Matthew Bunn and Martin B. Malin
Enabling a Nuclear Revival—
And Managing Its Risks
As John Holdren points out in the introduction to this Innovations special issue,
the world will need to produce huge quantities of energy in the 21st century to meet
the needs of a growing world population, while also working to lift billions of peo-
ple out of poverty. Providing this energy at a reasonable cost, without causing
unmanageable climate disruption, security risks, or other environmental devasta-
tion, will be one of the century’s most daunting challenges. This challenge will be
even more difficult to meet if nuclear energy does not play a substantial part. Aber
achieving the scale of nuclear energy growth required while managing the risks of
that growth will be a major challenge in itself, one that will require both technical
and institutional innovations.
Consider the scale of growth that is needed for nuclear energy to make a mean-
ingful contribution to mitigating carbon emissions. One oft-cited 2004 Analyse
broke down the problem of shifting away from a business-as-usual energy path
into seven “wedges”—different technologies that would each grow to displace a
billion tons of carbon emissions per year by 2050 (siehe Abbildung 1).1 More recent sci-
ence suggests that 10 Zu 15 such wedges are likely to be required, as business-as-
usual emissions are higher than previously projected, the carbon-absorbing prop-
erties of the oceans appear to be weaker, and the atmospheric concentration of car-
bon required to avoid disastrous climate consequences seem to be even lower than
once thought. For nuclear power to provide even one such wedge would require a
Matthew Bunn is an Associate Professor at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy
School of Government. He is the winner of the American Physical Society’s Joseph A.
Burton Forum Award for “outstanding contributions in helping to formulate policies
to decrease the risks of theft of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials,” and the
Federation of American Scientists’ Hans Bethe Award for “science in service to a more
secure world,” and is an elected Fellow of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science.
Martin B. Malin is Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard Universität. Prior to coming to the Kennedy School, he served as Director of
the Program on Science and Global Security at the American Academy of Arts and
Wissenschaften.
© 2009 Matthew Bunn and Martin B. Malin
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Matthew Bunn and Martin B. Malin
Figur 1. Stabilization Wedges.
Quelle: S. Pacala and R. Socolow “Stabilization Wedges,” Wissenschaft, Bd. 305, 13 August 2004, P. 969.
“BAU” refers to the “business as usual” scenario, which project ever-increasing carbon emissions;
“WRE500” refers to one particular emissions path for stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of
greenhouse gases at 500 parts per million of carbon dioxide.
tripling of global nuclear capacity by 2050, while simultaneously replacing nearly
all the reactors now operating as they reach the end of their useful lives. This would
entail increasing the pace of construction from four nuclear plants connected to
the grid each year worldwide—the current rate—to 25 plants on average every year
for the next 40 Jahre. Since there is no possibility that rate of growth will be
achieved in the next few years, the pace at the end of the period would have to be
still higher, in the range of 30 Zu 50 reactors per year worldwide.2
To achieve this level of growth, nuclear energy must become dramatically more
attractive to utilities, governments, and publics around the world. This would
require reducing costs, preventing any substantial accident, avoiding terrorist sab-
otage, finding politically sustainable solutions to nuclear-waste management, Und
ensuring that nuclear energy does not contribute (and is not seen as contributing)
to the spread of nuclear weapons to proliferating states or terrorist groups.
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Enabling a Nuclear Revival—and Managing Its Risks
Darüber hinaus, these challenges are interconnected and can only be addressed effective-
ly in an integrated fashion. Zum Beispiel, we must take measures to improve
nuclear safety and security that are also affordable, and we have to find acceptable
ways of disposing of waste without increasing proliferation risks.
Zusamenfassend, nuclear safety, security, Nichtverbreitung, and waste management are
essential enablers for large-scale nuclear energy growth. It is very much in the
world’s interest—and the nuclear industry’s interest—to drive the risk of catastro-
phe as close to zero as possible. Even a single catastrophe—whether a Chernobyl-
scale accident, a successful
sabotage
“security
(A
Chernobyl”), oder, worse yet,
a terrorist nuclear bomb—
would doom any prospect
for nuclear growth on the
scale needed to make a sig-
nificant contribution to
coping with
climate
ändern.
Nuclear energy must become
dramatically more attractive to
utilities, governments, and publics
auf der ganzen Welt. This would
require reducing costs, preventing
any substantial accident, avoiding
terrorist sabotage, finding
politically sustainable solutions to
nuclear-waste management, Und
ensuring that nuclear energy does
not contribute (and is not seen as
contributing) to the spread of
nuclear weapons to proliferating
states or terrorist groups.
Although continued
R&D on new technologies
is important, the most crit-
ical near-term steps to
reduce
aus
the risks
nuclear energy and to
improve its chances of
playing a major role in
mitigating climate change
will be institutional, nicht
technical. For the long
Begriff, new reactor and
fuel-cycle designs that are
cheaper, safer, more easily
secured, more prolifera-
tion resistant, and more
appropriate for developing countries with modest electricity grids and technical
infrastructures could have a major impact on nuclear energy’s role in carbon mit-
igation. But even as low-risk new technologies come on line, the global risk of an
accident or sabotage is likely to be dominated by a handful of facilities—those
without the new safety and security features, and those in countries with weak
safety and security regulations and poorly trained staff who cut corners on safety
and security rules. Stronger global institutions and agreements are needed now to
identify and remedy problems at the highest-risk facilities; greater international
cooperation will be a necessary and essential part of a peaceful and vibrant nuclear
future.3
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Matthew Bunn and Martin B. Malin
This section of the Innovations special issue presents three particular institu-
tional innovations now being pursued that could make a real difference for the
future of nuclear energy and potentially for the planet. Tariq Rauf and Zoryana
Vovchok describe current efforts to establish an international “bank” for nuclear
Kraftstoff, giving countries guaranteed fuel supplies without having to build their own
plants to enrich uranium (plants that could also be used to produce more highly
enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons). Roger Howsley describes the
recently established World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS), designed to pro-
mote stronger nuclear security practices worldwide. Charles McCombie outlines
the possibility of regional or international management of spent nuclear fuel or
nuclear waste, avoiding the risks and costs of every country with even one nuclear
power plant establishing its own nuclear waste disposal site laden with plutonium-
bearing spent fuel—and potentially creating strong incentives for countries to rely
on international fuel supplies, rather than building their own enrichment and
reprocessing plants to produce and manage their nuclear fuel. In what follows we
provide an overview of some of the innovations that must be put in place to enable
future nuclear growth and to manage the resulting safety, security, and prolifera-
tion risks.
