Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark

Attacking the Leader,
Missing the Mark
Why Terrorist Groups Survive
Decapitation Strikes

Jenna Jordan

Does leadership de-
capitation lead to the demise of terrorist organizations? Can the United States
undermine or destroy terrorist organizations such as al-Qaida by arresting or
killing their leaders? What explains organizational resilience to leadership tar-
geting? Leadership decapitation, or the killing or capturing of the leaders of
terrorist organizations, has become a core feature of U.S. counterterrorism
politique. Many scholars and analysts claim that it weakens terrorist organiza-
tions and reduces the threat they pose. Sans surprise, they saw the killing of
Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011, in Abbottabad, Pakistan, as a major tactical
victory for President Barack Obama and for the broader war on terrorism. De-
spite the success of this operation and subsequent attacks on al-Qaida leaders,
decapitation is unlikely to diminish the ability of al-Qaida to continue its activ-
ities in the long run. Plutôt, it may have counterproductive consequences, em-
boldening or strengthening the organization.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has
killed or captured many al-Qaida leaders as part of a general campaign to de-
capitate the organization. It has employed a variety of military operations
to achieve this objective, including raids by Special Operations forces. Both
bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of al-Qaida in Iraq, were killed
as a result of such raids. On October 5, 2012, U.S. forces captured Abu Anas
al-Libi, an al-Qaida leader, in a raid in Libya. The United States has also relied
heavily on drone strikes to target al-Qaida leaders and other militants in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen.

In June 2012, Abu Yahya al-Libi, then al-Qaida’s deputy leader, was killed
in Pakistan in a drone strike coordinated by the Central
Intelligence
Agency.1 Highly experienced, al-Libi served an important operational function

Jenna Jordan is Assistant Professor of International Affairs at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs
at Georgia Institute of Technology.

For helpful comments and suggestions, the author is grateful to Max Abrahms, Mia Bloom, Anne
Holthoefer, John Horgan, Charles Lipson, Chris McIntosh, John Mearsheimer, Michelle Murray,
Robert Pape, Dan Reiter, Sebastian Rosato, Lawrence Rubin, Keven Ruby, seminar participants at
the Program on International Politics, Economics, and Security and the Program on International
Security Policy at the University of Chicago and the Security Policy Workshop Series at the Elliott
School of International Affairs at George Washington University, conference participants at the an-
nual meetings of the International Studies Association and the American Political Science Associa-
tion, and the anonymous reviewers.

1. According to the data on drone strikes collected by Peter Bergen and Katherine Teidemann at

International Security, Vol. 38, Non. 4 (Spring 2014), pp. 7–38, est ce que je:10.1162/ISEC_a_00157
© 2014 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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International Security 38:4 8

within the organization. Scholars and policymakers saw his death as a sig-
niªcant blow to an already weakened al-Qaida.2 Nine months earlier, un
Hellªre missile ªred from a U.S. drone killed Anwar al-Awlaki, a Yemeni-
American cleric linked to a number of terrorist plots in the West. Sur
Août 22, 2011, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, believed to be the organization’s
second-highest leader, was reportedly killed in a drone strike in Pakistan.3
Rahman served an important communicative function between bin Laden
and lower-level operatives. Ilyas Kashmiri, reputed to be a senior member of
al-Qaida and the operational commander for Harakat-ul-Jihad al-Islami, était
killed in a drone attack in South Waziristan on June 3, 2011.4 These examples il-
lustrate the frequency with which the United States has targeted al-Qaida lead-
ers and operatives over the past few years, speciªcally through the use of
drone strikes.5

Despite these and other instances of successful targeting, al-Qaida remains a
resilient terrorist organization. Applying a theory of organizational resilience,
I examine why targeting al-Qaida’s leadership is not an effective counter-
terrorism strategy and, en effet, is likely counterproductive. A terrorist group’s
ability to withstand attacks is a function of two factors: bureaucratization and
communal support. Analyzing both when and why certain terrorist groups are
able to survive leadership attacks, this article differs from existing work by
providing a more nuanced lens through which to evaluate the effectiveness of
counterterrorism policy.

The analysis proceeds as follows. D'abord, I discuss existing studies on the ef-
fectiveness of targeting terrorist leaders. Deuxième, I present a theory of organi-
zation resilience to leadership decapitation. Troisième, I apply the theory to the
case of al-Qaida. Fourth, I assess empirical evidence on the effectiveness of tar-

the New America Foundation, the United States carried out 9 strikes in 2004, 118 dans 2010, 72 dans
2011, 48 dans 2012, et 9 from January 1 through March 10, 2013. See http://counterterrorism.new
america.net/drones. For data on drone strikes from the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, see http://
www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/.
2. Declan Walsh and Eric Schmitt, “Drone Strike Killed No. 2 in Al Qaeda, U.S. Ofªcials Say,” New
York Times, Juin 5, 2012. In the aftermath of al-Libi’s death, Peter Bergen argued that Ayman al-
Zawahiri was likely the only remaining inºuential leader in al-Qaida. See Bergen, “And Now,
Only One Senior al Qaeda Leader Left,” CNN Opinion, Juin 6, 2012, http://articles.cnn.com/2012-
06-05/opinion/opinion_bergen-al-qaeda-whos-left_1_abu-yahya-aqap-drone-strikes?_s=
MP:OPINION.
3. Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt, and Robert F. Worth, “Two-Year Manhunt Led to Killing of Awlaki
in Yemen,” New York Times, Septembre 30, 2011.
4. Mark Mazzetti, “C.I.A. Drone Is Said to Kill Al Qaeda’s No. 2,” New York Times, Août 27, 2011.
5. Not only have drone strikes been used to kill militant leaders, but they have also been em-
ployed against lower-level operatives and antigovernment insurgent leaders in countries such as
Pakistan and Yemen, often with the acquiescence of those countries’ governments. En outre,
although drone strikes serve as an important tool for targeting leaders, they are not synonymous
with leadership decapitation. This article focuses on the efªcacy of targeting terrorist leaders.

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Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark 9

geting al-Qaida. I then discuss implications of these ªnding for U.S. counter-
terrorism policy.

Existing Views on Leadership Targeting

The literature on the effectiveness of leadership targeting focuses on ªve areas:
the role of leadership, intelligence, and organizational structure, ainsi que
quantitative ªndings and counterproductive consequences. D'abord, une grande partie de la
optimism surrounding the removal of terrorist leaders is grounded in theories
that analyze the role of these leaders within their organizations. Theories of
charismatic leadership, Par exemple, posit that the susceptibility of terrorist
organizations to leadership targeting is a function of qualities inherent to the
leader.6 These qualities not only sustain leaders’ legitimacy, but also foster
the belief among followers that such leaders are irreplaceable.7 Theories of
charismatic leadership, cependant, overpredict the success of leadership decapi-
tation while overlooking both organizational variables and social context.

Other studies examine the contribution of leaders to organizational strength
and cohesion. According to Bryan Price, terrorist groups are clandestine,
values-based organizations, making leadership succession difªcult.8 Violent
organizations are more cohesive and are often led by charismatic leaders,
making succession especially difªcult. Clandestine organizations are more
dependent than nonclandestine organizations on their leaders, who are un-
likely to institutionalize their operations for both strategic and personal rea-
sons, further complicating succession. Enfin, because terrorist organizations
are values based, leaders are harder to replace, and their removal can cause in-
stability. Price offers one of the few theoretical explanations for leadership de-
capitation, but his model does not account for variation in the effectiveness of
leadership targeting. By treating all terrorist organizations as values based, his
theory overpredicts the occurrence of success.

The role of the leader can be another predictor of the ability of a decapitation
strike to weaken the organization. Michael Freeman argues that the likelihood
of success in targeting leaders can be determined by whether they have an op-
erational or inspirational role.9 Organizations in which the leader has both

6. See Max Weber, The Theory of Economic and Social Organization (New York: Free Press, 1964),
p. 358.
7. Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Nouveau
York: Presse universitaire d'Oxford, 1946).
8. Bryan C. Prix, “Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to
Counterterrorism,” International Security, Vol. 36, Non. 4 (Spring 2012), p. 14.
9. Michael Freeman, “The Headless Horseman: A Theoretical and Strategic Assessment of Leader-
ship Targeting,” Terrorism and Political Violence, forthcoming.

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International Security 38:4 10

operational and inspirational roles are the most likely to collapse after decapi-
tation. Freeman claims that although organizations with charismatic leaders
tend to be susceptible to leadership attacks, over time they can become more
institutionalized and more resilient in the face of such attacks.

Deuxième, targeting operations can yield critical intelligence about terrorist
group activity and lead to organizational weakening. Par exemple, authorities
found documents during the arrest of the leader of Peru’s Shining Path,
Abimael Guzmán, that led to the capture of other members of the group.10
Leaders under arrest can provide information about their organizations’ loca-
tion, capabilities, personnel, and operations.11

Troisième, some studies have found a link between organizational structure and
group stability.12 Kathleen Carley, entre autres, argues that decentralized or-
ganizations are harder to destabilize than hierarchical organizations.13 Marc
Sageman claims that, given the structure of such organizations, leaders may
not be the right targets. In a study of the global Salaª jihad, Sageman argues
that social networks provide an opportunity for socially and geographically
isolated and alienated individuals to join a community. The social bonds cre-
ated within these communities create and strengthen the ideological commit-
ment of potential militants, encouraging them to join jihadist movements. Le
decentralized and local nature of these groups makes them difªcult to target.

