A Way Forward - Specialized Research AI at MIT

A Way Forward

James Timbie

This essay develops elements of an agreement to limit and reduce nuclear forces that
would succeed the New START Treaty. The successor arrangements would be more
complicated than the bilateral INF, START, and New START treaties, involving more
subjects and more countries, as the negotiations consider each of the issues the Unit-
ed States and Russia have said should be addressed in a new agreement. The result is a
comprehensive program of practical steps to enhance predictability, resume the reduc-
tion of nuclear forces, and reduce the risk of conflict in an increasingly complex world.

A s New START (New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), the last of the bi-

lateral strategic nuclear arms treaties, approaches its expiration–which
seems likely by 2026 and perhaps much sooner–the international securi-
ty situation grows steadily more complex. The strategic forces of the United States
and Russia no longer dominate the nuclear landscape as they did when the bilateral
treaties were negotiated. Past success in reducing U.S. and Russian strategic nucle-
ar warheads has increased the salience of other nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons
of other countries, missile defenses, and advanced conventional and space systems,
all of which need to be considered in future negotiations. Looking ahead to a transi-
tion from bilateral treaties to more complicated arrangements involving more sub-
jects and more countries, this essay outlines a program of practical steps to enhance
predictability and transparency, resume the process of reductions in nuclear forces,
and reduce the risk of unintended conflict in an increasingly complex world.

While strategic competition between the United States and Russia and China
greatly complicates consideration of the diplomatic engagement with Russia and
China necessary to negotiate and implement the cooperative measures suggest-
ed here, placing bounds on otherwise unregulated competition could enhance the
security of all involved. At this difficult moment, international cooperation can
help to reduce the risk of conflict and need not be deferred to a perhaps distant fu-
ture with a more favorable political climate.

The objectives of the steps outlined here are to:

• Reduce the risk of unintended nuclear conflict, as a result of misinterpre-
tation of rapidly unfolding events in multiple domains with little historical
precedent.

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• Promote equality and predictability, and thereby reduce incentives to ex-

pand nuclear forces in order to match the other side.

• Provide transparency into the nuclear forces of other states.
• Support nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.
• Support the security of allies, partners, and friends.
• Encourage further reductions in nuclear warheads, in support of a long-
term enterprise to manage and reduce the existential threat posed by nu-
clear weapons.

While these objectives are generally familiar, the first (reduce the risk of unin-
tended nuclear conflict) is adapted to our current circumstances. Those who ne-
gotiated the strategic arms treaties of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s were concerned
about the risk of deliberate large-scale nuclear attack in a crisis situation, and
sought to enhance stability and provide for equality and predictability at lower
levels of forces.1 Today, a deliberate large-scale nuclear attack seems effectively
deterred by the prospect of certain retaliation in kind, and is therefore unlikely.
Blundering into unintended nuclear conflict is the more likely scenario. The
chances of conflict involving conventional, cyber, and space actions escalating to
the nuclear level are not necessarily small and seem to be growing.

As for the second objective (promote equality and predictability), the large-scale
strategic modernization programs of the United States and Russia now respect the
limits of New START. In the absence of any regulation, however, each side could
take steps to match the other in an upward spiral. A goal of cooperative measures
would be to provide for a measure of equality at or below New START levels, avoid-
ing incentives for expansion on one side to offset expansion on the other side.

W hile our objectives are somewhat familiar, the environment in which

they are now pursued is not. We live in a world in which the major
powers (and others) are preparing to fight in all domains. Now that
military prowess on land, in the air, and on and under the sea critically depends
on support from space and cyber assets, the future of conflict includes offensive
and defensive operations in all of these domains. The pace of innovation is rapid,
including:

• Precision conventional systems, some of which may threaten nuclear forces.
The end of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty could lead
to increased emphasis on long-range precision conventional systems.

• Autonomous systems, some of which can be produced in large numbers at
low cost, some of which can strike at long ranges, and some of which can
strike in swarms.

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149 (2) Spring 2020James Timbie

• Missile defenses, of uncertain effectiveness against offensive counter-

measures.

