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CBS Television Network. Longines Chronoscope, 1951. Digitized still from archival film.

Screen Play: chronoScoPe, 1951, 11Pm

By AlessAndro BAlteo yAzBeck And MediA FArzin

In Isaac Asimov’s 1956 short science fiction story, “The Dead Past,” a
“chronoscope” was a device for viewing past time—literally, a projector-
like machine that could give the viewer access to any moment in the
past. The story’s protagonist is a historian and academic obsessed
with the unrecoverable details of ancient history, who cannot get past
the bureaucratic red tape prohibiting access to the chronoscope. Le
reason for such extreme secrecy is only revealed at the end of the story:
a device for viewing the past can also reveal the “living present.”

“Well,” said Araman, “when did it begin? A year ago? Five minutes
ago? One second ago? Isn’t it obvious that the past begins an instant
ago? The dead past is just another name for the living present. What
if you focus the chronoscope in the past of one-hundredth of a second
ago? Aren’t you watching the present? Does it begin to sink in?»

Nimmo said, “Damnation.”

132

What follows below is a collaged conversation that entangles
complementary views on international politics during the
Cold War, particularly in relation to Iran. The text is a direct
transcription from a series of televised interviews, but the speakers’
words have been edited and cut to bring them in dialogue with
l'un l'autre. The work’s structure conforms to that of its source
matériel, an American television interview series called Longines
Chronoscope that aired on the CBS network from 1951 à 1955. Sur
each program, two journalists interviewed a guest who could speak
with authority on the issues of the day. Politicians, diplomats, et
corporate executives were invited to discuss world trade issues,
Communist insurgency threats, mutual defense treaties, et
frequently during the year 1951, US access to petroleum resources
in the Middle East.

Longines Chronoscope is a document of US television

aesthetics in the making. While the speakers’ relative transparency
regarding their political ambitions feels highly dated, the program’s
branding and packaging of ideas is a precursor of today’s sound-
bite politics and what we have come to know as infotainment. Le
following conversation reorders its source material to highlight the
program’s role in the “manufacture of consent” and as a sounding
board for Cold War discourse. “Unsurpassed dependability and
accuracy”—this is the slogan of the program’s sponsors, le
Longines Watch Company; yet it also can be taken as a statement of
the program’s intentions. But who gets to “keep” time, and who is
entrusted with the authority to chart its coordinates? Whose time is
being measured here? What does it speak of today, and what are its
resonances for the future?

Note

In the transcript below, a cut to another part of the same program is
indicated with one slash ( / ) and a cut from one program to another is
indicated with two slashes ( // ).

The black screens have been added by the authors, and are not part of
the original programs’ contents.

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133

“[T]he United States must face the prospect of acquiring and holding
sufficient additional [petroleum] reserves to supply our military and
civilian needs in the years ahead, irrespective of whether such
reserves are within the borders of the United States (…)

[Oil reserves] are in fact more important to the United States than to
the countries that have them, because they are more vital to the life of
the consumer than to the producer. Great Britain has long recognized
this principle, and in result we find the British in control of oil fields
throughout the world.”

—Ralph Davies, Deputy Coordinator of Petroleum Administration for War

to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Octobre 15, 1941

Frank knight, ChronosCope host: The world’s most honored watch
is Longines. Longines watches have won ten World’s Fair Grand
Prizes and twenty-eight gold medals, and more honors for accuracy
than any other timepiece.
Longines, the world’s most honored watch is made and
guaranteed by Longines-Wittnauer Watch Company.

