Research Articles
Green Industrial Policy and the Global
Transformation of Climate Politics
(cid:129)
Bentley Allan, Joanna I. Lewis, and Thomas Oatley*
Abstract
The rise of green industrial policy has injected purpose and competition into global envi-
ronmental politics. Efforts to build green industry have raised the economic and geopolit-
ical stakes of environmental issues as states seek to position their firms in global value
chains and reshore strategic industries. This could help to generate the technologies and
political momentum needed to accelerate global decarbonization. At the same time, these
green interventions confront status quo interests and a variety of industrial policies that
support fossil fuel-based industries. To help make sense of this new landscape, this intro-
duction to the special issue defines green industrial policy and situates it within domestic
political economy, social policy, and global geopolitics. We present six new studies that
demonstrate and explore the global politics of green industrial policy. To illustrate the
kinds of effects and implications of green industrial policy we are interested in exploring,
we show how green industrial policy has transformed climate politics. Changes in state
practice, ideas about the environment and economy, and technological cost declines came
together to produce a new opportunistic and competitive climate politics. We then identify
areas for further investigation as we call for a new climate politics research agenda, integrat-
ing green industrial policy more intentionally into studies of global environmental politics.
l
D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d
f
r
o
m
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
d
i
r
e
c
t
.
m
i
t
.
l
/
/
e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d
l
f
/
/
/
/
/
2
1
4
1
1
9
7
5
1
2
9
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
4
0
p
d
.
l
In November 2020, Boris Johnson announced £ 12 billion in spending to initiate
a “green industrial revolution in Britain” (Parker et al. 2020). It was a striking
image: a Conservative prime minister in a famously economically liberal country
announcing a significant state intervention. The sheen on this image was perhaps
dimmed by the clear need for stimulus in the midst of the COVID-19 crisis. All the
same, the move demonstrated the realignment of political forces in the United
Kingdom and elsewhere. By 2020, green industrial policy had already made the
United Kingdom a leader in cutting power emissions. From 2010 to 2020, no
country reduced its carbon intensity more than the United Kingdom, in large part
due to a 2013 offshore wind industrial strategy spearheaded by Conservative
f
b
y
g
u
e
s
t
t
o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3
* We thank the contributors to the special issue and the participants in the Global Green
New Deal Workshop at Johns Hopkins University in October 2019. We also thank the editors
of Global Environmental Politics and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback on
this article.
Global Environmental Politics 21:4, November 2021, https://doi.org/10.1162/glep_a_00640
© 2021 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
1
2 (cid:129) Green Industrial Policy
ministers and MPs in the Cameron government (HM Government 2013; Thomas
2020). Moreover, Johnson’s Brexit campaign was premised upon the nationalist
populist imperative to demonize immigrants and the promise to defend the
domestic economy from Europe. This was, as Hopkin (2017) suggests, a political
masterstroke: Conservatives promised to defend the country from Europeaniza-
tion wrought by Thatcherite neoliberalism. The quality of that move notwith-
standing, the implication was clear: this wasn’t Thatcher’s party, or country,
anymore.
Even in 2013, the United Kingdom was already late to the party. Embed-
ded within Obama’s post-2008 stimulus package was a US$ 90 billion “green new deal” that included US$ 25 billion for green energy. And during the prior
two decades, Chinese green industrial policy had restructured the global
markets for solar and wind, driving down costs and pushing out competitors
(Hopkins and Li 2016; Lewis 2013). This has led to policy responses to build
and protect green industry so that Europe and the United States can create value
chains that do not depend on China.
The new president of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen has
launched the Green Deal for Europe, which increases spending and seeks to im-
plement a carbon border tax (Bloomberg 2020). During his 2020 US presiden-
tial campaign, then-candidate Biden outlined a year 1 legislative agenda on
climate change that includes record investments in energy and climate research
and innovation as well as clean and resilient infrastructure and communities
(Biden for President 2020). In summer 2020, South Korea announced a “green
new deal” with US$ 60 billion in support for the domestic hydrogen market, green infrastructure, and advanced technological research (Thurbon et al. 2020). And in Australia, the Department of Industry has released a Technology Investment Roadmap that seeks to position the country as a global leader in low-emission technology (Australian Government 2020). This special issue explores how these green industrial policies—intentional efforts to build specific industries in the green economy—interact with the political economy of technological change, social policy, broader geopolitical trends, and climate politics. First, green industrial policy has important effects on domestic and international political economy by driving technological change. Technological change alters the costs and benefits of various pathways and shapes the balance of political power among industries (Kelsey, this issue). This illustrates the importance of countries developing the right mix of policy measures to support renewable energy (Lewis, this issue). However, as we see in two contributions to this special issue (Gao et al. Nahm and Urpelainen), the costs of technology alone do not determine the pace of change. State power, political interests, and patterns of elite investment play a key role in setting the form and pace of the energy transition. Countries may continue to invest in fossil fuels when they are no longer cost-competitive with alternatives because elites can continue to harvest political and financial benefits from fossil fuels. l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / d i r e c t . m i t . l / / e d u g e p a r t i c e – p d l f / / / / / 2 1 4 1 1 9 7 5 1 2 9 g e p _ a _ 0 0 6 4 0 p d . l f b y g u e s t t o n 0 7 S e p e m b e r 2 0 2 3 Bentley Allan, Joanna I. Lewis, and Thomas Oatley (cid:129) 3 These political-economic dimensions of the energy transition have distrib- utive implications that link industrial policy to social policy. As promoters of “green new deal” thinking have argued, green industrial policy could be a means to reduce economic inequality (Aronoff et al. 2019; Murphy 2019). In this vein, green industrial policies have been associated with the creation of good jobs and the realignment of power between labor and global capital. Geopolitically, green industrial policies promise to reposition states in global value chains and reconfigure the landscape of power. By building domes- tic industries, countries seek autonomy and growth in the context of competitive interdependence (Farrell and Newman 2019; Sbragia 2010). Efforts to reconfig- ure global networks of trade, investment, and production will also have impor- tant effects on the international institutional order. Furthermore, green industrial policy poses unique challenges for a global- ized world due to the tensions between the political economy of domestic re- newable energy support and the principles of the liberal trade regime, with direct implications for nations’ abilities to transition to low-carbon economies (Lewis 2014). For governments to garner political support for renewable energy technologies, they must promise job creation and domestic technological prog- ress, both of which compel direct interventions with international trade flows and may conflict with multiple World Trade Organization ( WTO) provisions and domestic trade laws. This also presents complications for global supply chains, which are important to optimize cost declines and widely scale the use of green technologies (Helveston and Nahm 2019). The collection expands the field of global environmental politics (GEP) by showing the effects and implications of green industrial policy at the national and international levels. This introduction illustrates the kinds of effects and im- plications we are interested in highlighting by tracing the transformation of global climate politics since 2000. As we suggest in this overview article, the it- erative interaction among green industrial policy, policy ideas, and technology costs transformed climate policy practice and political discourse in the run-up to the 2015 Paris Agreement. As a result, climate action is no longer exclusively thought of as a cost to the economy to be captured by pricing carbon. Rather, green industrial policies are motivated by the idea that environmental action can be a means to create strategic