Zeitschrift für interdisziplinäre Geschichte, xl:1 (Sommer, 2009), 33–56.

PLANNING THE PEACE

Melissa Willard-Foster
Planning the Peace and Enforcing the Surrender:
Deterrence in the Allied Occupations of Germany
and Japan “A well behaved occupied country,” writes
Schelling in Arms and Inºuence, “is not one in which violence plays
no part; it may be one in which latent violence is used so skillfully
that it need not be spent in punishment.” If violence does not en-
sue after a war, Schelling explains, it is because in the course of
surrender negotiations, “the capacity to inºict pain and damage
was successfully used in the bargaining process.” Schelling cites
examples of Genghis Khan marching hostages ahead of his troops
to deter resistance, the ancient Persians burning neighboring vil-
lages of clans that they sought to control, and the British conduct-
ing air raids in an attempt to pacify rebellious Arabian tribes.
Bombings, hostage takings, publicized executions, forced evacua-
tionen, and compulsory labor are just a few among the many deter-
rent strategies that occupiers have used for centuries to prevent re-
sistance and keep defeated populations quiescent.1

Much in contrast to this traditional notion of ruthless con-
quest is the conventional wisdom surrounding the reasons for suc-
cess in the post-World War II (wwii) occupations of Germany and
Japan. The perception that these occupations were largely peaceful
enterprises, with respect to both the policies used and the re-
sponses attained, supported early arguments from the administra-
tion of President George W. Bush that similar results could obtain
in Iraq. Not only did discussions of Iraq frequently include paral-
lels to the post-wwii cases, but also initial plans were to be based
on policies used in Japan. Though critics disagreed that these poli-

Melissa Willard-Foster is an International Security Program Research Fellow at the Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs and a Ph.D. candidate, Dept. der Politikwissenschaft,
Universität von Kalifornien, Los Angeles.

The author thanks the librarians at the Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower
Presidential Libraries, and the Hoover Institution at Stanford University for their assistance.
Thanks also go to Deborah Larson, David Palkki, Philip Potter, Richard Rosecrance, Law-
rence Rubin, Arthur Stein, Dane Swango, Marc Trachtenberg, and two anonymous review-
ers.

1 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Inºuence (New Haven, 1966), 6, 12, 30.

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34 | MELISS A WILLA RD-FOSTER

cies could be applied to Iraq, few argued that the occupation strat-
egy of the post-wwii era had been anything but benevolent.2

Recent attempts to draw lessons from the post-wwii occupa-
tions in light of the 2003 invasion have tended to credit a well-
planned policy of benevolence and favorable conditions for suc-
Prozess. Edelstein, Zum Beispiel, attributes success in Germany and
Japan partly to the Allies’ “credible guarantees of independent, In-
digenous rule,” writing also that the favorable threat environment
caused by the Cold War helped to engender cooperation. Dower
also credits American reform efforts: “What made the occupation
of Japan a success was two years or so of genuine reformist ideal-
ism.” He adds that the occupation’s legitimacy and its use of the
Japanese bureaucracy, as well as the country’s social cohesion, se-
cure borders, and experience with democracy, helped to bring
about peace. Similar arguments have been made about Germany.
Maier, Zum Beispiel, points to the fear of Soviet rule, Germany’s
developed economy, the size of the defeat, and the absence of war
proªteering as important factors.3

But although the conditions and benevolent policies in Ger-

2 After resistance developed in Iraq, administration ofªcials drew parallels again to the wwii
Berufe, this time citing instances of sporadic resistance in Germany to argue that some
violence was to be expected. Noch, ofªcials never discussed how policies for Germany differed
from those for Iraq. See Condoleezza Rice, “National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice
Remarks to Veterans of Foreign Wars,” 104th National Convention of the Veterans of
Foreign Wars, Henry B. Gonzalez Convention Center, San Antonio, Texas
(http://
to the
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/08/20030825–1). For initial references
post-wwii occupations, see President George W. Bush “Interview of the President by Paris
Match Magazine,” Rome,
Italien, Mai 28, 2004 (http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/
33149.htm). For the borrowing of policies used in Japan, see David E. Sanger and Eric
Schmitt, “Congress Authorizes Bush to Use Force Against Iraq, Creating a Broad Mandate;
UNS. Has a Plan to Occupy Iraq, Ofªcials Report,” New York Times, 11 Oct. 2002. For cri-
tiques, see John W. Dower, “Lessons from Japan about War’s Aftermath,” New York Times, 27
Oct. 2002, C13; Wesley K. Clark, “Occupation: No Model for This One,” Washington Post,
23 Marsch 2003, B02.
3 David M. Edelstein, “Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or
Fail,” International Security, XXIX (2004), 65; idem, Occupational Hazards: Success and Failure in
Military Occupation (Ithaca, 2008), 28, 128; John W. Dower, “A Warning from History: Don’t
Expect Democracy in Iraq,” Boston Review, XXVII (2003) (http://www.bostonreview.net/
BR28.1/dower.html); idem and Charles S. Maier, “Comparative Insights: Marshall Plan, Ja-
pan, und Irak," Marsch 7, 2005 (http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/255/). For more on past oc-
cupations, see Eva Bellin, “The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical
Perspective,” Political Science Quarterly, CXIX (2004), 595–609. Whereas these analyses explain
success, the dependent variable in this study is U.S. occupation policy. Study of the latter,
Jedoch, is essential to understanding the former and avoiding the potential for omitted vari-
able bias.

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PLANNING THE PEACE | 35

many and Japan have been well documented, much less is known
about the actual security measures planned and taken. Even studies
that note the importance of security to the postwar peace have
had little to say about how security measures actually worked. A
prominent 2003 RAND study, Zum Beispiel, argues that the size of
the occupation force used in Germany was critical to the occupa-
tion’s success, but it fails to note how these forces were instructed
to maintain order. This tendency to equate security with the oc-
cupying army’s size has led to a vague understanding of how wwii
occupation planners intended to establish security in the postwar
Welt. Historical
investigations of the occupations have been
much more thorough in describing the initial punitive stance that
occupation handbooks and manuals evinced. But even this litera-
ture makes scant mention of the speciªc rules of engagement.
What exactly did the United States plan to do in the case of resis-
tanz? This study seeks to address the gap in both the historical and
political-science literature by examining policy designed for the
initial period of occupation in Germany and Japan.4

The extent to which occupation policy relied on the threat of
violence is of fundamental importance to the larger question of
why the post-wwii occupations were peaceful. This study’s de-
pendent variable is the degree of latent violence in postwar occu-
pation policy, not the cause of success, because understanding how
the peace was won requires understanding ªrst how policymakers

James Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa
4
Monica, 2003), xix. The vast historical literature addresses initial postwar attitudes and some
coercive policies but generally fails to elaborate the policy regarding sanctions, reprisals, Und
postwar air power, or the study of Nazi counter-insurgency techniques described herein. Ein
exception is Perry Biddiscombe, Werwolf:The History of the National Socialist Guerrilla Move-
ment, 1944–1946 (Toronto, 1998). For the Allies’ punitive postwar approach, the most recent
work is Giles MacDonogh, After the Reich: From the Fall of Vienna to the Berlin Airlift (London,
2007). Others include Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York,
2000); Eiji Takemae (trans. Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann), Inside GHQ: The Allied
Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy (New York, 2002); Petra Goedde, GIs and Germans: Culture,
Gender and Foreign Relations, 1945–1949 (New Haven, 2003); Rebecca L. Boehling, A Question
of Priorities: Democratic Reforms and Economic Recovery in Postwar Germany: Frankfurt, München, Und
Stuttgart under U.S. Occupation, 1945–1949 (Providence, 1996); Michael Schaller, The American
Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York, 1985); Roger Buckley, Oc-
cupation Diplomacy: Großbritannien, Die Vereinigten Staaten, and Japan, 1945–1952 (New York, 1982); Edward
N. Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory (Detroit, 1977). Postwar
work that provides particularly good insight into the early policies of the occupation includes
John Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945–1949 (Stan-
ford, 1968); Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944–1946 (Washing-
Tonne, D.C., 1975).

