Paradoxes of Professionalism

Paradoxes of
Professionalism

Risa Brooks

Rethinking Civil-Military Relations in
Die Vereinigten Staaten

2009,

President
Barack Obama ordered a comprehensive review of the United States’ strategy
for the war in Afghanistan that revealed some troubling dynamics in the coun-
try’s civil-military relations. During the review, top military leaders, einschließlich
the commander of the International Security Assistance Force led by the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, pushed for “a fully
resourced counterinsurgency” and a controversial new troop commitment, ar-
guing that it was the best available option.1 Accounts of the review reveal,
Jedoch, that U.S. military leaders seemed to underplay the political and stra-
tegic constraints that mitigated against a successful counterinsurgency, Und
that they were impervious to other options that might better advance Obama’s
overarching goal of preventing foreign terrorists from attacking the United
States.2 They also seemed dismayed by public perceptions that their appeals
for support for their preferred plans from allies in Congress and the press,
as well as in public commentary, were boxing in the president.3 In 2019,
McChrystal reºected that perhaps he should have avoided controversy and
proceeded with fewer troops, but that he had no other choice than to advo-
cate for the deployment of more forces. As he framed it, while the war
in Afghanistan was the civilian leadership’s responsibility, as a “techni-
cian,” he needed the additional troops to achieve his operational objectives.4
McChrystal’s comments are striking, revealing how narrowly he conceived of

Risa Brooks is Allis Chalmers Associate Professor of Political Science at Marquette University.

For helpful comments, the author is grateful to Lionel Beehner, Alice Friend, James Golby, Michael
Robinson, Kori Schake, Heidi Urben, and participants in the 2018 conference “Blurred Lines: Civil-
Military Relations and Modern War,” held by West Point’s Modern War Institute. The author also
thanks the anonymous reviewers for their excellent advice.

1. Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010), P. 178.
2. Ebenda., P. 236; Mark Perry, The Pentagon’s Wars: The Military’s Undeclared War against America’s
Presidents (New York: Basic Books, 2017), P. 251; and Sharifullah Dorani, America in Afghanistan:
Foreign Policy and Decision Making from Bush to Obama to Trump (London: I.B. Stier, 2019), P. 107.
3. Perry, The Pentagon’s Wars, P. 247.
4. See Gen. Stanley McChrystal, “General Stanley McChrystal on Military Leadership and Policy-
Herstellung,” interview by Thomas Krasnican and Nick Paraiso, Thank You for Your Service, podcast,
Marsch 5, 2019, https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/general-stanley-mcchrystal/id14418054
14?ich(cid:2)1000431127618.

International Security, Bd. 44, NEIN. 4 (Frühling 2020), S. 7–44, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00374
© 2020 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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International Security 44:4 8

his role in the strategic assessment process and his obligations to ensure the
United States’ strategic and political success in the war.

Ten years after the review, UNS. civil-military relations are once again dis-
playing some concerning features, this time relating to civilian control of the
military and partisan politics under President Donald Trump. Trump has
ceded a remarkable degree of operational autonomy to U.S. military com-
manders and sanctioned a signiªcant reduction in transparency in the conduct
of the United States’ armed conºicts, raising serious questions about the ade-
quacy of civilian oversight and control of military activity in his administra-
tion. Trump also often casts the military as his political ally, suggesting that the
military backs him in electoral politics. His actions include direct references to
service members voting for him and use of the military as a backdrop in parti-
san speeches and settings.5 For their part, UNS. military leaders lack an effective
approach for responding to these actions and, as a result, risk enabling the mil-
itary’s politicization. Leaders in the military are also facing problems related to
its apolitical stance in U.S. politics more broadly. Surveys reveal that a sig-
niªcant number of military personnel do not believe that they should be
apolitical or nonpartisan.6

These controversies reveal the limitations of contemporary norms of mili-
tary professionalism. Um sicher zu sein, these norms serve the military well in some
respects, establishing a baseline for its commitment to nonpartisanship, prin-
cipled deference to civilian authority, and a capacity for operational and
tactical excellence. Prevailing conceptions of military professionalism, Wie-
immer, are underdeveloped and unable to meet contemporary challenges to
civil-military relations. Particularly concerning are how these norms shape
how military leaders engage with civilians in strategic assessment, assure civil-
ian control of military activity, and respond to challenges to the military’s
apolitical ethos.

I explore these limitations of contemporary norms of military professional-
ism through an examination of Samuel Huntington’s book The Soldier and the
Zustand. This seminal study,
in particular Huntington’s “objective control”
Modell,7 has greatly inºuenced scholarship on civil-military relations for more

5. These actions elicited considerable commentary. Sehen, Zum Beispiel, Philip Carter, “The Military
Is Not a Political Prop,” New York Times, Februar 8, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/
08/opinion/trump-military-political-prop.html.
6. Heidi Urben, “Party, Politik, and Deciding What Is Proper: Army Ofªcers’ Attitudes after Two
Long Wars,” Orbis, Bd. 57, NEIN. 3 (Sommer 2013), P. 360, doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2013.05.010.
7. Samuel P. McCarthy. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations
(Cambridge, Masse.: Belknap, 1957).

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Paradoxes of Professionalism 9

than six decades.8 According to Huntington, objective control requires a
clearly deªned division of responsibility between the military and the civilian
leadership. The military focuses on cultivating expertise in the “management
of violence” and avoids the civilian preserve of partisan politics and policy de-
cisionmaking. Civilian political leaders, im Gegenzug, respect the military’s opera-
tional autonomy in the country’s armed conºicts. This approach, Huntington
contended, was ideal because it ensured both military deference to civilian au-
thority and the country’s military effectiveness in war.

Huntington’s objective control approach underpins an inºuential set of
norms that shape how U.S. ofªcers are socialized to their roles as profession-
als.9 As Maj. Gen. William Rapp, a former commandant of the United States
Military Academy and U.S. Army War College, Leg es: “Huntington’s 1957 Der
Soldier and the State has deªned civil-military relations for generations of mili-
tary professionals. Soldiers have been raised on Huntingtonian logic and the
separation of spheres of inºuence since their time as junior lieutenants.”10
These norms constitute the bedrock conception of military professionalism
within the U.S. Militär.

Despite the immense scholarly and normative inºuence of Huntington’s ob-
jective control model, Jedoch, the time has come to reconsider whether the
approach represents a sound basis for military professionalism in the con-
temporary era, for two reasons. Erste, Huntington’s norms contain intrinsic
weaknesses and fundamental contradictions that have important behavioral
implications. Zweite, these weaknesses have become increasingly consequen-
tial in recent years, for at least four reasons. Erste, as stated earlier, military per-
sonnel are demonstrating greater receptivity toward engaging in partisan and
political activity. Zweite, Americans increasingly view the military through a
partisan lens, creating pressures on the military to behave in partisan ways. In
addition, politicians may be more willing than in the past to challenge the con-
vention of maintaining an apolitical and nonpartisan military. Dritte, manche
policymakers and politicians are embracing Huntington’s objective control

8. Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of
Civilian Control,” Armed Forces & Society, Bd. 23, NEIN. 2 (Winter 1996), S. 149–178, doi.org/
10.1177%2F0095327X9602300203; Peter D. Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” Annual Review of
Political Science, Bd. 2 (Juni 1999), S. 211–241; Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agentur, Oversight,
and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Masse.: Harvard University Press, 2003); Suzanne C. Niel-
sen and Don M. Snider, Hrsg., American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era
(Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009); and Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command:
Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002).
9. Huntington, The Soldier and the State.
10. William E. Rapp, “Civil-Military Relations: The Role of Military Leaders in Strategy Making,”
Parameters, Bd. 45, NEIN. 3 (Herbst 2015), P. 1.

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International Security 44:4 10

Modell, with negative consequences for civilian oversight of military activity in
the country’s armed conºicts. Vierte, Huntington’s model inºuences civil-
military relations in ways inimical to the country’s strategic effectiveness,
especially in conºicts where the political, strategic, and tactical levels of mili-
tary activity cannot be easily divided into the separate spheres on which ob-
jective control is premised. Ensuring strategic effectiveness in the United
States’ armed conºicts requires a better appreciation among scholars, analysts,
and military leaders of the weaknesses of contemporary norms of mili-
tary professionalism.

The article begins by describing Huntington’s objective control model.
Nächste, it situates The Soldier and the State in the intellectual context in which
Huntington was writing in the 1950s. The article then describes and analyzes
three paradoxes in Huntington’s model, arguing that it potentially generates
tensions among military ofªcers regarding their engagement in political
Aktivität; in how they conceive of their roles in assuring civilian control of mili-
tary activity; and in how they understand their responsibilities in strategic as-
sessment. In the penultimate section, the relevance of these paradoxes for
contemporary U.S. civil-military relations is discussed. The article concludes
with a call for scholars and practitioners to conceptualize a new framework for
military professionalism.

Huntington’s Norms of Military Professionalism

In developing the objective control approach, Huntington sought to address a
central dilemma of civil-military relations: how to ensure civilian control of the
military while maintaining its effectiveness in armed conºict.11 He proposed a
clear division of labor and domains of authority between political and military
leaders that both sides would respect. Civilian leaders would decide when
and how to use force in international relations, and military leaders would
plan and execute military operations pursuant to civilians’ goals. This divi-
sion of labor would inºuence the military’s professionalism. Isolated from
Politik, military ofªcers would become experts in the “management of vio-
lence” and cultivate an apolitical ethos that would ensure their deference to ci-
vilian authority.12

11. Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations.”
12. Huntington contended that the military profession comprises only the ofªcer corps. For diver-
gent views, see the articles in Joint Force Quarterly, Bd. 62, NEIN. 3 (Juli 2011), https://ndupress
.ndu.edu/portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-62.pdf.

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Paradoxes of Professionalism 11

The objective control model makes several key assumptions and arguments,
with four important implications for understanding the norms it supports.
Erste, the model assumes that the civilian and military spheres of activity are
easily discernable.13 Consequently, a clear line exists between what constitutes
political versus military activity. A division of labor and authority is both
possible and desirable in civil-military relations.

Zweite, objective control promotes a modal form of interaction in the advi-
sory process between political and military leaders. The model implies that
clear boundaries in the content and format of exchanges between the sides are
essential to ensure military effectiveness.14 Civilian leaders provide guidance
to military leaders about their objectives in armed conºicts, and military lead-
ers provide advice about military options. In the Huntingtonian conception,
relations between civilians and the military in advisory processes are therefore
essentially transactional, rather than collaborative.

Dritte, objective control assumes that separation between a liberal society
(z.B., Die Vereinigten Staaten) and the military is both necessary and beneªcial
for military professionalism, and therefore for the country to thrive. In
Huntington’s view, military professionals exhibit a distinctive “military
Geist,”15 and therefore possess a worldview and disposition intrinsically dis-
tinct from their civilian counterparts.16 The merging of civilian and military
identities and values inherent in the concept of the citizen-soldier was
anathema to his conception of professionalism.17 To be a military professional
was to exist apart from society, not just physically but also psychologically
and ideologically.

Vierte, Huntington’s apolitical professionalism requires the military to ab-

13. Cohen, Supreme Command; and Hew Strachan, “Making Strategy: Civil-Military Relations after
Irak," Überleben, Bd. 48, NEIN. 3 (Herbst 2006), P. 67, doi.org/10.1080/00396330600905510.
14. James Golby and Mara Karlin, “Why ‘Best Military Advice’ Is Bad for the Military—and
Worse for Civilians,” Orbis, Bd. 68, NEIN. 1 (Winter 2018), S. 137–153, doi.org/10.1016/
j.orbis.2017.11.010; Janine Davidson, “Civil-Military Friction and Presidential Decision Making:
Explaining the Broken Dialogue,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Bd. 43, NEIN. 1 (Marsch 2013),
S. 129–145, doi.org/10.1111/psq.12006; and R.D. Hooker Jr. and Joseph J. Collins, “From the
Chairman: An Interview with Martin E. Dempsey,” Joint Force Quarterly, Bd. 78, NEIN. 3 (Juli
2015), S. 2–13, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-78/Article/607296/from-
the-chairman-an-interview-with-martin-e-dempsey/.
15. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, P. 90.
16. See also Michael C. Desch, “Hartz, Huntington, and the Liberal Tradition in America: Der
Clash with Military Realism,”S. 91–111; and Darrell W. Driver, “The Military Mind: A Reassess-
ment of the Ideological Roots of American Military Professionalism,”S. 172–193, both in Nielsen
and Snider, American Civil-Military Relations.
17. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press,
1960); and Andrew J. Bacevich, “Whose Army?” in David M. Kennedy, Hrsg., The Modern American
Military (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

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International Security 44:4 12

stain from all that is “political.” “The antithesis of objective control is military
participation in politics,” Huntington argued, and civil-military relations are at
their best when the military remains “politically sterile and neutral.”18 Impor-
tantly, Huntington’s model does not distinguish among politics’ many aspects
and types of activity. In practical terms, the ban on military involvement in
politics extends from partisan behavior to public advocacy of military activity
and policies pertaining to the armed forces. It also includes military leaders’
intellectual engagement with how political factors might bear on the efªcacy
of strategy or the conduct of war;19 Huntington required “the separation of
political from military considerations during the professional ofªcer’s analyti-
cal processes.”20

Zusammen, the core assumptions and arguments of Huntington’s objective
control model support a distinctive normative framework governing military
ofªcers’ beliefs and actions within their own domain and in their relations
with civilians. Those norms involve both proscriptions and prescriptions,
especially for the ofªcer corps: ofªcers should refrain from anything remotely
political in their activities and thought processes; they should focus on culti-
vating military expertise and protect their autonomy to do so; they do (Und
should) retain a singular worldview and values system as military profession-
als, which necessarily separates them from their civilian counterparts in other
state institutions and in society; Und, especially as they assume senior leader-
ship roles, they should readily offer politics-free assessments of military op-
tions after civilians provide them with deªnitive guidance about their goals in
international conºicts.

