Accountability as Constructive Dialogue: - Specialized Research AI at MIT

Accountability as Constructive Dialogue:
Can NGOs Persuade States to
Conserve Biodiversity?

(cid:129)
Ana Maria Ulloa*

Abstract

State-to-state accountability has greatly failed to improve compliance with multilateral
environmental agreements. As this is also the case in the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity (CBD), this article explores how and with what effect nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) persuade states to fulﬁll their commitments to conserve biodiversity. The article
conceptualizes accountability as learning-enabling dialogue with the potential to inﬂuence
state behavior through the provision of constructive criticism. The underlying argument is
that NGOs can contribute to overcoming implementation challenges by engaging in con-
structive dialogue with states. The triangulation of interviews with NGOs, CBD documents,
and gray literature suggests that NGOs can challenge or even prevent states’ inertia by
establishing critical but cooperative multilevel partnerships with states to advance imple-
mentation. Reconceptualizing accountability as constructive dialogue may contribute to
realizing the transformative potential of accountability. However, more evidence is
needed to understand the roles of NGOs in fostering learning and the impact of learning
on improving implementation, compliance, and environmental outcomes.

The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) has nearly universal participa-
tion and is the most comprehensive multilateral environmental agreement
(MEA) for biodiversity governance. However, three decades after the CBD’s
adoption in 1992, biodiversity continues to decline at alarming rates (Intergov-
ernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services
2019), and the effectiveness of the Convention has been questioned. The
CBD has primarily relied on the adoption of strategic plans for biodiversity
(SPBs), backed up by nonbinding goals and targets, to address the drivers of
biodiversity loss. As states have failed to deliver the two SPBs adopted under
the Convention (Convention on Biological Diversity [CBD] 2010b, 2020a),
the CBD has been criticized for having little inﬂuence on states’ actions (Harrop

* I thank Susan Park for the encouragement, advice, and support to get this article published.
Thanks to Sylvia Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and Kurt Jax for planting the seed for this research. I also
thank all the participating NGO ofﬁcers for their time and insights. Thanks to Jonathan Freeman
for unconditional support and countless readings.

Global Environmental Politics 23:1, February 2023, https://doi.org/10.1162/glep_a_00673
© 2022 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Published under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International (CC BY 4.0) license.

D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d

f
r
o
m
h

t
t

:
/
/

d
i
r
e
c
t
.

i
t
.

e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d

f
/

2
3
1
4
2
2
0
6
7
7
9
3
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
7
3
p
d

b
y
g
u
e
s
t

o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3

Ana Maria Ulloa

(cid:129) 43

and Pritchard 2011; Morgera and Tsioumani 2010; Ulloa et al. 2018). With the
imminent adoption of a post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) (CBD
2021),1 how to persuade states to take implementation actions to safeguard bio-
diversity is, therefore, a timely question and the focus of this article.

According to the First Report on the Environmental Rule of Law (United
Nations Environment Programme [UNEP] 2019), a culture of noncompliance
in global environmental governance (GEG) and inadequate implementation
of MEAs have undermined decades of international cooperation to lessen envi-
ronmental deterioration (UNEP 2019). As enforcement mechanisms are rare in
GEG, accountability mechanisms to track national implementation and collec-
tive progress toward global goals have been favored to promote compliance with
MEAs. The premise is that, by fostering transparency, accountability mechanisms
can increase public pressure on states and facilitate cooperation, which in turn
can enhance compliance (Gupta and van Asselt 2019; Raustiala 2000). However,
despite increasing transparency, traditional state-to-state accountability mecha-
nisms have largely failed to improve the implementation of MEAs (Gupta and
van Asselt 2019; Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen et al. 2018). This generalized crisis of pub-
lic accountability in GEG has led to a proliferation of accountability mechanisms
that involve corporations and civil society as well as states (Chan and Pattberg
2008; Kramarz and Park 2019). Such hybrid mechanisms may include private–
voluntary sustainability certiﬁcation schemes (Chan and Pattberg 2008;
Gulbrandsen and Auld 2019); pluralistic public–private–voluntary cooperative
initiatives, which are increasingly common in climate governance (van Asselt
2016; Bäckstrand et al. 2017); and public–voluntary arrangements, where non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) play formal and informal roles in review
and follow-up of implementation (Duyck 2014; Elliott and Schaedla 2019).

Despite normative questions about the legitimacy of such mechanisms
(Kuyper et al. 2018; Widerberg and Pattberg 2015) and limited understanding of
their effectiveness to improve environmental outcomes (Kramarz and Park 2019),
hybrid accountability mechanisms represent alternatives to reinforce state-to-state
accountability and persuade states to implement MEAs (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen et al.
2018). In the CBD, the role of nonstate actors remains under-researched (Kok and
Ludwig 2021), even though formal accountability mechanisms have failed to over-
come implementation challenges (Morgera and Tsioumani 2010; Ulloa et al.
2018). Recognizing this gap, this article draws from interviews with NGOs, CBD
documents, and gray literature to explore how NGOs can strengthen accountability
in the CBD. Speciﬁcally, it uses the framework proposed by Mashaw (2006) to
examine how and with what effect peers and NGOs persuade states to fulﬁll their
biodiversity commitments. The objective is to identify deﬁcits in state-to-state

1. The GBF will be adopted at COP 15, which has been repeatedly postponed due to the COVID-
19 pandemic. The conference that was originally scheduled for October 2020 in Kunming,
China, was rescheduled as a two-part meeting. Part 1 took place virtually in November
2021. Part 2 is tentatively scheduled for December 2022 in Montreal, Canada (https://sdg
.iisd.org/events/un-biodiversity-conference-cbd-cop-15-part-2/, last accessed June 21, 2022).

D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d

f
r
o
m
h

t
t

:
/
/

d
i
r
e
c
t
.

i
t
.

e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d

f
/

2
3
1
4
2
2
0
6
7
7
9
3
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
7
3
p
d

b
y
g
u
e
s
t

o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3

44 (cid:129) Accountability as Constructive Dialogue

accountability to discuss how NGOs can reinforce them. This article argues that
through the provision of critical commentary of states’ (in)actions, NGOs can
strengthen accountability and more effectively inﬂuence state behavior to
advance implementation (Steffek 2010). If such commentary involves critical
yet constructive feedback to overcome implementation challenges, it has the
potential to enable learning (Bovens 2007) and inﬂuence state behavior ex ante
(Mashaw 2006). Given the traditional focus of accountability in GEG as an ex
post carrot-and-stick mechanism to promote compliance (Kramarz and Park
2019; Raustiala 2000), this research advances the understanding of accountabil-
ity as constructive dialogue with transformative potential to promote the imple-
mentation of MEAs even before noncompliance occurs.

This article ﬁrst conceptualizes accountability as learning-enabling dia-
logue, where NGOs can play a role in inﬂuencing state behavior through the
provision of constructive criticism. Second, it examines the mechanisms and
strategies that peers and NGOs use to persuade states to fulﬁll their biodiversity
commitments. Last, it discusses the transformative potential of state-to-state and
NGO-to-state accountability to enable dialogue, mobilize constructive criticism,
and catalyze the implementation of the upcoming GBF.

The Transformative Potential of Accountability, NGOs, and
Constructive Criticism

Accountability, as a mechanism, ultimately implies a relationship in which
actors and their publics engage in the exchange of questions, answers, informa-
tion, explanations, and justiﬁcations about conduct and in which the public can
inﬂuence actors’ behavior by passing judgment and imposing consequences
(Bovens 2007; Mashaw 2006; Steffek 2010). Accordingly, this article conceptu-
alizes accountability as dialogue with transformative potential to inﬂuence
behavior through active giving and demanding of reasons for conduct—a pro-
cess I refer to as accountability dynamics.

Accountability as a Carrot-and-Stick Mechanism in GEG
Accountability can inﬂuence state behavior by operating as a sanctioning or a
facilitating mechanism (Raustiala 2000; Tallberg 2002). Given the predominant
absence of legal or democratic instruments to address noncompliance in GEG
(Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen et al. 2018), sanctioning mechanisms aim to expose
wrongful state behavior to exert reputational pressure (Raustiala 2000). Facili-
tating mechanisms aim to improve the collective performance of states through
strategies for capacity building, rule interpretation, ﬁnancial support, technol-
ogy transfer, problem solving, and cooperation (Raustiala 2000; Tallberg 2002).
In theory, sanctioning is more effective at addressing lack of political will,
whereas facilitation better targets lack of capacity (Raustiala 2000; Tallberg 2002).
Lack of political will has been identiﬁed as a key obstacle to bridging the imple-
mentation gap in GEG and lessening the environmental crisis (UNEP 2019).

