Participating or Just Talking?

Participating or Just Talking?
Jonathan Rosenberg and Linus Spencer Thomas

Participating or Just Talking?
Sustainable Development Councils and
the Implementation of Agenda 21


Jonathan Rosenberg and Linus Spencer Thomas*

Democracy, Institutions, and Sustainability

Sustainable Development Councils were among the few speciªc institutional
recommendations to come out of the United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. They have
also been among the few concrete, national-level institutional manifestations of
the global commitment to sustainable development proclaimed in the two
main UNCED documents, the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21. As with most
post-Rio developments, the results achieved by the Sustainable Development
Councils (hereafter SDCs or councils) have been mixed. At their best, the coun-
cils represent concerted efforts by states, civil society, and international organi-
zations at a critical juncture of three basic principles laid out at Rio: (1) future
development must be economically, socially, and environmentally sustainable;
(2) sustainable development requires substantive and institutionalized stake-
holder participation;1 (3) developed countries have a responsibility to support
the costs incurred by developing countries in making development sustainable.2
At their worst they represent the frustrations and unmet challenges of the thir-
teen years since Rio.

In this paper, we offer case studies of three SDCs in small-island develop-
ing states (SIDS) in the Eastern Caribbean: Dominica, Saint Lucia, and Grenada.

* The authors wish to express their sincere thanks to the members of the Grenada Sustainable
Development Council. Their cooperation, enthusiasm and support helped make this research
possible. This research was supported by a Visiting Professorship for Dr. Rosenberg at the Wind-
ward Islands Research and Education Foundation of St. George’s University, Grenada. Any
errors or omissions and all opinions presented are the sole responsibility of the authors.

1. Precise theoretical and operational deªnitions of “sustainability” have been widely debated
(see for example Achterberg 1996). We rely on the Brundtland deªnition because it has
achieved the widest currency of any of the contenders and because it is the one that informs ma-
jor international conferences and conventions, including the Rio Accords and Agenda 21. It
deªnes sustainable development as “Development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs” (World Commission on
Environment and Development 1987).

2. United Nations Environment Programme 2001 and 1994.

Global Environmental Politics 5:2, May 2005
© 2005 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

61

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62 •

Participating or Just Talking?

Originally, six Eastern Caribbean SDCs were attempted. Only one is currently
functioning—the Sustainable Development Council of Grenada. Still, there is
much to be gained from subjecting both the successes and the failures to a com-
parative case study. First, we may be able to explain the variation we ªnd in each
country’s responses to the relatively vague guidance offered by the Rio docu-
ments. Second, we can question why state and civil society reacted differently to
fundamentally similar national conditions and resource limitations in three
countries. Third, there is still considerable interest and hope, in several Eastern
Caribbean SIDS, that some variation of the SDC model will take root. Finally,
there is reason to believe that the lessons derived from Eastern Caribbean cases
will be of interest in other small developing states.

The Sustainable Development Councils—in Principle and Practice

Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration states:

Environmental issues are best handled with participation of all concerned
citizens, at the relevant level.

At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to
information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities,
including information on hazardous materials and activities in their com-
munities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes.
States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by
making information widely available. Effective access to judicial and admin-
istrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.3

Chapter 8 of Agenda 21 calls for the strengthening of national institutional
capacity for the purpose of

Establishing domestically determined ways and means to ensure the coher-
ence of sectoral, economic, social, and environmental policies, plans, and
policy instruments, including ªscal measures and the budget; these mecha-
nisms should apply at various levels and bring together those interested in
the development process . . .

Governments, in cooperation, where appropriate, with international orga-
nizations, should strengthen national institutional capability and capacity
to integrate social, economic, developmental, and environmental issues at
all levels of development decision-making and implementation. Attention
should be given to moving away from narrow sectoral approaches, progress-
ing towards full cross-sectoral coordination and cooperation.4

Guided by these two documents, the Eastern Caribbean councils were estab-
lished on a standard pattern. During their formation they received a small
amount of funding and technical support from the United Nations Develop-

3. United Nations Environment Programme 2000.
4. United Nations Environment Programme 2001.

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Jonathan Rosenberg and Linus Spencer Thomas

• 63

ment Programme Capacity 21 Project, administered by a partner regional orga-
nization. In the Eastern Caribbean the Capacity 21 partner agency was the Ca-
ribbean Centre for Development Administration (CARICAD). CARICAD
worked through national “focal points” (responsible individuals) who issued
invitations to membership and acted as provisional conveners of the councils.
Invitations were made with an eye toward balanced representation from govern-
ment, the private sector, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and commu-
nity-based organizations (CBOs).

Terms of reference for each of the six Eastern Caribbean SDCs established
in the mid-1990s stipulate the following functions: an advisory role vis-à-vis
government policy-making processes, a coordinating role in planning and ad-
ministration, support to government in pursuing holistic approaches to devel-
opment policy, broad representation of all interested sectors and organizations,
and liaison with international organizations and external funding sources.5 In
practice, which of these functions were given precedence, how each SDC at-
tempted to realize them, and the institutional relationship of each SDC to its re-
spective national government proved critical to the councils’ effectiveness and
survivability. But the relationship between a council’s effectiveness and its sur-
vival has been neither linear nor direct.

Thus, even our small sample gives us considerable variability as to proce-
dural and structural aspects of Sustainable Development Councils (e.g., leader-
ship, membership, scope of responsibilities, and methods of institutional-
ization); the formal and informal relationships between such bodies and their
national governments and civil societies; and their effectiveness for ensuring the
sustainability of development policies and programs.

Ultimately, our purpose is to extract lessons that might lead to the estab-
lishment of long-lived and effective councils or similar bodies and to provide
practical lessons about the present and future of environmentally sustainable
development in highly vulnerable states by pointing out: (1) key political fac-
tors in the relationship between participatory democracy and environmental
sustainability and (2) the need for and limits to external support for participa-
tory practices in small democratic states.

Participation, Institutions, and the Environment: Some Theoretical Considerations

The theoretical case for ecological democracy is powerfully made from a variety
of ideological perspectives. Although much of the relevant literature delves
more deeply into democratic theory than is necessary for present purposes,
most of it supports a positive relationship between sustainability and participa-
tory policy-making processes. To ªnd essential value in participatory practices
one need not go as far as Mills (1996), who labels centralized, technocratic ad-
ministration of environmental policy “ecoauthoritarian.” It is enough to know

5. Fairclough 1996.

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64 •

Participating or Just Talking?

that both liberals and social democrats, regardless of their disagreements about
the socio-economic causes of environmental degradation, have supported ap-
proaches that emphasize active and substantive consultation of affected and in-
terested communities.6 The arguments in favor of democratic approaches are
supported by studies of developed democracies;7 transitional polities in Eastern
Europe, Asia, and Latin America;8 and democratic developing countries.9

The argument in favor of a special role for environmental movements in
democratization is probably clearest in the literature on deliberative democracy.
Barry, for example, argues that due to the greater responsiveness of democratic
institutions to new issues and demands, and the role played by environmental-
ists in democratization, there is an undeniably “positive relationship between
democratic institutions and ecological protection.”10 Still, there is considerable
disagreement over the meaning and means of democratic decision-making, the
ways in which environmentalism affects and is affected by liberal democracy,
the proper mix of centralization and decentralization for good environmental
management, and the right mix of technocracy and “indigenous knowledge.”11
Furthermore, even though calls for rethinking institutional arrangements are
routinely included in analyses of sustainable development policy-making, there
is insufªcient theory to guide the selection of particular decision-making pro-
cesses or institutional arrangements.12

There is, of course, an extensive case-study literature on stakeholder partic-
ipation, but it usually focuses either on the grassroots, treating environmental-
ism as a type of new social movement,13 or on the ways that environmentalist
parties and interest groups directly affect electoral and legislative politics.14
There are, however, several studies, including some on the Caribbean, that con-
tain suggestions for institutional reform and innovation.

