Growing Apart: China and India
at the Kigali Amendment to
the Montreal Protocol
(cid:129)
Shiming Yang*
Abstract
Developing countries are growing apart on environmental issues. International environ-
mental negotiations are no longer characterized merely by the North–South conflict.
Rising powers have come to divide the Global South and redefine the Common-But-
Differentiated Responsibilities principle. This article explains the divergence of China
and India at the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, one of the first global envi-
ronmental agreements to differentiate obligations between developing countries. China
and India, the world’s two largest hydrofluorocarbon producers, ended decades of
collaboration and split the rest of the developing world behind them. I argue that devel-
opmental strategy and political institutions shape the preferences and influences of
industrial, governmental, and social stakeholders, thereby explaining their negotiation
behavior and outcome. This article explains why China moved faster and further than
India on negotiations for hydrofluorocarbon regulation. It has important implications
for the two rising powers’ implementation of the Kigali Amendment and for their posi-
tion formulations on other environmental issues.
In October 2016, 197 countries passed the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal
Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer. This amendment, which
took eight years to negotiate, is among the first global environmental agree-
ments to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (in this case, hydrofluorocar-
bons, or HFCs). However, China and India—two of the biggest developing
countries, which, combined, emit 40 percent of GHGs and 80 percent of
HFCs—broke ranks, as China adopted an earlier phasedown schedule than
India. Other developing countries took sides, with most countries following
China’s schedule and nine following India’s, making the Kigali Amendment
the first environmental agreement that differentiates obligations between
self-selected groups of developing countries.
* I thank anonymous peer reviewers for helpful feedback on earlier drafts and greatly appreciate
the time that interviewees gave to this project.
Global Environmental Politics 23:2, May 2023, https://doi.org/10.1162/glep_a_00698
© 2022 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Published under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International (CC BY 4.0) license.
74
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Shiming Yang
(cid:129) 75
Why did they part ways? Since the inception of the Montreal Protocol,
China and India had always coordinated positions to bargain against industri-
alized countries—until 2016. How do we account for China’s position changes,
which seemed to raise its domestic compliance costs? What made India insist on
a three-year delay, which would cost its HFC sector the first-mover advantage in
the global market? Moreover, what does their divergence tell us about develop-
ing countries in global environmental negotiations? With their growing market
and political clout, China’s and India’s positions assumed at Kigali could influ-
ence other countries’ positions and negotiation outcomes at other multilateral
environmental agreements (MEAs).
The Kigali Amendment offers a compelling opportunity to study how
rising powers form positions on international environmental issues. Existing
literature explains countries’ environmental foreign policy from structural, insti-
tutional, ideational, and personal approaches, but limited research has studied
developing countries and, even less so, their divergence. Despite holding differ-
ent, sometimes opposite positions, developing countries had largely held
together to not set up a precedent of differentiating treatments without sufficient
justification. In this sense, the Kigali Amendment could undermine the unity of
the Global South in MEAs. Still, no academic or policy research so far has
attempted to explain why China and India chose to part ways then and there.
This article combines political economic and institutional perspectives to
understand the domestic determinants of China’s and India’s positions on HFC
regulation under the Montreal Protocol. Focusing on the interactions of national
government, industry, and civil society, I argue that state position formulation is
shaped by developmental strategy and political institutions. Developmental
strategy influences the preference of industrial stakeholders, the main compliers
of regulation. An export-led sector should be more open to international regula-
tion than one focusing on the domestic market. Political institutions shape the
roles of civil society and government. Democracy allows diverse stakeholders to
assert influence over governmental positions, whereas in an authoritarian sys-
tem, civil society’s participation is more limited, while government has more
discretion in assuming positions beyond domestic groups’ preferred range.
The empirical analysis draws from fieldwork at the Montreal Protocol
negotiations. I observed negotiation sessions, interviewed negotiation partici-
pants, and collected materials from other sources. These materials link stake-
holder actions in domestic and international arenas to piece together how the
two rising powers’ developmental strategies drove their preferences apart and
how political institutions kept their positions away. I find that China’s HFC
sector is export oriented and increasingly focused on the industrialized market,
which incentivized China to adapt early, voluntarily, and on a larger scale, with
governmental encouragement. China’s political system centralizes knowledge
generation in a homogeneous group of stakeholders, who, albeit holding
similar positions, have limited influence over the government’s position. India’s
HFC sector is domestically oriented, its industry less incentivized to adapt to
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76 (cid:129) Growing Apart
foreign markets. Its democratic system, however, engages stakeholders of diverse
interests, who influenced the Indian government to take a middle ground
acceptable to all.
This article contributes to the global environmental politics literature by
identifying the domestic determinants of a developing country’s environmental
foreign policy. Based on one of the first “official” separations within the Global
South, this article shows how developmental strategy and political institutions
explain developing countries’ position formulations on certain international
environmental issues. Moreover, this article shows that rising powers are grow-
ing apart. With differing self-positioning in the world, as well as differing
domestic economic and political structures, their discord is likely to continue,
as we can observe at global climate negotiations.
Developmental Strategy and Political Institutions in
Position Formulation
Since the dawn of global environmental cooperation, developing countries have
moved from the periphery to the center of global environmental negotiations.
The post–Cold War multilateralism, economic globalization, and growing expe-
rience in international negotiations have made them more willing to bargain,
and capable of doing so, on international stages. While developing countries’
commonalities in history, political, and economic capacity remain important
in understanding their behavior at environmental negotiations (Guha and
Martinez-Alier 1997; Johnson and Urpelainen 2020; Kasa et al. 2008), these
commonalities are overshadowed by diverging interests and negotiation capa-
bilities. The North–South dynamics are no longer sufficient to explain develop-
ing countries’ behavior on environmental issues, some of which are seeing
significant intra-South cleavages that rival North–South conflicts.
Scholars now recognize the heterogeneity within the Global South and the
possibility for differentiated treatments (Allan and Dauvergne 2013; Hurrell and
Sengupta 2012; Pauwelyn 2013). However, few have studied why developing
countries are united on certain issues and divided on others. On individual coun-
tries’ environmental foreign policy, existing literature takes structural, institu-
tional, ideational, and personal accounts (Recchia 2002). The structural approach
focuses on a country’s natural vulnerability, abatement costs, military interests,
and features of the MEAs (Grundig 2006; Sprinz and Vaahtoranta 1994). The
institutional approach emphasizes domestic groups and interactions (DeSombre
2000; Hopgood 1998; Raustiala 1997). The ideational approach examines how
ideas and science empower the epistemic community in environmental negotia-
tions (Haas 1992; Parson 2003). Still, far more research has been done on indus-
trialized than on developing countries, much less in a comparative sense.