D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d

f
r
o
m
h

t
t

:
/
/

d
i
r
e
c
t
.

i
t
.

e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d

f
/

2
3
1
4
2
2
0
6
7
7
9
3
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
7
3
p
d

b
y
g
u
e
s
t

o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3

Ana Maria Ulloa

(cid:129) 45

Despite this consideration, states have favored peer-based, nonconfrontational,
and consultative accountability mechanisms to promote compliance with MEAs,
which have been largely ineffective in advancing implementation (Karlsson-
Vinkhuyzen et al. 2018). In the CBD, for example, the failure to deliver the
SPBs 2002–2010 and 2011–2020 has been associated, inter alia, with weak
accountability mechanisms (Morgera and Tsioumani 2010; Ulloa et al. 2018).
Strengthening such mechanisms is critical to improving the prospects for suc-
cess of the post-2020 GBF (Phang et al. 2020; Xu et al. 2021). But what exactly
does it take to strengthen accountability in the CBD?

Reinforcing Accountability by Engaging States in Dialogue with NGOs

Formal accountability relationships for the implementation of MEAs are pri-
marily enacted by states. Their transformative potential depends on the willing-
ness of states to encourage or, when necessary, put pressure on peers to take
implementation actions. Yet sovereign states have proved to be reluctant to raise
questions, give critical commentary, and provide feedback on each other’s (in)
actions (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen et al. 2018; Steffek 2010), including in the CBD
(Ulloa et al. 2018). To counteract this fundamental accountability deﬁcit in
global arenas, Steffek (2010) argues that NGOs can willingly mobilize critical
commentary of states’ actions with potential to catalyze implementation at
the national level. The starting assumption of this article is that, based on their
expertise and long tradition of advocacy for the environment, NGOs can con-
tribute to strengthening state-to-state accountability in the CBD and persuade
states to take actions to conserve biodiversity.

NGOs can draw from their moral authority to challenge lack of political will,
namely, by putting pressure on states through name-and-shame and other confront-
ing strategies (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen et al. 2018). Conversely, expertise allows NGOs
to build capacity, for example, by assessing, praising, and promoting effective
implementation actions and supporting informed decision-making, environmental
management on the ground, and the formulation of effective policies and legisla-
tion (UNEP 2019). Because sanctioning and facilitating strategies to promote com-
pliance are in practice complementary and mutually reinforcing (Tallberg 2002),
this article posits a learning perspective on accountability to explore the role of
NGOs in enhancing the implementation of the CBD.

The Transformative Potential of Constructive Criticism to Enable Learning

A learning perspective on accountability recognizes the role of critical commen-
tary to inﬂuence behavior but emphasizes the value of cooperative strategies to
encourage reﬂection on conduct (Bovens 2007). As a learning-enabling
dynamic, accountability represents opportunities for states and their publics
to discuss implementation, identify successes and challenges, and accordingly
provide critical commentary and feedback to advance implementation. In this

D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d

f
r
o
m
h

t
t

:
/
/

d
i
r
e
c
t
.

i
t
.

e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d

f
/

2
3
1
4
2
2
0
6
7
7
9
3
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
7
3
p
d

b
y
g
u
e
s
t

o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3

46 (cid:129) Accountability as Constructive Dialogue

context, accountability primarily allows for critical yet cooperative dialogue
aimed at facilitating learning to improve collective and individual performance
(Mashaw 2006; Raustiala 2000). I will refer to these forms of critical commen-
tary and feedback, which have potential to foster cooperation and enable learn-
ing, as constructive criticism.

As opposed to ex post condemnation and praise, the provision of con-
structive criticism can also persuade states to take actions before noncompliance
occurs (Mashaw 2006). By promoting states’ self-reﬂection upon failures and
successes, constructive criticism can encourage new strategies to address actual,
foreseeable, or experienced implementation challenges (Bovens 2007), such as
triggering a switch in governance arrangements from “routine mode” to “crisis
mode” (Steffek 2010). By promoting cooperation and trust, constructive criti-
cism can also encourage openness and deliberation, which allows knowledge
to be shared, alternatives and solutions to be discussed, and collective lessons
to be learned (Bovens 2007; Mashaw 2006). As such, constructive criticism can
contribute to overcoming implementation challenges, whether deriving from
lack of capacity and/or from political will.

In GEG, accountability has traditionally operated as an carrot-and-stick
mechanism to endorse, correct, or improve state behavior ex post. Yet as a
learning-enabling dynamic, accountability has transformative potential to chal-
lenge, or even prevent, states’ inertia through the provision of constructive crit-
icism. Assuming that NGOs can effectively mobilize constructive criticism, this
article argues that NGOs can promote the implementation of the CBD and,
although beyond the empirical scope of this study, ultimately contribute to
delivering better biodiversity outcomes.

Methodology

To explore the transformative potential of NGOs to strengthen accountability in
the CBD and persuade states to fulﬁll their biodiversity commitments, I use the
framework of accountability relationships proposed by Mashaw (2006).
Mashaw proposes six questions (who? to whom? about what? by what standards?
how? and with what effect?) to deﬁne accountability relationships and assess
and/or compare their effectiveness. I will use these questions to characterize for-
mal and informal accountability relationships in the CBD enacted by states and
NGOs (see Table 1) and examine how and with what effect peers and NGOs
persuade states to take implementation actions. The objective is to identify def-
icits in state-to-state accountability and discuss how NGOs can reinforce them.
To characterize formal accountability relationships, I drew data from ofﬁ-
cial CBD documents, including the foundational text of the Convention, the
SPB 2002–2011 and 2011–2020, summaries of negotiations of the CBD on
the topics of implementation and follow-up and review mechanisms, and pre-
liminary documents for the deﬁnition of the upcoming GBF and its multidi-
mensional review process. These data served to identify whether NGOs have

D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d

f
r
o
m
h

t
t

:
/
/

d
i
r
e
c
t
.

i
t
.

e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d

f
/

2
3
1
4
2
2
0
6
7
7
9
3
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
7
3
p
d

b
y
g
u
e
s
t

o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3

Table 1
Accountability Relationships in the CBD

Who?

To whom?

About what?

Standards of appraisal?

How?

With what effect?

Signatory states
(Parties)

Peers,
NGOs

Frameworks for
implementation

Global goals, targets,
and indicators

Accountability
mechanisms:

Strategies to promote
implementation:

(cid:129) Monitoring
(cid:129) Reporting
(cid:129) Follow-up

(cid:129) Reputational
(cid:129) Facilitating
(cid:129) Learning-enabling

D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d

f
r
o
m
h

t
t

:
/
/

d
i
r
e
c
t
.

i
t
.

e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d

f
/

2
3
1
4
2
2
0
6
7
7
9
3
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
7
3
p
d

b
y
g
u
e
s
t

o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3

A
n
a

M
a
r
i
a

l
l

o
a

(cid:129)

4
7

48 (cid:129) Accountability as Constructive Dialogue

any formal role in the follow-up on implementation of the CBD; the monitor-
ing, reporting, and review mechanisms that the Convention has adopted to
track national implementation and progress toward global goals (how?); and
the strategies it has adopted to promote implementation (with what effect?).
To characterize informal accountability relationships enacted by NGOs holding
states to account, I drew data from interviews with environmental NGOs and
gray literature. I conducted the interviews remotely in 2016. They were intended
to elucidate how NGOs perceived the effectiveness of formal accountability
mechanisms and strategies adopted in the CBD to track progress and promote
implementation, the mechanisms NGOs used to follow up on the SPB 2011–
2020 and its Aichi Biodiversity Targets (how?), and the strategies NGOs infor-
mally used to persuade states to take implementation actions (with what effect?).
As primary data represented only NGOs’ perceptions, I used NGO position
papers and reports and policy documents to triangulate interview ﬁndings.

