Journal of Interdisciplinary History, xliv:4 (Spring, 2014), 453–473.

COMMUNICATION AND STATE CONSTRUCTION

in general,

Zef Segal
Communication and State Construction: The
Postal Service in German States, 1815–1866
Spatial
is related to spatial-diffusion processes
integration,
without barrier effects—that is, without geographical discontinu-
ities between contiguous areas that would indicate regional gaps.
Since this article examines the postal structure not as an institution
but as a representation of social integration, its primary focus is on
location (the geographical distribution of the various ofªces)
rather than administration (the technical and bureaucratic side of
the postal delivery system). Therefore, the main sources of infor-
mation are density maps, which depict the total number of post
ofªces in a particular area. The analysis is based upon the assump-
tion that proximity to a dense web of communication routes cor-
relates with better integration and that discontinuities correlate
with state disconnection. Granovetter, for example, claimed that
clustered social ties within a region produce a “local cohesion”
that leads to national fragmentation. Density maps of postal sys-
tems reveal potential fragmentations and threats to state unity.
Nevertheless, since these maps do not depict how people actually
used the postal system, they can display only the apparent unavail-
ability of communication, not that deªnite communication oc-
curred. Therefore, they are mainly useful for disproving state inte-
gration; the contrary would require additional proof.1

Zef Segal is Associate Fellow, Dept. of General History, Haifa University, and Associate Fel-
low, The Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, Hebrew Uni-
versity. He is the author of “Real, Actual, and Imagined Borders—State Construction in the
‘Third Germany,’” in Jose Brunner and Iris Nachum (eds.), Die Deutschen als die Anderen:
Deutschland in der imagination seiner Nachbarn (Göttingen, 2012), 21–43.

© 2014 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and The Journal of Interdisciplinary
History, Inc., doi:10.1162/JINH_a_00610

1 Philippe Deboe, Claude Grasland, and Adrian Healy, “Spatial Integration, Strand 1.4,” in
Study Programme on European Spatial Planning (1999), 38. This research, centered in Stock-
holm, was the result of a cooperative effort between the member states of the European
Union and the European Council. Regarding the British colonies in North America, John W.
Blassingame—“American Nationalism and Other Loyalties in the Southern Colonies 1763–
1775,” Journal of Southern History, XXXIV (1968), 59—claimed that irregular postal service
and nonexistent roads during the ªrst half of the eighteenth century encouraged provincial
isolation and local loyalty. Mark Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal
of Sociology, LXXVIII (1973), 1378.

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454 | ZEF SEGAL

In order to analyze the relationship between the postal system
and state integration, three parameters are used to connect the geo-
metric structure of the system to the political, social, and geograph-
ical environment: (1) orientation (outward-oriented systems were
designed to satisfy international communication, whereas inward-
oriented systems focused on state communication), (2) the role of
the capital city, and (3) system topology (the distinction between
cluster-shaped and path-shaped systems). The ªrst two classi-
ªcations are more sensitive to historical developments, whereas the
third is purely locational. A cluster-shaped system is based on ex-
tremely dense centers with sparser surroundings; a path-shaped
system is based on a speciªc route, not on a group of neighboring
centers. The three parameters allow for a combined analysis of the
postal system’s role in state construction.

nationalism, statehood, and the modern postal system
The theoretical connection between patterns of communication
and the construction of national and political unity has a long his-
tory in the literature concerning the development of nationalism
and statehood. In 1953, Deutsch, in one of the earliest and most
prominent descriptions of this relationship, viewed the boundaries
between national communities as deªned by “relative barriers to
communication.” These barriers, he wrote, have symbolic as well
as functional effects, since they transform people into communi-
ties, and outsiders into “others.” However, a leap is still required
in order to form an imagined construction of statehood from im-
mediate social ties. Giddens claimed that this leap required the
sense of place to be re-imagined via communication technologies
that form “relations between ‘absent’ others, locationally distant
from any given situation of face-to-face interaction.”2

The modern postal system was the pioneer of these technolo-
gies, changing the world and society in a much more dramatic
manner than simply “distance shrinking.” Johann Jacob Moser
equated the invention of the mail to that of the discovery of

2 Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of
Nationality (New York, 1953), 22. For examples, see Brian Weinstein’s research on state inte-
gration in Gabon—“Social Communication Methodology in the Study of Nation Building,”
Cahiers d’etudes africaines, XVI (1964), 569–589—and James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin’s
research on interethnic cooperation—“Explaining Interethnic Cooperation,” American Politi-
cal Science Review, IV (1996), 718–719; Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stan-
ford, 1990), 18–19.