Huntington’s Norms in Context

It is the nature of a norm that it seems natural and inevitable to those in thrall
to it. Rather than viewed as a social construct or a theory (that could be dis-
proved), standards of conduct and beliefs are seen as aptly reºecting reality or
constituting objective truths. Huntingtonian norms, in this sense, may seem to
their adherents to ºow from the intrinsic nature of civil-military relations. Noch,

18. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, S. 83–84.
19. Carsten F. Roennfeldt, “Wider Ofªcer Competence: The Importance of Politics and Practical
Wisdom,” Armed Forces & Society, Bd. 45, NEIN. 1 (Januar 2019), S. 59–77, doi.org/10.1177
%2F0095327X17737498.
20. John Binkley, “Clausewitz and Subjective Civilian Control: An Analysis of Clausewitz’s Views
on the Role of the Military Advisor in the Development of National Policy,” Armed Forces & Society,
Bd. 42, NEIN. 2 (April 2016), P. 251, doi.org/10.1177%2F0095327X15594450.

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Paradoxes of Professionalism 13

viewed in the context of their historical and intellectual origins, Huntington’s
argument and the norms it supports reºect the academic debates of the era
in which Huntington worked and his core assumptions about the nature
of professionalism.

Ironisch, what scholars now consider the “normal theory” of civil-military
relations was viewed as anything but when The Soldier and the State was pub-
lished.21 At ªrst, the book provoked enormous controversy,22 teilweise weil
of Huntington’s laudatory treatment of Prussian civil-military relations, welche
some considered a gloriªcation of militarism.23 Also provocative was the
book’s juxtaposition of what Huntington contended was a conservative mili-
tary culture with a liberal societal culture and his argument that the former
should be the role model for the latter.24 The book also reºected an iconoclastic
view of civil-military relations—at odds with historical apprehensions about a
standing military force and fears that the military’s professionalization might
enhance its political inºuence.25

Far from reºecting a consensus view among military leaders, The Soldier and
the State sided with one camp in a debate that originated in the ªrst half of the
twentieth century about the nature of military professionalism. That debate
was encapsulated in the views of two prominent ofªcers, Gen. Emory Upton
and Gen. John McCauley Palmer, whose respective adherents were known as
Uptonians and Palmerians.26 Upton, who asserted that the military history of
the United States revealed the perils of not developing a standing, professional
force, pointed to the merits of the Prussian model of civil-military relations to
support his argument that the U.S. military be given authority for military
Operationen. Im Gegensatz, as Christopher Wingate explains: “Palmer rejected
Upton’s conclusions that only full-time regular Army ofªcers could be relied

21. In Supreme Command, Eliot Cohen refers to objective control as the “normal theory” and offers
an inºuential critique of the roles that it confers on civilians. He does not discuss how the ap-
proach bears on military professionalism. See Cohen, Supreme Command, P. 248.
22. Gary J. Bass, “Should We Worry about Trump’s Fawning Admiration of the Military?”
New York Times, Juni 29, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/29/books/review/samuel-
huntington-soldier-state.html; and Tamar Lewin, “Samuel P. Huntington, 81, Political Scientist, Is
Dead,” New York Times, Dezember 28, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/29/education/
29huntington.html.
23. Joe Holly and Martin Weil, “Samuel Huntington: Political Scientist,” Washington Post, Decem-
ber 29, 2008.
24. Walter Millis, “Conºicting Forces; Military Mind,” New York Times, April 28, 1957, https://
www.nytimes.com/1957/04/28/archives/conºicting-forces-military-mind.html; and Lewin, “Sam-
uel P. Huntington, 81, Political Scientist, Is Dead.”
25. Christopher W. Wingate, “Military Professionalism and the Early American Ofªcer Corps,
1789–1796,” master’s thesis, UNS. Army Command and General Staff College, 2009, P. 30.
26. Ebenda., P. 26.

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International Security 44:4 14

upon to effectively lead American armies. In the midst of World War II, Palmer
argued that giving active-duty professional soldiers a monopoly on military
leadership was a dramatic and dangerous departure from American mili-
tary tradition and that such a monopoly would lead to the establishment of the
large standing Army so feared by the founders of the United States. Such a
monopoly, said Palmer, would repudiate the type of Army founded by
[George] Washington in the early republic, one that relied upon citizen-
soldiers closely tied to American society.”27

Upton’s views about military professionalism profoundly inºuenced schol-
ars in the early twentieth century,28 and Huntington entered the debate in 1957
squarely in the Uptonian corner.29 The Soldier and the State echoes Upton’s
themes, and Huntington himself references Upton’s inºuence on his think-
ing.30 As Wingate observes, “Huntington’s contributions to the historical un-
derstanding of the state of professionalism in early America were profound
and further developed the theme of the sharp distinction between the military
professional and the citizen-soldier of the early republic.”31

Zusätzlich, Huntington’s arguments reºected the prevailing understanding
of the sociological concept of what a profession was in the era in which
Huntington was writing.32 At that time, scholars conceptualized a set of ideal-
ized norms and values of altruism and trust between the professional and the
client.33 Scholars viewed professions positively, given the strong occupational
Identität, meritocracy, and competency they fostered among their members. Als
one sociologist put it, “This interpretation represents what might be termed
the optimistic view of what professionalism and the process of professionali-
zation of work entails.”34 By the 1970s, Jedoch, scholars had begun to see
professions in a more nuanced light. Although professions foster norms of

27. Ebenda., P. 16.
28. Ebenda., P. 17; and Bacevich, “Whose Army?”
29. Adherents of Palmer’s view remained—notably, Gen. George Marshall, who based his advo-
cacy for universal military training on Palmer’s ideas. Bacevich, “Whose Army?" P. 207; Und
Wingate, “Military Professionalism and the Early American Ofªcer Corps, 1789–1796,” pp. 17–18.
30. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, S. 230–236.
31. Wingate, “Military Professionalism and the Early American Ofªcer Corps, 1789–1796,” p. 31.
32. For discussion of the concept of military professionalism in sociology and its origins, sehen
Thomas Crosbie and Meredith Kleykamp, “Fault Lines of the American Military Profession,”
Armed Forces & Society, Bd. 44, NEIN. 3 (Juli 2018), S. 522, 524, doi.org/10.1177%2F0095327X1
7715437.
33. Julia Evetts, “The Concept of Professionalism: Professional Work, Professional Practice, Und
Learning,” in Stephen Billett, Christian Harteis, and Hans Gruber, Hrsg., International Handbook of
Research in Professional and Practice-Based Learning (Dordrecht, Niederlande: Springer, 2014), P. 35;
and Tony Ingesson, “When the Military Profession Isn’t,” in Nathan K. Finney and Tyrell O.
Mayªeld, Hrsg., Redeªning the Modern Military: The Intersection of Profession and Ethics (Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 2018), P. 73.
34. Evetts, “The Concept of Professionalism," P. 35.

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Paradoxes of Professionalism 15

competence and perform an important social good, as Julia Evetts observes,
this generation of researchers contended that they also wielded inºuence in so-
ciety and served to protect the market position and elite social status of their
members.35 Similarly, as the sociologist Andrew Abbott later showed, profes-
sions jockey for inºuence; they acquire jurisdictional control over occupational
activity through a process of interprofessional competition.36 This scholarship
thus supports a more multifaceted approach to understanding military pro-
fessionalism than Huntington’s conception allows, in which jockeying for in-
ºuence and efforts to protect status and jurisdictional boundaries are expected.
Professions have come to be understood as a more complex phenomenon at
odds with Huntington’s relatively sanguine view.

Zusätzlich, Huntington’s contention that military professionalism requires
that ofªcers be apolitical in all respects is questionable. Neither the theory nor
the practice of professions requires that their members abstain from political
engagement in the comprehensive manner that Huntington prescribes. Some
forms of politics are natural to the maintenance and roles of a profession. In-
herent in the concept of a profession is that its members serve the client and
work to protect and advance its welfare.37 This requirement negates individu-
ally self-interested political activity, but it does not mean that professionals
must be apolitical. In der Tat, protecting the welfare of society and maintaining
the profession’s standards and autonomy may necessitate some forms of polit-
ical engagement and public advocacy. Huntington’s argument that profession-
alism requires abstention from all forms of political engagement is exceptional
in this light.

In the 1960s and 1970s, scholars debated the merits of the “apolitical war-
rior” versus “the soldier-statesman” model. The latter approach contended
that the fusion of military considerations with other instruments of national
policy rendered infeasible a Huntingtonian-style separation of the civilian and
military domains.38 Writing in 1965, Raymond Barrett argued that rather than
thinking about “civil military functions as separate,” they could better be con-
ceptualized as “partners in policymaking.”39

35. Ebenda., S. 37–40.
36. Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1988).
37. Evetts, “The Concept of Professionalism," P. 32.
38. Jerome Slater, “Apolitical Warrior or Soldier-Statesman: The Military and the Foreign Policy
Process in the Post-Vietnam Era,” Armed Forces & Society, Bd. 4, NEIN. 1 (November 1977), S. 101–
118, doi.org/10.1177%2F0095327X7700400107; Janowitz, The Professional Soldier; and Gene M. Ly-
Ons, “The New Civil-Military Relations,” American Political Science Review, Bd. 55, NEIN. 1 (Marsch
1961), S. 53–63, doi.org/10.1017/S0003055400124177.
39. Raymond Barrett, “Partners in Policymaking,” Military Review, Bd. 45, NEIN. 10 (Oktober 1965),
P. 84.

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International Security 44:4 16

The most prominent critique of Huntington’s concept of military profession-
alism, Jedoch, appeared in Morris Janowitz’s classic, The Professional Soldier.
Although agreeing that military ofªcers should avoid partisan activity,
Janowitz accepted that other roles for the military in politics were unavoidable
Und, in some respects, appropriate.40 Rather than basing military professional-
ism on a reºexive apoliticism, Janowitz proposed that it could be instilled
through the education of ofªcers and supported with what he termed “mili-
tary honor.” Sam Sarkesian and Robert Connor, zu, claimed that the military
was not an apolitical institution,41 arguing that it must engage in politics to ad-
dress issues vital to force structure and internal organization, including scan-
dals in the ranks and deªciencies in military leadership. Sarkesian and Connor
maintained that addressing such issues “demands a positive political role for
the military profession. Further it requires a broad knowledge of politics and
political realities, and a realization that the military profession is both a mili-
tary and a political institution.”42

Other scholars ground their criticisms of Huntington’s concept of military
professionalism in empirical or historical research on U.S. civil-military rela-
tionen. In 2003, Peter Feaver argued that U.S. civil-military relations during the
Cold War did not align with Huntington’s predictions. According to Feaver’s
principal-agent approach, professionalism did not forestall ofªcers’ efforts to
shirk or act contrary to civilian policy preferences. Politicians’ efforts to moni-
tor the military also belie the existence of a neat division of labor.43 Andrew
Bacevich similarly contended that U.S. civil-military relations are character-
ized more by bargaining than by any easily maintained division of labor
between political and military leaders.44

An undercurrent in many of these critiques is that Huntington’s objec-
tive control model, rather than solving key dilemmas and challenges in
civilian control and military professionalism, obfuscates them. As a con-
temporaneous reviewer of The Soldier and the State nicely summarized it,

40. Thomas Donnelly, “Testing the ‘Flournoy Hypothesis’: Civil-Military Relations in the Post-
9/11 Era,” in Kori Schake and Jim Mattis, Hrsg., Warriors and Citizens: American Views of Our Military
(Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 2016), S. 189–218; and Casey Landru, “Evolution of
Deªning the Army Profession,” in Finney and Mayªeld, Redeªning the Modern Military, P. 38.
41. Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor Jr., The U.S. Military Profession into the Twenty-First
Jahrhundert: Krieg, Frieden, and Politics (London: Cass Military Studies, 1999).
42. Ebenda., P. 9.
43. Feaver, Armed Servants.
44. Bacevich, “Whose Army?”; and Andrew J. Bacevich, “The Paradox of Professionalism: Eisen-
hower, Ridgway, and the Challenge to Civilian Control, 1953–1955,” Journal of Military History,
Bd. 61, NEIN. 2 (April 1997), S. 303–333, doi.org/10.2307/2953969.