In response to the increasingly sophisticated behavior of developing coun-
tries, recent studies have examined the internal dynamics of the Global South
and individual countries’ environmental foreign policy. Some focus on
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Shiming Yang
(cid:129) 77
coalitions within the Global South (Bhandary 2017; Watts and Depledge 2018),
others on individual states, usually taking a geopolitical perspective (Eckersley
2020; Jayaram 2015). In the context of a power shift from Western to non-
Western countries, a growing literature compares rising powers’ environmental
policies (Aamodt and Stensdal 2017; Harrison and Kostka 2014; Shi and van
Rooij 2015; Wu 2018). By comparison, fewer studies compare their environ-
mental foreign policies. Among the few, Stokes et al. (2016) analyze the discord
between China and India at the Minamata Convention on Mercury from
domestic resources, developmental constraints, and technological capacity.
Even here, their contrasting negotiation behavior didn’t result in differentiated
treatments in the treaty. Until the Kigali Amendment, developing countries had
been reluctant to differentiate obligations arbitrarily between themselves, except
for special treatments based on country categories (e.g., least developed and
small-island states).
Existing studies may suggest three potential explanations for China and
India’s divergence at Kigali, but none of these explanations alone can account
for the contrasting behaviors of China and India. A structural argument may be
that China’s HFC sector is larger in size and more advanced in technology,
hence more prepared for transition. However, China’s HFC production is as reli-
ant on Western technologies as India’s, and both countries face high transition
costs and technological uncertainty. If anything, China’s greater emissions pro-
file should entail higher abatement costs, hence less cooperation than India
(Stokes et al. 2016). An intuitionalist may argue that China’s authoritarian sys-
tem may have allowed the government to make aggressive commitments with-
out domestic backlash. This might be true, but why haven’t political systems
worked earlier? Personal diplomacy plays a crucial role in international environ-
mental negotiations (Benedick 1998), which means bilateral talks and persua-
sion of the United States and European Union (EU) may have helped in forging
agreements with China and India. Still, why did China move faster and further
than India? In this article, I argue that China and India’s divergence is indeed
related to political system and industrial profile, but through decision-making
processes that have not been captured by existing studies.
This article analyzes state position formulation at MEAs from political eco-
nomic and institutional perspectives. Developing countries exhibit diverse
growth pathways and political institutions. Compared to industrialized coun-
tries, many developing countries view economic growth as the precondition
for political and social development, which makes them willing to prioritize
growth at any cost (Ohno 2013). Their integration into the global economy
complicates certain environmental foreign policy making by differentiating
interests of industries with various market orientations, technology endow-
ments, and positions in the supply chains (Falkner 2008; Lake 2009). An
export-oriented sector is open to the global market and vulnerable to policy
changes in other countries. It can lower environmental standards to attract
investments or adopt higher environmental standards to promote industrial
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78 (cid:129) Growing Apart
competitiveness ( Vogel 1995). As many trade agreements now require tighten-
ing environmental standards in exchange for favorable trade treatments (Bechtel
and Tosun 2009), exporters have incentives to adapt preemptively by increasing
trade before agreements enter into force (Magee 2008) or investing in new prod-
ucts for the new market. Exporters can collaborate with foreign companies to
access technology, which requires sticky capital investment and makes exporters
more open to international regulation (Kelsey 2021). In addition, government
is more likely to support its export sector in maintaining competitiveness (Evans
1995). A domestic-focused sector, on the contrary, is insulated from the inter-
national market. As long as domestic policy does not change, the sector is less
concerned with international regulation or collaborating with foreign compa-
nies, particularly if doing so will cut their profit away. Correspondingly, the gov-
ernment may find no need to intervene.
Developing countries also feature diverse political institutions that are not
seen in the Global North. Regarding political institutions and environmental
quality, some argue that democracy improves environmental quality through
participation and accountability (Policardo 2016). Others find that authoritar-
ianism can be more effective in making unpopular environmental regulations
(Beeson 2010; Gilley 2012). While it is uncertain whether democracy improves
environmental quality in developing countries (Kim et al. 2018), state capacity
and political institutions seem to matter (Harrison and Kostka 2014; Marcoux
and Urpelainen 2012). I argue that political institutions shape a country’s posi-
tion formulation through the composition and influence of domestic stake-
holders. These actors include companies, industrial associations (IAs), advocacy
groups, and research institutions. While companies and governmental agencies
are usually involved in decision-making, other stakeholders’ participation varies
considerably across political systems.
In a democratic developing country, diverse nonstate actors can participate
in decision-making. These actors provide important alternative information and
implementation resources to industry, which makes government value their
positions as well as that of the industry. An authoritarian system is less partic-
ipatory. Certain nonstate groups can be excluded even though they can provide
valuable information for decision-making. These stakeholders have less control
over government and are less likely to bargain with the state, whose capacity to
intervene in the economy gives it more leeway at international negotiations.
Even as domestic bargaining participants hold similar interests, the govern-
ment’s position is not necessarily bound by them.
Figure 1 illustrates how developing countries spread across the two-
dimensional framework may formulate positions at multilateral environmental
negotiations that require changes in the manufacturing industries. Democracies
with export-oriented sectors can be “reformers,” whose industries are receptive
to international regulation and their governments less likely to stand in their
way. Democracies with domestic-oriented industries, on the contrary, can be
“reluctant compliers,” who oppose regulation but are open to changes given
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Shiming Yang
(cid:129) 79
Figure 1
Illustrative Categorization of Developing Countries
proper stakeholder input and windows of opportunity. Authoritarian export-
oriented countries, as “unpredictable speedsters,” can take more progressive
stands than domestic stakeholders. Authoritarian domestic-oriented countries
are “resisters,” because neither industry nor government is incentivized to accept
international regulation.
Case Information and Data
The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer was established
in 1985 to protect the stratospheric ozone layer. The Montreal Protocol on
Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987) implements the Vienna Con-
vention by identifying and controlling ozone-depleting substances. It gives
developing countries a ten-year grace period for compliance and the Multi-
Lateral Fund (MLF) to finance their transitions. Under the Montreal Protocol
and its amendments, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), the major ODS, were
replaced by hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) and then HFCs, which possess
negligible ozone-depleting yet high global-warming potential (GWP). In this
article, the ODS sector refers to the chemical industry that produces HFCs
and the appliance industries that use HFCs in their products, even though HFCs
are not ODS. In recent years, developing countries have become the largest pro-
ducers, traders, and consumers of ODS products.
