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Erik Simanis and Stuart Hart

Expanding Possibilities
at the Base of the Pyramid

Innovations Case Discussion: KickStart

The last decade has witnessed a seismic shift in our understanding of and approach to pover-
ty alleviation. Driven in large part by the emergence of empowerment-based forms of devel-
opment practice—most notably, Participatory Rural Appraisal1—and the success of the
Grameen Bank and the microfinance movement it catalyzed, it is now well accepted that sus-
tainable poverty alleviation must recognize the poor as central agents in that process. In der Tat,
in place of the image of the poor as helpless dependants waiting on Western largesse to extri-
cate them from their predicament, the poor are increasingly recognized as highly resourceful
entrepreneurs who possess valuable knowledge, resources and capabilities. Im Gegenzug, business
development and enterprise creation driven by the poor has emerged as a powerful philoso-
phy and tool for addressing poverty and marginality. Significantly, this shift has simultaneous-
ly altered the role of the development practitioner—from that of a “development doctor,” who
diagnoses the poor’s problem and prescribes the solution, to that of “enterprise facilitator”,
who assists the poor in acting on their self-defined aspirations.

KickStart and its founders demonstrate the power of this enterprise-driven approach to
poverty alleviation, as their MoneyMaker™ pump has empowered over 30,000 income-poor
people to start or expand their own income-generating businesses on their own terms. Viel
as microfinance loans make possible a wide variety of businesses, Also, zu, do KickStart tech-
nologies. By simply making KickStart technologies accessible to the poor through local mar-
ket outlets, KickStart provides an enabling tool that expands the poor’s opportunity set and,

Erik Simanis is a Ph.D. candidate in Management at Cornell University’s Johnson Graduate
School of Management and co-director of the Base of the Pyramid Protocol® Project. He has
worked to integrate sustainability and Base of the Pyramid concepts into corporate strategy as a
consultant to Dupont, SC Johnson, The Solae Company, and ECOS Corporation, unter anderen.

Stuart Hart is the Samuel C. Johnson Chair in Sustainable Global Enterprise and Professor of
Management at Cornell University. Before coming to the Johnson School, he taught strategic man-
agement and founded both the Center for Sustainable Enterprise (CSE) at the University of North
Carolina’s Kenan-Flagler Business School, and the Corporate Environmental Management
Programm (CEMP) at the University of Michigan.

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Erik Simanis and Stuart Hart

consequently, their ability to provide for their own needs. In der Tat, MoneyMaker pumps are
used in a variety of income-generating activities—from expanding food crop production, Zu
launching plant nursery business, to washing cars and even to providing and selling drinking
Wasser. As KickStart founder Martin Fisher observes, the combined impact of these thousands
of locally spawned businesses produces country-level effects of significant proportion.

The enterprise-driven success of organizations such as KickStart and Grameen Bank has
also contributed to a silent revolution taking place in corporate boardrooms. Stung by the dual
recognition that their core market—the highest 20% of income earners on the globe—is sat-
urated and offers limited future growth opportunities and that serving the rich at the exclu-
sion of the poor will fuel an increasingly
global backlash,2 multinational corpora-
tionen (MNCs) are turning to the 4 Milliarde
poor that comprise the “Base of
Die
Pyramid” (BoP) as a viable market.3 By
learning to create business models and
offerings that serve the needs of those at the
BoP, the MNC opens up a market of mas-
sive growth potential while demonstrating
a commitment to serving a diversity of
needs and values.

[T]he massive opportunity for
corporations presented by the
[Base of the Pyramid] Ist
matched by an equally
daunting set of challenges.