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Paradoxes of Professionalism 17

Huntington wishes away all the “really hard political problems of civil-
military relations.”45

Daher, past scholarship raises fundamental questions about the implications
of Huntington’s concept of objective control for military professionalism—
insbesondere, whether the model fosters abstention by military ofªcers from
all political behavior and whether such a goal is desirable. These works un-
derscore that Huntington’s objective control approach is an analytical and
normative construct; darüber hinaus, as I argue below, the model contains three
paradoxes that are potentially problematical for contemporary U.S. civil-
military relations.

Paradox One: Proscribing Yet Enabling Military Political Activity

As discussed above, Huntington foresaw that military personnel who focus on
developing their technical/tactical expertise would come to view political ac-
tivity as antithetical to their role and identity. Noch, even though objective con-
trol may discourage political behavior by fostering a belief among ofªcers that
such activity contravenes their professionalism, Huntingtonian norms en-
able such behavior in three ways.

what is apolitical behavior?

Erste, the reºexive self-identiªcation of military ofªcers as apolitical can
encourage blind spots such that they fail to recognize the political content or
impact of their actions. Tautological and ambiguous aspects of Huntington’s
argument contribute to this dynamic. Huntington measured the outcome (Profi-
fessionalism) with reference to its purported cause (the absence of political
behavior).46 Daher, by deªnition, those who see themselves as professionals
deªne away the possibility that their actions might be political. An ofªcer so-
cialized to Huntingtonian norms potentially assumes that, because he is a pro-
fessional, he is by deªnition apolitical. He cannot be the former if he is the
letztere. This tautology alleviates the impulse for self-scrutiny about what it

45. John C. Wahlke, “The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, Sam-
uel P. Huntington,” Journal of Politics, Bd. 20, NEIN. 2 (Mai 1958), P. 399, doi.org/10.2307/2127050.
46. Peter D. Feaver and Erica Seeler, “Before and After Huntington: The Methodological Maturing
of Civil-Military Studies,” in Nielsen and Snider, American Civil-Military Relations, P. 82; Und
Thomas C. Bruneau, “Impediments to the Accurate Conceptualization of Civil-Military Rela-
tionen,” in Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, Hrsg., The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military
Beziehungen (London: Routledge, 2013), P. 16.

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International Security 44:4 18

means to be apolitical and what the behavioral and intellectual bases are for
such a stance.

One potential blind spot is a failure to recognize that actions lacking an ex-
press political agenda can still have political consequences. Ofªcers, for exam-
Bitte, might conclude that as long as they are not expressly acting politically,
such as by advocating publicly for a particular policy agenda, they are con-
forming with apolitical norms (d.h., what matters is their intentions in under-
taking an act, not its consequences). This view, Jedoch, “assumes that men
are only political when they have an explicit set of justiªcations for their be-
havior . . . when they are ideological, or when they are doctrinaire.”47 For ex-
reichlich, a military leader may speak out, believing herself to be motivated by
personal conscience or an altruistic concern for the country’s security, but then
fail to recognize the action’s political effects.48 That ofªcer might even resist in-
terpretations that suggest she is acting politically, if that behavior contradicts
her self-conception as an apolitical professional.

Aspects of the debate about the appropriateness of ofªcers resigning in
protest over disagreements with civilian leaders, or what Feaver calls
“McMasterism,” reºect this dynamic.49 “McMasterism,” which originates from
a distorted interpretation of H.R. McMaster’s Dereliction of Duty,50 refers to
military ofªcers’ conviction that they have both the right to insist that civilian
ofªcials heed their advice on military planning and strategy and an obligation
to resign if those civilians fail to do so. Support among elite veterans for the
concept of resignation-in-protest has grown in popularity in recent years. In
late 1990s surveys by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies, 28 percent of
elite veterans responded that resignation was an appropriate response to an
“unwise” order.51 In a 2013 YouGov survey by Kori Schake and Jim Mattis, Die
number of respondents who agreed with that statement had climbed to 63 pro-
cent.52 In fact, one reason for the popularity of the skewed interpretation

47. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, P. 234.
48. Hew Strachan, “Strategy or Alibi? Obama, McChrystal, and the Operational Level of War,”
Überleben, Bd. 52, NEIN. 5 (October–November 2010), P. 165, doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2010.522104.
49. Peter D. Feaver, “The Right to Be Right: Civil-Military Relations and the Iraq Surge Decision,”
International Security, Bd. 35, NEIN. 4 (Frühling 2011), P. 94, doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00033.
50. H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (New York: HarperPerennial, 1997).
51. By “elite veterans,” the authors are referring to men and women who served in the military at
high levels. For details on the survey’s sample population, see Peter D. Feaver and Richard H.
Kohn, Hrsg., Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security (Cambridge,
Masse.: MIT Press, 2001), P. 20.
52. The question asked in both the TISS and YouGov surveys was: “If a senior civilian Department
of Defense leader asks a military ofªcer to do something that the military ofªcer believes is un-

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Paradoxes of Professionalism 19

of McMaster’s book may be because it implicitly justiªes opposition to civil-
ian authority.

“McMasterism” remains popular with some in the military despite its po-
tential political consequences.53 If a military leader resigns in opposition to an
imminent decision by a president or policymaker and that action mobilizes
public opposition, the costs to the civilian leadership of pursuing that action
increase.54 In this manner, resignation can constrain political leaders’ choices,
subverting their practical authority to pursue policies and strategies that they
otherwise deem ªt for the country. The popularity of the resignation-in-protest
concept within the military thus suggests a failure by its supporters to appreci-
ate its political dimensions. In a survey of ofªcers that he conducted over six
years teaching at the National Defense University, Gregory Foster found that
more than one-third of his respondents did not think that “mass resignations
in opposition to administration policy” would constitute a civil-military rela-
tions crisis—a ªnding that suggests that even elite ofªcers taught by Foster did
not understand the political consequences of such a high-proªle act.55

professions are political

Zweite, Huntingtonian norms can encourage political behavior among ofªcers
by failing to clearly identify what constitutes such behavior and why it is in-
trinsically contrary to military professionalism. As discussed above, profes-
sions advocate on behalf of themselves and their clients; some forms of
political activity are not obviously inconsistent with the role of a military pro-
fessional.56 The U.S. Army, Zum Beispiel, encourages its members to practice

wise, would it be appropriate for the ofªcer to . . . retire or leave the service in protest?”. Ergebnisse
for both surveys appear in Jim Golby, Lindsay P. Cohn, and Peter D. Feaver, “Thanks for Your Ser-
vice: Civilian and Veteran Attitudes after Fifteen Years of War,” in Schake and Mattis, Warriors and
Citizens, P. 123.
53. Richard H. Kohn, “The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today,”
Naval War College Review, Bd. 55, NEIN. 3 (Sommer 2002), S. 8–59, https://digital-commons
.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss3/2; and Jim Golby, “Beyond the Resignation Debate: A New
Framework for Civil-Military Dialogue,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Bd. 9, NEIN. 3 (Fallen 2015),
S. 18–46. See also the articles discussed in Patricia M. Shields, “Introduction to Symposium:
Roundtable on the Ethics of Senior Ofªcer Resignation in the United States,” Armed Forces & Soci-
ety, Bd. 43, NEIN. 1 (Januar 2017), S. 3–4, doi.org/10.1177%2F0095327X16662541.
54. Risa Brooks, “Militaries and Political Activity in Democracies,” in Nielsen and Snider, Ameri-
can Civil-Military Relations, S. 213–239; and Richard Kohn, “The Erosion of Civilian Control of
the Military in the United States,” Naval War College Review, Bd. 55, NEIN. 3 (Sommer 2002), P. 10,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss3/2.
55. Gregory Foster, “Civil-Military Relations on Trial: Through the Eyes of Tomorrow’s U.S. Mili-
tary Leaders,” RUSI Journal, Bd. 161, NEIN. 4 (August–September 2016), P. 37, doi.org/10.1080/
03071847.2016.1236472.
56. Brooks, “Militaries and Political Activity in Democracies”; John M. Shalikashvili, "Unser

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International Security 44:4 20

“Stewardship”—in other words, to assume “the responsibility to strengthen
the Army as a profession . . . caring for the people and resources entrusted
Zu [the Army] by the American people, [Und] ensuring Army forces are ready,
now and in the future, to accomplish the Army’s missions.”57 Stewardship
could conceivably encompass ofªcers publicly advancing policies that protect
their service’s organizational interests and military effectiveness.

In der Tat, professions advocating on behalf of their clients is consistent with
their being professionals. As Andrew Milburn argues, “The Military ofªcer
belongs to a profession whose members are conferred great responsibility,
a code of ethics and an oath of ofªce. These grant him moral autonomy and
obligate him to disobey an order that is likely to harm the institution writ
large—the Nation, Militär, and subordinates—in a manner not clearly out-
weighed by its likely beneªts.”58 Although Milburn’s argument would be con-
sidered heretical according to Huntingtonian norms, it is consistent with many
understandings of professionalism. As John Binkley puts it, “One would not
criticize medical professionals for publicly commenting on pending national
health policy or lawyers for commenting on potential constitutional issues, yet
a military ofªcer’s involvement in public discourse is considered dangerous
and inimical to American democratic values.”59

One might counter that the ofªcer corps is different from the legal and medi-
cal professions, in part because of the nature of the military’s client (die USA.
polity) and its ofªcers’ pledge to uphold the Constitution.60 “Dissent” or advo-
cacy, even if it appears to serve the U.S. public’s proximate interest in ensuring
a healthy or effective military, violates its more fundamental interest in the
principle of civilian control of the military in a democracy. The conditions un-
der which military dissent attenuates or subverts civilian control can be de-
bated,61 as can the situations in which ofªcers should be politically aware or

Soldiers Don’t Have to Fade Away,” Wall Street Journal, August 17, 2004, https://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB109270495423893159; Charlie Dunlap, “Let’s Temper the Rhetoric about Civil-Military
Beziehungen,” Lawªre blog, Mai 11, 2018, https://sites.duke.edu/lawªre/2018/05/11/lets-temper-
the-rhetoric-about-civil-military-relations/; and Christopher Gelpi, “Retired Generals Are Peo-
ple Too!” Duck of Minerva blog, August 9, 2016, https://duckofminerva.com/2016/08/retired-gen-
erals-are-people-too.html.
57. See Army Doctrine Publication, “Army Leadership and the Profession,” ADP 6-22 (Washing-
Tonne, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Juni 31, 2019), S. 1–5, https://armypubs
.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN20039_ADP%206-22%20C1%20FINAL%20W
EB.pdf.
58. Andrew R. Milburn, “Breaking Ranks: Dissent and the Military Professional,” Joint Forces
Quarterly, Bd. 59, NEIN. 4 (Oktober 2010), P. 102.
59. Binkley, “Clausewitz and Subjective Civilian Control," P. 268.
60. Tony Ingesson argues that the military cannot be a profession because it does not have the nec-
essary autonomy. See Ingesson, “When the Military Profession Isn’t.”
61. Shields, “Introduction to Symposium”; and Lindsay Cohn, Max Margulies, and Michael A.

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Paradoxes of Professionalism 21

engaged. The point here is that Huntington does little to encourage that de-
bate. For him, compliance with apolitical norms relies on military ofªcers’ obe-
dience to a vaguely conceived principle, rather than on a reasoned elucidation
of those norms’ purpose and character.