industries, jobs, export revenue, and economic growth. This new opportunistic frame for climate action has further effects on international institutions and geopolitics, heightening competition and pre- senting new challenges for cooperation. Defining Green Industrial Policy Green industrial policies include investments, incentives, regulations, and pol- icy supports designed to stimulate and facilitate the development of environ- mental technologies (Harrison et al. 2017; Rodrik 2014). The distinctive feature of green industrial policies vis-à-vis other environmental actions is the l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / d i r e c t . m i t . l / / e d u g e p a r t i c e – p d l f / / / / / 2 1 4 1 1 9 7 5 1 2 9 g e p _ a _ 0 0 6 4 0 p d . l f b y g u e s t t o n 0 7 S e p e m b e r 2 0 2 3 4 (cid:129) Green Industrial Policy intent or the goal of the policies rather than the instrument used. It is the intent to restructure and transform the economy into a green economy that distin- guishes green industrial policy. This drive for restructuring and transformation is often motivated by domestic economic priorities, the global pressure for com- petitiveness, and the desire to secure better positions in global production and trade networks. In the economic literature, green industrial policy is represented as a re- sponse to a set of market failures and opportunities. The central problem is that returns to innovation are diffuse and the risks of failure are high (Rodrik 2014). Even when entrepreneurial bets pay off, they produce more benefits to society through spillovers and industry-wide learning than they return to the original investors. In the case of climate change, the problem is even larger, because emissions reductions are an archetypal public good. All this entails that private returns to green technological development are well below their return to soci- ety as a whole. But to really understand green industrial policy, we need to see it not as a functional response to market failures but as a strategic response within a com- plex global environment. In this frame, states are trying to creatively address problems in their strategic situation. Green industrial policies are economic in- terventions that serve the goals and purposes of states. In the context of global environmental politics, the promise of green industrial policy is that it can help motivate political action for addressing climate change by reducing abatement costs and generating societal co-benefits (Malhotra and Schmidt 2020). Any number of instruments might be used to pursue green economic transformation. Direct capital subsidies, research and development (R&D) grants, export credit assistance, local content requirements for manufacturing, tariffs or customs duties, and procurement policies have all been used to create specific industries. Even feed-in tariffs or market-based mechanisms could be interpreted as industrial policies if they were designed in a targeted fashion to push a specific industry (such as the electricity sector) toward environmental goals. Given this, it is difficult to establish tight analytical boundaries around green industrial policy. Nonetheless, some instruments are more likely to be associated with green industrial policy than more general attempts to reduce emissions or control pol- lutants. For example, grants and subsidies; support for research, development, and deployment (RD&D); and local content requirements are all more likely to be used to bolster specific targeted industries rather than produce general ef- fects on the economy or environment. Figure 1 shows the number of new fiscal programs providing grants and subsidies and RD&D support specifically for cli- mate goals. The figure reveals a flurry of new measures from the late 1990s through to the 2008 economic crisis, which introduced fiscal pressures that dampened a strong upward trend. Figure 2 plots local content requirements for renewable energy to clearly show their emergence in the 1990s and accumu- lation over time. l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / d i r e c t . m i t . l / / e d u g e p a r t i c e – p d l f / / / / / 2 1 4 1 1 9 7 5 1 2 9 g e p _ a _ 0 0 6 4 0 p d . l f b y g u e s t t o n 0 7 S e p e m b e r 2 0 2 3 Bentley Allan, Joanna I. Lewis, and Thomas Oatley (cid:129) 5 l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / d i r e c t . m i t . Figure 1 Climate Policy Instruments: Grants and Subsidies and RD&D Support (1975–2018) Source: NewClimate Institute (2021) Given the rapid rise of green industrial policies in global environmental pol- itics, we need further work to situate these policies within broader analyses of the political economy of technological change, social policy, and geopolitics. In po- litical economy, we highlight the role of green industrial policy in processes of l / / e d u g e p a r t i c e – p d l f / / / / / 2 1 4 1 1 9 7 5 1 2 9 g e p _ a _ 0 0 6 4 0 p d . l f b y g u e s t t o n 0 7 S e p e m b e r 2 0 2 3 Figure 2 Local Content Requirements for Renewable Energy Source: Lewis (2021) 6 (cid:129) Green Industrial Policy technological and political change. In social policy, we outline the potential distributive consequences of green industrial policy. In geopolitics, we show how green industrial policy links environmental issues to the core concerns of power politics to show that power politics has always been about energy and environment. The Political Economy of Technological Change This special issue builds on recent research on the political economy of green technological change (Aklin and Urpelainen 2018; Breetz et al. 2018; Geels et al. 2017; Lewis 2013; Meckling and Nahm 2019; Meckling et al. 2015; Nahm 2021; Schmidt and Sewerin 2017). This literature shows the power of green industrial policy to generate new technologies in a complex global economy, illustrated most clearly in the case of China. China’s green industrial policy has resulted in manufacturing expansion and R&D that drove down the costs and increased the deployment of clean energy technologies (Helveston and Nahm 2019; Lewis 2013). By empowering new firms and redistributing regional power in China, the creation of new in- dustries has altered the dynamics of China’s energy politics (Lewis 2013; Nahm 2021). This is a key insight of the literature in the political economy of techno- logical change: green industrial policy can break carbon lock-in by broadening the coalition for change (Breetz et al. 2018; Meckling et al. 2015). The implica- tion is that if policy makers sequence policies appropriately, they can increase the ambition of climate policies along the decarbonization path. As Meckling et al. (2015) argue, it makes more sense to start climate action with green industrial policies that build supportive coalitions than it does to start with market-based policies that could create backlash. The flip side of this potential green spiral (Kelsey, this issue) is that decades of industrial policies in support of fossil fuels have created powerful entrenched interests and political coali- tions. The result is a competition between fossil and green industrial policies. Second, China’s green industrial policy has had important global effects. It has produced global benefits in the form of cost declines that enable other countries to decarbonize cheaper and faster than they might otherwise have done (Helveston and Nahm 2019). More broadly, China’s green industrial policy has helped to build and reconfigure global value chains (Nahm 2021). Green industrial policy unfolds at the complex intersections between domestic and international political economy. Countries pursue industrial policies and trade policies strategically to influence the location of global value chains with the aim of encouraging local manufacturing. While not all coun- tries are well positioned to become competitive exporters of the same green technologies, if industrial policies can help create competitive domestic man- ufacturers, countries may be able to capture direct domestic economic benefits (Lewis and Wiser 2007). But the realities of the global economy mean that it is difficult for a country to create an industry on its own. Industries depend on l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / d i r e c t . m i t . l / / e d u g e p a r t i c e – p d l f / / / / / 2 1 4 1 1 9 7 5 1 2 9 g e p _ a _ 0 0 6 4 0 p d . l f b y g u e s t t o n 0 7 S e p e m b e r 2 0 2 3 Bentley Allan, Joanna I. Lewis, and Thomas Oatley (cid:129) 7 global supply chains as well as international markets for both investment and final demand. Moreover, these types of policies are often illegal under international trade regimes (Cottier et al. 2009; Kuntze and Moerenhout 2013). Local content requirements in particular create an inefficient application of resources and price inflation and, despite some new job creation in the targeted country, can result in net overall job losses globally. The reduction of world trade due to local content requirements is estimated in one study to be US$ 93 billion annually (Hufbauer
et al. 2013). Indeed, green industrial policy tends to raise concerns over a return
to the zero-sum world the liberal trading regime was designed to dismantle.
