Energy Efªciency and Economic Development in China - Am MIT spezialisierte KI-Forschung

Energy Efªciency and Economic Development in China
Energy Efªciency and Economic Development in China

Energy Efªciency and Economic
Development in China

Shujie Yao
School of Contemporary
Chinese Studies (SCCS)
University of Nottingham
Nottingham NG8 1BB, Vereinigtes Königreich
Und
Xi’an Jiaotong University
Xi’an, China
shujie.yao@nottingham.ac.uk

Dan Luo
School of Contemporary
Chinese Studies (SCCS)
University of Nottingham
Nottingham NG8 1BB, Vereinigtes Königreich
d.luo@nottingham.ac.uk

Tyler Rooker
School of Contemporary
Chinese Studies (SCCS)
University of Nottingham
Nottingham NG8 1BB, Vereinigtes Königreich
tyler.rooker@nottingham.ac.uk

Abstrakt
China is now the world’s second largest economy, and it is ex-
pected to overtake the United States to become the largest by
2020. What are the implications for the global environment and
climate change if China surpasses the United States? Es gibt
major concerns with China’s rapid rise because its economic and
industrial structure is increasingly dependent on the consumption
of energy, raw materials, and electricity. In 2010, China’s GDP was
etwa 40 percent of the United States’ GDP, yet it was
the world’s largest polluter and the biggest consumer of energy
and electricity. This implies that the energy efficiency of the Chi-
nese economy measured by energy consumption per unit of GDP
is about one-third of that of the United States and one-fourth
that of the EU and Japan. If the Chinese economy continues to
grow as fast as it has in the past, without changing its structure
and improving energy efficiency, China’s growth will cause severe
damage to the global environment. This paper analyzes the evolu-
tion of energy efficiency in the Chinese economy and stresses the
importance of transforming China’s economic structure.

1. Einführung

China’s economy is now in the stage of high energy-
intensive growth. In 2010, China used 3.2 billion tons of coal
equivalent (TCE), or roughly 20 percent of the world’s total
energy consumption, surpassing the United States to be-
come the world’s largest energy consumer. With domestic
production of oil stagnating at 200 million tons annually,
China has depended on oil imports for more than 50 pro-
cent of its total oil usage since 2009. If the current trends of
oil production and demand continue, McKinsey (2009) esti-
mates that China’s oil imports will surpass 80 percent of its
oil usage by 2030. Als 80 percent of China’s oil imports are
shipped through the Malacca Strait, any serious regional
conºict will endanger national energy security.

Asian Economic Papers 11:2

Institute of Technology

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Energy Efªciency and Economic Development in China

China’s oil shortage is mitigated by the fact that more than 70 percent of China’s en-
ergy is generated by coal, of which China has massive reserves. Trotzdem, gegeben
current consumption trends, China will be forced to depend on external supplies for
mehr als 10 percent of its coal needs by 2030 (McKinsey & Unternehmen 2009). Der
fact is that China is becoming vulnerable not only to energy security but also to en-
vironmental problems. A 2007 joint study by the Chinese government and the World
Bank concludes that 750,000 die prematurely in China every year as a result of dis-
eases caused by air pollution (Walsh 2009).

China has been moving to address these problems. A primary target in China’s 11th
Five-Year Plan (FYP), 2006–10, was to improve energy efªciency by 20 Prozent, A
rate of 3.7 percent per year (Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service 2009). Der
just released 12th FYP (2011-15) aims to reduce GDP energy intensity by another
16–17 percent.

According to the National Bureau of Statistics, China’s energy intensity declined
1.2 Prozent in 2006, 3.7 Prozent in 2007, 4.6 Prozent in 2008, 3.61 Prozent in 2009,
Und 4.01 Prozent in 2010 (Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service 2009; NBS 2009,
2010). Somit, China achieved its 11th FYP targets, improving energy efªciency by
19.1 percent over the 5-year period. Data from the China Energy Statistical Year-
Buch, Jedoch, which measures energy efªciency in terms of total primary energy
supply per thousand U.S. dollars of GDP (In 2000 Preise), show the improvement
in efªciency over the same 5-year period to be just 5.8 Prozent. This inconsistency
between the data from two different sources is troubling. Fischer-Vanden et al.
(2004) has in fact gone so far to suggest that the falling energy intensity in China
might actually be the result of under-reported energy consumption, over-reported
output, oder beides.

The objectives of this paper are to examine the key factors contributing to the rise in
energy consumption in China and discuss the policy options to achieve energy
efªciency targets that are compatible with China’s growth.

2. Energy consumption and challenges in China

China’s current energy situation involves three major challenges:

1. an increasing thirst for energy and reliance on imports;
2. an unbalanced mix of energy sources; Und
3. a need to slow down energy consumption and increase energy efªciency.

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Energy Efªciency and Economic Development in China

Figur 1. Energy consumption (billion TOE) by China and the United States, 1971–2010

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Quelle: World Bank and BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2010 Und 2011. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
EG.USE.COMM.KT.OE/countries?page(cid:2)4&display(cid:2)default.
Notiz: Billion TOE (cid:2) billion ton of oil equivalent. China (Prozent) and United States (Prozent) represent energy consumption by China
and the United States as a percent of world total. Data for 2009 Und 2010 are from BP Statistical Review of World Energy. Data for other

years are from the World Bank.

