John Steinbruner & Nancy Gallagher

Constructive transformation:
an alternative vision of global security

Throughout history, assuring the secu-

rity of citizens has been an overriding
priority of most governments, and large-
scale forms of deliberate aggression have
been their dominant concern.1 In re-
sponse to that concern, modern states
have made large investments in military
force, and the resulting balance of na-
tional capability has generally been con-

John Steinbruner is professor of public policy and
director of the Center for International and Secu-
rity Studies at the University of Maryland. A Fel-
low of the American Academy since 1992, he is
currently cochair (with Carl Kaysen) of the Acad-
emy’s Committee on International Security Stud-
ies. He is the author of numerous books and
essays, including “Principles of Global Security”
(2000).

Nancy Gallagher is associate director for research
at the Center for International and Security Stud-
ies at the University of Maryland. She codirects
the Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security
Programm, an interdisciplinary effort to address the
security implications of globalization by develop-
ing more re½ned rules of behavior and more com-
prehensive transparency arrangements. She is the
author of, among other works, “The Politics of
Veri½cation” (1999).

sidered the principal determinant of in-
ternational order.

Over the past decade, Jedoch, Das
traditional conception of security has
been continuously eroded by circum-
stances that do not readily ½t the as-
sumptions. Policymakers still worry
about belligerent enemies, but their
number has diminished in recent years,
and virtually none of them seems capa-
ble of the classic forms of massive ag-
gression. The extensive violence that
does persist is episodic, small in scale,
and widely dispersed. In the United
States in the aftermath of the September
11 Veranstaltungen, the phenomenon of terrorism
has been declared a global enemy, Aber
the damage directly caused by terrorist
actions has so far been only a small frac-
tion of that resulting from civil conflicts
and ordinary crime. The capacities and
characteristics of the largely anonymous
perpetrators seem to be less relevant
than the underlying causes. At the lead-

1 This essay was prepared as part of the
Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security
Program at the Center for International and
Security Studies at the University of Maryland,
with generous support from the John D. Und
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. A longer
version of this essay, “Prospects for Security
Transformation” (Marsch 2004), is available at
.

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John
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ing edge of practice, security of½cials
are being driven to contend as much or
more with dangerous processes as with
aggressive opponents, although the dis-
tinction has yet to crystallize in the for-
mulation of policy.

Es ist, Natürlich, notoriously dif½cult to
appreciate a fundamental shift in histor-
ical circumstance if you are caught in the
middle of it. But there are some very
strong indications that a major redirec-
tion is occurring in the aggregate pattern
of human development. With economic
growth in recent decades concentrated
among the wealthier segments of all so-
cieties, and population growth concen-
trated in the poorer segments, the global
distribution of resources appears to be
too inequitable to be inde½nitely sus-
tained without generating potentially
unmanageable amounts of civil violence.
Although the connection between vio-
lence and economic performance is nei-
ther simple nor well understood, es ist
prudent, even mandatory, to assume that
accumulating grievances combined with
increasing access to information and de-
structive technology pose a major threat
to the preservation of consensual order
necessary to operate the global economy
and to provide lasting security at an ac-
ceptable cost. Not even the most ad-
vanced military establishments could
expect to cope with a general breakdown
of legal order. They could not protect
any major society from being in½ltrated
by people determined to wreak havoc,
and they certainly could not identify
and preemptively destroy all those who
might wish to do harm.

Assuring at least minimally equitable
global standards of living–and achiev-
ing the political accommodation nec-
essary to support that objective–is a
necessary foundation for security. NEIN
amount of traditional military capa-
bility will compensate for the failure

to establish those determining condi-
tionen.

The apparent requirements for this
new situation are demanding: raising
the standard of living for the poor to an
acceptably equitable level would require
an expansion of the global economy by a
factor of ½ve over the next ½fty years, A
doubling of food production, and some-
thing like a tripling of energy production
even if ef½ciency gains are dramatic. In
order to do all that within the limits of
atmospheric tolerance, human-induced
carbon gas emissions will have to be
sharply restricted, and the technical ba-
sis for energy supply and consumption
will have to be dramatically altered–
from approximately 20 percent non-
fossil fuel at the moment to better than
80 percent by 2050. In order to accom-
plish that transformation on the sched-
ule required against at least the initial re-
sistance of current energy markets, ex-
tensive public investments would have
to be made globally, and extensive trans-
fers of technology would have to occur
to China and India especially. With near-
ly 40 percent of the total human popula-
tion between them and extensive inter-
nal economic development beginning to
geschehen, these two countries will inevitably
be on the front line of the global warm-
ing problem. But they cannot reasonably
be expected to meet the investment re-
quirements with their own resources
allein. Current security relationships are
incompatible with the required invest-
ment process–but if this process does
not occur, the destructive effects of al-
tered climate patterns could rival or even
surpass any damage that human warfare
might do.

These epochal developments have not

commanded much of½cial attention. In
fact, the security policies of the Bush ad-
ministration emphatically defy the im-

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Ein
alternative
vision of
global
security

plications. In a commencement speech
at West Point in June of 2002 and in two
formal documents issued subsequently,
the president radically revised long-
standing U.S. policy–not to address the
fundamental circumstances of globaliza-
tion, but to change the rules for dealing
with traditional threats.

Most notably, he asserted the right and
declared the intention to initiate the use
of force, including nuclear weapons if
necessary, to prevent the acquisition of
mass-destruction technology by “rogue”
states judged to be inherently belliger-
ent.2 His pronouncements were present-
ed as a deliberate revision of established
security doctrine and were received as an
apparent repudiation of prominent in-
ternational commitments.3 The general
understanding had long been that the
legitimate use of military force, and of
nuclear weapons in particular, would be
restricted to the prevention of imminent
attack–a formulation that allows for de-
terrent retaliation and defensive reac-
tion, but which does not extend to deny-
ing a potential adversary the right to
possess weapons.

2 “President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech
at West Point: Remarks by the President at the
2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States
Military Academy, West Point, New York” (1
Juni 2002), available at ; “The National Security
Strategy of the United States of America”
(September 2002), available at ; and “National
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion” (Dezember 2002), available at .

3 “New Agenda Coalition Working Paper:
Submitted by New Zealand on behalf of Brazil,
Ägypten, Ireland, Mexiko, Südafrika, and Swe-
den as members of the New Agenda Coalition
(nac), npt/conf.2005/pc.II/15” (29 April
2003), available at .

With the invasion of Iraq in March
von 2003, the Bush doctrine acquired a de-
gree of signi½cance that could not have
been achieved by declaration alone. In
retrospect it is now apparent that Iraq
may have harbored an aspiration to ac-
quire weapons of mass destruction but
did not actually possess them, did not
have active efforts to acquire them, Und
did not pose an immediate threat of
use. Initiating an attack in this situa-
tion poses obvious questions as to how
broadly that principle of preventive co-
ercion might be applied and what the
extended consequences of its applica-
tion might be.

There are peculiar features of the Iraq

situation that serve to limit the prece-
dent. As a result of un Security Council
Resolution 687, generated after its as-
sault on Kuwait in 1990, Iraq became
the only country in the world formally
denied the right to possess nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons and
associated delivery vehicles.4 Its embar-
goed economy and its general de½ance
of international standards under the rule
of Saddam Hussein rendered it perhaps
the least capable and most isolated of
the alleged rogue states. If Iraq were to
be its only application, the Bush doctrine
could be considered a quali½cation rath-
er than a fundamental revision of the es-
tablished international security regime.
It is evident, Jedoch, that the United
States is entertaining expansive aspira-
tions that could in principle give Bush’s
doctrinal revision revolutionary implica-
tionen. The level of military investment it
is sustaining and the capability it is ac-
quiring go well beyond what traditional
planning standards would require: Die
ability to defend the United States and

4 un Security Council Resolution 687 (3 April
1991) is available at .