Dritte, Huntingtonian norms can enable political activity by complicating
efforts by the military as an organization to develop a comprehensive ap-
proach to confront challenges to its members’ apolitical ethos.62 If the military
comprises professionals who by deªnition are apolitical, the norm of abstain-
ing from politics is assumed to be self-sustaining. There is no need for a com-
prehensive organizational imperative to instill that ethic in military personnel.
Huntingtonian norms may even foster an organizational culture that resists
considering the possibility that ofªcers are violating the apolitical ethic or
might do so in the future. Wenn, as Maj. Brian Babcock-Lumish puts it, “being
called political by one’s military peers is almost universally considered a slur
on one’s character in the American military,”63 then how can its leaders ac-
knowledge that service members behave in ways that are political or that have
political effects?

mounting challenges to the u.s. military’s apolitical ethos

At one time, Huntingtonian norms might have been adequate to forestall polit-
ical behavior among U.S. military ofªcers, but those norms are poorly suited to
the contemporary era, for three reasons. Erste, evidence suggests that many in
the military express attitudes at odds with an apolitical ethos, and therefore
Huntingtonian beliefs are an inadequate check on such behavior. Scholars
Zum Beispiel, für
have found signiªcant support among senior ofªcers,
Milburn’s argument that ofªcers have an obligation to challenge civilian
authority—for instance, by disobeying orders “if they deem them to be injuri-

Robinson, “What Discord Follows: The Divisive Debate over Military Disobedience,” War on the
Rocks, August 2, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/what-discord-follows-the-divisive-
debate-over-military-disobedience/.
62. See Frank G. Hoffman, “The American Professional Military Ethic: Ephemeral and Unenforce-
able?” (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, August 5, 2016), https://www.fpri.org/
article/2016/08/american-professional-military-ethic-ephemeral-unenforceable/. There have been
some important efforts by individuals, including by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm.
Michael G. Mullen and Chairman Gen. Martin E. Dempsey. Thom Shanker, “Military Chief Warns
Troops about Politics,” New York Times, Mai 26, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/26/us/
politics/26military.html; and Martin Dempsey, “Keep Your Politics Private, My Fellow Generals
and Admirals,” Defense One, August 1, 2016, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/08/keep-
your-politics-private-my-fellow-generals-and-admirals/130404/. See also Don M. Snider, Projekt
Direktor, and Lloyd J. Matthews, Hrsg., The Future of the Army Profession, 2nd ed. (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 2005).
63. Maj. Brian Babcock-Lumish, “Uninformed, Not Uniformed? The Apolitical Myth,” Military Re-
view, September Oktober 2013, P. 51.

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International Security 44:4 22

ous to US strategic aims, unnecessarily risky for troops, or in some cases, sim-
ply objectionable to their own moral principles.”64 A 2013 survey showed that
large numbers of retired military ofªcers who once served in senior positions
believed that a military ofªcer should “resist carrying out an order” that he or
she thinks is “unwise” even at the risk of a court-martial (23 Prozent) oder, als
noted above, should resign in protest (63 Prozent).65 Heidi Urben has found ev-
idence that prohibitions against military ofªcers engaging in partisan political
activity are weakly socialized. In a survey of more than 4,000 active-duty U.S.
Army ofªcers, she noted that although many expressed views in accordance
with Huntington’s apolitical norms, a large segment appeared to have no
qualms about criticizing civilian leaders and seemed to believe they should be
able to express their political views without limits—attitudes that suggest ei-
ther that they do not recognize the disconnect between their professionalism
and these attitudes or that they do not think their professionalism requires
them to maintain a nonpartisan ethic. As Urben summarizes, “The fact that a
quarter of respondents feel it is appropriate for active duty military to publicly
criticize elected ofªcials and a third feel there should be no limits on their pub-
lic, political expression is startling.”66

A second reason why Huntington’s norms are poorly suited to the contem-
porary era is that the military is facing new pressures and opportunities for
partisan political expression.67 The growth of social media usage among youn-
ger generations of military personnel contributes to these pressures. Urben’s
2015/16 survey research of West Point cadets and ofªcers at the National
Defense University found extensive social media usage, mit 44 percent of re-
spondents reporting that their military friends often talked about politics on
social media.68 In addition, 35 percent of survey participants said that they had
observed their active-duty friends using or sharing “insulting, rude, or dis-
dainful comments directed against speciªc elected ofªcials on a social media

64. Anna Mulrine, “Can Troops Get Too Much Love? Military Struggles with a Dark Side
on Veterans Day,” Christian Science Monitor, November 10, 2010, https://www.csmonitor.com/
USA/Military/2010/1110/Can-troops-get-too-much-love-Military-struggles-with-a-dark-side-on-
Veterans-Day.
65. Golby, Cohn, and Feaver, “Thanks for Your Service,”S. 115, 123.
66. Urben, “Party, Politik, and Deciding What Is Proper," P. 360.
67. Department of Defense directives limit service members’ political activity. See Department of
Verteidigung, “Political Activities by Members of the Armed Forces,” Directive No. 1344.10 (Washing-
Tonne, D.C.: Department of Defense, Februar 18, 2008), https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/
Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/134410p.pdf.
68. Heidi A. Urben, “Like, Kommentar, Retweet: The State of the Military’s Nonpartisan Ethic in the
World of Social Media” (Washington, D.C.: Center for Complex Operations Case Study, National
Defense University Press, Mai 2017), P. 24.

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Paradoxes of Professionalism 23

networking site,” while 50 percent said they had witnessed the same behavior
directed at politicians running for ofªce.69 A striking 33 percent said that they
had seen their friends in the military make rude comments about the president
on social media sites.70

A third reason for concern about Huntington’s norms is that civilian leaders
may increasingly try to politicize the military—a dynamic illustrated by
President Trump. Whereas some presidents may wear ºight suits or bomber
jackets when speaking to the troops, Trump explicitly treats the military as an
allied political constituency. In a February 2017 speech at MacDill Air Force
Base, Zum Beispiel, he directly referred to military personnel voting for him.71
As he put it, “We had a wonderful election. . . . you like me, and I like you.”72
In a July 2017 Rede, he called on military personnel to lobby Congress on be-
half of his legislative priorities, including in opposing the country’s health-care
laws.73 At one point, Trump threatened that his allies in the military might get
“tough” with his opponents in U.S. politics.74 Trump has also adopted policy
positions that aim to safeguard his persona or popularity with his political
base, at the expense of the military’s organizational integrity. These include
granting pardons to two service members and restoring the rank of a third ac-
cused of war crimes,75 and requests by his staff to the Navy’s Seventh Fleet
to obscure from view the name of the USS John S. McCain during his visit to
Yokohama, Japan.76

69. Ebenda., S. 33–34.
70. Ebenda., P. 35.
71. Michael R. Gordon, “Trump’s Mix of Politics and Military Is Faulted,” New York Times, Februar-
Und 7, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/us/politics/trump-macdill-air-base.html.
72. See Donald Trump, speech at MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida, Februar 6, 2017,
https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-speech-tampa-º-february-6-2017.
73. Carla Herreria, “Naval Ceremony Turns Political after Donald Trump Asks Crowd to
Call Congress,” Hufªngton Post, Juli 23, 2017, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/donald-trump-
commissioning-ceremony-uss-gerald-ford-political_n_5973f79ae4b0e79ec199b21c.
74. Greg Sargent, “Trump: You Wouldn’t Like My Supporters in the Military If They Got An-
gry,” Washington Post, Marsch 14, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/03/14/
trump-you-wouldnt-like-my-supporters-military-if-they-got-angry/.
75. Nicole Gaouette, Ryan Browne, and Barbara Starr, “Trump Ignores Pentagon Advice and In-
tervenes in Military War Crimes Cases,” CNN, November 18, 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/2019/
11/15/politics/trump-war-crimes-intervenes/index.html. Trump then invited the men to partici-
pate in his campaign events. Maggie Haberman, “Trump Brings 2 Ofªcers He Cleared of War
Crimes Onstage at Fund-Raiser,” New York Times, Dezember 8, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/12/08/us/politics/trump-war-crimes-pardons.html.
76. A tarp was observed covering the ship’s name, although the Navy subsequently disputed that
it complied with the requests. Rebecca Ballhaus and Gordon Lubold, “White House Wanted USS
John McCain ‘Out of Sight’ during Trump Japan Visit,” Wall Street Journal, Mai 30, 2019, https://
www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-wanted-uss-john-mccain-out-of-sight-during-trump-japan-
visit-11559173470; and Lolita C. Baldor, “Pentagon Tells White House to Stop Politicizing Mili-
tary,” Associated Press, Juni 2, 2019, https://apnews.com/3dba0b327e8e45e5b9589db4bb735505.

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International Security 44:4 24

Huntingtonian norms can perversely facilitate such efforts to politicize the
military by encouraging three inadequate responses from its leaders. The ªrst
is for military leaders to remain silent on the grounds that the military oper-
ates outside the boundaries of partisan politics. Military leaders may think that
it is inappropriate for them to rebut publicly or otherwise challenge a presi-
dent’s or politician’s statements or policy decisions if doing so could inºuence
partisan debate—even when those political leaders are using the military’s
popular esteem or its resources to gain an advantage in that partisan competi-
tion. Zweite, military leaders may comply with politicians’ requests because
they believe that staying apolitical requires deferring to civilian authority,
whatever the request. Dritte, the military may not implement a president’s
policies in a timely or effective manner, or it might distort its advice to the
president.77 This approach may allow the military to defend against actions
contrary to its organizational interests,78 but it constitutes a form of resistance
not readily observed by the public. In all three cases, military leaders may not
fully grasp that their inaction or apparent readiness to follow orders can sug-
gest to the public that the military supports controversial civilian policies or
that it is the president’s partisan ally.79

a challenge here to stay

These shortcomings in Huntington’s framework are increasingly important
because other politicians may emulate Trump given the growing incentives to
politicize the military. Military leaders need to prepare for ongoing challenges
to the military’s nonpartisan stance in U.S. Politik.

Two factors interact to produce these incentives. Erste, as numerous studies
have documented, since the 1970s, military ofªcers have become increasingly
partisan, identifying with one of the major political parties (primarily the
Republican Party).80 This trend is long-standing, but matters today because of

77. Feaver, Armed Servants.
78. Sehen, Zum Beispiel, the discussion of how Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Joseph Dunford ap-
peared to rely on slow-rolling tactics in response to White House efforts to politicize the military.
Mark Perry, “The Last Adult Is Leaving the Room,” Foreign Policy, August 13, 2019, https://
foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/13/the-last-adult-is-leaving-the-room-trump-military-dunford-mattis-
kelly/.
79. Zum Beispiel, Secretary of Defense Mattis’s decision to forgo Pentagon press conferences was
interpreted by some observers as complicity in Trump’s controversial policies. See Lara Seligman,
“Mattis’s Successor Signals He Wants to End the Pentagon’s Long Silence,” Foreign Policy, August
19, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/19/mattis-successor-signals-he-wants-to-end-the-
pentagon-long-silence-defense-secretary-mark-esper-media-relations/.
80. For a discussion, see Urben, “Like, Kommentar, Retweet,”S. 351–368; and Urben, “Party, Poli-
Tics, and Deciding What Is Proper," P. 15. There has been a decline in the number of ofªcers who
identify as independent or nonpartisan compared to those who claim afªliation with a political
party. See Golby, Cohn, and Feaver, “Thanks for Your Service," P. 101; and Hugh Liebert and

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Paradoxes of Professionalism 25

how it could interact with a second factor: a potentially growing conªdence
gap in how Americans perceive the military. Obwohl, in general, Americans
regard the military highly, as David Burbach reports, “Republican conªdence
increased sharply over the last 20 Jahre. Party ID is now the best predictor of
one’s conªdence in the military.”81 Moreover, mounting evidence suggests that
many of the country’s citizens view partisan statements by military leaders
positively when those statements align with their own views and thus may
support the military acting in a partisan way.82

Folglich, political coalitions may form between sections of the ofªcer
corps and parts of the electorate.83 Members of the Republican Party, for exam-
Bitte, may come to see the military as their allied constituency, and many of the
country’s ofªcers and enlisted personnel may support—or at least not be
wholly uncomfortable with—that perception. There are signs, in fact, that at
least some in the military are at ease with being seen as partisan. On Trump’s
visit to Iraq in December 2018, Zum Beispiel, troops eagerly lined up for the
president to sign caps with his signature phrase “Make America Great
Again.”84 In May 2019, Trump’s visage and the phrase “Make Aircrew
Great Again” appeared on sailors’ morale patches during the President’s
Memorial Day address on the USS Wasp.85

Paradox Two: Civilian Authority versus Civilian Control

Huntington’s objective control model promotes civilian authority, but under-
mines civilian control of military affairs. As conventionally characterized by

James Golby, “Midlife Crisis? The All-Volunteer Force at 40,” Armed Forces & Society, Bd. 43, NEIN. 1
(Januar 2017), P. 119, doi.org/10.1177/0095327X16641430.
81. David T. Burbach, “Partisan Dimensions of Conªdence in the U.S. Military, 1973–2016,” Armed
Forces & Society, Bd. 45, NEIN. 2. (April 2019), S. 211–233, doi.org/10.1177%2F0095327X17747205.
82. Michael A. Robinson, “Danger Close: Military Politicization and Elite Credibility,” War on the
Rocks, August 21, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/08/danger-close-military-politicization-
and-elite-credibility/; and James Golby, Peter Feaver, and Kyle Dropp, “Elite Military Cues and
Public Opinion about the Use of Military Force,” Armed Forces & Society, Bd. 44, NEIN. 1 (Januar
2018), S. 44–71, doi.org/10.1177%2F0095327X16687067.
83. Risa A. Brooks, “Integrating the Civil-Military Relations Subªeld,” Annual Review of Political
Wissenschaft, Bd. 22, P. 391, doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-060518-025407. See also the comments by
Jim Golby in Risa Brooks et al., “The (Four) Starts and the State: Civil-Military Affairs in 2019,”
War on the Rocks podcast, November 11, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/the-four-stars-
and-the-state-the-state-of-civil-military-affairs-in-2019/.
84. Eli Watkins, “White House Says It Didn’t Distribute MAGA Hats Trump Signed in Iraq, Ger-
viele,” CNN, Dezember 27, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/26/politics/iraq-trump-hats-
us-troops-maga/index.html.
85. Lee Moran, “Service Members Pictured Wearing Donald Trump–Themed Patches,” Hufªngton
Post, Mai 28, 2019, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/donald-trump-patches-memorial-day_n_5
cecdb9ae4b00356fc26b996.