The rising Chinese thirst for energy is captured in Figure 1, which shows the energy
consumption by China and the United States over the period 1971–2009. China’s en-
ergy consumption rose from 0.8 billion tons of oil equivalents (TOE) In 1971 Zu
2.8 billion TOE in 2010, which brought its share of world energy consumption from
7.1 Prozent zu 20.3 Prozent. The corresponding world share of the United States de-
clined from 29 Prozent zu 19 Prozent. China’s energy consumption will continue to
grow phenomenally in the years to come because per capita energy consumption in
2008 was only 1.6 TOE per capita in China compared to 7.5 TOE in the United
Zustände. The two major factors that will accelerate a rise in per capita energy con-
sumption in China are the high urbanization rate1 and the high growth rate of per
capita disposable income.

The demand for oil in China also increased enormously over the last decade.
Figur 2 shows the changes in domestic oil production, total consumption, Und

1 On average, urban residents consume 3.5 times more energy than their rural counterparts.

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Energy Efªciency and Economic Development in China

Figur 2. China’s consumption of crude oil, 1980–2009

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Quelle: China Energy Statistical Yearbook, 2010.

imports as a proportion to total demand over the past three decades. China was a
net oil exporter until 1993. Von 2010, China imported 239 million tons of oil, welche
accounted for more than 53 percent of the country’s total oil consumption.2 The rise
in dependence on external oil supply inevitably exposes China to serious energy se-
curity problems. Rising oil prices have signiªcantly raised the cost of oil imports for
China. In 2010, China spent US$ 135 billion on oil imports, which was 50 percent higher than in 2009, but the amount of oil imported only rose by 17 Prozent. The second challenge facing China is its highly unbalanced mix of energy sources. Because coal is the most abundant energy source within China’s borders, coal consistently supplied more than 70 percent of the total energy used over the past 30 Jahre, resulting in serious greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and pollution. China’s annual CO2 emissions have grown almost 10 percent since 2000 and China became the world’s biggest emitter of GHGs in 2006 (World Bank 2006). In 2010, CO2 emissions in China reached 8.3 billion tons, accounting for 26 percent of the world’s total (World Bank 2010). 2 The same ratio for the United States was also about 53 Prozent. 102 Asian Economic Papers Energy Efªciency and Economic Development in China In 2009, hydro, wind, solar, and nuclear power generation constituted 7.8 percent of China’s total energy mix compared with 14.3 percent in Brazil, 44.5 percent in France, 17.5 percent in Japan, Und 11.8 percent in the United States (World Bank 2009). This explains why the GHG issue is increasingly serious in China, making the country subject to international criticism. Equally worrisome is the fact that there has been a slowdown in improvement in sustainable production. The amount of CO2 emissions for every one million RMB of GDP, measured in 2000 Preise, declined from 668 tons in 1990 Zu 343 tons in 2000 and then to 309 tons in 2010; a decline of 49 percent and 10 percent in each respective decade. The third and most serious challenge for China is how to control energy consump- tion and improve energy efªciency. The GDP elasticity of energy (Elektrizität) con- sumption is the growth rate of energy (Elektrizität) consumption divided by the GDP growth rate. When the GDP elasticity of energy (Elektrizität) consumption is less than unity, it means that the economy is improving its energy (Elektrizität) efªciency over time. If the opposite holds true, then the economic growth pattern could be unsustainable. To examine the relationship between GDP and energy consumption in more detail, the post-reform period 1978–2010 is divided into three sub-periods: 1978–90, 1990– 2000, and 2000–10. Tisch 1 reports the growth rates of GDP, Energie, and electricity consumption, and the GDP elasticities of energy and electricity consumption over different economic development periods. The GDP elasticity of energy was 0.6 in 1978–90, 0.4 in 1990–2000, Und 0.8 in 2000–10. The surge in energy consumption was particularly pronounced in 2001–06 to produce a GDP-energy elasticity of 1.3 and a GDP-electricity elasticity of 1.6. The global ªnancial crisis in 2008 reduced China’s GDP energy and electricity intensity. The government’s 4 trillion RMB stimulus package and massive bank lending from the second half of 2009 triggered a new round of infrastructure and industrial ex- pansion in China, Jedoch. The demand for energy and electricity rocketed to a new high. The ªrst half of 2011 had GDP growing at 9.6 percent and electricity con- sumption at 12.6 Prozent, producing a GDP elasticity of electricity consumption of 1.31. The result was widespread shortage of electricity across the country because of this increase in the inefªcient use of electricity. To explore the issue of energy efªciency further, Tisch 2 compares the energy and electricity consumption per unit of GDP in different countries for the 2002–08 pe- 103 Asian Economic Papers l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / Direkte . m i t . / e d u a s e p a r t i c e – p d / l f / / / / / 1 1 2 9 9 1 6 8 2 9 1 9 a s e p _ a _ 0 0 1 4 7 p d . f by gu e s t o n 0 7 S e p e m b e r 2 0 2 3 Energy Efªciency and Economic Development in China Table 1. GDP growth and energy consumption Annual growth (Prozent) GDP elasticity of Energy consumption Electricity consumption GDP Energy consumption Electricity consumption Year 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 8.1 1.8 6.9 3.5 3.3 6.0 15.3 16.1 10.6 9.6 8.4 3.9 5.2 5.9 Average annual growth rate (Prozent) 1978–2010 1978–90 1990–2000 2001–06 2000–10 5.6 4.7 4.0 11.5 8.4 9.0 6.2 8.2 9.5 9.3 11.8 15.6 15.4 13.5 14.6 14.4 5.6 7.2 13.1 9.2 6.8 8.0 14.3 12.0 13.5 3.8 10.9 8.4 8.3 9.1 10.0 10.1 11.3 12.7 14.2 9.6 9.1 10.3 9.9 8.4 10.4 8.9 10.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.7 1.5 1.6 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 1.3 0.8 0.7 1.6 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.6 0.8 1.3 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.6 1.1 Quelle: NBS, China Statistic Year Book 2010. Notiz: The starting period for electricity consumption was 1980. Tisch 2. Energy and electricity consumption for US$ 1,000 GDP in 2000 Preise

