, Juin 14, 2022,
https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/us-partners-enter-pact-secure-critical-minerals-
lithium-2022-06-14/.
50. You-kyung Lee and Debby Wu, “U.S., Asian Partners Discussed Supply Chains in ‘Chip 4’
Talks,” Bloomberg, Février 25, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-26/us-
asian-partners-discussed-chip-supply-chain-reports-say.
51. Andrius Sytas, “Lithuania to Get U.S. Trade Support as It Faces China Fury over Taiwan,»
Reuters, Novembre 19, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/business/lithuania-get-us-trade-support-
it-faces-china-fury-over-taiwan-2021-11-19/; Jonas Deveikis, “China Sanctions vs Taiwan Invest-
ments: Lithuania’s Central Bank Weighs Economic Impact,” Lithuanian Radio and Television,

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Collective Resilience 105

Beijing’s economic coercion, the United States also organized business meet-
ings between Lithuanian and U.S. companies and activated embassy posts in
the Indo-Paciªc region to assist Lithuania in discovering new supply chains.
Par conséquent, “Lithuania’s GDP grew 2.2 pour cent [dans 2022], and currently less
que 0.5 percent of Lithuania’s exports go to China. They have replaced the
China gap by expanding their trade relationships and their exports to
other partners.”52

Yet these de-risking measures are largely defensive. They do not aim to
change or shape Chinese behavior. Supply chain resilience and ad hoc mitiga-
tion measures insulate certain lines of production from the Chinese govern-
ment’s economic coercion but do not stop it. Securing the supply of one
product (par exemple., PPE) does not prevent Beijing from ªnding another economic
sector through which to coerce its targets. Backªlling precipitous drops in a
country’s exports to China with trade diversiªcation helps the targeted coun-
try, but it imposes no costs on the Chinese government’s use of the predatory
practice against the next target. En effet, many countries’ enthusiasm for partic-
ipating in such mitigation measures is circumscribed by fears that Beijing will
ªnd new areas to enact more economic coercion.

Par exemple, South Korea initially hesitated to join the Chip 4 alliance in
part because it was concerned that Xi Jinping would retaliate against South
Korea’s consumer goods, tourism, and education like it did in 2017 over the
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system. De la même manière,
countries that have improved the resiliency of their supply chains for PPE and
for memory chips by reducing reliance on China and working more with like-
minded countries may still be timid to speak out on behalf of Taiwan or Hong
Kong to avoid being targeted by the Chinese government in other, unprotected
sectors. While certain supply chains can be protected, no country or group of
countries can fully decouple from one of the world’s largest economies. Sup-
ply chain resilience, trade diversiªcation, impact mitigation, and reshoring are
effective only if they are complemented by a competitive strategy to shape and
deter Beijing’s predatory behavior.

Janvier 21, 2022, https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1593215/china-sanctions-vs-taiwan-
investments-lithuania-s-central-bank-weighs-economic-impact.
52. “Economic Security: U.S. and Korean Perspectives,” Center for Strategic and International
Études, Février 23, 2023, YouTube video, 2:20:50–2:21:47, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v
(cid:3)AtqntHb5Iro.

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International Security 48:1 106

Collective Resilience

Collective resilience is a peer competition strategy that rests on the threat of a
multilateral response in the trade space to deter economic coercion. It can be
practiced by any group of countries that want to protect the liberal interna-
tional trading order from subversive economic bullying. Collective resilience
uses the threat of punishment with trade retaliation to impose signiªcant and
unacceptable costs on China if it attempts to coerce others economically. Le
purpose of collective resilience is not to advocate a trade war. Plutôt, its pur-
pose is for a collective of states to credibly signal that it will carry out the pun-
ishment if and when China acts against any of the states in the collective. Like
deterrence theory, collective resilience operates in the realm of non-action. Il
tries to elicit a non-action from China (no economic predation) with the threat
of certain retaliation. Only if the deterrent fails would the collective resilience
partners impose sanctions on China.