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COMMUNICATION AND STAT E CONSTRUCTIO N | 455

America, adding that “the formal postal system . . . had astonishing
consequences and cast the world into a different model.” Commu-
nication changed from being merely verbal exchange into the
transport of large quantities of information across long distances.
The postal system made the actual location of people less relevant
by enhancing the range of their activities. In addition, it expanded
the scope of their society beyond their immediate horizon, thus
forming an imagined community.3

The difference between the postal service and other institu-
tions revolves around the existence of communication routes and
the actualization of communication between people. Since the lat-
ter is the foundation of human society, especially a modern imag-
ined community, a postal service becomes a link between physical
infrastructure and collective identity. Consequently, identifying
the geographical formation of its deployment in various states en-
ables a better analysis of the success or failure of state construction.

the nineteenth-century german states in the aftermath of
napoleon After 1815 and following the break-up of the Holy
Roman Empire, Germany was roughly divided between two gi-
ants in the north and south—Prussia and Austria, respectively; the
thirty-ªve medium-sized states between them created the “Third
Germany.” These states were large enough to remain independent
and foster local patriotism, but they were too small to act in the in-
ternational arena, This predicament subjected them to a constant
internal struggle between state-unifying and state-dividing forces.
Hence, they provide a laboratory for research into state construc-
tion during the nineteenth century.4

The states discussed herein—Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover,
Wurttemberg, and Baden—were the ªve most dominant within

3 Moser quoted in Wolfgang Behringer, Im Zeichen des Merkur: Reichspost und Kommuni-
kationsrevolution in der Frühen Neuzeit (Göttingen, 2003), 19.
4 Tim Chapman, The Congress of Vienna: Origins, Processes and Results (London, 1998), 45.
For state construction in the “Third Germany,” see Norbert J. Mayr, Particularism in Bavaria:
State Policy and Public Sentiment, 1806–1906 (Ann Arbor, 1991); Lawrence J. Flockerzie, “State-
Building and Nation-Building in the “Third Germany”: Saxony after the Congress of Vi-
enna,” Central European History, XXIV (1991), 268–292; Loyd E. Lee, “Baden between Rev-
olutions: State-Building and Citizenship, 1800–1848,” ibid., 248–267; Marion W. Gray,
“Modifying the Traditional for the Good of the Whole: Commentary on State-Building and
Bureaucracy in Nassau, Baden, and Saxony in the Early Nineteenth Century,” ibid., 293–303;
Abigail Green, Fatherlands: State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century Germany (New
York, 2001).

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456 | ZEF SEGAL

Fig. 1 “Third Germany” from 1815 to 1866

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the “Third Germany” and the largest outside the two German su-
perpowers (see Figure 1). Bavaria had a population of roughly
4.5 million, and each of the other four states had a population of
about 2 million. All of these states were restructured in 1815. His-
torical research on state construction in these states has focused pri-
marily on political, economic, and legal reforms, neglecting the
creation of statehood, which will be examined indirectly in this arti-
cle. The Prussian-Austrian war of 1866, the precursor of the Ger-
man union of 1871, ended, or at least cast aside, these separate pro-
jects in favor of a uniªed German one.5

nineteenth-century political and social changes in the
german world Postal systems were not new in the German

5 For example, see Gerhard Schmidt, Die Staatsreform in Sachsen in der ersten Hälfte des 19.
Jahrhunderts: Eine Parallele zu den Steinschen Reformen in Preußen (Weimar, 1966); Stewart A.
Stehlin, Bismarck and the Guelph Problem, 1866–1890: A Study in Particularist Opposition to Na-
tional Unity (The Hague, 1973); Hans A. Schmitt, “Germany without Prussia: A Closer Look
at the Confederation of the Rhine,” German Studies Review, VI (1983), 9–39; Manfred
Hanisch, Für Fürst und Vaterland: Legitimätsstiftung in Bayern zwischen Revolution 1848 und
deutscher Einheit (Munich, 1991); Ferdinand Kramer, “Bavaria: Reform and Staatsintegration,”
German History, XX (2002), 354–372.

COMMUNICATION AND STAT E CONSTRUCTIO N | 457

world; they had been an important means of communication since
the fourteenth century. The pioneering postal enterprise was the
courier services offered by the Taxis family of Lombardy, which in
1490 received privileges to monopolize the postal services in the
territories of the Holy Roman Empire. It was largely reserved for
members of the nobility, the wealthy, and the educated. The fall of
the Holy Roman Empire, which saw the dismantling of the impe-
rial post, put an end to the once-united, private German system.
Earlier signs of trouble had appeared when relatively large German
states, such as Bavaria, demanded control of the postal system dur-
ing the late eighteenth century. Simultaneously, German liberals
were claiming, in accordance with the French Revolution, that
the imperial post was a feudal relic that needed to be replaced with
a new state mechanism. Words had turned into actions by 1806 af-
ter the dissolution of the empire; state postal systems were formed
across the German world, the most thorough in Wurttemberg
(1805), Bavaria (1808), and Baden (1811). In 1810, forty-three
German postal authorities were in operation, but when the Vi-
enna treaties of 1815 determined that seceding states had to com-
pensate the house of Taxis, eighteen of the smaller states returned
to the Taxis fold, as did Wurttemberg in 1819. The rest of them,
including the ªve medium-sized states covered in this article, re-
tained their postal autonomy.6

As a result of these changes, the post quickly became an inte-
gral part of the territorialization mechanism of these medium-sized
states; the infrastructure was already in place because of the Taxis
precedent. Unlike that of other European systems, Taxis post in
Germany was highly decentralized. Nonetheless, the private post
of the past transformed into a state post. The clients of these new
systems changed as well. The mail no longer belonged to just the
nobility and the educated class. Compulsory elementary education