Because I argue that constructive dialogue has transformative potential to
persuade states to fulﬁll their biodiversity commitments, this mapping exercise
had two objectives: ﬁrst, to identify whether state-to-state and NGO-to-state
accountability fosters constructive dialogue and, second, to assess if constructive
dialogue can catalyze implementation actions (Figure 1). Thus, ﬁrst I posed two
questions to identify instances of constructive dialogue: Do peers and NGOs
engage in conversations with states to discuss implementation opportunities
and challenges? If so, do they provide constructive criticism to states to over-
come implementation challenges and advance implementation? To answer
the ﬁrst question, I examined whether accountability mechanisms (mapped
under the category how? of both formal and informal accountability relation-
ships) enable accountability dynamics. To answer the second question, I cate-
gorized the strategies to promote implementation (mapped under the category
with what effect? of both formal and informal accountability relationships) as
facilitating, sanctioning, and learning-enabling. This categorization was aimed
at identifying if the Convention and NGOs use capacity building, name-and-
shame, or constructive criticism to address implementation challenges. Second,
I examined instances when peers and/or NGOs engaged in constructive dialogue

Figure 1
Assessing the Transformative Potential of State-to-State and NGO-to-State Accountability
Relationships to Inﬂuence State Behavior in the CBD

D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d

f
r
o
m
h

t
t

:
/
/

d
i
r
e
c
t
.

i
t
.

e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d

f
/

2
3
1
4
2
2
0
6
7
7
9
3
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
7
3
p
d

b
y
g
u
e
s
t

o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3

Ana Maria Ulloa

(cid:129) 49

with states vis-à-vis NGOs’ perceptions of the effectiveness of corresponding
mechanisms and strategies. NGOs’ perceptions and claims were in turn triangu-
lated with gray literature evidencing the impact of NGOs’ actions on policy out-
comes and processes conducive to implementation.

As a methodological reﬂection, the fact that interviews only involved a
small number of NGOs seems particularly relevant to understanding the limi-
tations of the article. Out of twenty NGOs contacted, only ﬁve agreed to partic-
ipate, even if sometimes with contributions from more than one NGO ofﬁcer. I
identiﬁed NGOs by looking at position papers, inputs submitted to the CBD,
and formal memorandums of understanding and cooperation with the Conven-
tion. Therefore, interviewed NGOs represent partners of the CBD who value
moderate approaches to promoting implementation. While interviewing NGOs
with such a proﬁle provided meaningful insights on the overlooked perspective
of accountability as learning in GEG literature, studying a broader and more
varied landscape of NGOs is necessary to make generalizations about the inﬂu-
ence of NGOs and learning on state behavior. Also, although I triangulated
NGOs’ perceptions and claims with gray literature, interviewing governmental
and CBD ofﬁcials would provide a more objective picture of the role and impact
of NGOs in persuading states to take implementation actions. Despite these
considerations, the interviews were fruitful and insightful. They involved
renowned NGOs in biodiversity conservation that operate globally and across
governance levels, sometimes partnering with other NGOs. As such, these inter-
views may represent how a broader cohort of NGOs operate and provide a start-
ing data set to broaden the understanding of the roles that NGOs can play to
strengthen accountability in the CBD.

Results

D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d

f
r
o
m
h

t
t

:
/
/

d
i
r
e
c
t
.

i
t
.

e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d

f
/

2
3
1
4
2
2
0
6
7
7
9
3
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
7
3
p
d

The CBD recognizes NGOs as key partners for implementation (e.g., by taking
actions on the ground or supporting governments) and welcomes their expertise
to shape CBD processes. This study provides evidence to suggest that NGOs
directly and indirectly contributed to the implementation of the SPB 2011–
2020 and the negotiations leading to the adoption of the upcoming post-
2020 GBF. The roles of NGOs in inﬂuencing the decisions of the Conference
of the Parties (COP) (e.g., in fostering input accountability) are beyond the
scope of this article. This section describes the roles of peers and NGOs in hold-
ing states accountable to promote implementation of the CBD (i.e., in fostering
output accountability).

b
y
g
u
e
s
t

o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3

Provisions to Hold States Accountable in the CBD

The draft post-2020 GBF envisions a whole-of-society approach to galvanizing
urgent actions to transform drivers of biodiversity loss at all levels (CBD
2021). This includes opportunities for NGOs (and other nonstate and

50 (cid:129) Accountability as Constructive Dialogue

subnational actors) to submit voluntary commitments that member states
(Parties) could, at their discretion, include as part of their national contribu-
tions toward global goals. It also considers opportunities for NGOs to submit
voluntary reports about measures taken to implement the GBF, which ideally
would support national reports (CBD 2020b). Despite this envisaged inclusive
approach, as per the foundational text of the CBD,2 formal responsibilities to
implement the GBF and render accounts would still rest with member states
(who?). In pursuit of the objectives to conserve, sustainably use, and equitably
share beneﬁts arising from the use of biodiversity (to what standards?), these
responsibilities include, in accordance with Parties’ particular conditions and
capabilities, and as far as possible and appropriate, obligations to develop a
National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) (Article 6), monitor
biodiversity (Article 7), and report on progress (Article 26). NBSAPs shall reﬂect
domestic circumstances and ensure that biodiversity conservation and sustain-
able use are integrated into plans, programs, and policies of all sectors that have
an impact on biodiversity (Article 6). Each Party shall monitor the status of bio-
diversity, including as a result of measures adopted in the NBSAP (Article 7),
and report to the COP on measures to advance national implementation and
their effectiveness in achieving the Convention’s objectives (Article 26) (how?).
Collectively, the COP is responsible for keeping implementation of the
Convention under review (Article 23). The Subsidiary Body on Scientiﬁc, Tech-
nical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA) and more recently also the Subsidiary
Body on Implementation (SBI) support the COP in this role (CBD 2014) (to
whom?). To do so, the COP reviews syntheses of national reports prepared by
the Secretariat of the Convention, reports submitted by the SBSTTA and other
scientiﬁc bodies, and the Global Biodiversity Outlook (GBO)—a quadrennial
report also prepared by the Secretariat and timed to allow the analysis and
aggregation of national reports. Reports of the SBSTTA on the status of biodi-
versity and the effects of measures adopted by Parties provide recommendations
on implementation, which, once endorsed by the COP, become de facto deci-
sions. As the SBSTTA welcomes scientiﬁc and technical contributions from
NGOs, such reports have been an arena for NGOs to provide inputs and indi-
rectly inﬂuence the course of the Convention (e.g., see Birdlife 2020). The GBO
is reviewed by the SBSTTA and discussed by Parties at their periodic meetings. It
summarizes the status and trends of biological diversity at the global level, ana-
lyzes global trends in implementation, and summarizes implementation of the
Convention at the national level based on information in national reports. The
GBO has become the main ofﬁcial mechanism to review and communicate
global progress toward achieving the objectives of the Convention (how?),
including the failure to deliver the SPB 2002–2010 (CBD 2010b) and to achieve
in full any of the Aichi Targets contained in the SPB 2022–2020 (CBD 2020a).

2. Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, June 5, 1992, available at: https://treaties
.un.org/doc/Treaties/1992/06/19920605%2008-44%20PM/Ch_XXVII_08p.pdf, last accessed
June 21, 2022.

D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d

f
r
o
m
h

t
t

:
/
/

d
i
r
e
c
t
.

i
t
.

e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d

f
/

2
3
1
4
2
2
0
6
7
7
9
3
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
7
3
p
d

b
y
g
u
e
s
t

o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3

Ana Maria Ulloa

(cid:129) 51

The Convention has relied on the adoption of SPBs (about what?) and
allied nonbinding global biodiversity goals, targets, and indicators (to what stan-
dards?) to pursue its objective of conserving biodiversity (CBD 2002, 2010a).
The adoption of SBPs has led to the establishment and reﬁnement of mecha-
nisms to keep track of implementation as previous challenges are identiﬁed
and subsequent frameworks adopted (how?). For example, with the adoption
of the SPB 2002–2010 (CBD 2002), monitoring was considered not only a tool
to assess the status of biodiversity over time (including as a result of measures
adopted in NBSAPs) but also a source of information for national reports. Spe-
ciﬁcally, through the use of standardized global indicators that Parties should
adapt to national circumstances, the SPB 2002–2010 attempted to create
national reports comparable across countries. Since then, the use of indicators
has positioned monitoring as the ﬁrst step toward the assessment of national
implementation and the contribution of domestic actions toward global goals.
Strengthening this process to keep the Convention under review, the SPB 2011–
2020 (CBD 2010a) proposed the use of outcome-oriented indicators and targets
that could be adapted at the national level to monitor and evaluate the status of
biodiversity on the ground. Furthermore, the SPB 2011–2020 emphasized the
use of indicators in national reporting. As national reports compose the back-
bone of the GBO, indicators were also proposed as tools to review progress at
national and global levels.