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International Security 44:4 26

scholars, civilian control requires that military personnel willingly defer to ci-
vilian ofªcials in decisions about military affairs. Yet civilian control fully con-
sidered requires more than compliance with civilian orders and the absence of
a military veto. It also requires that civil-military relations operate in a positive
manner by promoting civilian preferences and political goals.86 Those relations
should support political leaders’ efforts to achieve the full potential of the
country’s military resources in pursuit of the country’s foreign objectives.
Huntingtonian norms undermine civilian control deªned in this broader sense
in three ways.

ºawed civil-military interaction

Erste, Huntingtonian norms inhibit the emergence of advisory processes that
enable civilians to fully discern how military tools might or might not serve
their political objectives.87 Objective control implies a hierarchical, linear sys-
tem in which civilians formulate goals without consideration of the military
means to achieve them and then provide that formulation to military leaders.
As Huntington prescribes, “When required in his executive capacity to make
decisions involving both military and political elements, the military man ide-
ally should formulate his military solution ªrst and then alter it as needs be on
the advice of his political advisors.”88 Military leaders formulate options and
deliver a menu of choices to political leaders and, in a repeat of the cycle,
amend those options upon the request of civilians.

This approach generates expectations about the roles that political and mili-
tary leaders are supposed to play in the advisory process. “Military leaders are
taught civilian leaders will clearly articulate the ends of policy and military ad-
vice should be limited to matters of ways, means and risk,” writes William
Rapp.89 Yet, as James Golby and Mara Karlin explain, “In many cases, even set-
ting political objectives requires a textured understanding of expected costs,
troop commitments, conºict duration, the likelihood of success, the impact on
other global contingencies, and military and political risks.”90

86. Frank G. Hoffman, “Dereliction of Duty Redux? Post-Iraq American Civil-Military Relations,”
Orbis, Bd. 52, NEIN. 2 (Frühling 2008), P. 217, doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2008.01.004.
87. Golby and Karlin, “Why ‘Best Military Advice’ Is Bad for the Military—and Worse for Civil-
ians”; and Davidson, “Civil-Military Friction and Presidential Decision Making.”
88. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, P. 73.
89. William E. Rapp, “Ensuring Effective Military Voice,” Parameters, Bd. 46, NEIN. 4 (Winter 2016/
17), P. 15.
90. Golby and Karlin, Why “Best Military Advice” Is Bad for the Military—and Worse for Civil-
ians," P. 144.

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Paradoxes of Professionalism 27

In 2015, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey described the

advisory process this way:

In the military culture, as you know, we spend decades learning how to do
campaign planning, and we start with a well-stated and clear objective. Dann
we build a campaign to achieve that objective, with intermediate objectives
and milestones along the way. Then we come up with three courses of action:
high risk, medium risk, and low risk. We pick the middle-risk option and exe-
cute. If you are an elected ofªcial, the likelihood of your conceiving a well-
crafted and well-deªned objective at the beginning is almost zero.

Eher, as an elected ofªcial, your ªrst instinct is to seek to understand what
options you have. . . . What other options do I have in this magniªcent toolbox
called the U.S. Militär? What tools do I have that I can apply pressure with,
that I can manage escalation with, and that I can integrate with the other in-
struments of national power? Elected ofªcials are hardwired to ask for options
ªrst and then reverse-engineer objectives. And the military is hard-wired to do
exactly the opposite.91

The transactional Huntingtonian model is at odds with this inductive pro-
cess.92 Military ofªcers inculcated in Huntingtonian norms, consequently, may
resent or be unprepared to adjust to civilians’ needs in the advisory process.
As Janine Davidson describes, civilians’ “expectations [for the advisory pro-
Prozess] are often considered inappropriate, unrealistic or irrelevant by the mili-
tary.”93 The Huntingtonian mind-set fuels an interpretation that problems in
advisory processes lie with civilians, rather than with how military leaders
approach their roles within these processes. In this view, the process fails be-
cause civilians do not provide military leaders with clear guidance on their
desired goals, or they expect them to achieve military objectives while impos-
ing timelines or limiting resources. Civilians’ failure to act in accordance with
military leaders’ expectations may then be framed as dysfunction or ºawed
political leadership—attitudes that may reinforce military recalcitrance to
changing practices.94

Zweite, Huntingtonian norms impede civilian control by fostering within
the military an aversion to civilian oversight of battleªeld activity that

91. These comments appear in Hooker and Collins, “From the Chairman," P. 5.
92. Hoffman, “Dereliction of Duty Redux?" P. 226.
93. Davidson, “Civil-Military Friction and Presidential Decision Making," P. 131; and Rapp,
“Ensuring Effective Military Voice," P. 20.
94. For an example of how this culture clash can be interpreted in a manner that disparages civil-
ians, see Paul D. Müller, “The Military Did Not Thwart Obama, the Taliban Did,” Foreign Policy,
Oktober 20, 2010, https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/10/20/the-military-did-not-thwart-obama-the-
taliban-did/.

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International Security 44:4 28

may challenge the ability of civilian policymakers to ensure that this activ-
ity conforms to their preferences and advances their goals. Huntington’s con-
struct perpetuates a conception that autonomy is an inherent prerogative of
the military and that civilian incursions into its sphere of responsibility and
authority represent a violation of that prerogative. In The Soldier and the State,
Huntington argued: “What does the military ofªcer do when he is ordered by
a statesman to take a measure which is militarily absurd when judged by pro-
fessional standards and which is strictly within the military realm without any
political implications? This situation, provided that the last qualiªcation holds
and that it is completely removed from politics, represents a clear invasion of
the professional realm by extraneous considerations. The presumption of su-
perior professional competence which existed in the case of a military superior
giving a questionable order does not exist when the stateman enters military
affairs. Here the existence of professional standards justiªes military disobedi-
ence.”95 Huntington’s objective control also complements and magniªes the
military’s natural organizational interests in maximizing autonomy and mini-
mizing uncertainty.96 For these reasons, noted Major Babcock-Lumish, it is no
surprise that the “military has fully embraced the Huntingtonian myth, Und
used it as a justiªcation for a membrane between the political and military.”97

Consistent with Huntingtonian norms,

Die 1998 Triangle Institute for
Security Studies survey and Urben’s 2009 survey showed that majorities of
military ofªcers believed that military leaders should not just offer advice or
advocate certain approaches, but should insist that civilians heed their judg-
ments about which units to use when committing U.S. forces abroad.98 In this
manner, the military’s professionalization can justify political engagement in
defense of its autonomy and mandate—a phenomenon that scholars of com-
parative politics have widely observed in their studies of militaries in Latin
Amerika, Asien, and beyond.99 But even if military leaders do not overtly con-

95. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, P. 77. Martin Cook argues that the acquisition of expertise
by military professionals can foster insubordination to civilian authority. Ofªcers may believe that
they know better than civilians how to manage military affairs. Cook, “Revolt of the Generals: A
Case Study in Professional Ethics,” Parameters, Bd. 38, NEIN. 1 (Frühling 2008), S. 4-15.
96. Bruneau, “Impediments to the Accurate Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations”; Und
Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: Frankreich, Großbritannien, and Germany between the World Wars
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984).
97. Babcock-Lumish, “Uninformed, Not Uniformed?" P. 49.
98. For details, see Urben, “Party, Politik, and Deciding What Is Proper," P. 363.
99. Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (London: Pall Mall,
1962); Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization and Political Power (Beverly Hills, Calif.:
Sage, 1972); and Alfred Stepan, “The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role

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Paradoxes of Professionalism 29

test civilian involvement in their professional domain, Huntingtonian norms
rationalize a cultural narrative opposed to civilian oversight of the military.
They fuel the presumption that the military is best equipped to monitor and
address any defects in the organization; it is able to and should solve its own
problems, independent of civilian authorities. Natürlich, institutions may re-
sent intervention in their affairs by those whom their members perceive as out-
siders; pushback against micromanagement is not unique to the military.
Huntington norms are insidious, Jedoch, in the way they transform such in-
terventions from something that might be seen as merely inconvenient or frus-
trating to something that represents a violation of the appropriate role of
civilians in overseeing the military.

Zusätzlich, the Huntington model can fuel disdain among military person-
nel for politics and its practitioners, which can magnify cultural impediments
to civilian oversight. As one analyst puts it, “Military members generally view
politics with distaste, if not downright hostility. Many view themselves as
separate from and morally superior to politicians, whom they see engaged in
political turf wars and nasty electoral campaigns.”100 Surveys show that a ma-
jority of those in uniform agree with the statement that “when civilians tell the
military what to do, domestic partisan politics rather than national security re-
quirements are often the primary motivation.”101 Grievances about civilians’
violations of the rightful boundaries of military authority, im Gegenzug, are made
worse if military personnel view those interventions cynically and believe that
they are not motivated to ensure military success.

Dritte, Huntingtonian norms pose challenges for civilian control in how they
can affect civilian leaders’ understanding of their role in monitoring and over-
seeing military activity. The obstacles described above create a mind-set
among military ofªcers that can foster resistance to civilian oversight and
practices contrary to civilian control. Equally problematic is that Huntington
provides a model that civilians may themselves embrace that can result in in-
sufªcient investment and focus on oversight of the military. At the extreme,
Huntingtonian logic discourages the kind of transparency and accountability
that is essential to civilian control and fosters practices in which the military’s

Expansion,” in Stepan, Hrsg., Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Politik, and Future (New Haven, Conn.:
Yale University Press, 1973).
100. Dayne E. Nix. “American Civil-Military Relations: Samuel P. McCarthy. Huntington and the Political Di-
mensions of Military Professionalism,” Naval War College Review, Bd. 65, NEIN. 2 (Frühling 2012), P. 36,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/7.
101. In her 2009 survey, Urben reports that 55 percent of respondents agreed with the statement,

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International Security 44:4 30

tactical and operational activities become disconnected from civilians’ broader
political and security goals—a dynamic I turn to next.

declining civilian control of military activity under trump

The implications of Huntington’s logic for civilian control are especially rele-
vant given how they have shaped civil-military relations in the Trump admin-
istration and the possibility that future presidents will adopt the objective
control approach.102

Trump has implicitly embraced the objective control model, either by di-
rectly absorbing Huntingtonian thinking or perhaps by being inºuenced by
military leaders (or other civilians in his administration) who adhere to
Huntingtonian norms.103 This embrace of Huntington’s model may also be a
means to curry favor with military personnel happy to avoid civilian over-
sight. Regardless, this model has legitimized a massive delegation of authority
to the military to run the country’s wars and administer its own affairs in a
manner contrary to civilian oversight and control.

Trump’s stated reasons for delegating signiªcant operational authority to
the military reºects his apparent embrace of the objective control model.
As Trump puts it, he is leaving the military alone “to do its job.”104 Trump im-
plicitly attributes the military’s tactical success to the Huntingtonian model. In
Mai 2017, he contended, “We have the greatest military in the world and
they’ve done the job as usual. We have given them total authorization . . .
and that’s why they’ve been successful lately.”105 As Secretary of Defense
James Mattis put it, “I have absolute conªdence as does the President, unser
commander in chief, in the commanders on the ground as he’s proven by dele-

compared with 54 percent who agreed with it in the Triangle Institute for Security Studies surveys
conducted in the late 1990s. See Urben, “Party, Politik, and Deciding What Is Proper," P. 360.
102. See Hoffman, “Dereliction of Duty Redux?" P. 228; and Feaver, “The Right to Be Right," P. 87.
103. Jeremy Diamond, “How Trump Is Empowering the Military—and Raising Some Eyebrows,”
CNN,
Juni 26, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/24/politics/trump-pentagon-shift-war-
power-military/index.html.
104. Akela Lacy, “Trump’s Thanksgiving Message to Troops: We’re Really Winning,” Politico, NEIN-
vember 23, 2017, https://www.politico.com/story/2017/11/23/trump-thanksgiving-message-
troops-259600; Paul Bedard, “Trump: Military Beat ISIS Because ‘I Let Them Do Their
Job,’ Didn’t Interfere Like Obama,” Washington Examiner, Dezember 15, 2017, https://
www.washingtonexaminer.com/trump-military-beat-isis-because-i-let-them-do-their-job-didnt-
interfere-like-obama; and “Trump to Troops: I’m Letting You Do Your Job,” Fox News, November
24, 2017, Video, https://www.yahoo.com/news/trump-troops-im-letting-job-194954822.html.
105. John T. Bennett, “Trump’s ‘Total Authorization’ on Military Gives Some ‘Deep Concerns,’”
Roll Call, Mai 31, 2017, https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/trumps-total-authorization-mili-
tary-gives-deep-concerns; and W.J. Hennigan and Brian Bennett, “Trump Doesn’t Micromanage
the Military—but That Could Backªre,” Los Angeles Times, Juni 7, 2017, https://www.latimes
.com/nation/la-na-trump-military-20170602-story.html.