6 Frank Postler, Die historische Entwicklung des Post- und Fernmeldewesens in Deutschland vor
dem Hintergrund speziªscher Interessenkonstellationen bis 1945: eine sozialwissenschaftliche Analyse der
gesellschaftlichen Funktionen der Post (Frankfurt am Main, 1991), 20; Rückblick auf das erste
Jahrhundert der K. Bayer. Staatspost: (1. März 1808 bis 31. Dezember 1908); mit einer Darstellung
der Entwicklung des staatlichen Telegraphen- und Telephonwesens bis in die Gegenwart (Munich,
1908), 2, 3; Behringer, Im Zeichen des Merkur, 632; Kaspar Löfºer, Geschichte des Verkehrs in
Baden insbesondere der Nachrichten- und Personenbeförderung [Boten-, Post- und Telegraphenverkehr];
von der Ro?merzeit bis 1872 (Heidelberg, 1910), 307–308. Beginning in the 1820s, the house
of Taxis was the ofªcial postal authority in the Kingdom of Wurttemberg; the Duchies of
Nassau, Kurhessen, and Hesse-Darmstadt; the Principality of Thuringia; and the cities of
Frankfurt, Bremen, and Hamburg. Behringer, Thurn und Taxis: die Geschichte ihrer Post und
ihrer Unternehmen (Munich, 1990), 151, 159.

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458 | ZEF SEGAL

brought literacy, and thus the capability of written communica-
tion, to every layer of society. Furthermore, a gradual reduction in
the price of paper and stamping regulations combined with an im-
provement in the speed and accuracy of the provided services en-
abled the formation of a genuine mass-communication system,
a popular post. The new postal system differed from the old one
in content, efªciency, and accessibility, operating especially as a
letter-distribution service for a wider population under a state
umbrella. Although the separate German postal systems of the
nineteenth-century had formed connections—even a German
postal union—the rationale was purely practical, not under the
auspices of a combined German ideological framework. Each state
postal system had distinct attributes, which affected the societies
that created them.7

Because the post was the only system of long-distance com-
munication, the accessibility of post ofªces had a profound inºu-
ence on integrating the German-speaking population. In general,
all of the ofªces handled the distribution of private and ofªcial let-
ters and packages, but their vast differences in size affected the fre-
quency of their operation and the efªciency of their mail distribu-
tion. Although higher-ranked ofªcials managed a group of workers
in an organized ofªce, lower-ranked ones were mostly private
functionaries who supervised local collecting points for occasional
postal deliveries. The following analysis concerns only higher-

7
In Ireland, for example, there was public resentment during the nineteenth century
against the inefªciency of the postal system since every postal route had to go through Dublin.
See Garry Prendiville, “The Social Magic of Correspondence: Conceptions of the Mails in
Early Nineteenth Century Ireland,” Journal of Historical Geography, XXXI (2005), 459–477.
For decentralism in the German world, see Das Hauptstadtproblem in der Geschichte: Festgabe
zum 90. Geburtstag Friedrich Meineckes (Tübingen, 1952); Theodor Schieder and Gerhard
Brunn (eds.), Hauptstädte in europäischen Nationalstaaten (Munich, 1983); Bodo M. Baumunk
and Gerhard Brunn (eds.), Hauptstadt: Zentren, Residenzen, Metropolen in der deutschen
Geschichte) Köln, 1989); Uwe Schultz (ed.), Die Hauptstädte der Deutschen: Von der Kaiserpfalz
in Aachen zum Regierungssitz Berlin (München, 1993); Wolfram Siemann, “Die deutsche
Hauptstadtproblematik im 19. Jahrhundert,” in Hans Michael Körner and Katharina Weigand
(eds.) Hauptstadt: Historische Perspektiven eines deutschen Themas (Munich, 1995), 249–260;
Andreas W. Daum and Christof Mauch (eds.) Berlin-Washington, 1800–2000: Capital Cities,
Cultural Representation, and National Identities (New York, 2005). Rupert Kubon, Weiter-
führende Mädchenschulen im 19. Jahrhundert: am Beispiel des Grossherzogtums Baden (Pfaffenweiler,
1991), 9; Hans-Martin Moderow, Volksschule zwischen Staat und Kirche: Das Beispiel Sachsen im 18.
und 19. Jahrhundert (Köln, 2007), 77; Paul Katzwinkel, Briefmarken-Katalogisierungs- und
Fehllisten-Tabellen: (Basis Michelkatalog); Bayern, Württemberg, altdeutsche Staaten, Deutsche Post
im Ausland, deutsche Kolonien und Abstimmungsgebiete (Hamburg, 1948).