Two things make HFCs more difficult to regulate than their predecessors.
First, the Montreal Protocol was created to regulate ODS, which HFCs are not.
Moreover, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the UNFCCC already
qualified HFC-231 incineration as carbon emission reductions (CERs). Second,
unlike their predecessors, HFCs have no universal alternatives. Multiple alterna-
tives are under various stages of development with trade-offs in safety,
1. HFC-23 is a by-product of HCFC manufacturing and has GWP of 14,800.
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80 (cid:129) Growing Apart
efficiency, and environmental impact. The drop-in alternatives, such as HFOs,
require minimal appliance modification but are heavily patented. Natural alter-
natives, like water, carbon dioxide, ammonia, and propane, are inexpensive but
require more appliance adjustment. In other words, HFC phasedown is not a
simple bargain for financial support, on which China and India share interest.
Decisions on HFC alternatives lay bare economic and political differences
between the two countries.
Negotiations on HFC regulation initiated when Micronesia submitted a
proposal in 2009. From 2009 to 2013, major developing countries opposed
the proposal, arguing that the Montreal Protocol had no jurisdiction over
GHGs. Starting June 2013, the United States launched separate bilateral talks
with China and India, but only China accepted HFC regulation under the Mon-
treal Protocol, while India did not come on board until Narendra Modi
assumed power in 2014 ( White House 2013, 2014). Figure 2 marks the major
position changes of China and India during the negotiation.
I base the empirical analysis on fieldwork at Montreal Protocol negotia-
tions at the Open-End Working Group (OEWG) and Meeting of Parties
(MOP) from 2017 to 2019. Fieldwork data include negotiation observations,
interviews, distributed materials, and other data acquired from negotiations
and fieldtrips to China. At each negotiation, I observed the weeklong plenary
negotiations, contact groups, side events, and receptions, where I interviewed
national delegations; technical experts and scientists; intergovernmental and
developmental organizations (Die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), United Nations Industrial Development Organization,
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Figure 2
Major Position Shifts of China and India on HFC Phasedown (2009–2016)
Shiming Yang
(cid:129) 81
the United Nations Development Programme, and the United Nations Environ-
ment Programme); Montreal Protocol agencies (MLF and Technology and Eco-
nomic Assessment Panel); nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and think
tanks; and companies and industrial associations of the ODS sector from China,
India, the United States, and the EU, most of which participated for the entire
period of HFC negotiations. To gauge domestic stakeholders’ influence on gov-
ernmental positions, I compared delegations’ positions with domestic stake-
holder preferences in terms of base/freeze years and phasedown schedules.
The closer the governmental position was to the preferences of domestic stake-
holders, the greater influence these stakeholders had over the governmental
position.
Explaining the Kigali Amendment
This section analyzes each dimension separately. For the developmental strat-
egy, I look at the developmental strategy of the ODS sector before examining
the industrial response to potential HFC regulation. For the political institu-
tions, I survey the political system and stakeholders involved and then compare
their positions.
Developmental Strategy and Industrial Response
On HFC regulation, industrial stakeholders’ preferences evolved with ODS mar-
ket trends and HFC negotiation. China’s export-led growth brings about a glob-
ally integrated ODS sector with governmental backing. This led to voluntary
industrial response with extensive governmental support to navigate the transi-
tion from HFCs. India does not prioritize the manufacturing sector. Its ODS
sector faced a largely untapped domestic market and a less-interventionist
government, which gave it little incentive to accept HFC regulation.
China adopts an export-led industrialization with the secondary sector
contributing 40.5 percent of national GDP. Like other East and Southeast Asian
countries, China welcomes foreign direct investments and prioritizes
manufacturing and export. Each industry is organized by an industrial associa-
tion that communicates between industry and government. Both ODS produc-
tion and appliance industries in China are export oriented. China has the largest
fluorite reserve in the world, which gives it the advantage in producing ODS.
The market is dominated by low value-added products and price competition.
The ODS appliance industries use ODS as refrigerants and blowing agents.
China is also the world’s largest residential air-conditioner and refrigerator
exporter. Its cooling appliance manufacturers export both under their brands
and for foreign brands under OEM.
Voluntary adaptation from industry started immediately after the first HFC
proposal in 2009. Relying on export, but with limited technology indepen-
dence, the ODS production industry was vulnerable to changes in the export
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82 (cid:129) Growing Apart
market. The Global Financial Crisis reduced international demand, and domes-
tic price competition led to a continued slump. Meanwhile, industrialized coun-
tries began to turn away from HFCs. The US manufacturers developed HFOs. In
2010, the EU proposed full use restrictions by May 2013 on HFC-23 CERs,
which would cut a large chunk of profit of Chinese ODS manufacturers. In
2011, the EU banned the use of HFC-134a in new models of mobile air-
conditioning systems. The industry-wide predicament forced Chinese ODS
manufacturers to diversify. They may have opposed imminent HFC regulation
in China because they had just invested to convert production lines to HFCs.
However, they were willing to collaborate with foreign companies, who had
patents and distribution channels, to produce profitable low-GWP alternatives.
In 2010, Changshu 3F Zhonghao announced a 3,000-ton production line of
HFO-1234yf, a low-GWP alternative to HFC-134a, for Dupont. In 2012, Juhua
announced its collaboration with Honeywell to produce HFC-152a, a low-GWP
alternative to HCFC-22. In October 2012, Sinochem Lantian and Honeywell
started a joint venture to produce HFC-245fa to replace HCFC-141b as a foam-
ing agent. The new company would also produce Solstice, a low-GWP foaming
agent. In December 2012, Arkema acquired 5 percent share of Changshu 3F.
Most major ODS manufacturers in China initiated collaboration with foreign
companies before the United States–China bilateral talk in 2013, and three joint
ventures started production before the Kigali Amendment.
The Chinese government facilitated the transition shortly after the 2013
United States–China joint statement. Chinese ODS manufacturers lost the
financial incentive to incinerate HFC-23 after the EU terminated HFC-23 CER.
To compensate for the revenue loss and motivate HFC-23 incineration, the
National Development and Reform Council (NDRC) approved regressive sub-
sides for HFC-23 incineration for HCFC-22 projects that had no CDM funding.