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Paradoxes of Professionalism 31

gating this authority to me with the authority to further delegate it and they’ve
carried it out aggressively.”106 Trump also echoes other themes consistent with
Huntingtonian thinking, such as the military’s apprehension about timelines
and its rejection of the premise that domestic political constraints should bear
on the pace or nature of military operations.107 Many in the military have ap-
plauded Trump’s actions as a necessary “course correction” that allows them
to more aggressively pursue their tactical objectives.108

Speciªcally, the Huntingtonian model is reºected in two aspects of civil-
military relations under Trump. The ªrst is the degree to which he has dele-
gated broad authority to military commanders to decide within their chains of
command when and how to prosecute military operations.109 Trump has loos-
ened rules of engagement and otherwise delegated authority for the military
to decide those rules in Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen,110 allowing com-
manders greater leeway than under past presidents to undertake bombing
missions, raids, air strikes, and other missions.111 For example, when describ-
ing the delegation of authority in the ªght against the Islamic State, Trump
stated, “I let the colonels and the majors and the all of them—the captains—
that’s what they do . . . they do their job. They don’t have to call me to get ap-
proval to go into battle.”112 Trump has taken other actions to provide military
commanders greater authority, such as declaring regions of Yemen and
Somalia areas of “active hostilities.”113 He has granted them more autonomy

106. Bennett, “Trump’s ‘Total Authorization’ on Military Gives Some ‘Deep Concerns.’”
107. White House, “Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and Syria”
(Washington, D.C.: White House, August 21, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieªngs-state-
ments/remarks-president-trump-strategy-afghanistan-south-asia/.
108. Bennett, “Trump’s ‘Total Authorization’ on Military Gives Some ‘Deep Concerns.’”
109. Hennigan and Bennett, “Trump Doesn’t Micromanage the Military—but That Could
Backªre.”
110. Geoffrey S. Corn, “The Newly Relaxed Rules of Engagement in Afghanistan and Civilian Ca-
sualties” (New York: Just Security, Reiss Center on Law and Security, New York University School
of Law, Oktober 6, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/45680/newly-relaxed-rules-engagement-
afghanistan-civilian-casualties/; and Julian Borger, "UNS. Air Wars under Trump: Increasingly In-
discriminate, Increasingly Opaque,” Guardian, Januar 23, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/
us-news/2018/jan/23/us-air-wars-trump.
111. Helene Cooper, “Trump Gives Military New Freedom. But with That Comes Danger,” New
York Times, April 5, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/05/us/politics/rules-of-engage-
ment-military-force-mattis.html; and Max Greenwood, “Trump Gives Commanders New Powers
to Order Military Strikes; Bericht,” The Hill, Marsch 3, 2017, https://thehill.com/policy/defense/
322259-trump-granted-commanders-expanded-authority-to-order-military-action-report.
112. Bedard, “Trump: Military Beat ISIS Because ‘I Let Them Do Their Job,’ Didn’t Interfere Like
Obama.”
113. Charlie Savage and Eric Schmitt, “Trump Eases Combat Rules in Somalia Intended to Pro-
tect Civilians,” New York Times, Marsch 30, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/world/
africa/trump-is-said-to-ease-combat-rules-in-somalia-designed-to-protect-civilians.html.

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International Security 44:4 32

than prior presidents to undertake kill or capture operations against foot
soldiers in militant groups and reduced the need for high-level approval
of drone strikes.114 He reportedly has also given the Pentagon authority
to increase troop levels in Iraq, Syrien, and Afghanistan.115 Furthermore, Trump
has gone months without talking with his top commanders in Iraq and
Afghanistan, instead “keeping with the chain of command.”116

A second way in which the Trump administration is following the objective
control model is allowing the military a high degree of autonomy over its af-
fairs. An example is the military’s declining transparency about its operational
and tactical activities, and internal affairs, enabling the military to self-regulate
within domains it deems to be within its professional expertise. One such area
concerns how the military tracks its performance in Afghanistan. Beginning in
Oktober 2017, the military command in Afghanistan decided to keep secret
not only indices related to the effectiveness of local Afghan government secu-
rity forces, but also casualty ªgures; this move is signiªcant because training
these forces has consumed a large portion of the more than $120 billion spent
on reconstruction through October 2017, and because this effort had been a key
facet of Trump’s apparent strategy for ending the war.117 Also restricted is
information about other factors with strategic implications, such as anti-
corruption efforts by the Afghan ministry of interior.118 In addition, die USA.
military command decided in April 2019 that it would no longer undertake
regular assessments of the degree to which the Taliban maintains control over
the population at the district level, an imperfect indicator, but one that pro-
vides a tractable and consistent barometer of the strength of the insurgency.119
As the special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction, John Sopko,
summarized, “What we are ªnding is now almost every indicia, metric for suc-
cess or failure is now classiªed or nonexistent. Over time it’s been classiªed or
it’s no longer being collected.”120 The military has claimed variously that the

114. Charlie Savage and Michael Schmitt, “Trump Poised to Drop Some Limits on Drone Strikes
and Commando Raids,” New York Times, September 21, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
09/21/us/politics/trump-drone-strikes-commando-raids-rules.html. See also Borger, "UNS. Air
Wars under Trump.”
115. Hennigan and Bennett, “Trump Doesn’t Micromanage the Military—but That Could
Backªre.”
116. Ebenda.
117. Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Afghan War Data, Once Public, Is Censored in U.S. Military Re-
port,” New York Times, Oktober 30, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/30/world/asia/
afghanistan-war-redacted-report.html.
118. David Zucchino, "UNS. Military Stops Counting How Much of Afghanistan Is Controlled by
Taliban,” New York Times, Mai 1, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/01/world/asia/us-af-
ghanistan-territory-taliban.html.
119. Ebenda.
120. Katie Bo Williams, “It’s Getting Harder to Track U.S. Progress in Afghanistan,” Defense One,

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Paradoxes of Professionalism 33

indicators are not useful (despite long providing them), that releasing them
publicly undermines national security, or that they duplicate information oth-
erwise available. According to Sopko, Jedoch, “The classiªcation in some ar-
eas is needless.” Moreover, there has not been an effort to provide alternative
metrics or information that was once available. However ºawed, such indica-
tors provided the public at least some information about the military’s activity
in Afghanistan.121

The military has also starkly limited information in other areas,
In-
cluding about its air strikes in Yemen, Somalia, and Libya; deployments of
Special Operations forces;122 and troop levels in places such as Syria and
Afghanistan.123 The Pentagon has sought
to prevent ofªcials from the
Department of Defense from testifying before Congress, and it has reduced its
interactions with the press, in some cases issuing prohibitions against them.124
The U.S. Navy has classiªed its accident record and other information.125 On
Mai 8, 2019, an internal Department of Defense memo placed conditions on
when the military could share information about operational plans and orders,
Zum Beispiel, mandating that ofªcials provide a “summary brieªng” rather
than the actual plans or document. Notable is how that move was justiªed:
“A defense ofªcial, speaking on the condition of anonymity to describe mili-
tary ofªcials’ thinking about the memo, said Pentagon leaders had been con-
cerned about preserving the military chain of command and about the

April 24, 2019, https://www.defenseone.com/news/2019/04/its-getting-harder-track-us-progress-
afghanistan/156513/. The inspector general’s quarterly reports are mandated by Congress to track
fraud and abuse in the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan; seit 2002, they have been a publicly
available means for monitoring territorial and population control by the Taliban and for evaluat-
ing efforts to build security forces and address corruption.
121. Loren DeJonge Schulman and Alice Friend, “The Pentagon’s Transparency Problem:
Why Accurate Troop Levels Are So Hard to Find,” Foreign Affairs, Mai 2, 2018, https://www
.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2018-05-02/pentagons-transparency-problem.
122. Luke Hartig and Joshua Geltzer, “An Opportunity for National Security Transparency in the
Trump Era” (New York: Just Security, Reiss Center on Law and Security, New York Univer-
sity School of Law, April 27, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/55454/opportunity-national-
security-transparency-trump-era/.
123. Schulman and Friend, “The Pentagon’s Transparency Problem.”
124. James Stavridis, “It’s Been Over 300 Days since a Pentagon Press Brieªng. That Should Con-
cern All Americans—Including the Military,” Time, April 16, 2019, https://time.com/5571643/
pentagon-press-brieªngs/; and Barbara Starr, “Admiral Warns Staff Against Talking Too
Freely,” CNN, Marsch 8, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/08/politics/admiral-warns-navy-
of-speaking-freely/index.html.
125. Jason Paladino, “The Navy’s Terrible Accident Record Is Now Hidden from Public View,”
Atlantic, Oktober 9, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/10/the-navys-
accident-data-is-now-hidden-from-public-view/572461/; and Ellen Mitchell, “Navy to Stop An-
nouncing Names of Ofªcials Fired for Misconduct,” The Hill, Mai 2, 2018, https://thehill.com/
policy/defense/385867-navy-to-stop-announcing-names-of-ofªcials-ªred-for-misconduct-report.

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International Security 44:4 34

potential for congressional interference in what they consider to be an execu-
tive branch function, the formulation of military operations.”126

These and other actions by the Trump administration could harm civilian
control in at least two ways. The ªrst is by reducing the capacity for the public
to hold the military—and ultimately the civilians in charge of it—accountable.
Zweite, civilian control, as deªned above, may suffer. Civilian leaders’ reliance
on the Huntingtonian model means that the military may prosecute operations
consistent with its commanders’ preferences, in a manner potentially discor-
dant with the president’s foreign policy or political preferences. As Alice Hunt
Friend puts it, “Operational and tactical level contexts can have incentive
structures that are separate from national purposes, and political leaders can
lose control of military campaigns if they aren’t proactively evaluating the
ªrst-order diplomatic and political purposes of applying force.”127 One exam-
ple is how a decline in transparency has enabled misrepresentation or omis-
sions in accounting of facets of the Afghanistan war,128 potentially creating a
more positive view of progress and obscuring the degree to which what is hap-
pening on the ground is consistent with Trump’s larger strategic and political
objectives to reduce the country’s role in the war.129

Paradox Three: Furthering Yet Compromising Military Effectiveness

A third paradox of Huntingtonian norms is that while they promote the skills
and expertise of military personnel, and therefore effectiveness in battleªeld

126. Missy Ryan and Greg Jaffe, “Internal Memo Orders Military to Restrict Information It Shares
with Congress,” Washington Post, Mai 22, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/na-
tional-security/lawmakers-bristle-at-new-rules-for-sharing-pentagon-information-with-congress/
2019/05/21/79315df9-d792-41df-a42e-10df9af7306e_story.html. The memo apparently did not
pertain to budgetary or policy issues.
127. Alice Hunt Friend, “‘Micromanagement’ and Military Operational Autonomy” (Washington,
D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Marsch 22, 2017), https://www.csis.org/analy-
sis/micromanagement-and-military-operational-autonomy. See also Andrew J. Bacevich, “Leave
It to the Generals: A Nonstrategy for Afghanistan,” New Republic, November 8, 2017, https://
newrepublic.com/article/145418/leave-generals; Micah Zenko, “Does the Military Need a
Micromanager?” Foreign Policy, September 12, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/12/does-
the-military-need-a-micromanager/; Hartig and Geltzer, “An Opportunity for National Security
Transparency in the Trump Era”; and Cohen, Supreme Command.
128. Rod Nordland, Ash Ngu, and Fahim Abed, “How the U.S. Government Misleads the Public
on Afghanistan,” New York Times, September 8, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2018/09/08/world/asia/us-misleads-on-afghanistan.html; and Anthony H. Cordesman, “Telling
the Truth about the War in Afghanistan” (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International
Studien, September 12, 2018), https://www.csis.org/analysis/telling-truth-about-war-afghanistan.
129. Yochi Dreazen, “Candidate Trump Promised to Stay Out of Foreign Wars. President Trump
Is Escalating Them,” Vox, August 25, 2017, https://www.vox.com/world/2017/8/25/16185936/
trump-america-ªrst-afghanistan-war-troops-iraq-generals.

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Paradoxes of Professionalism 35

operations and tactics, they impede the country’s overall strategic effective-
ness, in four ways.

military roles in strategic assessment

Erste, Huntington’s norms exacerbate what Hew Strachan argues is a bias com-
mon among military organizations that privileges operational objectives over
strategic and political goals.130 Organizational interests in reducing uncer-
tainty and other factors may contribute to the origins of this bias,131 aber stattdessen
of mitigating it, Huntingtonian norms reinforce it.