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COMMUNICATION AND STAT E CONSTRUCTIO N | 459

ranked ofªcials, since they were the ones involved in constant and
continuous communication.8

saxony and the rise of small urban centers The Saxon post
had a much longer independent history than its southwestern
counterparts in Bavaria, Baden, and Wurttemberg. Unlike them,
the Saxon post was formed during the seventeenth century as a re-
sult of the rivalry between the Saxon and the Austrian royal
houses. Administratively, Saxony’s postal structure was unusual in
Germany for its centralized organization; the whole state had
merely one state superintendent (Oberpostamt) in Leipzig and one
regional center in Budissin. An additional center in the capital
Dresden was declared the “royal court ofªcial” (Hofpostamt) and
hence considered independent and separate from the rest of the
system. This double-headed centralism was also apparent
in
the routes of postal passenger services, which, in 1827, all origi-
nated or terminated in Leipzig or Dresden. Paradoxically, in a spa-
tial as opposed to an administrative context, the Saxon post was
completely decentralized, evincing a wide and uniform distribu-
tion of post ofªces across the state (see Figure 2).9

By the year 1866, the number of post ofªces in Saxony grew
ªvefold, though the administrative structure remained the same.
The new distribution of postal stations, however, was not uniform.
As depicted in Figure 3, the focal points of the system shifted from
the traditional centers to places once considered peripheral in the
southern and western parts of the state. Although the regional cen-
ters remained in the large cities of the north (Leipzig, Dresden, and
Budissin), most of the sub-stations were placed around the south-
western towns, largely because of the new commercial and indus-
trial centers there. This geographical and demographical change
had an immense effect on the economic and educational systems
of the state, among others, giving Saxony the appearance of a tri-
polar entity. But unlike other infrastructural systems, the postal
network developed outside the framework of existing political

8 Michael von Meyeren, Verzeichnisse von sächsischen Orten, Postorten und Postanstalten des 18.
und 19. Jahrhunderts (Dresden, 2005), 57; Rückblick auf das erste Jahrhundert der K. Bayer.
Staatspost, 6.
9
Johann L. Klüber, Das Postwesen in Teutschland: wie es war, ist, und seyn könnte (Erlangen,
1811), 24–27; Karl F. Kessler, Handbuch Des Postwesens Im Königreiche Sachsen: Für Cor-
respondenten, Postreisende Und Post-Ofªcianten (Dresden, 1827), 33–34.

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460 | ZEF SEGAL

Fig. 2 Postal Ofªcials in Saxony in 1819

source Königlich Sächsischer Hof-, Civil- und Militär-Staat (Leipzig, 1819).

norms, favoring the dense urban region of the southwest in more
of a unipolar operation, as depicted in the cluster around the newly
ascendant small towns (see Figure 3).10

Although it would be a mistake to describe Saxony as isolated,
its postal system, unlike those in such states as Baden and Hanover,
did not incline toward international linkages. Theoretically, exter-
nal communication should have been important there, since its
economy depended on active international commerce, but it had
few post ofªces along its borders, except for the western border,
which had old ties to the principalities of Thuringia, especially the
Duchy of Saxe-Altenburg, which was even added to the Saxon
postal system in 1854. These western ties, however, were neither
politically nor economically signiªcant (Saxony had far fuller trade
relations with Prussia in the north). To a great extent, the Saxon
postal system was relatively indifferent to the larger German
world.11

The Saxon post facilitated state integration by connecting
the whole state. The relatively homogeneous distribution of postal
stations across the country reºects widespread internal networks,
or at least the possibility of them. The system’s homogeneity
correlated with the distribution of other integrating factors, such

Segal, “Representation and Practices of the State Space: The Medium Sized German
10
States in the Years 1815–1866,” unpub. Ph.D. diss. (Tel Aviv University, 2013), 26–124; Staats-
Handbuch für das Königreich Sachsen (Dresden, 1866); Francesco Cinnirella, “On the Road to
Industrialization: Nutritional Status in Saxony, 1690–1850,” Cliometrica, II (2008), 229–257.
11 Staats-Handbuch für das Königreich Sachsen (Dresden, 1854).

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COMMUNICATION AND STAT E CONSTRUCTIO N | 461

Fig. 3 Density Map of the Saxon Postal System in 1866

note
In the calculation of the density of the post ofªces, superintendents have a value of 10,
inspectors at sub-stations a value of 7, inspectors with no sub-stations a value of 5, and all
other postal stations a value of 1. The value at every point is the sum of all ofªces in its vicin-
ity, using the “kernel density” function on ArcGIS software.
source Staats-Handbuch für das Königreich Sachsen (Dresden, 1866).

as educational facilities and railways. The communication infra-
structure might not have been the main integrating factor of Sax-
ony, but it certainly aided in the formation of a genuine Saxon
statehood.12

bavaria: a detour around the capital city Unlike the
Saxon postal system, which favored internal state communication,
the Bavarian post followed the inter-German communication
route from the north and middle (Saxony and Hesse) to the south
(Austria and Switzerland)—the traditional commercial
route
through the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century centers of Augs-
burg, Nuremberg, and Wurzburg. Surprisingly, it did not include
the capital Munich, despite its otherwise political, economic, cul-
tural, and demographic centrality. This exclusion, however, en-
abled the consolidation of the postal system without the traditional
distinction between the Protestant north and the Catholic south,
which existed in almost every other Bavarian institution.13

The system was extremely decentralized. Accordingly, the
state was divided into six districts, each headed by a superintendent:

12
Segal, “Representation and Practices of the State Space,” 26–166; Flockerzie, “State-
Building and Nation-Building”; James N. Retallack, Saxony in German History: Culture, Soci-
ety, and Politics, 1830–1933 (Ann Arbor, 2000).
13

Segal, “Representation and Practices of the State Space,” 26–166.