Ultimately, the political economy of clean energy innovation is about
winners and losers, with broad geopolitical implications. Thus a key insight
of the literature is that green industrial policies generate complex trade-offs
between local and global benefits.
Green Industrial Policy and Social Policy
Because it has important distributive implications, green industrial policy can be
linked to social policy. In particular, the rise of green industrial policy has
created opportunities for linking major investments in the energy transition
to efforts to reduce inequality by strengthening the working and middle classes.
In the United States, for example, the “Green New Deal” has emerged as a
means of integrating the broader issues of economic and social injustice with a
climate policy. This movement contains many themes similar to those we see in
other mobilizations of green industrial policy, including local job creation, di-
rect investments in low-carbon industries and R&D, and the enactment of trade
rules “to stop the transfer of jobs and pollution overseas” and “to grow domestic
manufacturing in the United States” (Ocasio-Cortez 2019). It explicitly connects
these efforts to the task of building domestic industries that will produce ben-
efits for the working and middle classes. The political and policy innovation
here was to fold industrial policy into the language and frame of environmental
and social justice.
The call for a Green New Deal inspired new thinking and political re-
sponses throughout the world. In the United Kingdom, new think tanks like
Common Wealth developed the ideas, building out a road map for thinking
about the Green New Deal domestically and internationally (Brett et al. 2020;
Murphy 2019). The Labour Party picked up this call and made it a component
of its 2019 election platform. The call promised to create 1 million green jobs in
the United Kingdom in new sectors of the new “industrial revolution,” such as
hydrogen and tidal energy (Proctor 2019). The language of the Green New Deal
also entered elections in Canada, Europe, Latin America, and Asia. These move-
ments did not always directly link climate action to the creation of new indus-
tries. Nonetheless, the spread of the new frame demonstrated that many climate
leaders were ready for a new approach that folded climate policy into a broader
l
D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d
f
r
o
m
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
d
i
r
e
c
t
.
m
i
t
.
l
/
/
e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d
l
f
/
/
/
/
/
2
1
4
1
1
9
7
5
1
2
9
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
4
0
p
d
.
l
f
b
y
g
u
e
s
t
t
o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3
8 (cid:129) Green Industrial Policy
political economy framework to motivate strategic state action to build the
green economy.
This global movement has legitimated and bolstered green industrial
policy by highlighting the need for state interventions to reduce rising global
inequality. Furthermore, this alliance between environmental activists and
economic actors has broadened the coalition for action in many countries.
The key question for the future of green industrial policy is whether its deploy-
ment exacerbates or reduces inequality. On one hand, green industrial policy
could strengthen the incumbent financial and business interests that are driving
increasing inequality. On the other hand, it could be used to disrupt incum-
bents, redistribute opportunity, reform labor markets, and invest in marginal-
ized communities.
The New Geopolitics of Climate Politics
Since its emergence in the 1960s and 1970s, environmental politics been sepa-
rated from political economy proper. Treated as a special case, it was considered
a “low-politics” issue, like global health or human security, which had emerged
on the global governance agenda but was ultimately immaterial to global power
politics. Today, however, there is broad recognition among policy makers and
scholars alike that climate politics has geopolitical implications. We know that
the emerging geopolitics of energy “will be fundamentally different from the
conventional map of energy geopolitics that has been dominant for more than
one hundred years” (IRENA 2013, 14). Less clear, however, is exactly what this
“new geopolitics” will look like.
A growing literature attempts to outline the likely consequences of an en-
ergy transition (Vokalchuk et al. 2020). Most studies agree that the transition
away from fossil fuels will create winners and losers (see, e.g., IRENA Global
Commission 2019; Overland 2019). Recent work conceptualizes winners and
losers in terms of the conflicting interests of asset owners with very different ex-
posures to the short-run impact of climate change and decarbonization (Colgan
et al. 2021; Oatley and Blyth 2021). Green industrial policy assumes tremen-
dous geopolitical as well as social and environmental significance within this
framework.
Green industrial policy is an important instrument in the competition for
global primacy in green technology and intellectual property (Scholten 2018).
For example, China’s green investments in alternative energies and in electric
vehicle and lithium-ion battery technology since 2008 have placed it in the
leading position to capture the rents associated with these green technologies.
One might suggest that the greatest prize in international politics—global power
primacy—goes to the state best positioned to exploit an emerging energy system.
We might also expect the great powers to use their financial capabilities to
support alternative energy projects to compete for clients and allies (Lewis 2020;
Liu and Urpelainen 2021). China, for instance, currently finances coal, oil, and
l
D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d
f
r
o
m
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
d
i
r
e
c
t
.
m
i
t
.
l
/
/
e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d
l
f
/
/
/
/
/
2
1
4
1
1
9
7
5
1
2
9
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
4
0
p
d
.
l
f
b
y
g
u
e
s
t
t
o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3
Bentley Allan, Joanna I. Lewis, and Thomas Oatley
(cid:129) 9
natural gas projects in low-income societies with pressing energy needs. As Gao
et al. argue in their contribution to this special issue, emerging economies must
be intentional about the transition to clean energy because foreign sources of
finance threaten to trap them into large new investments in dirty energy.