Deliberative democracy theorists point out the inherent limitations of the
electoral and legislative processes of liberal democracy for achieving the kind of
full stakeholder identiªcation and engagement recommended by Agenda 21.15
Parliamentary democracy in the Eastern Caribbean is no exception and the
small population size of Eastern Caribbean states presents some particular chal-
lenges. Accountability in the Westminster system relies on disciplined parties
with broad class and/or ideological constituencies; a large, professionalized,
and independent civil service; and civil society organizations that are either
institutionally linked to parties or able to inºuence government and state

6. Christoff 1996, 162.
7. Janicke 1996; and Hayward 1996.
8. Mumme and Korzetz 1997; Desai 1998; and Lee, Hsiao, Liu et al. 1999.
9. Nielson and Stern 1997, 146–151; Silva 1997; and Rosenberg and Korsmo 2001.
10. Barry 1996, 116–7.
11. Cooke and Kothari 2001.
12. Ostrom 1990; Fiorino 1996; and Fischer 2000.
13. Bryner 2001, Chapter 1; Szasz 1999; and Taylor 1995a.
14. For example, Kitschelt 1993.
15. Meadowcroft 2004, 181–187.

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Jonathan Rosenberg and Linus Spencer Thomas

• 65

decision-makers directly. But Eastern Caribbean parliaments are small and par-
ties tend to be personalistic, limiting the ability of civil society and the business
community to shape party manifestos and policy decisions.16 Small popula-
tions also limit the pools of qualiªed personnel to lead government, state agen-
cies, and NGOs. Leaders may move among government, state agencies, civil
society, and the business community as governments and economic opportuni-
ties change.17 Therefore, without institutional innovation it can be difªcult to
introduce new perspectives and methods of policy-making.

The introduction of environmental sustainability as a consideration in de-
velopment policy—via Agenda 21—ultimately required compromise, coopera-
tion, and new methods of accountability. Each state has dealt with the chal-
lenges differently, and with differing degrees of success. Eastern Caribbean
NGOs and quasi-governmental organizations can claim signiªcant accomplish-
ments in developing and applying methods of stakeholder identiªcation and in
the creation of innovative natural resource management schemes.18 In Do-
minica, Saint Lucia, and Grenada there are examples of stakeholders from
government, civil society, and the business community establishing new institu-
tions for cooperation and accountability in deªning problems, setting direc-
tions and implementing policies and programs for sustainable resource use.19
However, these states have not yet institutionalized the kind of national level it-
erative processes envisioned by the advocates of deliberative democracy.20 For
that, Meadowcroft suggests, “meso” level organizations, “where the personnel
and structures of the state meet individuals and groups rooted in civil and com-
mercial life,” hold the most promise for spreading substantive deliberative prac-
tices “to a speciªc policy sector such as environmental decision making.” He
suggests also that “such practices can enhance societal learning” related to envi-
ronmental and natural resource policy-making and implementation.21

Given their broad, tripartite representative structure, the councils seem to
satisfy the requirements of a “meso” level organization through which each par-
ticipating sector may add to its own capacity and the capacity of the state to
make and implement sustainable development policy. International environ-
mental NGOs, international organizations, and bi-lateral and multilateral aid

16. Ryan 2002, 244–246.
17. This is particularly true in Saint Lucia and Dominica. For example, during the time this research
was conducted the founding director of the St. Lucia Heritage Tourism Programme left to head
a government ministry and Dominica’s Chief Fisheries Ofªcer left government for private busi-
ness while retaining his seat on the Scott’s Head/Soufriere Marine Reserve Local Area Manage-
ment Authority. NGO and government ofªcials working in the region speak of GONGOs (Gov-
ernment Organized Nongovernmental Organizations).

18. Renard 2001.
19. Renard, Brown, and Geoghegan 2001; and Bass 2000. See also the web site of the Small Island
Developing States Network at http://www.sidsnet.org/successtories/ for a list of arguably suc-
cessful cases of “participatory environmental planning” in Caribbean and other small island
developing states.

20. Caribbean Natural Resources Institute 2003.
21. Meadowcroft 2004, 188.

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66 •

Participating or Just Talking?

agencies have clearly identiªed the need for that kind of capacity building in
their policy and case-history documents, and typically link capacity building to
democratization. For example, writing for the World Resources Institute,
Zazueta notes that

In strengthening the organizational capacities of NGOs and GROs [grass-
roots organizations] in Latin America, three challenges stand out as particu-
larly important: (1) deªning their speciªc roles and developing the corre-
sponding skills to contribute effectively to solving the complex problems
that they are being asked to address; (2) obtaining enough long-term
ªnancial assistance to be able to focus on strategic planning and implemen-
tation of projects; (3) joining forces to open political spaces and to confront
common problems with all those involved in attaining sustainable develop-
ment.22

Generalizations abound as to how these goals may be achieved. But par-
ticular types of solutions can only be derived from speciªc cases, most of which
seem to have developed through trial and error involving changing relation-
ships among governments, aid agencies, communities, and dedicated individu-
als. A complete typology would be beyond the scope of this paper, but we can
offer a few observations that place the SDCs in a broader context.

In the case-study literature we ªnd two polar types of participatory ar-
rangements. The ªrst is community-based—usually presented as either sponta-
neous or traditional—in which local groups wishing to remedy particular prob-
lems form (or existing groups re-orient themselves) to confront, circumvent or
supplement conventional political authority. Organizational structures and
methods vary with the larger political context, group membership, resources,
and the nature of the problem.23 The second type is broader-based. Groups with
national or regional memberships organize around more comprehensive envi-
ronmental agendas to affect legislative and electoral outcomes. These groups
may operate as political parties or conventional interest groups. As interest
groups, their positions and methods run the gamut from those of radical exter-
nal pressure groups to partners in corporatist or neo-corporatist arrangements
convened by governments to assist in policy formulation and implementa-
tion.24

However, there are many more innovative, resilient, and cooperative
arrangements in which organized grassroots actors participate in deliberative
processes. First, local NGOs and CBOs are not necessarily spontaneous or tradi-
tional. Many have shown great capacity for adapting to new challenges, taking
on new functions, and engaging a variety of local, national, and international
actors and issues.25 Second, in the Eastern Caribbean the distinctions between

22. Zazueta 1993, 1–2. See also, for example, Global Environmental Facility 1996; Organization of

American States 2001; Anderson 2000; and Inter-American Development Bank 2000.

23. Taylor 1995b; Rigg and Stott 1998; and Lee and So 1999.
24. Bryner 2001, Chapter 2; Lee, Hsiao, Liu, et al. 1999; and Lipschutz and Conca 1993.
25. See, for example, Pinchón, Uquillas, and Frechione 1999; and Langer and Muñoz 2003.