• Space and counterspace systems.
• Offensive and defensive cyber capabilities.
• Enhanced communications and surveillance.
• Development of hypersonic systems.
• Modernization of nuclear forces. Nuclear forces are no longer being re-

duced; some are growing.

Initiation of the use of nuclear weapons is being considered in an increas-
ing number of circumstances, not only in retaliation to nuclear strikes, but in re-
sponse to conventional, space, and cyber actions as well, which increases the com-
plexity of the current situation and the potential danger.

It is difficult to assess the stability of this multidimensional situation; the po-
tential advantages of going first with cyber and space actions raise questions about
stability.2 It is also difficult to predict the outcome of a conflict once it is initiated.
There could be surprises.

This is the world in which we now live. These developments must be taken
into account when contemplating the way forward. It is safe to assume that nego-
tiation of further bilateral U.S.-Russian treaties will no longer play a central role,
as many other issues will need to be addressed,3 including:

• Nuclear weapons of countries beyond the United States and Russia, begin-

ning with China.

• Nuclear systems beyond deployed strategic nuclear warheads (including

nondeployed and nonstrategic warheads).

• Subjects beyond strategic nuclear forces (including missile defenses, precision
conventional systems, hypersonics, space systems, and cyber capabilities).

S teps can be taken to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict, through resilience,

deterrence, international cooperation, and unilateral measures. None of
these is a solution, but working together, they could improve an otherwise

increasingly complex and potentially dangerous landscape.

Cyber resilience. While it is impossible to completely defend against the most
sophisticated cyberattacks, defense against the rest of the spectrum of potential
threats is feasible and a great deal can be done to make societies and military es-
tablishments resilient to cyberattack.4 In response to relatively unsophisticated dis-
tributed denial-of-service attacks that crippled government websites, email servers,
media, commerce, and banking for several weeks in 2007, the government of Esto-
nia has taken a series of steps to increase resilience to cyberattack, including:5

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Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & SciencesA Way Forward

• Protection for information systems that support vital services and critical

infrastructure.

•

Increased public awareness of cyber risks, including cyber crime and cyber
warfare.

• Establishment of a national monitoring system.
• Promotion of cyber security cooperation between the public and private

sectors, and international cooperation with allies and partners.

Implementation of such a whole-of-society approach can substantially increase
resilience to cyberattack, and to cyber crime as well, and is well worth the resourc-
es and public-private cooperation required.

Space resilience. Space-enabled communications, surveillance, and navigation
systems can decisively affect the outcome of conflict on Earth. These essential space
assets can be destroyed or degraded in a number of ways, including kinetic opera-
tions from the ground or from space, electronic interference with signals or con-
trol systems, directed energy, or attacks on ground-based support facilities, with the
prospect that counterspace operations are likely to be an important theater of future
conflict. Many space systems are dual-use, with vital civil as well as military mis-
sions. Some are dual-use in that they support both nuclear and conventional forces.
Resilience is the first line of defense for critical space assets. Modern technol-
ogy allows space functions to be distributed among large constellations of small
satellites, complicating attacks. Less capable but more survivable backup terres-
trial systems could also be put in place to assume priority missions as necessary.

Military resilience. Special attention should be devoted to making nuclear forc-
es and nuclear command and control systems resilient to cyberattack. A portion
of conventional forces can also be maintained to a high standard of resilience to
cyberattack, to protect conventional as well as nuclear response options.6

A t all levels of conflict, from cyber intrusion to nuclear war, deterrence can

be sought from two components: punishment (threat of retaliation) and
denial of success (defense).7

Deterrence through threat of punishment. Deterrence of nuclear attack is estab-
lished by maintaining a second-strike force whose ability to survive, retaliate, and
inflict catastrophic damage under any circumstances is unquestioned.

The prospect of punishment contributes to deterrence at other levels of the
spectrum of conflict as well, but deterrence of conventional conflict is more com-
plex (and less reliable) and does not rely on retaliation alone.