IMPROVING SAFETY
Nuclear plants today are dramatically safer than they were in the days of Three
Mile Island and Chernobyl.4 But the 2002 incident at the Davis-Besse plant in the
United States—where dripping boric acid ate away a football-sized hole in the
reactor pressure vessel head before it was discovered—is a potent reminder that
nuclear safety requires constant vigilance. Safety must continue to improve.
Tripling nuclear energy capacity by 2050 without increasing the risks of a nuclear
accident would require that the per-reactor annual accident risk be reduced by a
factor of three compared to today’s. Efforts to improve safety must focus particu-
larly on identifying and addressing the least safe facilities, which are likely to dom-
inate the global accident risks; these least-safe facilities are likely to be concentrat-
ed in three categories.
Erste, aging first-generation designs still pose significant safety risks that need
to be addressed. (Remarkably, a dozen reactors with the same design as Chernobyl
are still operating, Zum Beispiel; although a number of steps have been taken to
avoid a repeat of that accident, these reactors still lack modern containment ves-
sels and emergency core cooling systems.) Extending licenses and boosting the
designed power output in existing plants may be desirable for carbon mitigation
and profitable for the operators of those facilities, but such extensions must not be
granted without ensuring that every necessary step has been taken to ensure that
these reactors do not pose a substantially higher risk of a catastrophic radiation
release than more modern facilities. Those that cannot meet that goal should be
shut down.
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Enabling a Nuclear Revival—and Managing Its Risks
Zweite, there is the problem of “newcomer” countries that do not yet have
experience operating an effective nuclear regulatory system, building a sound
nuclear-safety culture, or providing trained and capable personnel. A major effort
will be necessary to help these countries put effective safety measures in place. Eins
approach that should be considered would focus on small, factory-built reactors
with high levels of built-in safety and security, which could be deployed at a site
and generate electricity for 10-20 years with few staff members on site, ein
approach sometimes referred to as the nuclear battery. An international nuclear
operating company could provide the initial staff and training for such facilities.5
Continued R&D, demonstrations, and institutional development would be need-
ed to bring such a concept to fruition.6
Dritte, there are reactors where the staff has a poor safety culture and does not
give safety measures the attention they require. While this category overlaps con-
siderably with the first two, safety culture is a major problem even in wealthy
developed countries that have been using nuclear power for decades. The Davis-
Besse incident already mentioned, Zum Beispiel, arose because of a fundamental
breakdown in the safety culture at the site and among regulators dealing with the
site at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, who allowed the site to postpone
inspections and did not follow up on earlier indicators of a potential problem.7
Even in the most advanced nuclear states, sustaining a strong safety culture as large
numbers of new plants are built and thousands of new personnel enter the nuclear
industry will pose a special challenge. China and India, with their near-term plans
for rapid construction of large numbers of new reactors, will face this challenge
acutely.
Operators of nuclear facilities, overseen by national regulators, are responsible
for addressing such problems and ensuring nuclear safety. But the consequences of
a major nuclear accident would extend far beyond national borders; the spread of
that realization after Chernobyl led to the establishment of a broad international
nuclear-safety regime. Today this regime includes international treaties such as the
Convention on Nuclear Safety, a variety of agreements on liability in the event of
a nuclear accident, a set of nonbinding international norms and standards, und ein
web of organizations that act to promote safety. The International Atomic Energy
Agentur (IAEA) has developed a series of safety standards and guides that do not
carry the force of international law but are nonetheless widely followed. The World
Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), an industry organization that includes
the operators of all the world’s nuclear power reactors among its members, Profi-
vides for exchanges of information on safety incidents, lessons learned, and best
safety practices, and organizes international peer reviews of safety arrangements at
member reactors. An IAEA program also offers peer reviews of safety arrange-
ments at individual reactors, along with other programs that offer reviews of reg-
ulatory practices and other matters. The IAEA and the OECD’s Nuclear Energy
Agency manage a global safety incident-reporting system. There are also bilateral
and multilateral nuclear safety assistance programs, international professional
associations and conferences, and other groups focused on nuclear safety.8
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Matthew Bunn and Martin B. Malin
This international regime has helped to achieve major improvements in
nuclear safety over the more than two decades since the Chernobyl accident, Aber
substantial gaps in the regime remain. The Convention on Nuclear Safety sets no
binding standards for how safe nuclear facilities should be.9 The IAEA peer reviews
occur only when a state asks for one, and most of the world’s nuclear power reac-
tors have never had such a review. Somit, when asked the question “which reactors
in the world pose the highest accident risks?” the IAEA has no real way of know-
ing the answer (though it can make some educated guesses). WANO peer reviews
are closer to being universal, but they are far less rigorous than, Zum Beispiel, those
of WANO’s U.S. affiliate, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, and WANO
promises its members that the results of these reviews will be kept confidential. Wenn
a WANO team finds a significant problem, WANO typically does not even tell the
national regulator, unless the facility’s operator agrees to do so. WANO officials
have warned that some operators are not implementing all the recommendations
of the peer reviews, so the same problems sometimes crop up on the next review.10
Both WANO and the IAEA have warned that some safety incidents are not being
reported, and some operators are not learning the lessons from incidents else-
Wo, so that the same kinds of problems continue to occur.11
In 2008, an international commission convened by the IAEA recommended
Das (A) the IAEA should lead efforts to establish a “a global nuclear safety net-
work” that would strengthen exchanges of safety-critical knowledge, Erfahrung,
and lessons learned; (B) im Laufe der Zeit, “states should enter into binding agreements to
adhere to effective global safety and standards and to be subject to international
nuclear safety peer reviews”; (C) the IAEA and relevant states should greatly
strengthen their efforts to help newcomer states “develop sound safety infrastruc-
tures”; Und (D) the IAEA should expand its efforts to help states around the world
assess and strengthen nuclear safety culture.12 The commission argued that the
IAEA’s budget for nuclear-safety activities should be substantially increased to sup-
port this larger role.