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Jonathan Rosenberg and Linus Spencer Thomas

• 67

state and civil society are not always clear-cut or historically ªxed. For example,
Grenada’s Agency for Rural Transformation (ART), which began as a state
agency under Maurice Bishop’s People’s Revolutionary Government, was shut
down after the US invasion, later to be reconstituted as a nongovernmental um-
brella organization for rural CBOs, development, cultural, and conservation
projects. ART has supported the formation of rural community and women’s
groups that have effectively instituted ongoing water conservation and eco-
nomic development projects and has been active in the Grenada SDC.26 In Saint
Lucia, the National Trust has helped organize several community-managed ru-
ral development and conservation projects; the Caribbean Natural Resources
Institute (a regional NGO discussed further below) has helped create successful
local resource management associations; and the Cultural Heritage Tourism
Programme has supported the development of community-based tourism pro-
jects.27 In Dominica, the Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries Division oversaw the
creation of a local management authority for a marine reserve.28

Not surprisingly, then, the Sustainable Development Councils are not,
strictly speaking, grassroots participatory bodies. Neither are they corporatist or
neo-corporatist “elite” or “peak” organizations. They are, instead, a special case
of representative body convened to advise government and evolving to take on
other roles: assisting government, acting independently or becoming absorbed
by state agencies. Members are expected to report to and reºect the interests of
their constituencies, even though they are not elected by their organizations
speciªcally to sit on the councils. Organizations are represented on the councils
through a mixture of invitation and self-selection, and the membership tends to
be drawn mainly from leadership positions in public and private sector organi-
zations. Although the particular mix of membership in an SDC can lend itself to
indirect representation of some grassroots groups and interests, other interested
sectors of society may be left out. As is typical of elite-level bodies, some of this
exclusiveness is the result of selectivity—based on a desire to keep the council
to a manageable size and allow for presentations and debate of technical issues
at a fairly high intellectual level—and some of it is idiosyncratic, random or
political.

Responses to Agenda 21: The Barbados Conference

Most small-island developing states ratiªed Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration
immediately. Perhaps because of the high level of economic and environmental
vulnerability to global change, SIDS were leaders in making institutional
responses to Agenda 21.

26. See “History” and “Programmes” at http://www.spiceisle.com/homepages/art/.http://www

.spiceisle.com/homepages/art/

27. See “Community Based Tourism” at http://www.stluciaheritage.com/default.htm; “Manage-
ment Areas” at http://www.slunatrust.org/; Geohegan and Smith 1998; and Renard 2001.

28. Lawrence, Magliore, and Guiste n.d.

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68 •

Participating or Just Talking?

The institutionalization process began to take shape in 1994 when the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) convened the Global Con-
ference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States in
Barbados. The conference produced the Declaration of Barbados and the
Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island De-
veloping States. The Programme of Action was developed for the express pur-
pose of implementing Agenda 21 and reºects the intensity of concern among
SIDS governments and NGOs about the environmental issues raised at Rio. The
Barbados Declaration, in language adopted directly from Agenda 21, empha-
sizes the need to develop institutional capacity for disaster preparedness, the
mitigation and prevention of environmental degradation using methods con-
sistent with the economic interests of SIDS, and the need to pursue external
funding. As with Agenda 21, the Barbados Programme calls for action in areas
eligible for funding by the Global Environment Facility (GEF), a new source of
grants established by UNDP, the UN Environment Programme, and the World
Bank in 1991 and focused on biodiversity, climate change, international waters,
ozone depletion, and land degradation. Consistent with Agenda 21, the Barba-
dos documents link all of these issues with the need for the institutional
mainstreaming of new sustainable development policy-making mechanisms
that are broad-based, authoritative, and participatory.

Even before the Barbados meeting, most Caribbean SIDS had already con-
sidered some kind of sustainable development task force. The Barbados Decla-
ration recognized those efforts by pledging to

Give sustainable development task forces or their equivalent the ofªcial au-
thority and validity to permit their continued meeting as interdisciplinary
and communally representative advisory bodies.29

Immediately following the Barbados conference, the Unit for Environmental
Policy Management of UNDP created Capacity 21. The program provided
ªnancial support, technical assistance, and training to build institutional capac-
ity in Dominica, Grenada, Saint Lucia, Barbados, Jamaica, and the British Virgin
Islands. UNDP provided a total of US$750,000 to the Caribbean Development
Bank, the designated facilitating institution. The Caribbean Centre for Develop-
ment Administration (CARICAD), a regional intergovernmental organization
based in Barbados, was selected as the implementing agency.30

UNDP and CARICAD dedicated a substantial portion of the funds to a se-
ries of national consultations evaluating local efforts and capacity and promot-
ing the establishment of new, tripartite consultative bodies.31

29. United Nations 2000, 51.
30. Unless otherwise indicated, the account of CARICAD’s role comes from a personal interview
conducted by Dr. Rosenberg with Angela R. Skeete, Regional Programme Coordinator, Carib-
bean Centre for Development Administration (CARICAD), Bridgetown, Barbados, 22 February
2002. Ms. Skeete was CARICAD Project Ofªcer for Capacity 21.

31. See for example CARICAD 1995, and 1996. The Dominica consultation was the ªrst of six in

the Eastern Caribbean.

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A major thrust of the capacity building effort will be the establishment of
Sustainable Development Councils or a related mechanism in each of the
participating countries. Participation in these consultative bodies will in-
clude government agencies, business and commercial associations and com-
munity-based organizations. Through the councils, the required administra-
tive and management devices of sustainable development plans and
programmes will be strengthened. The responsibility of selecting, analysing
and promoting activities and identifying policy issues related to priority ar-
eas, through a process of consultation, will be a major undertaking of the
project.32

Prior to the national consultations CARICAD selected “focal points” in the
six participating Caribbean countries. Selections were based on the assumption
that the best way to mainstream sustainability was to introduce it directly into
the planning process via well-placed ofªcials supported by expert private-sector
and NGO input. Therefore, the focal points were mainly from planning minis-
tries or related state or quasi-governmental institutions; they were expected to
convene councils that would provide an institutionalized platform for building
national consensus on the compatibility of environmental sustainability and
economic development.

The national consultations were guided, but broadly representative, partic-
ipatory processes in which the agenda and expectations of UNDP and
CARICAD were modiªed according to the input received. From the outset, the
ultimate aim was to form SDCs. At the end, CARICAD program ofªcers in-
structed their national focal points to issue invitations to a select steering com-
mittee for the purposes of forming a council.

While UNDP and CARICAD clearly encouraged stakeholder participation
and faithfully pursued the objectives for participatory policy-making set forth in
Agenda 21, their methodology shaped the SDCs in four ways that were to deter-
mine their effectiveness and survivability: (1) the requirement that the councils
be headed by ofªcials of governmental or quasi-governmental organizations;
(2) the guided selection of leadership and membership; (3) the tripartite—
government, private sector, and NGO/CBO—representation scheme; and
(4) the goal of authoritative input into speciªc areas of policy-making.

Capacity 21 guidelines required the councils to be permanent bodies
bringing together government, NGOs and CBOs, with private sector users, pro-
ducers, marketers, and consumers of resources, headed by a government ofªcial
for whom sustainable development was a primary responsibility. Typically, the
head of the SDC would also be a member of a governmental sustainable devel-
opment unit.33 The councils were to convene regular meetings to review and ad-

32. Caribbean Centre for Development Administration 1995, 2.
33. The Caribbean Development Bank authorized the disbursement of Capacity 21 funds in
tranches, at the beginning of each stage of the process determined by UNDP and CARICAD.
Therefore, each of the six countries received a limited amount of funds to develop the post of
council head, issue invitations and convene the ªrst meeting (personal interview by Rosenberg
with A. Skeete).