To encourage ODS manufacturers to leapfrog to low-GWP alternatives, the Min-
istry of Environmental Protection created a task force in 2013, with experts from
universities and IAs, to draft the HCFC Alternative Technology Guidebook. It out-
lined three principles for selecting the “List of Recommended HCFC Alterna-
tives,” one of which says that “alternatives should not have high-GWP.” The first
draft of the list contained twelve alternatives, and all except one were natural
alternatives (MEP 2015). A second draft added two HFO alternatives as foaming
agents but still left the main HFO alternative for vehicle air conditioners, HFO-
1234yf out of the list.
The ODS appliance industries also opposed HFC regulation before 2013,
but their voluntary adaptation was even more thorough. The largest ODS appli-
ance industry is refrigeration and air conditioning (RAC). China is the world’s
largest RAC exporter (33.5% for air conditioners and 22.8% for refrigerators).
Major companies, such as GREE, Midea, and Haier, are all domestic owned.
As the RAC ownership plateaued in urban areas by 2008 and in rural areas
by 2012, the RAC industry reoriented toward the foreign market, especially
the industrialized countries.
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Shiming Yang
(cid:129) 83
Exposure to the global market incentivized the RAC industry to move
away from high-GWP HFCs. Seeing the domestic sale stagnation and long-term
trend in low-GWP cooling, the Chinese RAC industry began to adapt before the
governmental commitment. Less disadvantaged than the ODS production sec-
tor in the global market, the RAC industry was more motivated to develop its
own HFC alternatives than to collaborate with foreign companies. With govern-
mental encouragement, the industry began “leapfrogging” by converting pro-
duction lines that use HCFCs directly to those that use low-GWP refrigerants,
mostly R-290. During the first HPMP (2011–2015), Chinese RAC manufactur-
ers secured US$ 36 million from the MLF in 2011, US$ 9 million in 2012, and
US$ 8.5 million in 2013, most of which was used to covert production lines from HCFCs to R-290. In December 2012, the MEP contracted four appliance manufacturers to phase out 3,300 metric tons of HCFCs for US$ 18 million. In
early 2013, the MEP contracted another four appliance companies to phase out
2,858 metric tons of HCFCs, 59 percent of which would be replaced by HFC-32,
a medium-GWP refrigerant. By 2015, China’s manufacturing capacity for R-290
air conditioners reached 4 million to 5 million units.
Unlike China’s, India’s economy is not built on export of manufactured
goods. By 2016, India’s manufacturing sector contributed merely 23 percent
of national GDP. India’s growth strategy creates a smaller and domestically
oriented ODS sector, featuring an ODS production industry dominated by
domestic companies and appliance industries, with a strong existence of foreign
companies. Companies organize industrial associations to lobby policy makers.
India’s ODS sector also adjusted before the Indian delegation changed
position in 2014. However, these adjustments were less coordinated, smaller
in scale, and with less governmental intervention. India’s ODS production
industry is dominated by five companies: SRF, Navin Fluorine, Gujarat Fluoro-
chemical, Hindustan Fluorocarbons, and Chemplast Sanmar. Only three of
them produce ODS, as some widely used ODS are primarily imported from
China. India’s ODS manufacturers maintained decent profit margins by limiting
competition (Council on Energy, Environment, and Water et al. 2016). Project-
ing a 10%–12% domestic market growth, SRF, India’s largest HFC producer,
scaled up its HFC capacity threefold in 2014. Facing little external pressure,
ODS manufacturers took a firm position against HFC regulation and did not
adapt until the Indian government changed stance after the second United
States–India talk in 2014. Only in March 2016, Navin signed an agreement with
Honeywell to produce HFO-1234yf. A month later, SRF announced its plan to
pilot HFO-1234yf production with its own technology.
Similar to China’s, India’s ODS appliance industries, especially the RAC
industry, opposed HFC regulation for difficulty in finding low-GWP alterna-
tives. Consider, for example, the room air conditioner industry: foreign compa-
nies from Japan and South Korea, such as Daikin, Hitachi, LG, and Samsung,
compose more than half of the market. These companies responded differently
based on their market projections. Some invested in efficiency improvement of
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84 (cid:129) Growing Apart
existing high-GWP refrigerants, while others sought medium- or low-GWP alter-
natives. In as early as 2002, Godrej and Boyce introduced hydrocarbon to
replace CFCs. With support from the GIZ under a Germany–India agreement,
Godrej and Boyce started a new production line of room air conditioners using
R-290 with the highest five-star energy-efficiency ratings (Ghosh 2019; Natural
Resources Defense Council [NRDC] et al. 2013). Daikin, one of Japan’s largest
fluorocarbon and air conditioning manufacturers, developed the medium-GWP
HFC-32 air conditioners in 2010. To promote this technology, Daikin offered
free access to its pledged patents, making HFC-32 an affordable alternative to
HFC-410a in developing countries. In February 2013, Daikin India announced
that its HFC-32 products would be available in India. Panasonic also planned to
offer split air conditioners using HFC-32 (NRDC et al. 2013).
The Indian government offered neither financial support for HFC-23
incineration nor policy guidance for HFC transition. It supported industry
mainly by facilitating information exchange. Responding to industrial demand,
the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) held an
Indo-US Workshop on HFCs in February 2011, attended by more than 100 par-
ticipants from India, the United States, and Europe. Indian IAs stressed that the
RAC sector was price sensitive, that HFCs were the only feasible alternatives to
HCFCs, and that the industry “cannot afford frequent changeovers as it involves
huge capital investment” (RAMA 2011). Participants agreed to launch a Joint
Indo-US Technical Task Force to produce a report covering all sectors by August
2011. Similar stakeholder workshops took place in April 2012 and February
2013, in which industrialized countries and think tanks presented technological
solutions and exchanged concerns with the Indian ODS sector. The Indian gov-
ernment’s noninterventionist approach continued after 2014. Despite Godrej’s
success in producing and selling R-290 units, the Indian government made no
policy to promote low-GWP refrigerants. As stated in its HFC proposal, “why
cannot alternative chemicals and technologies come in market and compete?”
(Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change 2015). Days before the
Kigali Amendment was adopted, the Indian government demanded that ODS
manufacturers incinerate HFC-23 at their own cost.