But the massive opportunity for corpo-
rations presented by the BoP is matched by an equally daunting set of challenges. Erste, die Kosten
structure and material intensity of MNCs’ current business models preclude their easy exten-
sion to BoP markets. For though MNCs’ customers account for little more than 20% of the
world’s population, these customers account for almost 80% of the resources consumed on the
planet. Zusätzlich, relative to wealthy consumer markets, BoP markets are characterized by a
completely different set of geographic (z.B., predominantly rural based), strukturell (z.B.,
absence of roads, telecommunications network), institutional (z.B., absence of Western prop-
erty rights regimes) and cultural (z.B., different life aspirations) factors. Clearly, serving BoP
markets sustainably requires a radical change in how corporations think of and do business.

It is with this in mind that we turn to consider the successes, as well as the untapped
Gelegenheiten, that KickStart’s experience provides. For it is from pioneering organizations
such as KickStart that corporations can gain valuable insight into alternative business
approaches and models for sustainably serving BoP markets.

WHAT IS “APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY”?

How has KickStart succeeded in designing and disseminating a technology (the MoneyMaker
pump) that has manifested such a tremendous impact on the lives of Kenya’s rural poor? Was
can corporations looking to serve the BoP learn from KickStart’s experience? At first blush, Und
based on the information in the case, it would seem that the foundation for KickStart’s success
is rather straightforward: The organization has created “truly appropriate” technologies and
marketing strategies based on the needs of the rural poor. Mit anderen Worten, the configuration of
their products and the way those products are advertised and disseminated are better suited to

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Expanding the Possibilities at the Base of the Pyramid

the unique needs of the rural poor, their socio-cultural structure, and their environmental
conditions than other technology-based development offerings. Let’s explore this assumption.
The KickStart case argues that income-generating technologies for the rural poor need to
be simple to use and easy to repair, labor and time intensive in their use, priced sufficiently low
to allow individual ownership, have low energy (non-human) requirements, and be environ-
mentally sustainable. Ostensibly, such technologies do not exist and require Western engineer-
ing capability to produce. An appropriate marketing strategy would focus on the individual
buyer and not impose any “arbitrary” ownership forms (z.B., women’s groups, collectives). In
theory, it is this unique combination of design and marketing characteristics that convert oth-
erwise inappropriate technologies and
development strategies into potent,
poverty-alleviating mechanisms. Noch, als
appealing as the simplicity of this answer
might be—for, if correct, global poverty
alleviation would entail the application
of a fairly straightforward set of princi-
ples—the evidence just isn’t there to
support it.

In theory, es ist [Kickstart’s]
unique combination of design
and marketing characteristics
that convert otherwise
inappropriate technologies and
development strategies into
potent, poverty-alleviating
mechanisms. Noch … the evidence
just isn’t there to support it.

Erste, we can point to a number of
successful examples of technology-driv-
en micro-enterprise creation among the
rural poor that utilize technology
designs and/or marketing approaches
that diverge from those of KickStart.
Let’s look in more detail at the cases of
GrameenPhone and n-Logue, as they
stand in stark contrast to KickStart’s
experiences with its MoneyMaker pump.

GrameenPhone, launched in 1997 in Bangladesh, outfits women entrepreneurs or “phone
ladies” in rural villages with an off-the-shelf mobile phone and a solar recharger unit, die Kosten
of which (etwa $175) is financed through microloans from Grameen Bank. The phone ladies retail the phone service to people in the villages where they live. The performance of Grameen Phone has been nothing but astounding. By August 2004, es gab welche 75,000 phone ladies with each operator generating additional income of approximately $1000 pro
Jahr. Recall that the per capita income in Bangladesh is $286 per year.4 Through the phone ladies, half of Bangladesh’s rural population now enjoys access to telephony. And Grameen Phone’s revenues are estimated at half a billion dollars. The India-based company n-Logue, also a privately-owned rural telecommunications company, piloted a locally engineered wireless-in-loop (WLL) voice- and data-splitting tech- nology in India in 2001 called corDECT. The company relies on a micro-franchise model to equip rural entrepreneurs with a computer, monitor, printer, digital camera, back-up battery and application suite, all in local language. A corDECT wall set connects the franchisee to a central node that provides access to India’s internet backbone and national telecommunica- tions network. Zusätzlich, the kiosk franchise owners receive six months of unlimited inter- Innovationen / Winter 2006 45 Von http heruntergeladen://direct.mit.edu/itgg/article-pdf/1/1/43/704062/itgg.2006.1.1.43.pdf by guest on 08 September 2023 INNOV0101FINAL.qxd 2/23/2006 11:48 AM Page 46 Erik Simanis and Stuart Hart net access, a marketing kit and introductory training. The cost of the package is approximate- ly $1,200. Franchisees generate income by selling a variety of internet-based services,5 teleph-
ony, computer training, digital photographs and video showings. Von 2004, n-Logue was oper-
ating in seven states and 1,900 villages, and expecting to enter an additional 4,000 villages in
2005.