It’s time for the Longines Chronoscope, a television journal of
the vital events of the hour, brought to you three times weekly,
a presentation of Longines-Wittnauer Watch Company, maker
of Longines, the world’s most honored Watch, and Wittnauer,
distinguished companion to the world honored Longines. //

New York City, 1951, 11pm

knight: Good evening, this is Frank Knight. May I introduce our co-
editors for this edition of the Longines Chronoscope: //

Mr. henry hazlitt, a political economist of respected judgment and
Contributing Editor of Newsweek magazine //

Mr. l.a. Brophy, General Business Editor of the Associated Press //

Mr. Frazier hunt, famous American journalist, magazine writer and
commentator, et

Mr. WilliaM BradFord huie, editor of The American Mercury. //

Our distinguished guest[s] for this evening / sont: //

Mr. Max thornBurg, Wartime Petroleum Advisor to the Department

134

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of State and expert on Middle Eastern affairs, [Senior Vice
President, Standard Oil Company] //

Mr. Charles l. harding, Coordinator of Middle East Operations,
and member of the board of directors of the Socony-Vacuum and
Arabian-American Oil Companies //

Mr. henry grady, United States Ambassador recently returned
from Iran //

general Bonner Fellers, famed strategist and psychological
warfare leader // et / the distinguished British statesman and
member of the King’s Privy Council, lord WilMot. //

knight: In this spontaneous and unrehearsed discussion, le
opinions are necessarily those of the speakers. //

WilliaM BradFord huie: Lord Wilmot, I believe that you are not
now a member of the British government, are you?

lord WilMot: No I’m not, I resigned from Mr. Attlee’s cabinet at
the end of 1947.

huie: Are you a member of Commons?

WilMot: I’m now a member of the House of Lords but for
seventeen years I was a member of the House of Commons.

huie: Do you mean that you are a Lord and also a socialist?

WilMot: Oui, I think that is right.

huie: Is there any incongruity in the statement?

WilMot: Not at all, ah— /

huie: And here tonight you are expressing your private opinions,

Je pense.

WilMot: Entirely, entirely. //

henry hazlitt: Mr. Thornburg, in addition to having been the
advisor—the petroleum advisor to the State Department, / what has
been your experience in the Middle East?

thornBurg: I spent the greater part of the past sixteen years living
and working in the Middle East or in close connection with its
problems.

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135

hazlitt: You were, aren’t you, advisor to the Shah of Iran?

thornBurg: The last five years I have been, most of the time in
Persia as advisor to the Persian government, yes. //

huie: Mr. Harding, our listeners tonight are of course concerned
over the Iranian crisis, and I’m sure they will welcome the
information, which an expert like you can give them. Now what do
you think is the next most likely development in the crisis sir.

The “Iranian Crisis” of 1951 was prompted by failed negotiations
between Britain and the Iranian parliament. By voting to nationalize
its oil industry, Iran ended the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s
half-century of control over Iran’s oil resources.

Charles l. harding: I think that’s a pretty hard question to answer.
It looks like the Iranians are pretty determined to exclude the
British technicians from their country.

huie: And if the Iranians do take such a step and they drive the
British technicians out, what will be the result sir?

harding: Well I doubt that there’ll be very much oil to leave the
Iranian shore. I don’t believe that they can operate the refinery or
the oil industry without the British technicians, nor do they have the
tankers nor the markets to move the oil to, so it seems to me that
the industry would stay at a standstill.

l.a. Brophy: With this great installation thus out of commission
Mr. Harding, what then do you think will be the effect upon the
economy of the European nations and of the United States?

harding: Well we won’t be short of oil, we still have plenty

of oil to supply the needs of our friendly powers and also of the
États-Unis. /

huie: Is there any danger sir of our troops in Korea suffering from a
loss of oil?

harding: No I think not.

huie: Is that war being oiled from the Middle East or from our own
supplies in the United States?

harding: I suppose a major portion of those supplies are coming

136

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from the United States, some have been coming from the Middle
East.

huie: Would you say that the—our enemies, the Chinese Reds,
are receiving any oil from the Middle East now sir?

harding: Not to my knowledge.

huie: Do you know where they are receiving their oil, from where
are they receiving it?

harding: Non, that’s a question that we have been trying to find the
answer to, I don’t know. //

huie: General Fellers, those of us who were in the Pacific, de
cours, remember that you were General MacArthur’s Planning
Officer, isn’t that correct sir?

general Bonner Fellers: That is correct, yes, for a time—

huie: And you have, are known now as a critic of, ah, some of our
war planning. Is that correct?