Political Institutions and Governmental Position Formulation
Developmental strategy may affect the preference of the industry as the main
stakeholders, but the governmental position at international negotiations is also
influenced by other stakeholders of various interests and influence. China’s author-
itarian system involves public stakeholders in addition to the industry. These stake-
holders, once contributing their knowledge, have limited control over the details of
HFC regulation. India’s democratic system allows for diverse stakeholders, who
advocate for their interests and influence the Indian delegation at Kigali.
China has an authoritarian system with limited division of power. Under
the single party’s rule, the national government is free from electoral uncertainty,
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Shiming Yang
(cid:129) 85
judicial review, and budget constraints, leading to greater policy continuity and
discretion. China’s ODS policy is drafted by the MEP and approved by the State
Council. The MEP implements decisions made at the Montreal Protocol and
heads the Ozone Protection High-Level Inter-Agency Task Force, consisting of
seventeen national agencies.
Four groups are involved in ODS policy making. The first are companies in
the ODS sector. Although their inputs are essential, these companies are not
directly involved in policy making. Their voices are channeled through a second
group, quasi-public industrial associations, which connect industry with govern-
ment. These IAs, once governmental organizations, are now “social organiza-
tions” and fund themselves by offering consulting, publishing, training, and
event-organizing services. However, they locate in the same buildings as govern-
mental agencies and engage routinely in governmental policy making. Public
research institutions provide research necessary for decision-making. Some uni-
versities have long-term R&D partnerships with industrial companies. National
labs, the National Science Academy, the Academy of Meteorological Sciences,
the Foreign Economic Cooperation Office (MEP), and other governmental orga-
nizations also supply information through grant-funded or industry-contracted
research. Most IAs, research institutions, and governmental agencies are obli-
gated to assist with policy making. No environmental NGOs are directly
involved in ODS policy making.
Nonstate stakeholders restrict participation to domestic consultation.
Consultation meetings are organized regularly by the MEP and attended by
IAs, scholars, and governmental agencies. These meetings review policy imple-
mentation and discuss potential regulations. Governmental ministries and
external donors can appropriate grants to research organizations and IAs to con-
duct research informing ODS policy making. Companies communicate primar-
ily with IAs, though they occasionally meet with governmental agencies or
attend international workshops. Only the largest IAs and experts regularly
attend Montreal Protocol negotiations, mostly in observational and consulting
capacities. Out of 155 side events and publications registered at the Montreal
Protocol website (2014–2016), only four concerned China or were held by
Chinese organizations, and all of them focused on R-290, China’s preferred
alternative to HFC-410a (see the later discussion).
China’s position change in 2013 was not fully anticipated by domestic
stakeholders. HFC regulation became a priority item in Obama’s climate diplo-
macy in his second term. In 2013, the United States initiated bilateral talks with
China and India. China agreed to phase down HFCs “through multilateral
approaches that include using the expertise and institutions of the Montreal
Protocol” ( White House 2013). This came as a surprise to domestic stake-
holders. Notwithstanding industrial adaptation, China’s ODS sector had no
consensus on when and how HFC should be regulated, nor were industrial
and epistemic communities notified that the government was ready to negotiate
HFC regulation. A Chinese scientist deeply involved in the Montreal Protocol
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86 (cid:129) Growing Apart
and Chinese ODS policy commented, “We knew it was coming, but we did not
know it came so soon and in such radical form” (interview 201801). That said,
stakeholders did sense the forthcoming regulation on HFCs. In 2011, China
released its first Five-Year Plan for Controlling for GHG Emissions, which outlined
a major objective to reduce non-CO2 GHG emissions, including HCFCs and
HFCs. This plan empowered the NDRC to control industrial GHG emissions.
In early 2013, the NDRC suggested that China’s GHG emissions may peak by
2025, and it planned to introduce a cap mechanism starting the thirteenth Five-
Year Period. Months before the United States–China talk, the NDRC began
sending strong signals to ODS manufacturers that tighter HFC restrictions were
in the pipeline and that continued refusal to discuss HFC phasedown would not
be tolerated. China’s ODS sector did not want to phase down HFCs yet, but
“China is a responsible world power, economics sometimes has to submit to
politics” (interview 201803).
The Chinese delegation surprised domestic stakeholders again during the
negotiation for the phasedown schedule. It stated that China did not fixate on
any schedules and was open on how to address HFCs. Domestic stakeholders
produced five industry-specific reports in addition to academic and technical
studies on HFC regulation. I analyze these industry reports on the overall
HFC sector as well as specific industries involved in HFC production and resi-
dential, automobile, commercial, and industrial air-conditioning/cooling.
Except for the overall HFC report, the other four were published after 2013.
These reports largely represent the nonstate groups’ preference on HFC
regulation.
As Table 1 shows, these reports are not easily comparable but still reveal
important information about the dynamics between state and nonstate stake-
holders. First, these reports used different scenarios, and three out of five reports
did not consider the three phasedown schedule proposals widely discussed at
the Montreal Protocol. Second, no IA reports estimated abatement costs or eco-
nomic benefits of HFC regulation. Instead, they estimated the “environmental
benefits” through potential GHG emission reductions. This contrasts with
Indian stakeholders, who emphasized high transition costs to avoid costly reg-
ulation. Chinese IA reports analyzed compliance challenges without any cost
estimation, opposition to specific regulations, or requests for governmental sup-
port. The ODS sector knew that cost estimates would not sway governmental
decisions. The use of GHG emissions as the main indicator across regulation
scenarios implies that China’s ultimate concern with regard to HFC control
was climate mitigation. All IA reports assumed that China caps GHG emissions
by 2030.
These stakeholder inputs had limited influence over the final governmen-
tal position. The HFC production industry preferred the Indian proposal’s freeze
year and the North American proposal’s phasedown schedule (ZRICI 2016).
The residential RAC industry report discussed three scenarios, the most practical
of which peaks in 2027 (CHEARI 2015). The industrial/commercial cooling
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Table 1
Chinese Nonstate Stakeholder Input on HFC Phasedown (2013–2016)
Research
Organization
and Date
Peking
University
( Jan. 2013)
CAS
(Sep. 2013)
CRAA
(Dec. 2014)
Project Name
Industry
Chemicals
Method
Main Findings
Controlling HFCs
Impact Assessment—
Opportunities and
Challenges
automobile and
residential air
conditioning,
HFC-23, and
PU foam
HFC-134a,
HFC-410a,
HFC-245fa,
HFC-23
cost–benefit analysis,
BAU plus two to eight
mitigation scenarios
An Investigation of
Non-CO2 GHG from
the Motor Vehicles in
China and Its Control
Potential Analysis
automobile air
conditioning
HFC-134a
emission modeling of
N2O, CH4, and HFC-
134a of BAU and five
mitigation scenarios
Report on Chinese
Industrial and
Commercial Cooling
Industry’s Use of
HFCs
industrial and
commercial
refrigeration and
air conditioning
HFC-134a,
HFC-410a
emission potential of
low/high-growth
models, each with BAU
and four mitigation
scenarios
HC-290 is preferred to replace
HFC-410a, and HC should be
used to avoid phasein of HFC-
245fa. Mitigation scenarios of
automobile and HFC-23
scenarios have trade-offs.
