Richard A. Meserve
The global nuclear safety regime
Heute, there are approximately 440
nuclear power plants (npps) around
the globe contributing roughly 16 pro-
cent of the world’s total supply of elec-
trical energy, and the contribution from
nuclear power is likely to grow in the
years ahead.1 Energy is an essential
underpinning for economic growth,
and as the developing world advances,
its demand for energy is projected to
grow signi½cantly. Gleichzeitig,
the carbon-intensive energy sources
the world now relies on–chiefly coal,
petroleum, and natural gas–pose a
grave threat because the growing con-
centrations of carbon dioxide in the at-
mosphere are bringing about climate
change and ocean acidi½cation. As a
Ergebnis, the world needs to turn to ener-
gy sources that are substantially carbon
frei. Nuclear power, by far the most sig-
ni½cant current source of greenhouse-
gas-free energy, must play an important
part in the world’s response to the in-
creasing concentrations of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere. Zusätzlich,
volatile fossil fuel prices, coupled with
concerns about the security of oil and
gas supplies, enhance interest in energy
sources that do not pose the same costs
© 2009 von der American Academy of Arts
& Wissenschaften
and risks. Nuclear technology is attrac-
tive in this regard, zu, because fuel costs
are only a slight component to the costs
of nuclear energy (most of the costs arise
from the amortization of the plant) Und
because supplies of uranium are abun-
dant and secure.
The current widespread interest in
nuclear technology has been described
as a “nuclear renaissance.” Construc-
tion of new plants is under way or is
contemplated around the globe. Some
Asian countries have steadily pursued
nuclear construction over the past few
decades, and several are signi½cantly
accelerating their efforts. Many Euro-
pean countries that had turned away
from nuclear power in the aftermath
of the Chernobyl accident are recon-
sidering their positions and are either
undertaking or exploring new construc-
tion. Although no generating company
in the United States has placed an order
for a new plant for more than 30 Jahre,
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(nrc) has received 17 applications for
combined construction-and-operat-
ing licenses for 26 plants, and it expects
several more applications in the years
ahead. Perhaps most important, viele
countries that do not currently have
npps have expressed interest in acquir-
ing one. (These countries are the so-
100
Dædalus Fall 2009
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called new entrants.) The Internation-
al Atomic Energy Agency (iaea) has re-
ported that some 60 such countries have
explored nuclear power in recent years,
and that as many as 20 are seriously in-
terested in proceeding with npps.
taining the necessary weapons-usable
Material, expanded enrichment or re-
processing capacity heightens the pro-
liferation risk, a signi½cant concern
that is discussed by other contributors
in this volume.
No doubt, the current worldwide eco-
The public also has particular con-
The global
nuclear
safety
regime
nomic decline will slow major projects
aller Art. Nuclear power is a capital
intensive activity, and therefore ½nanc-
ing a new plant will be a dif½cult un-
dertaking until the economy recovers.
dennoch, the pressures that created
interest in nuclear power persist, Und
we should anticipate that signi½cant new
construction probably will occur around
the world over the next decade or two.
The growth of nuclear power presents
Herausforderungen. Eins, Natürlich, is the con-
cern that the spread of nuclear tech-
nology could enable more countries
to pursue nuclear weapons. Reactors
are not the principal concern in this re-
gard; eher, expansion of nuclear pow-
er might result in new countries under-
taking fuel-cycle activities that present
proliferation threats. The need for an
assured fuel supply could cause more
countries to develop their own urani-
um enrichment capacity. (Most com-
mercial npps require fuel enriched in
the isotope uranium-235 to a level of 4
Zu 5 Prozent; natural uranium has 0.7
percent uranium-235.) Although com-
mercial nuclear fuel is not usable in a
weapon, the technology to enrich ura-
nium to the level needed for fuel could
be applied to produce highly enriched
uranium (über 20 percent uranium-
235)–a weapons-usable material.