Based on the principle of adaptive management through active learning (CBD
2010a), ﬁndings arising from these follow-up and review processes were
intended to facilitate the sharing of experiences on implementation; provide rec-
ommendations on ways to address obstacles; and strengthen mechanisms to
support implementation, monitoring, and review (with what effect?). As per
the foundational provisions to support Parties in the implementation of the
Convention (provisions on technology access and transfer, information
exchange, technical and scientiﬁc cooperation, ﬁnancial resources, and a ﬁnan-
cial mechanism to support developing countries—Articles 16, 17, 18, 20, and
21, respectively), SPBs mainstreamed facilitation mechanisms to overcome
implementation challenges. For instance, the SPB 2011–2020 enhanced sup-
porting mechanisms to promote effective implementation, including
capacity-building mechanisms speciﬁcally for the revision and updating of
NBSAPs and the development of indicators at the national level; the establish-
ment of the Clearing-House Mechanism (CHM), an operational network for
knowledge sharing and exchange of information; and partnerships and initia-
tives to enhance cooperation at all levels of society. The COP also resolved to
strengthen the strategy on resource mobilization to enable developing coun-
tries to meet the incremental implementation costs associated with the SPB
2011–2020.

As part of the upcoming GBF, a multidimensional review process (CBD
2020b, 2021) would build upon the framework of the SBP 2011–2020. In addi-
tion to provisions for monitoring, national reporting, and evaluations of

D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d

f
r
o
m
h

t
t

:
/
/

d
i
r
e
c
t
.

i
t
.

e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d

f
/

2
3
1
4
2
2
0
6
7
7
9
3
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
7
3
p
d

b
y
g
u
e
s
t

o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3

52 (cid:129) Accountability as Constructive Dialogue

progress toward global goals, the multidimensional review process would incor-
porate the submission of national commitments from Parties. National com-
mitments should be submitted by each Party within one year of adoption of
the framework, supported by national planning to implement them, and there-
after updated as per a gap report (CBD 2020b). The multidimensional review
process also envisions a country-by-country Party-led peer-review process under
the SBI, the operationalization of the voluntary peer-review (VPR) process of
NBSAPs’ revision and implementation adopted in 2018 (CBD 2018a), and a
global analytical review. The global analytical review would comprise a near
real-time monitoring platform to keep the status of biodiversity continuously
under surveillance (how?). In line with the facilitating approach of the CBD,
the peer-review processes would entail in-depth consideration of successes
and challenges encountered by countries during implementation, with views
to share experiences and lessons learned among Parties to enhance peer learning
(to what effect?). What exact shape the GBF and its allied multidimensional
review process will take after the adoption of the agenda (tentatively in Decem-
ber 2022) remains to be seen, as is the role that NGOs might play in them.
Table 2 summarizes the mechanisms and strategies adopted in the CBD to track
progress and promote implementation.

How and with What Effect NGOs Hold States to Account in the CBD

Up to the operationalization of the SBI (and the pilot of the VPR), the CBD
lacked a systematic way to review implementation on a country-by-country
basis (see Table 2). Instead, the CBD counted with what an NGO ofﬁcer
described as “an amalgamation of various ways to track progress towards
the implementation of the Strategic Plan and the objectives of the CBD”
(Interview 4). Interviewed NGOs saw value in these mechanisms as arenas to
keep track of global progress, foster transparency, raise the proﬁle of biodiversity
in domestic and international agendas, enable participation and engagement of
NGOs in CBD processes, and identify niches to contribute to implementation
on the ground. However, as “[the point] is not having meetings and gathering
and discussing” but identifying “how [governments] are implementing” (Inter-
view 2), NGOs saw limited potential in such mechanisms as effective instru-
ments to persuade states to take implementation actions.

[Global] meetings always deliver new traction and incentives to implement.
The big problem is that, in the CBD, there is no agreed way to look at the
situation in speciﬁc countries. . . . If we want to measure progress, we also
have to know where the problems exactly are, and there is a diplomatic res-
ervation against that. (Interview 1)

In other words, interviewed NGOs identiﬁed the lack of genuine review
processes of national implementation as a key obstacle to advancing implemen-
tation of the SPB 2002–2011. The inability to identify speciﬁc implementation

D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d

f
r
o
m
h

t
t

:
/
/

d
i
r
e
c
t
.

i
t
.

e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d

f
/

2
3
1
4
2
2
0
6
7
7
9
3
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
7
3
p
d

b
y
g
u
e
s
t

o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3

Table 2
Formal Accountability Relationships in the CBD, Enacted by Peers

Who?

To whom?

About what?

Standards of appraisal?

How?

With what effect?

Parties
to the
CBD

Conference of the
Parties (supported by
the Subsidiary Body on
Implementation and
Subsidiary Body on
Scientiﬁc, Technical
and Technological
Advice)

Global goal(s)
and indicators

Strategic
Plan for
Biodiversity
2002–2010

Monitoring the
status of biodiversity

National reporting on
implementation of
National Biodiversity
Strategies and Action
Plans

Facilitating:
Enhancement of
provisions on means
of implementation
(i.e., access and
transfer of technology,
exchange of
information, technical
and scientiﬁc
cooperation, ﬁnancial
resources, ﬁnancial
mechanism to support
developing countries)

Strategic
Plan for
Biodiversity
2011–2020

Strategic Goals and
Aichi Biodiversity
Targets

Indicators tailored
to national
circumstances

Monitoring biodiversity
status against indicators

Facilitating:

National reporting using
indicators

Evaluation of progress
toward global goals and
targets (i.e., Global
Biodiversity Outlook)

Provision of
recommendations,
support, and guidance

Enhancement
of means of
implementation (i.e.,
capacity building,
technology transfer,
ﬁnancial resources,

D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d

f
r
o
m
h

t
t

:
/
/

d
i
r
e
c
t
.

i
t
.

e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d

f
/

2
3
1
4
2
2
0
6
7
7
9
3
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
7
3
p
d

b
y
g
u
e
s
t

o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3

A
n
a

M
a
r
i
a

l
l

o
a

(cid:129)

5
3

Table 2
(Continued )

Who?

To whom?

About what?

Standards of appraisal?

How?

With what effect?

partnership and
cooperation, Clearing-
House Mechanism)

Learning-enabling:

Consideration of
challenges and
lessons learned

Adaptive mutual
learning

Same as above

Post-2020
Global
Biodiversity
Framework
(draft)

State commitments
(as country
contributions
toward global goals
and targets, which
can reﬂect voluntary
commitments
from nonstate and
subnational actors)

Indicators

Same as above but also
including:

Voluntary peer-review
process of national
strategies revision and
implementation

Country-led country-by-
country peer-review
process of national
commitments

Global analytical review
for near-real-time
monitoring

5
4

(cid:129)

A
c
c
o
u
n
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y

a
s

C
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
i
v
e

D
i
a
l
o
g
u
e

D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d

f
r
o
m
h

t
t

:
/
/

d
i
r
e
c
t
.

i
t
.

e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d

f
/

2
3
1
4
2
2
0
6
7
7
9
3
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
7
3
p
d

b
y
g
u
e
s
t

o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3

Ana Maria Ulloa

(cid:129) 55

challenges limited the provision of support tailored to speciﬁc needs for imple-
mentation, peer learning within the Convention, and broader discussions with
NGOs. It also made the process of persuading states to take implementation
actions more cumbersome. Despite these shortcomings, NGOs saw positive
changes in the Convention conducive to strengthening the review and strategic
support of national implementation processes. In particular, NGOs had expec-
tations about the role of the SBI as “a way to actually evaluate what the situation
is in each country” (Interview 1), to review implementation in a standardized
manner (Interview 4), and to better identify what can be done to promote
implementation at the national and local levels (Interview 3).

Furthermore, interviewed NGOs saw formal accountability mechanisms in
the CBD as arenas to informally play a role in holding states to account. By
observing states’ positions at global meetings and using information arising
from global reviews, NGOs could persuade states to fulﬁll their commitments
at domestic levels. To do so, interviewed NGOs used a variety of low-
confronting strategies ranging from advocacy and position papers to lobbying
and social campaigning.

