Foreword
William J. Perry
The dropping of nuclear bombs on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki ended World War II but ushered in
an entirely new form of conflict that came to be
called the Cold War. During the Cold War, the
United States and the Soviet Union each built up
enormous arsenals of nuclear weapons designed
to deter the other from launching a conventional
military or nuclear attack. At the time, deterrence
worked in the sense that the United States and the
Soviet Union did not come into direct military con-
flict with each other. But these vast nuclear ar-
senals did not deter the Soviets from using con-
ventional military force in Czechoslovakia, Hun-
gary, or Afghanistan. They did not deter the United
States from using military force in Korea and Viet-
nam. And they did not preclude both sides from
amassing large conventional forces in Europe.
When the Cold War ended, many hoped that a
new era of peace would replace the threat of large-
scale nuclear war breaking out at any moment.
Many believed that this peace would be accompa-
nied by a signi½cant global reduction in nuclear
weapons. Instead, new challenges to world security
arose. Regional instabilities led to threats of war
between India and Pakistan, on the Korean Penin-
sula, and in the Mideast. These threats contributed
to and were exacerbated by the proliferation of
nuclear weapons in these regions. Additionally,
catastrophic terrorism arose as a new threat to
world security, with large-scale attacks on civilian
populations in the United States, Russia, India,
© 2011 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences
WILLIAM J. PERRY, a Fellow of
the American Academy since 1989,
is the Michael and Barbara Ber-
berian Professor at Stanford Uni-
versity, where he is also a Codirec-
tor of the Preventive Defense Proj-
ect and Senior Fellow in the Insti-
tute for International Studies. At
the U.S. Department of Defense,
he served as Secretary of Defense
(1994 to 1997), Deputy Secretary
of Defense (1993 to 1994), and
Undersecretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering (1977
to 1981). He received the Presiden-
tial Medal of Freedom in 1997.
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5
Foreword
Spain, the United Kingdom, and Indone-
sia. Nuclear terrorism–the conflation of
those two dangers–loomed as a new and
grave potential security threat.
The occurrence of another global war,
while possible, still seems remote. Mili-
tarily, the United States is in a class of its
own. Today there is no peer competitor
for America’s military forces. Yet the
public debate in Congress and the Penta-
gon surrounding future U.S. military
planning still focuses on the potential
conventional military threats emerging
from a modernized China or resurgent
Russia. China has been making truly
impressive and sustained gains in its
economy and is devoting a signi½cant
portion of its gdp to modernize its mili-
tary. However, China is far from being a
peer military competitor to the United
States. Furthermore, war between China
and the United States appears unlikely,
with leaders from both countries recog-
nizing that a military conflict would be
disastrous for both societies. And while
Russia has a large nuclear force similar to
that of the United States, its convention-
al forces are substantially less capable
than those of the United States.
Since the end of the Cold War, four suc-
cessive presidential administrations have
been unclear as to how the U.S. military
should be restructured to respond to this
new security environment. Although we
cut back our conventional forces by about
one-third during the 1990s, we have start-
ed to rebuild our ground forces this past
decade in response to the ongoing mili-
tary operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In particular, we have made substantial
increases in our Special Operations For-
ces capabilities. Our nuclear arsenal has
been reduced by 84 percent from its peak
during the Cold War, but we still retain
2,150 deployed nuclear warheads, as well
as thousands more in reserve or storage.
In addition, we retain nuclear weapons
development facilities capable of build-
ing new weapons or modernizing old
ones. The most recent U.S. Nuclear Pos-
ture Review, released in May 2010, states
that as long as other nations have nuclear
weapons, the United States should en-
sure the reliability and effectiveness of our
deterrent force through a Life Extension
Program and a science-based Stockpile
Stewardship Program. Meanwhile, both
China and Russia are developing new
nuclear weapons.