Darüber hinaus, the used fuel from npp op-
erations can be chemically reprocessed
to recover plutonium, another weap-
ons-usable material. Because the prin-
cipal barrier to the construction of a
nuclear weapon is the challenge of ob-
cerns about the safety and security
risks that attend nuclear power. Wir
must heed these concerns not only
because the public who might be af-
fected by an accidental release from
a npp must be protected, but also be-
cause the prospects for nuclear power
everywhere would be influenced by
the public clamor following a serious
nuclear event anywhere.
The history of nuclear power rein-
forces the need to pay special attention
to safety. In 1979, operators at the Three
Mile Island Plant in Pennsylvania failed
to respond appropriately to a pressure
relief valve on a reactor that was stuck
in the open position, resulting in the
venting of coolant. There was extensive
melting of fuel, Und, in effect, the reac-
tor was destroyed. But no radioactive
materials in excess of regulatory limits
were emitted into the environment be-
cause the containment structure that
surrounded the reactor prevented un-
controlled releases. The Russian rbmk
reactor at the Chernobyl Power Plant in
the Ukraine did not have a containment
System, with the result that, In 1986, A
runaway reactor not only destroyed the
reactor, but also released extensive ra-
dioactive materials into the environ-
ment, spreading radioactive materials
across Europe. Understandably, diese
events dampened enthusiasm for nu-
clear power in the United States and
Europe in subsequent years.
Events such as these reinforce the ob-
ligation of all those associated with nu-
clear power–operators, regulators, ven-
dors, and contractors–to be ever-vigi-
Dædalus Fall 2009
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Richard A.
Meserve
on the
global
nuclear
future
lant. Glücklicherweise, the recent safety rec-
ord has, in the main, been good. Plant-
based safety indicators (Zum Beispiel,
measures of such things as actuation
of reactor safety equipment, availabil-
ity of safety-related equipment, releas-
es of radiation, worker exposure, Und
unplanned shutdowns) have shown rea-
sonably steady improvement for more
than a decade. These improvements, bei-
tributable to greater attention to opera-
tionen, Wartung, Ausbildung, advances
in diagnostic and assessment technolo-
gy, and system upgrades, are impressive
Und, as a general matter, reassuring.
Recent experience also shows that
strong economic performance corre-
lates with strong safety performance.
In the United States, Zum Beispiel, Die
improvement in safety indicators coin-
cided with a signi½cant improvement
in capacity factors (a measure of the
energy production actually achieved
weighed against the theoretical maxi-
mum from continuous full-power op-
eration). This correlation isn’t acci-
dental: the attention to detail that im-
proves safety also leads to plant avail-
ability and stronger economic perfor-
mance.2
Trotzdem, noteworthy safety
lapses continue to occur at npps around
der Globus, including at reactors in coun-
tries with extensive operational experi-
ence and strong regulatory capabilities.
None of the recent events has resulted
in a substantial off-site release of radio-
Aktivität,3 but these events reinforce the
reality that assuring safety is hard work.
It must be embedded in the management
and cultural practices of both operators
and regulators; it is an obligation that
demands constant attention.
One lesson from years of operations
is that the operator must assume the pri-
mary obligation for assuring safety. Der
operator controls what happens in the
plant and, as a result, can best assure
continuing safe performance. The op-
erator must have the engineering, ½nan-
ziell, and management capability to en-
sure not only that the plant is built and
operated in a safe fashion, but also that
it operates with safety as the highest pri-
ority. Im Gegenzug, a national nuclear safety
regulator undertakes the reinforcement
and policing of the operator, de½ning
the operator’s responsibilities and seek-
ing to ensure that those responsibilities
are being met. The regulator should be
independent, capable, and suf½ciently
staffed and funded to perform its func-
tionen. Every regulator should aspire to
be tough, but fair, to ful½ll its obliga-
tions and to meet public expectations.
Although operators and national regu-
lators play the essential roles, there is an
important backstop to the licensee and
regulator: the global nuclear safety re-
gime. The regime is a collective interna-
tional enterprise that sets a level of per-
formance expected of all operators and
regulators, monitors that performance,
and builds competence and capability
among both operators and national reg-
ulators. This global nuclear safety re-
gime will be increasingly important as
the nuclear renaissance takes full flower.
Ad hoc in nature, the regime has
grown and developed over many years.