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462 | ZEF SEGAL

Fig. 4 Bavarian Postal Ofªcials in 1827, Including Regional Authority

Boundaries

source Hof- und Staatshandbuch des Königreichs Bayern (Munich, 1827).

Munich (south), Augsburg (west), Nuremberg and Regensburg
(center), Wurzburg (northwest), and Speyer (Palatinate). The exact
demarcation of each district changed throughout the years, until
stabilized in 1851. These districts, although equal in authority,
were not equal in size or dominance. The least important was the
Speyer center; its postal head was demoted in 1826 to the rank of an
ordinary ofªcial (postamt), thus perpetuating a general discrimina-
tion against the isolated western region, which was also reºected in
the Bavarian educational, economic, and political institutions.14

Differences are also evident in the mainland, especially be-
tween the central route and the rest of the state. Figure 4 shows that
most of the ofªces in 1827 were under the authority of the Nurem-
berg and Augsburg ofªcials; Munich was responsible for only two
major post ofªces. This difference might not look so signiªcant for
communication as for administration. Figure 5, however, shows a
clearly deªned path of densely situated post ofªces leading from
Hof in the northeast to Lindau in the southwest, passing through
Augsburg and Nuremberg. The only possible inference is the infe-
riority of Munich within the postal system.

During this era, Munich’s status as a communications center

14 From 1826 to 1834, there were temporary changes in the roles of Regensburg and
Wurzburg. Rückblick auf das erste Jahrhundert der K. Bayer. Staatspost, 8, 10; Erwin Probst,
Behördliche Raumorganisation seit 1800: Grundstudie 3, Postorganisation (Hannover, 1977), 33;
Jonathan Sperber, Rheinland Radicals: The Democratic Movement and the Revolution of 1848–1849
(Princeton, 1991), 42.

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COMMUNICATION AND STAT E CONSTRUCTIO N | 463

Fig. 5 Density Map of the Bavarian Postal System in 1847

sources Königlich Sächsischer Hof-, Civil- und Militär-Staat
Staatshandbuch des Königreichs Bayern (München, 1847).

(Leipzig, 1819); Hof- und

was declining even as its status in economic, political, demo-
graphic, and educational areas was strengthening because of the ex-
tent to which the northeast to southwest route had grown in im-
portance, especially after the introduction of the ªrst railway lines.
Despite the fact that the number of post ofªces grew from 290 in
1834 to 813 in 1851, most of the growth was in the north, empow-
ering the central route. The new system, as depicted in Figure 5,
expanded the central route only toward Wurzburg in the north-
west, while remaining extremely scarce around the capital city. In
some respects, the postal system gave rival centers in Bavaria an op-
portunity to compete with the political and economic power of
Munich.15

By the end of the era, most of the state was integrated in a uni-
formly distributed postal system. Munich was not the center but
merely on a southern branch off the main route. Thus did the
postal system succeed in integrating the Bavarian space—an excep-
tional achievement, since other well-known measures of state
construction—for example, educational, religious, and cultural
reforms—maintained the schism between the northern and south-
ern parts of the state. While governmental plans for state integra-
tion were focused on emphasizing the political center, thereby rel-
egating the northern part of the state to the periphery, the postal
system was much less ideologically and politically determined.

15 Rückblick auf das erste Jahrhundert der K. Bayer. Staatspost, 8, 11.

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464 | ZEF SEGAL

The result was a growing connection between northern and south-
ern Bavaria, which occurred outside Bavaria’s much-researched
plan of nation-building. Even the old ties between the northern
Protestant cities and Prussia had long since disappeared by the war
of 1866, replaced by Bavarian patriotism. In contrast, the isolated
region of the Palatinate remained alienated, both institutionally and
socially, due, in large part, to its physical separation from the main-
land, which was never bridged by communication routes.16

baden: from external outlook to internal unification In
many respects, the Badenese and Bavarian posts were alike; both
of them were oriented toward international communication and
were formed around a central route connecting an otherwise sepa-
rated north and south. However, the postal system of Baden was
not based on as ready a foundation as Bavaria’s was; it developed
from a dramatic change in the traditional structure. This older
structure, which persisted until the late 1820s, had two commer-
cial centers—the ªrst in the northwest around Mannheim and the
capital Karlsruhe, and the second in the southeast around Con-
stance. These centers were not at the same level. All of the major
post ofªces (in Mannheim, Karlsruhe, and Kehl) were situated in
the northwestern region; the southeastern region had numerous
lower-ranked post ofªces even though it had no higher-ranked
ones (oberpostmeister and postmeister). This deployment suggests that
the southeastern region, despite a lack of administrative prestige,
was making distinct progress in communication.17