The refrigerant-changing
scenario has greatest emission
reduction potential, followed
by the emission standard
tightening scenario and
refrigerant-recycling scenario.
In both growth models,
scenario C presents the largest
reduction potential given
current technology, but it will
be very costly in the high-
growth model.
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(cid:129)
8
7
Table 1
(Continued )
Research
Organization
and Date
CHEARI
(Mar. 2015)
ZRICI
( Jun. 2016)
Project Name
Industry
Chemicals
Method
Main Findings
China Residential
Refrigerator and Air-
Conditioners Life-
Cycle Non-CO2 GHG
Emission Reduction
Potential Research
China
Flourochemcial
Industry Mitigation
Research
residential
refrigeration and
air conditioning
HFC-410a,
HFC-32
emission potential and
measures of the most
feasible and the ideal
scenarios against BAU
This report quantifies the
emission reduction potential
by life cycle segments of
residential refrigerator and air
conditioners, as well as the
measures required to reach
emission reduction goals.
HFC production
all major
HFCs
analysis of HFC
alternatives by country
and comparison of
North American, EU,
and Indian proposals
China should take the baseline
year of the Indian proposal
and the phsaedown schedule
of the North American
proposal.
8
8
(cid:129)
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Shiming Yang
(cid:129) 89
industry report used four mitigation scenarios with different adopted rates of
medium- and low-GWP alternatives, with scenario C (peak before 2024 and
with 10% reductions by 2029) representing China’s maximum reduction capac-
ity (CRAA 2014). In other words, three industries that combined produce 71
percent (volume) and 84 percent (USD) HFCs preferred to freeze HFC produc-
tion during 2027–2029 or at least after 2024. However, at Kigali, China agreed
to use 2020–2022 as the baseline, freeze by 2024, and reduce 10 percent by
2029. This position was more progressive than the ODS sector preferred.
India is a parliamentary democracy. Two contending political parties, the
Indian National Congress (INC) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), have
taken turns in ruling. The eight-year HFC negotiation was divided into the
administrations of Manmohan Singh from the INC (2009–2014) and Narendra
Modi from the BJP (2014–2016). The Ozone Cell under the MoEFCC makes
and implements ODS regulation. India’s democratic system invites diverse
stakeholders from public, private, and social sectors for ODS policy making.
Indian IAs are headed by the largest companies and represent their members’
interests. Balancing industry interests are the civil society groups that favor
HFC regulation. These NGOs draw power from expertise rather than the ability
to mobilize citizens. They incorporate works from academic, industrial, govern-
mental, and international organizations.
Indian stakeholders participated actively in domestic and international
forums. The Ozone Cell holds at least two meetings annually, including stake-
holder consultations, workshops, program launches, and roundtables. Partici-
pants include the MoEFCC and other governmental agencies, companies, IAs,
developmental and UN agencies, and NGOs. At these meetings, stakeholders
present on technology and market analyses with policy suggestions. Indian
companies, IAs, and NGOs attended MOPs and OEWGs regularly, held side
events, and distributed publications. Some NGOs, such as the Centre for Science
and Environment (CSE), were awarded the Partnership Award by the Montreal
Protocol Secretariat.
Indian stakeholders have strong influence over the delegation. Three
months after the United States–China bilateral talk, the United States–India
bilateral talks took place, but India agreed only to consider (rather than to
accept) HFC regulation under the Montreal Protocol. The joint statement did
not stop the Indian delegation from opposing the HFC agenda item at the
MOP-25. It contended that “while the United States and India had agreed to
establish a task force on HFCs, it would be premature to discuss any action until
the task force had been formed and completed its work” (United Nations Envi-
ronment Programme 2013). India’s stalling can be explained from domestic
politics. In a democracy with a strong bureaucratic class, the prime minister can-
not make deals without a cabinet majority, and the MoEFCC cannot enforce
regulation against strong industrial opposition. Toward the end of Manmohan
Singh’s term, his administration was bogged down in corruption scandals and
unable to make substantive policy (interview 201802). The joint statement was
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90 (cid:129) Growing Apart
symbolic, as ministries, especially the MoEFCC, wanted to keep a hard line and
did not support Singh’s decision (Ghosh 2019).
China’s position shift was a wake-up call for India. Since 2009, China and
India had always coordinated stances. Roughly half of India’s interventions were
supported by China, but this number dropped to zero at the MOP-25. Although
feeling “betrayed,” India tried to make sense of China’s actions (interview
201902). After all, China produced two-thirds of the world’s HFCs. “Reluctance
from India risks leaving India on the sidelines as China and the U.S. develop
their special relationship” (Shende 2013). What really changed the minds of
Indian stakeholders was less international pressure than the suspicion that they
would be left behind in terms of market, technology, and financial assistance
(interviews 201801 and 201901).
Still, no real change took place until Modi became prime minister in
May 2014. Promising to bring India jobs and growth, Modi centralized gov-
ernmental power and encouraged integration into the global supply chain.
Soon, the US Department of Energy reached out to India with an agenda that
included cooling as one of the issue areas and hinted that the United States
expected to forge synergies on country-level actions between climate change
and ozone protection (interview 201902). The issue was incorporated into
the fifth United States–India Strategic Dialogue in July 2014, and the United
States linked potential investment in the power sector to an agreement on
climate change during the negotiation with the Indian Ministry of Power.
Secretary of state John Kerry co-chaired the negotiations and met with Modi
afterward. Kerry’s visit to India was the first cabinet-level exchange between
the Obama and Modi administrations, and it aimed to pave the way for
Modi’s upcoming visit to the United States (PTI 2016). India finally agreed
to regulate HFCs under the Montreal Protocol in September 2014 ( White
House 2014).