How do GrameenPhone’s and n-Logue’s technologies stack up against the criteria outlined
in the KickStart case? Erste, it’s worth stating explicitly that, in both cases, all or part of the core
technology offering is an existing, off-the-shelf technology (z.B., cell phone, computer) previ-
ously utilized only by the wealthiest of people. It was not necessary to redesign either the cell
phone or the computer to make them appropriate for the rural poor. Although n-Logue’s
extension of internet connectivity to rural areas indeed required the development of a “rural-
ly-specific” technology, the technology is
clearly not mechanically simple—nor one
easily repairable by anyone other than a
highly trained engineer. The same would go
for the cell phone and computer. And
although technophiles would argue that the
cell phone and computer are easy to use rel-
ative to a MoneyMaker treadle pump, Sie
certainly require training..

One of the greatest sources of
value delivered by the cell
phone and internet access to
the rural poor is time based.

Contrary to KickStart’s design assump-
tionen, one of the greatest sources of value
delivered by the cell phone and internet access to the rural poor is time based. Through cell
phones and internet, poor rural farmers are able to get timely, up-to-date information on
everything from crop prices to crop insect pests and even livestock illness, thereby allowing
farmers to command higher prices for their crops and tend to crop disease or livestock illness
before incurring heavy economic losses. Zusätzlich, phone and internet access save rural
farmers the time (and expense) of journeying into town. Two days spent in transit are two days
away from the farm, thereby jeopardizing crop yield and income. Impact assessments of
Grameen Phone’s pilot study indicated that each call placed in the rural village saved the user
$2.70 Zu $10, which translates into 2.5% Zu 10% of monthly household income.6 Indeed, Die
rural poor experience opportunity costs as much as or even more intensely than wealthy peo-
Bitte.

Energy-wise, both the cell phone and the n-Logue computer system are dependent upon
Elektrizität. Cognizant of the unreliability (and even outright absence) of rural electrical grids,
each of the businesses addresses this gap by simply providing a mobile energy source as part
of the technology package. And in Grameen Phone’s case, the energy source relies on solar
power.

From a pricing standpoint, it’s not clear if the $175 cost of the cell phone kit is a priori “affordable,” given that the annual per capita income in Bangladesh is $286. Relative to the
MoneyMaker pump, which retails at $88 (by virtue of grant subsidies) in Kenya—a country whose per capita annual income is comparable to that of Bangladesh—the cost of the phone kit is seemingly pushing the threshold of affordability. Bei $1,200, n-Logue’s computer fran-
chise package for India’s rural poor appears absurd. Jedoch, ex post, the cost of the technol-

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Expanding the Possibilities at the Base of the Pyramid

ogy packages is clearly affordable, as the revenues generated by the micro-businesses are suffi-
cient to pay for the financing cost of the technology while leaving profit. The important point
is that “affordability” is not inherent to a technology—affordability is a function of the busi-
ness model within which the technology is embedded.