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70 •

Participating or Just Talking?

vise on development policy and programs, and to call government’s attention to
concerns about the sustainability of ongoing activities and existing programs.
Through their relationship with the sustainable development unit, SDCs would
be in a position to review all development policy for sustainability and ensure
compliance with international agreements and the requirements of external
funding agencies. The sustainable development units were to have unique au-
thority to affect decisions made by several ministries. The SDCs were to provide
a source of input and local expertise to support the functions of the unit.34

To date the SDCs have been, at best, partially successful, while the sustain-
able development units have yet to fully establish themselves as inºuential enti-
ties within their respective governments. The experiences of Dominica and Saint
Lucia are indicative.35

SDCs in Dominica and Saint Lucia

The National Sustainable Development Council of Dominica was created by the
Government of Dominica in 1995. It numbered thirteen members, the majority
being from individual businesses and business associations involved in tour-
ism, manufacturing, construction and services. The SDC was mandated to coor-
dinate all development projects. All projects proposed by the government or
submitted to the government from the private sector were supposed to come
through the council. In addition, the council was charged with monitoring and
ensuring compliance with international environmental treaties and programs
(such as Agenda 21, the Montreal Protocol, and conventions on desertiªcation
and biodiversity).

From the beginning the Dominica SDC was weak, poorly funded, and suf-
fered from organizational problems. Politically, the council was in a difªcult po-
sition. To carry out its mandate it would have to act as a virtual “super-ministry”
with authority to review and revise any policy with potential environmental im-
pact coming from any other agency. The potential for conºict with senior
agency heads and cabinet ministers was great. The council drew up Terms of Ref-
erence for dissemination to the government ministries affected by its mandate.
They were ignored. Originally, the council was subsidiary to the pre-existing

34. United Nations Environment Programme 2001. This general description of the roles and struc-
ture of the SDCs and sustainable development units is consistent with the mandate laid out in
Agenda 21. It was conªrmed to Rosenberg that the SDCs in Dominica and Saint Lucia were es-
tablished to conform to Agenda 21 speciªcations. Interview with Christopher Corbin, Castries,
St. Lucia 29 May 1998, 31 May 1999 and 12 February 2002; interview with Gerard Hill, Co-
ordinator Sustainable Development Council, Roseau, Dominica, 21 May 1998; and the author’s
observation of a meeting of the Grenada Sustainable Development Council, St. George’s, Gre-
nada, 18 June 1999, and on three occasions in November and December of 2001 and January
of 2002.

35. The following discussion of the Dominica National Sustainable Development Council and En-
vironmental Coordinating Unit is based on the interview with Gerard Hill cited above, and
Government of Grenada n.d.

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Jonathan Rosenberg and Linus Spencer Thomas

• 71

National Development Council in whose building its ofªce was located and
from which it drew its coordinator and staff. The National Development Coun-
cil is a statutory body concerned primarily with manufacturing and tourism.
Thus, its jurisdiction overlapped that of the SDC, and its mandate—to promote
growth—often contradicted the SDC’s goals of sustainability and broader stake-
holder participation.

Relations between the functional ministries of the government and the
National Development Council were well established. Neither the National De-
velopment Council nor the economic and planning ministries of the govern-
ment were willing to share responsibility with the SDC, a body headed by a ju-
nior administrator with the unenviable task of demanding that his seniors
relinquish some of their control over development policy. At best, the SDC was
able to review and make recommendations on speciªc projects directed to it by
the National Development Council and the ministries. Otherwise, the SDC co-
ordinator acted mainly as a liaison with representatives of international organi-
zations, greeting them and introducing them to the responsible ofªcials. It also
acted as a clearinghouse for the National Development Council and the minis-
tries for communications coming from international organizations and drafted
guidelines on compliance with international and regional initiatives.

The challenges to forming a viable SDC in Saint Lucia were similar. After
Barbados, the government held meetings on sustainable development and
made national environmental plans and surveys. Those efforts were mostly ad
hoc and informal and did not receive the full blessing of policy-makers. Govern-
ment did not seek legislative authority for an environmental coordinating unit,
and the responsible agencies did not buy into the desirability of having an SDC.
Through the 1990s, systematic effort to bring stakeholder participation into the
planning process was stymied by a “top-down” institutional culture and compe-
tition over administrative jurisdiction. The main body for convening stake-
holders involved in planning and development was the Saint Lucia Develop-
ment Control Authority (DCA), made up of representatives of public and
private entities involved in economic development. The DCA, which operated
out of the Physical Planning Department, with the Chief Planner acting as its
Executive Secretary, controlled much of the physical planning for construction,
zoning, and public works and had no tradition of consultation or participation
beyond its own membership. Even the DCA has been weakened by the occa-
sional practice of top political ofªcials overriding its decisions to approve pro-
jects that both the DCA and stakeholders had rejected or canceling projects that
stakeholders and the DCA had approved. Government (public works) projects
traditionally did involve some public hearings, but those hearings were rarely
substantive consultations.

Funding was also a problem for the SDCs. Capacity 21 funds were quickly
exhausted by the initial organizational work, leaving nothing to actually carry
out the councils’ sweeping mandate. SDCs became dependent on the limited

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72 •

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amounts of external funding available for speciªc projects and initiatives. In
Dominica, that included a share of a GEF grant given to the Organization of
Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) to promote regional land management and
Organization of American States (OAS) funds, distributed through the OECS, to
promote integrated regional development.

Thus, by the middle of 1998, the SDC coordinator in Dominica was left to
hope that the OECS/OAS project and pending grant applications to the GEF
could raise the council’s proªle and provide it with enough funds to eventually
carry out its original mandate. But the comprehensive mission of the SDCs put
them outside the mandate of the GEF. Even though their interests and responsi-
bilities included all GEF areas, GEF explicitly excludes institution building and
projects that integrate multiple areas of concern.

The GEF application was unsuccessful and one year later the Dominica
SDC was moribund. However, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Environment
did receive a grant from the GEF, under the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change, to expand institutional capacity by forming a new En-
vironmental Coordinating Unit. The GEF grant provided funds for a director,
two associates, and a secretary for 18 months. The former coordinator of the
SDC became the ªrst associate. As of early 2002 a secretary had been hired and a
director and second associate were being sought. The details have yet to be
worked out concerning the fate of the SDC and its relationship to the new unit.
But the unit’s relationship to its new home ministry is potentially clearer than
the relationship between the SDC and the National Development Council. The
unit has less autonomy and more governmental authority than the SDC and is
intended to be a fully empowered division of the Ministry of Agriculture and the
Environment, on par with the Forestry and Fisheries Divisions. It should sub-
sume all duties and responsibilities of the SDC pertaining to ministry programs
and actively solicit stakeholder input into all its decisions. It will also act as a
clearinghouse for information on GEF grants, which are expected to become an
important source of funding for environmentally sustainable development. The
establishment of the unit was the result of nearly three years of pressure by the
former coordinator of the SDC on the government, which had promised to es-
tablish such a unit in its 1995 electoral manifesto.

The Environmental Coordination Unit, when fully operational, should
also allow the government to ªnally draw on funds allocated to it under a vari-
ety of international environmental conventions. Any proposal of the Ministry of
Agriculture that has an environmental impact will be referred to the unit for re-
view and comment on its sustainability and use of participatory methods. In ad-
dition, the SDC still exists on paper and the unit will consider reviving it as an
independent advisory body. The former SDC coordinator proposes to reinstate
the methods of stakeholder identiªcation and inclusion used by the SDC,
which entailed selection of ad hoc representatives by the National Association of
Non-governmental Associations (NANGO) to join the SDC on a project-speciªc
basis.