The prospect of punishment (in kind or by other means) contributes to deter-
rence of cyberattack as well, but again, deterrence is complex, as the attribution
of the origin of an attack can be ambiguous and take time to determine, and the

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149 (2) Spring 2020James Timbie

consequences of a counterstrike in the cyber domain (and perhaps in other do-
mains as well) can be hard to predict. The prospect of punishment helps to deter at-
tacks on spacecraft as well, either response in kind or response in another domain,
but is not a reliable solution to the problem of vulnerability of critical space assets.
Deterrence through denial of success. Defense of the population and economic in-
frastructure of the United States and our allies against a substantial Russian or
Chinese nuclear attack is not technically feasible, hence reliance on an assured
second-strike capability to deter nuclear attack by a strategic competitor.

Defense can be considered against a small and unsophisticated nuclear strike,
to augment the deterrence provided by offensive nuclear forces. The performance
of such a defense against an attack by North Korea is uncertain. Construction of a
defense against North Korea has a deterrent effect as it calls into question the suc-
cess of an attack, but it also encourages North Korea to pursue larger and more so-
phisticated nuclear offensive capabilities designed to overcome the defense.

Defenses can make a substantial contribution to deterrence of conventional-
and cyberattacks. Deterrence cannot be relied upon, however, to prevent conven-
tional- or cyberattacks. (Conventional wars are fought and can be won.)

I nternational agreements can reduce the risk of unintended conflict in an in-

creasingly complex world in which actions can have unpredictable consequenc-
es, but the future will not be like the past. Future agreements will likely consist
of political commitments rather than formal treaties, involve more countries in ad-
dition to the United States and Russia, and address a wide range of subjects in ad-
dition to strategic nuclear warheads.8 Given that the United States and Russia hold
the great majority of the world’s nuclear weapons, and they share the need to man-
age the existential threat to each other, it makes sense to begin with bilateral negoti-
ations between the United States and Russia, recognizing that other countries start-
ing with China will need to become part of the solution at some point, and that we
would proceed in close consultation with allies, partners, and friends.

The measures outlined here are intended to address, in an initial way, concerns
the United States has expressed (including nonstrategic nuclear forces and new
nuclear systems), concerns Russia has expressed (including missile defenses and
precision conventional systems), and subjects of potential concern to both sides
(such as space systems, hypersonics, and INF systems). In order to address, even
in a preliminary way, all of the subjects the United States and Russia would like to
see in an agreement, the list of potential measures is necessarily long. The steps
outlined here are meant to be a balanced and coherent set of measures that could
plausibly be the basis for an initial agreement between the United States and Rus-
sia (and, where appropriate, China) if given a serious effort by all concerned.

Such an agreement would necessarily include commitments in areas subject
to rapid technological change, including missile defense, advanced conventional

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Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & SciencesA Way Forward

systems, and space. The duration of such commitments could be fixed, such as
for a period of ten years. There would be provision for a review after five years,
in which the sides would discuss extension of commitments from years eleven
through fifteen, possibly in modified form. This rolling format would allow pe-
riodic reassessment, changes as warranted by an evolving technical picture, and
consideration of further reductions over time.

Strategic nuclear forces. A useful way to begin would be for the United States and
Russia to reaffirm the November 1985 Reagan-Gorbachev statement that “a nuclear
war cannot be won and must never be fought.” It follows that both sides recog-
nize their mutual vulnerability as a technical fact and rely on deterrence of nuclear
conflict.

In the context of this reaffirmation of deterrence of (rather than prevailing in)
nuclear conflict, the two sides could maintain and extend the predictability pro-
vided by New START by extending New START for five years, or by making com-
mitments not to exceed for five years (such as through 2025) the levels specified in
New START (1,550 deployed warheads, 700 deployed missiles and bombers, and
800 deployed and nondeployed missiles and bombers). They could further com-
mit not to exceed somewhat reduced levels (such as about 20 percent below New
START levels) from 2026 through 2030. The ten-year time frame for the commit-
ments on offense would match the time frame of commitments in other areas, in-
cluding missile defense. If New START is no longer in force, the new commitments
could incorporate by reference the levels and definitions in the expired treaty.

While predictability advantages could be achieved by commitments not to ex-
ceed current New START levels, there would be advantages to returning to the re-
ductions approach of the past thirty years.