India’s acceptance of HFC regulation may have been affected by China,
but its position on how and when this regulation would happen was based
on domestic consultation (Ghosh 2019). The Indian government needed infor-
mation to determine its bargaining strategy. Independent research organiza-
tions, such as the Council on Energy, Environment, and Water (CEEW); CSE;
the Institute for Governance and Sustainable Development (IGSD); and the
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), provided indispensable analyses
that industry did not offer. Their research surveyed different industries and
modeled emission scenarios. They highlighted several key concerns for India,
including carbon accounting and research of technical, technological, economic,
and climate impacts of HFC phasedown (Ghosh 2013).
Domestic stakeholders’ positions were incorporated into India’s proposal
made in April 2015. This proposal assumed high growth in economy, urbani-
zation, and ODS-appliance penetration rates in India. India proposed a late
baseline year (2028–2030), freeze year (2031), and completion by 2050. It
further requested non–Article 5 countries to fund the “full-conversion cost”
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Shiming Yang
(cid:129) 91
(as opposed to the incremental transition cost) of HFC phasedown. India’s pro-
posal, as an opening bargaining gambit, reflected the civil society’s position to
phase down high-GWP HFC and the industry preference to delay the change-
over. Domestic groups received the Indian proposal with different attitudes.
Among the ODS sector, the transition was easiest for the foam and hardest
for the RAC industry, hence the former pushed for demonstration projects
and policy guidance, while the latter insisted on late phasedown and finance.
Among the research groups, CEEW and The Energy and Resource Institute
(TERI) supported the Indian proposal, but CSE preferred faster phasedown
and natural refrigerants (Table 2).
In the eighteen months that followed, domestic stakeholders scaled up
activities at all levels. Domestically, two more stakeholder consultation meet-
ings took place before the MOP-28. Major stakeholders met with the MoEFCC
to discuss India’s bargaining strategies. Industrial stakeholders requested the
government to “stick to the proposal of full cost of conversion and the timelines
as solutions are not available across for most of the products” (RAMA 2015).
On the international stage, research groups were more active. As Table 3 shows,
Indian stakeholders had four times as many side events and side-event publica-
tions as Chinese stakeholders. Unlike the ODS sector, which highlighted the
uncertainty and high cost of HFC phasedown, the research groups persuaded
policy makers that HFC phasedown was cost-beneficial for India in the long
run. CSE justified its expeditious phasedown schedule with proposals for energy
efficiency and leapfrogging to natural refrigerants. NRDC and IGSD illustrated
that the market was ready for transition even without significant governmental
finance. CEEW, in its last report before the Kigali Amendment, pointed out
that HFO-1234yf’s cost in the long run would be only three times as much as
HFC-134a, as opposed to seven to eight times as claimed by IAs. It also sug-
gested that India claim leadership by the “willingness to bear cost of transition,”
and if India were to accept an earlier freeze year, it should highlight its
“higher contribution across forums, especially (at the) UNFCCC” (Sharma
and Chaturvedi 2016).
These research groups’ activities outside negotiation rooms aimed to con-
vince the Indian delegation of the promise of HFC regulation and to show other
parties the challenges India faced in HFC transition. Immediately prior to the
Indian proposal, the NRDC held a side event on HFC phaseout in India, and
the IGSD and TERRE Policy Center held a joint side event for HFC phasedown.
These groups’ lobbying continued until the last moments of negotiation.
Eventually, India adopted 2024–2026 as baseline, 2028 as freeze year, and
phasedown by 2047. This was middle ground between industry and NGO pref-
erences. It is a big leap forward from India’s original proposal, while it held the
bottom line of the ODS sector—patents of HFO-1234yf would expire as early as
2025–2029, right before the freeze year. The differentiated obligations of India
and China and energy efficiency provisions were also incorporated into the text
of the agreement.
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Method
Main Findings/Arguments
Table 2
Major Indian Nonstate Stakeholder Input on HFC Phasedown (2013–2016)
Research
Organization
and Date
CEEW
( Jul. 2014)
Industry
residential air
conditioning
CSE
( Jul. 2015)
whole sector
Publication/Presentation
Name
Modeling Long-Term
HFC Emissions from
India’s Residential Air-
Conditioning Sector
Judging the Amendment
Proposals on Equity and
Ambition
six different growth and
technology scenarios and
their emissions
analyze North American,
island, EU, and Indian
proposals based on
equity and ambition
principles
CEEW
( Jul. 2015)
whole sector
India’s Amendment
Proposal and Long-Term
HFC Emissions
estimates the Indian
proposal’s emission
reduction
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(cid:129)
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India should transition away from
high-GWP refrigerants, because it
reduces GHG emission and offers
significant energy efficiency benefits.
The Indian proposal needs significant
revision to make baseline and
phasedown schedules more
ambitious. India should push for
energy efficiency provision, financial
and technology support for HFC
phasedown, and HFC destruction.
It supports the Indian proposal,
saying it will be successful in deep
HFC emission cuts for India,
Pakistan, African nations, and so on,
but will have limited impact on those
of China and other high-income A5
countries. India should not be treated
in the same way as China.
RAMA
( Jul. 2015)
IPUA
( Jul. 2015)
refrigeration and
air conditioning
foam
RAMA
(Aug. 2015)
refrigeration and
air conditioning
TERI
( Jun. 2016)
whole sector
Full Cost of Conversion
n/a
Industry Perspective on
Foam Manufacturing
Sector Including Micro,
Small and Medium
Enterprises
Technology Trends
Including Availability
and Costs in RAC Sector
India’s Amendment
Proposal for Phase-Down
of HFCs: TERI’s Views
n/a
market analysis
n/a
India should stick to the proposal of
full cost of conversion and timelines.
The foam industry can transition to
zero/low-GWP alternatives, but it
needs demonstration projects as well
as incentives and policy guidance.
India should delay the changeover as
much as possible. Estimation of cost
impact is not possible at this stage.
It supports the Indian proposal’s
freeze year of 2031.