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Jonathan Rosenberg and Linus Spencer Thomas

• 73

At the time of this writing, we cannot accurately assess or predict the suc-
cess of the new unit or its real contribution to effective stakeholder participa-
tion. However, the prospects are not good. The Programme Director of the
Dominica Conservation Association, the leading local environmental NGO,
questioned the capacity of NANGO to act on behalf of Dominican NGOs in an
organized government forum.36 Furthermore, 18 months was insufªcient to test
the viability of the new approach. Barring the unlikely event that the Environ-
mental Coordinating Unit receives a large budgetary allocation, its survival will
depend on its ability to attract support from external development assistance
agencies. As of February 2002, when this portion of the research concluded, the
Unit existed on paper but seemed to have been rendered ineffective by political
gridlock resulting from an unstable parliamentary coalition.

In Saint Lucia, we ªnd impediments to mainstreaming sustainability
within and among state agencies and in state/society relations. The more
integrative approaches to policy-making required by the SDC model have run
up against bureaucratic turf problems, especially as concerns the budgetary
process. Environmental considerations get included in development policy
only when they coincide with the established priorities of line ministers. Other-
wise, they can be seen by ministers as a source of competition for scarce project
funds.

Communications between technical personnel and grassroots stake-
holders also have proven difªcult. Some of the problems are as basic as lan-
guage barriers and cultural differences. The ofªcial language of government is
English, while many rural people speak a French-based Creole. The ministries of
Fisheries, Forestry, Environmental Health, and Community Development have
people placed in communities who speak Creole, but they have had limited suc-
cess in communicating their ministries’ interests in stakeholder input.

In addition, the Ministry of Planning has had considerable difªculty com-
municating broad planning goals to communities and other state agencies.
Ofªcials of the Sustainable Development Unit (housed in the Ministry of
Planning, Development and the Environment), originally involved in abortive
attempts to establish an SDC, have tried to promote intersectoral collaboration,
information ºows, and effective coordination of activities, but they lack the in-
stitutional resources. Some of the better-organized private sector stakeholders,
such as the Chambers of Commerce and Small Industry and the Tourism Asso-
ciation, have been consulted at times on policies that affect their interests, but
these consultations are episodic, policy-speciªc, and limited to organized
groups that already have established relationships with ministries and state
agencies.

36. Interview with Henry Shillingford, Programme Director, Dominica Conservation Association,
Roseau, Dominica, 8 June 1999. Mr. Shillingford did not question the importance of NANGO
or its dedication to stakeholder participation, only its organizational capacity. At the time of
this interview NANGO consisted of one executive (also the head of a local NGO) and one staff
person.

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Recently, ofªcials in the Saint Lucia Sustainable Development Unit have
shown an interest in reviving proposals for an SDC (or equivalent body) and
have looked to the Grenada example. At the time of this writing, the Unit is still
in a kind of legal limbo. As one senior ofªcial put it,

It does not really have the legal authority to do anything. One strong pro-
posal would elevate the unit to the status of a full-ºedged department of the
ministry. It certainly needs it, especially the additional stafªng and resources
that would come with being a department. The current workload already
overwhelms the capacity of the unit. For example, the climate change pro-
gram alone has taken on dimensions that would warrant a unit unto itself.37

The Grenada SDC: Survivability and Perhaps Success

Grenada is the only one of the original six Capacity 21 Caribbean SIDS that still
has a functioning SDC. Naturally, we are interested in the reasons for its contin-
uation, but we are more interested in the relationship between its survivability
and its efªcacy in carrying out its intended functions.38

The Grenada SDC was ofªcially launched on 29 February 1996 at the Ca-
pacity 21 National Consultation convened and supported by CARICAD and
UNDP. Its initial meetings were kept small—thirteen invited participants. On 21
October 1996 a three-member subcommittee of the council met to organize a
retreat to clarify its objectives and to reconsider its methods, structure, decision-
making processes, role, relationship to government and rules for conducting
meetings. A strategic retreat was held on 23 November and 7 December 1996
for the general membership to consider the ªndings of the subcommittee. After
the retreat, additional invitations to participate were issued and the council
achieved its present size (approximately forty-ªve members). In November of
1997, CARICAD held a workshop to evaluate the accomplishments and needs
of the Grenada SDC.

These early and intensive stock-taking exercises identiªed a number of
barriers to a fully functioning SDC. Some have since been addressed although
not completely overcome, some have proven chronic, and all are ongoing areas
of concern for current members. According to the CARICAD workshop report,

In order for the SDC to be effective in fulªlling its mandate to coordinate
national sustainable development activities, it needs to have a clear legal

37. Personal interview by Rosenberg with an anonymous highly placed ofªcial of the Ministry of
Planning, Development and the Environment, Government of Saint Lucia, Castries, Saint Lucia,
12 February 2002.

38. The following personal interviews conducted by Rosenberg are referenced below: George Grant,
President/CEO, Grant Communications, St. George’s, Grenada, 21 January 2002; Joseph
Antoine, President, Friends of the Earth—Grenada, St. George’s, Grenada, 19 December 2001;
Ricky Morain, Ministry of Finance, St. George’s, Grenada, 17 December 2001; Sandra C.A. Fer-
guson, Secretary-General, Agency for Rural Transformation, St. George’s, Grenada, 5 December
2001; Dr. Linus Spencer Thomas, Consultant, Ministry of Finance and Planning and Chairman,
Sustainable Development Council, St. George’s, Grenada, 17 December 2001 and 30 January
2002.

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Jonathan Rosenberg and Linus Spencer Thomas

• 75

framework and sufªcient support and resources, as well as the political will
to carry out its mandate. Having the SDC formally identiªed within the deci-
sion making structure of government would enable it to impact on policies
related to sustainable development. It was also recognized that a Secretariat
was needed to sustain and facilitate the work of the SDC as a focal point for
information and coordination.39

Problems that relate to the political will of the council and leadership alone
have been effectively addressed. Those related to communication among mem-
bers are ongoing but are being dealt with constructively. Those having to do
with representation are probably chronic. The extent to which the SDC actually
affects policy outcomes has proven impossible to measure; conclusions can
only be impressionistic. The problems of securing resources for the regular op-
erations of the SDC and maintaining a secretariat have not yet been solved.

The Grenada SDC has met monthly, almost uninterrupted, since its incep-
tion.40 At the time of this writing the council had met for sixty-ªve regular
sessions. Attendance has averaged about 25 members per meeting. While the
government, NGOs, and private sectors are all represented at every meeting,
government and quasi-governmental agencies are typically in the majority. The
most regular attendees are those representing a few government agencies
and NGOs. The NGO community is typically represented by the Agency for
Rural Transformation (a provider of economic development, health, education,
and environmental services for rural communities which hosts the meetings at
its headquarters) and Friends of the Earth (usually represented by its president,
a founding member of the SDC). Two community organizations concerned
with local development, from the rural parishes of St. Andrew’s and St. David’s,
are also regularly represented. The Chair is a consultant to the Ministry of
Finance and Planning. He has chaired the SDC since its inception, at which
time he was General Director of Finance and Planning. One or two other mid-
level ofªcials from Finance and Planning are usually in attendance as well. The
Ministry of Agriculture is the next most frequently represented government
agency, most often by an ofªcial of the Forestry and National Parks Department.
Private sector representation is more sporadic. Among agricultural interests,
the National Cane Farmers’ Association and the Cooperative Nutmeg Associa-
tion are most frequently in attendance. There is a notable lack of regular atten-
dance by business interests related to tourism (hotel and restaurant owners),
transportation (taxi and bus drivers), manufacturing and small businesses. Edu-
cational institutions and related government agencies are rarely represented.
Representatives from the local community college have attended, but usually
for special occasions only. Primary and secondary school teachers and adminis-
trators are conspicuously absent, as are representatives from St. George’s Univer-

39. Caribbean Centre for Development Administration 1997, 8.
40. The following description is taken from the ofªcial minutes of monthly meetings since January
1998, and participant observation of meetings in July 1999, November, December and January,
2002. Beginning in late 2003 Friends of the Earth stopped attending meetings and St. George’s
University and a local representative of the Nature Conservancy began attending.