To be successful, collective resilience requires both capabilities and political
will. No one country on its own can deal with and decouple fully from the
Chinese economic behemoth. Every country is asymmetrically dependent
on China in its trade balance. China accounts for 23.9 pour cent (South Korea),
20.3 pour cent (Japan), 25.9 pour cent (Australia), et 13.9 pour cent (États-Unis)
of each country’s share of global trade in 2022. China’s share of global trade in
2022 for these same four countries was 5.9 pour cent, 5.8 pour cent, 3.6 pour cent, et
12.3 pour cent, respectively.53

Economic interdependence—even asymmetric interdependence—still re-
quires give-and-take. Even though countries such as South Korea and
Australia may export less to China than they import from China, China values
and relies inordinately on a subset of this trade. In the words of Robert
Keohane and Joseph Nye, China experiences “vulnerability interdependence”
with these imports, in the sense that it would be sensitive to price changes or
would need to seek alternative suppliers if those goods were embargoed by
the exporting country.54 The Chinese government sanctions Australian beef

53. United Nations Statistics Division, UN Comtrade Database, https://comtrade.un.org/data.
The percentage for South Korea is based on 2021 UN Comtrade numbers, comme 2022 self-reported
trade data for South Korea were not available as of May 2023.
54. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., Power and Interdependence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Presse universitaire, 1972); Donne la vie. Baldwin, “Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis,»
Organisation internationale 34, Non. 4 (Fall 1980): 417–506, https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081830

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Collective Resilience 107

and barley, Par exemple, but it will not sanction Australian iron ore im-
ports because in 2022 China was over 65 percent dependent on this source
as a fraction of its total iron ore imports. This dependence potentially gives
Australia leverage.

Original data presented in this article show that China is highly dependent
on hundreds of exported items from countries that Beijing targets with eco-
nomic coercion. Collective resilience is the threat of retaliatory sanctioning on
China’s high-dependence items to deter future coercion. Part of the Chinese
government’s hubris in bullying its trade partners is its conªdence that the
targets would not dare to counteract with sanctions. But as Bonnie Glaser
argues, economic coercion has become such a pronounced practice by the
Chinese government that countries’ de-risking efforts to reshore or fortify sup-
ply chains are insufªcient; instead, they need to impose costs on China for
its predatory economic behavior.55 Contrary to conventional wisdom, ces
trade partners of China have the tools to do so.

capabilities

China is far more dependent on its trade partners than most people realize.
Australia, Japan, and South Korea, Par exemple, are like-minded U.S. demo-
cratic allies in Asia whose primary trade partner is China. In addition to the
États-Unis, they constitute almost 30 percent of China’s total global trade.
Each has been subject to harsh economic coercion by the Chinese government,
costing billions of dollars. Yet each country exports a wide variety of goods
on which China is highly dependent. Recall that I deªne a high-dependence
item as a good that China imports from a country that constitutes more than 70
percent of its total trade in that good (measured in total value of trade). While
70 percent is an arbitrary threshold, it is a fair indicator of Chinese trade de-
pendence. Par exemple, as noted above, China’s dependence on Australian
iron ore is 65 pour cent. Le 70 percent threshold is therefore a reasonable met-
ric. Tableau 2 summarizes China’s high-dependence trade with the eighteen
countries in this study that have been targets of the Chinese government’s co-
ercion in 2022: Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France,
Allemagne, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Nouvelle-Zélande, Norway, Palau,

0018828; Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations,
and States (Cambridge, MA: Presse universitaire de Harvard, 1970).
55. Glaser, “Time for Collective Pushback.”

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International Security 48:1 108

Tableau 2. China’s High-Dependence Imports from Its Targets of Economic Coercion (2022)

Total number of import items

Total value of imports (US$) 70% dependence 80% dependence 90% dependence 412 279 169 $46,650,985,373
$30,933,223,864 $12,789,682,384

SOURCE: Original table derived from UNSD Commodity Trade (UN Comtrade) trade database
at the World Bank’s analytical tool WITS (World Integrated Trade Solution), https://
wits.worldbank.org.

NOTE: The eighteen selected countries in this study are Australia, Canada, the Czech Repub-
lique, Estonia, France, Allemagne, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Nouvelle-Zélande, Norway,
Palau, the Philippines, South Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Taiwan is excluded from this summary.

the Philippines, South Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom (ROYAUME-UNI), et le
United States.56

These data are derived from the UN Comtrade Database, a UN-based repos-
itory of ofªcial international trade statistics. It is accessed through WITS
(World Integrated Trade Solution), which is administered by the World Bank.
Percentage dependence by China on a particular import from a given country
is taken as a percentage of total imports (par exemple., the value of the imports from
Australia of good X as a fraction of the total value of the imports of good X by
Chine). The import data used are based on nomenclature (HS 1988/92) and all
6-digit harmonized system (HS) codes.57

In total, targets of the Chinese government’s economic coercion export
412 items to China on which it is more than 70 percent dependent in its total
imports of those items. The total value of this trade is more than $46.6 milliard. These countries export 279 items worth more than $30.9 billion on which
China is 80 percent dependent, et 169 items valued at more than $12.7 billion with 90 percent Chinese dependence. According to these data, these countries have substantial leverage in dealing with Beijing’s bullying. Japan, for exam- ple, exportations 124 items worth more than $4.9 billion on which China is more
que 70 percent dependent as a percentage of total imports for those goods.
China is more than 90 percent dependent on an additional 49 items from Japan

56. Taiwan is not included as one of the eighteen countries in this study that have been targets of
economic coercion.
57. The World Customs Organization’s Harmonized System (HS) uses code numbers to deªne
des produits. The World Integrated Trade Solution website can be accessed at https://wits.worldbank
.org/Default.aspx?lang(cid:3)dans.