This division, a relic of the old Taxis network, changed during
the 1830s. The new situation reºected the weakening of Con-
stance and the creation of a new southwestern center at the univer-
sity town and archbishopric of Freiburg. The result was a cultural
division—a Protestant cultural hub in the north and a Catholic
cultural one in the south. The disappearance of the southeastern
postal center was a direct result of the economic and political dete-
rioration of Constance, south Baden’s equivalent of Mannheim,

16 Christoph Klessmann, “Zur Sozialgeschichte der Reichsverfassungskampagne von
1849,” Historische Zeitschrift, CCXVIII (1974), 283–337, 313; Manferd Hänisch, Für Fürst und
Vaterland: Legitimätsstiftung in Bayern zwischen Revolution 1848 und deutscher Einheit (Munich
1991), 142; Mayr, Particularism in Bavaria.
17 Löfºer, Geschichte des Verkehrs in Baden, 311; Probst, Behördliche Raumorganisation seit 1800,
29.

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COMMUNICATION AND STAT E CONSTRUCTIO N | 465

Fig. 6 Density Map of the Badenese Postal System in 1846

sources Königlich Sächsischer Hof-, Civil- und Militär-Staat (Leipzig, 1819); Hof- und Staats-
Handbuch des Grossherzogthums Baden (Karlsruhe, 1865).

beginning in the 1830s, along with the whole south eastern
region.18

As a result of the further integration of central Baden, the two
centers merged into a united route during the 1840s, encompassing
all of the central ofªces from Manheim in the north to Basel in
the south, as depicted in Figure 6. This consolidation reºected the
union of Freiburg and the southwestern Catholics with the cities of
the north, but it also indicated the neglect of Constance and the
whole southeastern region, which did not have any high-ranking
postal ofªcials until the 1870s.19

The reason for the creation of a central western route lies in
the location of two additional ofªces of the Badenese post—those
of French Strasburg and Swiss Basel, situated on the international
border, which were responsible for communications between the
states. These two foreign outposts demonstrated the importance of
economic and social communication with the neighboring states,
France and Switzerland. In contrast, the lack of such centers on the
eastern side implies the relative insigniªcance of communication
with neighboring German states, such as Bavaria, Wurttemberg,

18 Hof- und Staats-Handbuch des Grossherzogthums Baden (Karlsruhe, 1834); Gert Zang,
“A Region on the Way to the Periphery: The Town and District of Constance in the Second
Half of the 19th Century,” in Hans-Heinrich Nolte (ed.), Internal Peripheries in European His-
tory (Göttingen, 1991), 155–156.
19 Hof- und Staats-Handbuch des Grossherzogthums Baden (Karlsruhe, 1846).

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466 | ZEF SEGAL

and Austria. The Badenese postal system’s inclination toward the
west evinced a decidedly non-German vision. Paradoxically, this
more international-European bias eventually led to internal state
integration. Stronger ties were gradually formed as the ºow of
trade and communication between north and south began to
thrive. This trend did not result in Badenese statehood; Baden
was too weak and too dependent on external powers to maintain
an independent identity. Moreover, much of its communication
targeted neighboring states, thus hindering the postal demarcation
of Baden.20

wurttemberg: internal and external isolation The Wurt-
tembergian postal system changed three times during the period
under discussion, beginning with an early eponymous version
from 1807 to 1819, reverting to the private guidance of the Taxis
family from 1819 to 1851, and ªnally resuming its own administra-
tion from 1851 to 1866. Each of these iterations had to deal with
the central communication problem of the kingdom—the lack of
exit points from the state—since its geopolitical status allowed
Baden and Bavaria complete control over its access routes. This
handicap suggested two options, either to create stronger south-
western regional ties or to rely on internal uniªcation, while re-
maining isolated. Until 1851, while under the direction of the
Taxis, the system exhibited the ªrst option. Thereafter, however,
it shifted from a decentralized, geographically widespread struc-
ture to an administratively and geographically centered post,
focused inward.

One of the ªrst activities of the initial Wurttemberg post was
the establishment of agreements with Bavaria (1810), Switzerland
(1813), and Baden (1817). This policy affected not only the exter-
nal relations of the system but also its internal structure, leading
to the homogeneous deployment depicted in Figure 7. Nonethe-
less, control centers were distributed mainly around the capital city
of Stuttgart. Accordingly, three of the four state superintendents
who took their positions in 1807 after the establishment of the
Wurttemberg post were located within a radius of 45 km from
the capital (Stuttgart, Tubingen, and Heilbronn). The fourth su-

20 Löfºer, Geschichte des Verkehrs in Baden, 321; Segal, “Representation and Practices of the
State Space,” 296–359; Florian T. Ploeckl, “The zollverein Formation and Impact of a Cus-
toms Union,” unpub. Ph.D. diss. (Yale, 2009), 110–154.

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COMMUNICATION AND STAT E CONSTRUCTIO N | 467

Fig. 7 Density Map of the Wurttembergian Postal System in 1818

sources Königlich Sächsischer Hof-, Civil- und Militär-Staat
Württembergisches Hof- und Staats-Handbuch (Stuttgart, 1818).