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sity.41 And there has been only intermittent representation of the trade union
movement. Approximately 27 percent of regular attendees are women. Women
are among the most regularly attending and vocal members of the council and
we have observed no formal or obvious informal impediments to the full partic-
ipation of women.42

The topics discussed at the regular meetings of the Grenada SDC have re-
mained quite true to its original mandate as laid out in Agenda 21 and its own
Terms of Reference. It concerns itself with fundamental issues of development
affecting the island, focusing on issues of environmental sustainability, with
discussions often revolving around Grenada’s participation in international en-
vironmental conventions. The agendas for council meetings also reºect a keen
awareness of the vulnerabilities of small-island developing states, and the coun-
cil has become the principal venue for the discussion of contemporary eco-
nomic and social issues in Grenada.

Presentations and discussions tend to follow a particular set of issues, pol-
icies or programs over the course of several months. Attempts are made, under
the rubric of SDC meetings and through ad hoc committees, to provide input to
reports and other documents of policy planning, implementation, and review.
Although the Grenada SDC has not achieved the formal statutory status
envisioned in Capacity 21, it does have a kind of ofªcial standing. Administra-
tive support comes mainly from a staff member in the Ministry of Finance; the
ofªce that the SDC chair occupies in his position as consultant to the ministry
also serves as the SDC ofªce. Most importantly, the SDC is required to submit
its minutes and recommendations to the Permanent Secretary of Finance
and Planning who, in turn, is obligated to consider SDC input in his reports to
Cabinet.43

The ministry provides in-kind support for the council’s meetings and orga-
nizational activities. In 2001, the council received a small grant from the Univer-
sity of the West Indies for a public awareness program to raise the proªle of the
council and its mission, and to help make the council a point of contact for citi-
zens wishing to express opinions and provide information on issues related to
sustainable development.

In this manner the Grenada SDC inches forward toward fulªlling its mis-
sion. It continues to face the same structural impediments that have stymied the
formation of viable councils in Dominica and Saint Lucia, but it endures.
Within the council, opinion varies as to its actual purpose and efªcacy and the
reasons it survives; but members, regardless of afªliation, all agree that the
council is of value to them and their organizations.

41. The absence of St. George’s University is signiªcant for three reasons: (1) The university is the
leading institution of higher education in the country, with unmatched research and educa-
tional facilities for medicine, public health and ecology; (2) the university is perhaps the largest
single generator of income and foreign exchange; and (3) university operations and develop-
ment have signiªcant environmental and economic impacts.

42. This is not to say that gender is never a factor in the content or method of SDC deliberations,

but an analysis of that question is beyond the scope of the research being reported here.

43. The authors tried unsuccessfully to interview the Permanent Secretary for this study.

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• 77

Survey Results and Analysis

Twenty-nine current members of the Grenada SDC responded to a question-
naire asking them to: (1) evaluate the SDC’s performance of particular roles and
functions identiªed in the council’s terms of reference; (2) rate the importance
of those roles and functions to the overall mission of the council; (3) rate the
council’s ability to represent relevant categories of interest; (4) evaluate the re-
sources and capabilities of the council; and (5) evaluate the contribution that
the council makes to sustainable development.

1. SDC Performance
In rating the ability of the SDC to affect policy made and implemented by the
Government of Grenada, only one respondent (3 percent) thought the council
was “not at all effective.” Twenty-one percent thought that it was “rarely effec-
tive;” 21 percent, “sometimes effective;” 17 percent, “frequently effective;” and
38 percent “could not tell.”

This was the weakest area of efªcacy reported by the survey. It is, however,
signiªcant that the largest number of respondents felt that they could not tell
whether they were being effective. In personal interviews, members from all
three constituent groups (government, private sector, and NGO/CBO) were
willing to speculate that the SDC had gotten the government’s attention on cer-
tain issues such as sand mining and agricultural policy. Government members
were most likely and NGO members were least likely to believe that the council
was affecting at least some government decisions. The Friends of the Earth rep-
resentative, for example, felt that the council was ineffective because it did not
take an advocacy role and would be able to affect policy only if it acted as a pres-
sure group on government. The Secretary General of the Agency for Rural Trans-
formation argued that there was a positive relationship between the council’s
low efªcacy and its survivability, arguing that it survives because “it has no
teeth” and therefore does not threaten any entrenched interests.

The chair indicated that the original mandate of the SDC clearly precludes
advocacy. In fact, he argued that the very composition of the SDC reºects its ex-
clusively advisory and consultative functions. Since the body includes senior
members of public sector agencies and statutory bodies, parliamentary ofªcials,
and members of the diplomatic community, advocacy on any issue would be
clearly inappropriate. He maintains that the SDC can be, and has been, an effec-
tive forum for the initial airing and analysis of advocacy positions, and that such
positions coming from the membership may be reºected in the minutes and
recommendations that the council submits to government, but pressuring gov-
ernment for a particular action or promoting a particular position are not
among the council’s functions. This has been a point of contention between the
council’s leadership and at least one of its NGO members, leading to the recent
withdrawal of Friends of the Earth Grenada from active participation.

The SDC scored much higher on its ability to affect the implementation of
externally funded development projects (e.g., implementing international con-

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78 •

Participating or Just Talking?

ventions and regional programs on climate change, desertiªcation, biodiversity,
biosafety, and food security). Sixty-four percent found the council to be effective
“sometimes” or “frequently.” In that regard the council has shown itself to be
consistent with the intentions of Agenda 21 and useful to the government.
Where international conventions have required stakeholder participation and
national implementing committees, the government has often handed those as-
signments to the SDC, thus creating a symbiotic relationship between the coun-
cil and government. Government, chronically short on human resources, gets
expert assistance with meeting its obligations to international organizations;
the council gets opportunities for substantive deliberations on matters of na-
tional importance.

The SDC is most valued by its members (regardless of sector) for its infor-
mation functions. Eighty-eight percent felt that the council was “sometimes” or
“frequently” effective in providing channels of information about issues and
policies affecting environmentally sustainable development. Eleven percent felt
they “could not tell.” Sixty-nine percent found the SDC “frequently effective”
and 21 percent, “sometimes effective” as a venue for discussing and debating is-
sues. All respondents interviewed agreed that the SDC provided a forum for the
discussion of important issues that was not available anywhere else in Grenada.
All found the monthly meetings to be intrinsically interesting and worth the ef-
fort, if only for the intellectual stimulation. This ªnding is supported by the reg-
ular attendance at monthly meetings and the written comments of some re-
spondents indicating that their participation in discussions at SDC meetings
enriched their subsequent presentations to their respective organizations. Thus,
the SDC may be considered a source of intellectual capacity building contribut-
ing to more informed policy positions by public- and private-sector organiza-
tions.

2. SDC Roles and Functions
Council members place a great deal of importance on all four basic functions:
affecting government policy and externally funded projects, disseminating in-
formation, and providing a venue for debate on issues of sustainable develop-
ment. But members seem to have adjusted their expectations to reality. Twenty-
one percent considered affecting government policy an “important” part of the
SDC’s mission, 36 percent felt it was “very important,” and 39 percent felt it was
“extremely important.” Interviews revealed varying degrees of disappointment
and resignation about the council’s ability to affect government decision-
making. All respondents identiªed particular government decisions that seemed
to reºect SDC input. Ofªcials of government and parastatal agencies felt
conªdent that the Permanent Secretary read and took the council minutes into
account. The one private-sector representative interviewed felt that the govern-
ment-of-the-day was unresponsive in general, and had not singled out the SDC
to ignore. NGO ofªcials felt that the council should work outside of govern-
ment as a lobbying, pressure or public interest group in addition to its semi-

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Jonathan Rosenberg and Linus Spencer Thomas

• 79

formal relationship to the Ministry of Finance. None were satisªed with the re-
sponsiveness of government to the council on issues of sustainability.