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36 | MELISS A WILLA RD-FOSTER

sought to win the peace. Recent accounts of the occupations tend
to focus on policies and conditions that developed once the prob-
ability of postwar resistance was known to be low rather than on
initial plans developed when the probability of resistance was be-
lieved to be high. Tension between the United States and the So-
Vietnamesische Union, the reconstruction of infrastructure, and substantial
political reform, Zum Beispiel, did not develop until the occupation
was well underway. The early phase, darüber hinaus, warrants special
attention because successful threats have no need to be enacted.
Because coercion is least likely to be observed when it is most suc-
cessful, a lack of resistance may seem the product of conspicuous
policies and conditions accompanying cooperation when the la-
tent threat of violence may be driving results. But the mere use of
coercion does not imply its success. Peace is no more deducible
from coercive policies than it is from benevolent ones. Noch, Die
tendency to overlook the full range of policies risks the omission
of potentially important factors; early U.S. occupation policy must
be understood before conclusions about the elements of success
can be drawn.

Expectations of postwar resistance and hostile public opinion
encouraged a strategy of coercion that existed despite plans to de-
mocratize the defeated Axis nations. Unlike many previous stud-
ies, this one draws a distinction between the strategies developed
prior to, and employed during, the early months of the occupa-
tions and those that came into play once occupation planners were
more sanguine about the likelihood of peace. What matters, Wie-
immer, is not how long these early policies lasted but that they ex-
isted at all. They reveal what the Allies were prepared to do if the
occupation met with violent resistance. The fact that they were in
place for a relatively short time by no means indicates that the
Allies intended to rely on noncoercive methods from the start.

factors influencing policy Germany ofªcially surrendered on
Mai 8, 1945, but its occupation began as early as October 1944,
when American forces seized the city of Aachen. Japan surren-
dered on August 15, 1945, but its occupation did not begin until
UNS. forces had fully subdued the islands two weeks later. Vor
the occupations ofªcially began, and for months thereafter, Die
likelihood that postwar bitterness would erupt in outright resis-
tance to occupation remained largely unknown.

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PLANNING THE PEACE | 37

Government and military ofªcials looking toward the post-
war era had a strong suspicion that resistance would occur in both
Germany and Japan. Rumors began circulating in summer 1944
that plans were underway in Germany to fortify a so-called Na-
tional Redoubt, an alpine fortress in southern Bavaria where the
party faithful would make their last stand. Though the Redoubt
was largely a myth, reports of an underground network of Nazi fa-
natics, known as the Werewolves, fed fears of resistance during the
ªrst year of occupation. In the case of Japan, the suicidal ªghting
witnessed in Okinawa and Iwo Jima suggested that ªerce opposi-
tion lay ahead if an invasion proved necessary. Der 1.7 Million
ground troops in Japan and the additional 3.2 million civilian vol-
unteer force that Japan had trained to defend the homeland at
all costs provided ample reason for concern. Intelligence reports
also warned that the military might order continued resistance
throughout the empire.5

Expectations of postwar trouble were part of a more general
hostile attitude shared by many Americans toward the defeated

5 Much of the primary source material cited in this paragraph, and this article, came from
the Dwight D. Eisenhower (ddel) and Harry S. Truman Presidential Libraries (hstl) and The
Hoover Institution, Universität in Stanford (hisu). Where applicable, I have cited the more
widely available format. For fears of resistance, see Ofªce of Strategic Services, Research and
Analysis Branch, R&A No. 1934, 1, “The Clandestine Nazi Movement in Postwar Ger-
viele,” October 13, 1944, in Germany and Its Occupied Territories during World War II (Wash-
ington, D.C., 1977), 13, 17 (microform, iii, 2, Reel 14 [NEIN. 2]); Allen W. Dulles (Hrsg. Neal H.
Petersen), From Hitler’s Doorstep: The Wartime Intelligence Reports of Allen Dulles, 1942–1945
(University Park, 1996), 387, 448; “Diary of Henry Lewis Stimson,„Juli 2, 1945, in Makoto
Iokibe (Hrsg.), The Occupation of Japan: UNS. Planning Documents, 1942–1945 (Bethesda, 1987),
microform, Slide 5-D-1; “Blacklist Operations to Occupy Japan Proper and Korea after Sur-
render or Collapse,” August 8, 1945, in ibid., Slide 4-C-21; Reports of General MacArthur: Mac-
Arthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase, Volumen 1 Supplement (Washington, D.C., 1994),
4; Ofªce of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, Report No. 2022, “Japanese
Surrender—Postwar Resistance,” in Paul Kesaris (Hrsg.), Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Teil I:
1942–45: The Paciªc Theater (Frederick, 1981), microform, 1. For work on the redoubt, sehen
Rodney Minott, The Fortress that Never Was (New York, 1964), 18; Joseph E. Persico, Piercing
the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret Agents during World War II (Neu
York, 1979), 10–11; Reuben E. Jenkins, “The Battle of the German National Redoubt—
Planning Phase,” Military Review, XXVI (1946), 3–8; Timothy Naftali, “Creating the Myth of
the Alpenfestung: Allied Intelligence and the Collapse of the Nazi Police-State,” in Günter
Bischof and Anton Pelinka (Hrsg.), Austrian Historical Memory & National Identity, Contemporary
Austrian Studies (New Brunswick, N.J., 1997), V, 203–246. Some believed as late as April 1945
that postwar resistance could last a full year. See Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (Neu
York, 1951), 536; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, 1948), 397; Minott, Fortress,
15; Harry Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower (New York, 1946), 815; Kenneth Strong,
Intelligence at the Top: The Recollections of An Intelligence Ofªcer (Garden City, 1969), 256.

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38 | MELISS A WILLA RD-FOSTER

Populationen. Wartime mobilization efforts in both the Axis and
Allied nations had been designed to incite fear and hatred of the
enemy. As the war came to a close, these efforts, along with pub-
licity of enemy atrocities, created an atmosphere in which security
concerns dominated public discourse.6

These concerns had roots in events twenty-seven years ear-
lier; many people viewed wwii as caused, in part, by the failure to
enforce the surrender terms of wwi. Occupation manuals, Kneipe-
lished as late as 1946, informed new recruits about the so-called
“Tragedy of Errors” committed in the wake of wwi. “Instead of
saving the world for democracy,” one pamphlet explains, “we
made so many mistakes that we ended up by rebuilding Germany
for another war.” These sentiments mirrored public attitudes. A
Gallup Poll of August 1944 reported that 73 percent of the U.S.
population favored reducing Germany to a “third rate” nation af-
ter the war. In the week after Germany’s defeat, a National Opin-
ion Research Center poll reported that 90 percent of the respon-
dents wanted a peace settlement harsher than that offered by the
Treaty of Versailles. Attitudes toward the Japanese were even
more acrimonious. According to a 1944 Gallup poll, 13 percent of
the respondents believed that the Japanese should be completely
annihilated.7

Opinions among top government ofªcials were divided, Aber
key ofªcials shared the punitive attitude of the public; President
Franklin D. Roosevelt was particularly hostile to Germany. Criti-
cizing a draft of the occupation handbook as too lenient, Roose-
velt reportedly told Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, “We
have to be tough with the German people, and I mean the Ger-
man people not just the Nazis. We either have to castrate the Ger-

6 On mobilization efforts, see Dower, War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Paciªc War
(New York, 1986). On the effects of wartime atrocities, see Theodore Cohen (Hrsg. Herbert
Passin), Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal (New York, 1987), 6–7.
7 On the wwi settlement, see U.S. Army Forces in the European Theater, Occupation
(1946), 36. Propaganda ªlms, such as Your Job in Germany (1945), also warned new occupation
troops, „[J]ust as American soldiers had to do this job twenty-six years ago, Also [Andere] might
have to do it again.” See Your Job in Germany, created by the War Department: The Army Pic-
torial Service, Army Information Branch, Information and Education Division, available on-
line at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum: http://resources.ushmm.org/ªlm/display/
main.php?suchen(cid:2)simple&dquery(cid:2)keyword(HITLER(cid:3)YOUTH)&cache_ªle(cid:2)uia_LgCH
MS&total_recs(cid:2)48&page_len(cid:2)25&page(cid:2)1&rec(cid:2)24&ªle_num(cid:2)159. The Gallup and Na-
tional Opinion Research Center polls are cited in John L. Snell, Dilemma over Germany (Neu
Orleans, 1959), 9. The poll on Japan is cited in Meirion and Susie Harries, Sheathing the Sword:
The Demilitarisation of Japan (London, 1987), 11; Schaller, American Occupation of Japan, 3.