Fourth, quantitative studies on leadership targeting yield different results
regarding whether and when decapitation is effective. Price ªnds that decapi-
tation increases the mortality rate of terrorist organizations. Patrick Johnston
concludes that decapitation decreases the intensity and frequency of militant
attacks, increases the chance of war termination, and raises the probability of
government victory.14 Johnston claims that although decapitation can “help
break the morale of insurgencies that have been engaged in long, souvent
difªcult campaigns,”15 it is more effective as part of a larger campaign. Al-

10. Cynthia McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador’s FMLN and Peru’s
Shining Path (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 92.
11. Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist
Campaigns (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009), p. 17.
12. See Daniel Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, Non. 2 (March/April
2006), pp. 95–111; Kathleen M. Carley, Ju-Sung Lee, and David Krackhardt, “Destabilizing Net-
travaux,” Connections, Vol. 24, Non. 3 (2002), pp. 79–92; and James D. Thompson, Organizations in Ac-
tion: Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 2007).
13. See Kathleen M. Carley, “A Theory of Group Stability,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 56,
Non. 3 (Juin 1991), pp. 331–354; and Carley, Lee, and Krackhardt, “Destabilizing Networks.”
14. Patrick B. Johnston, “Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Tar-
geting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns,” International Security, Vol. 36, Non. 4 (Spring 2012), p. 50.
15. Johnston, “Does Decapitation Work?” p. 75. These ªndings run counter to mine and to Price’s.
Johnston’, cependant, uses ten years as a marker when analyzing the role organizational age plays
in decapitation effectiveness. Had he divided groups over eleven years of age into different cate-

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Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark 11

though Johnston’s statistical ªndings are robust, his article lacks a theoretical
discussion of decapitation: it does not provide an explanation for why decapi-
tation is effective, how it can inºuence a group’s operational capacity, and when
states should or should not target militant organizations. En outre, Johnston
focuses exclusively on insurgencies. Although some terrorist groups are also in-
surgents, many insurgent organizations do not employ terrorist tactics.

Fifth, some studies argue that leadership targeting may be counterproduc-
tive. Unintended consequences include the creation of a martyrdom effect, un
surge in recruitment, the occurrence of retaliatory attacks, an increase in group
resolve and strength, and a rise in the frequency and intensity of attacks.

A Theory of Organizational Resilience

Dans cette section, I present a theory to explain why some terrorist groups are able
to survive attacks on their leadership and others are not. “Organizational resil-
ience” refers to whether a group that has experienced degradation can still en-
gage in terrorist activity.16 Terrorist group resilience is a function of two
variables: bureaucracy and popular support. Leadership decapitation is un-
likely to result in the dissolution of groups that are highly bureaucratized or
that have high levels of popular support because leaders matter less in these
circonstances. Groups that are bureaucratic and have popular support are the
hardest to destabilize through leadership targeting, and it in these cases that
counterproductive outcomes are likely.

how bureaucratization increases group resilience

The theory of organizational resilience posits that the extent to which a terror-
ist organization is bureaucratized accounts for whether decapitation is likely
to result in its demise. Bureaucratized terrorist groups are diversiªed, have a
clear division of administrative responsibilities and functions, follow rules and
procedures, and are thus more likely to withstand the sudden removal of a
leader or leaders. Because smaller, younger, and more ideological organiza-
tions are less likely to be bureaucratized, they are more likely to succumb to
attacks on their leadership.

gories, these results might have changed. Both Price and I found that once a group crosses the
twenty-year threshold, decapitation becomes much less effective.
16. Organizational degradation can be measured by looking at both the frequency and lethality
of a group’s attacks. In the 2011 étude, I measured organizational degradation following decapita-
tion strikes against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the Basque separatist organi-
zation ETA, and Hamas. See Jenna Jordan, “When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of
Leadership Decapitation,” Security Studies, Vol. 18, Non. 4 (Octobre 2009), pp. 719–755.

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International Security 38:4 12

Bureaucracies have universalistic rules that are critical when delegating re-
sponsibilities within an organization.17 Michael Crozier argues that “imper-
sonal rules” create a kind of self-enforcing equilibrium by delimiting in great
detail the function of every individual within the organization.18 These results
prescribe the behavior to be followed in all possible events. According to Max
Weber, the clear delineation of authority, rules, and functions makes bureau-
cracies the most efªcient form of large-scale administration.19

bureaucratic stability. Bureaucracies contain speciªc features that in-
crease organizational stability and efªciency, making them more resilient to
leadership attacks. D'abord, they are characterized by organizational diversiªca-
tion, and they maintain a clear delineation between duties and power.20 As or-
ganizations become larger, more complex, and more specialized, ils sont
likely to develop diversiªed functions that increase their stability. Pierre
Grinyer and Masoud Yasai-Ardekani ªnd that an organization will become
more diversiªed and structurally complex as its size increases.21 Organiza-
tional diversiªcation, à son tour, helps to create a reliable and diversiªed resource
base, which is necessary to sustain terrorist group activities.22 David Veness
claims that terrorist groups with diversiªed funding sources have higher sur-
vival rates.23 And in a discussion of older groups with functionally differenti-
ated branches, Jodi Vittori argues that larger groups ªnd it easier to obtain
diversiªed funding resources.24

Deuxième, bureaucracies establish rules and routines that can enhance organi-
zational stability and efªciency.25 As Martha Feldman and Brian Pentland
write, routines are “the primary means by which organizations accomplish

17. Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).
18. Crozier also discusses how a bureaucratic system of routine and rules can contribute to a “vi-
cious cycle” in which individuals try to avoid face-to-face relationships. See ibid., p. 54.
19. Talcott Parsons, introduction, in Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization,
trans. A.M. Henderson and Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1947), p. 58.
20. Weber, From Max Weber.
21. Peter H. Grinyer and Masoud Yasai-Ardekani, “Strategy, Structure, Size, and Bureaucracy,»
Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 24, Non. 3 (Septembre 1981), p. 475. See also Jodi Vittori, “All
Struggles Must End: The Longevity of Terrorist Groups,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 30,
Non. 3 (Décembre 2009), p. 445.
22. Vittori, “All Struggles Must End,” p. 445.
23. David Veness, “Terrorism and Counterterrorism: An International Perspective,” Studies in
Conºict and Terrorism, Vol. 24, Non. 5 (September/October 2001), p. 410.
24. Vittori, “All Struggles Must End.” This is particularly apparent in the case of Hamas, an orga-
nization with separate wings that are assigned different tasks such as bomb making, logistical
planning, or spiritual advising. Its resilience can be traced in part to its diversiªed functions and
resource bases.
25. I make a distinction between efªciency and stability. “Efªciency” refers to how capably an or-
ganization functions, whereas “stability” refers to how well a group can respond to counter-
terrorism efforts and other challenges to its existence.

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Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark 13

much of what they do.”26 Barbara Levitt and James March argue that routines
increase the capacity for organizational learning, which can in turn increase or-
ganizational capacity and efªciency.27 They also increase stability by making
organizations capable of surviving leadership turnover. Organizations that do
not establish routines will struggle until they are perceived as reliable and ac-
countable by their members and by the communities in which they operate.28

Highly bureaucratic terrorist organizations are more likely to experience
smooth leadership transitions. Thus the violent or sudden removal of a leader
should be less destabilizing in hierarchical groups, which have clear suc-
cession processes. De plus, the clear division of responsibilities found in
such organizations allows them to continue functioning because each member
has speciªc duties. Enfin, rules and procedures make the organization much
less dependent on the leadership. Because the group’s operations are institu-
tionalized, the sudden removal of a leader should not have lasting effects on
the organizational capacity of a targeted group.

evaluating bureaucracy and terrorist organizations. Like bureaucra-
cies, many terrorist organizations are hierarchical: their authority comes from
the top; they have an administrative staff; they follow rules and standard oper-
ating procedures; and they maintain functionally separate branches and infra-
structure. Even clandestine organizations such as terrorist groups can organize
themselves bureaucratically. Par exemple, they may keep documents relating
to their members, ªnances, and activities.29 Terrorist group documents can of-
fer insight into the group’s organizational structure. Par exemple, some terror-
ist groups keep rosters of individuals, their ranks within the organization,
accounting information, and charts of the organization’s structure. These doc-
uments offer evidence of institutionalized rules and operating procedures.

The existence of separate political, military, and social wings within a terror-
ist group can signal that it has become more complex and able to carry out
separate and distinct functions. Hamas and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam offer two such examples. Through their social or political branches, ter-

26. Martha S. Feldman and Brian T. Pentland, “Reconceptualizing Routines as a Source of Flexibil-
ity and Change,” Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 48, Non. 1 (Mars 2003), p. 94. See also James
G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (Cambridge, Mass.: Puits noir, 1993); and Thomp-
son, Organizations in Action.
27. Barbara Levitt and James G. Mars, “Organizational Learning,” American Review of Sociology,
Vol. 14 (1988), p. 320.
28. Mark A. Hager, Joseph Galaskiewicz, and Jeff A. Larson, “Structural Embededdness and the
Liability of Newness among Nonproªt Organizations,” Public Management Review, Vol. 6, Non. 2
(Juin 2004), p. 162.
29. Jacob N. Shapiro argues that terrorist organizations often face a choice between maintaining
secrecy or efªciency. See Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2013).

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International Security 38:4 14

rorist organizations often provide social services to the communities in which
they are based. This is an important means by which they acquire support.
Efªcient infrastructure is necessary to effectively provide social services to lo-
cal communities. Par conséquent, the provision of services should signal that a
group has developed a sufªcient degree of bureaucratic control to manage this
infrastructure. This infrastructure, à son tour, can increase a group’s resilience to
targeting efforts.