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Collective Resilience 109

Tableau 3. China’s High-Dependence Imports by Country (2022)

Country

Japan
États-Unis
Allemagne
South Korea
France
Nouvelle-Zélande
Canada
Australia
Norway
United Kingdom
Philippines
Sweden
Mongolia
Czech Republic
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Palau

Totals

Number of items
((cid:4) 70% dependence)

124
87
64
28
27
20
18
14
7
6
5
5
4
3
0
0
0
0

412

Total value of
imports (US$) $4,960,038,430
$11,548,305,886 $827,620,276
$5,354,364,494 $2,490,927,512
$3,918,283,198 $5,090,898,875 $10,562,817,896 $544,501,211
$480,259,062 $185,491,811
$270,750,988 $409,607,128
$7,118,606 $0 $0
$0 $0 $46,650,985,373

SOURCE: Original table derived from UNSD Commodity Trade (UN Comtrade) trade database
at the World Bank’s analytical tool WITS (World Integrated Trade Solution), https://
wits.worldbank.org/Default.aspx?lang(cid:3)dans.

worth $1.3 milliard. The United States exports 87 items worth $11.6 milliard
on which China is more than 70 percent dependent, et 38 items worth
$2.8 billion with greater than 90 percent Chinese dependence (see table A1 in the online appendix). Tableau 3 summarizes China’s high-dependence imports from the eighteen countries in this study targeted by Beijing’s economic coer- cion.58 Six of the eighteen countries targeted by economic coercion each export over $3 billion worth of high-dependence goods to China.

strategic value and substitutability

Not every high-dependence item is costly to China. Par exemple, China is over
86 percent dependent on imports of ballpoint pens (HS Code 960810; trade
valeur $104.1 million) from Japan, et plus 88 percent dependent on suitcases 58. Table A1 in the online appendix includes summary statistics for China’s high-dependence goods (measured at 70, 80, et 90 pour cent) for each of the eighteen countries targeted by economic coercion. Table A2 in the online appendix includes itemized lists of all China’s high-dependence goods for each country. l Téléchargé à partir du site Web : / / direct . m je t . e d u / i s e c / art – pdlf / / / / 4 8 1 9 1 2 1 5 3 9 7 1 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 4 6 5 pd . f par invité 0 7 Septembre 2 0 2 3 International Security 48:1 110 (HS Code 420219; trade value $24.4 million) from Germany. But cutting off
these items would not alter Chinese behavior. For China to experience vulner-
ability interdependence, the items targeted in a collective deterrence strategy
must meet two criteria: (1) the good must have some strategic value (c'est à dire., it is an
intermediary good, an end-product good, or a luxury good); et (2) le
good must have low substitutability (c'est à dire., China lacks alternative suppliers).
I measure substitutability by determining whether the next one to three
suppliers of the good to China are like-minded partners of the collective
resilience coalition.

The trade data show many items that meet these two criteria. Tableau 4 pro-
vides a representative selection of items that could be incorporated in a collec-
tive economic deterrence strategy. If China were unable to import these items
from its top three or four suppliers, ªnding alternative sources could create
signiªcant transaction costs.59 For example, China is over 90 percent depend-
ent on the supply of silver powder (HS Code 710610) and nearly 70 percent de-
pendent on the supply of copper alloys (HS Code 741012) from Japan. Silver
powder is a critical intermediary good for producing solar panels, and copper
alloys are used in the construction sector.60 As ªgure 1 shows, the next two ma-
jor suppliers of silver powder to China are the United States (7.17 percent of
China’s total imports) and South Korea (1.17 pour cent). These three countries
provide about 99 percent of China’s global supply of silver powder. Le
three major suppliers of copper alloys to China are like-minded partners:
Allemagne (13.47 pour cent), the United States (7.78 pour cent), and Japan together
constitute more than 90 percent of China’s dependence on this intermediary
good. The United States constitutes more than 72 percent of China’s grass seed
imports (Kentucky bluegrass, HS Code 120924), which are used for soccer
ªelds, plus que 81 percent of zinc powders (HS Code 790390), which are used
for anticorrosion coating on metals, and almost 64 percent of China’s grain sor-
ghum imports (HS Code 100700), which are used to produce the popular
Chinese liquor baijiu. The next major suppliers of these goods to China are
mostly like-minded countries: Denmark is the second-largest supplier of blue-
grass seed (27.16 pour cent), and Australia is the third-largest supplier of sor-
ghum (17.68 pour cent). Suisse (9.87 pour cent) and Germany (3.85 pour cent)

59. Table A3 in the online appendix is an expanded list of China’s high-dependence items.
60. Silver powder (HS code 710610) is an ingredient in photovoltaic/electronic conductive paste
that is used to make solar panels in China. Copper alloys (HS code 741012) are used for wiring,
locks, doors, and electric sockets in the construction sector.