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John
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its formal allies against contingencies of
potential aggression by designated oppo-
nents at speci½ed locations.5 While con-
ceding that no other country is under-
taking military preparations that present
a major immediate threat to this core
objective, the United States is develop-
ing advanced military capabilities using
inherent feasibility rather than estimat-
ed threat as the planning standard. Der
stated aspirations are to be able to con-
duct continuous surveillance and per-
form high-resolution observation in any
part of the world, to initiate precise at-
tack in rapid reaction to any threat or
opportunity thereby identi½ed, und zu
deny these same capabilities to all other
military establishments. Were those
aspirations to be achieved, the United
States would have decisive superiority
across the entire array of potential mis-
sionen: it would be capable not only of
disabling any military force, but also of
conducting highly coercive operations
against any society. This combination of
evolving capability and declared intent
represents a policy of military domina-
tion that has already provoked strong
reactions from the rest of the world.

International concerns about the Bush

administration’s military ambitions
have been compounded by its accompa-
nying assault on the pillars of interna-
tional legal regulation and on the politi-
cal sensitivities of traditional allies.

In June of 2002, the United States for-
mally withdrew from the 1972 Antiballis-
tic Missile Treaty, thereby dismantling

5 Since the type of capability the United States
is developing is designed for large-scale opera-
tionen, in the assessment of most other countries
it cannot be explained as a rational response to
an emerging threat of terrorism. As demon-
strated most recently in Iraq, the decisive defeat
of a military establishment does not confer the
ability to stop terrorism emanating from a soci-
ety that supports it.

the centerpiece of bilateral restrictions
on strategic nuclear force deployments
that it had negotiated with the Soviet
Union and reaf½rmed with the Russian
Federation. The replacement arrange-
ment–the 2002 Moscow Treaty–pre-
serves the formal principle of legal re-
straint on offensive deployments, Aber
does not prevent the United States from
progressively improving its potential for
disabling the Russian deterrent force.
Russian military planners can still plau-
sibly expect to fend off a decisively dis-
arming strike, but in physical and opera-
tional terms the main source of bilateral
reassurance is now more rhetorical than
real, and the basis for internal con½-
dence is relentlessly diminishing. China,
as an indirect bene½ciary of the bilateral
arrangements, has a yet more acute ver-
sion of the same problem.

In less dramatic but nonetheless

signi½cant actions, the United States has
virtually repudiated the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (ctbt) and assertively
terminated negotiations for a veri½ca-
tion and enforcement protocol for the
Biological Weapons and Toxins Con-
vention (bwc). Since the ctbt has long
been the single most prominent condi-
tion for general adherence to the Non-
proliferation Treaty (npt), its repudia-
tion signals an unmistakable disregard
for the npt regime. The Bush adminis-
tration’s nonproliferation plan would
replace the basic bargain between npt
nuclear- and nonnuclear-weapon states
with more forceful efforts to prevent the
spread of enrichment and reprocessing
technology to any additional countries
even for peaceful programs.6

6 “President Announces New Measures to
Counter the Threat of wmd: Remarks by the
President on Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferation, National Defense University,
Washington, D.C.” (11 Februar 2004), verfügbar-
able at .

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In the context of these developments,
the invasion of Iraq was undertaken in
de½ance of especially strong objections
from France and Germany, und trotz
the failure to pass an authorizing resolu-
tion in the un Security Council. To an
extent that is not well appreciated in the
Vereinigte Staaten, the rest of the world is
drawing the conclusion that the Bush
administration now rejects the provi-
sions of legal restraint and political ac-
commodation that the United States
once actively sponsored, and does not
intend either to rely on them or to be
bound by them.

All this poses a serious planning prob-

lem for security bureaucracies through-
out the world. The apparent contempt
for international legal restraint is a radi-
cal departure from American tradition,
which has long proclaimed the rule of
law, both at home and abroad, to be the
foundation of democracy and security.
Foreign planners can reasonably doubt
that the American political system will
actually abandon its tradition to the ex-
tent currently being implied, but they
will also have to recognize that for some
inde½nite period of time the U.S. gov-
ernment is not likely to be the architect
and champion of international legal re-
straint that it has been for the past half
Jahrhundert. They may be skeptical that the
projected U.S. military program will ac-
tually reach the level required to estab-
lish the decisive superiority being imag-
ined; current levels of investment and
technical accomplishment do not yet
match the flamboyant aspirations ad-
vanced in military planning documents.
They can also question how long domes-
tic political support for current U.S. se-
curity policies can be sustained. Ameri-
can public opinion has so far tolerated
the doctrine of preventive coercion and
its speci½c application in Iraq, albeit

with growing unease. But American
public opinion does not appear inclined
to endorse the idea of imperial domina-
tion, let alone the expansive investment
of resources required to support it. Es ist
evident, Jedoch, that the American po-
litical system is still operating under the
acute sense of threat generated by the
September 11 terrorist attacks, und das
UNS. security policy is now under the
control of a radical minority intensely
dedicated to the asserted doctrine and
its supportive military program.

As a result of these complex circum-
stances, no prudent planner can assume
that economic, technical, or political
constraints will prevent the United
States from amassing coercive capabili-
ties that might be used to impose its na-
tional political will. All groups affected–
traditional friends as well as potential
enemies–have strong reason to contem-
plate how they will react if the Bush ad-
ministration’s proposed security policy
is relentlessly pursued.

There seem to be three basic options.
Erste, in principle other countries could
attempt to match the American military
Programm. That will be a prominent in-
stinct within those military establish-
ments that aspire to achieve the highest
performance standards, but the effort
required does not appear either feasible
or sensible for any other society. Der
scope and momentum of investment
that the United States has established
over several decades is simply too exten-
sive and too multifaceted to be duplicat-
ed rapidly. Darüber hinaus, any dedicated
effort to do so would further stimulate
the American effort and might enable it
to command the additional resources re-
quired to pursue more seriously the vi-
sion of dominance. Such an effort would
also divert investment from more com-
pelling priorities of economic perform-
ance.

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John
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Zweite, a threatened competitor
might seek to negate the instruments
of dominance rather than to replicate
ihnen. That is technically and economi-
cally more feasible and might ultimately
be considered necessary. Insbesondere, A
competitor could prevent the United
States from using the space-based assets
required to engage in advanced forms of
military coercion. But overt develop-
ment of this strategy would create a pat-
tern of confrontation that would stimu-
late the American program, and it is dif-
½cult to be con½dent the techniques of
negation would reliably prevail at an
acceptable cost in an extended competi-
tion.

Dritte, a constructive strategy might
attempt to develop common interest to
the point that it could contain and even-
tually replace the impulse for domi-
nance. That strategy is imaginable in
principle, highly desirable, and not with-
out precedent–witness the transforma-
tion of European security relationships
over the ½fty years following World War
II. It requires great wisdom and courage,
Jedoch, for any society to pit higher
forms of statesmanship against raw
physical power.

None of the basic choices–replica-
tion, negation, or transformation–can
easily emerge as the dominant interna-
tional reaction.