Fellers: That is correct, yes.

huie: Now, sir, what do you think is the essential problem of our
country now, ah, defensively?

Fellers: We must defend, we must be strong militarily but
we must fit that to our pocketbook and we must also have
that defense reflect the genius of America. We can no longer
match our enemy in manpower. We must substitute brains and
genius—

huie: Are we, are we opposed now or [do] our potential enemies
now have more men that we have? We are outmanned now. /

Fellers: / We are in very bad shape in Korea, we are
outnumbered on the ground and we are outnumbered in the air.
//

huie: Lord Wilmot, there’s been a good deal of criticism in the
États-Unis, of what we think is a soft British policy toward Red
Chine. /

WilMot: We have no soft policy, not at all. We are with you as
Mr. Attlee said in fighting aggression and we are going to see
it through but we do hope that we shall carry the Korean War

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137

to victory at an early date and victory will be when we turn the
aggressor out of South Korea. /

huie: Are you in favor now of admitting Red China in to the
United Nations?

WilMot: Certainly not while this aggression goes on, certainly not.

huie: Are you in favor of the Red Chinese signing the Japanese
peace treaty?

WilMot: No I don’t think so. I think so long as they are carrying
out a policy of aggression, which has been denounced by the
United Nations, they can have no part in the peaceful settlements
of the world. /

huie: / There is one other question I’ll like to ask Lord Wilmot and
that is about Iran. A great many Americans have been struck by
the incongruity of your government, where—which has pushed
nationalization in Britain opposing the nationalization of oil in
Iran sir, ah—

WilMot: Oui, I expect it does look like that but in fact it’s—there
is nothing illogical about it. We don’t, ah, dispute the right of the
Iranian government to nationalize the oilfields, what we do say is,
that they should honor their commercial agreements. Now such
nationalization has been carried out in Britain, every contract was
honored— /

huie: / One of the things that that contract calls for is about a 20%
profit per year and that the profit perhaps may have been a little
haut. The reason you have so much trouble in Iran today or that
we have—

WilMot: / 20% is what Iranians get out of this, and they get 20%,
on top of the royalties, they get 20% of the total profits of the
company although those profits arise, very largely, from trading all
over the world, and ah, this agreement with the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company, has meant immense benefits for the people of Iran //

thornBurg: / but they have been realized by a very small part of
the people of Persia, perhaps by 1% or something of that sort.

huie: Well how have the British failed specifically now?

thornBurg: Bien, the British have unquestionably, in my view,

138

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interfered with the political life of the country, in such a way as
to make it impossible for the Shah to develop a really responsible
government in his country, one that would look after the welfare
of the people. That is one way in which the British have brought
about this crisis that faces us today. //

WilMot: / It’s a tragedy really, that this thing should have been
torn up in the way that it has. //

hazlitt: Well Mr. Thornburg, / what is the next step that Britain
can take? What is the next step that the Atlantic Nations can take?

thornBurg: I don’t believe that any step that anyone takes
aimed directly at this oil nationalization itself is going to cure
the situation in Persia. What is wrong in Persia is that there is
no government over there that is responsible to deal with. Now
you asked what is likely to happen? Ah, there is virtually a state
of anarchy today in Persia and you cannot forecast what anarchy
is going to do. One of the things that might happen would be a
general revolution of the people, it might be that they would kill
a considerable number of the British operators that are in there,
there might be a religious uprising, there might be a Communist
uprising, anything of that sort could happen today when there is
no strong government there to control things.

huie: Coming back to the causes of this unrest, this situation that
you described, are the Russians partially the cause of it?

thornBurg: I wouldn’t say that the Russians are really the cause
of any important trouble in Persia today. They are going to be the
only ones who benefit from what is going wrong over there.

hazlitt: That was something I was just going to ask: isn’t the
immediate effect that the oil has been in effect lost to the West, pour
the time being, and isn’t it quite probable or isn’t the danger very
great that it will fall into the hands of Russia within a year or so.

thornBurg: Unless, a sound government is established in the
country, very soon, in my opinion, we will lose Persia to the
Communists. Then they will get the oil along with the rest of it. //

huie: Ambassador Grady, / did you as our ambassador or did our
embassy there understand what was likely to happen? Did you
foresee the developments?