Country or area

World average
OECD total
Non-OECD Total

BRIC

China
Indien
Russland
Brasilien

TPES/GDP (TOE/US$ 1,000) Electricity consumption/GDP (kWh/US$ 1,000)

2002

0.31
0.20
0.75

0.86
1.07
2.16
0.31

2005

0.32
0.20
0.70

0.89
0.83
1.86
0.29

2008

0.30
0.18
0.65

0.81
0.75
1.60
0.29

2002

450
350
850

1,070
870
2,700
520

2005

460
340
860

1,123
810
2,370
510

2008

460
330
850

1,250
780
2,130
500

Quelle: NBS, China Energy Statistical Yearbook, 2010.
Notiz: TPES (cid:2) total primary energy supply; TOE (cid:2) ton oil equivalent; kWh (cid:2) kilowatt hour; BRIC (cid:2) Brasilien, Russland, Indien,
and China.

Riod. China’s energy (Elektrizität) efªciency is constantly well below the world aver-
Alter. In 2008, China consumed 4.5 times as much energy and 3.8 times as much elec-
tricity to produce the same amount of GDP as the OECD average. China’s energy
(Elektrizität) efªciency is only one-third (40 Prozent) of the level achieved by Brazil.
India’s energy efªciency was lower than China’s in 2002 (1.07 versus 0.86), but it
outperformed China by 2008 (0.75 versus 0.81). It is very shocking that electricity
efªciency declined sharply in China, aus 1,070 kWh in 2002 Zu 1,250 kWh in 2008

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Energy Efªciency and Economic Development in China

Tisch 3. Composition of GDP by industries in the world’s major economies (Prozent) In 2009

2009

BRIC

Brasilien
China
Russian
Indien

Developed countries

Frankreich
Deutschland
Italien
Spanien
Vereinigtes Königreich
Vereinigte Staaten
Japan
Singapur

Average

Quelle: The World Bank.

Landwirtschaft

Industry

Dienstleistungen

Exports/GDP

6
11
5
18

2
1
2
3
1
1
1
0

25
46
33
27

19
26
25
26
21
22
28
26

69
43
62
55

79
73
73
71
78
77
71
74

11
27
28
20

23
41
24
23
28
11
13
221

1.6

24.1

74.5

23.3

Notiz: The average ªgure is calculated based on all developed nations listed in the table. The average exports of goods and services ªgure

does not take Singapore into account.