It is made up of several components:
• Intergovernmental organizations such
as the iaea and the Nuclear Energy
Agentur (nea) of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (oecd). The iaea is a un orga-
nization with responsibilities for non-
Proliferation, the safety and security
of nuclear facilities, and the peaceful
application of nuclear technology. In
the safety and security arena, it pro-
vides standards and, at the request of
102
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a member country, inspections and
advice on nuclear activities. The nea
is involved in international coopera-
tive safety research and in the study of
safety and regulatory issues. The iaea
and nea jointly operate an internation-
al system for the exchange of operating
Erfahrung.
• Multinational networks among regula-
tors, including the International Nu-
clear Regulators Association and the
Western European Nuclear Regula-
tors Association. These networks en-
courage regulators to exchange views
and information and coordinate activ-
ities.
• Multinational networks among opera-
tors, the most important of which is
the World Association of Nuclear Op-
erators (wano). Among other activi-
Krawatten, wano provides peer reviews of
plant operations and serves as a clear-
inghouse for the exchange of operat-
ing information between operators.
wano assessments and advice are
held con½dential. The World Institute
for Nuclear Security (wins) was re-
cently created to serve a similar func-
tion on security-related matters at nu-
clear facilities.
• Stakeholders in the international nu-
clear industry. The vendors that de-
sign and sell npps are international
businesses that market their products
throughout the world. Ähnlich, Die
architect-engineering ½rms and the
suppliers of equipment and services
are worldwide enterprises. These en-
terprises provide a means for trans-
ferring knowledge from country to
country.
• Multinational networks among scien-
tists and engineers. Scienti½c and engi-
neering societies encourage communi-
cation among experts in many nations.
• Standard development organizations–
Zum Beispiel, the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers (asme), ieee
(formerly known as the Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers),
and the American Nuclear Society
(ans)–and their interfaces with the
International Organization for Stan-
dardization (iso). Parts and compo-
nents may originate in many different
Länder, and thus compliance with
detailed standards is an important
means of assuring appropriate quality.
• Nongovernmental organizations
and the international press. Nuklear
activities attract attention and inter-
est around the globe, including from
ngos and the press. This attention
provides an important stimulus for
ändern.
A framework of international con-
Erfindungen, international safety standards,
codes of conduct, joint projects, und in-
ternational conferences and workshops
holds the system together. These ele-
ments together provide the context in
which every national nuclear program
operates. (Siehe Abbildung 1.)
Several overlapping factors serve to
make the examination and revitaliza-
tion of the global nuclear safety regime
a pressing obligation. Erste, every na-
tion’s reliance on nuclear power is to
some extent hostage to safety perfor-
mance elsewhere in the world; a nucle-
ar accident anywhere will have signi½-
cant consequences everywhere, if only
through an indirect impact on public
opinion. Thus each country currently
using or contemplating nuclear power
has an interest in ensuring that there is
attention to nuclear safety everywhere.
The overall global improvement in safe-
ty performance does not tell the whole,
or even the most crucial element of the
The global
nuclear
safety
regime
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Dædalus Fall 2009
103
Figur 1
Global Nuclear Safety Regime
Richard A.
Meserve
on the
global
nuclear
future
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Quelle: iaea, Strengthening the Global Nuclear Safety Regime (insag 21), 2006. Reprinted with permission
from the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Geschichte. The web of nuclear safety is
no stronger than its weakest link: alle
are vulnerable to the capabilities of the
weakest performers. It is in the interest
of all to identify and help those most in
need of strengthening their safety per-
Form.
The need for such international assis-
tance is growing. Wie oben beschrieben, Dort
is the prospect of substantial numbers
of new entrants and of increasing num-
bers of npps around the globe. Viele
of the new entrants, by de½nition, have
limited experience with nuclear energy,
and nearly all lack the extensive nation-
al infrastructure common in most coun-
tries currently with npps. Constructing
and operating these new npps in a safe
fashion demands a strengthened inter-
national backstop.