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Collective Resilience 111

Chiffre 1. Substitutability of China’s High-Dependence Goods from Lead Suppliers

(United States or Japan, 2022)

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NOTE: Substitutability is measured by determining whether the next one to three suppliers
of the good to China are like-minded partners of the collective resilience coalition. À
highlight the difªculty of substitutability for China by showing that secondary suppliers
(par exemple., Australia, Allemagne) are like-minded partners of the lead supplier (c'est à dire., the United
States or Japan), this ªgure shows China’s second- and third-largest suppliers of key
high-dependence goods.

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(

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International Security 48:1 114

Chiffre 2. Substitutability of China’s High-Dependence Goods from Lead Suppliers
(Canada, France, the Philippines, or the United Kingdom, 2022)

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NOTE: Substitutability is measured by determining whether the next one to three suppliers
of the good to China are like-minded partners of the collective resilience coalition. À
highlight the difªculty of substitutability for China by showing that secondary suppliers
(par exemple., Australia, Espagne) are like-minded partners of the lead supplier (par exemple., Canada, France),
this ªgure shows China’s second- and third-largest suppliers of key high-dependence
goods.

make up the rest of zinc powder suppliers to China. Ensemble, these like-
minded partners constitute 90–100 percent of China’s supply of these goods.
The electrical vehicle battery market is very important to China, but China is
dependent on the Philippines and Australia—countries that the Xi regime has
routinely coerced—for nearly 70 percent of its global supply of nickel ores and
concentrates (HS Code 260400). These materials, used to produce battery cath-
odes, amount to a trade value of over $3 milliard (see ªgure 2). China does not export these minerals, which suggests high vulnerability and replacement costs to ªnd alternative sources. De plus, many luxury goods meet the vul- nerability interdependence criteria. China is almost 100 percent dependent on lobster (HS Code 30622) from Canada and the United States. C'est 96 percent Collective Resilience 115 dependent on whiskeys (HS Code 2208301) from the UK, Japan, and the United States, and China is over 99 percent dependent on France for its supply of brandies (HS Code 220820). Two relevant points emerge regarding a collective resilience strategy. D'abord, China could respond by practicing trade diversiªcation, locating alternative foreign suppliers for one, deux, or a handful of these items. But if a large coali- tion of countries threaten to act on an array of these goods (table 4 is only a se- lective list) in response to Beijing’s coercion against any country, the increased costs of trade diversiªcation may alter Chinese behavior. Deuxième, countries that participate in the collective resilience coalition would need to threaten action on only one or two items that meet the vulnerability interdependence criteria (c'est à dire., high-dependence, strategically important Chinese goods that ex- hibit low substitutability). Par exemple, Japan would not be required to sanc- tion all 124 high-dependence items that it exports to China; instead, it might be called on to threaten to act on only two critical exports—silver powder and copper alloys—to signal credible deterrence to discourage the Chinese gov- ernment’s economic coercion of others. The upshot is that the targets of eco- nomic coercion can make credible threats to retaliate against and thus deter China’s bullying. political will Having the capabilities to deter economic coercion is only half the strategy. The other half is political will. Like deterrence in the security realm, collective resilience is only as effective as it is credible. Such credibility requires targets of the Chinese government’s economic coercion to make an Article 5–type of commitment to the cause—if Beijing sanctions any one country in the group, this will elicit a collective response from the others against China’s high- dependence items. Admittedly, this strategy could be difªcult to implement. Collective resil- ience members would have to address several challenges. D'abord, they would have to agree on both how to deªne economic coercion, which can take many different forms, and what would be the trigger for collective action. Disputes over trade that could be decided by the WTO would not meet the threshold. Plutôt, deterrence would focus on China’s politically motivated trade actions. Deuxième, coalition members would need to reassure smaller powers that they would not be abandoned when Beijing threatens sanctions to pressure them to leave the coalition. This requires key members such as the United States or l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / direct . m je t . e d u / i s e c / art – pdlf / / / / 4 8 1 9 1 2 1 5 3 9 7 1 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 4 6 5 pd . f par invité 0 7 Septembre 2 0 2 3 International Security 48:1 116 Japan to commit to trigger actions if Beijing bullies any other member, even if it