Older and larger terrorist groups are more likely to have developed bureau-
cratic features, increasing their stability, efficacité, and ability to survive an
attack on their leadership.30 Arthur Stinchcombe’s “liability of newness” the-
sis, which posits that a higher number of new organizations fail than old orga-
nizations, provides theoretical grounding for the hypothesis that older and
larger groups should be more stable.31 Stinchcombe argues that as a group
ages, it is likely to develop rules and routines that temper the costs associated
with newness, decreasing the likelihood of organizational failure.32 Studies in
business management have found that regardless of a group’s initial organiza-
tional blueprint, age and size are positively correlated with bureaucracy.33

30. See Josef Bruderl and Rudolf Schussler, “Organizational Mortality: The Liabilities of Newness
and Adolescence,” Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 35, Non. 3 (Septembre 1990), pp. 530–547;
John Freeman, Glenn R. Carroll, and Michael T. Hannan, “The Liability of Newness: Age Depend-
ence in Organizational Death Rates,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 48, Non. 5 (Octobre 1983),
pp. 692–710; Mark A. Hager et al., “Tales from the Grave: Organizations’ Accounts of Their Own
Demise,” American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 39 (Août 1996), pp. 975–994; Hager, Galaskiewicz,
and Larson, “Structural Embededdness and the Liability of Newness among Nonproªt Organiza-
tions”; Michael T. Hannan and John Freeman, “The Population Ecology of Organizations,” Ameri-
can Journal of Sociology, Vol. 82, Non. 5 (Mars 1977), pp. 929–964; Robert O. Keohane, “The Demand
for International Regimes,” International Organization, Vol. 36, Non. 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 325–355;
Jitendra V. Singh, David J. Tucker, and Robert J. Maison, “Organizational Legitimacy and the Liabil-
ity of Newness,” Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 31, Non. 2 (Juin 1986), pp. 171–193; and James
Ranger-Moore, “Bigger May Be Better, but Is Older Wiser? Organizational Age and Size in the
New York Life Insurance Industry,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 62, Non. 6 (Décembre 1992),
pp. 903–920.
31. Arthur Stinchcombe, “Organizations and Social Structure,” in J.G. Mars, éd., Handbook of
Organizations (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 142–193. Numerous studies support the empiri-
cal accuracy of the liability of newness thesis. See Ranger-Moore, “Bigger May Be Better, but Is
Older Wiser?»; Freeman, Carroll, and Hannan, “The Liability of Newness”; Hager, Galaskiewicz,
and Larson, “Structural Embededdness and the Liability of Newness among Nonproªt Organiza-
tions”; and Singh, Tucker, and House, “Organizational Legitimacy and the Liability of Newness.”
32. The liability of newness thesis is widely accepted by organizational theorists; studies have
scrutinized its empirical roots, tested its accuracy, and generally conªrmed that younger organiza-
tions have a higher failure rate than older organizations. See Ranger-Moore, “Bigger May Be
Better, but Is Older Wiser?»; Bruderl and Schussler, “Organizational Mortality”; and Freeman,
Carroll, and Hannan, “The Liability of Newness.”
33. See Jack A. Nickerson and Todd R. Zenger, “Comment: Dynamically Engineering Bureau-
cracy,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 15, Non. 1 (Avril 1999), pp. 47–55; and James
N. Baron, M.. Diane Burton, and Michael T. Hannan, “Engineering Bureaucracy: The Genesis of
Formal Policies, Postes, and Structures in High-Technology Firms,” Journal of Law, Economics,
and Organization, Vol. 15, Non. 1 (Mars 1999), pp. 1–41. Surtout, terrorist organizations do not
necessarily increase in size as they age. Independent of the relationship between size and age,

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Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark 15

Because terrorist groups are by nature clandestine and under constant threat
from counterterrorism measures, developing a stable bureaucracy presents
challenges for groups that require secrecy.34 Still, many terrorist organizations,
including the Shining Path and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia,
have become highly bureaucratic. Some terrorist organizations, tel que
Hamas, are hierarchical at the upper levels, while maintaining decentralized
networks at the operational level.35 These characteristics make many terrorist
organizations exceedingly resilient to countermeasures.36

As mentioned earlier, much of the conventional wisdom regarding the effec-
tiveness of leadership decapitation is based on theories of charismatic leader-
ship. Even if terrorist groups depend on a charismatic claim to authority,
charisma can become routinized, ultimately resulting in a bureaucratic form of
authority. Routinization establishes norms and rules for recruitment, eliminat-
ing succession problems. The leader’s message becomes institutionalized.37
Plus loin, a routinized organization can provide for a group’s needs by develop-
ing the economic conditions necessary to raise taxes and contributions. Ce
point is fundamental for terrorist organizations, which must raise funds while
remaining covert.

how popular support increases group resilience

Popular support is essential to a terrorist group’s ability to maintain organiza-
tional strength and capacity following an attack on its leadership. Organi-
zations with high levels of support have an easier time acquiring the resources
necessary to carry out effective campaigns. Scholars including Roger Petersen
and Scott Atran have argued that effective insurgencies require vast amounts
of popular support.38 Militant organizations have recognized the impor-

cependant, organizations that age or grow larger are more likely to develop some of the characteris-
tics of bureaucracies that prove useful when carrying out an effective terrorist campaign.
34. See Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma.
35. Although Weber argues that a hierarchical system of authority is a critical feature of a bureau-
cracy, Roger Mansªeld notes, “At no point did he [Weber] suggérer, cependant, that centralization of
decision making in such a hierarchy was a characteristic of bureaucracy nor did he even make ex-
plicit the relationship between bureaucracy and centralization.” Mansªeld points to “the absence
of any positive relationship between centralization and bureaucratization. In general there is some
evidence of negative association between these variables.” See Mansªeld, “Bureaucracy and Cen-
tralization: An Examination of Organizational Structure,” Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 18,
Non. 4 (Décembre 1973), pp. 477–488.
36. In discussing this quasi-bureaucratic organizational structure, Michael Kenney claims that the
decentralized nature of networks “does not preclude the existence of vertical decisionmaking hier-
archies within nodes that carry out the network’s most dangerous activities.” See Kenney, Depuis
Pablo to Osama: Trafªcking and Terrorist Networks, Government Bureaucracies, and Competitive Adapta-
tion (Parc universitaire: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007).
37. Weber, From Max Weber, p. 54.
38. See Roger D. Petersen, Resistance and Rebellion (Cambridge: la presse de l'Universite de Cambridge, 2001);
and Scott Atran, “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 27, Non. 3 (Été

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International Security 38:4 16

tance of local community support.39 Groups with public support are likely to
be seen as legitimate by their communities, further increasing their strength
and effectiveness. Par conséquent, counterinsurgency strategy has focused on win-
ning “hearts and minds” to reduce the desire for rebellion. Underlying this ap-
proach is the idea that by addressing grievances, counterinsurgents will gain
local support that could otherwise help insurgents.40 Because religious and
separatist organizations often represent the views and beliefs of the commu-
nity from which they emerge, they should have higher levels of communal
support than ideological organizations, making ideological organizations eas-
ier to destabilize.

popular support and stability. Popular support contributes to terrorist
group resolve and stability in many ways. It allows the group to recruit, raise
money, provide critical resources, ensure its ability to operate as a covert orga-
nization, encourage more violent behavior, and maintain political and ideolog-
ical relevance. D'abord, supporters can provide useful information and be a source
of recruits. Petersen suggests that the provision of resources, information, et
recruits by the local community is key to understanding the success of rebel-
lions.41 In a study examining terrorist organizations that carry out suicide at-
tacks, Robert Pape argues that support can “enable a suicide terrorist group to
replenish its membership.”42 Further, Atran claims that although reasons
for communal support can differ, “without community support, terrorist org-
anizations that depend on dense networks of ethnic and religious ties for
information, recruitment, and survival cannot thrive.”43 Ultimately, communal
support is critical for groups not only to succeed, but also to function.

2004), pp. 67–90. Although terrorist movements differ from insurgencies, many of the cases that I
evaluate could be classiªed as involving both terrorist organizations and insurgent organizations.
Insurgent organizations may adopt a strategy of terrorism, guerrilla warfare, or more conventional
warªghting. This explains the partial overlap between studies of insurgencies and terrorist cam-
paies. Matthew Kocher suggests that the difference between terrorist groups and insurgent orga-
nizations is grounded in strategic choice. Terrorist organizations employ a strategy of punishment,
whereas insurgencies use a strategy of denial. This deªnition, aussi, allows for potential overlap. Pour
example, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party uses denial in rural areas and punishment in urban areas.
39. Paul Collier and Anke Hoefºer, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers,
Vol. 56, Non. 4 (Octobre 2004), pp. 563–595.
40. See Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970). For a
discussion of different views regarding popular support and counterinsurgency strategy, see Eli
Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Joseph H. Felter, “Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Econom-
ics of Counterinsuregncy in Iraq,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 119, Non. 4 (Août 2011),
pp. 766–819. Berman and his coauthors demonstrate an important relationship between the provi-
sion of local public goods and a reduction in insurgent violence.
41. Although Petersen does not discuss terrorist organizations speciªcally, he looks at rebellion as
a general concept. See Petersen, Resistance and Rebellion.
42. Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random
Maison, 2005), p. 81.
43. Atran, “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism,” p. 82.

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Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark 17

Deuxième, popular support can allow a terrorist group to function covertly by
helping it avoid “detection, surveillance, and elimination by the security forces
of the target society.”44 Because decapitation can generate a sense of outrage
within the community, residents may respond to a targeted attack by offering a
safe place in which a leader or key operatives can hide.

Troisième, public support for the use of violence can encourage terrorist groups
to carry out more violent campaigns. Mia Bloom claims that when societies
support the killing of civilians, terrorist groups have an incentive to adopt such
tactics.45 In addition, terrorist organizations care about social approval and seek
legitimacy to increase their status relative to rival militant groups. Risa Brooks
argues that “the militant’s home constituency forces militants to adhere to so-
cietal norms about how violence is used.”46 A society’s tolerance for violence
provides a group with physical security, intelligence, and defensive resources
that can assist in concealing militants and in building infrastructure.47

Fourth, public support facilitates the ability of terrorist groups to maintain
their political or ideological relevance. Local communities can lose interest
in the ideology or aims of the group and thus undermine its cause,48 a phe-
nomenon that explains the decline of many Marxist groups.49 The ideology on
which religious and separatist groups is based does not depend on a particular
group or leader for its articulation. A loss of public interest is therefore less
detrimental to religious groups, whose ideology has appeal beyond the local
community.