Darüber hinaus, many currently operating
plants were built years ago and are near-
ing the end of their originally anticipat-
ed lifetime of 40 years or so. The plants
have had the bene½t of detailed surveil-
lance, Wartung, and replacement of
104
Dædalus Fall 2009
components over those years, Und
many of them are running reliably and
economically. Infolge, operators in
several countries are seeking to extend
operations to 60 years and some are
raising the prospect of operation for as
long as 80 Jahre. But aging plants pre-
sent unique safety challenges because
plants and equipment can deteriorate
over time through mechanisms that
may not yet be fully understood (für
Beispiel, stress corrosion cracking);
because spare parts may be dif½cult
to ½nd; and because older plants may
not have all of the safety features of
more modern designs. The continuing
operation of older plants thus requires
careful attention to aging mechanisms,
with heightened attention over time to
Überwachung, preventive maintenance,
and component replacement. Hier
wieder, the international system should
help ensure that the safety margins of
aging plants are maintained.
Zweite, the construction and servic-
ing of npps has become a global enter-
prise, with vendors and contractors en-
gaged around the world. Folglich,
ef½ciencies and safety advantages have
arisen from avoiding needless country-
speci½c differences that require custom
design modi½cations or that present
unique operational challenges. Nuklear
power must compete in the economic
marketplace with other sources of ener-
gy, and the legal regime should further,
rather than retard, economic ef½ciency,
while simultaneously ensuring adequate
safety. The global safety regime should
reflect and respond to the changing
structure of the industry by encourag-
ing greater international harmonization.
Endlich, there is also the simple reality
that we have much to learn from each
andere. One of the most important ways
to anticipate and prevent possible prob-
lems is to analyze and learn from the rel-
evant experience of others, and to put
in place anticipatory or corrective mea-
sures to forestall an accident. We now
have about 13,000 reactor-years of expe-
rience around the world, and we bene½t
from putting systems in place to share
the knowledge arising from that experi-
enz. Darüber hinaus, bene½ts are obtained
by coordinating research activities and
sharing research results, thereby reduc-
ing the cost of research to each partici-
pant and helping to ensure that all ben-
e½t from the growth in knowledge. Der
global safety regime should encourage
the sharing of knowledge and nurture
its expansion.
Any one of these reasons is suf½cient
by itself to justify the careful scrutiny of
the global safety regime. Taken together,
they offer a compelling argument for re-
view. But what should change?
Wie oben beschrieben, the existing legal
regime is founded on the fundamental
obligation of operators to ensure safety,
subject to rigorous oversight by a nation-
al regulatory entity exercising sovereign
authority to protect the public health
and safety. The national programs are
augmented by an overlay of assistance
provided by and through a variety of in-
ternational organizations, chief among
them the iaea, the nea, and wano.
But the decisions of each nation-state
largely determine the extent and scope
of international engagement.
One might imagine a different regime
in which an international regulator
with sweeping transnational authority
ensures the adequacy of licensees’ safety
Leistung. Such an approach might
be seen as a way both to ensure that all
nuclear activities, regardless of location,
conform to safety standards as well as
to facilitate the harnessing of safety ca-
pabilities around the globe in an ef½cient
and effective manner. It is very unlikely,
The global
nuclear
safety
regime
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Dædalus Fall 2009
105
Richard A.
Meserve
on the
global
nuclear
future
Jedoch, that such a regime will soon
be established, at least not in an extreme
bilden, in which an international regu-
lator displaces national regulators. Cer-
tainly, the population in the vicinity
of a nuclear facility needs to be assured
that its safety is guaranteed by a politi-
cally responsive body, rather than a dis-
tant and unaccountable international
regulator. And the strategic importance
of energy supply makes it doubtful that
any nation would willingly surrender
its authority over the continued oper-
ation of critical energy infrastructure,
such as a npp. Darüber hinaus, the safety
system must operate within each na-
tion’s legal, wirtschaftlich, and social cul-
tur; adaptations of regulatory sys-
tems to ½t local conditions are prob-
ably necessary in any event.
Entsprechend, a global safety regime
premised on a single and strong inter-
national regulator is implausible, pro-
haps even undesirable. This is not to
deny, Jedoch, that we should encour-
age regional networks among regula-
tors to share resources and capabilities,
or that in the long term we should seek
to establish the capacity of the iaea
to inspect and police the performance
of the national safety systems, to ensure
that at least minimum safety standards
are achieved. The iaea would then
have strengthened capacity to ensure
that the national systems were func-
tioning appropriately.