The situation presents a signi½cant
problem for the American political sys-
tem as well. The doctrine of preventive
coercion, with its implication of imperi-
al dominance, is largely the project of
an intense political minority. Obwohl
the policy of domination resonates with
some of½cial military planning docu-
gen, its hard-edged assertion of will-
ingness to initiate military attack has
not emerged from professional military
channels–and certainly not from major-
ity political opinion. The shock of the

September 11 terrorist attacks and the
exigencies of the Bush administration’s
open-ended war on terrorism have
been used to silence criticism of the an-
nounced doctrine, of its application to
Irak, of the denigration of allies, and of
the repudiation of international legal
Instrumente. For the United States to
remain a democracy worthy of the
name, fundamental questions must be
asked about whether coercive preven-
tion and imperial dominance will bring
greater security or growing violence and
disastrous political isolation. The single-
minded pursuit of national advantage
would generate new threats the United
States could not absolutely defeat. Es
would assuredly undermine the legiti-
macy of U.S. military operations
throughout the world–a vital if insuf-
½ciently acknowledged ingredient of
practical capability.

Ironisch, Jedoch, the provocation
and apparent misdirection of American
policy also create a constructive oppor-
tunity. If the circumstances of globaliza-
tion are indeed as relentless as they ap-
pear to be, leadership will predictably
gravitate to those who come to under-
stand the implications. Correspondingly,
it is very likely that principles of equity
and methods of accommodation will
prove to be of much greater signi½cance
than traditional forms of military con-
frontation. All this implies that a con-
structive response to the provocation
emanating from the U.S. military pro-
gram is feasible in principle–one that
would subordinate the divisive practice
of confrontation to inherently more ef-
½cient methods of direct collaboration.
Collaboration is possible when fun-
damental interests are aligned, and be-
comes imperative when those interests
cannot be reliably protected by coercive
means alone. There are compelling cir-
cumstances of that sort in the emerging

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Ein
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security

situation–most notably, in the control
of biotechnology and nuclear explosive
material and in the management of
space activities. These possibilities are
worth exploration–especially if we
hope to make progress in achieving the
political accommodation that appears
to be the foundation for viable security
within our increasingly globalized
Welt.

The burden of strategic reaction to the

Bush administration’s security policy
primarily falls on Russia and China, Aber
with different timing and different glob-
al implications in each case. For an in-
de½nite period of time, Russia will be
the only country capable of counterbal-
ancing the U.S. nuclear force, thereby
assuring the basic condition of mutual
Abschreckung. Although advocates of the
new American doctrine like to claim
that mutual deterrence is now an irrele-
vant relic of cold war history, die en-
during fact is that it protects against a
dangerous concentration of power–the
international equivalent of the checks
and balances fundamental to the U.S.
Constitution. Since the corrupting ef-
fects of excessive power must prudently
be assumed to be generic–not peculiar
to any individual, government, Kultur,
or historical era–the protective balanc-
ing of mass-destruction capability is as
relevant and vital as it ever was, and will
remain so, as long as that capability is
preserved in any form. So it is in the in-
terest of all nations, even of the United
Zustände, that Russia’s burden be safely and
successfully carried.

For China the immediate burden in-
volves a more narrowly de½ned national
security interest stemming principally
from the Taiwan situation, but the man-
ner in which China develops its security
policy has very important global impli-
Kationen. Of all the nuclear weapon

Staaten, China has maintained by far the
most restrained pattern of military
deployment. Its deterrent force is the
smallest and has never been put on alert
Status. Its conventional forces do not
have power-projection capability. Its se-
curity policy has been explicitly based
on principles of equitable accommoda-
tion rather than active confrontation. Wenn
China preserves this historical pattern of
restraint and develops the practice of ac-
commodation, it might be able to give
strong constructive impulse to general
international security arrangements. Wenn,
Jedoch, China adopts a strategy of im-
mediate negation or ultimate emulation
in reaction to projected U.S. military de-
velopment, another lengthy episode of
global confrontation might well ensue.
The extent to which the general fea-
tures of globalization will shape these
strategic choices must be considered an
open question at the moment, but it
seems apparent that the speci½c fear of
terrorism will have substantial influence
on relevant aspects of policy. In particu-
lar, the possibility that terrorist organi-
zations might attempt to inflict massive
social damage gives all societies a strong
incentive to establish much higher stan-
dards of control over the two principal
technologies that would enable a small
clandestine operation to have truly cata-
strophic effects–namely, nuclear explo-
sives and lethally contagious biological
pathogens. Since large issues of policy
are usually worked out ½rst in some
speci½c context, it is reasonable to an-
ticipate that new security relationships
of global signi½cance will be forged
in the process of managing those two
technologies.

Although they share catastrophic po-

tential and therefore present a common
managerial problem, nuclear explosives
and biological pathogens have starkly

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different characteristics and historical
legacies. So far it has required large in-
dustrial facilities to extract or create the
radioactive isotopes that can generate
nuclear explosions. Access to those facil-
ities and their products has been actively
controlled from the outset, and fabricat-
ed nuclear weapons have long been the
most elaborately protected of all human
commodities. The prevailing arrange-
ments are not impenetrable, especially
not within the extensive network of
facilities that Russia inherited from the
Soviet Union. Higher standards of pro-
tection are currently being pursued, Und
signi½cantly higher ones are feasible.
dennoch, the physical and procedur-
al barriers to any unauthorized use of
nuclear explosives currently de½ne the
most advanced standard of active con-
trol.

Im Gegensatz, the process of extracting

and producing biological pathogens,
which are spontaneously generated in
nature, is not nearly as demanding. Der
facilities required are not large or dis-
tinctive, and access to them is not as
carefully restricted. Until very recently,
biological pathogens were freely ex-
changed for purposes of scienti½c explo-
ration, epidemiological investigation,
and medical diagnosis even between
otherwise antagonistic societies. Scien-
ti½c understanding of these pathogens
emerges from a globally dispersed bio-
medical research community whose ac-
tivities are conducted for compellingly
legitimate reasons. In that context it has
been neither practical nor appropriate to
sequester information or materials to
the extent that nuclear explosives have
been isolated. In der Tat, the barriers to
hostile use of biotechnology have been
primarily attitudinal in character–a
form of passive control more signi½cant
than is commonly appreciated.

In general the destructive application

of nuclear technology has been legiti-

mized by the practice of mutual deter-
rence but elaborately restricted. Offen-
sive application of biotechnology, on the
andererseits, is the least legitimate and
least developed of the mass-destruction
technologies–yet access has not been as
eingeschränkt. Somehow out of these nearly
antipodal situations a coherent policy
of managerial control will have to be
fashioned.

The thought naturally arises that the
methods of control devised for nuclear
explosives might simply be extended to
dangerous areas of biotechnology. Nicht
surprisingly that has been the prevailing
inclination in the United States follow-
ing the anthrax letters that were mailed
to politicians and media ½gures shortly
after the September 11 terrorist attacks.
Under legislation passed in response to
those mailings, all stocks of live patho-
gens and toxins deemed to be dangerous
must be registered with the federal gov-
Ernährung, and access to the listed agents
must be restricted to persons who have
cleared background checks. National
identity is henceforth to be used as a cri-
terion for access. Zusätzlich, several bil-
lion dollars have been allocated to initi-
ate protective research efforts, a signi½-
cant portion of which is to be directed
to so-called threat assessment. The term
refers to the exploration of potentially
destructive applications of biotechnolo-
gy in order to anticipate and prepare a
response to possible future threats. Work
of that sort is to be subject to security
classi½cation that will prevent potential
terrorists from learning about it.

Natural and perhaps inevitable as
those measures may be, Jedoch, Die
attempt to impose traditional national
security controls on biotechnology is
virtually certain to be ineffective and is
very likely to have overwhelmingly per-
verse consequences.