In the ½rst half of the twenty-½rst centu-
ry, we face very different security dangers
than we did during either the ½rst half of
the twentieth century (two world wars
fought with massive conventional forces)
or the second half (a Cold War character-
ized by the buildup of enormous nuclear
arsenals). Security dangers today must be
dealt with at least as much with political,
social, and economic strength (soft pow-
er) as with military strength (hard pow-
er). Our need to exert military power can
no longer be met by the large convention-
al forces used during World War II, or the
large nuclear forces accumulated during
the Cold War. Today, our armed forces
have been recon½guring to meet these
new demands, but many more changes
are required. We must continue to down-
size our conventional forces and at the
same time recon½gure them to be more
agile. Our ground troops need to focus on
further developing expeditionary forces
that can be moved quickly to distant
locations and do not need established
military bases nearby to conduct oper-
ations. Our air forces should focus on
strengthening their long-range strike and
unmanned capabilities. Our naval forces
should continue to focus on their mission
of establishing sea control that can be
projected worldwide on relatively short
notice. Also, all our military services must
become more pro½cient in operating in an
6
Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences
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environment of cyber-threats to military
technologies.
While the U.S. military will never go
back to the large conventional forces
required during World War II, or the
large nuclear forces amassed during the
Cold War, its operations will continue
to be stretched worldwide, and it will
have to deal with emerging unconven-
tional threats such as insurgents, terror-
ists, and pirates. At the same time, it will
have to maintain effective command and
control in the face of potential cyber-
attacks.
These developments will take place
while profound technological changes
are occurring in society. Some of these
changes can be used against us (cyber-
attacks on our military command and
control, or on our civil infrastructure).
However, they can also be used to our
advantage, as was the case during the so-
called Revolution in Military Affairs
(rma), which led to quantum leaps in
the effectiveness of technology used
to detect enemy targets, avoid detection
of U.S. warplanes by enemy radars
through use of stealth technology, and
provide more accurate readings of loca-
tion through the development of Glob-
al Positioning System (gps) technolo-
gy. This rma gave the U.S. military a
major advantage over other militaries,
as was demonstrated convincingly in
Operation Desert Storm at the beginning
of 1991. Unfortunately, these technolo-
gies have not been effective in dealing
with urban insurgencies or global ter-
rorism, and other technologies have not
yet been developed to give our military
a compelling advantage against these
threats. In the meantime, an entirely
new application of technology–social
networking–is having a profound effect
on political developments throughout
the world, and could affect global mil-
itary developments as well.
The American military has, since
World War II, depended on U.S. industry
for building most of its weapons, includ-
ing those developed during the rma.
This has worked very well because our
country’s most advanced technologies
are created in the private sector. But as
the need for weapons fluctuates, and in
particular, as future needs remain uncer-
tain, it is dif½cult to maintain a stable
defense industry. And as military spec-
i½cations and procurement regulations
continue to diverge from those in the
commercial sector, more and more mili-
tary procurement will rely on companies
dedicated solely to military work.
During the wars in Iraq and Afghan-
istan, our military complicated this mil-
itary-industry collaboration by heavily
relying on private security personnel
from defense contractors deployed in the
battle space to conduct operational tasks
usually reserved for members of the
armed forces. With these private security
contractors operating outside the tradi-
tional command structure of the mili-
tary, their use resulted in signi½cant com-
mand and discipline problems. As a re-
sult, the U.S. military in the future will
need to exercise tighter control over what
operational functions can be performed
by contractor personnel.
Another kind of technology, medical
technology, has had a profound effect on
preventing battle½eld casualties. Our
wounded soldiers in Iraq and Afghan-
istan have had far better medical treat-
ment than in any other war, resulting in a
high percentage of soldiers surviving
wounds that would have been fatal in ear-
lier wars. However, the presence of ad-
vanced weapons on the battle½eld has
also resulted in a much higher number of
veterans with long-term disabilities, in-
cluding Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.
The need for more and better treatment
facilities has never been greater.
William J.