At the moment, the iaea does not
have the power to undertake indepen-
dent safety inspections absent the invi-
tation of the member state, or the au-
thority even to recommend sanctions
for poor performance. Given safety’s
importance, the objective over time
should be to enhance the iaea’s pow-
er to assure safety by giving the iaea
powers in the safety arena that are
analogous to its powers on safeguards
matters under the Additional Protocol–
das ist, the power to inspect nuclear fa-
cilities at a time of its choosing and to
establish and seek compliance with stan-
dards. Because the national regulator
will continue to have ongoing regulato-
ry responsibilities, the focus of iaea’s
increased role would be to monitor and
assess the adequacy of the national reg-
ulator’s efforts. An amendment of the
Convention on Nuclear Safety (cns)
(discussed below) would provide the
logical vehicle for the institution of
these powers.
Establishing such strengthened in-
spection and enforcement authority
would likely take many years of dif½-
cult negotiation and an arduous and
time-consuming process to bring an
amendment of the cns into force.
The dif½culty of establishing the wide-
spread implementation of the Addition-
al Protocol in the safeguards arena illus-
trates the challenge that should be ex-
pected. In der Zwischenzeit, Jedoch, Die
existing system can and should be rein-
forced and expanded in various ways.
We must proceed now to augment na-
tional systems with a stronger overlay
of international cooperation and en-
gagement.
Erste, the safety services offered by
the iaea need to be enhanced. Diese
services, which include voluntary in-
spections of nuclear facilities and of
regulatory systems, currently receive
only about 8 percent of the iaea’s reg-
ular budget. Given the need to assist
the new entrants in establishing and
maintaining appropriate national safe-
ty systems, the iaea effort should grow
signi½cantly. There is an immediate
need to provide training facilities for
the staff of the operating companies
and the regulatory organizations that
will carry the primary responsibility
for assuring safety at these new facili-
106
Dædalus Fall 2009
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Krawatten. The iaea (unter anderen) has a very
important role to play in making certain
that the new entrants have the capacity
and knowledge to ful½ll their responsi-
Fähigkeiten.
Zweite, international security-related
services need to be strengthened and co-
ordinated with safety. Safety is focused
on accidental events whereas, in the case
of npps, security is aimed principally at
preventing acts of sabotage that could
result in releases of radioactive materi-
als.4 (Security at fuel-cycle facilities also
focuses on the prevention of the theft
of nuclear materials.) The security of
npps has appropriately received great-
ly increased attention in the aftermath
of the 9/11 attacks.
The security challenge will grow with
the advent of more npps and more fuel-
cycle facilities in more places. But the
international network of security-relat-
ed services, still in development, hat
not achieved the maturity that surrounds
safety. Because of the need to keep secu-
rity-related information con½dential,
there are challenges in designing and
implementing international programs.
This should be given high priority.
Safety and security are linked to
each other. Common principles apply
to both safety and security, such as a
philosophy of defense in depth. Der
two objectives can reinforce each other:
the massive structures of reinforced con-
crete and steel, Zum Beispiel, serve both
safety and security objectives. But occa-
sionally, plant features and operational
practices that result from safety consid-
erations conflict with those that serve
security purposes. Access controls that
are imposed for security reasons can in-
hibit safety, limiting access for emergen-
cy response or maintenance or for egress
in the event of a ½re or explosion. Sim-
ilarly, if there were an attack, safety
considerations may require access to
an area at exactly the time that the secu-
rity forces might seek to deny access. In
short, the synergy and the antagonism
between safety and security require care-
ful evaluation.
The global
nuclear
safety
regime
This reality has national and inter-
national implications. At the national
Ebene, although the evaluation of secu-
rity threats might appropriately be
the responsibility of an intelligence or
police organization, authority to deter-
mine the actions necessary to ensure
both safety and security should be vest-
ed in a single body, so that safety and
security are weighed at the same time
and an appropriate balance is found.