for every US$ 1,000 of GDP, whereas electricity efªciency increased signiªcantly in Russia, Indien, and Brazil over the same period. 3. Factors responsible for high energy demand and low energy efªciency in China China’s soaring demand for energy results from several factors that are central to the structure of the Chinese economy, and thus are quite clear. Erste, China is reliant on the fast expansion of the secondary industry, and particularly heavy industry. Zusätzlich, in recent years China has increased its exports of energy-intensive prod- ucts such as automobiles, machinery, and steel. Endlich, the relocation of energy- intensive industries from the coastal region to the inland areas reduces the overall energy efªciency of the Chinese economy. All these factors result in high energy demand and low energy efªciency in the Chinese economy. 3.1 Economic and industrial structures China’s economy is heavily skewed toward manufacturing. In 2009, Zum Beispiel, the manufacturing industry was responsible for 46 percent of China’s GDP. For the developed economies, this share is less than 25 Prozent (Tisch 3). The agricultural sector is responsible for over 10 percent of China’s GDP, compared with less than 3 percent for developed countries, and the service sector accounts for only 43 pro- cent of China’s GDP, compared with over 70 percent for most developed economies. China’s economic structure suggests that the more energy-intensive industries (d.h., agriculture and manufacturing), are more dominant than the energy-efªcient 105 Asian Economic Papers l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / Direkte . m i t . / e d u a s e p a r t i c e – p d / l f / / / / / 1 1 2 9 9 1 6 8 2 9 1 9 a s e p _ a _ 0 0 1 4 7 p d . f by gu e s t o n 0 7 S e p e m b e r 2 0 2 3 Energy Efªciency and Economic Development in China Table 4. Total industrial output value and its composition, 1965–2009 (2000 constant prices) Industrial output value (trillion yuan) Percentage (Prozent) Total Light industry Heavy industry Light industry Heavy industry 1978 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 42 52 97 239 919 857 2,516 3,165 4,052 5,073 5,483 Growth rate (Prozent) 1978–2009 1978–90 1990–2000 2000–09 17.0 15.5 13.6 22.9 18 24 46 118 435 341 783 949 1,196 1,454 1,615 15.6 16.8 11.2 18.9 24 27 51 121 484 516 1,733 2,217 2,855 3,619 3,868 17.8 14.4 15.6 25.1 Quelle: NBS, China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook, 2010. 43.1 47.2 47.4 49.4 47.3 39.8 31.1 30.0 29.5 28.7 29.5 (cid:3)1.2 (cid:3)1.1 (cid:3)2.1 (cid:3)3.3 56.9 52.8 52.6 50.6 52.7 60.2 68.9 70.0 70.5 71.3 70.5 (cid:3)0.7 (cid:3)1.0 (cid:3)1.8 (cid:3)1.8 services industry relative to all the other major economies in the world. Even in comparison with other BRIC economies, the Chinese economy is far more domi- nated by the industrial sector. The industrial sector can be further divided into two subsectors: heavy and light in- dustries. The composition and structural changes within the industrial sector ex- plain why the Chinese economy becomes more energy intensive over time. Tisch 4 shows the industrial output values and their composition by the two subsectors for the period 1978–2009. In 1990, light industry accounted for 49 percent of the total in- dustrial output value but this share declined to 29.5 percent by 2009. On average, industrial output value grew rapidly at 13.6 percent per year during 1990–2000 and 22.9 percent per year during 2000–09. The output value of the heavy industry in- creased faster at 15.6 percent and 25.1 Prozent, jeweils, during the same peri- Odds. As heavy industry is more energy intensive than light industry (in general), its more rapid growth raises the energy intensity of the Chinese economy on the whole. Figur 3 shows that during 2000–09, total energy consumption in China increased 106.7 percent—from 1.5 Zu 3.1 billion TCE. Over the same period, energy consump- tion by the industrial sector increased 111.2 percent from 1.04 Zu 2.2 billion TCE. Measured by coal consumption, the industrial sector’s share rose by almost 10 pro- centage points from 1995, Zu 95 percent by 2009. In 2009, the industrial sector con- tributed only 46 percent of GDP but was responsible for over 71 percent of total en- ergy and 95 percent of total coal consumption, indicating that this sector is highly energy inefªcient in terms of units of added value. 106 Asian Economic Papers l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / Direkte . m i t . / e d u a s e p a r t i c e – p d / l f / / / / / 1 1 2 9 9 1 6 8 2 9 1 9 a s e p _ a _ 0 0 1 4 7 p d . f by gu e s t o n 0 7 S e p e m b e r 2 0 2 3 Energy Efªciency and Economic Development in China Figure 3. Energy and coal consumption by the industrial sector, 1995–2009 l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / Direkte . m i t . / e d u a s e p a r t i c e – p d / l f / / / / / 1 1 2 9 9 1 6 8 2 9 1 9 a s e p _ a _ 0 0 1 4 7 p d . f by gu e s t o n 0 7 S e p e m b e r 2 0 2 3 Quelle: NBS, China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook, 2010. 