The critical point is to challenge governments [upon] what [they] have
decided. [To ask them] what is [their] process for implementation? What
are the structures that need to be set up? And to keep track and challenge
them [with evidence] from year to year to implement that. (Interview 2)

More speciﬁcally, NGOs have used their expertise and knowledge to
encourage states to take implementation actions. For instance, NGOs have pro-
vided technical support to governments for processes that they recognize are
costly and sometimes beyond the capacity of some states, such as the operatio-
nalization of indicators (e.g., Birdlife 2020) and the formulation of biodiversity
legislation (e.g., World Future Council [WFC] 2012). NGOs have also used data,
evidence, and analyses to signal problems, desired outcomes, and measures that
they consider effective and ineffective; discuss solutions; suggest courses of
action; and provide concrete policy and/or environmental management advice.
This can be observed in position papers, press releases, and assessments, where
NGOs praise states for their good actions, challenge them on measures that
need strengthening, reﬂect on lessons learned, and make tangible recommenda-
tions in line with the objectives of the Convention (e.g., International Union for
Conservation of Nature [IUCN] 2018; World Wildlife Fund [WWF] 2018; WFC
2014). As NGOs recounted, this practice is also common in letters to govern-
mental bodies, public campaigning, lobbying, and workshops:

[Our] position papers praise those activities and Parties that provide a good
example in terms of advancing implementation of the Aichi Targets; at the
same time, we are “bold” in some of our statements calling for the urgency
that is needed to tackle the biodiversity crisis and explicitly mentioning
actions which have been running against that level of immediate commit-
ment. (Interview 4)

D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d

f
r
o
m
h

t
t

:
/
/

d
i
r
e
c
t
.

i
t
.

e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d

f
/

2
3
1
4
2
2
0
6
7
7
9
3
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
7
3
p
d

b
y
g
u
e
s
t

o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3

56 (cid:129) Accountability as Constructive Dialogue

Grassroots NGOs have also used independent monitoring, whether com-
munity based or scientiﬁc, to indirectly assess the impact of policy (in)actions
on biodiversity conservation and to generate information to hold states account-
able. For example, the Local Biodiversity Outlooks–2 (LBO-2), a joint publication of
several Indigenous peoples’ organizations (Forest Peoples Programme [FPP]
2020), assessed the status of biodiversity on the ground against the Aichi Targets,
increasing transparency on states’ actions to implement the SPB 2011–2020. The
LBO-2 thus represented opportunities for multilevel cooperation between NGOs,
local communities, and governments by providing data and analysis that states
can use in reporting or formulating biodiversity strategies and by engaging local
communities in global processes for biodiversity. Independent monitoring has
also allowed NGOs to focus on the aspects of biodiversity they consider relevant
and that sometimes governments neglect, which is particularly relevant for NGOs
working with Indigenous peoples. For example, the LBO-2 increased awareness
among states about Indigenous peoples’ priorities for biodiversity conservation
and Indigenous peoples’ contributions to achieving the Aichi Targets:

We are trying to identify relevant indicators so that we can really see the sit-
uation for Indigenous peoples . . . so that local organizations can engage
through the monitoring of implementation and the operationalization of
those indicators. (Interview 3)

Another example of independent monitoring is the Living Planet Report (WWF
2020), a tool designed to increase awareness about the status of biodiversity and
that has been often used in lobbying. NGOs have also conducted independent
assessments to measure countries’ progress against indicators and have used this
information to provide recommendations on global processes and mainstream
global biodiversity frameworks in national agendas (e.g., Birdlife 2015; IUCN
2018). Ultimately, such information has given NGOs leverage to start conversa-
tions with states about the impact of implementation actions (i.e., to challenge
inactions or inadequate measures or to praise, share, and promote successful ones).

When you have information, you have a stronger base to hold [govern-
ments] to account. You also start speaking a common language about those
commitments that have been made [in the international arena] at national
and local levels. (Interview 3)

All in all, evidence from this study suggests that NGOs have fostered crit-
ical partnerships and successfully established multilevel communication chan-
nels with states. The informal role of NGOs in persuading states to fulﬁll their
biodiversity commitments contrasts with their formally recognized role as
awareness raisers and implementers on the ground.3 All NGOs interviewed

3. These formalized roles are acknowledged by the Convention as agreements of cooperation and
partnership, sometimes through memorandums of agreement or understanding (https://www
.cbd.int/agreements, last accessed June 21, 2022).

D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d

f
r
o
m
h

t
t

:
/
/

d
i
r
e
c
t
.

i
t
.

e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d

f
/

2
3
1
4
2
2
0
6
7
7
9
3
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
7
3
p
d

b
y
g
u
e
s
t

o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3

Table 3
Informal Accountability Relationships in the CBD, Enacted by NGOs Holding States to Account

Who?

To whom?

About what?

Standards of appraisal?

How?

NGOs

Parties
to the
CBD

Strategic Plan
for Biodiversity
2011–2020

Global Strategic
Goals

Aichi Biodiversity
Targets

Indicators tailored
to national
circumstances

Community and scientiﬁc
monitoring

Independent assessment of
status of implementation
against indicators

Operationalization of
indicators

Assessment of effectiveness
of policies and
environmental management
measures

With what effect?

Sanctioning:

Publication of position papers,
statements, and press releases
Lobbying and campaigning
Facilitating:

Provision of data, evidence,
and analysis

Capacity building
Provision of policy and
environmental management
advice

Independent reports about
the status of biodiversity

Learning enabling:
Advocacy

Follow-up of meetings of
the COP, states’
commitments, and CBD’s
collective evaluations of
progress toward global goals

Partnerships to discuss
solutions and contributions
toward policy outcomes or
reports

Promotion and sharing of
lessons from successful
implementation actions

D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d

f
r
o
m
h

t
t

:
/
/

d
i
r
e
c
t
.

i
t
.

e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d

f
/

2
3
1
4
2
2
0
6
7
7
9
3
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
7
3
p
d

b
y
g
u
e
s
t

o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3

A
n
a

M
a
r
i
a

l
l

o
a

(cid:129)

5
7

58 (cid:129) Accountability as Constructive Dialogue

for this research favored critical but cooperative approaches to challenge states’
inertia through evidence and knowledge and to encourage states to take imple-
mentation actions by discussing solutions. They considered name-and-shame
counterproductive, only resorting to mildly confronting strategies when states
were reluctant to engage in conversations. Once states were responsive to public
pressure, these NGOs reportedly went back to discussing options. Mechanisms
and strategies NGOs used to promote implementation of the SPB 2011–2020
are summarized in Table 3.

We provide evidence: “look, this is the situation, you have to do something
about it.” That means that we analyze the problem and collect evidence
about the problem. Then, we try to formulate and bring onto paper a solu-
tion and some kind of orientation, like “this is the way the government
should go.” So it is not a very confronting approach. It is an approach more
about providing input, points of discussion, solutions, ground for thought.
(Interview 2)

Discussion

The inability to systematically review national implementation processes in the
CBD has represented a major accountability deﬁcit. Multiple nonexclusive
weaknesses have been raised as contributing factors. These include the lack of
binding obligations to back up accountability mechanisms (Harrop and
Pritchard 2011); the focus on agenda setting and shallow review of previous
commitments (Morgera and Tsioumani 2010); the vague character of goals, tar-
gets, and indicators (Xu et al. 2021); the absence of global stocktaking of ambi-
tion for national implementation (Kok and Ludwig 2021); and the lack of a
peer-review mechanism for regular discussion of national implementation on
a country-by-country basis (Ulloa et al. 2018). In this article, I have elaborated
on the argument that the availability of accountability mechanisms is not
enough to foster transformative accountability dynamics (Gupta and van
Asselt 2019; Kramarz and Park 2019). Conversely, I argue that constructive dia-
logue has potential to address implementation challenges and persuade states
to fulﬁll their global environmental commitments, which points out the value
of critical commentary and feedback, lessons learned over time, and coopera-
tion to inﬂuence state behavior (Mashaw 2006; Raustiala 2000). Accordingly,
in this section, I discuss the transformative potential of formal peer-review pro-
cesses in the CBD and the informal role of NGOs to foster constructive dialogue
and catalyze implementation of the GBF.

Deﬁcits in Peer Accountability in the CBD

Lack of political will from states to implement MEAs is not uncommon (UNEP
2019). Diplomatic reservations against being held accountable for global envi-
ronmental commitments are also well known (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen et al.

D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d

f
r
o
m
h

t
t

:
/
/

d
i
r
e
c
t
.

i
t
.

e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d

f
/

2
3
1
4
2
2
0
6
7
7
9
3
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
7
3
p
d

b
y
g
u
e
s
t

o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3

Ana Maria Ulloa

(cid:129) 59

D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d

f
r
o
m
h

t
t

:
/
/

d
i
r
e
c
t
.

i
t
.