It is also an open question what effects green geopolitics will have on the
current institutional order. We highlighted previously the tension in the liberal
trading regime, but green industrial policy also poses challenges to investment
treaties and standards regimes (Birkbeck et al. 2020). In a world of competitive
and weaponized interdependence, states maintain complex institutions and
global regulations but also seek to exploit and shift them (Farrell and Newman
2019; Sbragia 2010). There is a tension here, and it is not yet clear whether
naked competition and complex interdependence are compatible in the long
run. The pressures for decoupling between the West and China are a case in
point (Stein and Whalen 2021).
As in the domestic sphere, green industrial policy will create geopolitical
winners and losers. The competitive dynamics unleashed by green geopolitics
may be salutary in some ways. If states compete in hard-to-build green indus-
tries, they may produce global public goods in the form of cost declines and big
domestic green coalitions that will drive further rounds of ambitious policy
making. At the same time, this competition could derail the kinds of coopera-
tion most likely to make Paris and other agreements a success.
The Transformation of Global Climate Politics
In this special issue, we present six new articles that explore the politics of
industrial policy. The articles cluster around three key themes that emerge from
this research in the context of the broader literature and policy debate. The first
is the increased role of the state in environmental action, marking a break with
the liberal compromise of earlier eras. The second is the centering of techno-
logical innovation and technology choices in political strategies for environ-
mental action. The third is the new importance of geopolitical competition in
climate politics. It is this folding together of state power, technological change,
and geopolitical competition that gives green industrial policy its special pur-
chase in the analysis of global politics.
We frame these themes within a narrative about the transformation of
global climate politics that demonstrates the importance of green industrial
policy to recent changes in the regime. The shirking and deadlock of the Kyoto
era have been replaced by a flurry of spending announcements and net-zero
commitments by the major powers. It is too early to tell whether these actions
will produce substantial emissions reductions, but climate politics is now
marked by concerted action and competition to capture economic value in
the transition.
What caused this transformation of climate politics? In a rationalist frame-
work, one could argue that the rapid declines in the cost of wind and solar
l
D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d
f
r
o
m
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
d
i
r
e
c
t
.
m
i
t
.
l
/
/
e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d
l
f
/
/
/
/
/
2
1
4
1
1
9
7
5
1
2
9
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
4
0
p
d
.
l
f
b
y
g
u
e
s
t
t
o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3
10 (cid:129) Green Industrial Policy
between 2010 and 2015 drove a process of political change—as states saw the
costs of mitigation decline, they became more willing to take action on climate.
But as the literature on technological learning and green industrial policy has
shown, these cost declines were in fact driven by national and subnational poli-
cies (Hayashi et al. 2018; Schmidt and Sewerin 2017). We therefore suggest that
an iterative positive feedback loop developed between green industrial policy,
discursive shifts, and technological change that has produced a new opportunistic
and competitive climate politics. In short, green industrial policies motivated by
state interests spurred processes of policy learning and technology cost declines
that in turn made green industrial policies more likely and made clear the
geopolitical stakes of the energy transition. This interaction between state action
(or inaction), the domestic politics of technology, and geopolitical consider-
ations is essential to understanding the politics of green industrial policy.
The Role of the State
State action or inaction plays a central role in determining the pace of the energy
transition. This point is often missed in modeling that centers on the relative
costs of renewable and fossil energy. For decades, state action in global environ-
mental policy making was dominated by what Bernstein (2001) called the com-
promise of liberal environmentalism. Proposed solutions were dominated by
market-based policies such as efforts to put a price on pollutants. In global cli-
mate politics, this culminated in the Kyoto Protocol and subsequent efforts to
build national and regional carbon markets.
Meanwhile, state inaction was structured by the political power of fossil
fuels and the popularity of fossil fuel subsidies that made fuel cheap and society
dependent on the internal combustion engine (Oatley, this issue). This struc-
ture of interests motivated a panoply of industrial policies that entrenched and
expanded the role of fossil fuels in the economy.
However, in the 1990s, China initiated a series of green industrial policies
that transformed the market for renewable energy technologies. In subsequent
decades, the global policy community learned from these and other experi-
ments. In so doing, they argued that state action was needed to invest in infra-
structure, drive innovation, and create new industries (Meckling and Allan
2020). In particular, the originators of the “green growth” arguments at the
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific drew
inspiration from the environmental economic development policies of South
Korea and China. When the United Nations Environmental Programme devel-
oped the “green economy” framework for its work, it represented South Korea’s
and China’s green investments as models for others. In short, discussion of in-
dustrial policies helped to change the global policy discourse. The 2008 global
economic crisis increased interest in this argument, reinforcing the rise that had
begun around 2000. Thus the rise of green growth thinking was in part a reac-
l
D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d
f
r
o
m
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
d
i
r
e
c
t
.
m
i
t
.
l
/
/
e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d
l
f
/
/
/
/
/
2
1
4
1
1
9
7
5
1
2
9
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
4
0
p
d
.
l
f
b
y
g
u
e
s
t
t
o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3
Bentley Allan, Joanna I. Lewis, and Thomas Oatley
(cid:129) 11
tion to green industrial policy. All of this has inspired further experiments in
green industrial policy.
Kelsey’s contribution to this issue suggests that even small initial actions
by the state might create a positive feedback loop that further alters global
policy dynamics. In contrast to earlier work on the ozone negotiations, Kelsey’s
article focuses on the technological dynamics of the case. Kelsey examines the
ozone negotiations to argue that what she calls the “green spiral” was critical to
making these negotiations a success. In a green spiral, early negotiations result
in initial policy moves that shift the sticky material interests of industries,
forcing them to adapt to regulation. Initial adaptations in turn increase the
feasibility of more stringent regulation in subsequent negotiating rounds.
The article shows that the green spiral explains the overall success of the nego-
tiations as well as the timing and nature of the shifts in negotiating position
and regulatory behavior of participating countries. She then uses this analysis
to discuss how conceptualizing environmental negotiations as path-dependent
processes with feedback between environmental policy and economic interest
groups provides a useful lens for understanding the outcomes from climate
negotiations and how they might be improved. Thus small regulatory actions
can spur broader change.
Despite a potentially positive role, the role of the state in the energy tran-
sition is questionable because many states are invested in fossil industry. In this
special issue, Nahm and Urpelainen examine the concept of state capacity by
looking in depth at interest group opposition to green industrial policies in
China’s coal power sector. They employ a novel data set of investments in
2,675 Chinese coal power plants to show that public actors at different levels
of government have remarkably similar financial holdings in, and thus expo-
sures to, coal plants. Not only do state actors have controlling shares in the ma-
jority of nominally private coal plants in China but the majority of such plants
have investments from agencies at multiple levels of government. These findings
suggest that opposition to green industrial policies might come from within the
state itself as state-owned coal plants and government agencies with substantial
investments in such enterprises object to and strive to block policies that reduce
the value of these assets. The study highlights a predicament for the Chinese
state in climate policy: it has set ambitious goals to decarbonize but also has
a vested interest in ensuring the profitability of the world’s largest coal-fired
power generation fleet. Nahm and Urpelainen argue that this implies that we
must reconceptualize state capacity to include the ability to overcome internal
opposition.