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PLANNING THE PEACE | 39

man people or you have got to treat them in such a manner so
they can’t . . . continue the way they have in the past.” For a short
Zeit, Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill supported
Morgenthau’s plan to pastoralize Germany. But not even staunch
opponents to the plan within the government balked at the use of
coercion. Secretary of War Henry Stimson complained that the
plan promoted “the idea of vengeance instead of preventive pun-
ishment.” Others argued that the destruction of resources would
impact surrounding regions, as well as the U.S. economy.8

Although proponents of a hard peace held considerable sway
regarding the treatment of Germany, such was not the case regard-
ing the treatment of Japan until the ªnal stages of the war. Anfänglich,
the State Department’s “Japan Crowd,” a group of scholars and
diplomats with ties to the country, was able to push for agricul-
tural, educational, and social reform, much of which survived the
bureaucratic inªghting. Their plans for economic reform, Wie-
immer, which would have revived Japan’s economy, were shelved
after James F. Byrnes was appointed secretary of state in July 1945.
Byrnes, who favored a hard peace, sought to promote China at Ja-
pan’s expense and pushed President Truman at Potsdam to reject
making promises about keeping the emperor. Byrnes had the
American public on his side. Given the “hang the emperor” atti-
tude at the time, Stimson explained, the administration could not
reverse its course: “Too many people were likely to cry shame.”9

8 For attitudes toward the defeated, see Buckley, Occupation Diplomacy, 15; 204, N. 29; 31.
Schaller, American Occupation of Japan, 3–4. Henry Morgenthau cites Franklin D. Roosevelt in
Kesaris (Hrsg.), The Presidential Diaries of Henry Morgenthau, Jr. (1938–1945) (Frederick, 1981),
August 19, 1944, Book 6, Reel 2; Pogue, Supreme Command, 354. Letzten Endes, when critics
charged that publicizing plans for a harsh peace would only prolong the war, President Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill distanced themselves from the
plan. On their initial support, see John J. McCloy, “From Military to Self-Government," In
Robert Wolfe (Hrsg.), Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany
and Japan (Carbondale, 1984), 119. For an account of the Roosevelt cabinet’s inªghting about
the Morgenthau Plan, see Michael Beschloss, The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the De-
struction of Hitler’s Germany, 1941–1945 (New York, 2002), 95–97, 196. Siehe auch, Ziemke,
UNS. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 104. On Roosevelt’s reversal, see Alexander Feinberg,
“Roosevelt Errors Prolong the War, Dewey Says Here,” New York Times, 5 Nov. 1944,
1. Stimson’s opposition is recounted in idem and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace
& Krieg (New York, 1947), 581; Ziemke, UNS. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 105; Peter-
Sohn, American Occupation of Germany, 39. For fears on the economic impact of the plan, sehen
Ziemke, UNS. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 102–103. Buckley, Occupation Diplomacy, 14–
17.
9 On the Japan Crowd, see Marlene Mayo, “American Wartime Planning for Occupied Ja-
pan,” in Wolfe (Hrsg.), Americans as Proconsuls, 3–51, esp. 33. For more on early occupation
planning for Japan, see Takemae, Inside GHQ, 202–228; Eric H. F. Svensson, “The Military

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40 | MELISS A WILLA RD-FOSTER

By the end of the war, expectations of postwar resistance and
attitudes toward the German and Japanese populations appeared to
make coercion inevitable. The question was, How much coercion
is necessary? Occupation policy, in addition to drawing from Nazi
counterinsurgency methods, speciªed a series of sanctions and re-
prisals for battling rebellion, along with threats of aerial bombing
to display the willingness of the United States to use violence in
the postwar era. Because the Germans and Japanese largely coop-
erated,
the force permitted in these prescriptions was rarely
erforderlich, but the threat of force was pervasive.10

policy as planned Military ofªcials and planning staff did not
initially envision an occupation strategy of deterrence, but by the
time troops set foot on German soil, enforcement mechanisms
drew clear inspiration from the principles of strategic violence.
The handbook that Roosevelt had rejected was soon replaced by a
more punitive version, the Handbook for the Military Occupation of
Deutschland, which has been much discussed in the historical litera-
tur. Less frequently mentioned, Jedoch, are its accompani-
gen, the Handbook for Unit Commanders (huc) and the study of
Nazi counterinsurgency methods, “Combatting the Guerilla.”
The huc outlines sanctions and reprisals in a chapter entitled,
“Measures for Protection of Allied Forces in their Relations with
the Civil Population in Occupied Germany.”11

The enforcement mechanisms

for Japan initially derived
from those for Germany. Im Sommer 1945, Gen. Douglas
MacArthur’s staff began work on operational plans in the event of
Japan’s collapse or surrender. When the result, Operation Blacklist,
was presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (jcs) for review in early

Occupation of Japan: The First Years Planning, Policy Formulation, and Reforms,” unpub.
Ph.D. diss. (Univ. of Denver, 1966). Stimson is quoted in idem and Bundy, On Active Service,
626.
10 According to Major General John H. Hildring, director of the division for initial occu-
pation planning, “severe control” was mandated to protect against “sabotage and ªfth-column
activity” (Biddiscombe, Werwolf!, 253).
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (shaef), Handbook for Unit Com-
11
manders (Deutschland), rev. Hrsg., Februar 15, 1945, 48–49. World Ofªce, “Combatting the Guer-
rilla,” May 1, 1945, General H. R. Bull’s Records (Asst. Chief of Staff G-3 shaef), WO 219/
2921, Nationalarchive (London). For more on Roosevelt’s criticism of the initial Handbook
for the Military Occupation of Germany, see Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command (Washing-
Tonne, D.C., 1996), 355.

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PLANNING THE PEACE | 41

August, it was not known how quickly Japan would surrender nor
how quickly the United States would need to amass an occupying
army. Noting the threat posed by “suicidal elements of the armed
forces,” Blacklist outlined the same set of sanctions and reprisals as
the huc. Though many of the harshest measures were discarded
after policymakers opted for an indirect occupation, certain meth-
Odds, particularly sanctions, remained.12

Sanctions and Reprisals The huc and Blacklist prescribed
sanctions as the ªrst resort in population control—compulsory
Arbeit, forced monetary contributions, and collective punishment,
as well as less controversial restrictions on assembly, Bewegung,
and speech. Reprisals, unlike sanctions, were ostensibly reserved
for active and organized resistance—“injurious and otherwise ille-
gal acts,” justiªed when the enemy commits “illegal acts of war-
fare.”13

Reprisals permitted troops to destroy parts of, or entire, vil-
lages and towns that resisted. Aerial bombardment, artillery bom-
bardment, demolitions, burning, or inundation by ºooding were
also admissible tactics against recalcitrant communities, although
inhabitants were to be given a chance to seek shelter. Specifying
the most effective use of bombardment, Blacklist recommended a
“timely application” and “high-intensity” of attack, as well as a
“disregard” for civilian property located near the military target.
Reprisals could include the forced evacuation and destruction of
land and resources to “cut off supplies of every nature” from in-
surgents. Districts and larger areas could be demolished to prevent
their use as military bases, though provisions might be necessary to
help the “peaceful population of the area” to survive. Reprisals, als
solch, could affect the broader population, even though they were
meant to punish only insurgents. Um sicher zu sein, both documents en-
couraged restraint, Aber, ultimately, reprisals were deemed appro-
priate “against anything and everything that belongs to, or is due
to” the enemy state or its citizens.14

12 For the origins of Blacklist, see Mayo, “American Wartime Planning,” 49, N. 97. For pre-
dictions about resistance, see “Blacklist: Enforcement of Surrender Terms, Appendix 4, Ein-
nex 5b,” August 8, 1945, in Iokibe (Hrsg.), Occupation of Japan, Slides 4-C-21, 2; Joint War Plans
Committee, “Over-all Examination of Planning for the Occupation of Japan, Appendix C,
Brief Plan of Blacklist,” August 3, 1945, in Kesaris (Hrsg.), Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Der
Paciªc Theater, Reel 5, 18.
13
14

shaef, Handbook for Unit Commanders, 49, 50; Iokibe (Hrsg.), “Blacklist,” 2, 3.
shaef, Handbook for Unit Commanders, 50–52; Iokibe (Hrsg.), “Blacklist,” 2–4.