Let’s briefly turn our attention to the issue of marketing and dissemination strategy, Par-
ticularly in the case of Grameen Phone. As stated in the case, KickStart argues strongly against
“arbitrary” segmentation perpetuated by development professionals (z.B., Frauen) Und
“Marxist-based” models of collective ownership. Such approaches not only fail to reach the
right customers, they also create mis-aligned incentives, inevitably leading to what economists
call moral hazard. Yet Grameen Phone and Grameen Bank, as many are aware, target women
for its customers. They do so in the belief—supported by empirical studies—that women,
more so than men, invest additional income in their children’s health and education.

Zusätzlich, Grameen Bank, which finances the phone purchases, utilizes a solidarity lend-
ing model in which a group of women collectively become the guarantors of unsecured loans
issued to individual women in the group. Conventional economic wisdom suggests that such
a loan scheme—which removes a large part of the risk associated with an individual’s loan—
would be ripe for abuse. Jedoch, Grameen Bank’s loan repayment rate stands above 95%, A
rate far better than that of traditional banks. The success of the solidarity lending model—and
Grameen Bank’s and GrameenPhone’s business model—is dependent upon the communal
ties that exist among women in rural Bangladeshi communities. In der Tat, the assumption of
individual self-interest and rent-seeking that underlies traditional banking approaches raises
significantly the cost of doing business (as they require intensive background screening, Papier
arbeiten, demonstration of collateral, and credible threat of legal recourse) Und, thereby, raises the
price of loans beyond the reach of the poor.

As we’ve seen, if we were to extract a set of “appropriate” technology design and market-
ing approaches from the success cases of Grameen Phone and n-Logue, our list would be prac-
tically the reverse of KickStart’s. But there is yet another reason to doubt that any such criteria
form the foundation for KickStart’s success—for there are examples of failed micro-enterprise
development interventions that compare favorably with KickStart’s criteria.

The animal-drawn wheeled toolcarrier—the subject of Paul Starkey’s 1988 study7—was
designed as a multipurpose farming tool to boost farming productivity, primarily in Asia and
Africa. The toolcarriers could be used for everything from plowing, seeding, weeding and
Transport. As Chambers recounts, the toolcarriers “were designed by agricultural engineers,
developed and tested in workshops and on research stations, and then passed on to farmers for
trials and to manufacturers for production.”8 The resources and brainpower that went into
some three decades of research and development on the toolcarriers are astounding. Starkey
estimates that the development costs (In 1987 Preise) waren vorbei $40 Million, involving hun- dreds of senior and junior staff at multilateral institutions such as the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT).9 By most estimates (prior to Starkey’s 1988 Veröffentlichung), the animal-drawn wheeled tool- carrier was an “appropriate” technology that blended Western design capability with local environmental conditions. At the time, it compared favorably with KickStart’s current criteria. Critically, the toolcarrier’s central purpose was to boost farming productivity and efficiency and, somit, generate additional income. Economic forecasts from a research station in Senegal innovations / Winter 2006 47 Von http heruntergeladen://direct.mit.edu/itgg/article-pdf/1/1/43/704062/itgg.2006.1.1.43.pdf by guest on 08 September 2023 INNOV0101FINAL.qxd 2/23/2006 11:48 AM Page 48 Erik Simanis and Stuart Hart suggested that the wheeled toolcarriers would “allow cultivated surfaces to double…while at the same time allowing returns to both area and labour to increase.”10 An ICRISAT analysis claimed that the additional incremental profits generated by the toolcarriers would pay for the $1,000-plus costs of the equipment within a year’s time. Given the success of n-Logue’s $1,200
computer franchise package, these forecasts certainly sound plausible.

The design relied on Western engineering capability and research, much of which took
place on agricultural research stations dotted across the developing world. Even the design
principles articulated by Jean Nolle, a French agricultural engineer and pioneer in the devel-
opment of toolcarriers for the better part of three decades, included simplicity of design,
multi-purpose use, and standardization of components.11 Ruggedness and simplicity of use
and ease of manufacture and repair were central concerns. As well, the toolcarriers did not
require electricity or fossil fuels, simply animal power.