• We can begin to reduce strategic forces without a fundamental reassessment
of strategic posture or policies. The United States could implement reduc-
tions from 1,550 strategic warheads to 1,250 by, for example, reducing the
planned number of new ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) from
four hundred to one hundred.

• Reducing the size of the Russian strategic nuclear force is an important part
of our long-term strategy to manage, reduce, and eventually eliminate the
existential nuclear threat to the United States.

As holders of the majority of the world’s nuclear weapons, the United States
and Russia could lead the process. They could seek commitments from China and
other holders of nuclear weapons not to increase their numbers of nuclear war-
heads as the United States and Russia reduce theirs.

Information exchange, transparency, and visits. The intrusive verification pro-
cedures of New START could not be replicated using political commitments.

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149 (2) Spring 2020James Timbie

Verification of commitments would be carried out by national means, which
could be enhanced by cooperative measures, and by a less intrusive approach es-
tablished by a combination of exchanges of information on numbers and loca-
tions of deployed and nondeployed systems and visits to those locations. Routine
visits could enhance confidence that commitments are being fulfilled and infor-
mation exchanged is accurate. Visits could also help resolve questions that arise.
Nonstrategic nuclear forces. Nonstrategic nuclear forces are important to the
United States as political and symbolic links between U.S. nuclear forces and the
security of our Atlantic and Pacific allies. They are important to Russia to count-
er conventional capabilities of the United States and China. Russia has large num-
bers of nonstrategic nuclear warheads that in time of conflict could be mated with
a wide variety of systems, including tactical aircraft and missiles, submarine-
launched missiles and torpedoes, and air and missile defenses.9 The United States
has a much smaller number of nonstrategic warheads for tactical aircraft, some of
which are deployed in Europe.10

There is concern in the United States that Russia’s nonstrategic weapons are
becoming increasingly important as strategic forces are reduced, and that Russia’s
nonstrategic nuclear posture is designed in part to support the potential use of a
small number of such weapons with the objective of ending a conventional con-
flict on favorable terms. For its part, Russia has long expressed concern about U.S.
nonstrategic weapons deployed in Europe.

U.S. objectives would be to reduce the size of Russian nonstrategic nuclear
forces, relocate them away from the territory of allies, and increase transparency.
A Russian objective would be to remove U.S. nuclear warheads from Europe. Spe-
cific steps that could be considered include:

• Reducing the number of Russian nonstrategic nuclear warheads and consol-

idating them in designated facilities away from Russian borders.

• Eliminating certain classes of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, such as nuclear
air and missile defenses, nuclear missiles and torpedoes on ships other than
strategic ballistic missile submarines, and short-range ground-launched nu-
clear missiles.

• Exchanging information on types and numbers of delivery systems for non-
strategic nuclear warheads, and on numbers of associated warheads. Visit-
ing locations of delivery systems and warhead storage.

• Committing not to mate nonstrategic nuclear warheads with delivery sys-

tems, which might indicate that nuclear conflict was imminent.

• Committing not to exceed a combined limit on nonstrategic and non-

deployed strategic warheads.

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Given the asymmetries inherent in constraining nonstrategic forces, and the
difficulty of verification, such steps would best be implemented as coordinat-
ed unilateral steps. And given the problematic implementation of the Soviet and
Russian unilateral initiatives of 1991–1992, the steps would include the exchange
of information on implementation of these commitments and visits to facilities to
confirm the information.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces. With the demise of the INF Treaty, new
cooperative steps could address land-based missiles with ranges between 500
and 5,500 kilometers. The constraints of the INF Treaty applied to conven-
tionally armed missiles because of the difficulty of distinguishing them from
nuclear-armed variants. This simplified verification, but over time, the con-
straints on long-range conventional systems contributed to the incentives to
terminate the treaty. New steps, which would apply only to systems tested and
deployed for nuclear weapons delivery (not to conventional missiles), could
include:

• A Russian commitment for ten years to limit nuclear INF systems to a small
number (fewer than one hundred) deployed a specified distance from its
borders.