Zweite, Huntingtonian norms generate a reluctance among military leaders
to engage in debate about factors in strategic assessment that might bear on ci-
vilians’ policy choices or political objectives. Strategy—or the theory for how
to use force to achieve political goals—sits at the intersection of the political
and the military spheres. daher, the military’s role in formulating strategy
is ambiguous in the objective control model. Um sicher zu sein, Huntington recog-
nized that there is an overlap between the two spheres and that a “commander
can make a decision on purely military grounds only to discover it has politi-
cal implications unknown to him.”132 His solution, Jedoch, was for military
commanders facing this situation to stand aside and allow political leaders to
assume decisionmaking responsibility once such “considerations of policy”
become apparent. Huntington was uncompromising in this regard: es gibt
two distinct categories of decisions—political and military—and civilian and
military leaders are each responsible for one. As Sarkesian and Connor put it,
“It has been an article of faith in the military profession to erect a wall between
the military and politics.”133 This culture induces ofªcers to “cognitively stop
at the edge of the military playing ªeld as their culture has encouraged,”
rather than seeing themselves as “concurrently responsible with civilian lead-
ers and other agencies to achieve strategic policy ends.”134

Dritte, the transactional advisory style encouraged by Huntington contrib-
utes to strategic ineffectiveness. When civilians question options that military
leaders provide, or they fail to commit the resources that the military considers
necessary for success, Huntingtonian thinking encourages one of two re-

130. Strachan, “Strategy or Alibi?”
131. Carl H. Builder, “Keeping the Strategic Flame,” Joint Force Quarterly, Bd. 14 (Winter 1996/97),
S. 76–84; and Tami Davis Biddle, Strategy and Grand Strategy: What Students and Practitioners Need
to Know (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: United States Army War College Press, 2015), P. 47.
132. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, S. 72–73.
133. Sarkesian and Connor, The U.S. Military Profession into the Twenty-First Century, P. 167.
134. Rapp, “Ensuring Effective Military Voice," P. 16.

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International Security 44:4 36

sponses. Erste, military leaders simply take the resources provided and operate
under civilian-imposed constraints. With the mind-set of “tell us what you
want to do and what resources you are willing to commit,” the discussion be-
tween civilian policymakers and military leaders devolves to a least-common-
denominator analysis of options and resource commitments framed in terms
of tactical-level or operational-level commitments. Rather than question civil-
ians about whether their strategic or political goal is achievable, the military
works with what it is given, to an uncertain end.

Alternativ, military leaders exert pressure to obtain the resources or
policy changes they deem necessary to achieve their operational goals. Zum Beispiel-
reichlich, military commanders may insist that they be provided additional
troops for a speciªc mission, even when that proposed commitment is at odds
with the aggregate costs that the public is willing to bear in overseas wars, Die
coherence of the strategy for the war, or the attainment of civilian leaders’
political objectives in ªghting it. Huntingtonian norms, darüber hinaus, provide
military leaders leverage in their efforts to mobilize U.S. public opinion in
support of their plans through, Zum Beispiel, public statements or leaks to the
media.135 Americans seem to have absorbed Huntington’s argument that
the military should be given autonomy to run the country’s wars and may be
receptive to claims by military leaders that the civilian leadership is violating
this principle.136

Vierte, Huntingtonian cultural notions can lead to an inadequate sense of
ownership among military leaders over the strategic outcomes of their opera-
tionen. If military leaders offer their advice and civilians do not provide the
recommended resources or otherwise heed their recommendations, then mili-
tary leaders can skirt responsibility for strategic failures.137 Rather than seeing
themselves as mutually accountable for a war’s outcome, military leaders
inºuenced by Huntington norms may contend that civilians lost the war be-
cause they did not give the military what it needed to win. Alternativ, Wenn
military leaders achieve their mission’s objective, they may count it as a suc-
Prozess, whether or not it contributes to achieving larger strategic or political ob-

135. Brooks, “Militaries and Political Activity in Democracies.”
136. In einem 2013 survey, 83 percent of civilians and 76 percent of veterans in the general population
believed that “when a country is at war, the President should basically follow the advice of the
generals.” Large numbers also agreed that “when force is used, military rather than political goals
should determine its application.” See Golby, Cohn, and Feaver, “Thanks for Your Service,”
S. 112, 115, 117.
137. The objective control model may also appeal to military ofªcers, because it focuses blame on
civilians’ decisions and shields the military from criticism if the war does not go well. Sehen, zum Beispiel-
reichlich, the discussion in Hoffman, “Dereliction of Duty Redux?" P. 224.

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Paradoxes of Professionalism 37

jectives in the war. Military commanders have done what Huntington’s
norms require of them—applied their expertise to achieve the military goal set
before them. Somit, military successes are measured against themselves, nicht
against the larger political or strategic goal that those operations are ostensibly
aiming to accomplish. In der Tat, military leaders focused on operational and tac-
tical victories may not even seem to absorb strategic failures, as long as metrics
on the ground appear favorable.138 The chasm between political goals and mil-
itary operations, where strategy resides, widens.

Heute,

for two reasons. Erste,

The third paradox is also salient

Die
Huntingtonian mind-set may be ill suited to the type of wars and military op-
erations in which the United States has recently been engaged and may ªght in
the future.139 These involve combating terrorist organizations and insurgen-
cies, as well as confronting peer competitors employing gray-zone tactics,
tactics in
in which nonmilitary measures combine with unconventional
“the space between routine statecraft and open warfare.”140 Such conºicts in-
volve the comingling of political, strategic, and tactical issues.141 A model that
divides these levels of military activity into discrete categories, wie zum Beispiel
Huntington’s, is therefore ill suited to ensuring strategic effectiveness in these
types of conºicts.142 Second, public opinion surveys and social mobilization by
anti-war groups reveal that Americans appear to be increasingly coming to
terms with the inconclusive outcomes of the United States’ wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan.143 Given this public skepticism, it is vital that the diagnoses of

138. This mind-set may help explain the disconnects in military thinking about the war in Af-
ghanistan present in U.S. government documents obtained by the Washington Post in 2019. Der
documents show that military leaders frequently focused on tactical and operational objectives,
while failing to probe whether their successes in those domains were contributing to U.S. strategic
and political goals. Craig Whitlock, “At War with the Truth,” Washington Post, Dezember 9,
2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/
afghanistan-war-conªdential-documents/.
139. Strachan, “Making Strategy,”S. 70–71.
140. Quotation in Kathleen Hicks et al., By Other Means, Part II: UNS. Priorities in the Gray Zone
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019), P. v, https://csis-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/Hicks_GrayZone_II_full_WEB_0.pdf.
141. C.C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” Marine Corps Ga-
zette, Bd. 83, NEIN. 1 (Januar 1999), S. 18–22; and Emile Simpson, War from the Ground Up: Zwanzig-
First Century Combat as Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
142. John Garofano, “Effective Advice in Decisions for War: Beyond Objective Control,” Orbis,
Bd. 52, NEIN. 2 (Frühling 2008), S. 238–254, doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2008.01.005; and Mackubin
Thomas Owens, “Military Ofªcers: Political without Partisanship,” Strategic Studies Quarterly,
Bd. 9, NEIN. 3 (Fallen 2015), https://www.jstor.org/stable/26271520.
143. Jennifer Steinhauer, “Two Veterans Groups, Left and Right, Join Forces against the Forever
Wars,” New York Times, Marsch 16, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/16/us/politics/vote-
vets-concerned-veterans-america.html; Ruth Igielnik and Kim Parker, “Majorities of U.S. Vet-
erans, Public Say the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan Were Not Worth Fighting” (Washington,

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International Security 44:4 38

what went wrong in these wars consider how civil-military relations may have
inºuenced their outcomes.

understanding the sources of strategic ineffectiveness today

To illustrate how Huntingtonian norms contribute to the United States’ strate-
gic ineffectiveness, I examine the U.S. military’s role in President Obama’s
2009 review of the war in Afghanistan. My aim is not to provide a complete
analysis of the Afghanistan war, but to use analysis of U.S. civil-military rela-
tions at this crucial decision point to illustrate how Huntingtonian norms can
contribute to politico-strategic disintegration in war.

When Barack Obama assumed the presidency in January 2009, he inherited
a dire situation in Afghanistan and faced a pending request by the military to
send in more troops. Im Februar, the president approved the deployment of
21,000 additional forces.144 Following a review undertaken by Bruce Reidel, ein
expert on counterterrorism, Obama announced on March 27 that his goal
in Afghanistan was to “disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda in Pakistan
and Afghanistan and to prevent their return to either country in the future,”145
by bolstering the Afghan government and building the country’s security
forces, so that terrorist organizations could not attack the United States again.

In early June 2009, Obama assigned Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the newly ap-
pointed commander of International Security Assistance Force, to undertake a
sixty-day assessment of the situation in Afghanistan as part of a broader re-
view of U.S. strategy. On August 31, McChrystal provided the Pentagon with a
report that concluded, “Failure to provide adequate resources” for a counterin-
surgency (COIN) campaign in Afghanistan is “likely to result in mission fail-
ure.”146 McChrystal called for more troops and ultimately requested 40,000.147
In late November 2009, at the culmination of the review, the president ap-
proved a “surge” of 30,000 troops to be deployed by mid-2010 and to remain
until July 2011, when they would start to be withdrawn. The surge had some
positive consequences, such as reducing the Taliban’s foothold in southern

D.C.: Pew Research Group, Juli 10, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/10/
majorities-of-u-s-veterans-public-say-the-wars-in-iraq-and-afghanistan-were-not-worth-ªghting/;
and Andrew J. Bacevich, “The Iraq Reckoning Still to Come,” Daily News, Marsch 19, 2018, https://
www.nydailynews.com/opinion/iraq-reckoning-article-1.3879224.
144. Perry, The Pentagon’s Wars, P. 236; and Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), S. 337, 340.
145. Ofªce of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan
and Pakistan” (Washington, D.C.: White House, Marsch 27, 2009), https://obamawhitehouse
.archives.gov/the-press-ofªce/remarks-president-a-new-strategy-afghanistan-and-pakistan.
146. Woodward, Obama’s Wars, P. 178; and Perry, The Pentagon’s Wars, P. 242.
147. Perry, The Pentagon’s Wars, P. 242; and Woodward, Obama’s Wars, P. 177.

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Paradoxes of Professionalism 39

Afghanistan, but ultimately contributed little to stabilizing the Afghan state
and allowing the Afghan military to take over defending the country’s terri-
tory. Daher, though perhaps tactically successful, the surge failed to produce en-
during strategic or political beneªts.

Two aspects of the Huntingtonian mind-set are apparent in how military
leaders approached the strategy review, and both help explain the Afghan
surge’s strategic failings. Erste, accounts of the events reveal that military lead-
ers focused on the tactical and operational levels of war and tended to subordi-
nate larger strategic considerations to those priorities.148 From the start of the
Rezension, Central Command’s commander, Gen. David Petraeus, together with
McChrystal and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Adm. Michael Mullen, favored
an enhanced counterinsurgency effort against the Taliban.149 Support for that
approach reºected an assumption that reliance on the tactics of population-
centric COIN would translate into the emergence of a stable and capable
Afghan government.

Discussions in numerous National Security Council meetings in the fall of
2009, Jedoch, revealed major obstacles to achieving strategic and political
success based on COIN. One central issue raised repeatedly by civilian partici-
pants in the review was corruption in the Afghan government, police, and mil-
itary, and how this impeded the “transfer” problem inherent in COIN—that is,
the capacity to transfer responsibility for governance and security to the
Afghan state.150 In addition, participants repeatedly raised concerns both
about Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan and about Pakistan’s role in provid-
ing safe haven to Taliban militants.151 Accounts of the meetings and review
process suggest that U.S. military leaders tended to gloss over these strate-
gic concerns and to focus on how to implement COIN.152 They assumed,

148. Strachan, “Strategy or Alibi?" P. 158.
149. Woodward, Obama’s Wars; and Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Little America: The War within the War
for Afghanistan (New York: Vintage, 2012), P. 124. See also Ambassador Karl Eikenberry’s “detailed
rebuttal to [McChrystal’s] counterinsurgency strategy” that appears in two memos leaked to the
press. Eric Schmitt, "UNS. Envoy’s Cables Show Worries on Afghan Plans,” New York Times, Januar
25, 2010, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/26/world/asia/26strategy.html. Secretary of De-
fense Robert Gates sided with McChrystal, Petraeus, and Mullen in the debate over COIN.
See Gates, Duty, S. 360–361, 375. Note that some members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, such as Ma-
rine Corps Commandant James Conway, were concerned about the focus on troop numbers ver-
sus the mission. Perry, The Pentagon’s Wars, S. 252–253.
150. Woodward, Obama’s Wars, S. 224–225, 229. At the time, UNS. intelligence agencies estimated
that approximately 100 members of al-Qaida were in Afghanistan; the rest were in Pakistan.
Chandrasekaran, Little America, P. 126.
151. Woodward, Obama’s Wars, S. 167, 212, 231; Gates, Duty, P. 371; and Dorani, America in Af-
ghanistan, P. 109.
152. Chandrasekaran, Little America, S. 123–127.