Much like KickStart, many dissemination strategies, particular during the 1960s and 1970s,
relied on private-sector manufacturing and distribution. Private sector-led initiatives could be
found in India, Botswana, Brasilien, Mexiko, Senegal and Cameroon. During the 1980s, a shift
toward government and aid-sector distribution of agricultural implements shifted trading pat-
Seeschwalben, with manufacturers of toolcarriers moving out of direct sales to focus on governmental
and aid agency contracts.

Am Ende, Jedoch, the wheeled toolcarriers were flatly rejected by farmers, who argued
that single-purpose implements better suited their needs and that the toolcarrier’s cost was too
hoch. Noch einmal, ex post, one can easily identify a host of design flaws that might explain its
failure. But the point remains that had KickStart’s criteria been in place three decades ago, Die
same outcome would have resulted: The toolcarrier would have been deemed appropriate and
launched into the market with expectations of success.

Noch, if this example isn’t sufficiently convincing—as we recognize that our and Starkey’s
readings of this technology and its history are but one of many—there is another organization
whose technologies adhere letter for letter to KickStart’s design and marketing principles but
that have failed to catalyze significant rural micro-enterprise development: KickStart itself. Für
it is important to remember that no other KickStart technology—which among others include
an oilseed press, a soil block press, a hay baler, and a pit latrine slab—has had an effect remote-
ly comparable to the MoneyMaker pump on rural micro-enterprise development and, conse-
quently, on rural poverty reduction. As its 2003-2004 annual report indicates, über 98% of the
organization’s unit sales (9,007 out of a total 9,189 units sold) are generated by a single prod-
uct type: the micro-irrigation technologies. And the MoneyMaker line of pumps was not
KickStart’s first product released into the market—so success doesn’t stem from longer market
exposure. There simply is no easy way to explain the disparity in impact among KickStart’s
own technologies.

What this brief analysis reveals is that KickStart’s success has little to do with having hit
upon some sacred, infallible set of design and marketing criteria that are inherently “appropri-
ate” for the rural poor—otherwise, the pump’s success would extend over to KickStart’s entire
suite of technologies. In der Tat, the very use of the moniker “appropriate technology” often relies
on a tautological logic: If a successful business incorporates a technology, Die Technologie (Und
its dissemination strategy) is deemed appropriate; if no profitable business model can leverage
Die Technologie, it is relegated to the status of “inappropriate.” Yes, all of the factors and crite-

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Expanding the Possibilities at the Base of the Pyramid

ria identified in the KickStart case inform a business model and how the end-user (the rural
poor in this case) implements a technology, but they do not a priori determine business suc-
cess or failure. They merely establish the context within which the entrepreneur innovates.
Appropriateness, daher, is not determined by the technology or the marketing approach
but by the imagination of its user.

REAL OPTIONS FOR REACHING THE “BASE OF THE PYRAMID”

Back to our original question: Why has KickStart been successful, and how can companies
learn from their experience? Clearly, KickStart is accomplishing something that few other
organizations—for profit or otherwise—can claim. Boosting a country’s GDP by 0.5% while
serving its poorest sectors is no small feat! But if the success of the MoneyMaker pump (Und
all other technologies) in catalyzing micro-enterprise has little to do with ingenious product
design or marketing (or prescient knowledge of profitable business opportunities for that mat-
ter), where then do we turn?