is economically costly to the patrons; otherwise, collective resilience will have little credibility. Troisième, the incentives to free ride among the group would be high. Larger powers would need to provide early and tangible signs of their commitment to underwrite the coalition and create conªdence. Partners might invest in a col- lective fund to compensate smaller members for losses or offer alternative export or import markets to divert trade in response to Chinese sanctions. Oth- erwise, the temptation to defect from the collective resilience coalition when another was being coerced by the Chinese government would be high. Fourth, all members would need to build support at home for the strategy, which will not be easy because it may cause some economic hardship. A com- pany in the United States, Par exemple, may not be willing to sacriªce its quar- terly earnings from China’s exports to cooperate with the strategy, especially if it is on behalf of a country on the other side of the world being coerced by China. Contrary to the collective resilience strategy, some companies may even see opportunity in economic coercion. When the Xi regime sanctioned the im- port of Norwegian salmon, Par exemple, Scottish salmon exporters proªted handsomely. Ainsi, some mix of industrial policy, legislation, and incentives to promote public-private sector partnerships would be needed to support the strategy. China is not a democracy, and therefore it faces fewer political obsta- cles to enacting a competing strategy of economic coercion. It can decree that society bears the costs of any blowback from its coercive strategies. Despite these challenges, what would hopefully motivate each party to stay the course is the desire to escape the dilemma of trading with China and being subject to Beijing’s economic coercion, which has deleterious effects on the lib- eral international order. Knowing that this strategy works better as a collective effort, given the combined capabilities of the economies, should create incen- tives to band together. Each party’s political commitment to the collective is critical for the deterrent strategy to be effective. Any one country practicing this policy alone would do nothing to change the Chinese government’s behavior. But a group of countries working together would create problems for Beijing. The larger the coalition of countries, the more credible the deter- rent threat. would the xi regime care? Even though China’s high-dependence goods are a small percentage of its overall trade, threats to leverage such goods would alarm Beijing. China l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / direct . m je t . e d u / i s e c / art – pdlf / / / / 4 8 1 9 1 2 1 5 3 9 7 1 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 4 6 5 pd . f par invité 0 7 Septembre 2 0 2 3 Collective Resilience 117 presumably tolerates its dependencies on these goods because doing so is optimal in terms of price and efªciency. Beijing also assumes that no single trade partner would dare retaliate in what would amount to self-inºicted eco- nomic difªculty. The Chinese government mostly targets low-dependence, easily substitutable sectors.61 Beijing rarely employs sanctions on its high- dependence goods. Par exemple, China will not sanction TSMC or Samsung because it depends on these memory chip suppliers. De même, China will not leverage its imports of Australian iron ore. If Beijing is unwilling to locate al- ternative sources at this level of dependence, then greater sensitivity to de- pendence levels of 70 percent or higher would be expected. De plus, the Chinese government usually targets those sectors that matter more to the ex- porting country than to China. Par exemple, the Xi regime’s ban on Canadian soybeans in 2019 over the detention of a Huawei executive cost Canada more than $1 billion but constituted only 3 percent of China’s total trade in that
product. China was only 36–40 percent dependent on Australian wines and
only 19 percent dependent on Australian barley when the Chinese govern-
ment banned them in 2020.

Would China be able to replace a cutoff of these high-dependence goods
with domestic production? This is possible, but not without
incurring
signiªcant costs. The fourth column in table 4 shows the “replacement ratio.”
This measures the amount of domestic production of the good by using
Chinese exports of the same good as a proxy variable. The replacement metric
is the exports/imports ratio. A value less than 1 (c'est à dire., China exports less of the
good than it imports) suggests that China would have little or no capacity to
replace external dependence with domestic production (c'est à dire., what I call “highly
costly” replacement). A value close to 1 (c'est à dire., China exports about an equal
amount of the good as it imports) suggests “costly” replacement, because it
would require a signiªcant diversion of China’s exports to domestic need. UN
value exponentially higher than 1 (c'est à dire., China exports more than it imports of
the good) suggests “not costly” replacement capacity. Chiffre 3 categorizes
China’s capacity to replace imported high-dependence goods with domestic
production (values are for the representative list of goods in table 4 and the ex-
panded list of high-dependence goods in table A3 in the online appendix).