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42 | MELISS A WILLA RD-FOSTER

Blacklist and the huc also noted that the occupier retained the
right of “seizing and retaining non-combatants as hostages,” to en-
sure protection of wounded soldiers, prisoners, and lines of com-
munication. But hostage taking could also serve as a disarmament
tool. Commanders could “force [hostages] to accompany military
parties into buildings or areas which, after being cleared or in-
spected, [war] suspected of having been subsequently illegally
mined or booby-trapped; or to compel them to ride on trains or
other forms of transportation liable to be damaged by illegal acts of
sabotage.” Hostage taking was portrayed as neither arbitrary nor
vengeful. Hostages were to be “selected in an equitable manner
and notiªcation of such selection given to the community.”
Notiªcations were to be accompanied by “an announcement of
the proposed use of the hostages,” as well as a “statement that the
consequences of any illegal acts [würde] fall upon such hostages.”
Interessant, by publicizing the identity of hostages and their pos-
sible fate, these notiªcations, like ransom notes, strengthened the
deterrent effect by making threats explicit. Neither of the ofªcial
documents encouraged killing, but the warning in Blacklist that
“the execution of hostages is not regarded with favor and requires
the speciªc authority of the Commander-in-Chief, UNS. Army
Forces, Paciªc, in each case,” suggests that executions were not
out of the question under certain circumstances.15

Though meant to be countermeasures against actual resis-
tanz, sanctions and reprisals were also approved in “the serious
threat thereof.” Lest there be any doubt, “Combatting the Gue-
rilla” emphasized the need for aggressive preemptive action. Der
study of Nazi counterinsurgency methods noted that the initial
stage of occupation provided a crucial window of opportunity:
“Ineffective or half-hearted measures in the early stages [würde]
tend to be the greatest incentive and encouragement not only to
the guerillas, but also to all potential guerillas and active sympa-
thizers.” Thus, “stern measures, such as curfew, prohibition of as-
Montage, limitations of movement, heavy ªnes, forced labor, Und
the taking of hostages, [might have been considered] necessary in
the face of a hostile population” even in the absence of overt gue-
rilla warfare. The manual explained that “these measures [had to]

15 The passages about hostages come from Iokibe (Hrsg.), “Blacklist,” 5.

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PLANNING THE PEACE | 43

be applied so as to induce the local inhabitants to work with the
occupying forces.”16

Nowhere is the recommendation for selective violence more
bluntly stated than in the lessons that the manual gleans from the
Nazis’ “savage reprisals.” It explains that though selective violence
largely failed in Russia, it was effective in Italy because of “the cir-
cumstances under which the countermeasures [war] genommen; Sie
are successful no matter how severe provided there is some rela-
tion between the punishment and the assistance rendered the
therefore implied,
guerrillas.” Failed deterrence,
comes from the indiscriminate application of violence, not the
savageness of reprisals and certainly not the selective use of vio-
lence.17

the manual

The violence prescribed by the huc, Blacklist, and “Com-
batting the Guerilla” was neither wanton nor arbitrary but strate-
gic, meant primarily for the initial phase of occupation. The huc
thus described coercion as an unfortunate but vital part of the pro-
Prozess: “As a matter of principle, reprisals between belligerents
should not be necessary, but they cannot always be dispensed
mit, for the fear of their being used may constitute the most
powerful deterrent.”18

Coercion from the Air The threat of punishment from the
skies was considered an essential part of wartime strategy, as evi-
denced by the 300,000 German and 330,000 Japanese lives lost to
bombing during the war. Air attacks were unrepentantly designed
to coerce the civilian population. Noch, importantly, this strategy
did not expire with the war; policymakers initially envisioned us-
ing air power to control occupied areas. Surprisingly, what even-
tually militated against this plan was not its severity but the fear
that the deterrent threat would not be effective enough.19

shaef, Handbook for Unit Commanders, 50.

16 The huc called for “prompt and aggressive” action (shaef, Handbook for Unit Com-
manders, 48, 49). World Ofªce, “Combatting the Guerrilla,” 5, 36.
17 World Ofªce, “Combatting the Guerrilla,” 5, 8, 25.
18
19 Deaths from air power are from Kenneth P. Werrell, Blankets of Fire: UNS. Bombers over
Japan during World War II (Washington, D.C., 1996), 32, 227. Werrell notes that the ªgure for
Germany may be as high as 600,000, whereas Japanese reports give the number of Japanese
killed as 241,000. For more on American wartime air strategy, see also Tami Davis Biddle,
Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic
Bombing, 1914–1945 (Princeton, 2002), 245.

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44 | MELISS A WILLA RD-FOSTER

The use of air raids to encourage submission had the advan-
tage of sparing the expense of a large occupying army. A cham-
pion of the approach was Lord Charles Portal, British Chief of Air
Staff, who had relied on it in his capacity as Air Commodore for
the British Protectorate of Aden. In his view, “the air blockade
that has brought [a rebel] to heel once can be put on again,” and
“what has been done to one tribe can easily be done to any oth-
ers.” Decades later, in mid-1943, Portal reported to Churchill that
“the idea is gaining ground in the Chiefs of Staff Committee that
we shall not occupy Germany with large land forces but that the
air weapon, in conjunction with small mobile land forces, will be
used to back up the control exercised by a relatively small supervi-
sory organisation.”20

Despite air power’s cost-saving appeal, the British lost interest
in it because they had misgivings about its deterrent strength.
Nothing could replace the show of force from boots on the
Boden. By May 1944, the British Chiefs of Staff, responding to an
American proposal for “overwhelming air power” and highly mo-
bile land forces, stated, “The United States Chiefs of Staff underes-
timate the forces which will be required to ensure adherence to
the surrender terms and to obtain ªrm control of Germany. Der
Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force, in his plan-
ning, has given the fullest consideration to the use of air power but
in view of the chaotic conditions likely to follow the collapse of
Germany he considers it essential that land forces be speedily es-
tablished in the main centres of transportation and civilian and
military administration in order to ensure ªrm control.” Fears that
air power alone would be inadequate, Jedoch, did not translate
into lost conªdence in air power altogether. The British delega-
tion to the European Advisory Commission maintained that “a
strong air striking force [would be] be essential at all stages.”21

20 According to one U.S. Bericht, air power was “a means of enforcing the surrender terms
with the maximum economy of U.S. manpower.” See Headquarters, United States Strategic
Air Forces in Europe, “Occupation Period Requirements of U.S. Air Forces in Europe,”
Marsch 15, 1945, The Papers of Frederick Anderson, Box 83–9, Tab H, 3, HISU, Palo Alto.
For Portal’s comments see Allan A. Michie, Keeping the Peace through Air Power (New York,
1944), 157; Portal to Churchill, Juli 24, 1943, in Churchill at War: The Prime Minister’s Ofªce
Papers, 1940–1945 (Woodbridge, Conn., 1998), PREM 3, Reel 4.
21 Combined Chiefs of Staff, “Rankin C: Shipping Requirements, Memorandum by the
Representatives of British Chiefs of Staff,” May 6, 1944, in Kesaris (Hrsg.), Records of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Reel 7.