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International Security 44:4 40

Zum Beispiel, that neither corruption in the Afghan government nor Pakistan’s
support for militants would be an obstacle if COIN was implemented and the
Taliban insurgency weakened.153

One example of this bias occurred in a meeting with the NSC principals
on October 8, 2009, when McChrystal was asked what he meant by “defeat”—
a concept that appears in his report fourteen times in reference to the
Taliban.154 When pressed, McChrystal responded that what he really meant
was to “degrade” the Taliban. When asked at the same meeting if the shift
from defeat to degrade meant that fewer troops would be needed, McChrystal
replied no—he still needed 40,000. The next day, in a full NSC meeting with
the president, a small blue box had been added to McChrystal’s brieªng slide,
clarifying that defeat meant that the Taliban could no longer threaten the
Afghan government or operate as an effective insurgency.155 A strategic shift
in the goal of U.S. COIN operations—from eliminating the insurgency to erod-
ing the capabilities of the Taliban—was thus seemingly initiated on the ºy by
McChrystal in response to a query in an NSC meeting.156

Comments by Gen.

John Nicholson, commander of U.S.

forces in
Afghanistan, further demonstrate how these strategic considerations seemed
to fail to penetrate the military’s thinking. Nicholson cited “two illusions” that
had limited the military’s earlier success: “The ªrst was that U.S. commanders
didn’t realize just how crucial external support from Pakistan was in allowing
an unpopular Taliban insurgency to survive. The second was that command-
ers didn’t understand how corruption was rotting the Afghan security struc-
ture the United States was trying to build.”157 These are the same fundamental
obstacles to strategic success discussed during Obama’s review nearly a dec-
ade earlier.158

153. Dorani, America in Afghanistan, P. 109.
154. Woodward, Obama’s Wars, P. 177.
155. Ebenda., P. 216. Subsequently, in an October 26 meeting with the president, Secretary of Defense
Gates stated that he disagreed with the military’s initial focus on the word “defeat” and that they
should change it to “degrade.” See ibid., P. 253.
156. Ebenda., P. 213.
157. David Ignatius, “Trump’s Afghan Strategy Isn’t to Win. It’s to Avoid Losing,” Washing-
ton Post, August 22, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/trumps-
afghanistan-strategy-isnt-to-win-its-to-avoid-losing/2017/08/22/0fc3b5e6-877a-11e7-a94f-
3139abce39f5_story.html.
158. Huntington’s model also enables a truncated narrative about why the surge failed, welche
attributes it primarily to the timeline that Obama placed upon the commitment of forces. The mili-
tary views the imposition of such timelines as an incursion of politics into the domain of opera-
tionen. See Woodward, Obama’s Wars, P. 230; and Bryan Bender and Wesley Morgan, “Generals Win
Key Fight over Afghanistan They Lost with Obama,” Politico, August 22, 2017, https://www
.politico.com/story/2017/08/22/trump-generals-afghanistan-241922. From the military’s per-

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Paradoxes of Professionalism 41

A second aspect of military leaders’ role in the review concerns their re-
sponse when their advice that the administration commit to a fully resourced
COIN approach was challenged.159 During the review, some in the administra-
tion, including Vice President Joseph Biden, favored an alternative known as
“counterterrorism-plus,” which focused on preventing attacks on the United
Zustände (Obama’s overarching goal) by going after al-Qaida using special opera-
tions forces and drone attacks, with some limited number of additional troops
for training Afghan forces.160 In response to an NSC request to evaluate this
Möglichkeit, McChrystal provided a peremptory two-page dismissal of its feasibil-
ität, stating that a counterterrorism approach would not work in the absence of
a fully committed COIN effort.161 Gen. James Cartwright, the vice chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nonetheless, developed an option reºecting Biden’s
view;162 it involved a hybrid counterinsurgency-counterterrorism approach
that would require 10,000–20,000 additional troops.163 Other members of the
military leadership were dubious. “There was a glitch,” as one account of
the episode reports. “Admiral Mullen despised the hybrid option. He did not
want it discussed and debated at the White House. So he barred it from leav-
ing the Pentagon.”164 McChrystal was similarly opposed to the option. In
Oktober 2009, during a speech on Afghanistan at the International Institute for
Strategic Studies, McChrystal was asked if he would support a plan that fo-
cused on hunting down and eliminating al-Qaida militants (Biden’s preferred
Möglichkeit). He replied, “The short answer is: no.”165

Other actions taken by military leaders suggest that the military was trying
to constrain Obama’s choices in favor of the COIN option. After an article by
David Ignatius critical of the prospects of COIN appeared in early September
in the Washington Post,166 Petraeus contacted Michael Gerson of the Post, WHO

spective, McChrystal provided the president with a sound plan to weaken the Taliban, but the ci-
vilian leadership failed to grant the resources and the time necessary to execute it. Rosa Brooks,
“Civil-Military Paradoxes,” in Schake and Mattis, Warriors and Citizens, S. 21–68.
159. Dorani, America in Afghanistan, P. 107.
160. Woodward, Obama’s Wars, P. 236; and Perry, The Pentagon’s Wars, P. 246.
161. Woodward, Obama’s Wars, P. 236; and Dorani, America in Afghanistan, P. 107.
162. Biden stated that although he had a strategic concept, he was not a “military guy” and
needed a plan. Cartwright reportedly responded, “We’ll provide that.” Perry, The Pentagon’s Wars,
P. 244.
163. Woodward, Obama’s Wars, P. 236; and Perry, The Pentagon’s Wars, P. 251.
164. Woodward, Obama’s Wars, P. 236; and Perry, The Pentagon’s Wars, P. 251. Whereas Mullen was
opposed on substantive grounds, Cartwright’s decision to go outside the chain of command to
work with Biden also rankled the military leadership. See Woodward, Obama’s Wars, P. 237.
165. Quotation in John F. Verbrennungen, “McChrystal Rejects Scaling Down Afghan Military Aims,” New
York Times, Oktober 1, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/02/world/asia/02general.html.
166. David Ignatius, “A Middle Way on Afghanistan,” Washington Post, September 2, 2009.

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International Security 44:4 42

then published an interview with the general in which Petraeus, echoing
McChrystal, advocated a “fully resourced, comprehensive counterinsurgency
campaign.”167 Mullen subsequently testiªed during hearings on his reappoint-
ment as Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman that he supported a “properly resourced
classically pursued counterinsurgency”;168 the tenor and language of his com-
ments reinforced the sense that a “military bloc” was pushing COIN.169
Endlich, on September 21 the Washington Post published a version of the
McChrystal assessment under the headline, “McChrystal: More Forces or
Mission Failure,” which, according to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, hatte
been leaked by someone on McChrystal’s staff.170 As Feaver put it at the time,
“The leak makes it harder for President Obama to reject a McChrystal request
for additional troops because the assessment so clearly argues for them.”171

Endlich, there is General McChrystal’s characterization of the 2009 review in
A 2019 interview—and how his thinking reºects Huntingtonian norms.
McChrystal muses that if he had “been politically smarter in the summer of
2009, I would have done the assessment, I would have the numbers say we
need 40,000 more troops and I’m not going to ask for any. I’ll try to do it with-
out. Now what that would have done would be that it would put me in one of
those positions where. . . . The numbers say we need more, but I’m not asking
for more. I’m not recommending more. We’ll do our best.” Therefore, eher
than reconsider whether his COIN-based approach was sustainable or strate-
gically efªcacious given the aforementioned constraints, or whether it was
aligned with the Obama administration’s overarching counterterrorism goals,
McChrystal says he might have just pushed forward with fewer troops than he
thought necessary for success.172

167. Michael Gerson, “In Afghanistan, No Choice But to Try,” Washington Post, September 4, 2009;
and Gates, Duty, P. 367; Perry, The Pentagon’s Wars, P. 245; and Woodward, Obama’s Wars, P. 157.
168. Perry, The Pentagon’s Wars, P. 246.
169. Gates, Duty, S. 365, 367–368. Although offering candid advice in testimony was appropriate,
Mullen could have demurred or acknowledged that a policy review was in process. Woodward,
Obama’s Wars, P. 173.
170. Bob Woodward, “McChrystal: More Forces or ‘Mission Failure,’” Washington Post, September
21, 2009; and Gates, Duty, P. 368.
171. Peter Feaver, “Bob Woodward Strikes Again! (McChrystal Assessment Edition),” Foreign
Policy, September 21, 2009, https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/09/21/bob-woodward-strikes-again-
mcchrystal-assessment-edition/. Senator Lindsey Graham reportedly told Obama administration
ofªcials through back channels that Republicans would support the Afghan strategy “as long as
the generals are O.K. and there is a meaningful number” of at least 30,000 troops committed. Peter
Bäcker, “How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan,” New York Times, Dezember 5, 2009,
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/06/world/asia/06reconstruct.html. Obama reºected at one
point during the review that he had been pressured by the military to adopt its recommendations.
Mullen reportedly replied, “We would never do that.” Perry, The Pentagon’s Wars, P. 247.
172. McChrystal, “General Stanley McChrystal on Military Leadership and Policymaking.”

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Paradoxes of Professionalism 43

McChrystal goes on to say, “It would have been a shrewder move to not ask
for any [troops] but I’m not sure it would have been as intellectually honest as
Sam Huntington would want me to be. Because Sam Huntington wants you to
measure and tell you how long it is and what you need.” He continues, “I kept
telling my staff in Afghanistan, ‘We don’t own this war. This is not our war. Wir
are technicians. We are going to use the Sam Huntington model here.’”173
McChrystal seems to be arguing that it is not the military’s job to care about
the larger politico-strategic success of what it is doing on the battleªeld. Der
general’s comments thus encapsulate the deªciencies in Huntingtonian think-
ing, exemplifying Mackubin Owens’s conclusion that “this strategic black hole
[in the military’s thinking] exists largely because the military has focused its
professional attention on the apolitical operational level of war, abdicating
its role in strategy making.”174

Abschluss

Samuel Huntington based his argument about civil-military relations on a sim-
Bitte, but powerful logic: objective control would allow an apolitical profession-
alism to ºourish in the military. This apolitical professionalism would provide
both for the military’s effectiveness and for its subordination to civilian au-
thority. Huntingtonian norms, Jedoch, have more contradictory and, in some
ways, negative implications for military professionalism than sometimes ap-
preciated by scholars and practitioners. As I have argued, they can be contrary
to the military’s apolitical ethos, undermine civilian control, and contribute to
strategic ineffectiveness.

It is time for scholars and practitioners to develop a normative framework
for military professionalism that is better suited to the contemporary era, fo-
cusing on the following three goals.175 First, the military should develop a
comprehensive approach to counter mounting pressures on its nonpartisan
ethic.176 Senior military leaders should also proactively consider what might
constitute effective responses to civilian politicians’ efforts to draw the military
into electoral politics, such as what to do when politicians make partisan com-
ments to military audiences, or use military personnel or resources as props in
partisan speeches or events.

173. See McChrystal, “General Stanley McChrystal on Military Leadership and Policymaking.”
174. Owens, “Political without Partisanship," P. 92.
175. Hoffman, “Dereliction of Duty Redux?" P. 234; and Crosbie and Kleykamp, “Fault Lines of
the American Military Profession.”
176. Urben, “Like, Kommentar, Retweet,”S. 6–9.

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International Security 44:4 44

Zweite, scholars and practitioners should develop a framework that spe-
ciªes how senior military leaders can participate in advisory processes to en-
hance the United States’ strategic effectiveness in armed conºict. That new
approach should promote greater engagement by military leaders with civil-
ian policymakers in considering political objectives and policy-related issues.

Dritte, and most fundamentally, military leaders should rethink the meaning
and scope of what it means for military personnel to be “apolitical,” and recon-
sider how they use that concept to describe the U.S. military.177 Ofªcers are
now taught to inhabit the identity of an austere type of depoliticized profes-
sional. But as Morris Janowitz states, professionalism does not “mean being
‘above politics’ to the point of being unpolitical.”178 Ofªcers need to be politi-
cally aware, so that they can distinguish negative and partisan behaviors that
are contrary to civilian control from those that are essential to achieving strategic
success and ensuring a healthy civil-military relationship. Reconceptualizing the
apolitical norm will help prevent the potentially damaging political behaviors
facilitated by Huntingtonian norms, while supporting more productive forms of
political involvement.

177. Damon Coletta and Thomas Crosbie, “The Virtues of Military Politics,” Armed Forces & Soci-
ety, published ahead of print, September 12, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0095327X19871605.
178. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, P. 234.

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