Figure 2
Percentages Calculated from the Total Number of Parties at the Time of Each Report’s
Due Date

Ten submitted reports are not represented due to lack of specification of the submission date. Data are from
https://www.cbd.int/reports/search, last accessed July 2021.

2018). This is no exception in the CBD (Ulloa et al. 2018). Overcoming the lack
of political will of states to engage in accountability dynamics remains a chal-
lenge in the CBD, particularly in the Global North.4 Despite positive feedback
from Parties that submitted themselves to the pilot of the VPR, few Parties
volunteered thereafter (CBD 2018b). Furthermore, submission of national
reports—which keep collective progress under review and implicitly track
national implementation—has been inadequate (Figure 2). NGOs also recog-
nize that “some countries don’t realize the added value of discussing [imple-
mentation] with peers, NGOs, etc.” (Interview 1). Transforming the GBF into
a learning framework, where states can share their experiences and ambitions
to achieve country commitments, has been emphasized as a way to address
ongoing implementation challenges in the CBD (Kok and Ludwig 2021;
Phang et al. 2020). But can learning encourage states to discuss implementation
openly?

It is expected that the COP will implement the post-2020 multidimen-
sional review process after the adoption of the GBF tentatively in August–
September 2022 (CBD 2021). This may include obligations for national

4. While Parties from the Global North ( Japan, Norway, and Switzerland) have committed fund-
ing and resources to develop the VPR, only Parties from the Global South have expressed inter-
est in being reviewed (Iraq, Mali, Montenegro, Sri Lanka, Togo, and Uganda) (CBD 2018b).

e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d

f
/

2
3
1
4
2
2
0
6
7
7
9
3
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
7
3
p
d

b
y
g
u
e
s
t

o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3

60 (cid:129) Accountability as Constructive Dialogue

reporting, review, and means of implementation in the form of country-by-
country Party-led peer reviews and the operationalization of the VPR as a formal
mechanism to review national implementation. Discussions to transform the
VPR into a mandatory review process have also already started (CBD 2020b).
These considerations by the COP about measures to strengthen accountability
in the CBD through active country-by-country review processes signal the
willingness of Parties to engage in dialogue with peers to advance national
implementation and collectively learn lessons. Formal CBD accountability
mechanisms have so far failed to enact accountability dynamics that allow
for constructive criticism and learning. Therefore, the relational character of
such peer-review processes is certainly a counteracting factor for the CBD’s
accountability deﬁcit. After all, peer reviews can be arenas to openly discuss
and reﬂect on national implementation processes and ambition. Making them
mandatory represents a way to challenge states’ lack of political will to engage in
such discussions.

However, placing too much hope on the weight of peer pressure, even if
backed up by obligations, may be unrealistic. Peer accountability has done little
in GEG to persuade states to engage in transformative accountability dynamics
(Gupta and van Asselt 2019; Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen et al. 2018). Furthermore,
the CBD has predominantly followed a soft approach to ensuring the conserva-
tion of biodiversity (Harrop and Pritchard 2011). With the imminent adoption
of the GBF, despite enhancements such as national commitments toward global
goals and targets coupled with national plans to implement them and commit-
ments to update them (CBD 2020b), there are no indications that this is going
to change radically in the foreseeable future. Further examining the informal
roles that nonstate actors can play to strengthen accountability in the CBD looks
more promising, albeit with its own complexities (Chan et al. 2019).

Opportunities for NGOs to Strengthen Accountability in the CBD

Despite the reluctance of states to openly discuss national implementation, the
triangulation of NGO interviews, reports, and policy documents suggests that
NGOs have engaged in dialogue with states, with some positive results to
advance implementation. For instance, NGOs have made tangible contribu-
tions, hand-in-hand with governments, toward the formulation of national
biodiversity strategies (e.g., the Swiss Biodiversity Strategy5). NGOs have also
conducted assessments against biodiversity indicators that have been endorsed
at national, regional, and/or global levels. For example, the Local Biodiversity
Outlooks (FPP 2020) was a contributing publication to the GBO-5 that formally
assessed the delivery of the SPB 2011–2020 (CBD 2020a). The European

5. Available at: https://www.bafu.admin.ch/ud-1060-e, last accessed June 21, 2022.

D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d

f
r
o
m
h

t
t

:
/
/

d
i
r
e
c
t
.

i
t
.

e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d

f
/

2
3
1
4
2
2
0
6
7
7
9
3
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
7
3
p
d

b
y
g
u
e
s
t

o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3

Ana Maria Ulloa

(cid:129) 61

Environmental Agency (EEA) has also drawn on NGOs’ monitoring and analy-
sis of data against indicators to assess the status of nature (e.g., European Envi-
ronmental Agency 2016):6

In collaboration with [a European network of NGOs], we made an assess-
ment of progress towards different [biodiversity] targets [at the EU level] that
is now available on the [European Environmental Agency] website. So, the
European Union has taken our comments on board and it is communicating
them [to governments]. (Interview 1)

Thus, NGOs can engage states in accountability dynamics that can result in
tangible actions to overcome implementation challenges. The key to such inter-
actions seems to be a critical yet cooperative approach that challenges states
through knowledge, while enabling discussion, teamwork, and perhaps learn-
ing. Interviewed NGOs all valued establishing effective communication net-
works with governments. As an NGO ofﬁcer described, building constructive
relationships over time and fostering dialogue are key to persuading states to
take implementation actions, even if they have not yet signaled an unwilling-
ness to do so (Interview 2). However, NGOs also recognized that strategies to
inﬂuence state behavior are varied and that “other NGOs [can be] more con-
frontative” (Interview 2). Therefore, a relevant consideration is that the willing-
ness (and capacity) of NGOs to foster cooperative relationships with states may
vary across a broader landscape of NGOs, as may their transformative potential:

It is basically communicating, convincing people [working in the govern-
ment] that this is the right way to go, and provide some good ideas and
solutions. Of course we have our position papers . . . but then you have to
go to the people and discuss them . . . ask what role they want to play. . . . It
does not work from the beginning. You have to work with colleagues and get
their conﬁdence over the years. Then you have better possibilities that they
accept your ideas, suggestions, and proposals. So, this is a combination of
communication and making good relationships with people what opens
the door for discussion and exchange of ideas. (Interview 2)

In these dynamics, NGOs acted as critical partners with states rather than
acting as judges or mere capacity builders. Speciﬁcally, the NGOs interviewed
for this research used evidence, data, and analysis to remind states of their com-
mitments and encouraged or challenged them to fulﬁll them, while providing
tools to help them do so. For example, through the operationalization of indi-
cators and analysis of data derived from community monitoring, one NGO

6. NGOs are not cited as contributors in the actual report. Nevertheless, I found biodiversity
reports (including European Environmental Agency 2016) and analyzed data to track progress
against indicators in the Global Catalogue of the EEA (https://search.apps.eea.europa.eu, last
accessed June 21, 2022) by selecting NGOs as contributing organizations in the browsing
ﬁlters.

D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d

f
r
o
m
h

t
t

:
/
/

d
i
r
e
c
t
.

i
t
.

e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d

f
/

2
3
1
4
2
2
0
6
7
7
9
3
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
7
3
p
d

b
y
g
u
e
s
t

o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3

62 (cid:129) Accountability as Constructive Dialogue

contributed to assessing the impact of governmental and Indigenous peoples’
actions to conserve biodiversity (Interview 3), providing information for global
assessments (CBD 2020a) and making recommendations to governments to
improve implementation on the ground (FPP 2020). Another NGO assessed
biodiversity legislation globally to identify exemplary legislation ( WFC 2014),
designed training materials for policy makers ( WFC 2012), and partnered with
the Convention to help states overcome implementation challenges associated
with policy making:7

We work with parliamentarians and policy makers to help them develop
good legislations and national biodiversity strategies. We [not only] raise
the proﬁle [of] biodiversity and create awareness to put pressure on govern-
ments [but also] we provide concrete tools to policy makers. (Interview 5)

As states are formally responsible for implementing the CBD and report-
ing on progress, such partnerships with NGOs can decrease the ﬁnancial, tech-
nical, and human burden on governments to fulﬁll their CBD commitments
(e.g., monitor the status of biodiversity, operationalize national indicators, col-
lect and analyze data for national reports, develop NBSAPs, and research effec-
tive ways to formulate environmental policies). Showcasing this added value
can help overcome lack of political will to implement the GBF and lessen dip-
lomatic reservations of states to engage in accountability dynamics. However,
exploring how states perceive such dynamics remains crucial to understanding
their transformative potential. As these NGO-to-state accountability dynamics
are voluntary, they require willingness from both NGOs and governments to
be fruitful.