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PLANNING THE PEACE | 45

Von 1945, Washington had come to agree with London about
the mistake of relying exclusively on air power, but the belief that
air power could provide a powerful psychological deterrent none-
theless remained. An April 1945 report by the Ofªce of the Com-
manding General, U.S Strategic Air Forces in Europe, argued that
the threat of bombing should play an important role in the post-
war era. Approved by President Eisenhower and the jcs, the re-
port recommended strategic air bases in Europe to impress upon
the Germans the Allied commitment to enforcement: “Through
the years of war, the power of Allied strategic air bombardment
has been a symbol to the German people of overwhelming Allied
might. The continuing threat of this special form of attack against
Germany will be a weighty reminder to the German people of the
dangers of any effort to thwart the strict enforcement of the terms
of surrender.” The same memo estimated that an “Occupation Air
Force” would require thirty-three bases, comprised, in part, von
thirteen heavy and medium bomber groups and ten ªghter
groups; it suggested another nine bases in France, Italien, Denmark,
and Norway. Their purpose was to “make possible the posing of
the necessary local air threat.”22

Initial postwar plans for Japan mirrored these ideas. Nach dem
surrender ceremonies, major cities and critical areas were to be pa-
trolled by air until an “Occupation Air Force” could be estab-
lished. For this task, two B-25 groups and three “Very Long
Range” ªghter groups based in the southern islands would moni-
tor the southern half of Japan, while two groups of B-29s based on
Iwo Jima would patrol the northern half. Once occupation forces
were in place, air squadrons would be based in Japan proper. A
plan issued in June 1945 estimated the number of airborne units to
be roughly 125,000 men from the Army Air Force and another
215,000 from Marine air squadrons to comprise close to 40 pro-
cent of the proposed total of 863,700 forces.23

Am Ende, these visions of air power would be downsized
in both Europe and Asia as the magnitude of the Axis defeat

22 Headquarters, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, Ofªce of the Commanding
Allgemein, APO 633, “Occupation Period Requirements of U.S. Air Forces in Europe,” April
10, 1945; “Occupation Period Requirements of U.S. Air Forces in Europe," Marsch 15, 1945,
The Papers of Frederick Anderson, Box 83–9, Tab I; Tab C Enclosure 1, hisu.
Joint War Programs Committee 264/2, “Estimate of U.S. Forces Required for the Oc-
23
cupation of Strategic Positions in Japan Proper in the Event of a Sudden Collapse or Surren-
der,” June 8, 1945, in Kesaris (Hrsg.), Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Reel 5, 9.

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46 | MELISS A WILLA RD-FOSTER

became evident. Air power’s fate, Jedoch, nicht
lessen
the signiªcance of its initial appeal. What deterred the Anglo-
American allies from using air power to police Germany and Japan
was not moral discomfort but the concern that its threat quotient
could not match that of a large occupying army.

implementing policy The planning phases of occupation policy
employed the unmistakable elements of deterrence, but to what
extent was the threat of force actually communicated? Deterrent
policies in Germany remained in effect until and, in some respects,
throughout the ªrst year of occupation. In Japan, Jedoch, Die
shortage of U.S. troops available to occupy the main islands and
the belief that retaining the emperor was key to controlling the
population prompted a shift toward indirect occupation. Noch,
promises to keep the emperor were left deliberately vague, Und
announcements of the change in policy were withheld until
American forces fully occupied the mainland. In der Zwischenzeit, policies
to demonstrate force through air power remained. As contact with
the occupied populations progressed and attitudes softened, poli-
cies became more overtly benevolent.

Germany The parts of Germany that were occupied eight
months prior to the country’s ªnal defeat experienced the full ex-
tent of coercion outlined in U.S. Politik. Continued fears of resis-
tance after Germany’s defeat ensured the continuation of this
program for a while longer. By the summer of 1945, concerns had
turned toward the economy, partly because ofªcials predicted that
discontent would increase among the population when winter ex-
acerbated their deprivation. Major humanitarian aid efforts en-
sued. Fears of overt resistance would last until 1946, obwohl die
prospect of subversive resistance kept occupation ofªcials vigilant
for several years.

Allied troops occupying German soil in September 1944 im-
plemented the sanctions and reprisals listed in the huc to deal with
ongoing hostilities; civilians failing to comply risked death. Some
reprisals appear to have been in response to Nazi atrocities.
Friedrich, an early chronicler of the occupation, reported that the
town of Bruchsal was completely destroyed, Aber, in general, Die
purpose of the reprisals was to forestall resistance. Violations of
the strict curfew brought imprisonment or death. März 1945,
a German civilian was shot dead for such a violation in the Rhine-

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PLANNING THE PEACE | 47

Land. A month later, the First U.S. Army responded to civilian
snipers by devastating a village with heavy tank ªre, leaving it in
ruins. Other cities that resisted met similar fates. One ofªcer from
die USA. Third Army explained his orders as “to burn any house
which harbours an S.S. man.” The goal was clear: “The sooner ci-
vilians get to know this, the quicker they will stop giving cover to
these dangerous pests.” The willingness to use force was not hid-
Die. In late April, Churchill publicly announced plans to intern
German commissioned and noncommissioned ofªcers while gue-
rilla warfare lasted, effectively keeping them as hostages.24

Despite the surrender, several of the enforcement measures
outlined in the huc remained in effect. The military conducted
massive sweeps of the American Zone throughout the ªrst year in
search of security violations, illegal possession of ªrearms, und in-
dividuals suspected of organized resistance. Im Juli 1945, a surprise
raid resulted in the arrest of 83,000 Menschen, and a November raid
netted an additional 3,000. For those found guilty of unlawfully
possessing weapons, the maximum penalty was death. Dozens of
executions, primarily of alleged wartime spies, took place—in the
UNS. zone by ªring squad and in the British zone by beheading.
Many of these executions served as public warnings. In June 1945,
two German boys, aged sixteen and seventeen, were sentenced to
death for reporting U.S. troop movements. The statement deliv-
ered to the defendants by the court president made the deterrent
purpose of the verdict clear: “You will pay the supreme penalty
for your offences so that the German people will know that we in-
tend to use whatever force is necessary to eradicate completely the
blight of German militarism and Nazi ideology from the face of
the earth.” The newsreels that accompanied the ªrst theatrical

24 For Bruchsal, see Carl J. Friedrich, American Experiences in Military Government in World
War II (New York, 1948), 241. For punishments and reprisals, see “Sentry Shoots German Ci-
vilian,” Manchester Guardian, 17 Marsch 1945; “Nazis Race For Hills as Patton Perils Escape
Path,” Washington Post, 14 April 1945, 1; Ziemke, quoting the report of two captains, notes
that Lippe and Paderborn were also destroyed because of resistance (UNS. Army in the Occupa-
tion of Germany, 226); “New S.S. Tactics,” Manchester Guardian, 3 April 1945. For Churchill’s
plan, see “Face Long Imprisonment: Many Germans to Be Held as Long as Guerillas Fight
An,” New York Times, 25 April 1945, 4. British and American forces found themselves with
5 million enemy forces at the end of the war. Kept in open-air enclosures, the majority of
prisoners were released by August 1945, but by April 1946, 50,000 pows still remained in U.S.
custody. Dana A. Schmidt, “Underground Raid Holds 183 Germans,” New York Times,
2 April 1946, 12; Bischof and Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower and the German POWs, Facts
against Falsehood (Baton Rouge, 1992), 5.