Similarly, Gao et al.’s contribution to this special issue (discussed further
later) suggests that the balance of fossil fuel interests in a country determines the
rate of coal phaseout. Taken together, the implication of these two contributions
is that the contest between green industrial policy and fossil industrial policy,
and not the politics of carbon pricing, will set the pace of change in much of
Asia and the rest of the middle-income world.
l
D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d
f
r
o
m
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
d
i
r
e
c
t
.
m
i
t
.
l
/
/
e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d
l
f
/
/
/
/
/
2
1
4
1
1
9
7
5
1
2
9
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
4
0
p
d
.
l
f
b
y
g
u
e
s
t
t
o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3
12 (cid:129) Green Industrial Policy
The Politics of Technology Choices
Despite the failures of Kyoto and other climate policy initiatives, by 2010, there
had been significant changes in the landscape of climate policy practice and
ideas. State action through green industrial policies had initiated the process
of technology change, and green growth ideas had reframed the problem. Then,
the prices of solar and wind declined precipitously between 2010 and 2015
(IRENA 2021). These cost declines played a contributing role at Paris. They
helped to secure the support of the private sector and served as an inspiration
for initiatives like Mission Innovation. Announced at Paris, Mission Innova-
tion was a commitment by twenty-one countries, including the United States,
China, Brazil, and Germany, to double their investment in clean energy and
support the role of the private sector in the transition. It was premised on the
need to build on recent clean energy cost declines and deployments (Mission
Innovation 2015).
As Schmidt and Sewerin (2017, 1) suggest, “the Paris Agreement might
ultimately represent a paradigm shift from cost-minimizing to opportunity-
seizing, and thus from a focus on emissions to a focus on technologies.” But
the key here is that Paris was not the cause of this shift; rather, it reflected
changes set in motion by green industrial policy. As such, it reflects the power
of green industrial policy to alter the politics of energy and climate at both the
domestic and the international levels.
In this special issue, two articles examine the complex politics of technology
choice in which green industrial policies intervene. Gao et al. look at the domestic
politics of transitioning away from entrenched fossil fuel industries by examining
the politics of coal plant construction in Indonesia and Vietnam. Globally, coal is
the largest global contributor to heat-trapping carbon dioxide and must be
phased out to meet Paris Agreement targets. Most new coal plants are being built
in the Asia Pacific region, and an increasing fraction are reliant on finance and
construction services provided by government-supported and private-sector
banks in China, Japan, and South Korea, with Indonesia and Vietnam the two
leading recipients. Recent developments, however, suggest a change in coal
politics as Indonesia and Vietnam have canceled projects. Gao et al. find that in
Vietnam, which has canceled more capacity than Indonesia, fuel switching and
national planning were common reasons for canceling, whereas cancellations
in Indonesia reflect a more diverse set of factors. In addition, public opposition
appears as more of a cause for cancellation in Vietnam than in Indonesia. These
findings suggest that though coal interests remain strong in both countries,
Vietnam has moved further toward coal phaseout than Indonesia. They con-
clude that more rapid coal phaseout in Asia will require coordinated global ac-
tion and that emerging economies must be intentional about the transition to
clean energy because of entrenched fossil fuel interests in the domestic arena,
and foreign sources of finance threaten to trap them into large new investments
in dirty energy. The complexities of Asian coal politics suggest that though green
l
D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d
f
r
o
m
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
d
i
r
e
c
t
.
m
i
t
.
l
/
/
e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d
l
f
/
/
/
/
/
2
1
4
1
1
9
7
5
1
2
9
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
4
0
p
d
.
l
f
b
y
g
u
e
s
t
t
o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3
Bentley Allan, Joanna I. Lewis, and Thomas Oatley
(cid:129) 13
industrial strategies have transformative potential, they must compete with fos-
sil interests and the international politics of energy financing.
Lewis examines the evolution of green industrial policy in supporting
renewable energy (RE) technologies, particularly as countries have pledged RE
targets in the context of the Paris Agreement. The examination of the use of
green industrial policies is notably absent from most studies of RE policy de-
sign, even as they are being more frequently implemented. Given the trade
and economic concerns resulting from the use of industrial policy to support
renewable energy, Lewis argues that policy makers and researchers alike should
pay closer attention to how RE industries are being supported around the world
and continue to engage in global conversations about how best to foster clean
energy innovation, rapid technology deployment, and economic development,
with a shared vision that does not leave emerging and developing countries
behind. Furthermore, given the adverse impacts of industrial policy, she pre-
sents alternative strategies to reap local economic benefits from RE deployment.
Geopolitical Competition
The rise of green industrial policy accelerated after 2016 as a number of factors
converged. The rise of populism, and especially the election of President Trump,
shook the liberal international order. The fallout from decades of cartel politics
that neglected rising inequality has empowered populist movements denouncing
global elites and markets (Hopkin and Blyth 2019). President Trump challenged
the idea of free trade without substantially altering its practice, which opened up
political space for other attacks. This general weakening of free-trade norms and
the interconnected decline of international institutions’ authority have made it
possible for states to openly espouse nationalist economic ends. As the French
finance minister put it, building a European battery industry was a “matter of
sovereignty” (Hall and Milne 2019). Furthermore, rising economic and political
tensions with China have led both Europe and the United States to use green
industrial policy as a means to reshore value chains and compete with China.