The results of research in critical areas
of molecular biology are shared globally

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for unquestionably compelling reasons.
The investigation of basic life processes
that has been gathering momentum for
several decades is now delivering results
of enormous consequence for public
health and medical therapy. With the
improved understanding of the dynam-
ics of life at the molecular level, Die
eradication or mitigation of many his-
torical diseases will be possible. The en-
hancement of basic cognitive, emotion-
al, and reproductive functions will prob-
ably also become possible. Great scien-
ti½c achievements are in prospect, Und
vast fortunes are to be made. No nation-
al security bureaucracy citing the uncer-
tain threat of catastrophic terrorism
will be able to justify the imposition of
secretive authority over this momen-
tous, inherently open process. The at-
tempt to do so would predictably incite
resentment, suspicion, evasion, Und
emulation.

All societies caught up in this momen-

tum of discovery–in effect, the entire
human species–will have to contend in
some manner with the dangers associat-
ed with it. These dangers can arise as
easily from inadvertence as from delib-
erate manipulation, so any system to
prevent the misuse of biotechnology
must not focus solely on potential ter-
rorists, but should also include legiti-
mate researchers whose work could have
unintended social consequences. Exactly
the same basic research that identi½es
opportunity for constructive interven-
tion in basic life processes also identi½es
destructive opportunity. And unfortu-
nately it is easier to produce a single de-
structive effect than to defend against all
destructive possibilities. Infectious dis-
eases signi½cantly more lethal than
those that have naturally evolved could
in principal be created–a supposition
widely thought to be impossible as little
as a decade ago. Nefarious manipula-
tions of thoughts, feelings, and repro-

ductive capability are much more specu-
lative at this point but appear to be a
serious possibility. The scope of applica-
tion of biotechnology is so broad, Und
the potential consequence so large, Das
innovative methods of protective man-
agement responsive to its distinctive
characteristics will almost certainly have
to be devised. Over the longer term, eins
can reasonably surmise, the speculative
problem of catastrophic terrorism will
likely be assimilated to the much larger
and more immediately pressing problem
of managing biotechnology generally.

Although many of the anticipated con-

sequences of biotechnology have yet to
be realized, at least three determining
features of the situation can be dis-
cerned. Erste, since the relevant research
process is highly developed and globally
distributed, managerial oversight will
have to be global in scope, das ist, uni-
versally accepted as reasonable and equi-
table. Zweite, since no categorical dis-
tinctions can be made at the level of fun-
damental research between potentially
protective and potentially threatening
lines of inquiry, prudential judgments
will have to be made in detailed context
by intimately informed scientists, not by
government bureaucrats or distant regu-
lators of any sort. Aber, dritte, since the
potential consequences of molecular
biology extend far beyond what even
the leading research scientists can be
expected to comprehend, and since in-
advertently destructive consequences
are at least as worrisome as deliberately
destructive ones, protective oversight
must involve representative social judg-
ment as well as scienti½c review and
must be appropriately comprehensive.
If there is no categorical distinction in
biotechnology between bene½cial and
destructive knowledge, there is no cate-
gorical distinction between wise and
foolish or good and evil people either.

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Taken together, these circumstances
imply a managerial process that is based
on universally accepted principles of in-
dependent peer review. But such a pro-
cess would have to be broader in scope
and jurisdiction, more actively organ-
isiert, and more re½ned in legal terms
than any of the precedents that might be
cited. And, arguably, it would have to
operate at an overall level of ½delity well
beyond any that has yet been demon-
strated by existing regulatory processes.

Obviously, the development of a glob-

al oversight arrangement that meets
these conditions will face a multitude of
practical dif½culties, many of which will
be cited by skeptics as grounds for sum-
mary rejection of the entire idea. Bei der
moment, there does not appear to be any
of½cial consideration of such an arrange-
ment, and the United States’ recent re-
jection of the effort to negotiate a veri½-
cation and enforcement protocol for the
bwc has demoralized the diplomatic
community that supports active con-
sideration. Vor allem, Jedoch, a special
committee of the National Academy of
Sciences recently concluded that the po-
tential for catastrophic misuse of bio-
technology research was grave enough to
warrant an expanded, strengthened, Und
more integrated national oversight sys-
tem. The committee’s report also con-
ceded that any regulatory system would
have to be adopted internationally to be
effective.7 It is reasonable to expect that
governments will ultimately be driven
to examine global protective oversight
procedures for biotechnology, und in
the course of doing so will be induced
to contend with the implications for
security practices generally.

Some important implications arise
from inherent tensions between individ-

7 Committee on Research Standards and Prac-
tices to Prevent the Destructive Application of

ually important strategic objectives. Der
problem presented by emerging biotech-
nology is that of promoting vital bene½ts
while simultaneously preventing appli-
cations that could put the entire human
species at risk. Because the principal
source of threat is either inadvertent or
clandestine, the entire apparatus of con-
frontational deterrence is essentially in-
applicable. Defensive reaction–all that
is involved in diagnosing, treating, Und
containing a disease outbreak–is not re-
liable enough to be the primary basis
for protection against the more extreme
forms of imaginable danger. Preventing
the creation of catastrophically destruc-
tive pathogens must become the pre-
dominant concern. Signi½cant tension
arises because the scienti½c inquiry nec-
essary to support defensive measures
against known infectious diseases will
also provide the basis for generating yet
more lethal variations. The challenge is
to pursue inherently more dif½cult de-
fensive applications while restricting of-
fensive applications of biotechnology–
a reversal of the strategic principle long
associated with the prevailing practice of
mutual deterrence. That reversal would
have to be accomplished, darüber hinaus, nicht
only in interaction among separately or-
ganized societies, but also in increasing-
ly consequential interaction with the
natural process of evolution, a process
which presumably neither guarantees
nor precludes the survival of the human
Spezies.

Those who are more familiar with the

history of war than with the history of
public health are likely to conclude that
the offensive application will eventually
come to predominate for biotechnology
as it did for the technology of nuclear

Biotechnology, Biotechnology Research in the Age
of Terrorism: Confronting the Dual Use Dilemma
(Washington, D.C.: National Academies
Drücken Sie, 2004).

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explosives. That cannot be considered
an inevitable outcome, Jedoch. Nicht
only are the incentives and the circum-
stances substantially different, but so
are the available methods.

There is an important advantage in the

fact that the remarkable momentum of
molecular biology has been established
on the basis of a predominantly open
Verfahren. Systematic transparency has
allowed a collective process of scientif-
ic discovery to develop that is far more
powerful than one segmented and se-
questered by security classi½cation, Und
the same process offers far more power-
ful regulation as well. Human societies
spontaneously generate standards of be-
havior that are both equitable and pro-
tective, and can enforce them very effec-
tively if relevant information is readily
verfügbar. Criminals must hide in order
to succeed, as must anyone violating
strongly established social norms. Der
norms against destructive application of
biotechnology that exist in the global
biomedical community are among the
most powerful of all social standards.
They prevail across national and cultural
differences, essentially without excep-
tion. A regulatory system that reinforced
the deeply ingrained abhorrence of in-
fectious disease with disclosure rules
and active oversight would be powerful-
ly consequential, so much so that the
practical impediments to such a system
have more to do with fears of misuse
than fears of ineffectiveness. In principle
the actively organized practice of trans-
parency and independent scrutiny (Die
same basic practice that enables ½nan-
cial systems to function despite the eter-
nal temptation to steal) could provide
much more advanced protection against
the offensive use of biotechnology.
Presumably that would forever fall short
of absolute assurance, but the degree of
protection that could be accomplished is

potentially meaningful enough to shape
the evolution of international security
generally.