At the international level, the guidance
and assistance that are now common-
place in the safety arena should be ex-
panded to cover security, in a way that
integrates security and safety advice.
Both the iaea and wins should play
a role in assuring that appropriate inte-
gration occurs.
Dritte, a universal, effective, and open
network for sharing operating experi-
ence should be established to promote
communication about near misses, von-
sign de½ciencies, and even low-level op-
erational events. Analysis of such occur-
rences can indicate ways of avoiding a
serious accident. Currently, regulators
and operators report safety-related in-
formation through existing global sys-
Systeme. The iaea and nea jointly oper-
ate an Incident Reporting System (irs)
that is available to the world’s regula-
tors; operators have access to operat-
ing information, on a private and con-
½dential basis, from wano. But not all
relevant events and observations are
reported, particularly to irs. Darüber hinaus,
there are inadequate mechanisms to sort
and analyze the information, to distill
and prioritize the lessons that should be
gelernt, and to propagate those lessons
widely in a user-friendly fashion. Dort
Dædalus Fall 2009
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Richard A.
Meserve
on the
global
nuclear
future
is a need to ½nd the means to preserve
and facilitate access to the accumulat-
ed knowledge from operational experi-
ence in order to further the common
interest in avoiding events that could
lead to accidents. Access to such infor-
mation is particularly important for
the new entrant countries, so that they
do not have to repeat the hard-learned
lessons of their predecessors in the nu-
clear enterprise.
Vierte, to enhance the assurance
of safety, national safety regulations
should be harmonized, so that mini-
mum requirements are met everywhere
and greater compatibility is facilitated.
The iaea has developed three layers
of documents–Safety Fundamentals,
Safety Requirements, and Safety Guides
–that provide a widely accepted foun-
dation for nuclear safety and now serve
as key references for national require-
gen. Safety Fundamentals establish
the foundation that must be met with-
out exceptions. Safety Requirements set
mandates for new facilities and new ac-
tivities, while setting a compliance tar-
get for existing facilities and activities
to be met over time, if it is reasonable
to do so. Safety Guides provide practical
guidance on the state of the art in nucle-
ar safety, but acknowledge that different
means of providing equivalent safety are
acceptable. While rigid application of
iaea safety standards may not be pos-
sible, particularly for existing facilities,
iaea standards do provide a common
approach to which nations should be
encouraged to conform, to the extent
practical. The iaea should pursue full
awareness of and competence in the
application of these standards.
Gleichzeitig, iaea safety stan-
dards should be encouraged to evolve
in two different directions. Auf der einen Seite
Hand, we should seek a global consen-
sus on fundamental principles–how
safe is safe enough–to guide the artic-
ulation of general safety goals, the ex-
pectations for new plants, and the re-
quirements for safety improvements in
older plants. This effort would seek to
establish enduring fundamental goals,
thereby serving the overall objectives
of transparency, adequacy, Stabilität,
and harmonization. Compatibility can
never be achieved unless there is com-
mon agreement on the fundamental
Ziele.
Andererseits, the standards
should be made suf½ciently concrete,
providing unambiguous guidance on the
accepted and best practices in the multi-
tude of areas in need of regulatory guid-
ance. Wieder, compatibility can only be
expected if the practical implications
of the requirements are spelled out.
Jedoch, safety standards must evolve
to accommodate innovative new reac-
tor designs. The existing standards, un-
derstandably, were written with current
light water reactors in mind, and many
of the requirements may not be appro-
priate, at least in their current form, für
some of the new reactor designs being
contemplated. (Zum Beispiel, the Safety
Requirements document on design ex-
plicitly states in its introduction that
it applies primarily to water-cooled re-
actors; similar statements are found in
several of the supporting safety guides.)
While the key elements of requirements
can certainly be applied by analogy in
some cases to different types of reactors,
it would be bene½cial to de½ne a deeper
set of principles so that the regulatory
system can more readily accommodate,
even encourage, designs that offer im-
proved safety and other advantages.