3.2 Fast expansion of energy-intensive industries and products There are over 40 industrial subsectors in China, but eight sub-sectors are responsi- ble for 35 percent of total industrial output value and 60 percent of energy consump- tion over the period 1995–2009 (Tisch 5). These subsectors are non-metallic mineral products; petroleum, coking, nuclear fuel; paper and paper products; ferrous metals; metal products; Textil-; non-ferrous metals; and chemical products. They consis- tently account for more than 60 percent of industrial energy demand, a share that is increasing in recent years (Figur 4). Aus 1995 Zu 2009, their industrial output share declined from 39 Prozent zu 35 Prozent, but their energy consumption share rose from 65 Prozent zu 73 Prozent (Figur 4, Tisch 5). These ªgures suggest that these eight industrial subsectors are far more energy-intensive than the other industrial subsectors, presenting a serious challenge to China’s industrial policy, which is geared toward these energy-consuming and polluting industries. It is encouraging to note that average energy consumption for each unit of output has declined over the past decade (Figur 4). To produce 10,000 RMB of output in these eight key industries, these industries consumed an average of 0.8 TCE in 2009, representing a decline of 76 percent from the 1995 levels. dennoch, the decline in 107 Asian Economic Papers Energy Efªciency and Economic Development in China Figure 4. Industrial production and energy consumption of eight key industries to total l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / Direkte . m i t . / e d u a s e p a r t i c e – p d / l f / / / / / 1 1 2 9 9 1 6 8 2 9 1 9 a s e p _ a _ 0 0 1 4 7 p d . f by gu e s t o n 0 7 S e p e m b e r 2 0 2 3 Quelle: China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook, 1996–2010; China Energy Statistical Yearbook, 1996–2010. energy intensity measured by gross industrial output value is somewhat mislead- ing. This is because the share of value-added in gross output value declines over time, implying that the decline in energy intensity is overestimated relative to en- ergy consumption per unit of value-added. It needs to be stressed that we can only measure energy intensity based on gross industrial output value because there is a lack of matching data for both industrial value-added and energy consumption. Another factor triggering the fast expansion of China’s heavy industry is increased internal consumption and external demand. As mentioned earlier, higher living standards not only increase per capita ownership of electrical appliances, but also allow Chinese residents to purchase more energy intensive products, such as motor vehicles and houses. This in turn accelerates the production of these products and the development of the automobile and real estate industries. Tisch 6 lists the outputs of key energy intensive industrial products over the period 1978–2009. It shows that the production of motor vehicles experiences the fastest growth over the past decade. Total output increased by almost seven times from 2000 Zu 2009, with China surpassing the United States to become the world’s biggest automobile producer and consumer. In der Zwischenzeit, the production of real 108 Asian Economic Papers Energy Efªciency and Economic Development in China Table 5. Industrial outputs of eight key industries and their energy consumption, 1995–2009 Energy consumption/10,000 yuan 1995 2000 2005 2009 Non-metallic mineral products Petroleum, coking, nuclear fuel Paper, paper products Ferrous metals Metal products Textile Non-ferrous metals Chemical products GIOV (billion yuan) GIOV of 8 industries (billion yuan) Eight industries in total (Prozent) Energy use of 8 industries in total (Prozent) 4.4 2.8 2.1 5.1 0.6 0.8 2.1 4.2 5,424 2,090 38.5 65.0 3.7 1.6 1.4 4.0 0.5 0.6 1.9 2.5 8,567 3,006 35.1 62.5 2.6 1.1 0.9 2.0 0.4 0.5 1.0 1.6 22,887 8,219 35.9 68.3 1.3 0.7 0.6 1.6 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.9 46,443 16,412 35.3 72.5 Quelle: China Industry Economy Statistical yearbook, 1996–2010; China Energy Statistical Yearbook, 1996–2010. Notiz: GIOV (cid:2) gross industrial output value. All the values are measured in 2000 Preise. Tisch 6. Output of key energy intensive industrial products, 1978–2009 Home refrigerators (mil sets) Chemical fertilizers (mil tons) Motor vehicles (mil) Pig iron (mil tons) Crude steel (mil tons) Cement (mil tons) 1978 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 0 0 1.4 4.6 9.2 12.8 29.9 35.3 44.0 47.6 59.3 8.7 12.3 13.2 18.8 25.5 31.9 51.8 53.5 58.3 60.1 63.9 Average annual growth rate (Prozentsatz) 1978–2009 1978–90 1990–2000 2000–09 28.0 53.1 10.7 18.6 6.6 6.6 5.4 8.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 1.5 2.1 5.7 7.3 8.9 9.3 13.8 15.7 10.9 14.9 23.5 34.8 38.0 43.8 62.4 105.3 131.0 343.8 412.5 476.5 470.7 552.8 9.3 5.0 7.7 17.3 22.1 27.2 36.9 51.5 89.8 131.5 377.7 468.9 565.6 584.9 694.1 11.8 7.3 9.8 20.3 65.2 79.9 146.0 209.7 475.6 597.0 1,068.8 1,236.8 1,361.2 1,400.0 1,644.0 11.0 10.2 11.0 11.9 Quelle: NBS, China Statistical Yearbook, various issues (1980–2010). estate–related products (das ist, all other products in Table 6) increased substantially since 2000. External demand boosts the production of energy-intensive products further. Rising demand drives the expansion of production capacity of the Chinese companies and underpins a substantial rise in international prices of many minerals and metals. Tisch 7 presents the export values of key energy intensive industrial products over 1995–2009. Tough economic conditions worldwide during the 2008 global ªnancial crisis reduced China’s exports by 13.9 Prozent in 2009, so the growth rate analysis here is based on the period prior to 2008. Growth rates of all four energy-intensive products are higher than the growth of total exports. Zum Beispiel, during 2005–08, China’s exports rise by 23.4 percent per year whereas the exports of rolled steel, 109 Asian Economic Papers l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / Direkte . m i t . / e d u a s e p a r t i c e – p d / l f / / / / / 1 1 2 9 9 1 6 8 2 9 1 9 a s e p _ a _ 0 0 1 4 7 p d . f by gu e s t o n 0 7 S e p e m b e r 2 0 2 3 Energy Efªciency and Economic Development in China Table 7. Exports of key energy intensive industrial products by China (billion US$)