• A U.S. commitment for ten years to limit nuclear INF systems (for which it
has no current plans) to the same number deployed in the continental Unit-
ed States.

• A Chinese commitment for ten years to limit nuclear INF systems (includ-
ing nuclear variants of the DF-21 and DF-26) to the same number deployed
a specified distance from its borders.

• Exchange of information on deployments of nuclear INF systems, and visits

to confirm the information.

New systems. President Putin has announced the Russian development of a va-
riety of new systems designed to ensure penetration or circumvention of missile
defenses.11 The relationship of some of these new systems to New START is ques-
tionable. An objective of new cooperative steps would be to address concerns
about these new systems, including:

• Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missiles. This is not a new concept; past ef-
forts at nuclear-powered missiles and aircraft have raised safety and envi-
ronmental hazards. Russia and the United States could commit for ten years
not to test or deploy nuclear-powered aircraft or cruise missiles.

• Poseidon nuclear-powered long-range nuclear-armed torpedoes. The nuclear tor-
pedo is another way to circumvent missile defenses. In the context of ten-
year restraints on missile defense and on nuclear weapons on ships other

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149 (2) Spring 2020James Timbie

than strategic ballistic missile submarines, Russia could agree to forgo test-
ing and deployment of the Poseidon system for ten years.

• Avangard boost-glide vehicles. Russia has announced plans to deploy boost-
glide vehicles on ICBMs to counter midcourse and terminal defenses. Since
boost-glide vehicles do not follow a ballistic trajectory, their status under
New START is arguably ambiguous. Russia and the United States could com-
mit for ten years to test and deploy boost-glide vehicles for delivery of nucle-
ar weapons only on ICBMs, and to count them and their launchers against
New START warhead and launcher limits.

• RS-28 Sarmat new heavy ICBM. The Sarmat is designed to counter missile de-
fenses in a variety of ways. Russia could commit for ten years to exhibit this
new system, provide information required by New START, and count its
warheads and launchers against New START limits.

• Kinzhal hypersonic air-launched missiles. The Kinzhal is a hypersonic missile
that can be launched from aircraft against land targets or ships, including
land- and sea-based missile defenses. Russia could commit for ten years not
to test or deploy the Kinzhal for delivery of nuclear weapons (consistent
with commitments on other hypersonic systems).

Missile defense. The United States and Russia have limited defenses against stra-
tegic ballistic missiles and more extensive theater missile defenses, none of which
pose a significant threat to the ability of the strategic offensive missile forces of
the other side to carry out a retaliatory strike. Russian concerns about the poten-
tial of U.S. missile defenses, however, have been a major obstacle to reductions in
strategic offensive forces.

The United States has accepted vulnerability to a large and sophisticated nucle-
ar missile attack as a technical fact, but not as a policy choice. As a result, we have
no defenses designed to counter Russian or Chinese ICBMs or SLBMs (submarine-
launched ballistic missiles), a task deemed beyond our technical capability, and
rely on deterrence to prevent nuclear conflict with these strategic competitors. We
have growing defenses designed to counter North Korean ICBMs, a task deemed
technically feasible, and rely on a combination of deterrence and defense to pre-
vent nuclear conflict with North Korea.

If we judge that as a technical matter missile defenses are not likely to be ca-
pable of countering ICBM and SLBM forces of the size and sophistication of those
of Russia and China for the next ten years, we can consider constraints that could
address Russian concerns and that do not inhibit efforts to defend against small-
er and less sophisticated North Korean threats. Such constraints on missile de-
fenses, measured in scope and in time, will be necessary to secure significant con-
straints on strategic offensive forces.

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Missile defense can be addressed in the following ways:

• The United States and Russia could exchange information annually on num-
bers, locations, and characteristics of certain missile defense systems (in
Alaska and California for the United States, near Moscow for Russia), along
with plans for the next ten years (such as through 2030). Plans would be up-
dated annually as they evolve.

• Exchanges of information on numbers, characteristics, and plans could be
extended to other U.S. and Russian missile defense systems as well (such as
THAAD, PAC-3, Aegis, Aegis ashore, and S-300/400/500).