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139

aMBassador henry grady: We realized the great importance of
a settlement on the oil question, we felt that that was basic to any
economic measures we might take to aid the country and, ah,
stem the trend towards communism. /

huie: For our audience sir, I did like to review that, ah . . . Le
British had been paying about 13% and they were offering to pay
depuis 25% à 30% and during that same period, the United States
was paying a higher rate [50%] of royalties to the Middle Eastern
des pays.

grady: That is correct.

huie: And is it your opinion sir that the British were at fault in not
meeting our terms in the Middle East?

grady: It wasn’t so much a question of meeting the terms
regarding royalties but it was a matter of making a number of non-
monetary concessions. /

huie: I see, now, non-monetary you mean questions of face and
other concessions—

grady: I mean for example employing more Iranians in the plants,
a matter of the prices charged for oil products within Iran, le
ah— /

huie: As American ambassador, did you urge the British to make
those concessions sir?

grady: Oui, very strongly. //

hazlitt: What do you think is likely to be the outcome, Lord
Wilmot, if the Iranians persist in their present policy?

WilMot: Bien, I’m afraid that the oil will go to waste and the
economy of the country will be ruined.

hazlitt: Bien, don’t you think there is a real danger of Russia
stepping in there, into that picture and—

WilMot: Bien, I think there is a danger and we are doing our
very best and I’m still not without hope of success of coming to a
reasonable agreement, which we’ve offered to do for a long time
past. //

140

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Brophy: Since you need oil to win wars, / Mr. Harding, / what do
you think is the situation regarding the present and potential oil
supplies of the free nations, and of Communist Russia?

harding: Bien, I think you might be interested in our best guess
there as to the Russian picture, but on the whole we’re producing
about ten times the amount of oil in the free nations that are
produced by Russia and her satellite countries. //

Frazier hunt: Bien, General Fellers, are we getting and planning
for a real and genuine and adequate defense now?

Fellers: Mr. Hunt, I think we are not. We are in very bad
shape in Korea, we are outnumbered on the ground and we
are outnumbered in the air. Our program to hold Stalin out of
Russia—ah, Europe if he should attack, is wholly inadequate. Nous
plan and hope to have in two or three years 60 allied divisions,
Stalin already has 200. Il a 60 satellite divisions, between the
Red Army and our troops in Europe, so that there is no way I see
that you could call our program adequate! //

huie: Mr. Harding, / I’d like to know this sir, if the Iranian oil
fields should fall in the hands of Russia, I think most of our
people are worried over that contingency, if that should happen,
if Russia should move in, ah . . . do you think that it would be
possible for Russia to exploit these fields at once?

harding: Bien, if Russia were to make an arrangement with
Iran, then her real problem would be transportation. And she’s
separated from the oil by this high range of mountains. So I
would doubt very much that more than the tiniest trickle of oil
would flow overland to Russia— /

huie: Now you represent companies sir that are now engaged
in other parts of the Middle East in producing oil. What’s the
situation in regard to your company’s and our relations with
other nations in the Middle East now?

harding: I think on the whole our relations are relatively good.
But those countries are watching this Iranian development very
closely and I’m sure that depending on this form of solution
worked out there it could have an effect on their attitude towards
us. /

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141

huie: Mr. Harding, this is a question that I know the military has
discussed a great deal. Are the Middle Eastern oil reserves so
valuable that we as a nation should even go to war to deny them
to Russia? Can we as a nation safely allow Russia to take over the
Middle Eastern oil fields?