In this special issue, Meckling and Oatley highlight different aspects of the
broader geopolitical shifts occurring in climate policy writ large. Meckling argues
that as green industrial policy has moved into the center of climate change
response, climate policy has become less a classic instance of environmental
policy and more a central component of economic and industrial policy. This
reconceptualization matters because industrial policy and environmental policy
differ in their goals, instruments, and distributional effects. Moreover, this change
in approach raises questions about how interactions between industrial and en-
vironmental logics in climate policy might affect decarbonization. Meckling takes
some initial steps to identify complementary and conflictual dynamics between
the two policy logics at the domestic and international levels. Continuing to deepen
our understanding of these policy interactions, he concludes, will be central to
leveraging the potential of industrial policy to advance environmental goals.
l
D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d
f
r
o
m
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
d
i
r
e
c
t
.
m
i
t
.
l
/
/
e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d
l
f
/
/
/
/
/
2
1
4
1
1
9
7
5
1
2
9
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
4
0
p
d
.
l
f
b
y
g
u
e
s
t
t
o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3
14 (cid:129) Green Industrial Policy
Oatley’s article provides a historical frame within which we can under-
stand the long history of global energy geopolitics and the role of the state within
it. His contribution focuses on how industrial policies have shaped the coevo-
lution of energy systems and the complexity of international order. He argues
how, over time, the complexity of international order ratchets up—the world
becomes more populous; it becomes more differentiated socially, economically,
and politically and therefore more interdependent. As societies organize many of
their activities over a larger geographic area, the amount of energy needed to sus-
tain international order thus also increases. Each turn of the coevolutionary cycle
then begins from a baseline of greater complexity. This coevolution has brought
us today to the point at which we must find new sources of energy to sustain the
most complex international order in human history. The latest tranche of green
industrial policies is initiating a new movement in this coevolution with impli-
cations for the structure and dynamics of international order. Oatley notes that a
key implication of this history is that green industrial policies confront a more
complex international order, and therefore face a harder task, than previous in-
dustrial policies did in building the fossil fuel–based order.
Toward a New Climate Politics Research Agenda Integrating Green
Industrial Policy
The rise of green industrial policy has transformed climate politics. However,
the result is a fragmented and uncertain landscape. In the era of Kyoto, the task
of global climate policy was politically difficult, but at least everyone could
envision the end point: a global system of linked carbon markets that would
raise the price of fossil fuels. The folding of political economy, populism, and
geopolitics into climate politics makes the end game much harder to envision.
A green competitive race driven by green industrial policy could pull in
finance, insurance, and other industries to produce a global decarbonization
“lock-in.” In this scenario, net-zero commitments from states and corporations
generate the cost declines necessary to establish a self-reinforcing green spiral.
An alliance of capital and thermodynamics forms, creating a race for green com-
petitiveness that drives down global emissions. Or, in another optimistic scenario,
the global rise of green industrial policy generates the domestic coalitions neces-
sary to support the Kyoto-style global carbon market that was impossible decades
before.
However, green industrial policies could also fail to generate widespread
transformation in the face of incumbent interests and fossil industrial policies.
Even if fossil energy were uneconomical, political economy could sustain it for
decades. This would set up a protracted contest between low-carbon and high-
carbon interests that would unfold as the world warmed (Colgan et al. 2021).
Even in the optimistic scenarios, there is a danger in relying on green indus-
trial policy to drive decarbonization. As Meckling explains in this issue industrial
policy and climate policy operate according to distinct logics. Industrial policy
l
D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d
f
r
o
m
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
d
i
r
e
c
t
.
m
i
t
.
l
/
/
e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d
l
f
/
/
/
/
/
2
1
4
1
1
9
7
5
1
2
9
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
4
0
p
d
.
l
f
b
y
g
u
e
s
t
t
o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3
Bentley Allan, Joanna I. Lewis, and Thomas Oatley
(cid:129) 15
seeks to change the economy, whereas climate policy remains focused on green-
house gas reductions. It is possible that a green industrial race will produce lots
of competition but little decarbonization. How can we ensure that the technolog-
ical gains translated into complete sectoral coverage with low rates of leakage? In
addition, as Lewis argues in this issue the majority of countries pursuing
industrial policies are developing countries, placing them at risk of becoming
implicated in costly trade disputes. Moreover, competition means that countries
will be duplicating efforts. Reshoring supply chains may produce a net cost to the
global economy as countries have to replicate the cost declines achieved by
competitors. We may not have the time or extra resources for such duplication.
To understand this future—as well as the future of the circular economy,
biodiversity politics, and so on—we need further work that seeks to define,
operationalize, explain, and understand green industrial policy. There is no
authoritative database of green industrial policies—building that, despite the
inherent definitional difficulty in deciding on cases, should be the first task.
Once we have better data, and more nuanced taxonomies and typologies,
scholars should seek to explain why states adopt different green industrial pol-
icies in different contexts.
Given the spread of green industrial policy and its importance to the com-
ing energy transition, we need to complement this work with an action-oriented
research agenda that analyzes the conditions under which green industrial pol-
icies will generate transformations in low-carbon industries. For example,
scholars should seek to identify which technologies are amenable to green
industrial policy (Malhotra and Schmidt 2020). Another difficult issue is how
to situate subnational, national, and supranational jurisdictions in global macro-
economic and technological contexts in such a way as to enable strategic action.
We also need a research program on the interactions between green industrial
policy and its interactions with international political economy. As Gao et al. and
Nahm and Urpelainen show in this issue, networks of finance and investment are
essential to the coming contest between green and fossil industrial policies.
Oatley’s contribution gives us a sense of the interconnections between the energy
regime, the trade and investment regime, production networks, and security, but
the mechanisms at each juncture must be better understood.
Moreover, green industrial policy runs the risk of harming welfare through
industry or state capture. This suggests the necessity of a research program on the
institutional and political-economic foundations of successful green industrial
policy. Are the conditions of success for green industrial policy similar to other
forms of industrial policy? What institutional designs can structure productive
interactions between the public and private sectors? Under what conditions can
industrial policies be translated into green spirals instead of competitive
duplication? What green industrial policies actually add value to economies
and their peoples? How can green industrial policies be harnessed to reduce
rather than exacerbate inequality? It is clear from this special issue that a rich
research program in the study of green industrial policy is needed.
l
D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d
f
r
o
m
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
d
i
r
e
c
t
.
m
i
t
.
l
/
/
e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d
l
f
/
/
/
/
/
2
1
4
1
1
9
7
5
1
2
9
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
4
0
p
d
.
l
f
b
y
g
u
e
s
t
t
o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3
16 (cid:129) Green Industrial Policy
Bentley Allan is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins
University. He has research interests in the history and theory of international
order, global environmental politics, the role of science and expertise in global
politics, and qualitative methods. His book Scientific Cosmology and International
Orders (2018) is the winner of the American Political Science Association’s Don
K. Price Award for the Best Book in Science, Technology, and Environmental
Politics. He has published articles in International Organization, International
Studies Quarterly, Review of International Political Economy, and Nature Climate
Change, among other journals.
Joanna Lewis is Provost’s Distinguished Associate Professor of Energy and En-
vironment and director of the Science, Technology, and International Affairs
Program (STIA) at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign
Service. Her research examines political and technical determinants of energy and
climate policy as well as technology transfer and innovation in the energy
sector. Much of her work focuses on China, where she has worked on energy
and climate issues for two decades. She is the author of the award-winning book
Green Innovation in China (2013), was a lead author of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change’s Fifth Assessment Report, and has published papers
in Science, Energy Policy, Energy for Sustainable Development, and Applied Energy,
among other journals.