Total exports
Coke and semi-coke
Rolled steel
Rolled aluminium
Motor Vehicles

1995

62.1
0.7
2.2
0.1
n./a.

2000

249.2
0.9
2.2
0.3
0.2

2005

762.0
2.3
13.1
2.0
1.9

2008

1,430.7
5.8
63.4
6.4
8.9

Average annual growth rate (Prozentsatz)

1995–2008

1995–2000

2000–08

2005–08

Total exports
Coke and semi-coke
Rolled steel
Rolled aluminium
Motor vehicles

27.3
17.9
29.6
35.2
n./a.

32.0
6.0
0.4
20.5
n./a.

45.8
46.3
55.9
53.5
59.3

23.4
35.4
69.3
48.3
67.1

Quelle: NBS, China Statistical Yearbook, various issues (1996–2010).

Notiz: Exports dropped in 2009 due to the world ªnancial crisis but recovered sharply in 2010 Und 2011.

rolled aluminium, and motor vehicles are up by 69.3 Prozent, 48.3 Prozent, Und
67 Prozent, jeweils. In 2008, China exported about 59 million tons of steel and
640,000 units of motor vehicles. It is obvious that controlling energy consumption
requires appropriate adjustment of China’s export mix. China should reposition it-
self toward the higher value-added end of the international production chain rather
than acting as a world factory for low-value and polluting products.

3.3 Relocation of industrial production from the coastal to the inland regions
Energy efªciency of economic activities varies signiªcantly across the country. Due
to the 2008 global ªnancial crisis and rising labor and land costs, many traditional
manufacturing industries have relocated from the coastal to the inland areas. As en-
ergy efªciency is signiªcantly lower in the inland areas than in the coastal regions,
this industrial relocation reduces the overall energy efªciency of China’s industrial
production. Tisch 8 compares the energy consumption per unit of GDP production
among the three large regions in China (Ost [coastal], Central, and West) to illus-
trate this point.

Aus 1990 Zu 2009, energy and electricity consumption per unit of GDP declined by
53 percent and 25 Prozent, jeweils, across the whole country. On average for the
whole country, 1.9 TCE of energy and 1,892 kWh of electricity were required to pro-
duce 10,000 RMB of GDP measured in 2000 prices in 1990. For the same amount of
output, nur 1.37 TCE of energy and 1,427 kWh of electricity were required in 2009.

The variation in the amount of energy and electricity to produce the same amount
of GDP shows signiªcant divergence between regions. Zum Beispiel, to produce
10,000 yuan of GDP in 1990, Die 2.6 TCE of energy and 1,822 kWh of electricity in
the East were much lower than the 3.27 TCE and 1,973 kWh in the West. In 2009, Zu

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Tisch 8. Energy production and consumption by region, 1990–2009

1990

1995

2000

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Energy production (share of national total, Prozent)

Coal
production

Power
Generation

Ost
Central
Westen

21.0
57.7
21.3

47.1
35.0
17.9

24.9
57.0
18.2

49.9
32.3
17.7

18.1
58.3
23.6

48.4
32.9
18.7

15.9
59.2
24.9

48.4
33.2
18.4

Energy consumption (TCE/10,000 yuan of GDP) bei 2000 Preise

TCE/GDP

Ost
Central
Westen
All China

2.60
3.15
3.27
2.90

1.76
2.49
2.90
2.15

1.34
1.70
2.11
1.55

1.28
1.83
2.15
1.55

Electricity consumption (kWh/10,000 yuan of GDP) bei 2000 Preise

kWh/GDP

Ost
Central
Westen
All China

1,822
1,953
1,973
1,892

1,459
1,738
2,014
1,624

1,312
1,387
1,852
1,408

1,379
1,521
1,861
1,482

14.9
58.8
26.2

48.0
33.1
18.9

1.25
1.80
2.09
1.52

1,382
1,589
1,898
1,507

13.8
60.0
26.3

46.3
34.8
19.0

1.24
1.75
2.04
1.49

1,416
1,589
1,929
1,533

12.1
61.5
26.4

43.7
36.4
19.9

1.20
1.65
1.93
1.43

1,369
1,517
1,827
1,473

11.9
60.9
27.3

43.9
35.6
20.6

1.15
1.58
1.86
1.37

1,324
1,459
1,794
1,427

Quelle: NBS, National Statistical Yearbook, various issues (1991–2010) and China Energy Statistical Yearbook, 2010.
Notiz: TCE (cid:2) tons of coal equivalent. “East” includes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian,
Shandong, and Guangdong. “Central” includes Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan,

Guangxi, and Hainan. “West” includes Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Und

Xinjiang. GDP value is calculated at 2000 constant prices.

produce the same amount of GDP, nur 1.15 TCE and 1,324 kWh was required in
the East, compared with 1.86 TCE and 1,794 kWh in the West. On average, the east-
ern region was 62 percent more energy efªcient and 35 percent more electricity
efªcient than the western region in 2009. This implies that any shift of industrial
production from the East to the West reduces China’s overall energy or electricity
efªciency signiªcantly.

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The turning point in the spatial distribution of industrial production took place in
2005. Vor 2005, the eastern region tended to grow faster than the inland regions.
Nach 2005, the inland regions outperformed the eastern region in both GDP growth
and industrial production. Insbesondere, the most energy-consuming and polluting
industries moved more quickly from the eastern to the inland regions after 2005, als
shown in Tables 9 Und 10. Aus 2005 Zu 2009, the share of national output accounted
for by the eastern region declined and output by the central and western regions in-
creased in all the most energy-consuming and polluting sub-industries, reaching a
6-percentage-point decline in the eastern region’s share for metal products.