The survey reºects the very high value that members place on the informa-
tional and intellectual beneªts of membership. Forty-eight percent felt that pro-
viding channels of information about issues and policies affecting environmen-
tally sustainable development was “very important” and another 48 percent felt
that it was “extremely important.” Fifty percent responded that discussing and
debating issues related to environmentally sustainable development was “very
important” and 50% thought it “extremely important.” Interviews reveal that
while these numbers reºect the intellectual beneªts of membership, they also
reveal that members regularly use information garnered from SDC meetings in
their professional duties. They consider the information, especially the formal
presentations which are a feature of each meeting, of a very high quality and
take seriously their responsibility to communicate with and represent the inter-
ests of their constituents and colleagues. One respondent remarked, “Despite
the apparent shortcomings, the SDC is the best representation of civil society in-
volvement in issues of sustainable development in the country.”

3. Representation on the SDC
Most respondents found representation on the SDC less than satisfactory.
Government ofªcials are the largest of the three groups of council members.
Sixty-six percent (19 of 25) respondents identiªed their primary afªliation as
“government agency, statutory body, department or ministry;” 17 percent,
“nongovernmental or community-based organization;” 3 percent, “private sec-
tor (business or trade organization);” 3 percent, “trade union or other employ-
ees’ or workers’ organization;” and 10 percent, “other.” There were no represen-
tatives of educational institutions among the respondents.

All subjects interviewed found representation inadequate in similar ways.
The small number of private-sector representatives was attributed to a lack of in-
terest and/or beneªt for larger businesses, and logistical and practical impedi-
ments for smaller businesses. Few small businesspeople can take two or three
hours out of a weekday to attend a meeting that does not bring immediate ma-
terial beneªts. Therefore, critical economic actors in the retail businesses, trans-
portation, manufacturing, tourism, agriculture, and the informal sectors do not
attend. NGO members felt that grassroots organizations from outside the capi-
tal were disadvantaged by the location of the meetings in St. George’s, as well as
by the content and level of discussions. Lack of representation of educational
institutions (administrators, faculty or students) was explained by apparent lack
of interest. But in their positive assessments of the informational and debate
functions of the council, all interviewees revealed a preference for an elite-level
body that facilitates informed and often technical exchanges. This aspect
beneªts from factors that tend to limit private sector and grassroots representa-
tion. All interviewees also felt that the current size of the SDC was optimal for
lively discussion and constructive interaction.

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80 •

Participating or Just Talking?

Thus, while the Grenada SDC remains true to the tripartite structure estab-
lished under the Capacity 21 project, private sector and NGO/CBO representa-
tion is not as inclusive as members would like. However, the imbalance among
the three sectors is reºected more in numbers of attendees than in voice or input
in council debates and deliberations. Despite representation skewed in favor of
government, no one felt that the government representatives dominated pro-
ceedings. It was felt that the chair conducted meetings in an evenhanded man-
ner and that NGO and private sector representatives were vocal and assertive.
Substantive problems of representation manifest themselves within, rather than
among, sectors.

Sixty-seven percent of respondents to the survey characterized representa-
tion as either “broad but uneven,” or “as good as possible.” Twenty-six percent
called it “broad and inclusive.” Only seven percent called it “limited” and none
characterized it as “narrow and restricted.”

It should also be noted that self-selection plays an important part in coun-
cil membership. Ofªcially, the council is open to all groups and individuals.
Written comments on the survey indicated that actual attendance at a meeting
was the critical factor in convincing them to join. Several respondents indicated
that personal development was their main motivation for attending meetings.

4. Resources and Capabilities of the SDC
Members’ evaluations of the performance, methods, leadership, and resources
of the SDC were consistent with their assessments of its roles and functions.
There was broad agreement that funding is inadequate, reºecting the fact that
until the University of West Indies grant was secured in 2001, no external fund-
ing was available after Capacity 21 ended in 1997. Sixty-one percent character-
ized funding as “poor;” 32 percent, “fair;” and only 7 percent, “good.” All but
one respondent (3 percent) felt that the frequency of meetings (monthly) and
the quality of presentations were “good,” “very good,” or “excellent.” All re-
spondents characterized the quality of discussions as “good,” “very good,” or
“excellent.”

Leadership of the Grenada SDC has been praised throughout the Eastern
Caribbean. Ofªcials of CARICAD and in the Saint Lucia Ministry of Planning,
Development and Environment felt that the longevity of the Grenada SDC was
attributable in large measure to its chair. Members tended to agree, but not so
unequivocally. Eleven percent rated leadership as only “fair;” 29 percent,
“good;” 50 percent, “very good;” and 26 percent, “excellent.” In addition, evalu-
ation of leadership likely reºects not just impressions of the chair but of the
Management Team and ad hoc committees as well.

Most interviewees gave considerable credit to the chair for keeping the
council going, including those from the NGO sector who expressed some dis-
satisfaction with the lack of leadership initiative on certain issues and the un-
willingness of the chair to allow the council to advocate particular positions.
This view is supported by the fact that the SDC went through a short hiatus in

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Jonathan Rosenberg and Linus Spencer Thomas

• 81

early 1998 when the chair left his post as Director General of the Ministry of
Finance and Planning, and reconvened only when he was reappointed chair by
the Minister of Finance in September.

Members’ ranking of the SDC’s overall effectiveness also reºected a combi-
nation of frustration, limited expectations, and satisfaction with the way the
council functions given the limits of its relationship with government and the
underrepresented sectors. Three percent rated “overall effectiveness” as “poor;”
20 percent, “fair;” 52 percent, “good;” 24 percent, “very good;” and none rated
it “excellent.”

The inability of the council to function as a direct advocate for change was
identiªed as the major source of frustration. One member remarked that the
SDC is a “rubber stamp for the government.”

5. The SDC’s Contribution to Sustainable Development
Members were asked to rate the council’s effectiveness in carrying out the core
missions prescribed by Agenda 21. On its contribution to national capacity for
effective stakeholder participation, one respondent (3 percent) felt it made “no
contribution;” 17 percent rated the contribution “marginal;” 21 percent, “occa-
sionally signiªcant;” and 59 percent, “important.” None, however, characterized
the SDC as a “national leader.” Given the structural limitations on its efªcacy
and the misgivings that many members have about the council’s ability to affect
government decisions, these responses demonstrate the fairly high value that
members place on discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information as
participatory processes.

This ªnding is further illustrated by the somewhat lower rating that mem-
bers gave to the SDC’s contribution to ensuring sustainability of national devel-
opment policies and programs. Thirty percent rated the council’s contribution
“marginal;” 30 percent, “occasionally signiªcant;” and 41 percent, “important.”
Finally, as an additional measure of the SDC’s contribution to capacity
building, members were asked to rate its contribution to the development of
human resources related to sustainable development. Thirty-three percent found
its contribution “marginal;” 30 percent, “signiªcant;” 33 percent, “important;”
and one respondent (3 percent) characterized it as a “national leader.”