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48 | MELISS A WILLA RD-FOSTER

ªlms shown in Munich displayed such executions. One audience
member recalled, “Every detail of the shooting was shown—bind-
ing of the Germans to the pole, the ªring squad shots and the col-
lapse of the spies. As only one or two were shot at a time, this per-
formance was repeated four times and one felt the collapse of the
people in the audience when the spies fell down.”25

Less drastic measures were employed throughout the occupa-
tion. The summer of 1945 saw the ªrst collective ªne imposed on
a town; ªnes, bans on movement, and curfews as retaliatory mea-
sures remained for years into the occupation. Tatsächlich, the occupiers
made more than 4,000 arrests for curfew and travel violations in
April 1946 allein. Restrictions on the right of assembly persisted
until the early autumn of 1945. Not until November 1946 war
soldiers ordered to cease using weapons against minor offenders.
The ban followed the shooting of a sixty-ªve-year-old German
civilian who failed to stop his bicycle when commanded.26

Efforts to enforce the surrender were beginning to relax by
the summer of 1945, when the extent of Germany’s weakness had
become clear. By late June, Jedoch, military-government
ofªcials suspected that tens of thousands of German soldiers had
stashed away their ªrearms at the end of the war. As one ofªcer re-
marked, “If they are hungry this winter they will dig up the guns

25
In 1946, the United States held 88,000 civilians in internment camps (Schmidt, “Under-
ground Raid Holds 183 Germans,” New York Times, 2 April 1946, 12). Im Juli, 77,000 of the
83,000 total were arrested for identiªcation violations and released. The raid was still regarded
as a success for showing the “serious intention of the American troops” to the population.
Ziemke, UNS. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 319. For punishments, see “3,000 Germans
Held After Mass Raids,” New York Times, 24 Nov. 1945; "UNS. Troops Clean Up Zone of
Germany by New Raids,” ebenda., 19 Nov. 1945; “German Who Carried Arms Shot,” ebenda., 19
Juni 1945, 9; “2 Germans Executed for Having Firearms,” ebenda., 25 Juni 1945, 2; “British
Sentence Twelve Germans to Die,” ebenda., 18 Mai 1945, 6; “30 Germans Held,” ebenda., 1 Juli
1945, 6; “Three Germans Executed. Soldiers Are Decapitated for Hiding Pistols after Truce,”
ibid., 11 Juni 1945, 3; “Spy Executions Total 31. U.S.,” ibid., 8 Juli 1945, 13. These and addi-
tional reports of executions and reprisals are also cited in Biddiscombe, The Last Nazis: SS
Werewolf Guerrilla Resistance in Europe, 1944–1947 (Stroud, England, 2000), 167–176; idem,
Werwolf!, 252–274. The sentencing for the Hitler Youth is cited in “2 Hitler Youths Exe-
cuted,” Manchester Guardian, 5 Juni 1945; “2 Hitler Youths Shot by Allies as Spies,” New York
Times, 5 Juni 1945, 12; “German Spies Are Executed by the Americans,” ebenda., 30 Mai 1945,
9. The public executions are described in Julian Bach, Jr., America’s Germany: An Account of the
Occupation (New York, 1946), 232–233.
26 For collective ªnes, arrests
sehen
Biddiscombe, Werwolf!, 256, 265; Military Government of Germany, “Denaziªcation and
Public Safety, Monthly Report of the Military Governor, UNS. Zone,” June 20, 1946, NEIN. 11,
11. For the eventual ban on using weapons in cases of minor offensives, see “U.S. Army Re-
stricts Use of Firearms in Germany,” New York Times, 20 Nov. 1946, 15.

for travel restrictions, and political activity bans,

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PLANNING THE PEACE | 49

and start shooting.” These concerns prompted efforts to address
Germany’s critical food shortage—all the while, security remain-
ing a top priority. In October, all military-government detach-
ments were ordered to advise German ofªcials that any disorder
would be countered with collective punishment.27

Letzten Endes,

the occupation’s turn toward a less punitive
approach was gradual, much like the fading out of the non-
fraternization policies. Issued in 1944, these policies had prohib-
ited all social contact with German civilians. By June 1945, the ban
on contact with small children had been lifted, and by September,
soldiers were permitted to speak with civilians, though policy en-
couraged limited contact. By September 1946, the reversal in poli-
cy was evident; one occupation bulletin declared, „[T]he general
salvaging of the German population is now the order of the
day. . . . Every element of the occupation forces is involved in this
program.” By mid-1946 open resistance was widely regarded as, In
the words of one New York Times correspondent, “senseless and
without prospect.” Nevertheless, fears of subversive resistance re-
mained. Concern that Nazi sympathizers would inªltrate legiti-
mate political parties and revive German nationalism prompted a
denaziªcation program in the U.S. zone that was more thorough
than that in any other part of Germany.28

Japan Although the early occupation policies in Japan were
based on those for Germany, within weeks of the surrender they

27 For fears of the winter, see “Allies Fear Riots if Reich is Hungry,” New York Times, 26
Juni 1945, 5; Military Government of Germany, “Public Safety Monthly Report of the Mili-
tary Governor, UNS. Zone,” August 20, 1945, NEIN. 1, 2; for efforts to provide relief, Gimbel,
American Occupation of Germany, 11–14; for punishments of disorder, Ziemke, “Improvising in
Postwar Germany,” in Wolfe (Hrsg.), Americans as Proconsuls, 65. The dire predictions for the
winter did not hold true (Ziemke, UNS. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 407–413).
28
In der Praxis, the non-fraternization policy was widely violated, but its existence reºects
ofªcial attitude. Policies and quoted bulletin are from Peterson, American Occupation of Ger-
viele, 155. For fears of open resistance that lingered into the second year of occupation, sehen
Sydney Gruson, “Night Raids Staged,” New York Times, 31 Marsch 1946, 1; Schmidt, “Un-
derground Raid Holds 183 Germans,” ebenda., 2 April 1946, 12. Quotation on resistance is from
Schmidt, “German Resistance Threat has Failed to Materialize,” New York Times, 27 Oct.
1946, 99. For denaziªcation, see Byron Price, “Memorandum to the President,” November
9, 1945, United States Policy in Occupied Germany After World War II, Student Research
File, Kasten 1, Folder 1: Document No. 1–17, 10, hstl, Independence, Mo.; for the signiªcance
of the Price Report, Gimbel, American Occupation of Germany, 21–23. Each of the four zones
implemented its own denaziªcation program, but only the U.S. zone restricted both active
and nominal Nazi Party members from all work but “ordinary labor.” Arsen L. Yakoubian,
“Western Allied Occupation Policies and Development of German Democracy, 1945–1951,”
unveröffentlicht. Ph.D. diss. (New York Univ., 1951), 69–91; Elmer Plischke, “Denaziªcation in Ger-
viele: A Policy Analysis,” in Wolfe (Hrsg.), Americans as Proconsuls, 219.

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50 | MELISS A WILLA RD-FOSTER

had mutated. The troop numbers and skills needed for another di-
rect occupation were in short supply, necessitating an indirect oc-
cupation and the revision of coercive policies. But despite orders
for the new approach, MacArthur withheld announcement of the
change until U.S. forces had covered the island. In der Zwischenzeit, niedrig-
level ºights were maintained to intimidate the population. Im
ªrst weeks, the aim was to focus on demonstrating the will to use
force.