As ªgure 3 shows, China could mitigate the impact of a collective resilience
action on only 1 of the 23 items on the high-dependence list: nickel oxides
(HS Code 282540) from Japan. China’s exports of nickel oxides are seventeen-

61. Adachi, Brun, and Zenglein, “Fasten your Seatbelts.”

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International Security 48:1 118

Chiffre 3. China’s Capacity to Replace High-Dependence Goods with Domestic Production

(2022)

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NOTE: The replacement metric is the exports/imports ratio. A number greater than 1
(“costly” or “not costly”) suggests a strong capacity to replace a loss of imports with do-
mestic sources by diverting exports to ªll demand. A value less than 1 is “highly costly”
replacement (c'est à dire., China would have little or no capacity to replace external dependence
with domestic production).

Collective Resilience 119

fold higher (replacement ratio of 17.72) than its imports from Japan, suggérer-
ing that it could relatively easily divert exports of the good to domestic need if
external sources dried up. The other 22 high-dependence goods are not easily
substituted by domestic production. China would experience “highly costly”
replacement for 19 items (a replacement ratio of exports over imports of
0.28 ou moins). Il y a 11 items for which China has no replacement capac-
ville (c'est à dire., replacement ratio of 0.00 ou 0.01). These data indicate that China
would feel the impact of a collective resilience strategy. Chinese leaders would
certainly prefer to avoid such a situation, which would add to China’s ongoing
problems of a failed COVID-19 lockdown, tensions with Taiwan, and the eco-
nomic slowdown.

overcoming the commitment trap: group of seven plus australia

Critics might argue that this collective resilience strategy faces a commitment
trap. There are two aspects to this trap. D'abord, the Chinese government will in-
timidate the weakest countries in the coalition. While many countries are un-
happy with Beijing’s bullying, few may be up to challenging China in this way.
After all, some countries, particularly in Asia, have large Chinese expatriate
communautés, many are deeply penetrated by the Chinese government’s disin-
formation narratives, and many distrust one another and the United States.
Deuxième, it will be harder to build a coalition around countries that are not like-
minded and that do not share the same threat perceptions of China.

One way of circumventing the commitment trap would be to build coali-
tions around like-minded groupings. I propose the Group of Seven plus
Australia (G-7 (cid:2) A in tables 5 et 6) because these countries: (1) want to pre-
serve the liberal order against economic coercion; (2) are medium-to-large
countries that cannot be easily bullied by Beijing; (3) already participate in
the European Union’s anti-coercion efforts or have already confronted
Beijing’s coercion; et (4) have the collective resilience capabilities to leverage
China’s vulnerability.

As tables 5 et 6 show, the G-7 (cid:2) A countries have 395 items on which
China is 70 percent dependent with a trade value of more than $37 milliard (2022), et 153 items valued at $7.5 billion on which China is 90 percent de-
pendent. To deter further economic coercion against any members, Australia
and Canada could threaten to act on their exports of nickel powders (HS Code
750400) to China. These two countries make up almost 80 percent of China’s
global supply, and China’s replacement costs for alternative sources of nickel
powder would be “highly costly” (replacement ratio of 0.17). For luxury

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International Security 48:1 120

Tableau 5. China’s High-Dependence Imports from G-7 (cid:2) UN (summary, 2022)

Total number of import
items

Total value of imports (US$) 70% dependence 80% dependence 90% dependence 395 268 153 $37,172,756,418
$22,160,627,838 $7,531,449,278

Tableau 6. China’s High-Dependence Imports from G-7(cid:2)UN (by country, 2022)

Country

Number of import items (cid:4)70%

Value of imports (US$) Japan United States Germany Italy France Canada Australia United Kingdom Totals 124 87 64 55 27 18 14 6 395 $4,960,038,430
$11,548,305,886 $827,620,276
$1,211,888,481 $2,490,927,512
$5,090,898,875 $10,562,817,896 $480,259,062 $37,172,756,418

goods, Canada and the United States could leverage their exports of nonfrozen
lobster (HS Code 30622), and France and Italy could act on their supply of
champagne (HS Code 220410). These two pairs make up nearly 100 pour cent
et plus 90 pour cent, respectivement, of China’s imports of these luxury goods,
which would be “highly costly” for China to replace (replacement ratio of 0.00
for lobster and 0.03 for champagne). In addition to silver powder exports by
Japan discussed previously, Japan and Germany provide more than 82 pour cent
of China’s imported supplies of alloyed steel ingots, used for shipbuilding (HS
Code 722410). China has no alternative domestic supply for this product (concernant-
placement ratio of 0.00). Or the United States and the UK could act on their
supplies of cobalt materials (HS Code 810590) to China, used for battery pro-
duction. Beijing would have a hard time replacing its 73 percent dependence

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Collective Resilience 121

on its Anglo-American suppliers (replacement ratio of 0.11). Table A4 in the
faible-
online appendix includes an itemized list of high-dependence,
substitutability strategic/luxury items for the G-7 (cid:2) A group. This G-7 (cid:2) UN
grouping is already highly cohesive, making it more feasible for it to enact col-
lective action and to exhibit a stronger political will than an ad hoc coalition of
victims of Chinese economic coercion. As chair of the G-7 in 2023, and as the
country with which China exhibits the highest vulnerability interdependence,
Japan would be well positioned to introduce a collective resilience strategy to
the group.