Thomas Oatley holds the Corasaniti-Zondorak Chair of International Relations
at Tulane University in New Orleans, Louisiana. He held a research fellowship at
the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars in 2020–2021. He is
writing a book that explores the relationship between energy and international
order, one small extract of which appears as “The Death of the Carbon Coali-
tion” in Foreign Policy. His earlier work, which examines the systemic elements
of international finance, has appeared in Socio-economic Review, International
Studies Quarterly, International Organization, and the Review of International Polit-
ical Economy and as a Cambridge University Press book.
References
Aklin, Michael, and Johannes Urpelainen. 2018. Renewables: The Politics of a Global Energy
Transition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/11112
.001.0001
Aronoff, Kate, Alyssa Battistoni, Daniel Aldana Cohen, and Thea Riofrancos. 2019. A
Planet to Win: Why We Need a Green New Deal. New York, NY: Verso.
Australian Government. 2020. Technology Investment Roadmap: First Low Emissions
Technology Statement—2020. Department of Industry, Science, Energy, and Resources.
Bernstein, Steven. 2001. The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism. New York, NY:
Columbia University Press. https://doi.org/10.7312/bern12036
Biden for President. 2020. Plan for Climate Change and Environmental Justice. July 14.
Available at: https://joebiden.com/climate-plan/, last accessed October 7, 2021.
l
D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d
f
r
o
m
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
d
i
r
e
c
t
.
m
i
t
.
l
/
/
e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d
l
f
/
/
/
/
/
2
1
4
1
1
9
7
5
1
2
9
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
4
0
p
d
.
l
f
b
y
g
u
e
s
t
t
o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3
Bentley Allan, Joanna I. Lewis, and Thomas Oatley
(cid:129) 17
Birkbeck, Carolyn Deere, Thomas Hale, Lise Johnson, Emily Jones, Andreas Klaasen,
Gregory Messenger, Harro van Asselt, and Bentley Allan. 2020. Governance to Sup-
port a Global Green Deal. Future of Climate Cooperation. Available at: https://
www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/publications/governance-support-global-green-deal,
last accessed October 7, 2021.
Bloomberg. 2020. Carbon Border Tax Emerges in EU as Weapon to Protect Green Deal.
September 29. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09
-29/carbon-border-tax-emerges-in-eu-as-weapon-to-protect-green-deal, last
accessed October 7, 2021.
Breetz, Hanna, Matto Mildenberger, and Leah Stokes. 2018. The Political Logics of Clean
Energy Transitions. Business and Politics 20 (4): 492–522. https://doi.org/10.1017
/bap.2018.14
Brett, Miriam, Adrienne Buller, and Mathew Lawrence. 2020. Blueprint for a Green New
Deal. Common Wealth. Available at: https://www.common-wealth.co.uk/reports
/blueprint-for-a-green-new-deal, last accessed October 7, 2021.
Colgan, Jeff D., Jessica F. Green, and Thomas N. Hale. 2021. Asset Revaluation and the
Existential Politics of Climate Change. International Organization 75 (2): 586–610.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818320000296
Cottier, Thomas, Garba Malumfashi, Sofya Matteotti-Berkutova, Olga Nartova, Joelle De
Sepibus, and Sadeq Z. Bigdeli. 2009. Energy in WTO Law and Policy. Working
paper, NCCR Trade Regulation.
Farrell, Henry, and Abraham L. Newman. 2019. Weaponized Interdependence: How
Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion. International Security 44 (1):
42–79. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00351
Geels, Frank W., Benjamin K. Sovacool, Tim Schwanen, and Steve Sorrell. 2017. Socio-
technical Transitions for Deep Decarbonization. Science 357 (6357): 1242–1244.
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aao3760, PubMed: 28935795
Hall, Ben, and Richard Milne. 2019. Europe First: How Brussels Is Retooling Industrial
Policy. Financial Times, December 1.
Harrison, Ann, Leslie A. Martin, and Shanthi Nataraj. 2017. Green Industrial Policy in
Emerging Markets. Annual Review of Resource Economics 9 (1): 253–274. https://
doi.org/10.1146/annurev-resource-100516-053445
Hayashi, Daisuke, Joern Huenteler, and Joanna I. Lewis. 2018. Gone with the Wind:
A Learning Curve Analysis of China’s Wind Power Industry. Energy Policy
120 (September): 38–51. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2018.05.012
Helveston, John, and Jonas Nahm. 2019. China’s Key Role in Scaling Low-Carbon Energy
Technologies. Science 366 (6467): 794–796. https://doi.org/10.1126/science
.aaz1014, PubMed: 31727813
HM Government. 2013. Offshore Wind Industrial Strategy: Business and Government
Action. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads
/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/243987/ bis-13-1092-offshore-wind
-industrial-strategy.pdf, last accessed October 14, 2021.
Hopkin, Jonathan. 2017. When Polanyi Met Farage: Market Fundamentalism, Eco-
nomic Nationalism, and Britain’s Exit from the European Union. British Journal
of Politics and International Relations 19 (3): 465–478. https://doi.org/10.1177
/1369148117710894
Hopkin, Jonathan, and Mark Blyth. 2019. The Global Economics of European Populism:
Growth Regimes and Party System Change in Europe (The Government and
l
D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d
f
r
o
m
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
d
i
r
e
c
t
.
m
i
t
.
l
/
/
e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d
l
f
/
/
/
/
/
2
1
4
1
1
9
7
5
1
2
9
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
4
0
p
d
.
l
f
b
y
g
u
e
s
t
t
o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3
18 (cid:129) Green Industrial Policy
Opposition/Leonard Schapiro Lecture 2017). Government and Opposition 54 (2):
193–225. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2018.43
Hopkins, Matthew, and Yin Li. 2016. The Rise of the Chinese Solar Photovoltaic Industry.
In China as an Innovation Nation, 1st ed., edited by Yu Zhou, William Lazonick, and
Yifei Sun. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso
/9780198753568.003.0012
Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs. 2013. Local Content
Requirements: A Global Problem. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
IRENA. 2013. 30 Years of Policies for Wind Energy: Lessons from 12 Wind Energy Markets.
Available at: https://www.irena.org/publications/2013/Jan/30-Years-of-Policies-for
-Wind-Energy-Lessons-from-12-Wind-Energy-Markets, last accessed October 7, 2021.