It is not dif½cult to visualize how a
protective oversight arrangement would
work.8 The central objective would be
preventing the deliberate or inadvertent
creation of pathogens more lethal than
those that have naturally evolved. Der
basic method of ensuring this would be
a set of procedural rules designed to
bring independent, informed scrutiny to
bear on all fundamental research activi-
ties that could create catastrophically
destructive pathogens. Those activities
would be distinguished in terms of the
intrinsic transmissibility, infectivity, Und
lethality of the pathogens in question,
with greater levels of risk associated
with higher level oversight and more
intense scrutiny. People and facilities
engaged in such activities would be
licensed according to internationally
determined standards. Proposed re-
search would require informed peer
review and approval at the local, nation-
al, or international level, depending on
the degree of risk involved. The conduct
of approved projects would be moni-
tored and the dissemination of results
would be managed according to interna-
tionally determined rules. Access to es-
pecially sensitive information would be
restricted to those participating in the
oversight arrangements, and the fact of
access would be documented. Any viola-
tion of the licensing and approval re-
quirements or of the associated disclo-
sure and information handling rules

8 For a fuller description, see John Stein-
bruner, Elisa D. Harris, Nancy Gallagher, Und
Stacy Gunther, “Controlling Dangerous Patho-
gens: A Prototype Protective Oversight Sys-
tem,” Center for International and Security
Studies at Maryland Working Paper (September-
ber 2003), .

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would be subject to criminal prosecu-
tion in any jurisdiction.

If the legitimate scienti½c community

were to engage comprehensively in an
oversight arrangement of this sort, Dort
would be direct protection against indi-
vidual misjudgment and indirect protec-
tion against deliberate malfeasance. Any
attempt to evade systematic scrutiny
would run a substantial risk of detection,
and any detected violation would be sub-
ject to extremely assertive enforcement.
However the practicalities of such an ar-
rangement are judged, the fundamental
point is that the degree of protection
against the destructive application of
biotechnology depends primarily on the
degree of global transparency that is
achieved. The only way for defenses
against infectious disease to outrun of-
fensive misapplication is for the legiti-
mate researchers to combine their ef-
forts through the free flow of informa-
tion and ideas.

The same principle of systematic dis-
closure of information for mutual pro-
tection applies as well to the manage-
ment of nuclear explosive material, drug
traf½cking, political corruption, tax eva-
sion, and many other familiar maladies,
but in most of those instances it encoun-
ters more resistance from the relevant
historical legacy. Standards of behavior
are generally not as well established in
most of these areas as they are with re-
gard to infectious disease, and the right
to of½cial secrecy and personal privacy is
better established. But it is reasonable to
expect that some signi½cant revision of
historical practice might be considered
for nuclear explosive materials as the
possibility of catastrophic terrorism is
taken more seriously. Tatsächlich, es scheint
doubtful that an overriding commitment
to defensive application could be estab-
lished for emerging biotechnology while
preparation for offensive attack remains
the primary basis for nuclear security.

In principle, signi½cantly higher stan-

dards for the accounting and physical
protection of nuclear explosive material
could be organized on a global scale
while sensitive details about the design
and location of individual weapons
were restricted to the states that possess
ihnen. Techniques of information man-
agement could create a common ac-
counting system that achieves greater
aggregate accuracy while controlling
access to individual entries with com-
plete assurance. Monitoring techniques
could continuously determine the status
of control over fabricated nuclear weap-
ons and material containers while ob-
scuring which weapons were stored at
which locations in the system, if that lat-
ter provision were considered to be a
vital national interest. Deterrent capabil-
ity would hardly be affected, and overall
managerial control would be substan-
tially improved. As in the case of bio-
Technologie, albeit to a lesser extent, Die
degree of protection here depends sub-
stantially on the degree of transparency
that is achieved. Any physical barrier
to a nuclear weapon or a cache of nu-
clear material can be breached if
there is suf½cient time to do so, Aber
as a practical matter that could not be
done if monitoring were active and con-
tinuous.

To the extent that the threat of cata-
strophic terrorism is taken seriously, Und
meaningful protection against it is ac-
cepted as a priority, the major security
establishments will be driven to develop
protective monitoring techniques to
assure managerial control over nuclear
explosive material and prudential over-
sight over critical areas of biological re-
suchen. Developing such protective regu-
lation would require dramatic revision
of the operational principles associated
with the prevailing practice of mutual
Abschreckung. Procedures for the organized
sharing of detailed information docu-

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menting continuous compliance with
agreed standards of behavior would nec-
essarily subordinate traditional practices
of secrecy to an overriding interest in
systematic transparency. Preventive ef-
forts to ensure that the potential threats
are never realized would necessarily
dominate traditional preparations for
contingency reaction. Security relation-
ships would necessarily elevate interest
in protective collaboration over the lega-
cy of confrontation.

It remains to be seen, Natürlich,
whether the major governments–the
United States in particular–are capable
of undertaking such adjustments, welche
could fairly be considered revolutionary
in character. It is evident, Jedoch, Das
they are being subjected to potentially
compelling incentives to do so.

As the possibility of catastrophic ter-

rorism is pondered and the implications
assessed, international security arrange-
ments will simultaneously be shaped by
an emerging problem of a very different
character. Sensing and information
management technologies are providing
the basis for military operations that are
increasingly precise, schnell, and stealthy.
These technologies allow large-scale tra-
ditional missions to be performed more
ef½ciently and with greater con½dence,
thereby reducing the self-deterring ef-
fect that has served to restrain the use of
military force. Gleichzeitig, preci-
sion technology is enabling extremely
intrusive small-scale missions to be
undertaken.

Since the capability for small-scale co-

ercive intrusion is still not fully devel-
geöffnet, there is relatively little precedent
to demonstrate how it might be used
and what its implications might be, Aber
technical projections are suf½ciently ro-
bust to energize the imaginations of the
military planners and security bureau-
crats who do threat assessment. Preci-

sion technology, zum Beispiel, could be
directed against critical social assets that
normal terrorists could not easily reach
–cars or planes transporting heads of
state, or critical power system trans-
formers. The ability to undertake coer-
cive action at long range without warn-
ing, and possibly even without indis-
putable attribution, would confer an
ability to impose political demands in a
high-tech form of blackmail. The U.S.
military has by far the most advanced
military information technology sys-
Systeme; that emerging capability connect-
ed to the proclaimed doctrine of pre-
ventive coercion is, to put it mildly, ein
alarming prospect to any country with
reason to believe it is a potential target.
American security planners are already
concerned that hostile states might use
their nascent information warfare capa-
bilities in asymmetrical attacks, Und
these planners would be especially
alarmed should any other country ac-
quire the level of precision-strike capa-
bility that the United States already pos-
sesses. When the implications are better
appreciated, precision-strike capability
is likely, indeed virtually certain, to be
considered an urgent topic for protective
regulation–a central strategic consider-
ation intimately related to all the others.
The capability in question is being
generated by such a broad array of spe-
ci½c technologies and practical applica-
tions that the focus of effective regula-
tion is a signi½cant question. Since vari-
ous support functions performed from
space are essential elements of preci-
sion-strike capability, Jedoch, it is rea-
sonable to expect that space activities
will play a major role. If the capacity for
direct attack within, aus, and through
space were developed as the United
States proposes, space would clearly be-
come the primary venue for coercive in-
trusion and military dominance. Sei-
cause of the inherent physical and legal

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vulnerability of space assets, Jedoch, Es
is also the natural venue for countervail-
ing reaction. For these reasons, the evo-
lution of space policy is likely to shape
the evolution of security relationships
generally.

Up to this point, space activities have

been regulated by a mixture of formal
legal provisions and customary opera-
tional practices, most of which were de-
veloped primarily to support the mutual
deterrence arrangement. Nuclear force
operations provided the original impetus
for sensing, Verfolgung, optical observa-
tion, electronic intercept, navigation,
communications relay, and weather as-
sessment. Those central purposes domi-
nated the evolution of rules. Scienti½c
exploration and manned space programs
introduced competing considerations
from the outset, and those have been re-
inforced in recent decades by commer-
cial utilization. Support for conventional
force operations, including precision-
strike capability, has also been an in-
creasingly important and somewhat
competitive military concern in recent
decades. Allgemein, Jedoch, the rules
have not been adjusted to reflect the
changing security context and pattern of
space utilization.