Fifth, local support is critical to the acquisition of resources that enable ter-
rorist organizations to function.50 Resource mobilization theory can provide a
way to understand how support and resources matter to a terrorist organiza-
tion.51 Social movement organizations need resources to mobilize collective be-

44. Pape, Dying to Win.
45. Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press,
2005).
46. See Risa A. Brooks, “Societies and Terrorist Violence: How Social Support Affects Militant
Campaigns,” Marquette University, 2011, p. 27.
47. Ibid., pp. 27–28.
48. Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, p. 104.
49. Cronin points to the Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, et 17 November as ex-
amples of groups whose ideologies became irrelevant. She also includes in this category groups
that were supported by the Soviet Union and thus became historically irrelevant after its collapse.
See ibid., pp. 105–106.
50. For a discussion of how insurgent groups’ survival depends on local supporters providing the
means to acquire and hide resources, see Jeremy M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insur-
gent Rebellion (Cambridge: la presse de l'Universite de Cambridge, 2007); and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Re-
sources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment,” Journal of Conºict Resolution, Vol. 49,
Non. 4 (Août 2005), pp. 598–624.
51. See John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, “Social Movement Organizations,” in Jeff Goodwin
and James M. Jasper, éd., The Social Movements Reader: Cases and Concepts (Chichester, U.K.: Wiley-

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International Security 38:4 18

havior to “sustain their activities and (peut-être) motivate people to contribute
to their cause.”52 Groups with high levels of community support should be
able to obtain more resources than those with less support. Mayer Zald and
Roberta Ash posit that the environment of a social movement organization is
composed of two elements: (1) the broader social movement, including the
people who identify with it, et (2) the society in which the social movement
operates. This constituent base determines the “ebb and ºow of sentiments to-
ward an organization” and is crucial for organizational success.53 And because
its constituents control the size of a group’s resource pool, the group with
more community support should have a larger constituent base and thus
larger resource ºows.54Finally, political process theory, which attributes the
success of social movements to political opportunity, further highlights the im-
portance of public support to insurgencies. Noting that “indigenous structures
frequently provide the organizational base out of which social movements
emerge,” Doug McAdam identiªes four resources that are critical for insurgent
group activity: members, solidary incentives, communication networks, et
leaders. These resources facilitate political action and ensure group survival,
particularly in response to repression against the insurgent community.55

evaluating popular support for terrorist organizations. Terrorist
groups that provide social services to their local communities may experience
increased public support, and thus a boost to their public image. Hamas’s pro-
vision of social services to Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip and West
Bank is a useful example.56 In creating local networks that have provided
critical educational, social programs, and religious services, Hamas has estab-
lished a well-organized, highly functioning infrastructure, allowing it to ob-
tain resources for its political activities and to facilitate continued support.57

Puits noir, 2009), pp. 193–210. Neil J. Smelser also questions the usefulness of the deprivation
model in accounting for the occurrence of terrorist movements. See Smelser, The Faces of Terrorism:
Social and Psychological Dimensions (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007).
52. Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991 (Cambridge:
la presse de l'Universite de Cambridge, 2001), p. 57.
53. Mayer N. Zald and Roberta Ash, “Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay, et
Changement,” Social Forces, Vol. 44, Non. 3 (Mars 1966), pp. 327–341.
54. Zald and Ash argue that older organizations are more likely to have stable structures, increas-
ing their ability to reach isolated adherents and thus potential constituents. Larger groups are also
better able to reach isolated adherents and should thus have larger bases of support, enabling ac-
cess to more resources. See ibid.
55. Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 46.
56. Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perlinger, “The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks: A Social Net-
work Perspective,” Social Forces, Vol. 84, Non. 4 (Juin 2006), pp. 1987–2008; and Ziad Abu-Amr,
“Hamas: A Historical and Political Background,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 22, Non. 4 (Sum-
mer 1993), p. 15.
57. Shaul Mishal, “The Pragmatic Dimension of the Palestinian Hamas: A Network Perspective,»

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Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark 19

Organizations that provide social services are not only more resilient but also
more effective.58

Deuxième, a society’s tolerance for violence can serve as an indicator of popu-
lar support. Heavy-handed counterterrorism tactics can increase public sup-
port for the terrorists’ cause. Bloom argues that the manner in which a state
responds to terrorism will have an effect on whether suicide bombers can win
the “hearts and minds” of the larger population.59 More generally, she argues
that “some of the more heavy-handed counterterrorism tactics of certain states,
such as preemptive attacks on the supporters of terrorism, are likely to backªre
and mobilize greater support for terror.”60

Troisième, public opinion surveys are also useful in evaluating changes in sup-
port for terrorist organizations. Admittedly, there are obvious limitations to
the use of public opinion data in this regard. In the case of al-Qaida, for exam-
ple, there is a shortage of data in many of the countries in which the organiza-
tion operates. A further problem is that most surveys do not collect data over
temps, making it difªcult to identify how attitudes and support for al-Qaida and
militancy may change. En outre, respondents may not feel comfortable or
safe expressing their true feelings toward al-Qaida and militancy, in general.
Toujours, trying to assess public opinion support for militancy can be useful, given
its contribution to organizational resilience.

Some types of organizations generate more popular support than others. Dans-
deed, organizational type can be a proxy for communal support. I argue that
separatist and religious groups should have more support than ideological
groups because it is easier for them to reproduce the doctrines on which their
organizations are based.61 In comparison, the doctrines of ideological organi-
zations usually depend on a set of beliefs exclusive to those groups, their
leader, or a particular time period. Par exemple, the Shining Path adhered to
an interpretation of revolution grounded in Guzmán’s extremely violent
and uncompromising interpretation of Maoist beliefs.62 Other organizations
tend to represent a minority view of the communities from which they
emerged. These views are more often found on the fringe, making the role of

Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 29, Non. 4 (Été 2003), pp. 569–589; and Sara Roy, “Hamas and the
Transformation(s) of Political Islam in Palestine,” Current History, Janvier 2003, pp. 13–20.
58. Eli Berman and David D. Laitin, “Religion, Terrorism, and Public Goods: Testing the Club
Model,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 92, Nos. 10–11 (Octobre 2008), pp. 1942–1967.
59. Bloom, Dying to Kill.
60. Mia Bloom, “Dying to Kill: Motivations for Suicide Terrorism,” in Ami Pedahzur, éd., Root
Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 49.
61. The category “ideological organizations” includes both left-wing and right-wing groups. Pour
further discussion of how I classify organizations, see Jordan, “When Heads Roll.”
62. James Ron, “Ideology in Context: Explaining Sendero Luminoso’s Tactical Escalation," Revue
of Peace Research, Vol. 38, Non. 5 (Septembre 2001), pp. 569–572.

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International Security 38:4 20

individual leaders all the more necessary to promote the values and beliefs of
the groups.

Although the tactics of terrorist groups can be more radical than what many
communities would like, their beliefs often enjoy common support. Terrorist
groups acting on behalf of separatist movements represent the desire of those
communities to acquire some degree of autonomy or independence. Their ide-
ology reºects the overall orientation of the communities from which those
groups emerged and operate. As with religious organizations, this embedded-
ness provides separatist groups with a great deal of local support, making
them more likely to be seen as legitimate in the communities within which
they operate.63 Targeting policies can further increase local support for a ter-
rorist organization, resulting in counterproductive consequences. The follow-
ing section examines the interaction between bureaucracy and communal
support as it pertains to organizational resilience and the possibility of retalia-
tory responses.

interaction between bureaucracy and communal support

Bureaucracy and communal support interact in multiple ways. Variation in or-
ganizational responses to decapitation is a function of variation in levels of
bureaucracy and communal support. Terrorist organizations with high levels
of both bureaucracy and communal support should be able to survive attacks
on their leadership and carry out retaliatory attacks in response to decapitation
(see ªgure 1, quadrant I).64 Leaders matter less in these cases, and it is easier
for an organization to regroup and rebuild after having undergone such at-
tacks. Organizations in quadrant II (high bureaucracy and low communal sup-
port) should also be able to survive attacks on their leadership, as should
organizations in quadrant III (low bureaucracy and high communal support).
There is an important difference between the two types of organizations, comment-
jamais. Organizations in quadrant II should ªnd it easier to regroup and rebuild
after experiencing a destabilizing leadership attack, whereas those in quad-
rant III should still survive, but are likely to have a harder time regrouping.
Enfin, if organizations have low levels of both bureaucracy and communal
support (quadrant IV), they are likely to succumb to attacks on their leadership.
Bureaucracies require a supply of individuals who, after displaying organi-
zational commitment and competence, can move up the organizational ranks.
Volunteers and recruits often do not enter the organization with demonstrated

63. There are cases in which the opposite is true. je discute, cependant, that this trend should be
predominant.
64. This quadrant should also contain the fewest outliers.

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Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark 21

Chiffre 1. Organizational Resilience to Leadership Decapitation

competence. Those who display more commitment, passion, and expertise are
able to climb the ranks. Terrorist organizations also fundamentally depend on
the ability to recruit new members to ªll positions occupied by militants who
may have been captured or killed. A group with more communal support will
be able to attract the recruits necessary for a group to regenerate. The next sec-
tion examines data on leadership targeting.

empirical ªndings on leadership decapitation

To evaluate the effectiveness of leadership decapitation and identify the condi-
tions under which decapitation is more or less likely to result in organizational
decline, I created a dataset of 298 instances in which terrorist leaders from
92 terrorist organizations were arrested or killed from 1945 à 2004.65 I also ex-
amined 169 terrorist organizations to determine the rate of decline for groups
that had experienced leadership targeting compared to those that had not, et
found that decapitation does not increase the likelihood of organizational
collapse. Somewhat counterintuitively, organizations that have not experi-
enced decapitation are more likely to cease activity than those that have.
Whereas 53 percent of decapitated terrorist groups fell apart, 70 percent of
groups that did not experience decapitation are no longer active. The rate
of decline is almost 20 percent lower for decapitated organizations.

The data from this earlier study support the predictions that emerge from
the theory of organizational resilience. The rate of organizational decline is
lower for larger, older, religious, and separatist organizations. The data indi-
cate that larger, older, and religious organizations are highly resilient to leader-

65. Jordan, “When Heads Roll.”

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International Security 38:4 22

ship targeting. These group-level variables provide a way to evaluate the
theoretical variables examined in this article. A group’s age and size can act as
proxies for bureaucracy, while a group’s type can act as a proxy for communal
support. Data from previous empirical results thus support the claim that the
most resilient groups should be the most likely to be bureaucratized and have
local support. Donc, how do these data apply to the case of al-Qaida?