Perry
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140 (3) Summer 2011
7
Foreword
Besides the profound changes to the
international threat environment and ad-
vances in military technology, there have
been equally profound changes in the
political, economic, and social environ-
ments within the United States over the
last century. Politically, the American
people and their Congress are not as di-
rectly engaged with the U.S. military as
they were during World War II or the
Cold War. Today, less than 1 percent of
American families have a family member
in active military service; only 22 percent
of U.S. Senators and congressional repre-
sentatives have ever served in the mili-
tary. Our military force is composed en-
tirely of volunteers, which has many real
bene½ts, especially in the training and
discipline of the force. But it also has one
great liability: the American people and
their elected representatives are more
detached from their military than at any
time this past century. As our body poli-
tic makes decisions about how to use its
military force, these decisions should be
made with the understanding that the
people whose lives are being risked are
the sons and daughters of their constit-
uents (or their own sons and daughters).
There is a potential danger that our all-
volunteer force could eventually be seen
by Congress as a “mercenary” force.
Congress, under Article 1, Section 8 of
the U.S. Constitution, is granted the au-
thority “[t]o raise and support Armies . . .
To provide and maintain a Navy. To make
Rules for the Government and Regula-
tion of the land and naval Forces.” Over
time, Congress has manifested this re-
sponsibility by passing laws that set
speci½c standards for civilian control of
the military, for civil-military interfaces,
and for establishing a military structure
that enables effective joint-service opera-
tions. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986,
which restructured civil-military relations
in the Pentagon and put into place a cul-
ture of “jointness” between the military
services, has been a successful example of
military legislation, and lawmakers are
currently considering new legislation to
bring the act up to date.
Along with these external and domestic
political changes, our military is shaped
by the evolution of society and our ed-
ucational systems. These changes affect
the capabilities and attitudes of recruits
for the all-volunteer force. Declining qual-
ity of K-12 education will result in declin-
ing quality of potential recruits at a time
when the technological demands on mil-
itary personnel are only getting higher
and more complex. This in turn will in-
crease the need for the military services
to do their own training, possibly includ-
ing remedial training to compensate for
inadequacies of the K-12 education sys-
tem. Society is also becoming more ac-
cepting of gender and racial differences,
and these changes will be reflected in
today’s military services. The military for
many decades has been open to all races.
Women are now accepted in all services
and with increasing responsibilities. Con-
gress recently amended the law to allow
gays to serve openly. All these changes
will bring the face of the military to look
more like the face of America.
Finally, America’s economic power has
strongly influenced its military strength.
U.S. government spending on the mili-
tary forces has increased over time, paral-
leling our economic growth. As a result,
we have by far the largest military budget
in the world; in fact, ours is about equal
to the rest of the world’s combined mil-
itary budgets in real terms. But we are
also the only nation that takes on global
responsibilities for security. Our nuclear
umbrella over many allied countries al-
lows them to remain non-nuclear, which
is a bene½t to world security, including
our own. Our naval and air forces in the
Paci½c have contributed to peace in that
8
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historically troubled part of the world, to
the bene½t of East Asian countries and
our trade with them.
The present economic dif½culties fac-
ing the United States will generate strong
pressures to decrease defense spending.
Military and civilian leaders will increas-
ingly be pressed to answer the question,
how much spending is enough to meet
the requirement? That question could be
answered by returning to our historical
estimate of appropriate defense spending
based on a percentage of gdp. For the
last sixty years, our defense budget has
been about 3 to 6 percent of our gdp,
excluding defense spending during the
years of the Korean and Vietnam Wars
when it reached a high of 11 percent.
Alternatively, defense spending can be
measured by an assessment of the threat
we face, but that is a highly subjective
measurement that can be endlessly de-
bated. But the wind-down of military op-
erations in Iraq and Afghanistan may still
create an opportunity to decrease mili-
tary spending without compromising U.S.
national security or interests.
The world has been changing in impor-
tant ways since the end of the Cold War,
and new and dangerous threats are
emerging every day. But, against all odds,
the world has not had a nuclear bomb
used in anger since World War II; there
has not been, nor is there likely to be, a
World War III; and the average standard
of living worldwide has increased since
the end of the Cold War. The U.S. mili-
tary has played an important role in these
positive results and will be called upon to
play that positive role in the future. In or-
der to do so, the U.S. military has to adapt
to economic, political, technological, and
social changes as well as evolve to meet
the changing global threat environment.
William J.
Perry
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140 (3) Summer 2011