The need to make these adjustments

has been widely recognized–by the
un’s Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space (copus), the un Gener-
al Assembly, and the Conference on Dis-
Rüstung (cd), the un’s independent
multilateral arms control negotiation
Körper. In 1994, the cd convened its most
recent ad hoc committee on Preven-
tion of an Arms Race in Outer Space
(paros). Since then, China has been
the most active champion of the effort to
secure a negotiating mandate for paros,
the United States its principal antago-
nist. Despite nearly universal interna-

tional support for active negotiations,
the United States has utilized cd proce-
dural rules to prevent the issuing of an
enabling mandate.9

The core issue in contention has to do
with weapons in space as distinct from
military support activities. Der 1967
Outer Space Treaty (ost) unambiguous-
ly prohibits stationing weapons of mass
destruction in space and using the Moon
and other celestial bodies for non-peace-
ful purposes, including military installa-
tions and weapons testing. The treaty,
Jedoch, does not mention the transit-
ing through space of such weapons as
warheads on a non-orbiting ballistic
missile trajectory, nor does it make any
determination about the utilization of
conventional explosives or other tech-
nologies not traditionally placed in the
mass-destruction category. Under Chi-
na’s interpretation, the treaty extends
legal protection to all other space activi-
Krawatten, including those providing support
for military operations under the provi-
sion stated in Article III that such activi-
ties are peaceful in character–that is,
con½ned to the right of self-defense con-
ferred by the un Charter. With that un-
derstanding, sovereign jurisdiction exer-
cised over land, sea approaches, und in
the atmosphere cannot be extended into
Raum. Article II declares that outer space
is not subject to national appropriation,
which means that satellites can orbit
over national territory without permis-
sion and, by extension, without any le-
gitimate grounds for interference. Un-
9 In 2002, the annual un General Assembly
resolution urging steps to reinforce and expand
the legal regime for outer space (einschließlich der
establishment of an ad hoc committee on
paros in the cd) was supported by 159 coun-
versucht, with no opposition, and abstentions only
by the United States, Israel, and Micronesia.
Der 2002 New Agenda Coalition Resolution
also expressed for the ½rst time concern about
space weaponization.

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der of½cial U.S. Deutung, a general
prohibition on interference with satel-
lites is now ½rmly established in custom-
ary law, and thus neither rests solely on
the legal foundation of the ost nor is
subject to its peaceful-use quali½ca-
tion.10 China maintains that the provi-
sions of the ost must be explicitly ex-
tended to prohibit the utilization of all
weapons in space, and suggests, without
detailed elaboration, that some con-
straint on military support activity is
necessary as well. China further sug-
gests that the systematic development
of space weapons being projected by the
United States would violate the terms of
the ost and thereby remove the legal
protection it provides. The implication,
reasonably inferred but so far not explic-
itly stated, is that China or any other
country would then be free to interfere
with satellite transit over national terri-
tory in exercise of its own right of self-
defense.

This impasse over paros in the Con-
ference on Disarmament can reasonably
be seen as an inchoate and slowly devel-
oping policy confrontation with omi-
nous implications–analogous, vielleicht,
to a malignant tumor in its earliest
Stufen. Any country that believes itself
compelled to defend against coercive
threat with a strategy of negation would
almost certainly focus on space assets as
the most promising target.

The idea that satellites can be defend-
ed with superior technical virtuosity or
in Wild West gunslinger style might be
appealing in Hollywood, but not to any-

10 “Speech on Outer Space by Eric M. Javits,
US Ambassador to the Conference on Disar-
mament (cd), to the ‘Conference on Future
Security in Space,’ organized by the Monterey
Institute of International Studies and the
Mountbatten Centre of International Studies,
Southampton, England” (28 Mai 2002), verfügbar-
able at .

one in the business of operating satel-
lites. The unavoidable fact, largely de-
termined by the laws of physics, is that
all space services can be disrupted at a
small fraction of the cost required to
perform them. With some effort, satel-
lites can be observed and their move-
ments can be predicted. The velocity re-
quired to maintain their orbits and the
energy required to achieve that velocity
make satellites structurally vulnerable to
collision with any object of any appre-
ciable size. Zusätzlich, their internal
functions are vulnerable to many forms
of hostile electromagnetic radiation. Es ist
vastly easier to arrange for direct colli-
sions than to avoid them or to protect
against their consequences. Electromag-
netic interference is somewhat more
demanding but still confers an advan-
tage to the attacker. Standard methods
of protection (hardening, camouflage,
evasive maneuver, and active defense)
can be attempted, but all of these are
substantially less effective and more
expensive than they are in other envi-
ronments.

Space is an environment so dependent
on protective rules that a threat to those
rules becomes a threat to the viability of
all space activity well before any subtle
acts of interference, let alone blatant
acts of destruction, actually occur. Als
the most immediately apparent symp-
tom of an incipient strategic confronta-
tion between the United States and Chi-
na, the impasse in Geneva is evidence of
the ill health of the existing system of
rules for space. Any doctor who ignored
a comparably ominous symptom in a pa-
tient would be subject to a ruinous law-
suit.

If China or any other country were ac-

tually to undertake a strategy of nega-
tion in space, and were to do so skillfully,
presumably it would begin with low-
level acts of interference intended to

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warn rather than provoke. Precisely
because of the importance and fragility
of the regulatory rules, this strategy of
negation would be dangerous to the ini-
tiator as well as the target, even in its
earliest detectable stages, and would
become much more mutually dangerous
if it were played out to some decisive
conclusion. An adroit negation strategy
would be designed to achieve early
accommodation and would absolutely
have to establish broadly accepted justi-
½cation. Otherwise the actions designed
to exert countervailing pressure could
result in political disaster. The problem,
Natürlich, is that subtle warnings are of-
ten discounted or not recognized at all,
whereas acts of provocation stark
enough to command attention tend to
induce belligerent reaction. Das bekommen
balance right is something like walking a
tightrope in a variable wind. Since there
are few indications in the public record
that acts of interference against satellites
have yet been speci½cally threatened or
actually undertaken, it is reasonable to
conclude that the strategy of negation is
perhaps an option but not yet a commit-
ment for any major country.11 Thus,
there is time to consider a more con-
structive approach.

If the incipient collision of policy is to
be gracefully avoided, existing space reg-
ulations would have to be elaborated
and formalized to accomplish two relat-
ed purposes: 1) categorical prohibition
of the destruction of space assets or di-

11 Much has been made recently of Iraqi efforts
to jam gps receivers during the war and of alle-
gations that Cuba has been jamming expatriate
satellite television broadcasts into Iran, Aber
these are isolated, relatively low-tech acts of
interference. See David A. Fulgham, “War
Shapes New Products,” Aviation Week and Space
Technologie 158 (24) (16 Juni 2003): 152; Und
Henry Hamman, “Jamming of Satellite Broad-
casts puts Spotlight on Cuban-Iranian Ties,”
Financial Times, 21 Juli 2003, 6.

rect interference with their legitimate
functions; Und 2) more re½ned speci½ca-
tion of the limits of permissible activity.
That latter provision would be especially
controversial in the United States, Aber
basic common sense suggests that toler-
ance of space activities will ultimately
depend on credible assurance that they
are not unacceptably intrusive. Presum-
ably, current levels of capability can be
accommodated inde½nitely, und in
some areas, such as communication re-
lay, there is no reason to anticipate im-
posed limitations. With regard to multi-
spectrum observation and perhaps elec-
tronic intercept, Jedoch, one can pro-
ject the evolution of capability to levels
that would require some regulatory limi-
Station. If navigation services are to be
protected, darüber hinaus, some understand-
ing will have to be reached about their
utilization in precision-attack opera-
tionen. Over the longer term, assets that
are as consequential and as vulnerable
as those in space will have to be broadly
legitimized to be sustained–and nation-
al dominance will not constitute a viable
basis for international legitimacy. Im
end, a more inclusive formulation of
purpose and a more equitable distribu-
tion of the bene½ts of space services will
have to be devised.