STRENGTHENING SECURITY
Nuclear security requires even more urgent action. Terrorists are actively seeking
nuclear weapons and the materials and expertise needed to make them, and have
seriously considered sabotaging nuclear power plants.13 The growth and spread of
nuclear energy—and potentially thousands of lives and billions of dollars—will
depend on the world’s ability to prevent either of these threats from materializing.
Achieving that goal will require major improvements in nuclear-security practices
in many countries around the world.
A potential nuclear revival has quite different implications for these two
threats. More nuclear reactors in more places need not increase the chance that ter-
rorists could get their hands on the material for a nuclear bomb. Heute, most
nuclear power reactors run on low-enriched uranium fuel that cannot be used in
a nuclear bomb without further enrichment, which is beyond plausible terrorist
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Enabling a Nuclear Revival—and Managing Its Risks
capabilities. These reactors produce plutonium in their spent fuel, but that pluto-
nium is 1 percent by weight in massive, intensely radioactive spent-fuel assemblies
that would be extraordinarily difficult for terrorists to steal and process into mate-
rial that could be used in a bomb. If this plutonium is separated from the spent fuel
by reprocessing, fabricated into new fuel, and shipped from place to place, Das
could increase the risk that terrorists could seize the material for a nuclear bomb
unless operators take extraordinary security measures throughout the process.
Glücklicherweise, economics and counter-terrorism point in the same direction in this
Fall: because reprocessing is much more expensive than simply storing spent fuel
pending disposal, few countries that do not already reprocess their fuel are inter-
ested in starting, and some of the existing plants are running far below capacity or
heading for shut down.
Trotzdem, many more nuclear power reactors in many more countries
would mean more potential targets for terrorist sabotage—and more chances that
some reactor’s security would be weak enough that an attack would succeed in
overwhelming built-in protections designed to reduce the risk of catastrophic dis-
persal of the reactor’s radioactive core. A successful sabotage would be a catastro-
phe for the country where it occurred, and for its downwind neighbors. But the
location of the reactor would determine the location of the damage; unlike readi-
ly transported nuclear weapons or materials, a successful attack on a reactor would
not threaten lives in countries thousands of kilometers away.
Bedauerlicherweise, in many countries, the security measures in place to prevent
theft of weapons-usable materials are demonstrably insufficient to defeat the kinds
of threats terrorists and criminals have shown they can pose. Infolge, theft and
illicit trafficking of nuclear materials is not a hypothetical concern but an ongoing
and current reality. The IAEA, Zum Beispiel, has documented 18 cases of theft or
loss of plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU)—the essential ingredients of
nuclear weapons—confirmed by the states concerned.14 That reality was driven
home in November 2007, when two armed teams simultaneously attacked the
Pelindaba nuclear facility in South Africa, which contains hundreds of kilograms
of HEU. One of the groups successfully disabled the security systems and the
attackers made their way to the control room, shooting a security officer there
before any alarm was sounded. Although they did not seize any HEU, they escaped
before external security reinforcements arrived and were never apprehended.15
Given incidents such as these and the major improvements in nuclear safety in
recent years, the probability of a catastrophic release caused by malevolent human
action—a successful sabotage or a terrorist nuclear bomb—may well be higher
than the chance of such a release occurring purely by accident. Wenn ja, a radical
change in nuclear security practices, Kultur, and regulation around the world is
erforderlich, for the emphasis in the industry today focuses overwhelmingly on safety
and far less on security.
As with safety, national authorities and facility operators themselves bear pri-
mary responsibility for providing effective security for nuclear weapons, weapons-
usable materials, and facilities that might be vulnerable to a catastrophic sabotage.
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Matthew Bunn and Martin B. Malin
But the international community—including the global nuclear industry—has an
overwhelming stake in ensuring that they carry out this responsibility effectively.
Bedauerlicherweise, international institutions for nuclear security are substantially
weaker than those for nuclear safety. Because the world has yet to witness a suc-
cessful act of nuclear terrorism, complacency is widespread; many policy-makers
and nuclear managers around the world dismiss the danger or assume that exist-
ing security measures are more than sufficient. Most countries view nuclear secu-
rity as an exclusively national responsibility, and shroud their practices in secrecy
to avoid having potential adversaries learn about the kinds of defenses they might
have to overcome.
The international conventions related to nuclear security,
einschließlich der
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facilities and the
International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, do not
set specific standards for how secure nuclear materials or facilities should be, Und
include no mechanisms for verifying that states are complying with their commit-
gen. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 legally obligates all U.N. member
states to provide “appropriate effective” security and to account for any nuclear
weapons or related materials they may have, but no one has defined what key ele-
ments are required for a nuclear security and accounting system to be considered
“appropriate” and “effective.”16 The IAEA has published physical protection recom-
mendations, but these are still vague; in the case of a substantial stock of plutoni-
um or HEU, Zum Beispiel, they call for having a fence with intrusion detectors but
say nothing about how difficult it should be to get past the fence or avoid setting
off the detectors. As in the case of safety, IAEA-led peer reviews of security are
entirely voluntary; much less than half of the world’s nuclear power reactors, Und
very few of the sites with HEU or plutonium, have ever had an international review
of their security arrangements.
The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program and similar bilater-
al and multilateral cooperation programs have played a crucial role in improving
nuclear security over the past 15 Jahre, particularly in the former Soviet Union.
The United States has invested billions of dollars in programs designed to help
countries install and operate improved security and accounting systems, and to
remove weapons-usable nuclear material entirely from a wide range of sites—for
Beispiel, by converting research reactors to use low-enriched uranium rather than
HEU. As a result of these efforts, nuclear security at scores of sites around the
world has been markedly improved, and dozens of additional sites no longer have
any weapons-usable nuclear material that could be stolen. 17 But there are still many
important vulnerabilities to be addressed, and these international cooperative pro-
grams have so far not focused in depth on addressing the danger of sabotage.