(Leipzig, 1819); Königlich-

perintendent, who was responsible for the southeastern region, was
ªrst situated in Biberach but later moved to Ulm. In spite of the re-
turn to the Taxis post, the locations of the superintendents and the
number of post ofªces remained almost unchanged during the next
three decades. As depicted in Figure 8, the immense density along
regional and state borders indicated Wurttemberg’s active commu-
nication lines between different regions and between neighboring
states.21

Wurttemberg’s withdrawal from the Taxis orbit and the foun-
dation of its own post in 1851 created a much more centralized and
inward focus, both administratively and spatially. Administratively,
with the cancellation of regional division, two mobile supervisors
took charge of the 122 small ofªces around the country. Conse-
quently, the whole postal system came under the direct supervision
of the postal department in Stuttgart, and all of the postal interac-
tions were concentrated in the state center. An extra superinten-
dent was installed in the vicinity of the capital (Reutlingen), thus
raising the share of high ofªcials in the state center from 66 percent

21 Friedrich Weber, Post und Telegraphie im Königreich Württemberg: Denkschrift aus Anlass des
Ablauts der fünfzigjährigen Verwaltung des württembergischen Post- und Telegraphenwesens durch den
Staat (Stuttgart, 1901), 97; Probst, Behördliche Raumorganisation seit 1800, 23.

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468 | ZEF SEGAL

Fig. 8 Wurttembergian Postal Ofªcials in 1843, Including Regional

Authority Boundaries

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source Königlich-Württembergisches Hof- und Staats-Handbuch (Stuttgart, 1848).

to 80 percent. Western and eastern border stations were abolished,
and many new ones emerged in the center, as depicted in Figure 9.
The cluster-shaped structure around the capital city diverged dra-
matically from the old system, which made no distinctions be-
tween center and periphery or between border and internal region.
The shift to a “national” post divided the center from both the
periphery and the neighboring states.22

hanover: internal division and regional unity The struc-
ture of the Hanoverian post was based on two distinct and isolated
centers—a southeastern center around Hanover-Hildesheim-
Tubingen, which constituted “old-Hanover,” and a northwestern
center in East Frisia. On the surface, it seemed hardly propitious
for state integration. As a result the system favored regional ties
over national ones, thus creating the possibility for integration on
a larger scale in northwestern Germany.23

22 Weber, Post und Telegraphie im Königreich Württemberg, 154.
23 This division was also an economic, educational, cultural, and political division. See
Stehlin, Bismarck and the Guelph Problem, 1866–1890, 46.

COMMUNICATION AND STAT E CONSTRUCTIO N | 469

Fig. 9 Density Map of the Wurttembergian Postal System in 1865

sources Königlich Sächsischer Hof-, Civil- und Militär-Staat
Württembergisches Hof- und Staats-Handbuch (Stuttgart, 1865).

(Leipzig, 1819); Königlich-

In general, the system underwent almost no changes between
1815 and 1866. Apart from the previously mentioned centers, the
northern and southwestern regions had few post ofªces, although
deployment in each region differed. The north was signiªcant eco-
nomically because of the rivers connecting the North Sea and
Bremen to southeastern Hanover and the rest of Germany. The
few stations operating in northern Hanover were along the rivers
Elbe and Weser at the expense of the towns across the region. In
contrast, the dearth of stations in southwestern Hanover, which
represented the only connection between the western and eastern
parts of the kingdom, seriously hampered cross-country communi-
cation. As a result, two isolated sub-systems were formed—a dense
southeastern one connected to the North Sea along the Weser
River and a dense northwestern one. This alignment reºected a re-
gional rather than a national communication bias.24

Figure 10, depicting the number of sub-stations that each
postal inspector handled, exhibits important regional differences.
Unlike old, decentralized Hanover in the southeast, those regions
that were once nearly devoid of postal service saw the policy re-
versed, permitting a few large isolated centers to be established. In

24 Hannoverscher und Churfürstlich-Braunschweigisch-Lüneburgischer Staaskalender
1818).

(Hanover,

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470 | ZEF SEGAL

Fig. 10 Hanoverian Postal Ofªcials in 1865

note The size of the symbol reºects the number of substations.
source Hof- und Staatshandbuch für das Königreich Hannover (Hanover, 1865).

some respects, this arrangement was similar to the one in Bavaria,
which placed far fewer inspectors in Munich than in the north and
the west. But, whereas the Bavarian policy led to a weakening of
the capital, thus creating a central route equally servicing the whole
country, the Hanoverian deployment reduced connectivity by in-
creasing the distance between stations and stultifying active com-
munication lines between the various centers. The existence of
two densely populated centers with no connecting line of active
postal ofªces—that is, no postal inspectors—signiªed the limited
communication between them.