Al-Qaida: Why Decapitation Is Unlikely to Succeed

Since 2001 al-Qaida has undergone a sustained campaign of leadership at-
tacks. (When referring to al-Qaida in this article, I mean the larger umbrella or-
ganization that encompasses al-Qaida’s core and afªliated organizations. À
times, I look at speciªc afªliated organizations and indicate when this is done.)
Experts disagree over the degree to which these leadership attacks have dam-
aged the organization and even how to evaluate al-Qaida as an organization.
Al-Qaida is a complex organization, composed of a core based largely in
Pakistan, a periphery, and afªliated groups in Yemen, Somalia, the Islamic
Maghreb, Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Although different organizations,
al-Qaida core, al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI), al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP), and al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have been subjects of
U.S. counterterrorism policy. De plus, the ideology to which each group
adheres is largely consistent across the organization. Each group has goals
speciªc to its region, but the overall message of inspiring potential recruits
remains largely the same. Although decapitation may continue to produce
short-term effects on the operational capacity of al-Qaida, targeting its leaders
is unlikely to result in signiªcant organizational degradation.

the bureaucratic structure of al-qaida

Bruce Hoffman describes al-Qaida as exercising both top-down and bottom-up
planning and operational capabilities along four levels.66 First, al-Qaida’s core
leadership exerts “some coordination, if not command capability, in terms
of commissioning attacks, directing surveillance and collating reconnaissance,
planning operations, and approving their execution.”67 Members of the sec-
ond level, al-Qaida afªliates and associates, belong to insurgent or terrorist
groups and have received some form of assistance, either material or spiritual,

66. See Bruce Hoffman, “The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama Bin Laden Still Mat-
ters,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, Non. 3 (May/June 2008), pp. 133–138.
67. Bruce Hoffman, “Combating Al Qaeda and the Militant Islamic Threat,” written testimony
submitted to the U.S. House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional
Threats, and Capabilities (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, Février 16, 2006), p. 3.

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Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark 23

from al-Qaida. This level includes terrorist and insurgent groups in Bosnia,
Chechnya, Indonésie, Kashmir, the Philippines, and Uzbekistan. Occupying
the third level are al-Qaida locals who adhere to al-Qaida’s ideology, have
some experience with terrorism, and have some previous connection with
al-Qaida. Enfin, the al-Qaida network comprises homegrown Islamic radicals
and local converts to Islam who have no direct contact with al-Qaida but are
prepared to carry out attacks in support of its agenda.68 While al-Qaida the or-
ganization, which is headed by Ayman al-Zawahiri, has further decentralized
since Hoffman offered this description, it still has a functional leadership,
identiªable afªliates or franchises, local militants, and homegrown radicals.69

Despite its increasingly decentralized structure, al-Qaida retains elements of
a well-organized group with a central command.70 In testimony to the U.S.
House Armed Services Committee, Hoffman observed that “[un]l-Qaida re-
mains a hierarchical organization: capable of ordering, planning and imple-
menting bold terrorist strikes.”71 Most al-Qaida afªliates, such as AQAP,
AQI, and AQIM, have sworn bayat (loyalty) to al-Qaida’s leadership.72
Hoffman and Fernando Reinares argue that al-Qaida’s core has “shown itself
capable of adapting and adjusting to even the most consequential counter-
measures directed against it, having, despite all the odds, survived for nearly a
quarter of a century.”73

Highly bureaucratized terrorist organizations can face a trade-off between
maintaining security and exercising organizational control.74 Yet, Jacob Shapiro
uses documents from al-Qaida in Iraq’s successor organization, the Islamic

68. See ibid. For a debate about the intensity of the threat from homegrown terrorism, voir
Hoffman, “The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism”; and Bruce Hoffman and Marc Sageman, “Does
Osama Still Call the Shots? Debating the Containment of Al Qaeda’s Leadership,” Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 87, Non. 4 (July/August 2008), pp. 163–166.
69. See Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “The Future of Al-Qaeda: Results of a Foresight
Project” (Ottawa: Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2013). Thomas Joscelyn concurs with this
assessment of al-Qaida. See Joscelyn, testimony to the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, 113th Cong., 1st sess., Juillet 18, 2013
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Record).
70. Hoffman, “Combating Al Qaeda and the Militant Islamic Threat,” p. 3.
71. Bruce Hoffman, written testimony submitted to the U.S. House Armed Services Committee,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, 110th Cong., 1st sess., Fév-
ruary 14, 2007, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2007_hr/socom.pdf.
72. Joscelyn, testimony to the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terror-
ism, Nonproliferation.
73. Bruce Hoffman and Fernando Reinares, “Al-Qaeda’s Continued Core Strategy and Dis-
quieting Leader-Led Trajectory,” ARI 37/2013 (Madrid: Elcano Royal Institute, Septembre 10,
2013), p. 3.
74. Jacob N. Shapiro and David A. Siegel, “Moral Hazard, Discipline, and the Management of
Terrorist Organizations,” World Politics, Vol. 64, Non. 1 (Janvier 2009), pp. 39–78; Jacob N.
Shapiro, “Bureaucracy and Control
in Terrorist Organizations,” Princeton University, 2008;
and Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma.

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International Security 38:4 24

State of Iraq, to show that the organization has exhibited a “non-trivial” level
of bureaucracy despite risks to its security.75 An examination of primary docu-
ments captured during U.S. counterterrorism efforts against al-Qaida and its
afªliates since the invasion of Iraq in 2003 reveals a high level of bureaucratic
organization. These include documents from the Department of Defense’s
Harmony database that provide a sense of the inner workings of these organi-
zations.76 The “Harmony documents” reveal “how explicit al-Qaida has been
in its internal discussions covering a range of organizational issues, particu-
larly regarding the internal structure and functioning of the movement as well
as with tensions that emerged within the leadership.” James Forest, Jarret
Brachman, and Joseph Felter argue that the Harmony collection offers insight
into how al-Qaida developed “Western-styled bureaucratic structures.”77 The
documents also identify recruitment criteria, training programs for new re-
cruits, and tactics.

Al-Qaida’s bylaws clearly explain the group’s goals, principles, voting laws,
processes for airing grievances, the importance of reports, details on organiza-
tional structure, members’ duties, leadership responsibilities, ªnancial policies,
budgetary requirements, and policies for different committees (military, politi-
cal, and security).78 Employment contracts, which are signed under oath, lay
out membership duties, holidays, salaries, travel details, rewards, and punish-
ment.79 Al-Qaida has also kept membership rosters of martyred individuals.80
Documents retrieved by coalition forces in Sinjar during the Iraq War also
provide valuable information about AQI. Le 109 documents analyzed in a
report by West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center include signed contracts;
policy memos; press releases; and managerial reports on personnel, ªnances,
and equipment.81 Shapiro’s chapter in this report focuses on the managerial

75. Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma.
76. Harmony documents (originals and translations) are available through the Combating Terror-
ism Center website, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/programs-resources/harmony-program.
77. James J.F. Forest, Jarret Brachman, and Joseph H. Felter, “Harmony and Disharmony: Ex-
ploiting al-Qa’ida’s Oganization Vulnerabilities” (West Point, N.Y. Combating Terrorism Center at
West Point, 2006), p. 2. According to Shapiro, this level of bureaucratization not only lessens the ef-
fect of preference divergence, but can increase efªciency and signal legitimacy for local popula-
tion. See Shapiro and Siegel, “Moral Hazard, Discipline, and the Management of Terrorist
Organizations”; and Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma.
78. “Al-Qaida’s Structure and Bylaws (English Translation),” Harmony #AFGP-2002-600048 (West
Point, N.Y.: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, n.d.).
79. “Al Qaida Constitutional Charter (Original Language),” Harmony #AFGP-2002-600045 (West
Point, N.Y.: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, n.d.).
80. “List of Names of Al-Qaida Members (Original Language),” Harmony #AFGP-2002-600046
(West Point, N.Y.: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, n.d.).
81. Brian Fishman et al., “Bombers, Bank Accounts, and Bleedout: Al-Qa’ida’s Road in and out of
Iraq” (West Point, N.Y.: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2008).

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Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark 25

challenges facing terrorist organizations. He observes that leaders have to del-
egate duties, a process that can result in preference divergence between princi-
pals and agents and requires monitoring of the latter. Shapiro ªnds that
“[je]eaders typically exercise control over their agents through a standard set of
bureaucratic tools including policy memoranda, reporting requirements, et
tracking spreadsheets.”82 (This process by which leaders must monitor their
agents is consistent with this article’s understanding of bureaucracy.) Pierre
Bergen also ªnds that, like its parent organization, AQI is highly bureaucra-
tized. Noting, Par exemple, that AQI asked its non-Iraqi recruits to ªll out
applications asking for demographic information. AQI also kept detailed
information on battle plans, pay sheets, minutes of meetings, prisoners, ros-
ters, and vehicle records.83 Documents captured from AQI show an interest
in organizations similar to AQAM documents that recorded intelligence and
security information, operational activity, entraînement, personnel, recruiting tech-
niques, strategy, and political goals.

Al-Qaida core and many of its afªliates have thus adopted features of tra-
ditional bureaucracies. Its hierarchy, despite repeated leadership attacks,
remains surprisingly relevant. And recently, al-Qaida has beneªted from polit-
ical upheaval in places such as Libya and Syria, taking advantage of this
upheaval to reafªrm its relevance. Zawahiri, Par exemple, has made public
statements about the legitimacy of particular afªliated organizations and their
relationship to al-Qaida core. Al-Qaida continues to expand into new areas
through afªliated organizations being created in weak states such as Somalia,
Mali, and Kenya. It has also developed ties with local jihadist groups. Dans l'ensemble,
al-Qaida core’s hierarchy, though weakened, has adapted and withstood lead-
ership attacks. A key reason for this resilience is continued public support for
the organization and its objectives.

al-qaida and communal support

The resonance of al-Qaida’s beliefs within local communities has increased the
organization’s ability to withstand leadership targeting. Al-Qaida’s philoso-
phy transcends not only the charismatic bin Laden, but also his speciªc inter-
initially most Islamic
pretation of Islam. As Rohan Gunaratna observes,
struggles against non-Muslim governments were primarily engaged in territo-
rial campaigns. These guerrilla and terrorist groups did not subscribe to a

82. Jacob Shapiro, “Bureaucratic Terrorists: Al-Qa’ida in Iraq’s Management and Finances,” in
ibid., p. 75.
83. Peter Bergen, The Longest War: The Enduring Conºict between America and Al-Qaeda (New York:
Free Press, 2011), p. 169.