The world needs a fast-paced global campaign to strengthen nuclear-security
measures for all the sites and transports that handle nuclear weapons or weapons-
usable material, or that could result in a catastrophic release of radioactive mate-
rial if sabotaged. Plutonium and HEU that might be stolen reside not only in the
stockpiles of states with nuclear weapons, but also in civilian facilities that
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Enabling a Nuclear Revival—and Managing Its Risks
reprocess and fabricate plutonium and in research facilities that use HEU in
dozens of countries around the world. President Obama has pledged to lead “a new
international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world
within four years.”18 Achieving that objective will take sustained high-level leader-
ship, an effective and comprehensive plan, broad international cooperation, Und
adequate resources. The job will require convincing political leaders around the
world that nuclear terrorism is a real and urgent threat to their countries’ security,
worthy of increased investment of their time and resources, not just a figment of
overheated American imaginations.
As part of such a global campaign, a major effort is needed to reduce dramat-
ically the number of buildings and bunkers where nuclear weapons and the mate-
rials needed to make them exist. States must also agree on and implement effective
global standards for nuclear security, not only to prevent theft of nuclear weapons
or materials, but also the sabotage of nuclear reactors, so that all are providing
comparable levels of security against threats that terrorists have shown they can
pose. Endlich, to sustain nuclear security over the long run, those responsible for
providing security at individual nuclear facilities must foster a strong security cul-
ture in the workplace.19
In this volume, Roger Howsley describes a new institution, WINS, which may
play a key role in this effort. By providing a forum were nuclear security operators
can exchange best practices and ways to resolve common issues, WINS has the
potential to help strengthen nuclear security worldwide and to build up security
Kultur, convincing operators and staff that the threats are real and can be
addressed effectively without breaking the bank.
DEALING WITH NUCLEAR WASTES
As reliance on nuclear power increases, so too will the problem of how to deal with
highly radioactive nuclear wastes. Nuclear waste is expensive to process or dispose
of underground, politically unpopular to site, potentially vulnerable to sabotage
when left in overfilled pools at reactor sites, and contains plutonium that could be
reprocessed for use in nuclear weapons. Glücklicherweise, the technology of concrete
and metal dry-storage casks offers a cheap, safe, and proven means to store spent
nuclear fuel for decades while more permanent solutions are developed. But the
politics of waste storage and disposal remains a major problem, as President
Obama’s recent decision to cancel the Yucca Mountain nuclear-waste repository, In
the face of pressure from Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid of Nevada, makes
clear. Hier, zu, institutions will be critical in building trust and public support for
effective nuclear-waste management approaches.20 As Charles McCombie writes in
this issue, programs in which supplier states would “lease” fuel, taking back the
spent fuel after it was used, and regional repositories could provide a critical means
for small states to make use of nuclear energy without having to establish their
own nuclear-waste repositories—and without leaving plutonium-bearing spent
fuel scattered permanently in dozens of countries all over the world. “Shared dis-
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Matthew Bunn and Martin B. Malin
posal facilities for the spent fuel and highly radioactive wastes at the back end of
the fuel cycle,” writes McCombie, “should be one key component in a secure glob-
al [Kernenergie] system.”
REDUCING PROLIFERATION RISKS
There is also much to be done to ensure that the growth and spread of nuclear
energy will not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Preventing pro-
liferation is another key to large-scale nuclear energy growth. The proliferation
risks posed by nuclear reactors themselves are not zero—ordinary power reactors
produce plutonium in their spent fuel and require large staffs of trained people
who might later be turned to a nuclear weapons program, and substantial nuclear
bureaucracies that may advocate for a weapons program. But the biggest risks
come not from nuclear reactors but from the materials needed to make a nuclear
bomb, plutonium separated from spent fuel or highly enriched uranium, and from
the uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities that could be used
to make these potential bomb materials. A world of many more nuclear reactors
will require more uranium enrichment or more plutonium recycling, potentially
creating more challenges to safeguarding these materials, more companies work-
ing on enrichment technologies that might leak onto the nuclear black market, oder
more countries with facilities that could readily be turned to producing nuclear
bomb material.
Darüber hinaus, the nonproliferation regime has suffered a number of major blows
over the past several years. With North Korea becoming the first state to withdraw
from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NVV) and test a nuclear bomb, Iran
apparently seeking to come up to the edge of a nuclear weapons capability while
staying within the regime, and the A.Q. Khan network peddling dangerous nuclear
technologies across the globe, the need for action to strengthen the global effort to
stem the spread of nuclear weapons has never been clearer. And nations aspiring
to produce nuclear energy are not the only states that must renew their commit-
ment to uphold the basic rules and principles of the nonproliferation regime. To
gain international support for strengthened nonproliferation measures, Die
nuclear weapon states will have to be seen to be living up to their end of the non-
proliferation bargain as well by pursuing nuclear arms reduction and disarmament
in good faith.
Many steps will have to be taken to limit proliferation risks. Iran and North
Korea present the first and most urgent challenges. The outcome of today’s efforts
to walk North Korea back from the nuclear brink and to persuade Iran to accept
restraints on its fuel-cycle activities will have a major effect on whether nuclear
energy will spread peacefully or will become a hedge behind which nuclear new-
comers develop the necessary infrastructure to eventually build weapons. Der
United States and the other partners in relevant talks must engage directly with
North Korea and Iran, with packages of promised benefits and punishments large
enough and credible enough to convince these states that it is in their interest to
give up their nuclear weapon ambitions.
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Enabling a Nuclear Revival—and Managing Its Risks
welche
Beyond those two cases, some of the most important means of limiting the risk
of proliferation include phasing out the civilian use of HEU and minimizing civil
plutonium reprocessing; forging new approaches to the fuel cycle that limit the
spread of nationally controlled uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing
facilities; building new approaches to police, intelligence, and export control coop-
eration to stop black-
market transactions in
Technologie;
nuclear
strengthening interna-
tional safeguards; Und
strengthening enforce-
ment when states vio-
late their nonprolifer-
ation obligations.