Conclusion

Experts and ofªcials disagree over the claim that the People’s Liberation Army
will be ready to take Taiwan by force by 2027.62 There is full agreement, comment-
jamais, that the Chinese government will use economic coercion against other ac-
tors by this same date. The Chinese government’s weaponization of trade is a
menace to the international system because it causes self-censorship among
all actors that trade with China; it compels governments and companies to
defer to China’s illiberal interests; and it erodes trust in the multilateral trad-
ing order. From supporting democracy in Hong Kong to joining secure
technology and biomedical production supply chains outside the Chinese or-
bit, governments are afraid to act for fear of being targeted by Beijing’s eco-
nomic coercion.

In this article, I have introduced novel data and a strategy of pursuing
collective resilience to deter future coercion by the Chinese government. Col-
lective resilience rests on two bodies of theory in international security and in-
ternational political economy. It borrows from traditional deterrence theory

62. Hal Brands and Michael Beckley, “The Coming War over Taiwan,” Wall Street Journal, Au-
gust 4, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-coming-war-over-taiwan-11659614417;
Amy Hawkins, “Taiwan Minister Warns of Conºict with China in 2027,” Guardian, Avril 21, 2023,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/21/taiwan-foreign-minister-warns-of-conºict-
with-china-in-2027; Miya Tanaka, “Ex-US Commander Sticks to 2027 Window on Taiwan Attack,»
Kyodo News, Janvier 23, 2023 https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2023/01/018a26a02962-ex-
us-indo-paciªc-commander-sticks-to-2027-window-on-taiwan-attack.html; Timothy R. Heath, “Is
China Planning to Attack Taiwan? A Careful Consideration of Available Evidence Says No,” War
on the Rocks, Décembre 14, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/12/is-china-planning-to-
attack-taiwan-a-careful-consideration-of-available-evidence-says-no/; J.. Tedford Tyler, “China
Isn’t Ready to Invade Taiwan,” National Interest, Décembre 11, 2022, https://nationalinterest.org/
feature/china-isn%E2%80%99t-ready-invade-taiwan-206006.

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International Security 48:1 122

and builds on the literature on weaponization of interdependence. In the latter
case, the strategy shows that actors without a dominant hold on key nodes of
an embedded network can still exercise power by banding together and hold-
ing something of value to the stronger actor, especially if the stronger actor
lacks exit options. I have shown that past targets of Beijing’s economic coer-
cion have signiªcantly more leverage than they think. I have argued that
countries need to mobilize around the understanding that economic interde-
pendence, even asymmetric dependence, is a two-way street. These countries
supply strategic and luxury goods to China on which Beijing is highly or fully
dependent. If countries can cooperate to overcome collective action problems,
they can send a credible deterrent message to the Chinese government that its
continued economic predation will incur high costs.

Collective resilience is not a strategy that advocates escalating a trade war
with China; it is better thought of as a strategy of great power competition.
D'abord, collective resilience could succeed not by actually using sanctions, but by
credibly signaling to threaten such actions. If the Chinese government under
Xi Jinping does not coerce other states, then there is no need to act on the
threat. Deuxième, the purpose of this strategy is not to target all Chinese eco-
nomic behavior. As one of the world’s largest economies, China will have
trade disputes with its partners. These should be resolved and negotiated bi-
laterally and through WTO adjudication. What collective resilience aims to de-
ter are acts of economic coercion that do not conform to WTO rules and that
aim to achieve goals not related to trade. Retaliating against Norway for
awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to a Chinese dissident, sanctioning South
Korean companies for deploying a missile defense system, and embargoing
imports from certain countries for speaking out against suppression of democ-
racy in Hong Kong are the types of coercive actions that need to be thwarted.
Troisième, collective resilience should supplement rather than replace de-risking
measures such as trade diversiªcation, impact mitigation, and supply chain re-
silience. Hopefully even more like-minded countries would participate in
these strategies once the threat of economic bullying by the Chinese govern-
ment is deterred.