harding: Bien, I suppose [it] may be a question of what you mean
by “safely.” But certainly those Middle Eastern reserves are most
important to us. We need them in the world today. Without the
Middle East, now that’s something quite different than Iran, you’re
talking about—

huie: Oui.

harding: You are talking about the total Middle East.

huie: I mean if the fire spreads and we lose them all—

harding: Then we wouldn’t have enough oil to supply our needs
and the needs of Western Europe without very severe rationing in
this country, if we were to lose the Middle East. //

[Silence] //

huie: Mr. Thornburg, / let me ask you this sir: ah, we are, are we
more successful than the British in our operations in the Middle
East? I mean as—

thornBurg: Our oil operations?

huie: Our oil operations. /

Two years later, dans 1953, the CIA’s Operation Ajax brought down

the elected government of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad

Mosaddegh.

142

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It was arguably the first successful US attempt at toppling a

foreign government.

huie: / Are we more successful than the British in our operations
in the Middle East? I mean as—

thornBurg: Our oil operations?

huie: Our oil operations. /

[Silence] //

huie: What have we done with our oil operations that the Anglo-
Iranian has not done?

thornBurg: Bien, the two principal American oil concessions in
the Middle East, in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, have had no trouble of
any sort. In the first place they have been ready to adjust their royalty
payments to the governments and they have done it during this past
année, voluntarily, they have increased them very substantially.

huie: And the British have not done that.

thornBurg: The British have not done that. They have been
negotiating for two years but, never due to the company’s own
fault, in my opinion, never came to an agreement.

hazlitt: Are you speaking of the British policy generally or simply
of Anglo-Iranian policy?

thornBurg: I’m glad you ask that because what I’m speaking of is
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company policy, not British foreign policy
generally.

huie: But the British government owns the majority of the stock in
the Anglo-Iranian—

thornBurg: The British government owns 52% ou 53%, / de
course from that point of view it’s unfortunate that this tragically
unnecessary accident of oil nationalization ever took place. //

huie: Mr. Ambassador, this interesting old gentleman Mr.
Mosaddegh is now a visitor in the United States.

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143

Do you know him personally sir?

grady: Yes extremely well.

huie: Is he an able and responsible statesman?

grady: He is extremely able. He is a patriot. I think he is
misguided in the way he is carrying out the nationalization
program. I have told him that a number of times and I told
him that as a friend of Iran because I think a failure of this
program of his may be very harmful to his country, and a
failure to make some kind of agreement with responsible
management—some responsible management company to
operate because I doubt that the Iranians themselves can
operate this industry. Ah, he is, he is honest, ah, he is one of
the ablest speakers in the country, very attractive personality,
good sense of humor. He is a Persian gentleman. //

huie: Mr. Thornburg, / what do you find is hopeful in this
picture? What is our solution?

thornBurg: I don’t see much that is hopeful in the oil picture
lui-même. The hope that I do see is almost entirely in this fact: que
Persia has in its ruler, the Shah, a young man of admirable
qualities who for several years has been trying to establish a
decent government in his country.

huie: You are an advisor to the Shah, I believe.

thornBurg: That’s right. I have been, I am not now.

huie: I see. Are you impressed, with his sincerity and his
ability?

thornBurg: Very impressed, yes.

huie: And you think he is the hopeful factor.

thornBurg: He certainly is. Now, if the Shah had the support
of the British government and of our government—

hazlitt: Bien, I’m sorry Mr. Thornburg, but I’m afraid our
time is up. Thank you very much for being with us tonight. //

WilMot: Well I’m very glad to have been here and I’m very
glad to have had this discussion.

144

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knight: Thank you very much indeed gentlemen.