• The United States and Russia could also engage in technical discussions of
ballistic missile defenses and their implications for maintaining a second-
strike capability and undertake cooperative measures such as visits to mis-
sile defense deployments and observation of tests.

• The United States and Russia could commit, for ten years, not to test or de-
ploy space-based missile defense interceptors or comparable directed-ener-
gy systems.12 While neither side has such systems, and they raise technical
and cost challenges, the potential for future space-based interceptors has
been an obstacle to efforts to limit and further reduce strategic offensive sys-
tems. A ten-year commitment not to pursue space-based missile defense in-
terceptors could open the way to a ten-year commitment to restrain and re-
duce strategic offensive arms. China could also commit not to pursue space-
based missile defense interceptors. (Space-based sensors, which have a wide
variety of purposes, including early-warning, would not be constrained.)

Early warning and nuclear command and control. A small number of early-warning
and nuclear command and control spacecraft and associated ground-based facil-
ities provide continuous assurance that a nation is not under attack. Interference
with these systems could easily be interpreted as an indication of imminent at-
tack, with potentially serious consequences. Recognizing the special sensitivity of
these systems, the United States and Russia could establish a bilateral mechanism
to share information on critical space-based early-warning and nuclear command
and control systems, and to develop confidence-building measures such as re-
fraining from approaching these spacecraft closer than a specified distance and
refraining from intruding into or interfering with nuclear command and control
systems. This mechanism could be used for consultations in the event of any indi-
cation of interference with these systems. A similar bilateral mechanism could be
established with China.

Early-warning cooperation. The United States and Russia could take a further step
to display to each other real-time information derived from their early-warning
systems. The two displays would show routine worldwide missile-launch activities

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149 (2) Spring 2020James Timbie

and confirm the absence of launches directed at each other. This concept for early-
warning cooperation would realize with current technology an approach that was
considered but not implemented in the past. Early-warning cooperation could
be expanded to add China, which could provide information based on its early-
warning assets and view information provided by the United States and Russia.

Spacecraft proximity. A concrete step in the space domain would be a U.S.-
Russian agreement that the approach of a spacecraft of one side closer than a spec-
ified distance to a spacecraft of the other side would be cause for concern. This
would limit the potential of surveillance activities to be misinterpreted and lead
to unintended conflict. Such an understanding on proximity could be extended to
China, and eventually to all spacefaring states.

A second step could be U.S.-Russian commitments not to place spacecraft into
the planes of each other’s navigation and timing satellites. Such an agreement
could also be extended to China and to all constellations of navigation and timing
satellites, and could be considered for other constellations as well.

A third step could be U.S.-Russian commitments not to test or deploy systems
in space for attacking targets on Earth. While there are no such systems today,
Russia has expressed concerns about this possibility.

Cyber exercises. There is little prospect for establishment of norms for cyber ac-
tivities whose scale and effects are comparable to armed conflict. The Tallinn Man-
ual process seeks to establish norms by applying existing international law govern-
ing armed conflict (such as proportionality and self-defense) to the cyber domain.
The resulting cyber norms are not widely accepted, in part due to the imperfect
analogy between cyber activities and conventional military activities, and in part
because some countries (including Russia and China) do not accept the concept of
application of existing international law to cyber activities. The other existing ef-
fort to develop cyber norms, the UN Group of Governmental Experts, produced a
set of eleven useful norms for responsible behavior in 2015, but subsequent efforts
to go further have not met with success. Given the poor prospects for agreement
on norms for cyber activities whose scale and effects are comparable to armed con-
flict, one way to proceed would be to pursue bilateral government-to-government
(initially U.S.-Russian and U.S.-Chinese) exercise scenarios designed to illustrate
how cyber and kinetic activities can interact. A series of such exercises could devel-
op an appreciation of uncertainties and risks, increase understanding of practices
that can lead to escalation or that might stabilize a situation, and establish a cadre
of military and civilian officials with practical experience with adversaries on this
subject who could be called upon in times of tension or conflict.