A strategy of collective resilience would start with policy leaders explicitly
acknowledging and condemning Beijing’s practices. Par exemple, then UK for-
eign secretary Liz Truss stated in January 2022 in Australia: “[The Xi regime] est
using its economic muscle to attempt to coerce democracies like Australia and
Lithuania. . . . We will stand up for our economic security. That means calling
out China when it blocks products from Lithuania or imposes punitive tariffs

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Collective Resilience 123

on Australian barley and wine.”63 The May 2023 G-7 leaders’ statement also
formally declared a willingness to counter economic coercion: “We express se-
rious concern over economic coercion and call on all countries to refrain from
its use. . . . We will use our existing tools, review their effectiveness and de-
velop new ones as needed to deter and counter the use of coercive economic
measures. . . . We will use early warning and rapid information sharing, regu-
larly consult each other, collaboratively assess situations, explore coordinated
réponses, deter and, where appropriate, counter economic coercion, in accor-
dance with our respective legal systems.”64 This study takes a step toward
meeting the need for a universal mapping of high-dependence exports to the
Chinese market. Building political commitment to a norm of collective resil-
ience could be undertaken in groupings such as the Indo-Paciªc Economic
Framework, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, U.S.-Japan-South Korea
trilaterals, and European Union or other Indo-Paciªc and Euro-Atlantic fo-
rums. Incentives to implement sanctions (par exemple., when the Chinese government
is sanctioning another country in the group) would need to be established,
such as having members of the collective sanction a handful of strategic high-
dependence items, which might reduce the temptation to free ride. Another in-
centive would be for the big powers to promise impact-mitigation measures
for those targeted by coercion, as the United States has done for Lithuania.

The threshold for what would constitute triggering behavior by China
would need to be established and communicated to allies and to China. The le-
gal implications of such a counter-coercion strategy would need to be invest-
igated. Initial work in the European Union suggests that it would be an
exception to WTO rules on grounds of national security.65 Furthermore, if col-

63. Liz Truss, “Foreign Secretary Liz Truss’ Speech to the Lowy Institute,” UK Foreign, Common-
wealth & Development Ofªce, Janvier 21, 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/
foreign-secretarys-speech-to-the-lowy-institute.
64. “G7 Leaders’ Statement on Economic Resilience and Economic Security,” White House,
May 20, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieªng-room/statements-releases/2023/05/20/g7-
leaders-statement-on-economic-resilience-and-economic-security/. Also see the anti–economic co-
ercion statement in the April 2023 leaders’ statement from the United States and South Korea:
“Leaders’ Joint Statement in Commemoration of the 70th Anniversary of the Alliance between the
United States of America and the Republic of Korea,” White House, Avril 26, 2023, https://www
.whitehouse.gov/brieªng-room/statements-releases/2023/04/26/leaders-joint-statement-in-
commemoration-of-the-70th-anniversary-of-the-alliance-between-the-united-states-of-america-
and-the-republic-of-korea/.
65. See Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Ivo Daalder, “Memo on an ‘Economic Article 5’ to Counter
Authoritarian Coercion” (Chicago: Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Juin 2022), https://www
.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/ªles/2022-06/CCGA%20Economic%20Article%205%20
Brief_vF_0.pdf.

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International Security 48:1 124

lective resilience is framed as a reciprocal action that is executed only in re-
sponse to coercion by the Chinese government, then the strategy might
comply with WTO signatories’ nondiscrimination obligations.66 Domestic sup-
port would have to be built for the policy, not least among ªrms that would
withstand the worst of the actions. Governments in consultation with the pri-
vate sector would need to devise a suite of industrial, tax, and related policies.
China would almost certainly use both carrots and sticks to try to persuade in-
dividual countries not to join the alliance. Beijing might retaliate against any
collective action by escalating to a trade war. But an effective collective resil-
ience strategy requires that steadfast partners recognize the increasing threat
of the Chinese government’s weaponization of interdependence and endure
the political and economic costs of Beijing’s economic retaliation.

Globalists might ªnd a strategy of collective resilience to be anathema to the
very liberal order that they are trying to protect. But they must treat it as a peer
competition strategy necessary to save that order. It has been over three de-
cades since the United States engaged in great power peer competition. Some
may have forgotten that high-stakes competition against another great power
can be backhanded and hypocritical, such as when the United States had to
countenance illiberal practices at times to protect the Western order during the
Cold War. Hopefully, the threat of collective resilience would never have to be
exercised. In that sense, it is like deterrence in the security realm. It requires
both the capabilities and the political will of all involved to signal to the
Chinese government that it can no longer use economic coercion as a tool of
diplomacy that threatens the liberal international order.

66. To comply with the WTO, collective resilience might have to be informal rather than formal.
Thanks to Christina Davis for raising this point.

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3 Collective Resilience image

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