These last ªndings are reºected in statements by interviewees expressing
frustrations over the limitations of the SDC as a contributor to capacity building
and sustainability but strong support for its continued existence. As mentioned
above, some respondents cited particular policies and issues in which they
felt the SDC had been inºuential. Others conceded that they simply could
not tell whether the SDC was inºuencing government. All stated that SDC
meetings were informative in ways that helped them introduce considerations
of sustainability into their own professional activities and provided a forum
for airing their particular concerns. And all pointed to the intrinsic if in-
tangible beneªts of a fairly broad-based, sophisticated forum for debate and
discussion.

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82 •

Participating or Just Talking?

Conclusions

The three cases examined in this article offer some lessons for the survivability
of Sustainable Development Councils and similar representative and consulta-
tive bodies concerned with environmentally sustainable development policy.
They also raise some questions about the efªcacy and desirability of such bod-
ies. We conclude that such bodies can survive and that members can derive
signiªcant if intangible beneªts for themselves while producing diffuse, indirect
beneªts for society. Furthermore, the relationship between efªcacy and surviv-
ability is not linear; in fact, to survive, councils may have to avoid attempts to af-
fect policy directly in ways that challenge government decision-makers and in-
stitutionalized relationships between the state and private sector. Finally, SDCs
represent a particular type of venue for stakeholder participation in which dis-
course and agendas are limited to areas and methods that do not always em-
brace the interests or orientations of grassroots and certain private sector actors,
but which can still bring together a fairly wide variety of public and private sec-
tor interests and viewpoints.

Brown and Fox argue that interorganizational coalitions can help to over-
come accountability problems and become important venues for deªning envi-
ronmental problems, setting directions for sustainable polices and implement-
ing and revising policies and programs.44 The critical function is “bridging,”
whereby new organizational arrangements open lines of communication and
help create and deªne common purpose among disparate stakeholders.

The effectiveness of such coalitions may be “facilitated by preexisting orga-
nizational relationships,” which seems to have been the case in Grenada.45 But
they can also be undermined by preexisting relationships as seen in Dominica
and Saint Lucia. Given the limited human resources in the Eastern Caribbean, it
can be expected that such coalitions will beneªt from the commitment of a rela-
tively small number of “bridging individuals” who dedicate considerable effort
to resisting the “tremendous centrifugal forces” acting upon them.46 In Grenada,
those individuals are found among the leadership and core members of the
council. While this has led to the underrepresentation of NGOs, CBOs, and the
business community, active SDC members from those sectors have generally
understood and accepted the attendant limitations. In contrast, insistence by
the president of Friends of the Earth Grenada that the SDC act as a source of ex-
ternal pressure on government led to that organization’s exit from the council,
leaving the local representatives of the Nature Conservancy as the sole members
from an environmental NGO.

In Saint Lucia, collaborative resource management projects have been
facilitated by NGOs perhaps to a larger extent than in Grenada. But Saint Lucia
has had no success to date in institutionalizing an SDC. Signiªcantly, although

44. Brown and Fox 1998, 449–450.
45. Brown and Fox 1998, 454–455.
46. Brown and Fox 1998, 455.

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Jonathan Rosenberg and Linus Spencer Thomas

• 83

the Caribbean Natural Resource Institute (CANARI—formerly based in Saint
Lucia) and the National Trust have been leaders in participatory natural re-
source management in Saint Lucia, neither organization was involved in at-
tempts to establish a council, focusing their efforts instead on particular re-
source management projects.47

In Dominica, the leading environmental NGO—the Dominica Conserva-
tion Association—acts primarily as a pressure group on government. Its leader-
ship believes that despite Dominica’s historical tradition of local participation,
government and state agencies have taken an antagonistic approach to NGOs
and CBOs since the 1980s.48 State ofªcials assigned to the role of “bridging indi-
viduals” in the nascent Dominica SDC lacked the established relationships and
credibility to overcome established relationships between state development
agencies and the private sector or the mutual suspicions of government and the
NGO community. Dominica’s progress in bringing stakeholders together to
manage natural resources has happened outside the rubric of the SDC or its suc-
cessor organization and without the cooperation of established environmental
NGOs.

Therefore, although the Grenada SDC may be mainly a “talk shop,” that
does not mean it is of no value. Clearly, its members value it. They beneªt from
discussions and presentations that are often lively and represent sharply diver-
gent opinions on issues of great importance to small island developing states,
including climate change, deforestation, biodiversity, emergency preparedness,
sea level rise, ozone depletion, agriculture, poverty eradication, hazard mitiga-
tion, physical planning, coastal zone management, and solid waste manage-
ment. There is an intrinsic beneªt in keeping state ofªcials in line agencies,
NGOs, and businesses well informed on these subjects. Furthermore, govern-
ment is made aware of these discussions. The council has also contributed sub-
stantive input to the Grenadian components of international treaties, conven-
tions, and protocols related to sustainable development. And if the current
public awareness strategy is successful, the SDC may become a national clear-
inghouse for information and debate on sustainable development.

Eventually, the Grenada SDC may help to articulate what Barry refers to as
an “ecological contract” through which an “ecological common good” is gener-
alized to a wide range of development policies.49 The massive destruction vis-
ited upon Grenada by Hurricane Ivan in September 2004 has created opportu-
nities for making sustainability a guiding principle for reconstruction efforts.
The new National Environmental Policy and Management Strategy, presented to
Cabinet in December 2004, mentions the Sustainable Development Council as
a key element in building capacity for “policy analysis and formulation” and

47. Personal communication between Dr. Thomas and Yves Renard, former director of CANARI, 23

December 2004.

48. Personal interview by Rosenberg with Atherton Martin, Director of the Dominica Conservation

Association, Roseau, Dominica, 26 May 1998.

49. Barry 1996, 121–122.

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84 •

Participating or Just Talking?

“promoting the sharing of skills and expertise among environmental manage-
ment agencies.”50

Still, the Grenada SDC cannot claim many clear victories in inºuencing
government actions. But the contrasting cases of Dominica and Saint Lucia
show that survivability of SDCs is not directly related to effectiveness in domes-
tic policy contests. In both Dominica and Saint Lucia, the councils were given
formal relationships to state and quasi-governmental institutions that were
meant to insert them into established policy-making and evaluation processes.
And in both cases, the councils met resistance. In Dominica, the National De-
velopment Council practically ignored the SDC. In Saint Lucia, the existing rela-
tionship between the Ministry of Planning and the Development Control Au-
thority helped keep the SDC outside of the planning process. In Grenada, the
vagueness of the institutional relationship between the SDC and the Ministry of
Finance and Planning allows the Permanent Secretary nearly complete discre-
tion in the way he uses (or ignores) SDC input. While Grenada SDC members
remain frustrated and/or uncertain about their ability to inºuence policy in this
way, council leadership does not ªnd itself having to ªght its way through al-
ready established relationships with competing private interests. Therefore,
while the council may only occasionally be inºuential in government, it is un-
likely to be seen as threatening.

Finally, as institutions of stakeholder participation and capacity building,
SDCs are of limited but not insigniªcant value. Alone, they cannot come close
to fully implementing Agenda 21’s call for integrated and institutionalized par-
ticipatory practices; but they do provide a particular kind of elite-level participa-
tion not available elsewhere. The tripartite membership structure; the combina-
tion of invited and self-selected membership; and the emphasis on debate,
discussion, and formal presentations of sometimes abstract and technical issues
indirectly discriminate against many grassroots and business interests. The in-
ability of SDCs to solve speciªc developmental and environmental problems or
promote particular economic interests for their members makes them appeal-
ing mainly to those who value and can contribute to dialogue on sustainable
development and related issues. But those who participate represent a variety of
government agencies, quasi-governmental organizations, and NGOs whose ac-
tivities do affect the sustainability of development in small-island developing
states.

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