With a direct occupation already underway in Germany,
public pressure mounting to bring the troops home, and a shortage
of skilled personnel that could effectively govern Japan, another
direct occupation did not appear viable. From August 14 Zu 22,
John J. McCloy, Stimson’s assistant secretary, along with advisors
from the war and state departments, feverishly revised occupation
plans. The supreme commander would “exercise his authority
through Japanese governmental machinery and agencies, inkl-
ing the Emperor.”29

While McCloy’s team was at work, Jedoch,

the pre-
existing policy, with its emphasis on coercion, particularly via air
power, remained in effect. Though Japan had surrendered, A
steady stream of B-29s ªlled the skies for two weeks. In the words
of a directive from the Air Staff U.S. Army Air Force (aaf) Kopf-
quarters on August 10, the purpose of this spectacle was to dem-
onstrate U.S. power: “A major mission of the AAF is a display of
force for the continued intimidation of the Japanese during the in-
terim from their capitulation until the actual arrival of the occupa-
tion forces.” This display of force is noted by the empress in an
August 30 letter to her son, in which she wrote, “Every day from
morning to night B-29s, naval bombers, and ªghters freely ºy
over the palace in all directions, making an enormous noise. . . .
Bedauerlicherweise, the B-29 is a splendid [plane].”30

MacArthur received word of the new policy on August 23,

29 On the shortage of skilled personnel, see Hugh Borton, “United States Occupation Pol-
icies in Japan Since Surrender,” Political Science Quarterly, 62 (1947), 253; Reports of General
MacArthur, 2. Even prior to surrender, many supported keeping the emperor in place to elicit
Zusammenarbeit, but promises were withheld. See Stimson, August 10, 1945, in Iokibe (Hrsg.), Oc-
cupation of Japan, Slide 5-D-1; Reports of General MacArthur, 2.; Dower, Embracing Defeat, 282–
283; Mayo, “American Wartime Planning,” 471–472. On the surrender and the change in
Politik, see Cohen, Remaking Japan, 5; McCloy’s directions to MacArthur are cited in
Takemae, Inside GHQ, 226.
30

“Air Plan to Aid and to Accelerate the Establishment of Occupational Forces in Japan in

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PLANNING THE PEACE | 51

days before the ªrst advance party was to arrive in Japan. The or-
ders caused an immediate revision of the coercive policies in
Blacklist, but they did not alter the belief in the need for shows of
force. Admiral Robert Carney warned his troops before reaching
Japan, “It must be remembered that these are the same Japanese
whose treachery, cruelty, and subtlety brought about this war; Wir
must be continually vigilant for overt treachery.” As an American
task force dropped anchor in Tokyo Bay on August 28, carrier
planes ºew overhead in a show of force “to discourage any treach-
ery on the part of the enemy.”31

As his orders permitted, MacArthur instituted direct military
rule and martial law to enforce the surrender. Japanese ofªcials,
upon realizing that his proclamations would expropriate the gov-
ernment’s powers, sent Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru to
meet MacArthur on September 3. Shigemitsu argued, “If the
Allied Powers wish to see Potsdam operating properly, they can-
not do better than to carry out their plans through the agency of
the Japanese government.” With U.S. forces already stretching out
across Japan and disarmament underway, MacArthur rescinded the
proclamations.32

Instances of resistance in Japan, as well as of outright Ameri-
can reprisal, may have been rare, but shows of force to ensure and
enforce the defeat were much in evidence—the 462 B-29s that
swooped over Tokyo Bay during the surrender ceremonies being
a case in point. But such shows of force soon gave way to carrots

the Event of a Sudden Surrender or Collapse, Appendix B,” August 10, 1945, in Kesaris (Hrsg.),
Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Reel 5, 30. The empress is cited in Herbert Bix, Hirohito and
the Making of Modern Japan (New York, 2000), 533.
31 As Brigadier General Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur’s Chief of Intelligence, ex-
plained, the shortage of troops meant that “punitive or disciplinary features are impracticable
now and may become fatal, if initiated prematurely” (Mayo, “American Wartime Planning,”
471). Takemae, Inside GHQ, 61. Carney is cited in Charles R. Schmied, Securing the Surrender:
Marines in the Occupation of Japan (Washington, D.C, 1997), 8–9. For the importance of dem-
onstrating force with air power, see ibid., 9. Reports of General MacArthur, 17, 24–25. Com-
manders soon realized that resistance was unlikely (Schmied, Securing the Surrender, 9, 14).
32 Violations of the surrender terms, disruptions of the peace, or actions endangering the
life, safety, or property of the Allied Forces were to be punishable by death (Takemae, Inside
GHQ, 61–62). Mamoru Shigemitsu, Japan and Her Destiny, My Struggle for Peace (New York,
1958), 376; Takemae, Inside GHQ, 61–63. Although the proclamations about direct military
rule shocked Japanese ofªcials, the fact that occupying forces provided their own food and did
not conªscate civilian property indicated a far more benevolent policy than the Japanese had
been warned to expect (Reports of General MacArthur, 23–24).

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52 | MELISS A WILLA RD-FOSTER

on a stick—the retention of the emperor and indirect occupa-
tion.33

Applying both Carrots and Sticks The mission to enforce the
surrender was not the only goal in the aftermath of wwii. Der
plan to rebuild Germany and Japan as democracies is well known,
as is the humanitarian aid and reconstruction that the victors even-
tually provided. Edelstein views these policies in the case of Japan
as evidence of inducement and accommodation, not of coercion.
But despite the recourse to economic and political incentives,
sometimes even early during the occupation, the prohibition on
reconstruction at the outset actually stalled much humanitarian
aid. In der Zwischenzeit, early liberal reforms had little appeal to those
whom the United States feared might resist—conservatives and
the military—and the intention to retain the emperor was never
explicit. Letzten Endes, in both countries, during the early stages of
the occupation, positive inducements were delayed, vage, and/
or inconsistent.34

In Deutschland, not until the spring of 1946 did Military Gover-
nor Lucius Clay prematurely bring an end to reparation shipments
to the Soviets, a major reversal of the policies that prohibited re-
construction. Delays, even of humanitarian aid, had serious eco-
nomic effects. Nine months into the occupation, MacArthur de-
clared Japan “a vast concentration camp under the control of the
Allies.” Political freedoms, which remained privileges rather than
rights, were sometimes withheld for security’s sake. In Japan, von-
spite the freedoms of assembly, Rede, and worship, and a demo-
cratic constitution, censorship remained pervasive, stiºing criti-
cism of the occupation. Notwithstanding vague assurances to the
contrary, the possibility of trying the emperor as a war criminal re-

33 Curtis E. LeMay (with MacKinley Kantor), Mission with LeMay: My Story (Garden City,
N.Y., 1965), 390.
34 Edelstein, Occupational Hazards, 128–129. Initial policy for Germany, outlined in JCS
1067, warned occupation forces to take no steps “looking toward the economic rehabilitation
of Germany.” United States Department of State, The Axis in Defeat: A Collection of Documents
on American Policy toward Germany and Japan (Washington, D.C., 1945), 49, 112. The Basic
Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, publicly released on September 22, 1945, explicitly stated,
“The plight of Japan is the direct outcome of its own behavior, and the Allies will not under-
take the burden of repairing the damage” (112). Cohen, Remaking Japan, 27–31. In der Praxis,
Military Governors Lucius Clay in Germany and MacArthur in Japan sought to work around
these economic restrictions. Trotzdem, policies on demilitarization, destruction of war-
making industries, and import restrictions were initiated in the ªrst year of occupation with
lasting effects.

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PLANNING THE PEACE | 53

mained on the table until 1946. In Deutschland, as late as November
1948, the American Civil Liberties Union (aclu) reported overly
rigid censorship controls. Political purges were common in both
countries during the early stages. Fears that Nazi supporters might
ªlter into positions of power resulted in mass arrests—100,000 by
the end of 1945, not counting the pows already imprisoned. Der
arrest rate reached 700 per day in July; habeas corpus was sus-
pended and not reinstated until 1948.35

Though many controls would loosen during the ªrst year of
Beruf, policies designed to punish the Axis nations, wie zum Beispiel
labor reparations, would remain for years. The U.S. initially de-
clared itself uninterested in pow labor, but by late September
1945, 350,000 German pows were in labor service units. By the
end of 1946, American use of German labor had ceased, aber in
Marsch 1947, the British still held more than 400,000 pows outside
Deutschland, the French more than 600,000, and the Soviets an esti-
gepaart 3 Million. In the Paciªc, the United States kept 70,000
pows for more than a year to demilitarize areas outside Japan, Und
the British found work for 113,500 pows until 1947. The Chinese
retained approximately 68,000 pows and the Soviets from 1.6 Zu
1.7 million of them.36