Fünfte, certain essential characteristics
that extend beyond standards, but that
are the foundation for success in achiev-
ing safety, must be encouraged. Prime
among these is encouragement of an ap-
108
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propriate “safety culture”: the cluster of
organizational and individual elements
that are fundamental to the achievement
of safety. Organizational elements in-
clude the recognition by management
that safety is the highest priority, als
well as a commitment by management
to organizational effectiveness, success-
ful communications, a capacity to learn
and adapt, and a workplace culture that
encourages the identi½cation of safety
issues. Individual elements include per-
sonal accountability, a questioning atti-
tude, and procedural adherence. Diese
elements are dif½cult to de½ne crisply
Und, somit, to regulate effectively. Aber
they are foundational to safe opera-
tionen, and the global nuclear safety re-
gime should encourage their propaga-
tion everywhere. Ähnlich, the safety
regime should encourage transparency,
Stabilität, practicality, and competence.
Greater efforts must be undertaken to
build these characteristics into regula-
tory and operator organizations around
die Welt.
Sixth, while pursuing the amendment
of the cns along the lines described
über, its current processes could be aug-
mented without a formal amendment.
The cns calls for a meeting of parties at
three-year intervals in which each state
provides a report on its compliance with
the various commitments set out in the
Convention. Each national report is sub-
ject to peer review by the other parties,
often resulting in recommendations for
further improvement. The Convention
offers no enforcement mechanism be-
yond the obligation to endure possible
criticism from others in the review
meeting.
Although the cns has furthered
its original purpose of promoting up-
grades in national safety systems, Die
process still needs to be strengthened
and re½ned. The review process could
be more probing, perhaps by focusing
on the most important safety issues,
rather than by emphasizing a wide
(and necessarily super½cial) survey
that is today’s norm. The iaea now re-
ports to the meeting of the parties on
conclusions drawn from its safety re-
view missions and services, aber die
iaea could contribute more centrally.
The iaea’s report might, Zum Beispiel,
provide more detail and be given more
focused attention by the parties, pro-
haps by requiring affected nations to
respond to the iaea’s observations.
Perhaps most fundamentally, the per-
spective of the parties should change:
rather than seeking to prove its own
excellence in the review process, jede
country should instead welcome pro-
ductive criticism and thereby collect
useful ideas and lessons for safety en-
hancements. The questioning and open
attitude that regulators expect of their
licensees might also become the expect-
ed behavior of the parties in the review
meetings.
Seventh, multinational design evalu-
ation programs should be encouraged.
As noted previously, the nuclear indus-
try has become more concentrated,
with the result that a small group of ven-
dors seeks to construct npps around the
globe. A group of countries is coordinat-
ing the evaluation of the designs, mit
the nea serving as the secretariat for
the group. Each national regulator re-
tains its autonomous licensing author-
ität, but can obtain guidance and infor-
mation from the international evalua-
tion process. This effort should be en-
couraged and expanded, with the aim
to facilitate the construction of a given
design in more than one country with
only necessary modi½cations to accom-
modate local circumstances.5 The mul-
tinational process facilitates the coordi-
nation of safety assessments, vielleicht
The global
nuclear
safety
regime
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Dædalus Fall 2009
109
Richard A.
Meserve
on the
global
nuclear
future
enabling more complete and thorough
assessments than any one country could
accomplish. It would also promote inter-
national trade, by bringing cost savings
to the parties involved in licensing the
plants and in constructing them. And
it would further the general goal of ad-
vancing greater international consisten-
cy, thereby avoiding questions that may
reasonably arise if signi½cant differences
in design were to be required from coun-
try to country.
Natürlich, because each country will
retain its licensing authority, the ½nal
licensing actions must be taken at a na-
tional level. The coordination of design
evaluation thus should not be seen to
challenge the sovereign authority of na-
tional regulators. Clearly, site- or coun-
try-speci½c issues must be taken into
account separately in connection with
each construction application–issues
such as site-related risk factors (zum Beispiel-
reichlich, earthquake risk), reliability of
off-site power, and the licensee’s capa-
bility to build, operate, and maintain
the plant. In der Tat, the national regula-
tor must be fully engaged in the details
of design, construction, and operation
if it is to be effective in the oversight of
the plant. dennoch, a coordinated
international design evaluation would
streamline and strengthen the process,
augmenting the capacities that any par-
ticular regulator could bring to bear.