Despite the great divide between east and west and the lack of
internal postal routes, the opening of cross-border communication
was a primary target of the Hanoverian post. The importance of in-
ternational commerce led to treaties of cooperation with Holland,
Belgium, and Britain as early as 1815. As the emphasis shifted from
non-German states to Hanover’s neighbors in northwestern Ger-
many, postal stations were established in the free cities of the north
(Hamburg, Bremen, and Lubeck) and in the neighboring princi-
palities (Braunschweig and Schaumburg Lippe). Although some of
these ofªces had existed since the eighteenth century, almost half
of them emerged during the late 1840s and the early 1850s, suggest-

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COMMUNICATION AND STAT E CONSTRUCTIO N | 471

ing a rising interest in regional ties. The Hanoverian inªltration
into neighboring states was completed in 1856 with the transfer of
postal authorities from Hamburg, Bremen, Schaumburg Lippe,
and Braunschweig to the Hanoverian post. The postal system
served as both a foundation for regional unity in northwestern Ger-
many and a cause for the growing split between the eastern and
western parts of the state, affecting not just communication within
state borders but also the people’s attitude toward the state as a
whole. Although the king enjoyed broad popular support during
the late 1860s, the populace tended not to view Hanover as a
united political entity.25

The German postal systems were based on a mixture of old and
new components. On the one hand, reliance on the imperial post
run by the Taxis prevented extreme centralism as well as a distinct
localism, at least at ªrst. On the other hand, nothing in their forma-
tion showed any reference to a united “German space.” In general,
the post broke the old regional strangleholds and created inner ties
between different parts of a state, thus serving, inadvertently, as a
major integrating factor. The various postal systems served a wide
range of economic interests, such as those along the commercial
routes in Bavaria, Baden, and Hanover and in the evolving indus-
trial centers in Saxony. They also lessened the effect of certain geo-
graphical barriers, such as the rivers in Hanover and the mountains
in Wurttemberg and south Bavaria, though not necessarily political
ones.

Based on the ªve postal systems examined herein, a distinction
can be made between an inner-German, an outer-German, and an
isolated form. The ªrst one, exempliªed by Hanover and Bavaria,
operated as a regional German network—in this case, in north-
western and southeastern Germany, respectively. The second form,
instantiated by Baden, was oriented primarily toward such non-
German polities as France and Switzerland. The third form, mani-
fested by Saxony and Wurttemberg, was much less affected by
foreign connections than by inner state changes and internal devel-
opments.

25 Werner Steven, Inhaltsübersicht der postalisch relevanten hannoverschen Circulare, Gesetze und
Verordnungen von 1810 bis 1866 (Hanover, 1998), 21; Probst, Behördliche Raumorganisation seit
1800, 43; Steven, Inhaltsübersicht der postalisch relevanten hannoverschen Circular, 98; Evan B.
Bukey, “The Guelph Party in Imperial Germany, 1866–1918,” Historian, XXXV (1972),
43–60.

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472 | ZEF SEGAL

The distribution of post ofªces in the ªve systems falls into
two categories—a path-shaped distribution, communication cen-
ters along a particular route, and a cluster-shaped distribution, de-
centralized communication within a certain region. The Badenese
and Bavarian posts were both constructed along routes that con-
nected their states’ access and exit points, while integrating internal
space in the process. The Saxony and Wurttemberg versions were
both cluster-shaped, leading to contradictory results. Hanover was
split into two sub-systems, both of which were cluster-shaped. The
effect of the shape on state integration derives from, among other
things, the ratio between the size of the route or the cluster and the
size of the whole state. The larger the route, the better it serves
the purpose of state integration, by providing access to a broader
population. A cluster, however, usually implies disintegration and
regional isolation, unless it is large enough to obviate such an
outcome.

Of the three parameters mentioned earlier—orientation, top-
ological shape, and centrality of the capital city—the third was
most critical in enabling integration. Whereas the orientation and
the shape of the systems varied according to geographical and eco-
nomic circumstances, a postal system had to maintain political in-
dependence from a center to create a unifying structure. The shape
of a central route determined the inºuence of a capital city on a
postal system; when a capital was only one center of many along
the route, as in Bavaria and Baden, strong state integration was pos-
sible. The cluster shape signiªes the tendency of capitals to accu-
mulate power, thus inhibiting general integration, as in Hanover
and Wurttemberg. In Saxony, the decentralized structure formed a
cluster shape in the periphery, thus strengthening the weaker parts
of the state, at the expense of the capital of Dresden, and enabling
state integration.

A postal system, in itself, is not a sufªcient condition for state
integration and the formation of statehood—terms used in this arti-
cle interchangeably. But the existence of an appropriate communi-
cation infrastructure is certainly a necessary precondition. There-
fore, the failures of Hanover and Wurttemberg could have been
foretold by their decentralized postal systems. The existence of a
widespread postal infrastructure, however, implies only the possibil-
ity of a strong internal communication, not its realization, which
depends on the actual modes of communication between people—

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COMMUNICATION AND STAT E CONSTRUCTIO N | 473

letter correspondence, newspaper distribution, etc. Nevertheless,
the deployment of post ofªces is a good indication of how well
communication had developed in a particular place. The creation
of strong Bavarian, Saxon, and, to some extent, Badenese identi-
ties, which still persist, is largely attributable to their communica-
tions infrastructure as represented by the post.

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