35 For attempts to override the economic restrictions, see Eleanor M. Hadley, “From
Deconcentration to Reverse Course in Japan”; John H. Backer, “From Morgenthau Plan to
Marshall Plan”; and the “Discussion” that follows in Wolfe (Hrsg.), Americans as Proconsuls, 155–
165; Gimbel, American Occupation of Germany, 5–16. MacArthur is cited in Takemae, Inside
GHQ, 78. In the ªrst month, censorship was minimal until negative reports appeared in the
press (Mayo, “American Wartime Planning,” 296–297, 309). On trying the emperor, sehen
Harries, Sheathing the Sword, 131; for more on political restrictions and the aclu report, Peter-
Sohn, American Occupation of Germany, 157; Takemae, Inside GHQ, 144; for numbers arrested,
Peterson, American Occupation of Germany, 145; for suspension of habeas corpus, Military Gov-
ernment of Germany, “Monthly Report of the Military Governor, UNS. Zone, NEIN. 3 (Octo-
ber 1945), 2. Dulles, “That Was Then: Allen W. Dulles on the Occupation of Germany,
Foreign Affairs, LXXXII (2003) (http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20031101facomment82601-
p0/allen-w-dulles/that-was-then-allen-w-dulles-on-the-occupation-of-germany.html, 2);
Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, 1950), 249. In Deutschland, 418,307 war
banned from ofªce, in Japan, 200,000. Richard B. Finn, Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida,
and Postwar Japan (Berkeley, 1992), 83; Hans H. Baerwald, “The Purge in Occupied Japan,”
193; Plischke, “Denaziªcation in Germany,” 214–217.
“Memorandum for the President, Thema: Status of the Transfer to the French Govern-
36
ment of German Prisoners of War,” the Papers of Harry S. Truman, White House
Conªdential File, War Department, 1945–46, Kasten 35, Folder 2, 35, hstl. UNS. numbers come
from Ziemke, UNS. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 409; Informal Policy Committee on
Deutschland 1/4, 11 Mai 1945, the Papers of Harry S. Truman, Subject File, 1945–53, Foreign
Affairs, Kasten 155, Folder 1, 22, hstl. The U.S. government report cited is the “Report of the
Interdivisional Committee on Reparation, Restitution and Property Rights,” PWC-226,

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54 | MELISS A WILLA RD-FOSTER

The policies commonly lauded for making the occupations of
Germany and Japan a success were inconsistently applied during
the initial months of occupation because security was the priority.
This is not to say that the Allies did not attempt to provide aid and
implement reforms to induce cooperation, but their efforts were
complicated by disagreements, restrictions from Washington, Und
lingering fears of resistance.37

Prior studies that take the post-wwii cases of Germany and Japan
as models of successful military occupation generally focus on the
favorable conditions and benevolent policies that accompanied the
occupations when they were well established. These studies, Wie-
immer, do not take into account the security measures that the
United States enacted during the early period of occupation. Sogar
studies that note the priority given security during this time, als
much of the historical literature does, fail to specify the rules of
engagement. Infolge, they cannot convey a proper understand-
ing of what security meant in the postwar era and how U.S. occu-
pation planners intended to deal with resistance. The analysis
herein ªlls this gap by examining the policies designed and imple-
mented while the probability of resistance was still believed to be
hoch. The ªndings show that despite plans for democratization,
American policymakers recommended sanctions and reprisals,
threatened aerial bombardment, and drew lessons about effective
population control from dealing with Nazi counter-insurgency.
The coercion planned and employed was in many ways a log-
ical outgrowth of attitudes at the time. Fears that Nazi fanatics
would ªght to the end, along with experiences ªghting in Oki-
nawa and Iwo Jima, prompted U.S. ofªcials to plan for the worst.
Darüber hinaus, the rules of engagement, fostered by the brutality of

Juni 10, 1944, from State Department Documents of the Postwar Programs Committee, 1944 (Wash-
ington, D.C., 1979), microform, Reel 3; the Soviet estimate from Department of State, Occu-
pation of Germany: Policy and Progress, 1945–46 (Washington, D.C., 1947), 15; the U.K. Und
France estimates from The Council of Foreign Ministers, Moskau, “Questions Relating to
Deutschland," Marsch 14, 1947, the Papers of Robert F. Murphy, Kasten 62, hisu. For the number
of pows involved in labor reparations in the Paciªc, see Dower, Embracing Defeat, 51; for more
on German labor, Bishof and Ambrose, Eisenhower and the German POWs, 68–70.
37 The degree to which MacArthur operated independently of Washington’s policies is a
matter of some debate. In his memoirs on the occupation, Cohen, Remaking Japan, 9–10, 13,
who served as Chief of the Labor Division, insists that MacArthur’s reputation as a “free
agent” was an “illusion.”

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PLANNING THE PEACE | 55

the war, permitted such methods as hostage taking, forced labor,
aerial bombing, and public execution, some of which remained in
effect for weeks, months, Und, in a few instances, Jahre. In Ger-
viele, even after hostilities ceased, mass imprisonment, collective
ªnes, curfews, restrictions on communications, prohibitions on
internal movement, and compulsory labor continued. In Japan,
the United States made a show of its air power to intimidate the
Japanese population, and orders for martial law and direct occupa-
tion were rescinded only when American troops had become well
established throughout the country. Notwithstanding the more
benevolent policies that eventually followed, the priority of secu-
rity sometimes led to drastic measures.

The period of draconian policy was relatively short. In Ger-
viele, strict measures began to fade in August 1945, and by mid-
1946, they had mostly petered out with the fear of overt resistance.
In Japan, the United States revised its coercive strategy within
weeks of surrender. Noch, a focus on duration misses the point.
Threats of violence need not continue indeªnitely to be effective.
The strategic threat of violence in the initial period of occupation
could well have made a lasting impression.

That wwii occupation planners gave serious attention to mat-
ters of security may seem an obvious point, but the extent to
which they emphasized security is decidedly less so. Darüber hinaus,
ªfty-eight years later, the notion that security measures should
take priority in occupation was hardly evident when the United
States planned its invasion of Iraq in 2003. In der Tat, arguments that
American forces would be greeted as liberators, as in Germany and
Japan, encouraged the belief that strict security measures were
largely unnecessary. Noch, importantly, occupation policy for Ger-
many and Japan assumed that U.S. forces would not be greeted as
liberators and, as such, made strict security measures a priority.
Critics of the Iraq War point to the small number of troops ini-
tially stationed in Iraq compared to the forces that occupied Ger-
many and Japan. The size of the force in occupied territory after
wwii may be relevant, but the initial orders given to these forces
must be taken into consideration as well.38

38 On the lack of measures addressing security in Iraq, see Bob Woodward, State of Denial:
Bush at War, Part III (New York, 2006), 260–261; on U.S. forces being greeted as liberators,
Interview with Vice-President Dick Cheney, “NBC News’ Meet the Press," Marsch 16, 2003,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3080244/.

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56 | MELISS A WILLA RD-FOSTER

By establishing the role of coercion in post-wwii occupation
Politik, this study represents a ªrst step toward answering the ques-
tion of how the post-wwii peace was won. The ªndings herein,
Jedoch, do not suggest that coercion was primarily responsible
for deterring resistance. Further research into the attitudes of the
Germans and Japanese, particularly top military and political
ofªcials,
is required to test this hypothesis. dennoch, Die
ªndings are signiªcant. Studies that attempt to explain the peace
must be based on a clear and detailed analysis of the full range of
policies to avoid missing potentially relevant factors.

Equally important, the common perception of the wwii oc-
cupations as entirely peaceful operations, in both intention and
outcome, has generated the assumption that successful occupations
can be devoid of violence. Although nothing in this study suggests
ansonsten, attempts to characterize the wwii cases as evidence of
successful occupations lacking coercion are without merit. Der
lesson to be drawn is not that coercion is necessary to deter resis-
tance but that expectations and attitudes after wwii initially in-
spired a coercive policy of occupation. In der Tat, when such expec-
tations and attitudes are lacking, coercive policies may lack
credibility, thus dooming any attempt to replicate the occupations
of Germany and Japan.

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