Some of the most important means
of limiting the risk of proliferation
include phasing out the civilian use
of HEU and minimizing civil
plutonium reprocessing; forging
new approaches to the fuel cycle that
limit the spread of nationally
controlled uranium enrichment and
plutonium reprocessing facilities;
building new approaches to police,
intelligence, and export control
cooperation to stop black-market
transactions in nuclear technology;
strengthening international
safeguards; and strengthening
enforcement when states violate
their nonproliferation obligations.
One approach that
holds special promise
as a nonproliferation
tool is the proposed
IAEA-sponsored fuel
bank,
Ist
described by Tariq
and Zoryana
Rauf
Vovchok in this issue.
The idea is to provide
a nonpolitical, nondis-
criminatory mecha-
nism
for supplying
nuclear fuel to any
state that is in compli-
ance with its nuclear-
safeguard obligations.
Having an assured
backup if fuel supplies
were ever cut off could
strengthen
states’
incentives not to both-
er with the major investment required to build their own uranium enrichment
facilities, thus limiting the long-term proliferation risks posed by such facilities.21
As most countries already have high confidence in the existing commercial market
for fresh fuel, arrangements that would solve countries’ spent fuel problem by
allowing them to send their foreign-supplied spent fuel away—as described by
Charles McCombie in this issue—could provide an even more powerful incentive
for countries to rely on international fuel supply. In the future, as outgoing direc-
tor-general of the IAEA, Mohammed ElBaradei, has argued, the goal should be a
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Matthew Bunn and Martin B. Malin
shift toward international or multinational control of all enrichment and repro-
cessing—perhaps starting with new facilities and eventually converting existing
plants to some form of multinational ownership and control—“so that no one
country has the exclusive capability to produce the material for nuclear weapons.”22
New technologies and approaches to their use could raise significant future
barriers to proliferation. Some of the small “nuclear battery” reactor concepts
mentioned earlier, Zum Beispiel, are being designed to reduce proliferation risks
through a combination of technological innovation (such as sealed reactor cores
with no on-site access to the fuel) Und
new institutional arrangements (solch
as international firms to build, oper-
aß, and remove such reactors).23
These concepts are still in develop-
ment, Jedoch, and it remains to be
seen whether the promise of real sys-
tems will match that envisioned while
the reactors are still on paper. Im Par-
besonders, cost may be a major issue for
these designs: the nuclear reactors on
sale today are predominantly in the 1-
1.6 gigawatt-electric (GWe) Klasse
because of economies of scale, und es
remains to be seen whether very small
reactors can make up in economies of production scale what they lose in
economies of physical scale.
For decades to come, Es
will be institutional rather
than technological
innovations that
contribute the most to
stemming the spread of
nuclear weapons.
But for decades to come, it will be institutional rather than technological inno-
vations that contribute the most to stemming the spread of nuclear weapons.24 The
foundation of all the nonproliferation institutions is the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty; all states except India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea are
now parties. The NPT and the global nonproliferation regime have been largely
unheralded success stories. There has been no net increase in the number of states
with nuclear weapons in 20 Jahre (South Africa dropped off the list, becoming the
first case of real nuclear disarmament, and North Korea added itself to the list), ein
astonishing achievement, given that this 20 years included the chaos following the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the operation of the A.Q. Khan network in its export-
ing phase, and secret nuclear weapons programs in Iraq, Libyen, Syrien, Iran, Und
Nord Korea. There are now more states that have started nuclear weapons pro-
grams and verifiably abandoned them than there are states with nuclear
weapons—meaning that nonproliferation efforts succeed more often than they
fail, even when states have already started down the nuclear-weapons road. Aber
given the new pressures the regime now faces, even stronger nonproliferation
agreements and institutions are needed to ensure continued success.
The IAEA is the primary international organization charged with overseeing
compliance with nonproliferation rules. Its safeguards agreements with member
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Enabling a Nuclear Revival—and Managing Its Risks
Staaten, Zum Beispiel, play a critical role in ensuring that the use of nuclear technol-
ogy in states without nuclear weapons remains peaceful. But IAEA safeguards have
important weaknesses, particularly in the difficult job of detecting undeclared
activities at covert sites. The IAEA faces significant constraints in its access to sites,
Information, resources, Technologie, and the Security Council. There are also
important issues of institutional culture that require constant attention; for exam-
Bitte, balancing the need to maintain positive relationships with states—which is
essential for the IAEA to do be able to do its work—with an appropriate investiga-
tory attitude is a continuous challenge.
With respect to access to sites and information, the “Additional Protocol” to
safeguards agreements, negotiated in the 1990s in response to the post-1991 reve-
lation of the full extent of Iraq’s nuclear activities, is a major advance. For those
states that agree to it, the Additional Protocol requires states to disclose more infor-
mation on nuclear-related activities, permits the IAEA access to an expanded set of
sites, allows for short-notice inspections, and is intended to provide at least limit-
ed confidence not only that a state is not diverting nuclear material from declared
nuclear facilities, but also that the state does not have secret, undeclared nuclear-
related activities. Jedoch, many issues remain. Erste, there are dozens of states,
some with significant nuclear activities, that have not acceded to the Additional
Protocol more than a decade after its adoption. Zweite, the Additional Protocol
still focuses the IAEA’s authority on sites involving nuclear material or the tech-
nologies to make such materials. When the IAEA wanted to visit, Zum Beispiel,
Parchin in Iran, to investigate accusations that explosive experiments related to
nuclear weapons might have taken place, there were no undisputed legal grounds
for doing so.25 To address some of these issues, former IAEA deputy director-gen-
eral for safeguards, Pierre Goldschmidt, has suggested that the U.N. Sicherheit
Council should pass a legally binding resolution that would impose a wide range
of additional safeguards obligations on any state found to be in violation of its
safeguards agreements, including broad-ranging inspections and a right for inter-
national inspectors to interview key scientists and other participants in nuclear
programs in private.26
With respect to resources, the IAEA’s budget for implementing nuclear safe-
guards worldwide is roughly the size of the budget of the Vienna police depart-
ment, a situation that clearly has limited what the IAEA can hope to do, even as the
demand for safeguards inspections is increasing. Bedauerlicherweise, the IAEA has been
caught up in the broader politics of efforts to reform the U.N. system and restrain
the growth of the budgets of U.N. agencies. At the same time, with the nuclear
revival increasing demand for nuclear experts in the private sector and IAEA
salaries and other personnel policies constrained by participation in the common
personnel system for all U.N. agencies, the IAEA has had increasing difficulty
recruiting and retaining the nuclear experts it needs to carry out its mission.