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During the past two decades, the eastern region alone produced almost 60 Prozent
of China’s GDP and 70 percent of China’s industrial output value but consumed less
als 50 percent of the country’s total energy. During the period from 2005 Zu 2009,

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Tisch 9. BIP, production, and energy consumption of 8 key industries by region, 1990–2009

As percent of national total

Average annual growth, Prozent

Region

1990

2000

2005

2009

1990–09

2000–09

2005–09

BIP

Industrial
output value

Energy
consumption

Electricity
consumption

Ost
Central
Westen

49.9
33.7
16.9

61.1
27.0
11.9

44.4
36.6
19.0

47.7
34.8
17.6

56.8
29.7
13.6

69.5
21.1
9.4

49.0
32.5
18.5

52.9
29.2
17.9

59.1
27.8
13.2

72.2
19.1
8.7

48.9
32.9
18.3

55.0
28.5
16.5

57.6
28.9
13.5

67.7
22.8
9.5

48.3
33.3
18.4

53.4
29.6
17.0

17.6
15.8
15.4

17.6
15.9
15.7

7.3
6.3
6.7

10.0
8.5
9.2

Quelle: NBS, China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook, 1991–2010.

16.0
15.5
15.8

22.5
23.9
23.1

9.9
10.4
10.0

11.9
11.9
11.2

15.6
17.5
17.2

23.3
30.9
28.3

7.6
8.2
8.1

9.4
11.2
11.1

Notiz: “East” includes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang , Fujian, Shandong, and Guangdong. “Central”

includes Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, and Hainan. “West” includes

Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang. Growth rates of GDP and industrial

outputs are in current prices.

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Tisch 10. BIP, production, and energy consumption of 8 key industries by region,
1990–2009

Energy-consuming industries

Regions

2000

2005

2009

2000–09

2005–09

Share in national total
Prozent

Average annual
growth percent

Non-metallic mineral products

Petroleum, coking, and nuclear fuel

Paper and paper products

Ferrous metals

Metal products

Textiles

Non-ferrous metals

Chemical materials and chemical
Produkte

Ost
Central
Westen

64.0
25.9
10.1

66.7
25.5
7.8

73.4
19.8
6.8

64.1
24.4
11.4

85.8
10.4
3.8

78.9
16.4
4.6

40.9
32.6
21.7

67.6
22.3
10.1

64.7
23.8
8.6

64.2
23.1
12.7

76.9
18.1
5.1

67.8
23.2
9.1

88.1
8.8
3.1

85.7
11.1
3.3

48.8
32.2
19.0

71.8
18.7
9.6

58.7
30.9
10.3

61.0
23.7
15.3

71.6
21.9
6.5

66.1
24.5
9.5

82.0
12.6
5.4

81.6
14.5
4.0

46.9
37.6
15.4

69.8
21.0
9.2

22.4
26.0
23.9

18.0
18.2
28.4

19.8
21.4
19.6

28.1
27.7
25.0

22.2
25.4
27.5

18.5
16.4
15.9

30.3
30.4
23.5

23.4
22.1
21.6

25.1
36.9
34.5

14.2
16.5
21.1

16.6
24.5
26.4

17.9
20.3
20.0

22.9
36.9
43.6

14.6
24.1
21.8

25.7
31.9
20.5

21.7
26.3
21.2

Quelle: China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook, 1991–2010.

Notiz: “East” region includes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, and Guangdong.

“Central” region includes Shanxi, Inner Mor. Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, and Hainan.

“Western” region includes Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang.

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industrial output value of the eastern region rose by 23.3 percent annually while the
same ratios for the central and western regions were 30.9 percent and 28.3 Prozent,
jeweils. Relocating companies and manufacturing activities from the eastern to
the central and western regions has inevitably caused more energy consumption per
unit of GDP and industrial production. As the share of GDP and industrial produc-
tion generated by the eastern region declined from 2005, it resulted in rising
inefªciency in energy and electricity consumption for the whole country.

The factors that generate China’s challenges in terms of energy efªciency and the
environment are deeply ingrained in the structure and development of China’s
economy. A focus on secondary industry to lead development, and in particular
heavy industry, makes transformation of the system difªcult. Weiter, a regional
move out of expensive coastal cities by heavy industry increases the inefªciency of
energy use, while also increasing costs to transport energy into the consuming
coastal areas. Yet there are speciªc policy measures that can be adopted to directly
combat these difªculties.

4. Conclusions and policy implications

We propose six policies to control the surging energy consumption and to ensure
sustainable economic growth. The ªrst policy measure is for China to accelerate the
pace of its economic structure transformation. Instead of focusing on a single target
of achieving certain levels of aggregated GDP growth, more attention should be
paid to value-added and job creation in different industries. China should reduce its
reliance on heavy industry and devote more resources to support the development
of the “strategic emerging industries” including computers, mobile phones, hybrid
vehicles, and biomedicines, as stated in China’s 12th FYP.

The second policy measure to control energy consumption and promote sustainable
economic growth is for China to change its export structure, which has been domi-
nated by low-quality cheap energy-intensive products, and has accounted for at
least one-third of the energy consumed by China (Walsh 2009). As China’s compara-
tive advantages in these products dries up, there is the need to shift its production
chain toward the higher value-added end. In the coming decade, China should fo-
cus more on research and technological innovation, developing a series of high-tech
(and low-energy-intensive) products such as high-resolution TVs, computers, com-
puter software, mobile phones, high-value garments and clothing, medicines, Und
so forth, to restructure its export portfolio.