IRENA. 2021. IRENA Global Trends in Renewable Energy Costs. Available at: https://
www.irena.org/Statistics/ View-Data-by-Topic/Costs/Global-Trends, last accessed
October 14, 2021.
IRENA Global Commission. 2019. A New World: Geopolitics of Energy Transformation. Abu
Dhabi: IRENA.
Kuntze, Jan-Christoph, and Tom Moerenhout. 2013. Local Content Requirements and the
Renewable Energy Industry—A Good Match? ICTSD. Available at: https://unctad
.org/system/files/non-official-document/DITC_TED_13062013_Study_ICTSD.pdf,
last accessed October 14, 2021. https://doi.org/10.7215/GP_IP_20130603
Lewis, Joanna I. 2013. Green Innovation in China: China’s Wind Power Industry and the
Global Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy. New York, NY: Columbia University
Press. https://doi.org/10.7312/lewi15330
Lewis, Joanna I. 2014. The Rise of Renewable Energy Protectionism: Emerging Trade
Conflicts and Implications for Low Carbon Development. Global Environmental
Politics 14 (4): 10–35. https://doi.org/10.1162/GLEP_a_00255
Lewis, Joanna I. 2020. Toward a New Era of US Engagement with China on Climate
Change. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 21: 173–181. https://doi.org
/10.1353/gia.2020.0032
Lewis, Joanna I. 2021. Renewable Energy Support Measures and Industrial Policies
Database. Mendeley Data 1.
Lewis, Joanna I., and Ryan H. Wiser. 2007. Fostering a Renewable Energy Technology
Industry: An International Comparison of Wind Industry Policy Support Mechanisms.
Energy Policy 35 (3): 1844–1857. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2006.06.005
Liu, Chuyu, and Johannes Urpelainen. 2021. Why the United States Should Compete
with China on Global Clean Energy Finance. Brookings (blog), January 7. Available
at: https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-the-united-states-should-compete
-with-china-on-global-clean-energy-finance/, last accessed October 7, 2021.
Malhotra, Abhishek, and Tobias S. Schmidt. 2020. Accelerating Low-Carbon Innovation.
Joule 4 (11): 2259–2267. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joule.2020.09.004
Meckling, Jonas, and Bentley B. Allan. 2020. The Evolution of Ideas in Global Climate Policy.
Nature Climate Change 10 (5): 434–438. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-020-0739-7
Meckling, Jonas, Nina Kelsey, Eric Biber, and John Zysman. 2015. Winning Coalitions for
Climate Policy. Science 349 (6253): 1170–1171. https://doi.org/10.1126/science
.aab1336, PubMed: 26359392
Meckling, Jonas, and Jonas Nahm. 2019. The Politics of Technology Bans: Industrial Policy
Competition and Green Goals for the Auto Industry. Energy Policy 126 (March):
470–479. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2018.11.031
l
D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d
f
r
o
m
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
d
i
r
e
c
t
.
m
i
t
.
l
/
/
e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d
l
f
/
/
/
/
/
2
1
4
1
1
9
7
5
1
2
9
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
4
0
p
d
.
l
f
b
y
g
u
e
s
t
t
o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3
Bentley Allan, Joanna I. Lewis, and Thomas Oatley
(cid:129) 19
Mission Innovation. 2015. Mission Innovation Joint Launch Statement. Available at:
https://www.mission-innovation.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/ Mission
-Innovation-Joint-Launch-Statement.pdf, last accessed October 7, 2021.
Murphy, Luke. 2019. An Industrial Strategy at the Heart of a Green New Deal. Common
Wealth. Available at: https://www.common-wealth.co.uk/reports/an-industrial
-strategy-at-the-heart-of-a-green-new-deal#chapter-5, last accessed October 7, 2021.
Nahm, Jonas. 2021. Collaborative Advantage: Forging Green Industries in the New Global
Economy. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso
/9780197555361.001.0001
NewClimate Institute. 2021. Climate Policy Database. Available at: https://
climatepolicydatabase.org/, last accessed October 7, 2021.
Oatley, Thomas, and Mark Blyth. 2021. The Death of the Carbon Coalition. Foreign
Policy, February 12.
Ocasio-Cortez, Alexandria. 2019. Text—H.Res.109—116th Congress (2019–2020):
Recognizing the Duty of the Federal Government to Create a Green New Deal.
February 12. Available at: https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house
-resolution/109/text, last accessed October 7, 2021.
Overland, Indra. 2019. The Geopolitics of Renewable Energy: Debunking Four Emerging
Myths. Energy Research and Social Science 49: 36–40. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss
.2018.10.018
Parker, George, Jim Pickard, Nathalie Thomas, and Peter Campbell. 2020. Johnson Seeks
Down St Reset with ‘Green Industrial Revolution.’ Financial Times, November 17.
Proctor, Katie. 2019. Labour Manifesto Promises 1m Green Jobs to Tackle Climate Crisis.
The Guardian, November 21.
Rodrik, Dani. 2014. Green Industrial Policy. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 30 (3):
469–491. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/gru025
Sbragia, Alberta. 2010. The EU, the US, and Trade Policy: Competitive Interdependence
in the Management of Globalization. Journal of European Public Policy 17 (3):
368–382. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501761003662016
Schmidt, Tobias S., and Sebastian Sewerin. 2017. Technology as a Driver of Climate and
Energy Politics. Nature Energy 2 (6): 1–3. https://doi.org/10.1038/nenergy.2017.84
Scholten, Daniel. 2018. The Geopolitics of Renewables. New York, NY: Springer. https://doi
.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67855-9
Stein, Jeff, and Jeanne Whalen. 2021. President Biden’s Second Big Bill May Be China
Package Pushed by Top Senate Democrat. Washington Post, March 10.
Thomas, Nathalie. 2020. Johnson Urged to Match Biden’s Clean Energy Goals. Financial
Times, November 29.
Thurbon, Elizabeth, Hao Tan, John Mathews, and Sung-Young Kim. 2020. South Korea’s
Green New Deal Shows the World What a Smart Economic Recovery Looks Like.
The Conversation, September 9. Available at: https://theconversation.com/south
-koreas-green-new-deal-shows-the-world-what-a-smart-economic-recovery-looks
-like-145032, last accessed October 7, 2021.
Vokalchuk, Roman, Daniel Scholten, and Indra Overland. 2020. Renewable Energy and
Geopolitics: A Review. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 122 (April): 1–12.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2019.109547
l
D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d
f
r
o
m
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
d
i
r
e
c
t
.
m
i
t
.
l
/
/
e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d
l
f
/
/
/
/
/
2
1
4
1
1
9
7
5
1
2
9
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
4
0
p
d
.
l
f
b
y
g
u
e
s
t
t
o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3
Download pdf