As a ﬁnal caveat, there is still much to learn about the impacts of multi-
level, multiactor accountability mechanisms on fostering (or hampering) legit-
imacy (Kuyper et al. 2018; Widerberg and Pattberg 2015), transparency (Kok
and Ludwig 2021), participation and representation (Chan et al. 2019), and
environmental and ecological justice (Balboa 2019). We do not yet understand
how accountability mechanisms contribute to improving environmental out-
comes (Kramarz and Park 2019) or to whom nonstate actors are accountable
(Balboa 2019). Although this article suggests that NGOs can strengthen
accountability in the CBD through constructive criticism, fundamental ques-
tions remain about how accountability can have transformative potential in
GEG. With the upcoming adoption of the GBF, exploring how NGOs can foster
ex ante accountability to enhance the ambition of national commitments
(Gupta and van Asselt 2019) and to increase transparency of voluntary contri-
butions by nonstate actors toward country contributions (Kok and Ludwig
2021) is particularly relevant.

See https://www.cbd.int/iyb/doc/partners/iyb-Germany-WorldFutureCouncil.pdf, last accessed
June 21, 2022.

D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d

f
r
o
m
h

t
t

:
/
/

d
i
r
e
c
t
.

i
t
.

e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d

f
/

2
3
1
4
2
2
0
6
7
7
9
3
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
7
3
p
d

b
y
g
u
e
s
t

o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3

Ana Maria Ulloa

(cid:129) 63

Conclusions

The peer-review processes that are expected to be operationalized with the adop-
tion of the GBF have potential as arenas where accountability dynamics can be
enacted and, as such, could strengthen accountability in the CBD. They have the
potential to increase peer and broader social pressure on states to fulﬁll their
biodiversity commitments. They may also enable a cooperative and supportive
environment to discuss implementation challenges, provide speciﬁc advice to
overcome them, and facilitate mutual learning. In doing so, peer-review pro-
cesses could provide the Convention with mechanisms to challenge, or even
prevent, states’ inertia. However, the speciﬁcs are still to be deﬁned and opera-
tionalized, and thus the effectiveness of such peer-review processes remains to
be seen. Given the urgency to halt biodiversity loss, exploring alternatives to
reinforce state-to-state accountability and enhance implementation of the
CBD warrants further research. This article suggests that critical but cooperative
dialogue between NGOs and states can overcome implementation challenges,
whether deriving from lack of capacity or political will. Reconceptualizing
accountability in GEG as constructive dialogue may enable learning over time
and catalyze the implementation of global environmental commitments, such
as the upcoming GBF. Thus, further exploring the role of NGOs in fostering
learning-enabling conversations with states may shed light on alternatives to
set biodiversity speciﬁcally, and Earth’s life-supporting systems more generally,
on a path to recovery.

Ana Maria Ulloa is a PhD candidate in the Department of Government and
International Relations at the University of Sydney. She is interested in under-
standing how global environmental agreements can be more effectively trans-
lated into domestic actions to improve the environmental crisis. Her research
focuses on the roles of NGOs in global biodiversity and climate governance
and explores the link between accountability, learning, and environmental out-
comes. Ana has published in Biological Conservation and authored a chapter in
The Implementation of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2018).

References

Bäckstrand, Karin, Jonathan Kuyper, Björn-Ola Linnér, and Eva Lövbrand. 2017. Non-
state Actors in Global Climate Governance: From Copenhagen to Paris and
Beyond. Environmental Politics 26 (4): 561–579. https://doi.org/10.1080
/09644016.2017.1327485

Balboa, Cristina M. 2019. Participation Versus Performance: The Crisis of Accountability
for Environmental Nongovernmental Organizations. In Global Environmental
Governance and the Accountability Trap, edited by Susan Park and Teresa Kramarz,
3–34. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Birdlife. 2015. Halfway There? Mid-term Assessment of Progress on the EU 2020 Biodiversity
Strategy. Available at: https://www.nabu.de/imperia/md/content/nabude

D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d

f
r
o
m
h

t
t

:
/
/

d
i
r
e
c
t
.

i
t
.

e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d

f
/

2
3
1
4
2
2
0
6
7
7
9
3
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
7
3
p
d

b
y
g
u
e
s
t

o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3

64 (cid:129) Accountability as Constructive Dialogue

/naturschutz/150601-nabu-birdlife-midtermreview.pdf, last accessed June 21,
2022.

Birdlife. 2020. Indicators for Global and National Biodiversity Targets—Experience and Indica-
tor Resources for Development of the Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework. Available
at: https://www.cbd.int/api/v2013/documents/075247AC-6898-9CC4-FD27
-C0164E21D844/attachments/212378/Birdlife.pdf, last accessed June 21, 2022.

Bovens, Mark. 2007. Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework.
European Law Journal 13 (4): 447–468. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0386.2007
.00378.x

Chan, Sander, Idil Boran, Harro van Asselt, Gabriela Iacobuta, Navam Niles, Katharine
Rietig, Michelle Scobie, Jennifer S. Bansard, Deborah Delgado Pugley, Laurence L.
Delina, Friederike Eichhorn, Paula Ellinger, Okechukwu Enechi, Thomas Hale,
Lukas Hermwille, Thomas Hickmann, Matthias Honegger, Andrea Hurtado
Epstein, Stephanie La Hoz Theuer, Robert Mizo, Yixian Sun, Patrick Toussaint,
and Geoffrey Wambugu. 2019. Promises and Risks of Nonstate Action in Climate
and Sustainability Governance. WIREs Climate Change 10 (3): e572. https://doi.org
/10.1002/wcc.572

Chan, Sander, and Philipp Pattberg. 2008. Private Rule-Making and the Politics of
Accountability: Analyzing Global Forest Governance. Global Environmental Politics
8 (3): 103–121. https://doi.org/10.1162/glep.2008.8.3.103

Convention on Biological Diversity. 2002. Decision of the Conference of the Parties VI/6:
Strategic Plan for the Convention on Biological Diversity. Report UNEP/CBD/COP/
DEC/ VI/6. Available at: https://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-10/cop-10-dec
-02-en.pdf, last accessed June 21, 2022.

Convention on Biological Diversity. 2010a. Decision of the Conference of the Parties X/2:
The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets. Report
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/ X/2. Available at: https://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop
-10/cop-10-dec-02-en.pdf, last accessed June 21, 2022.

Convention on Biological Diversity. 2010b. Global Biodiversity Outlook 3. CBD Secretariat.
Available at: https://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/gbo/gbo3-ﬁnal-en.pdf, last
accessed June 21, 2022.

Convention on Biological Diversity. 2014. Decision of the Conference of the Parties XII/26:
Improving the Efﬁciency of Structures and Processes of the Convention: Subsidiary Body on
Implementation. Report UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/ XII/26. Available at: https://www
.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-12/cop-12-dec-26-en.pdf, last accessed June 21, 2022.
Convention on Biological Diversity. 2018a. Decision of the Conference of the Parties XIV/29:
Review Mechanisms. Report UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/ XIV/29. Available at: https://
www.cbd.int/decisions/cop/14/29, last accessed June 21, 2022.

Convention on Biological Diversity. 2018b. Second Meeting of the Subsidiary Body on
Implementation: Mechanisms to Facilitate Review of Implementation. Report
UNEP/CBD/SBI/2/11. Available at: https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/a22d/f883
/a0d8e8ad8ca02c9f9410e577/sbi-02-11-en.pdf, last accessed June 21, 2022.
Convention on Biological Diversity. 2020a. Global Biodiversity Outlook 5. CBD Secretariat.
Available at: https://www.cbd.int/gbo/gbo5/publication/gbo-5-en.pdf, last
accessed June 21, 2022.

Convention on Biological Diversity. 2020b. Third Meeting of the Subsidiary Body on Imple-
mentation: Options to Enhance Planning, Reporting, and Review Mechanisms with a View
to Strengthening the Implementation of the Convention. Report UNEP/CBD/SBI/3/11.