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International Security 38:4 26

“universalistic brand of Islam.”84 Bin Laden was an activist and an ideologue;
he developed and expanded the appeal of al-Qaida’s beliefs, including an anti-
Western and anti-Israel message, to attract a broad base of support.85 Pape
argues that much of al-Qaida’s appeal, cependant, is the result of the Western
occupation of Muslim lands.86 Moreover, the movement is multiethnic, further
broadening its appeal and contributing to the global and resilient nature of al-
Qaida’s beliefs, support, and infrastructure.

Al-Qaida’s propaganda operations have helped to extend its belief system to
many parts of the world. The use of the internet has improved communication
between al-Qaida core and its afªliates. As Marc Sageman writes, “[This devel-
opération] is potentially dangerous, especially in the context of [le] regrouping
de [le] al-Qaida leadership.”87 The appeal of al-Qaida’s beliefs, the growth of
decentralized networks, and the regrouping of al-Qaida’s leadership indicate
the futility of capturing or killing bin Laden and other leaders within the
organization. Opinion polls offer a glimpse into the role of public support for
al-Qaida and recognition of the kind of social services that it has provided to
local communities.

public opinion polls. Public opinion surveys have generally found that
although a signiªcant number of people support al-Qaida and the goals of
other militant groups, they object to their tactics.88 The data from these surveys
show that support for al-Qaida declined from 2010 à 2013 as the public con-
tinued to express fear of Islamic militancy. A study by World Public Opinion in
2009 found that people in majority-Muslim countries supported al-Qaida’s
goals. According to the report, “Views of al-Qaida are complex. Majorities
agree with nearly all of al-Qaida’s goals to change U.S. behavior in the Muslim
monde, to promote Islamist governance, and to preserve and afªrm Islamic
identity.”89 Sixty-six percent of respondents in eight countries stated that U.S.

84. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Columbia University
Presse, 2002), pp. 71–72.
85. Ibid..
86. See Robert A. Pape and James K. Feldman, Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Ter-
rorism and How to Stop It (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010); and Pape, Dying to Win.
87. Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-ªrst Century (Philadelphia: Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), p. 130.
88. For a discussion of support for militant causes, see Bloom, Dying to Kill. Robert Pape and Ken-
neth Feldman analyze surveys by Shibley Tehami and ªnd little support for al-Qaida’s tactics and
mixed support for its goals. Pape and Feldman claim that despite the lack of support for reestab-
lishing an Islamic caliphate, there is support for al-Qaida’s opposition to U.S. military policy. Ils
ªnd pockets of sympathy for al-Qaida in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco, which the authors at-
tribute to al-Qaida’s strategic targeting of the United States. See Pape and Feldman, Cutting the
Fuse, p. 180.
89. Steven Kull et al., “Public Opinion in the Islamic World on Terrorism, al Qaeda, and U.S. Pol-
icies,” WorldPublicOpinion.org, Février 25, 2009, p. 3.

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Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark 27

naval forces in the Persian Gulf were a bad idea. A majority of respondents in
Egypt, the Palestinian territories, and Jordan approved of attacks on U.S.
troops based in Muslim countries. Another survey carried out by World Public
Opinion in 2009 in Azerbaijan, Indonésie, Jordan, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Pales-
tinian territories, and Turkey found similar results.90 Negative views toward
al-Qaida stem largely from public discomfort over attacking civilians. The sur-
veys indicate that the majority of respondents renounce the use of attacks on
civilians to achieve political objectives.

Recent surveys carried out by the PEW Center’s Global Attitudes Project
found that across eleven different Muslim populations, 67 percent of respon-
dents expressed concern about Islamic extremism. In surveys conducted in
Indonésie, Jordan, Pakistan, Tunisia, and Turkey, Muslim respondents felt that
extremism has increased. En même temps, extremist groups such as al-Qaida
have seen a decline in popular support. A poll carried out by the PEW Center’s
Global Attitudes Project in March and April 2012 found that majorities in
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Turkey expressed unfavorable views of
al-Qaida.91 Although these trends might suggest that al-Qaida may become
more susceptible to decapitation, this is unlikely for two reasons. D'abord, it still
beneªts from large pockets of support; presque 35 percent of the population in
the Palestinian territories, Indonésie, and Egypt still support it.92 Second, it is
al-Qaida’s afªliates, some of which are enjoying increasing levels of support,
that are the predominate targets.

After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the leadership of al-Qaida
and the Taliban moved across the border from Afghanistan to Pakistan.93 By
2009, al-Qaida controlled all seven agencies of the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas, extending its reach into the North-West Frontier Province, al-
most as far as Peshawar.94 Given the importance of Pakistan to al-Qaida’s
current operational capacity, it is useful to examine Pakistani attitudes toward
al-Qaida and jihad, in general. To evaluate support for militancy in Pakistan,
Christine Fair, Neil Malhotra, and Jacob Shapiro surveyed 6,000 Pakistanis in
Avril 2009. Their study, which they designed to analyze “beliefs about Islam,
Sharia, the legitimacy and efªcacy of jihad, and attitudes towards speciªc mili-

90. Steven Kull et al., “Public Opinion in the Islamic World on Terrorism, al Qaeda, and U.S.
Policies.”
91. Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Project, “On Anniversary of bin Laden’s Death, Little
Backing of al Qaeda,” April 30, 2012, http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/04/30/on-anniversary-of-
bin-ladens-death-little-backing-of-al-qaeda/.
92. Seth G. Jones, “Think Again: Al Qaeda,” Foreign Policy, Avril 23, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy
.com/articles/2012/04/23/think_again_al_qaeda.
93. Bergen, The Longest War, p. 248.
94. Ibid., pp. 255–256. The North-West Frontier Province is now known as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

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International Security 38:4 28

tant organizations,” found signiªcant support for jihad, especially when car-
ried out by nonstate actors.95 Citing “al-Qaida’s vigorous marketing efforts to
depict its activities as seeking justice for the world’s Muslims,» 47 percent of
their interviewees believed that al-Qaida was ªghting for justice. Although
this ªgure is smaller than the percentage of those who believed that other
groups were ªghting for justice, according to Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro, it is
still a substantial minority. De plus, 37 percent of respondents believed that
al-Qaida stood for democracy, et 47 percent felt that al-Qaida was protecting
Muslims.96 Among its conclusions, the survey found that “jihad has a consid-
erable legitimacy among Pakistanis.”97

In an earlier survey of urban Pakistanis, Shapiro and Fair looked at support
for militant organizations.98 They found that “urban Pakistanis support small
militant organizations when two conditions hold: (1) those organizations are
using violence in support of political goals the individual cares about; et
(2) violence makes sense as a way to achieve those goals, given the respon-
dent’s understanding of the strategic environment.”99 Taken together, this sur-
vey and the study referenced in the paragraph above suggest some Pakistani
support for militancy.

Polls conducted by the Arab Barometer in Yemen, a country in which al-
Qaida has succeeded in holding signiªcant amounts of territory, indicate consid-
erable support for terrorist attacks carried out against American targets. For ex-
ample, when asked if U.S. involvement in the region justiªes attacks against
Americans anywhere in the world, 73.4 percent of respondents answered yes.100
social services. Some organizations, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, have
institutionalized their provision of social services. In contrast, al-Qaida has

95. C. Christine Fair, Neil Malhotra, and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Islam, Militancy, and Politics in Paki-
stan: Insights from a National Sample,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 22, Non. 4 (Septembre
2010), pp. 495–521. For other studies that examine support for militancy in Pakistan, see C. Chris-
tine Fair, “Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al Qaeda and Other Organizations,»
Studies in Conºict and Terrorism, Vol. 27, Non. 6 (November/December 2004), pp. 489–504; and Jacob
N. Shapiro and C. Christine Fair, “Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan,” In-
ternational Security, Vol. 34, Non. 3 (Hiver 2009/10), pp. 179–218.
96. Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro, “Islam, Militancy, and Politics in Pakistan,” p. 511.
97. Ibid..
98. See Shapiro and Fair, “Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan.” The con-
ventional wisdom holds that poverty and Islamic religiosity are powerful predictors of militancy.
This view has animated current policy toward Pakistan and other areas in which militancy occurs.
99. Shapiro and Fair, “Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan,” p. 83.
100. Mark Tessler et al., “Arab-Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Morocco,
Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Yemen, 2006–2007” (Ann-Arbor, Mich.: Interuniversity Consor-
tium for Political and Social Research, 2012). It is important to note that it is difªcult to ªnd reliable
survey data in many of the areas that al-Qaida is most active and where the United States is target-
ing militants.

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Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark 29

provided social services only in areas where the government’s ability to reach
local residents is limited.

Providing social services increases not only a terrorist organization’s base of
support, but also its ability to raise funds—facts that al-Qaida has learned from
the success of social welfare programs implemented by terrorist groups such
as Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan, Hamas, and Hezbollah.101 To support this
ªnding, Juan Zarate and David Gordon point to bin Laden’s statement issued
after the 2010 ºoods in Pakistan in which bin Laden “focused heavily on the
need to ensure relief for the Pakistani people and called for the provision of aid
and the creation of ‘a capable relief task force.’”102

Since 2010 al-Qaida has become more communally active in Somalia and
Yemen, both weak states with largely tribal societies in which the government
has been unable to provide adequate services. Al-Qaida has begun to ªll this
gap by building schools and providing a variety of social services.103 Seth
Jones observes that, in Yemen, al-Qaida “has exploited a government leader-
ship crisis and multiple insurgencies to cement control in several provinces
along the Gulf of Aden.”104 He continues, “Al-Qaida’s afªliates in Somalia
and Iraq also appear to be maintaining a foothold where there are weak
governments, with al-Shabab in Kismayo and southern parts of Somalia, et
al-Qaida in Iraq in Baghdad, Diylal and Salah and Din provinces, among oth-
ers.”105 This combination of territorial control and provision of services is
likely to increase popular support for al-Qaida, making the organization
harder to weaken, particularly through the targeting campaign currently being
employed in Yemen.

Empirical Evidence on Targeting al-Qaida

The theory of organizational resilience presented in this article posits that lead-
ership targeting is unlikely to diminish al-Qaida’s long-term operational ca-
pacity to engage in terrorist activity. Al-Qaida’s behavior ªts the pattern of a
group against which decapitation will be ineffective. Formed in 1988, al-Qaida
has been in existence for more than twenty-ªve years, a point at which terror-
ist groups become very stable. As a religious organization, its goals include es-

101. Juan C. Zarate and David A. Gordon, “The Battle for Reform with Al-Qaeda,” Washington
Trimestriel, Vol. 34, Non. 3 (Été 2011), pp. 103–122.
102. Ibid..
103. Scott Baldauf, “Is Al Qaeda in Yemen Connected to Al Qaeda in Somalia?” Christian Science
Monitor, Janvier 7, 2012.
104. Jones, “Think Again.”
105. Ibid..