Roughly half of all senior IAEA inspectors and managers will reach the agency’s
mandatory retirement age within five years.27
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Matthew Bunn and Martin B. Malin
The IAEA and various of its member states are exploring a variety of new tech-
nologies that can contribute to the safeguards mission, from ever-evolving tech-
niques for analyzing tiny particles taken in swipes from nuclear facilities to systems
for monitoring the flow of nuclear materials in sensitive facilities in real time.
Finding hidden nuclear facilities remains a fundamental challenge, Jedoch.
Centrifuge enrichment plants, insbesondere, are small and potentially easy to hide;
a facility capable of producing enough material for a nuclear bomb every year
might not use any more power or cover any more area than a typical supermarket.
And, in manchen Fällen, the safeguards challenge is not just to develop the technology
but also to get industry to permit its use. The enrichment industry, Zum Beispiel,
has so far refused to allow the IAEA to use equipment for continuous monitoring
of the flow in their plants.
Endlich, there is the question of the will and effectiveness of the U.N. Sicherheit
Council in requiring states to comply with IAEA inspections, and in enforcing
nonproliferation obligations more generally. When North Korea was found to be
in violation of its safeguards obligations in the mid-1990s, the Security Council
issued a statement but did nothing more. In der Zwischenzeit, the United States reached an
accord with North Korea that postponed IAEA special inspections many years into
the future. More recently, in the case of Iran, the U.N. Security Council passed
legally binding resolutions requiring Iran to comply with IAEA inspection require-
gen, provide additional transparency to resolve key issues, and suspend its
enrichment and reprocessing activities. Iran has ignored these resolutions, leading
the Security Council to impose a series of mild sanctions against Iran that have not
caused that country to change course.
In 2008, an international commission on the future of the IAEA called on
states “to give the IAEA access to additional information, sites, and people, along
with the money, qualified personnel, and technology that it needs to carry out its
mission.” The commission made a wide range of more specific recommendations,
from universal adoption of the Additional Protocol to interpreting the agency’s
existing authority to give it the responsibility to “inspect for indicators of nuclear
weaponization activities.”28
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is also an important international non-
proliferation institution, but it faces ongoing challenges to its effectiveness and
legitimacy. Established in response to the 1974 Indian nuclear test, the NSG has
traditionally operated by consensus and, as more and more states have joined, con-
sensus on modernizing its rules has become more difficult to achieve. Most NSG
Teilnehmer, Zum Beispiel, strongly support making the Additional Protocol a con-
dition for nuclear exports from NSG states, but Brazil (which has not accepted the
Protocol) has resisted. Canada has similarly refused to agree that enrichment tech-
nologies be exported only on a “black-box” basis, d.h., without the recipient being
able to have access to the technology.29 Turkey recently objected to a proposal that
would allow exporting states to consider proliferation problems in a recipient’s
geographic region when deciding whether to approve an export.30 NSG members
have held several rounds of discussions on strengthening export guidelines, Aber
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Enabling a Nuclear Revival—and Managing Its Risks
such objections have so far stalled these efforts. Some key states that may be wor-
risome sources of nuclear technology—including Pakistan, Indien, Israel, Norden
Korea, und Iran, among others—are outside of the NSG. The NSG also has a prob-
lem of legitimacy as a self-selected group: many developing countries believe the
NSG is effectively a cartel that unfairly restricts nuclear trade, and is contrary to
the NPT requirement to cooperate in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
The past decade has seen a variety of efforts at institutional innovation in the
nonproliferation regime. With the advent of the Additional Protocol, the IAEA is
in the process of a fundamental shift from simply measuring the nuclear material
at declared facilities to a “state-level approach” that seeks to understand all the
nuclear activities of each state, and to look for hints of secret, undeclared facilities.
In the aftermath of the A.Q. Khan network and the 9/11 attacks, the U.N. Sicherheit
Council unanimously passed Resolution 1540, which legally requires every U.N.
member state to take a wide range of actions, from establishing “appropriate effec-
tive” export controls and security for nuclear stockpiles to criminalizing any effort
to help nonstate actors with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.
Bedauerlicherweise, Jedoch, no one has yet fleshed out what specific measures are
required for export control or nuclear-security systems to meet the “appropriate
effective” standard, and relatively little has been done to help states put effective
systems in place.
Efforts to get states to work together to prevent proliferation without new
treaties or organizations may also, over time, lead to building new institutions.
After an embarrassing episode in which the United States found it had no author-
ity to stop a ship and seize its cargo on the high seas, even though it was carrying
North Korean missiles to Yemen (there was no agreement preventing Yemen from
making such a purchase), the Bush administration launched the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI), a voluntary grouping of countries that agrees to stop ships
or aircraft carrying illicit nuclear, chemical, biological, or missile cargo when they
are flying the flag of a participating country or in one of those countries’ waters or
airspace.31 While the Bush administration went out of its way to avoid institution-
alizing the PSI and the later Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism out of
a misplaced allergy to international institutions, President Obama has argued that
because these threats are likely to be long-lasting, both should be turned “into
durable international institutions.”32
Some innovations were less positive or less successful. In 2005, Zum Beispiel,
President Bush reversed years of international nonproliferation policy by agreeing
to supply civilian nuclear technology to India, even while India continued its
nuclear weapons program. The Nuclear Suppliers Group eventually blessed this
new arrangement, creating a situation in which some non-nuclear-weapon states
saw India getting all the benefits they received for being a party to the NPT with-
out joining the treaty or even capping its growing nuclear-weapons stockpile, let
alone giving it up. The Bush administration also called for a major international
discussion of strengthening the safeguards system, but this effort collapsed in dis-
array with no agreement on even the most modest new steps.33 Similarly, Die 2005
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Matthew Bunn and Martin B. Malin
review conference for the NPT fell apart without reaching any agreements, in large
part because of the Bush administration’s refusal to even discuss the disarmament
commitments that all parties had agreed to at the previous review.