The third policy measure is to reform the pricing system. To protect the households
Und, to a lesser extent, industrial and commercial enterprises, China sets strict re-

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Energy Efªciency and Economic Development in China

strictions on the consumer prices of primary energy products, such as coal and
crude oil. This means that energy prices in China do not fully reºect environmental
impacts, resources scarcity, and supply and demand imbalances (Chai et al. 2009).
Such low energy prices foster the growth of energy intensive industries, reduce
pressure to improve energy efªciency, and encourage wasteful consumption.

In China, coal prices are inºuenced by the market but wholesale power prices paid
to generators are still set by the government with some variations according to age,
efªciency, and location of power plants. Infolge, coal mining companies and
crude oil producers make substantial proªts, but power generators and oil reªners
suffer tremendous losses. Pressure from the international market has forced China
to raise its domestic energy and electricity prices closer to the global level. Neverthe-
weniger, they are still distorted by subsidies, quotas, and other forms of state control
(Der Ökonom 2007). Such a dual pricing system leads to various problems. Stattdessen
of selling domestically, power generators and oil reªners export at a proªt, causing
an internal energy shortage. Darüber hinaus, rising energy prices do not affect end users,
encouraging waste and undermining the government’s energy conservation efforts.
Endlich, artiªcially low energy prices lose their potential to stimulate domestic explo-
ration and production. This hinders China’s long-term energy plan. To overcome
these problems, the Chinese government has to fully liberalize its energy pricing
System, allowing free-market competition to promote efªciency.

The fourth policy measure to help curb energy consumption is to increase public
awareness and enforce tougher standards on building design. Residential houses
and commercial ofªces are a large source of energy consumption and carbon emis-
sionen, responsible for over 40 percent of ªnal energy consumption worldwide.
Somit, enhancing building energy efªciency is one of the quickest and cleanest
ways to mitigate climate change. Locating residential and commercial housing near
public transportation systems—for example, transit-oriented development (TOD)
and pedestrian-oriented development—can also improve energy efªciency. Viele
cities throughout the world use TOD, including Vancouver, Denver, Montreal, San
Francisco, and Hong Kong (Olympic City, usw.).

Improving building energy efªciency has the potential to realize energy saving for
businesses and consumers. Zum Beispiel, among all types of energy consumption in
the real estate industry, space heaters account for the largest percentage (Lang 2004).
In north China alone, residential heating consumes over 30 percent of total real-
estate energy consumption. Compared with countries in Western Europe or North
Amerika, which have similar weather conditions, Jedoch, each unit of construction
area of Chinese residential buildings consumes two to three times more energy for

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heating (Wu 2008). daher, China still has a huge potential to save energy by
improving building energy efªciency.

The ªfth policy measure is to ensure energy security. The government should pro-
vide more ªnancial support for domestic energy exploration and production, Und
for mass transit construction.

The sixth policy is to diversify the country’s energy sources. Because it is hard to
transform China’s coal-based energy consumption structure, another way to im-
prove its energy efªciency is to adjust its energy structure via technological change
and management advancement (Chai et al. 2009). More emphasis should therefore
be placed on cleaner and more renewable sources, such as natural gas, nuclear
power, hydro power, and solar and wind power.

Tatsächlich, China has considered the issue of developing renewable resources as a na-
tional strategy for a long time. Zum Beispiel, China’s Renewable Energy Law imple-
mented in February 2005 (Zhang et al. 2009) targets the country’s abundant renew-
able resources, especially wind and hydropower. Wind energy utilization, especially
onshore grid-connected wind power generation, has been used in China for over
30 Jahre (Han et al. 2009). The country is now the global leader in total power capac-
ity from renewable energy, including wind turbines and solar photovoltaic) cells
(Martinot 2010).

Rising utilization of renewable resources helps rebalance energy supply between
different regions. Fossil fuels, such as coal, oil, and natural gas are mainly located in
the Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Heilongjiang, and Xinjiang provinces, wohingegen
the exploitable potential of hydropower resources, solar energy and wind farms are
distributed in the Southwest (Sichuan and Yunnan), Northwest (Qinghai and
Xinjiang), Northeast (Liaoning and Jilin), Ost (Hebei and Jiangsu), and West
(Gansu) (Zhang, Liorb, and Jin 2011). Each of the provinces should devote more ef-
forts to developing energy resources wherever there is comparative advantage. Das
not only diversiªes the overall energy supply structure but also has the potential to
save transportation-related costs and reduce reliance on importing energy.

Trotzdem, the development of renewable resources in China still faces many
Herausforderungen, such as technology development, transmission constraints, market barri-
ers, policy development, and restructuring. Zum Beispiel, it is estimated that about
one-third of the wind generation capacity was not connected to the national grid in
recent years due to the relatively small scale of energy produced compared to the
coal-ªred power plants (Wang, Yin, and Li 2010). Darüber hinaus, convincing the general

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public about the safety of nuclear power is another challenge, particularly after the
2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami disaster in Japan.

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