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International Security 38:4 30

tablishing a pan-Islamic caliphate, overthrowing non-Islamic regimes, et
expelling inªdels from Muslim countries.106 Considerable disagreement ex-
ists over the size of the organization. Par exemple, looking at the number of
al-Qaida ªghters, Bergen argues that in 2009 the core comprised 100 à
150 members in Afghanistan; the heart of the network (which is now in
Pakistan) contained a few hundred “free agent” foreign ªghters; and the ªnal
layer was composed of several thousand militant Pashtun tribal members.107
Excluding the Pashtun tribal members, al-Qaida still has at least 400 active
members. Director of Central Intelligence Leon Panetta estimated that al-
Qaida in Afghanistan consisted of 50 à 100 militants, but that “the main loca-
tion of al-Qaeda is in the tribal areas of Pakistan.”108 The rate of collapse for
decapitated groups with between 100 et 500 members is nearly 35 pour cent
lower than for groups with 25 à 100 members. Even using a conservative esti-
mate, destabilizing al-Qaida will be difªcult. If one takes its afªliates into
consideration, the organization is likely to be even more resilient.

Decapitation has not led to al-Qaida’s demise, nor has it resulted in long-
term organizational degradation. The remainder of this section evaluates
changes in the frequency and lethality of its attacks. As mentioned earlier, un
of the key challenges when discussing the operational capacity of al-Qaida is
deciding whether to evaluate the organization as a whole or to disaggregate
the analysis by evaluating al-Qaida core and its afªliated organizations sepa-
rately. Here I assess al-Qaida as a whole unless otherwise speciªed. U.S.
counterterrorism policy has increased its efforts in Yemen, Somalia, et
Pakistan, indicating that the afªliated organizations are seen as posing serious
national security threats. Depuis 2001 à 2011, al-Qaida as a whole under-
went 109 attacks on its leadership, weakening the operational capacity of its
core.109 Some of its afªliated organizations, cependant, including AQAP, AQI,
and AQIM continue to launch frequent, highly lethal attacks. Many scholars
see AQAP as a signiªcant and immediate threat, and the data here are consis-
tent with that view. In Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra has become an effective force in
ªghting Bashar al-Assad’s regime. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria contin-

106. Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, p. 182.
107. See Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, “The Almanac of Al Qaeda,” Foreign Policy,
Avril 29, 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/26/the_almanac_of_al_qaeda.
108. See Evan Harris, “CIA: At Most, 50–100 Al Qaeda in Afghanistan,” Political Punch blog, ABC
News, Juin 27, 2010, http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2010/06/cia-at-most-50100-al-
qaeda-in-afghanistan.html. These discrepancies among estimates of al-Qaida’s size occur because
scholars often measure different aspects of the organization: al-Qaida core, its network of decen-
tralized ªghters, or its afªliates. See Pape and Feldman, Cutting the Fuse, pp. 178–180.
109. All data on the lethality and frequency of al-Qaida attacks are from the Global Terrorism
Database at the University of Maryland. See http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

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Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark 31

Chiffre 2.

Instances of Decapitation against al-Qaida, 2001–11

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SOURCE: Data taken from Jenna Jordan dataset on leadership targeting.

ues to operate and has, in fact, increased the frequency of its attacks against
Shiite targets since the U.S. withdrawal.

Chiffre 2 plots instances of leadership decapitation against al-Qaida from
2001 à 2011. Chiffre 3 plots the number of attacks carried out by al-Qaida
depuis 2001 à 2011.110 I use the Global Terrorism Database to identify the num-
ber and lethality of al-Qaida attacks. The data show that despite a sizable
decline in 2006 and a smaller dip in 2009, the number of attacks carried out by
al-Qaida rose steadily after the September 11 attacks with the beginning of
the United States’ sustained targeting campaign. Dans 2010 the number of at-
tacks against al-Qaida’s leadership reached its peak, as did the number of
attacks perpetrated by al-Qaida in 2011. Ainsi, despite having experienced the
most intense period of targeting in 2010, the organization not only managed to
recover, but was able to execute more attacks. Essentially, al-Qaida did not suf-
fer a period of degradation.

Chiffre 4 and table 1 display the total number of attacks by all al-Qaida
afªliates from 2001 à 2011. During this period, AQAP experienced a dramatic
rise in attacks despite major U.S. targeting efforts carried out against al-Qaida

110. These numbers reºect reported incidents. Given that many of the early targeting efforts oc-
curred covertly, the actual numbers could plausibly be higher.

International Security 38:4 32

Chiffre 3. Al-Qaida Attacks, 2001–11

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SOURCE: Data taken from the Global Terrorism Database, “National Consortium for the Study

of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2013.»

operatives in Yemen. AQIM witnessed a decrease in activity every year follow-
ing its peak in 2007. AQI, which carried out 60 attacks in 2005, saw a decline
in activity in 2009, which in part could be a result of the U.S. surge in 2007. Le
number of AQI attacks, cependant, increased after the 2009 decline. Dans l'ensemble,
the data indicate that al-Qaida afªliates proved remarkably resilient despite
continued U.S. targeting operations.

Enfin, ªgure 5 shows the lethality of attacks by al-Qaida and afªliates
depuis 2001 à 2011. The highest number of deaths occurred in 2001, avec le
Septembre 11 attacks.111 Al-Qaida core carried out only one small attack in
2011, but its afªliates launched numerous lethal attacks, despite ongoing tar-
geting campaigns against both their leaderships and lower-level operatives.
Al-Qaida afªliates were responsible for the deaths of nearly 700 individuals in
2011 alone.

The ªgures above do not indicate signiªcant degradation of organizational
capacity or a marked disruption in al-Qaida’s activities. Toujours, the United
States will likely continue its targeting operations, with a particular focus

111. I deleted this year from the graph to display more variation from year to year.

Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark 33

Chiffre 4. Al-Qaida Afªliates Number of Attacks per Year, 2001–11

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of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2013.»

Tableau 1. Al-Qaida Afªliates—Number of Attacks, 2001–11

Groupe

Al-Qaida
Al-Qaida in Iraq
Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula
Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb

SOURCE: Data taken from the Global Terrorism Database.

Number of Attacks

52
200
143
184

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on leaders who possess operational roles. Par exemple, al-Qaida’s Atiyah Abd
al-Rahman, who was killed by a drone strike in Pakistan in August 2011, com-
municated important information between the core in Pakistan and other al-
Qaida afªliates. At the time of his death, it was argued that he would be very
hard to replace. Nevertheless, he was replaced by Abu Yahya al-Libi, who was
later killed by a drone strike in Pakistan in June 2012. Organizations may have
difªculty regrouping after successful targeting efforts, yet ultimately their
leaders will be replaced. There is a vast supply of new recruits who can be

International Security 38:4 34

Chiffre 5. Lethality of al-Qaida Attacks, 2002–11

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SOURCE: Data taken from the Global Terrorism Database, “National Consortium for the Study

of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2013.»

trained to ªll their spots, and organizations with bureaucratic institutions
should have an easier time with this succession process.

Despite its operational weakness, al-Qaida’s core remains active. It contin-
ues to provide leadership directives to the larger movement. Par exemple, dans
Novembre 2013 and again in February 2014, Ayman al-Zawahiri stated that
the Islamic State of Syria was formed to operate in Syria without permission
from the organization’s main command, that it should cease operations, et
that Jabhat al-Nusra should remain an afªliated branch of al-Qaida.112 Michael
Vickers, who has served as the Pentagon’s undersecretary for defense intelli-
gence since 2011, argues that even a severely weakened al-Qaida core would
probably remain a propaganda arm.113 Propaganda has been critical to inspir-
ing new recruits and is important in maintaining al-Qaida core’s ties to its afªl-
iates.114 And as Megan Smith and James Igoe Walsh argue, despite having

112. Ben Hubbard, “The Franchising of al Qaeda,” New York Times, Janvier 25, 2014.
113. Vickers, however still advocates targeting as a key counterterrorism policy. See Michael
Vickers, quoted in Adam Levine, “Al Qaeda Leader Killed in Pakistan,” September 15, 2011, http://
security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/15/another-al-qaeda-leader-killed-in-pakistan/?hpt=hp_t2.
114. Using generation and dissemination of propaganda as a measure of al-Qaida’s ability to un-

Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark 35

undergone numerous drone strikes, al-Qaida has been able to continue gener-
ating propaganda for its cause.115

Policy Implications

Leadership targeting has become a cornerstone of U.S. counterterrorism policy.
Although targeting leaders can be effective in some cases, it is unlikely to re-
sult in the collapse of terrorist organizations generally being targeted today.
Even if organizations are weakened after the killing or arrest of their leaders,
they tend to survive, regroup, and continue carrying out attacks. The ªndings
of this study have four implications for U.S counterterrorism policy.