Glücklicherweise, with President Obama’s commitment to “a world without nuclear
weapons,” along with renewed support for negotiating deeper near-term reduc-
tions in U.S. and Russian nuclear arms, ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, and negotiating a verified cutoff of the production of fissile materials for
weapons, the atmosphere in international nuclear discussions has changed dra-
automatisch, greatly improving the prospects for the next NPT review in 2010.34 Von
course, the goal of zero nuclear weapons is a long-term prospect, and it is not yet
certain whether it can be achieved. But it is crucial to begin taking steps in that
Richtung, reducing the nuclear danger at each step.
Fundamentally, strengthened nonproliferation measures are critical to a safe
future for nuclear power, but they will not get international support unless
President Obama and the leaders of the other nuclear weapon states make good on
their NPT obligation to negotiate in good faith toward nuclear disarmament.
Reducing existing arsenals may not have any effect on convincing North Korea or
Iran not to want nuclear weapons, but it will have a major effect on convincing
other countries to vote for stronger inspections, enforcement, Exportkontrollen, Und
the like, all of which will help cope with the challenges posed by states violating the
regime. A future of expanded reliance on nuclear power necessarily implies a
future of much reduced reliance on nuclear weapons.
ENABLING A SAFE, PEACEFUL, AND VIBRANT NUCLEAR FUTURE
Creating the conditions for nuclear energy to grow on the scale needed for it to be
a significant part of the world’s response to climate change without posing undue
risks is a global challenge. New steps to ensure safety, security, waste management,
Nichtverbreitung, and progress toward disarmament will be essential to success. Alle
of these will require close international cooperation and stronger international
institutions. In particular, achieving the safe, secure, and peaceful growth of
nuclear energy will require an IAEA with more money, more authority, mehr
Information, more technology, and more support from the U.N. Sicherheitsrat.
With nuclear energy growth still proceeding at a modest pace and much of the
industry focused on the inevitable difficulties of building the first few reactors of
the new generation of designs, many policymakers have been putting off the issues
addressed here for a later day. But it will take time to build the institutions needed
to guide a peaceful and vibrant nuclear future. It is essential that governments act
in time, before an accident or terrorist attack shows us where and how we were too
spät.
Endnotes
1. S. Pacala and R. Socolow, “Stabilization Wedges,” Science, August 13, 2004, S. 968-972.
2. Pacala and Socolow envision 700 1-gigawatt nuclear plants substituting for efficient coal plants by
2050. The existing roughly 370 gigawatt-electric (GWe) of nuclear energy will also have to be
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Enabling a Nuclear Revival—and Managing Its Risks
replaced by 2050, for a total requirement to build over 1,000 1-GWe reactors in the next 40 Jahre.
In der Tat, since the “business-as-usual” scenario presumably already includes a substantial amount
of reactor construction, adding 700 reactors would require a still faster pace of reactor construc-
tion.
3. For a similar argument, see Commission of Eminent Persons, Reinforcing the Global Nuclear Order
for Peace and Prosperity: The Role of the IAEA to 2020 and Beyond (Vienna: International Atomic
Energy Agency, Mai 2008).
4. The authors are grateful to Andrew Newman for research assistance with this section.
5. See U.S. Außenministerium, “Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement: Pursuant to Section
123A. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as Amended, With Respect to the Proposed Agreement
for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the United Arab Emirates Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy” (Washington, Gleichstrom:
Außenministerium, April 2009), P. 4.
6. For a discussion of the potential nonproliferation advantages of such reactors in the context of
large-scale growth and spread of nuclear energy, see Harold Feiveson, Alexander Glaser, Marvin
Müller, and Lawrence Scheinman, Can Future Nuclear Power Be Made Proliferation Resistant?
(College Park, MD: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, University of
Maryland, Juli 2008); see also http://cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/future_nuclear_power.pdf
(accessed June 29, 2009). For an article advocating a multinational consortium to provide and
operate such reactors around the world, see Evgeniy Velikhov, Vyacheslav Kuznetsov, and Vladimir
Schmelev, “Proposal for Nuclear Power Development on the Basis of Serial Medium-Capacity
NPP in Non-Proliferation Conditions,” paper presented at Achieving a World Free of Nuclear
Weapons: International Conference on Nuclear Disarmament, Oslo, Norwegen, Februar 2008,
http://disarmament.nrpa.no/wp-content/uploads/2008/02/Paper_Kuznetsov.pdf (accessed July
15, 2009).
7. Sehen, Zum Beispiel, UNS. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC’s Regulation of Davis-Besse
Regarding Damage to the Reactor Vessel Head, Inspector General Report on Case No. 02-03S
(Washington, Gleichstrom: Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Dezember
2002),
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-gen/2003/02-03s.pdf (accessed June 29,
2009), and U.S. Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Regulation: NRC Needs to More
Aggressively and Comprehensively Resolve Issues Related to Davis-Besse Nuclear Plant’s Shutdown,
GAO-04-415 (Washington, Gleichstrom: GAO, Mai 2004), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04415.pdf
(accessed June 29, 2009).
30,
8. For an overview of nuclear safety institutions and recommendations, see International Nuclear
Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), Strengthening the Global Nuclear Safety Regime, INSAG-21
(Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 2006). A useful summary of recent activities can be
found in International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2007,
GC(52)/INF/2 (Vienna: IAEA, Juli 2008),
http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC52/GC52InfDocuments/English/gc52inf-2_en.pdf
(abgerufen im Juli 3, 2009).