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(cid:129)
9
3
Table 3
Side Events and Publications Concerning China and India at Montreal Protocol Negotiations (2014–2016)
Year
2014
Event
Organization
OEWG-34
CEEW
Country
India
Side Event
or Publication
publication
2015
OEWG-35
IGSD, TERRE
India
side event
2015
OEWG-35
NRDC
2015
OEWG-35
IGSD, TERRE
2015
OEWG-36
CSE
India
India
India
side event
side event
publication
2015
OEWG-36
CSE
India
publication
2015
OEWG-36
CSE
India
side event
Title
Modelling Long Term HFC Emissions
from India’s Residential Air-
Conditioning Sector
The Importance of Energy Efficiency in
HCFC Phaseout and HFC Phasedown
(1300–1500)
Business Case for Phasing out HFCs in
India (1300–1500)
Workshop for an HFC Phase Down
Amendment (18:00–20:00)
An equity-Based Framework for an
Ambitious phase-down of HFCs Under
the Montreal Protocol
Getting the World off the Chemical
Treadmill—A Per Capita Convergence
Framework for an Ambitious Phase-
Down of HFCs Under the Montreal
Protocol
Judging the HFC Amendment Proposals
on the Basis of Fairness and Ambition
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(cid:129)
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2015
OEWG-36
CHEAA
China
side event
2015
OEWG-36
IGSD, TERRE,
LBNL
India
side event
2015
OEWG-36
CHEAA
China
side event
2015
MOP-27
UNDP
India
side event
2015
MOP-27
TERRE, ISHRAE,
IIAR, Climate
Control Middle
East Magazine
2015
2016
MOP-27
OEWG-38
IGSD
CSE
2016
OEWG-38
CSE
2016
OEWG-38
CEEW, IIASA
India
side event
India
India
India
India
publication
publication
side event
side event
China’s Endeavour to Use Low-GWP
Alternative in Residential Air-
Conditioner
The Double Climate Benefits of Energy
Efficiency and Low GWP Refrigerants in
Air Conditioning
Safety Issue on Using HC-290
Technology in Residential Air-
Conditioner and Related Safety
Standards
Indian Experience in Adoption of Low-
GWP Technologies in Residential Air-
Conditioning Applications
Non-HFC Cold Chain: Food and Energy
Security
Reducing Stress on India’s Power Grid
What Kind of Amendment? Ideas for
Framework to Phase Down HFC in an
Ambitious and Equitable Manner (CSE)
Prioritizing Natural Refrigerants During
HFC Phase-Down Amendment
Economy-Wide Cost of Transition for the
HFC Phase Down in India
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Table 3
(Continued )
Year
2016
Event
Organization
MOP-28
CEEW
Country
India
Side Event
or Publication
side event
2016
MOP-28
GIZ Proklima
China
publication
2016
MOP-28
MEP/FECO
China
publication
2016
MOP-28
IGSD
India
publication
Title
Implications of Different Baselines and
Freeze Years for an Operational Strategy
and Sector Wise HFC Phase Down in
India
Promoting R290 AC in China and
Beyond
Low-GWP Technologies Introduction
and Standards Barriers in R&AC Sectors
of China
New Indian Leadership for Super-
Efficient Room Air Conditioning Using
Lower GWP Refrigerants
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Shiming Yang
(cid:129) 97
Conclusions
The divergence of China and India at Kigali is among the most significant devel-
opments in recent global environmental negotiations. This article explains this
divergence from national developmental strategy and political institutions,
which shape industrial preference and governmental weighing of stakeholder
inputs. China’s export-oriented ODS sector was receptive to international regu-
lation, and its political system grants Chinese government the power to assume
even more aggressive positions at international negotiations. India’s domesti-
cally focused ODS sector was resistant to international regulation, but the dem-
ocratic system of India allowed stakeholders of diverse interests to influence the
governmental position, which ultimately fell within the domestic bargaining
range. China and India exhibit two distinct types of position formulation here,
which characterize their negotiation and implementation of the Kigali Amend-
ment. Chinese government guided the leapfrogging to R-290, and the ODS sec-
tor has made tremendous investment converting production lines, modifying
standards, and promoting to seize the market before making a profit. This strat-
egy is costly, yet potentially rewarding. India lets the market decide the best
technology, offering institutional support to lower transition costs by facilitating
bulk procurement and buyers’ clubs. This liberal approach is cost-efficient, at
least in the short term, as it intends to wait and see how China’s chosen tech-
nology goes.
China and India’s divergence sheds light on the common and differenti-
ated interests between developing countries. The Global South’s level of unity
differs across environmental issues. When liability and vulnerability fall on dif-
ferent countries, as in the case of climate change, internal cleavages widen as the
largest GHG emitters face significant trade-offs between domestic interests and
those of vulnerable developing states. This is less an issue for ozone depletion.
With the MLF, negotiations for CFC and HCFC phaseout went smoothly. The
GWP of HFCs increased internal conflicts within the Global South between
small island and gulf states, which is why HFC regulation took longer to nego-
tiate than CFC and HCFC regulation. However, China and India remain the
main producers of ODS products as well as beneficiaries of MLF funding.
The fact that China and India are free to break paths does not mean that
they would at Kigali. This article suggests two factors that made their divergence
more likely. First, the ODS sector in China became more integrated into the
global supply chain, especially into the industrialized market, between 2009
and 2016. Market shifts drove the positions of Chinese companies closer to
HFC regulation. The attributes of HFCs also matter. If transition from HFCs
did not involve tremendous uncertainty regarding GWP, safety, and cost, the
interests of China and India would have been more aligned and their divergence
would have been less likely. Out of technology and climate concerns, the Chi-
nese government steered its industry toward natural refrigerants, whereas the
Indian government let the ODS sector decide and finance the transition. If
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98 (cid:129) Growing Apart
the two countries had had similar sectoral orientations, their ODS sectors might
have held similar views, and it would have been costlier for their governments
to break paths. If China had a more democratic system, its position might be
more predictable, although not necessarily as progressive.
This article also suggests that the split between China and India is deeply
rooted and likely to last. Their divergence at Kigali was no accident and not nec-
essarily undesirable for them. Although Groups 1 and 2 of Article 5 countries
did not appear until the last hours of the negotiation, the “differentiated
treatments between developing countries” had long been proposed by Indian
stakeholders, as they argued that China was too developed to qualify for the
preferential treatments at the Montreal Protocol and the UNFCCC. In this sense,
the Kigali Amendment marks rising powers reconsidering their interests and
responsibilities in global environmental agreements. As their positions increas-
ingly reflect domestic and national interests, China and India are likely to differ
on other environmental issues. This might bring about a “new normal” to mul-
tilateral environmental negotiations, in which differentiated treatments between
developing countries become more common.
Shiming Yang is a university lecturer at the Institute for Area Studies, Leiden
University. She received her PhD from the University of Southern California
(2021). She studies international environmental politics and political economy.
Her current project studies environmental diplomacy of rising powers. She has
published in Review of International Political Economy, Review of Policy Research,
and China and World Economy.
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