D'abord, decapitation can have counterproductive or adverse consequences,
particularly if the leader plays a key inspirational or spiritual role.116 In the af-
termath of the targeting of its leader, an organization may be motivated to re-
taliate. Terrorist organizations will often identify such targeting as the motive
for their subsequent attacks. Revenge can be a powerful motivator: not only
does killing a terrorist leader inspire the desire for retaliation on the part of an
organization, but it can also increase sympathy and support for the organiza-
tion from local and international communities.117 Civilian deaths can intensify
this motive. Hamas, Par exemple, has engaged in numerous acts of retaliation
in response to the killing of some of its key leaders. After the assassination of
Yahya Ayyash, Hamas’s chief bomb maker, the group carried out four retalia-
tory bus bombings, which killed more than ªfty people.118 The assassinations
of Hamas leaders Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi triggered
massive local and international outrage. Yassin’s death was condemned by the
international community and unleashed a huge amount of sympathy through-
out Palestinian society.119 Rantisi’s death spurred less international condemna-
tion than Yassin’s, but it was a more serious loss for the organization. Rantisi
was a skilled organizer with popular support. Clairement, bin Laden’s death did

dertake political action and violence, Megan Smith and James Igoe argue that drone strikes have
not degraded al-Qaida. See Smith and Walsh, “Do Drone Strikes Degrade Al Qaeda? Evidence
from Propaganda Output,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 25, Non. 2 (Février 2013), pp. 311–
327.
115. See Smith and Walsh, “Do Drone Strikes Degrade Al Qaeda?»
116. Michael Freeman examines the difference in the effectiveness of targeting leaders with inspi-
rational versus operational functions. See Freeman, “The Headless Horseman.”
117. Stephen R. David, Par exemple, claims that targeted killings have an important revenge func-
tion for Israelis. See David, “Fatal Choices: Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killing,” Mideast Security
and Policy Studies No. 51(Ramat Gan, Israel: Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan
University, 2002).
118. Hamas claims that the attacks were carried out in retaliation for Ayyash’s killing. See Avery
Plaw, Targeting Terrorists (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2008), p. 167.
119. Khaled Hroub, “Hamas after Shaykh Yasin and Rantisti,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 33,
Non. 4 (Été 2004 ), p. 21.

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International Security 38:4 36

not result in international condemnation or outrage, yet it is important to con-
sider how sympathy and revenge can further motivate a terrorist organization.
Deuxième, heavy-handed counterterrorism polices can generate organizational
support. Policies that are seen as unreasonably severe can result in outrage to-
ward the government employing them. Atran argues that coercive tactics do
not dampen popular support for jihadist movements.120 The manner in which
a state responds to terrorism can affect militant sentiments, the local popula-
tion, and the international community.121 In response to the September 11 à-
tacks, the United States launched ground invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq,
both of which generated much sympathy for the militants and ªerce condem-
nation of the U.S. decision to invade Iraq.

Troisième, drone strikes have had a signiªcant impact on public opinion, pas
only in Pakistan and Yemen (the most frequent targets of these attacks), mais
also internationally.122 Although drone strikes have been in decline since 2012,
they are still one of the primary ways to target terrorist leaders. These strikes
can result in civilian casualties, which can generate sympathy for the groups
being targeted.123 The New America Foundation estimates that, dans 351 grèves,
entre 261 et 305 civilians were killed out of a total of 1,965 à 3,295 dead.

120. Atran, “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism.”
121. Bloom, Dying to Kill.
122. There is a considerable debate regarding the effectiveness of drone strikes, how many civilian
deaths they cause, and the extent to which they inºuence public opinion. See Patrick B. Johnston
and Anoop Sarbahi, “The Impact of U.S. Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan” (Cambridge,
Mass.: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School of Govern-
ment, 2011); David Kilcullen and Andrew McDonald Exum, “Death from Above, Outrage Down
Below,” New York Times, May 16, 2009; Smith and Walsh, “Do Drone Strikes Degrade Al Qaeda?»;
Walsh and Schmitt, “Drone Strike Killed No. 2 in Al Qaeda, U.S. Ofªcials Say”; International Hu-
man Rights and Conºict Resolution Clinic of Stanford Law School and Global Justice Clinic at
New York University School of Law, “Living under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians
from U.S. Drone Practices in Pakistan,» 2012, http://www.livingunderdrones.org; and Interna-
tional Crisis Group, “Drones: Myth and Reality in Pakistan,” Asia Report No. 247 (Brussels: Inter-
national Crisis Group, 2013).
123. Encore, there is considerable disagreement over the number of civilians or noncombatants
who have been killed during drone strikes. Par exemple, the International Crisis Group’s report on
drone strikes claims, “Both the international and Pakistani media often rely on ªgures provided by
unnamed sources in the U.S government and/or Pakistani military, each with a vested interest in
sous- or over-reporting civilian causalities.” See International Crisis Group, “Drones,” p. 25.
Pakistani journalists can also be coerced or threatened by members of Pakistan’s Inter-Services In-
telligence directorate and militants. C. Christine Fair has argued that the number of civilian casual-
ties in drone strikes has been overreported. See Fair, “Drone Wars,” Foreign Policy, May 28, 2010;
and Fair, “For Now, Drones Are the Best Option,” New York Times, Janvier 29, 2013. There is also
disagreement over what constitutes a civilian or a combatant. The Pakistani military, Par exemple,
considers civilians who harbor Taliban militants to be militants themselves. It also considers civil-
ians who have not ºed a conºict zone ahead of a military operation to be militant sympathizers
and thus targets. The U.S. government argues that all military-age men killed in a strike zone are
militants, unless proven otherwise. Despite considerable differences among existing drone strikes
databases, all show a decline in the number of civilian deaths since 2011. Two more recent studies
look at speciªc drone strikes to address some of the legal issues regarding civilian casualties. Voir
Amnesty International, “‘Will I Be Next?’ U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan” (Londres: Amnesty Inter-

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Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark 37

The Bureau of Investigative Journalism estimates that, dans 366 grèves, entre
411 et 884 civilians were killed out of a total of 2,537 à 3,581.124 A study by
Stanford and New York University argues that drone strikes have resulted in
considerable civilian death, and as such are not supported by local civilians.125
As noted earlier, civilian deaths can increase local support for the targeted
organization, fuel recruitment, and lessen support for counterterrorism poli-
cies.126 It should be noted, cependant, that it is hard to obtain reliable public
opinion in Federally Administrated Tribal Areas. De plus, some locals have
hidden their opposition to drone strikes to avoid being seen as pro-Taliban. Comme
a result, the level of public opposition to drones could be much higher than re-
ported. Although it is unlikely that the use of such strikes will subside, criti-
cism of their legality, efªcacy, and consequences will remain prominent within
public discourse.127

Fourth, future leaders may be more radical in their beliefs or more violent
in their tactics. Leadership succession among Chechen militants and the
Provisional Irish Republican Army demonstrates that more radical or violent
leaders can emerge in the power vacuum left by a leader’s death or arrest, po-
tentially increasing both the frequency and lethality of future attacks.

In the case of al-Qaida, there is reason to believe that continued targeting
also has potential for counterproductive consequences. Decapitation efforts
against al-Qaida could instigate retaliatory attacks, fuel recruitment, or gener-
ate more sympathy for the movement, ultimately strengthening it. According to
Bergen, although al-Qaida does not pose a signiªcant threat to U.S. national
security, the group is likely to withstand the capture or death of key leaders.128
He has argued that, in the short term, bin Laden’s death would lead to anti-
American attacks around the globe and, in the medium term, would be a ma-
jor blow to the organization.129 Consistent with the ªndings of this study,

national, 2013); and Human Rights Watch, “‘Between a Drone and Al Qaeda’: The Civilian Cost of
U.S. Targeted Killings in Yemen” (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2013).
124. See International Crisis Group, “Drones,” p. 8. Kilcullen and Exum also express concern over
the number of civilians injured or killed during drone strikes. See Kilcullen and Exum, “Death
from Above, Outrage Down Below.”
125. International Human Rights and Conºict Resolution Clinic of Stanford Law School and
Global Justice Clinic at New York University School of Law, “Living under Drones.”
126. Although support may increase, there are questions about whether it affects the ability of a
group to recruit more members. The International Crisis Group’s report claims, cependant, que
drone strikes have minimal impact on recruitment. See International Crisis Group, “Drones.”
127. For research on issues related to the legality of drones strikes, see Mary Ellen O’Connell, “Se-
ductive Drones: Learning from a Decade of Lethal Operations,” Journal of Law, Information, and Sci-
ence, Vol. 21, Non. 2 (Août 2011), pp. 1–27; and Michael L. Gross, “Fighting by Other Means in the
Mideast: A Critical Analysis of Israel’s Assassination Policy,” Political Studies, Vol. 51, Non. 2 (Juin
2003), pp. 350–368.
128. See ibid.; and Bergen, “Should We Still Fear Al Qaeda?” CNN Opinion, Février 6, 2013,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/03/opinion/bergen-al-qaeda-deadly.
129. Bergen, The Longest War.

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International Security 38:4 38

Bergen has concluded that in the long term, bin Laden’s death would bolster
the power of his ideas, ultimately strengthening the organization. The resil-
ience of these ideas is grounded in the belief of al-Qaida’s members that they
are carrying out a holy mission.130

Conclusion

The targeting of terrorist leaders afªliated with al-Qaida has been the corner-
stone of U.S. counterterrorism policy since 2001. This article has developed
a theoretical explanation for when targeting is effective. Terrorist organizations
that possess characteristics such as bureaucratic forms of organization or sub-
stantial levels of communal support are more likely to survive attacks on their
leadership than those that do not.

Using size and age to serve as proxies for bureaucracy and organizational
type as a proxy for communal support, I found that older, larger, and religious
groups are more likely to resist destabilization in the face of leadership attacks
than are younger, smaller, ideological groups. Larger and older organiza-
tions tend to have more bureaucratic traits than smaller or younger groups,
and religious and separatist groups have higher levels of local support than
ideologically oriented organizations.

In the immediate aftermath of decapitation, a terrorist organization is often
temporarily weakened, affecting its operational capacity. During this period, it
will attempt to reorganize its leadership. From a counterterrorism perspective,
the key objective is to prevent the organization from regrouping and reengag-
ing in hostile activity. My examination of al-Qaida leads me to conclude that
targeting al-Qaida is not likely to result in organizational decline or long-term
degradation. Its bureaucratic organization and communal support have al-
lowed it to withstand frequent attacks on its leadership. Although it has been
weakened since the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent efforts to kill
or capture key leaders, it has adapted to a changing landscape. De plus, le
weakening of al-Qaida’s core in Pakistan has not meant the decline of its
afªliates and may embolden some of these groups to increase their level of
militancy to achieve greater legitimacy within the extremist community.

Regardless of the effectiveness and potential for adverse consequences of its
decapitation strategy, the United States is likely to continue targeting al-Qaida
leaders because U.S. policymakers view the killing of high-level targets, tel
as bin Laden, al-Libi, al-Rahman, Kashmiri, and Mauritania, as successes in
themselves. Finalement, cependant, leadership targeting alone is not enough to
effectively ªght a strong and emboldened terrorist organization.

130. Ibid., p. 547.

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