Before we address this question, let’s remind ourselves how difficult it is to build a new
business, whether you are a multinational corporation entering a new-product market or a
micro-entrepreneur in Kenya. The failure rate of startup businesses in the U.S. has been esti-
mated to reach 85% in certain sectors, despite the resources people have available to them rel-
ative to the rural poor. “Good ideas” are a dime a dozen—turning an idea into a profitable
business is where the rubber meets the road. Within such a context, the linear and highly reg-
imented planning (and design) models that constitute the heart of much managerial and
administrative training—both of business and development professionals—are likely to fail. Es
takes a different kind of organizational strategy, one that accepts and integrates ambiguity and
uncertainty, not masks it behind a façade of numeric certainty. KickStart’s success, wir glauben,
is the result of such an organizational strategy, one which we shall call a “real options” strate-
gy.12

A strategy is distinct from a “business model.” KickStart’s business model consists of the
organization’s particular configuration of resources and assets by which it manufactures, mar-
kets, finances, and distributes its pumps and other technologies. A strategy, by contrast, out-
lines how a firm intends to achieve its stated mission over time. Key strategic processes include
defining the scope of the organization’s activities, the allocation and targeting of funds, und das
choices one makes regarding organizational size and structure.

The notion of a real-options strategy takes its name and underlying logic from the “finan-
cial option.” A financial option explicitly recognizes the value of uncertainty (volatility) Und
time and the relationship between the two. Its appeal as a logic for guiding organizational
strategy stems directly from its ability to value uncertainty. As we’ve argued above, new enter-
prise creation is a prime candidate for such an approach, particularly at the BoP.
Fundamentally, a real-options strategy responds to uncertainty through a staged process of
schnell, low-cost continuous learning supported by a flexible resource allocation and organiza-
tional structure. Small-scale experimentation and low-cost “probes” are the tools that enable
such learning. Within a real-options logic, organizational flexibility is of central concern. Als
solch, investments are targeted into establishing a core-capabilities platform from which the
organization can respond in multiple directions based on new information. Durch Erweiterung, In

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Erik Simanis and Stuart Hart

place of a single-product approach, which can lead to over-commitment, a portfolio of prod-
ucts and technologies would be developed and tested, thereby spreading risk while increasing
the number of “probes” in the market. Within a real-options framework, product or business
failures are not considered wasted efforts, but valuable sources of information.

Organizational growth and expansion—in people and infrastructure—would be limited
until the experiments and small-scale pilots yield sufficient insight into the business model to
justify scaling up or discontinuing. As the
wheeled toolcarrier example demonstrates,
having the organizational flexibility to termi-
nate a low-value project is as valuable as the
opportunity to scale-up one that shows prom-
ise. And the scale-up process itself follows an
incremental approach, avoiding the all-or-
nothing investment decisions which lock the
organization into a single business model
von Anfang an.

KickStart’s strategy for
alleviating poverty through
technology-based micro-
enterprise formation
provides an excellent
example of this real-options
strategic framework.

KickStart’s strategy for alleviating poverty
through technology-based micro-enterprise
formation provides an excellent example of
this real-options strategic framework. Der
trial-and-error approach that the case alludes
to conceals a deeper strategy that leverages the
KickStart’s core competency in producing durable, culturally-sensitive, mechanically operated
technologies within a highly flexible organizational design that facilitates rapid, low-cost learn-
ing. A visit to KickStart’s corporate headquarters in Nairobi quickly supports the notion that
the organization’s resources are focused on harnessing and expanding its technology-develop-
ment capability. Most of the organization’s formally trained personnel work in its Tech-Dev
department (as do its ex-patriots), and a significant portion of its office space goes toward this
Funktion. And “cultural capital” clearly resides within Tech-Dev, as decision-making power
flows from Tech-Dev to the field.

KickStart also maintains organizational flexibility and low experimentation costs by driv-
ing most of its operations through a variable-cost model. Manufacturing is outsourced.
Products are sold through independent dealers. The Marketing/Sales group relies heavily on
commission-based employees. The Impact Monitoring department is a recent phenomenon
that has developed as demand for the pumps has increased, along with donor requests to learn
the impact of their funds.