The term ‘transformation,’ as it is used

in uns. military planning documents,
generally refers to all that is involved in
making military operations more effec-
tive–the application of advanced tech-
nology certainly, but also the evolution
of doctrine, Ausbildung, and mission con-
ception to produce more decisive capa-
bility. The implicit assumption is that
more decisive capability, as measured
against the capacities of potential adver-
saries, will assure greater security for the
United States and for those to whom we
choose to extend protection. In that ap-

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plication, ‘transformation’ is not a com-
prehensively inclusive term, and it poses
the question how the security of the
United States and its allies relates to in-
ternational security generally. Seit
those formally included in the U.S. alli-
ance system are a declining fraction of
the world population (no more than 30
percent at the moment), that is a serious
question for everyone involved. The cur-
rent military planning presumption is
that the United States can and must pre-
serve a competitive edge inde½nitely,
and that the security of anyone outside
die USA. alliance system is not a vital
national concern. That is said to be a
realistic perspective. The possibility
that transformation so conceived might
stimulate major threats that might oth-
erwise be avoided is not currently being
berücksichtigt. The possibility that the se-
curity of the United States ultimately
depends on the security of everyone else
is essentially ignored. Such a thought is
said to be unrealistic.

The currently proclaimed standards of
realism will eventually have to be adjust-
Hrsg. Over time, technology developed in
the United States will assuredly diffuse
to the rest of the world. If the context for
that diffusion is competition in intimi-
dation, the inherent vulnerability of the
United States will be a rising danger, po-
tentially an unmanageable one. Trans-
formation as currently practiced carries
an appreciable risk of ultimate doom. Wenn
die USA. political system does not ulti-
mately recognize that risk and confront
the implications, its viability will be
threatened. All of which is to say that the
exploration of alternatives can fairly be
considered a vital obligation, und das
exploration might usefully begin with a
broader notion of transformation.
If it is to be globally constructive,

transformation would have to be applied
in the ½rst instance not to the instru-

ments of coercion, but rather to the cen-
tral purpose of security and to the funda-
mental principles on which the conduct
of security is based. The spontaneously
integrating character of the global econ-
omy, the issues of equity and social co-
herence generated by the pattern of eco-
nomic activity, the environmental impli-
cations of aggregate human activity, Und
the momentum of technology and of
biotechnology in particular all suggest
that global security will have to become
the dominant objective and that security
policy will necessarily have to be com-
prehensively inclusive. That further im-
plies that policy will have to be based on
principles that can inspire something
approaching global consensus, and can
manage the emerging threats of smaller-
scale violence as well as the traditional
ones of larger-scale aggression.

For some inde½nite period, die USA.
military will be able to prevent large-
scale forms of aggression on a global ba-
Schwester. If that capability is to be accepted as
legitimate and preserved at a reasonable
cost, Jedoch, the scope of application
and the basis for justi½cation will have
to be altered. Protection against hostile
invasion would have to be generally ex-
tended. Such protection could not be ex-
clusively provided for the current alli-
ance system. Principles of active con-
frontation, designed to assure that a
strong deterrent is preserved and that
effective preparations are made for pre-
dictable conventional force contingen-
cies, would have to be subordinated to
principles of reassurance whereby inher-
ently superior U.S. forces conveyed con-
½dence that they would not initiate at-
tack as long as international standards of
behavior were upheld. In order to con-
vey that assurance convincingly, Die
United States would have to engage with
all signi½cant military establishments in
the cooperative manner that it currently

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does only with formal allies. If that is to
happen, die USA. political system would
have to alter its traditional practice of
justifying its military effort in terms of
designated threats, and would have to
accept the burden of providing general
protection. In doing so it would have to
acknowledge that the United States is
the dominant source of potential threat
for everyone else, and that reassurance is
as important as deterrence. Those are
dif½cult but ultimately necessary con-
ceptual and political adjustments to sus-
tain the traditional commitment to pre-
venting major war.

The problem of dealing with civil vio-

lence and clandestine terrorism is yet
more demanding, since deterrence and
defensive reaction are more dif½cult,
making prevention all the more impor-
tant. Effective prevention in these areas
requires not merely conveying reassur-
ance, but also direct collaboration in the
control of what is broadly determined to
be intolerably criminal activity. The ½rst
step in this is to de½ne fundamental and
universal standards of behavior widely
enough accepted that powerful methods
of mandatory transparency and enforced
compliance could be globally applied
without exception. The necessary ac-
companying step is to devise appropriate
limitations and other forms of legal pro-
tection suf½cient to ensure that those
methods of prevention do not them-
selves become a menace.

The standard of behavior most likely
to achieve universal adherence would be
the prohibition of preparation for acts of
truly massive destruction. That rule
might be primarily directed against the
speculative possibility of catastrophic
terrorism, but it presumably would also
have to be applied to the legacy practice
of deterrence. It is also prudent to as-
sume that the capability of precise co-
ercion, which might be necessary to en-

force a preventive regime, would have
to be globally regulated.

The situation in North Korea presents

the most critical immediate test of those
broad principles and of the process of
transformation generally. The currently
declared intention of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea to proceed
with the production of plutonium is the
½rst explicit challenge to the American
policy of preventive coercion, Und
the eventual outcome will determine
whether that is an operational policy or a
lesser political exercise largely con½ned
in den Irak. Since the declared North Korean
intention has also been accompanied by
a stated willingness to contemplate the
negotiated dismantlement of the coun-
try’s nuclear materials production com-
plex, Jedoch, there also appears to be a
constructive opportunity. Whatever
happens on the Korean peninsula–a
preventive attack, successful de½ance of
that threat, negotiated dismantlement,
or some change in the political regime
–the conditions of global security will
be generally affected. An image of con-
structive transformation reasonably, Und
perhaps necessarily, will begin with an
outcome in North Korea that demon-
strates the underlying principles.

Such an outcome would involve a
comprehensive settlement under which
North Korea would dismantle its nucle-
ar materials production facilities; termi-
nate its ballistic missile development
and export programs; redeploy its con-
ventional forces (its artillery in particu-
lar) away from the dmz and out of im-
mediate range of Seoul; and submit to
veri½cation procedures to document
compliance with these provisions. In
exchange, the North Korean government
would gain full political normalization,
an end to all economic sanctions, sub-
stantial assistance for economic regener-

100

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ation, and security guarantees credibly
issued and actively practiced by the
Vereinigte Staaten. That arrangement would
be endorsed and implemented not only
by the six states currently involved in
diplomatic discussions–China, Japan,
Russland, and South Korea in addition to
the United States and North Korea–but
also by all parties to the Nonprolifera-
tion Treaty and by the international ½-
nancial institutions. In the event that the
nuclear reactors promised under the
1994 Agreed Framework are ever com-
pleted, the fuel would be under direct in-
ternational control at all times, und das
requirement would become the new
standard for all new nuclear reactors
worldwide.12

Such a comprehensive settlement
would go well beyond what has been
considered in any documented of½cial
discussion–and would be considered
unrealistic by most of those who have
participated in those discussions.
The grounds for objection have much
more to do with prevailing political atti-
tudes, Jedoch, than with real interest.
It seems evident that security for all par-
ties would be substantially improved
under such an arrangement. The provi-
sions are less fanciful than the United
States’s imagining it could conduct a
preventive war against North Korea at