D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d

f
r
o
m
h

t
t

:
/
/

d
i
r
e
c
t
.

i
t
.

e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d

f
/

2
3
1
4
2
2
0
6
7
7
9
3
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
7
3
p
d

b
y
g
u
e
s
t

o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3

Ana Maria Ulloa

(cid:129) 65

Available at: https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/3572/0ba5/0c4173a13cf0e7b040f7e6e2
/sbi-03-11-en.pdf, last accessed June 21, 2022.

Convention on Biological Diversity. 2021. Open Ended Working Group on the Post-2020
Global Biodiversity Framework: First Draft of the Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Frame-
work. Report UNEP/CBD/ WG2020/3/3. Available at: https://www.cbd.int/doc/c
/abb5/591f/2e46096d3f0330b08ce87a45/wg2020-03-03-en.pdf, last accessed
June 21, 2022.

Duyck, Sébastien. 2014. MRV in the 2015 Climate Agreement: Promoting Compliance
Through Transparency and the Participation of NGOs. Carbon and Climate Law
Review 8 (3): 175–187.

Elliott, Lorraine, and William H. Schaedla. 2019. Accountability in Public-Voluntary
Governance: The Case of Ilegal Wildlife Trade. In Global Environmental Governance
and the Accountability Trap, edited by Susan Park and Teresa Kramarz, 3–34. Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press.

European Environmental Agency. 2016. European Forest Ecosystems: State and Trends. EEA
Report 5/2016. Available at: https://eea.europa.eu/publications/european-forest
-ecosystems/, last accessed June 21, 2022.

Forest Peoples Programme. 2020. Local Biodiversity Outlooks–2. Available at: https://www
.localbiodiversityoutlooks.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/ Local-Biodiversity
-Outlooks-2.pdf, last accessed June 21, 2022.

Gulbrandsen, Lars H., and Graeme Auld. 2019. Navigating Contested Accountability
Logics in Nonstate Certiﬁcation for Fisheries Sustainability. In Global Environmental
Governance and the Accountability Trap, edited by Susan Park and Teresa Kramarz,
143–168. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Gupta, Aarti, and Harro van Asselt. 2019. Transparency in Multilateral Climate Politics:
Furthering (or Distracting from) Accountability? Regulation and Governance 13 (1):
18–34. https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12159

Harrop, Stuart, and Diana Pritchard. 2011. A Hard Instrument Goes Soft: The Impli-
cations of the Convention on Biological Diversity’s Current Trajectory. Global
Environmental Change 21 (2): 474–480. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha
.2011.01.014

Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services. 2019.
Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services of the Intergovernmental
Science Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services. Edited by E. S. Brondizio,
J. Settele, S. Díaz, and H. T. Ngo. Bonn, Germany: IPBES Secretariat.

International Union for Conservation of Nature. 2018. Position Paper on Review of Progress
and the Post-2020 Biodiversity Framework. Available at: https://www.iucn.org/sites
/dev/ﬁles/content/documents/iucn_position_paper_cbd_cop14_-_review_of
_progress_and_post-2020_-_en.pdf, last accessed June 21, 2022.

Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, Sylvia I., Maja Groff, Peter A. Tamás, Arthirs L. Dahl, Marie Harder,
and Graham Hassall. 2018. Entry into Force and Then? The Paris Agreement and
State Accountability. Climate Policy 18: 593–599. https://doi.org/10.1080
/14693062.2017.1331904

Kok, Marcel T., and Kathrin Ludwig. 2021. Understanding International Non-state and
Subnational Actors for Biodiversity and Their Possible Contributions to the
Post-2020 CBD Global Biodiversity Framework: Insights from Six International
Cooperative Initiatives. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Eco-
nomics 22: 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-021-09547-2

D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d

f
r
o
m
h

t
t

:
/
/

d
i
r
e
c
t
.

i
t
.

e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d

f
/

2
3
1
4
2
2
0
6
7
7
9
3
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
7
3
p
d

b
y
g
u
e
s
t

o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3

66 (cid:129) Accountability as Constructive Dialogue

Kramarz, Teresa, and Susan Park. 2019. Identifying Multiple Accountabilities in Global
Environmental Governance. In Global Environmental Governance and the Account-
ability Trap, edited by Susan Park and Teresa Kramarz, 3–34. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.

Kuyper, Jonathan, Björn-Ola Linnér, and Heike Schroeder. 2018. Non-state Actors in
Hybrid Global Climate Governance: Justice, Legitimacy, and Effectiveness in a
Post-Paris Era. WIREs Climate Change 9 (1): e497. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.497
Mashaw, Jerry Louis. 2006. Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on
the Grammar of Governance. In Public Accountability Designs, Dilemmas and Experi-
ences, edited by Michael W. Dowdle, 115–156. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.

Morgera, Elisa, and Elsa Tsioumani. 2010. Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow: Looking
Afresh at the Convention on Biological Diversity. Yearbook of International Environ-
mental Law 21 (1): 3–40. https://doi.org/10.1093/yiel/yvr003

Phang, Sui C., Pierre Failler, and Peter Bridgewater. 2020. Addressing the Implementa-
tion Challenge of the Global Biodiversity Framework. Biodiversity Conservation 29:
3061–3066. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10531-020-02009-2, PubMed: 32836919

Raustiala, Kal. 2000. Compliance and Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooper-

ation. Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 32 (3): 387–440.

Steffek, Jens. 2010. Public Accountability and the Public Sphere of International Gover-
nance. Ethics and International Affairs 24 (1): 45–68. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747
-7093.2010.00243.x

Tallberg, Jonas. 2002. Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the Euro-
pean Union. International Organization 56 (3): 609–643. https://doi.org/10.1162
/002081802760199908

Ulloa, Ana Maria, Kurt Jax, and Sylvia I. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen. 2018. Enhancing
Implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity: A Novel Peer-Review
Mechanism Aims to Promote Accountability and Mutual Learning. Biological
Conservation 217: 371–376. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biocon.2017.11.006
United Nations Environment Programme. 2019. Environmental Rule of Law First Global
Report. Available at: https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/assessment
/environmental-rule-law-ﬁrst-global-report, last accessed June 21, 2022.

van Asselt, Harro. 2016. The Role of Non-state Actors in Reviewing Ambition, Implemen-
tation, and Compliance Under the Paris Agreement. Climate Law 6 (1–2): 91–108.
https://doi.org/10.1163/18786561-00601006

Widerberg, Oscar, and Philipp Pattberg. 2015. International Cooperative Initiatives in
Global Climate Governance: Raising the Ambition Level or Delegitimizing the
UNFCCC? Global Policy 6 (1): 45–56. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12184
World Future Council. 2012. Designing Future Just Laws on Biodiversity. Available at:
https://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/designing-future-just-laws-on-biodiversity/,
last accessed June 21, 2022.

World Future Council. 2014. Biodiversity Legislation Study: A Review of Biodiversity Legisla-
tion in 8 Countries. Available at: https://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/wp-content
/uploads/2016/01/ WFCplus_2014_Biodiversity_Legislation_Study.pdf, last
accessed June 21, 2022.

World Wildlife Fund. 2018. Convention on Biological Diversity: WWF Proposal on the Post-
2020 Global Biodiversity Framework. Available at: https://www.cbd.int/doc/strategic
-plan/Post2020/postsbi/wwf2.pdf, last accessed June 21, 2022.

D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d

f
r
o
m
h

t
t

:
/
/

d
i
r
e
c
t
.

i
t
.

e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d

f
/

2
3
1
4
2
2
0
6
7
7
9
3
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
7
3
p
d

b
y
g
u
e
s
t

o
n
0
7
S
e
p
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
2
3

Ana Maria Ulloa

(cid:129) 67

World Wildlife Fund. 2020. The Living Planet Report 2020. Available at: https://f
.hubspotusercontent20.net/hubfs/4783129/LPR/PDFs/ENGLISH-FULL.pdf, last
accessed June 21, 2022.

Xu, Haigen, Yun Cao, Dandan Yu, Mingchang Cao, Yuxiao He, Michael Hill, and
Henrique Pereira. 2021. Ensuring Effective Implementation of the Post-2020
Global Biodiversity Targets. Nature Ecology and Evolution 5: 411–418. https://doi
.org/10.1038/s41559-020-01375-y, PubMed: 33495589

D
o
w
n
o
a
d
e
d

f
r
o
m
h

t
t

:
/
/

d
i
r
e
c
t
.

i
t
.

e
d
u
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
e
–
p
d

f
/

2
3
1
4
2
2
0
6
7
7
9
3
g
e
p
_
a
_
0
0
6
7
3
p
d