In a crisis, in which conflict is possible and perhaps imminent, all parties will
seek to enhance collection of information to increase situational awareness and
support decisions. Misinterpretation of cyber actions to collect information as
preparations for attack could trigger responses leading to unintended conflict.

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In the cyber domain, the distinction between information collection and attack
preparation can be difficult to make on technical grounds. Precrisis exercises with
potential adversaries could call attention to this problem and reduce the chances
of unintended conflict.

Long-range precision conventional systems. Steps to address long-range precision

conventional systems include:

• Exchange of information on the numbers and characteristics of precision
conventional systems over a specified range capability (such as one thou-
sand kilometers), along with plans for the next ten years (such as through
2030). There could also be technical discussions to assess as a practical mat-
ter the limited threat such systems pose to strategic forces.

• Commitments by the United States, Russia, China, and eventually others not
to test or deploy hypersonic systems for delivery of nuclear warheads. This
would reduce the risk of a nuclear response based on misinterpretation of
a launch of a conventional strike. (New START–accountable systems, such
as ICBMs, could be tested and deployed with nuclear hypersonic systems,
such as Avangard boost-glide vehicles. Other hypersonic systems, including
the Russian Tsirkon and Kinzhal and U.S. and Chinese hypersonic systems
could be tested and deployed only for delivery of conventional munitions.)

Prospects for negotiations. Notwithstanding the renewed strategic competition,
election interference, hostilities in Ukraine, and sanctions, the United States and
Russia would both benefit from an agreement that provided a measure of predict-
ability and stability, rather than the costs and risks of unregulated arms competi-
tion. Since the conclusion of New START, Russia has taken the position that fur-
ther agreements must address third-country forces, missile defense, space, and
precision conventional systems. The United States has called for further reduc-
tions in strategic nuclear forces and constraints on nonstrategic nuclear forces.
The measures outlined here would address all of these. This combination of mea-
sures could be a plausible basis for an initial agreement that would begin to ad-
dress concerns of both sides and reduce the risk of unintended conflict.

Up to now, China has not been open to negotiations on most of these subjects.
The suggestion here is for the United States and Russia, at a certain point in their
negotiations, to approach China in specific areas in which U.S.-Russian agreement
depends on Chinese participation in some way. This would be a new question for
China and could lead to further consideration and a constructive response.

Negotiation and implementation of an agreement along the lines outlined
here would require an intense effort by the governments of the United States and
Russia. National teams can be established in each country to negotiate and im-
plement commitments, provide and receive information, host and conduct visits,

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149 (2) Spring 2020James Timbie

and discuss and resolve implementation questions. The national teams of the
United States and Russia would be able to communicate 24/7, forming a mecha-
nism for exchanging routine information on a day-to-day basis and for rapid com-
munication in the event of problems, incidents, or ambiguous situations. China
and other countries could be connected to this network as well.

ability and reduce the risk of unintended conflict.

T here are also unilateral steps nuclear powers can take to increase predict-

Invest in capabilities to respond to conventional- and cyberattacks (rather than
plan to take preemptive action). There may be substantial advantages to being
first to initiate advanced conventional, cyber, or counterspace actions in a tense
situation. But in current circumstances, with the outcome of armed conflict be-
coming increasingly unpredictable, and our ability to manage escalation ques-
tionable, decision-makers in situations in which conflict seems imminent deserve
options beyond preemption. Planning should include capabilities to respond ef-
fectively in all circumstances.

Refrain from policies linking nuclear responses to non-nuclear (cyber, counterspace, and
conventional) attacks. Planning to initiate nuclear strikes, which would put the exis-
tence of the United States at risk, in response to non-nuclear attacks is not a pru-
dent response to the increasingly complex and dangerous situation. Investment in
resilience, defense, and capabilities for non-nuclear responses is more challeng-
ing and requires more resources, but represents a safer course.

Use caution in drawing upon artificial intelligence to support decision-making. Machine
learning systems make mistakes, including in the transition from training to real-
world situations. Use of automated systems to decide what information to display
to decision-makers should also be approached cautiously. Some use of artificial
intelligence in decision-making is inevitable–to manage the vast amount of in-
formation collected by modern systems and, later, to keep pace with the automat-
ed systems of adversaries–but caution is warranted to avoid mistakes that lead to
unintended conflict.