The editorial board for this edition of the Longines Chronoscope
était: // Mr. Henry Hazlitt [Newsweek], // Mr. L.A. Brophy [Le
Associated Press], // Mr. Frazier Hunt [independent journalist],
and Mr. William Bradford Huie [The American Mercury.] //

Our guest[s]: the distinguished British statesman Lord Wilmot,
// Mr. Max Thornburg, the noted authority on Middle Eastern
affairs [Senior Vice President, Standard Oil Company]; // Mr.
Henry Grady, our recent ambassador to Iran; // Mr. Charles L.
Harding, Coordinator of Middle East Operations, and member
of the board of directors of the Socony-Vacuum and Arabian-
American Oil Companies; // General Bonner Fellers, famed
strategist and psychological warfare leader. //

Next week the Longines Chronoscope will welcome as its special
guest the Chinese ambassador Tingfu F. Tsiang. //

The worldwide prestige of Longines watches is proof of their
unsurpassed dependability and accuracy. These qualities are the
result of the extraordinary excellence in design and manufacture
of the Longines watch movement, the beating heart of every
Longines watch. Here is the matured product of the skills and
experience acquired through eighty-five years of watch making.
The ultra slow motion camera reveals the smooth flawless
mechanism of the Longines balance assembly, the guardian of
the accuracy of the watch.

This is Frank Knight, again reminding you that the Longines
Chronoscope is brought to you three times weekly, every Monday,
Wednesday and Friday, so won’t you join us every Monday,
Wednesday and Friday evening at the same time for the Longines
Chronoscope, a television journal of the important issues of
the hour. Broadcast on behalf of Longines, The World’s Most
Honored Watch. //

Produced Under The Supervision and Control of CBS Public
Affaires /

This is the CBS Television Network. //

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145

New York City, 1953, 11 pm

Eleanor Roosevelt

Former First Lady and US Delegate to the United Nations

edWard p. Morgan: Mrs. Roosevelt, some nights ago, I had dinner
with a man and his wife in Spokane, Washington. Quite sincerely
but quite seriously they asked me two questions. They said: do
these foreigners hate us as much as they seem to? Et, are they
ever going to be grateful for the things that we do for them? Now
you’ve come back from one of your latest trips in far parts of the
monde. Could you answer those questions? /

eleanor roosevelt: Bien, I would not say that foreigners hated us.
I would say that, ah, many of them were a little suspicious, that ah,
there is . . . / when people say, will they never be grateful for what
we’ve done, I think there is gratitude, but gratitude is sometimes
swamped by the sense of, why was this done, was it done in the
long run so we could, we who just freed ourselves from political
domination be dominated through economics? //

146

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The transcript above uses excerpts from the following episodes of the CBS
television program Longines Chronoscope:

Juin 25, 1951: Lord John Wilmot, British statesman, interviewed by Henry
Hazlitt (Newsweek) and William Bradford Huie (The American Mercury).

Juillet 9, 1951: Max W. Thornburg, petroleum advisor, Department of State,
interviewed by Henry Hazlitt and William Bradford Huie.

septeMBer 28, 1951: Charles L. Harding, coordinator, Middle East
Operations, and member of the board of directors, Socony-Vacuum and
Arabian-Oil Company, interviewed by L. UN. Brophy (The Associated Press)
and William Bradford Huie.

oCtoBer 3, 1951: Brig. Gen. Bonner F. Fellers, strategist and psychological
warfare expert, interviewed by Frazier Hunt and William Bradford Huie.

oCtoBer 24, 1951: Henry F. Grady, U.S. Ambassador to Iran, interviewed
by Frazier Hunt and William Bradford Huie.

august 26, 1953: Eleanor Roosevelt, U.S. stateswoman, interviewed by
Edward P. Morgan (CBS) and Bill Downs (CBS).

Access to footage of the Longines Chronoscope provided by the United
States National Archives and Records Administration, Washington D.C.

Chronoscope, 1951, 11pm is the title of a 24:49 minute video installation by
Alessandro Balteo Yazbeck, made in collaboration with Media Farzin, part of
an ongoing cycle of works based on the Cold War and its cultural artifacts.
The video was first shown at the 12th Istanbul Biennial, in Istanbul, Turkey,
September through November 2011.