9. For an intriguing assessment of the convention and a suggestion of an alternative approach, sehen
Jack N. Barkenbus and Charles Forsberg, “Internationalizing Nuclear Safety: the Pursuit of
Collective Responsibility,” Annual Review of Energy and Environment, Bd. 20 (1995), S. 179-212.
10. See Ann MacLachlan, “WANO Warns Safety Lapse Anywhere Could Halt ‘Nuclear Renaissance,’”
Nucleonics Week, September 27, 2007.
11. In der Tat, In 2006, then-WANO managing director Luc Mampaey complained that some utilities
were not reporting incidents at all, and some types of incidents were continuing to recur despite
repeated WANO reports about them. Mampaey warned that safety lapses anywhere could bring
a halt to the nuclear revival. See MacLachlan, “WANO Warns.” Improving incident reporting
and implementation of lessons learned is a major focus of INSAG, Strengthening the Global
Nuclear Safety Regime.
12. Commission of Eminent Persons, Reinforcing the Global Nuclear Order.
13. For an overview of nuclear security issues focusing primarily on nuclear weapons and materials,
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Matthew Bunn and Martin B. Malin
see Matthew Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2008 (Cambridge, MA: Project on Managing the Atom,
Harvard University), and Nuclear Threat Initiative, November 2008). For an overview of the
problem of nuclear sabotage, see Committee on Science and Technology for Countering
Terrorismus, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism
(Washington, Gleichstrom: Nationale Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2002), S. 39-64, http://books.nap.edu/open-
book.php?isbn=0309084814 (abgerufen im Juli 10, 2009).
14. IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database (Vienna: IAEA, September 2008),
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Features/RadSources/PDF/fact_figures2007.pdf (zugegriffen
Juli 3, 2009). Perhaps the best summary of the available data on nuclear and radiological
smuggling is “Illicit Trafficking in Radioactive Materials,” in Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan,
A.Q. Khan, and the Rise of Proliferation Networks: A Net Assessment (London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007), S. 119-138 (Lyudmila Zaitseva, principal author).
15. See “60 Minutes: Assault on Pelindaba,” CBS News, November 23, 2008,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/11/20/60minutes/main4621623.shtml (abgerufen im Juli 15,
2009). See also Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2008, S. 3-4, and sources cited therein.
16. For one attempt at such a definition, see Matthew Bunn, “‘Appropriate Effective’ Nuclear
Security and Accounting: What Is It?” presentation made at Appropriate Effective Material
Accounting and Physical Protection: Joint Global Initiative/UNSCR 1540 Workshop, Nashville,
Tennessee, Juli 18, 2008, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/bunn-1540-appropriate-effec-
tive50.pdf (abgerufen im Juli 15, 2009).
17. See Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2008, S. 17-113.
18. See The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Barack Obama,
Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-
By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/ (accessed June 6, 2009).
19. For specific suggestions in each of these areas, see Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2008.
20. Juhani Vira, “Winning Citizen Trust: The Siting of a Nuclear Waste Facility in Eurajoki, Finland,”
and Allison Macfarlane, “Is It Possible to Solve the Nuclear Waste Problem? Innovations Case
Diskussion: Siting of Eurajoki Nuclear Waste Facility,” Innovations: Technologie, Governance,
Globalization, Bd. 1, NEIN. 4 (Fallen 2006), S. 67-92.
Bd.
21. For a summary of proposals for strengthening fuel assurances see “12 Proposals on the Table”
bei
(Marsch
IAEA Bulletin,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull492/49204845963.pdf (accessed July
15, 2009). See also Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan and Debra K. Decker, “Insure to Assure: A New
Paradigm for Nuclear Nonproliferation and International Security, “ Innovations: Technologie,
Governance, Globalization, Bd. 4, NEIN. 2, (Frühling 2009), S. 139-155.
verfügbar
2008),
62-63,
NEIN.
S.
49,
2
22. Mohamed ElBaradei, “Reviving Nuclear Disarmament,” conference on “Achieving the Vision of
a World Free of Nuclear Weapons, Oslo, Februar 26, 2008.
23. See Feiveson, Glaser, Müller, and Scheineman, Can Future Nuclear Power Be Made Proliferation
Resistant?
24 For the most complete available listing of relevant institutions, see James Martin Center for
International Studies, Inventory of
bei
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of
International Nonproliferation
http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/index.htm (abgerufen im Juli 6, 2009).
and Organizations,
verfügbar
Regimes
25. Infolge, the IAEA asked Iran to voluntarily accept a visit to that site, and Iran eventually did
Also.
26. Pierre Goldschmidt, “IAEA Safeguards: Dealing Preventively with Non-Compliance”
(Washington, Gleichstrom: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Belfer Center for Science
Und
2008),
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Goldschmidt_Dealing_Preventively_7-12-08.pdf
(abgerufen im Juli 6, 2009).
International
Universität,
Harvard
Affairs,
Juli
12,
27. Commission of Eminent Persons, Reinforcing the Global Nuclear Order, S. 29-31.
28. Commission of Eminent Persons, Reinforcing the Global Nuclear Order, S. 18-20.
29. Daniel Horner, “NSG Mulling New Text on Criteria for Sensitive Nuclear Exports” Nuclear Fuel,
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Enabling a Nuclear Revival—and Managing Its Risks
Bd. 33, NEIN. 24, (Dezember 1, 2008).
30. Mark Hibbs, "UNS. Effort to Contain ENR Technology Encounters Resistance in Islamic World,”
Nuclear Fuel vol. 34, NEIN. 12 (Juni 15, 2009).
31. Mark J. Valencia, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: A Glass Half-Full,” Arms Control Today,
Juni 2007, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_06/Valencia (abgerufen im Juli 6, 2009).
32. The White House, “Remarks by President Barack Obama,” op. cit.
33. Sehen, Zum Beispiel, Mark Hibbs, “Board Sinks IAEA Safeguards Panel with No Agreement on
Improvements,” Nuclear Fuel, Juli 2, 2007.
34. For Obama’s statement, see The White House, “Remarks by President Barack Obama,” op. cit.
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