12 It is reasonable to speculate that as part of
a comprehensive settlement of this sort, Norden
Korea would be provided, as a form of econom-
ic assistance, a modernized power grid that
could be built much more rapidly than a reac-
tor. Even if such a settlement were made, Wie-
immer, the North Korean government might in
principle insist on the right to the reactors, In
which case the provisions for international con-
trol of the fuel cycle would be relevant. Inter-
nationalizing control of the nuclear fuel cycle
would be a much higher standard than current
npt rules, and that fact would be at least part
of the answer to those who contend that any
compensation for North Korea is unacceptable
acquiescence to blackmail.

an acceptable cost, or North Korea’s
imagining it could safely prosper by ex-
porting nuclear materials and ballistic
missiles while fending off the United
States with nuclear threats, or anyone’s
imagining North Korean society will
undergo a felicitous internal transforma-
tion unassisted. dennoch, with cur-
rent policy dominated more by political
attitude than by real interest, a compre-
hensive arrangement is not likely to
emerge from either the United States or
Nord Korea.

Exploration of a general settlement
would have to be initiated by a third
party, most plausibly China. With the
breakdown of the Agreed Framework,
China has already become procedurally
more active in promoting and organiz-
ing of½cial dialogue among what is com-
ing to be called the group of six. It is ad-
mittedly a stretch, but not an inconceiv-
able one, that China, concerned about
the implications of an unraveling situa-
tion, might become substantively more
venturesome as well.

Whatever the outcome in North Ko-
rea, its global implications will be affect-
ed by the handling of Iran’s nuclear ma-
terial production activities. A strategy
for constructive transformation would
reasonably aspire to make that situation
a reinforcing precedent. In a report is-
sued in November of 2003, the director
general of the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency (iaea) detailed Iran’s viola-
tions of its disclosure obligations under
the npt.13 The report determined that
dating back to 1985, and in some in-
stances back to 1981, Iran had conducted
technical explorations of “practically

13 “Implementation of the npt Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran:
Report by the Director General,” iaea (gov/
2003/71), (10 November 2003), .

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a complete front end of a nuclear fuel
Zyklus, including uranium mining and
milling, conversion, enrichment, Kraftstoff
fabrication, heavy water production, A
light water reactor, a heavy water re-
search reactor and associated research
and development activities”–all of
which should have been reported but
was not.14 Small amounts of enriched
uranium had been produced in proto-
type gas centrifuges and laser enrich-
ment facilities. Small amounts of sepa-
rated plutonium had been produced in
experimental facilities as well. A proto-
type uranium enrichment plant and a
much larger production facility were
revealed to be under construction at
Natanz. Although the effort had not yet
produced enough material for a single
nuclear weapon, completion and op-
eration of the observed facilities would
in principle provide the capacity for
producing enough material for many
weapons.

Caught in the subterfuge, Iran of½cial-
ly committed itself to full disclosure, ein-
nouncing acceptance of the additional
iaea inspection protocol (infcirc 540)
it had resisted up to that point. Under
pressure from Russia, Frankreich, Deutschland,
and Britain, Iran also temporarily sus-
pended its uranium enrichment and plu-
tonium separation activities by implica-
tion until the details of the iaea inspec-
tion could be worked out. While admit-
ting its violation of disclosure rules, Die
Iranian government nonetheless insisted
that its activities were designed for nu-
clear power generation only and did not
constitute a nuclear weapons program.
The United States forcefully alleged the
contrary, Jedoch, and attempted, un-
successfully, to have the iaea Governing
Board refer the matter to the un Securi-
ty Council for the imposition of sanc-

14 Ebenda., 9.

102

Dædalus Summer 2004

tionen. Eventually, the United States com-
promised with the Europeans and Iran
on an iaea resolution that “strongly de-
plores Iran’s past failures and breaches,”
welcomes its new policy of disclosure,
and warns that the iaea Governing
Board will respond quickly and strongly
if any further violations are discovered.
None of the parties involved, Jedoch,
yet seems fully satis½ed.

The Iranian admission of disclosure
violations and apparent acceptance of
more intrusive inspections clearly indi-
cate a change of policy, but do not re-
solve the question of underlying inten-
tion. Under current npt provisions it
would be legally permissible for Iran to
accumulate separated plutonium under
full iaea safeguards, as Japan has done,
thereby producing a material stockpile
that in principle could be rapidly con-
verted into a nuclear weapons arsenal. Wenn
that possibility is to be prevented, Iran
would have to forgo the independent
production of enriched uranium and
plutonium and to accept international
control of the fuel for any of the nuclear
reactors it constructs and operates–the
higher standard of control envisaged for
Nord Korea. In accepting that higher
standard, Iran might reasonably de-
mand speci½c security guarantees from
Die Vereinigten Staaten. Because Iran’s inher-
ent economic prospects are much better
than North Korea’s, a general settlement
package might rely more exclusively on
security provisions, but the underlying
principle of accommodation would be
ähnlich. Were fundamental accommoda-
tion to be achieved in both instances, Die
troublesome concept of ‘rogue state’
might be retired–and that would be a
signi½cant practical accomplishment.
Such accommodation is even less likely
to emerge from any bilateral interaction
than it is from the North Korean case,
but the potential mediators are at least

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as readily identi½ed and already more
active. It is evident that the eu and Rus-
sia together could play that role, und das
substantive terms of accommodation
would be a natural evolution of their
current policies.

The other opportunities for construc-
tive transformation are less immediately
urgent but more directly global in char-
acter. The impasse over a negotiating
mandate for paros and the failed effort
to devise a veri½cation and enforcement
protocol for the bwc have already en-
gaged the general diplomatic communi-
ty in a struggle with the United States
over basic security principles. In both
instances the United States, acting es-
sentially alone, has blocked widely sup-
ported efforts to devise protective regu-
lation, and those actions are now inter-
preted to be a diplomatic extension of its
preventive coercion doctrine. Recogniz-
ing that unusually powerful common
interests are engaged in both instances,
strategists for constructive transforma-
tion could plausibly seek to mobilize
frustrated international sentiment and
could eventually expect to induce reso-
nance within the United States as well.
In more mature phases of such an effort,
there would have to be active of½cial
champions urging protective oversight
provisions for biotechnology and offer-
ing candidate schemes for space regula-
tion. Jedoch, such efforts usually origi-
nate with less formal, more spontaneous
discussions of the sort that are occurring
among like-minded countries and in
track-two meetings of professional soci-
ethisch. One can reasonably imagine a con-
structive program with general concep-
tual coherence emerging from the quiet
exploratory efforts currently being un-
dertaken on both topics.

It is certainly true, nonetheless, Das
very prominent and presumably very
extensive public discussion would be

Ein
alternative
vision of
global
security

required if constructive transformation
were actually to be accomplished or
even seriously attempted. Die Idee
would have to be put into circulation in
engaging detail if security policy is to be
meaningfully affected, and that would
require of½cial advocates who are force-
voll, consequential, and adroit enough to
command global attention. By virtue
both of incentive and apparent inclina-
tion, China would be the most plausible
source of such an initiative, aber es ist nicht
reasonable to impose the burden of
global leadership entirely on China. Es ist
more reasonable to imagine a productive
collaboration between China and the
members of the eu and the osce. Der
basic principles of constructive collabo-
ration for mutual protection have been
most signi½cantly developed in Europe
over the course of the cold war and
thereafter. It is that legacy, adapted by
China and extended to Asia, that offers
the most promising prospect for improv-
ing security through a process of con-
structive transformation.

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Dædalus Summer 2004

103
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