Unlike many NGOs, KickStart does not invest significant funds, research or activism into
development issues. As the case suggests, KickStart does not believe in extensive training or
skills development (other than operation of its equipment), does not focus on establishing
“women’s self help groups,” nor address itself to a host of other potential domains (z.B., nutri-
tion, Gesundheit). KickStart believes in these important issues, but does not feel it possesses the
capacity to address them effectively. Zusätzlich, the group’s philosophy focuses on the indi-
vidual as the locus of change. Wieder, the critical implication is that KickStart maintains very
low overhead, giving it the organizational flexibility to experiment and learn.

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Expanding the Possibilities at the Base of the Pyramid

KickStart maintains a portfolio of products that include an oilseed press, the soil block
press, the treadle pump, and the hay baler, unter anderen. The organization continues to devel-
op additional technologies, many of which leverage a common compression technology. Der
products share a suite of common characteristics: all are manually operated and require, bei
most, two people to function; they are ergonomically designed and easy to operate; and dura-
bility and ease of repair are made possible by designs that require few moving parts. By main-
taining a portfolio of technologies, KickStart gains greater market knowledge through its mul-
tiple touch points with the market and increases the likelihood that a successful match will
geschehen. It’s instructive to recall that KickStart’s first technology was not the micro-irrigation
pump, but the oilseed press (which only sold 49 units in Kenya in 2004 compared with 9,007
micro-irrigation pumps). Had KickStart bet the farm on its oilseed press—much as the devel-
opers of the wheeled toolcarrier—KickStart would not be in the position it is today.

The value of a real options strategy for serving BoP markets is that it increases the proba-
bility that an organization will develop a product or service that a poor person or community
will successfully embed into a profitable, wealth-generating local business. And as KickStart
and other pioneering social entrepreneurs have demonstrated, demand for their products and
services is ultimately dependent on the ability of the end-user—the owner of the MoneyMaker
pump or the cell phone—to fashion a wealth-creating micro-enterprise. Aber, as we’ve suggest-
Hrsg, catalyzing these micro-enterprises is not something amenable to deliberate, deductive
planning, nor a natural outcome from a technology’s design characteristics, nor based on how
we may market them. Ja, these factors comprise the boundary conditions within which busi-
ness models are developed, but they do not determine them. Als solche, there is no silver bullet
technology for dealing with the uncertainty of new enterprise creation. But there are strategies
that can help organizations manage such conditions. KickStart’s real-options strategy is one
such model.

Wir laden Leser zu Kommentaren ein. Please send an email to .

1. Robert Chambers, Whose Reality Counts: Putting the First Last, (London: ITDG Publishing: 1997).
2. As demonstrated by the intensification of anti-WTO, WEF, and IMF protests, from Seattle, Davos, Prague, Und
Cancun to, most recently, Hongkong. Außerdem, today’s demonstrators are as likely to include smallholder
farmers and Third World women’s coalitions as they are American college students and European “Greens.”
3. C. K. Prahalad and Stuart Hart (2002), “The fortune at the bottom of the pyramid,” Strategy+Business 26: 54-
67; C. K. Prahalad, The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid (Philadelphia: Wharton School Publishing, 2004);
Stuart Hart, Capitalism at the Crossroads (Philadelphia: Wharton School Publishing, 2005).
4. Hart, Capitalism at the Crossroads.
5. n-Logue facilitates the provision of various internet-based services, including education and training, telemed-
icine and health care, and agricultural and veterinary services.
6. Hart, Capitalism at the Crossroads.
7. Starkey, Animal-Drawn Wheeled Toolcarriers: Perfected yet Rejected (Braunschweig, Deutschland: Friedr. Vieweg &
Sohn, 1988).
8. Kammern, Whose Reality Counts, P. 12.
9. Ebenda.
10.Starkey, Animal-Drawn Wheeled Toolcarriers, P. 122.
11. Ebenda, P. 16.
12. See Hart, Capitalism at the Crossroads, S. 196-198.

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