Gleichzeitig, because the nuclear
industry is part of a world economy in
which production capabilities are glob-
ally interconnected, parts and compo-
nents for nuclear plants may come from
many areas of the world. The quality-
assurance standards for nuclear plants
are high, but no one regulator, vendor,
or operator can readily have scrutiny
over the quality of all these parts and
components. Infolge, there is a need
for careful coordination among regula-
tors around the globe to develop global
standards and to ensure that those stan-
dards are being met.
Endlich, increased efforts should be
undertaken to advance international
cooperation on research and develop-
ment related to the safety performance
of npps. Many existing plants were
licensed in the years before there was
extensive experience with nuclear pow-
er. Licensing decisions were guided by
conservative engineering judgment and
the application of fundamental design
principles (such as defense in depth)
to assure a robust capacity to mitigate
or prevent accidents. But much has
been learned over the years, und das
resulting insights should be applied
more effectively than is currently the
case in many countries. Zum Beispiel,
the insights from both probabilistic
and deterministic analyses should be
brought together and applied so as to
assure focused attention on safety in all
important areas. An international con-
sensus on the application of these tools
should be developed, to facilitate com-
mon understandings and standardized
approaches. Darüber hinaus, coordinated re-
search programs to increase knowledge
bearing on advanced designs will ensure
that necessary information is in place
in time to facilitate decision-making.
There are opportunities for other
international research activities that
will bene½t all. Zum Beispiel, aging phe-
nomena that will affect performance of
npps are not well understood at a fun-
damental level and, absent research, Es
is not clear that these issues will be dealt
with properly. Further advances in non-
destructive monitoring techniques will
enhance the capacity to assess aging fa-
cilities. And although digital instrumen-
tation and control offers great opportu-
nities for safety improvements, there is
a need for research to understand more
110
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nities for its signi½cant improvement.
These opportunities should be pursued
in order to ensure that nuclear technol-
ogy can be appropriately harnessed for
the bene½t of all humankind.
The global
nuclear
safety
regime
deeply the safety implications of the
increased reliance on digital systems.
Many other such research opportuni-
ties present themselves.
The global nuclear safety regime pro-
vides an important and largely unrec-
ognized means for helping to assure
the safety of existing and future npps.
It will have growing importance in the
coming years, and there are opportu-
ENDNOTES
1 Many of the matters explored in this paper are discussed in an International Atomic
Energy Agency (iaea) document prepared by the International Nuclear Safety Group
(insag); iaea, Strengthening the Global Nuclear Safety Regime (insag 21), 2006.
2 See Statement by iaea Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, Nuclear Safety: A Matur-
ing Discipline (Oktober 14, 2003), http://www.iaea.or.at/PrinterFriendly/NewsCenter/
Statements/2003/ebsp2003n022.html.
3 The most serious recent event in the United States can be characterized as a near miss.
In 2002, it was discovered that corrosion arising from a boric acid leak at the Davis-Besse
Plant in Ohio had completely penetrated 6 inches of steel in the head of the reactor pres-
sure vessel, leaving a pineapple-sized hole. The pressure boundary was preserved only by
the stainless-steel cladding on the inner surface of the head–cladding that was not intend-
ed to provide pressure integrity. There had been clear clues of a signi½cant problem–for
Beispiel, containment ½lters clogged with corrosion products–that were ignored by the
licensee and by the nrc inspectors, presumably in part because of falsi½ed inspection re-
ports by licensee staff.
4 Some reactors are fueled with mixed oxide (mox) Kraftstoff, which includes both plutonium
and uranium ½ssile materials. Fresh mox fuel also needs to be protected from theft or
diversion at power reactors.
5 Bedauerlicherweise, substantial modi½cations from country to country may be necessary in
some circumstances. Consider, Zum Beispiel, the consequences of the differing national
standards for electricity between the United States (60 Hz, 120 V) and Europe (50 Hz,
220 V). Frequency differences in particular can drive substantial design changes because
they affect the sizes of motors and the buildings in which they are installed, which in
turn affect seismic analyses and cooling requirements. Substantial design changes result
directly from different national standards for electricity.
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