Increased emphasis on research and education. The cumulative effect of advancing
technology in all domains is that decisions on use of force involve considerable
complexity and uncertainty in uncharted territory. All involved, military and ci-
vilian, would benefit from research and education that facilitates critical assess-
ment in novel situations. All would benefit from research at universities and think
tanks that helps strategy and policy keep up with technology and increases atten-
tion to the choices before us in an increasingly complex and dangerous world.

T he bilateral treaties that for decades provided valuable predictability and

dramatically reduced U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces are no
longer a good fit for the more complex world in which we now live. The

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approach outlined here is designed to accommodate the greater number of sub-
jects, countries, and advancing technologies that must now be considered.

International cooperation has a role to play, along with resilience, deterrence,
and unilateral steps, in reducing the risk of nuclear conflict. The addition of space
and cyber as domains for conflict, along with rapidly advancing technology across
the spectrum of military forces, greatly complicate the task of negotiating and im-
plementing agreements (just as they increase the costs, risks, and uncertainty of
unmanaged competition).

The United States and Russia have outlined additional subjects that they be-
lieve should be addressed in future agreements. The approach suggested here is
to address all of these subjects, for a limited period of time, in a balanced pack-
age, and in a format that accommodates commitments on a wide range of issues.
Negotiation and implementation of an agreement along the lines suggested
here would require an intense effort by all concerned. But even in difficult times
(perhaps especially in difficult times), international cooperation that helps to re-
duce the costs and risks of unregulated competition, and to manage and reduce
the existential threat of nuclear conflict, merits a priority effort.

author’s note

The opinions and characterizations in this essay are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent those of the U.S. government.

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about the author

James Timbie is an Annenberg Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Insti-
tution at Stanford University. He is retired from the U.S. State Department, where
he worked for many years on nuclear negotiations with the Soviet Union, Russia,
and Iran, including SALT, the INF Treaty, START, New START, and the JCPOA. He is
an editor, with George P. Shultz and Jim Hoagland, of Beyond Disruption: Technology’s
Challenge to Governance (2018).

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endnotes

1 This essay avoids use of the term “arms control,” as it has come to be associated with for-
mal treaties, which are no longer a good match to the current task, and the term “stra-
tegic stability,” as it has come to have many different meanings, some of which are far
removed from the original technical concept of avoiding incentives to strike first.

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149 (2) Spring 2020James Timbie

2 For further discussion of the stability implications of new technologies, see Christopher
F. Chyba, “New Technologies & Strategic Stability,” Dædalus 149 (2) (Spring 2020).
3 For further discussion of the unlikely prospects for further bilateral treaties, see Linton F.

Brooks, “The End of Arms Control?” Dædalus 149 (2) (Spring 2020).

4 Defense Science Board, Task Force Report: Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber

Threat (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2013), iii.

5 Republic of Estonia Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications, 2014–2017
Cyber Security Strategy (Tallinn: Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications,
2014).

6 Defense Science Board, Task Force Report, 85.

7 In principle, deterrence can also be derived from entanglement with an adversary, so that
damage to the adversary also results in damage to oneself. This would not seem to play
a substantial role in deterring serious military conflict in current circumstances.

8 For further discussion of restraints other than formal treaties, see Nina Tannenwald,
“Life beyond Arms Control: Moving toward a Global Regime of Nuclear Restraint &
Responsibility,” Dædalus 149 (2) (Spring 2020).

9 Amy F. Woolf, Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research

Service, 2019), 27.

10 Ibid., 21.
11 Jill Hruby, Russia’s New Nuclear Weapon Delivery Systems (Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Threat

Initiative, 2019).

12 For a more comprehensive discussion of a commitment not to pursue space-based mis-
sile defense interceptors, see James N. Miller Jr. and Richard Fontaine, Navigating Dan-
gerous Pathways: A Pragmatic Approach to U.S.-Russian Relations and Strategic Stability (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center and Center for a New American
Security, 2018), 22–24.

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