Charles Darwin
Comparison of the Mental Powers
of Man and the Lower Animals–continued
Editors’ note: This year marks the bicentennial of Charles Darwin’s birth. Darwin famously
breathed new life into the philosophical and scienti½c debates about humanness by asserting in
“The Descent of Man” (1871) that “the difference in mind between man and the higher ani-
mals, great as it is, is certainly one of degree and not of kind.” In chapter 4, excerpted here
(from the second edition, 1879), Darwin examines the roots of morality in the instincts of
lower animals.
I fully subscribe to the judgment of
those writers who maintain that of all
the differences between man and the
lower animals, the moral sense or con-
science is by far the most important.
This sense, as Mackintosh remarks,
‘has a rightful supremacy over every
other principle of human action’, Es
is summed up in that short but impe-
rious word ought, so full of high signi½-
Abbruch. It is the most noble of all the at-
tributes of man, leading him without
a moment’s hesitation to risk his life
for that of a fellow-creature; or after
due deliberation, impelled simply by
the deep feeling of right or duty, to sac-
ri½ce it in some great cause. Immanu-
el Kant exclaims, ‘Duty! Wondrous
thought, that workest neither by fond
insinuation, flat tery, nor by any threat,
but merely by holding up thy naked
law in the soul, and so extorting for
thyself always reverence, if not always
obedience; before whom all appetites
are dumb, however secretly they rebel;
whence thy original?'
This great question has been discussed
by many writers of consummate ability;
and my sole excuse for touching on it, Ist
the impossibility of here passing it over;
and because, as far as I know, no one has
approached it exclusively from the side
of natural history. The investigation pos-
sesses, Auch, some independent interest,
as an attempt to see how far the study of
the lower animals throws light on one of
the highest psychical faculties of man.
The following proposition seems to
me in a high degree probably–namely,
that any animal whatever, endowed
with well-marked social instincts, Die
parental and ½lial affections being here
in cluded, would inevitably acquire a
moral sense or conscience, as soon as
its intellectual powers had become as
well, or nearly as well developed, as in
man. Für, ½rstly, the social instincts lead
an animal to take pleasure in the socie-
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ty of its fellows, to feel a certain amount
of sympathy with them, and to perform
various services for them. The services
may be of a de½nite and evidently in-
stinctive nature; or there may be only
a wish and readiness, as with most of
the higher social animals, to aid their
fellows in certain general ways. Aber
these feelings and services are by no
means extended to all the individuals
of the same species, only to those of
the same associ ation. Zweitens, as soon
as the mental faculties had become high-
ly developed, images of all past actions
and motives would be incess antly pass-
ing through the brain of each individ-
ual; and that feeling of dissatisfaction,
or even misery, which invariably results,
as we shall hereafter see, from any un-
satis½ed instinct, would arise, as often
as it was perceived that the enduring
and always present social instinct had
yielded to some other instinct, Bei der
time stronger, but neither enduring in
its nature, nor leaving behind it a very
vivid impression. It is clear that many
instinctive desires, such as that of hun-
dt, are in their nature of short dura-
tion; and after being satis½ed, are not
readily or vividly recalled. Thirdly, nach
the power of language had been ac-
quired, and the wishes of the commu-
nity could be expressed, the common
opinion how each member ought to
act for the public good, would natural-
ly become in a paramount degree the
guide to action. But it should be borne
in mind that how ever great weight we
may attribute to public opinion, our re-
gard for the approbation and disappro-
bation of our fellows depends on sympa-
thy, welche, as we shall see, forms an es-
sential part of the social instinct, und ist
indeed its foundation-stone, zuletzt, habit
in the indi vidual would ultimately play a
very important part in guiding the con-
duct of each member; for the social in-
stinct, together with sympathy, Ist, wie
any other instinct, greatly strengthened
by habit, and so consequently would be
obedience to the wishes and judg ment
of the community. These several subor-
dinate propositions must now be dis-
cussed, and some of them at consider-
able length.
It may be well ½rst to premise that I
do not wish to maintain that any strictly
social animal, if its intellectual faculties
were to become as active and as highly
developed as in man, would acquire ex-
actly the same moral sense as ours. In
the same manner as various animals
have some sense of beauty, though they
admire widely different objects, so they
might have a sense of right and wrong,
though led by it to follow widely differ-
ent lines of conduct. Wenn, zum Beispiel, Zu
take an extreme case, men were reared
under precisely the same conditions as
hive-bees, there can hardly be a doubt
that our unmarried females would, wie
the worker-bees, think it a sacred duty
to kill their brothers, and mothers would
strive to kill their fertile daughters; Und
no one would think of interfering. Nev-
erthe less, the bee, or any other social an-
imal, would gain in our supposed case,
as it appears to me, some feeling of right
or wrong, or a conscience. For each in-
dividual would have an inward sense of
possessing certain stronger or more en-
during instincts, and others less strong
or enduring; so that there would often
be a struggle as to which impulse should
be followed; and satisfaction, dissatis –
faction, or even misery would be felt,
as past impressions were compared dur-
ing their incessant passage through the
Geist. In this case an inward monitor
would tell the animal that it would have
been better to have followed the one
impulse rather than the other. The one
course ought to have been followed, Und
the other ought not; the one would have
Mental
Powers
of Man
und das
Lower
Animals
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Dædalus Summer 2009
61
Charles
Darwin
on being
menschlich
been right and the other wrong; but to
these terms I shall recur.
[. . .]
Es ist, Jedoch, impossible to decide in
many cases whether certain social in-
stincts have been acquired through nat-
ural selection, or are the indirect result
of other instincts and faculties, wie zum Beispiel
sympathy, reason, Erfahrung, and a ten-
dency to imitation; or again, ob
they are simply the result of long-contin-
ued habit. So remarkable an instinct as
the placing sentinels to warn the com-
munity of danger, can hardly have been
the indirect result of any of these facul-
Krawatten; it must, daher, have been direct-
ly acquired. Andererseits, the hab-
it followed by the males of some social
animals of defending the community,
and of attacking their enemies or their
prey in concert, may perhaps have origi-
nated from mutual sympathy; but cour-
Alter, and in most cases strength, must
have been previously acquired, proba-
bly through natural selection.
[. . .]
Although man, as he now exists,
has few special instincts, having lost
any which his early progenitors may
have possessed, this is no reason why
he should not have retained from an ex-
tremely remote period some degree of
instinctive love and sympathy for his fel-
lows. We are indeed all conscious that
we do possess such sympathetic feelings;
but our consciousness does not tell us
whether they are instinctive, having
originated long ago in the same manner
as with the lower animals, or whether
they have been acquired by each of us
during our early years. As man is a social
Tier, it is almost certain that he would
inherit a tendency to be faithful to his
comrades, and obedient to the leader of
his tribe; for these qualities are common
62
Dædalus Summer 2009
to most social animals. He would conse-
quently possess some capacity for self-
command. He would from an inherited
tendency be willing to defend, in concert
with others, his fellow-men; and would
be ready to aid them in any way, welche
did not too greatly interfere with his
own welfare or his own strong desires.
The social animals which stand at the
bottom of the scale are guided almost
exclusively, and those which stand high-
er in the scale are largely guided, by spe-
cial instincts in the aid which they give
to the members of the same community;
but they are likewise in part impelled by
mutual love and sympathy, assisted ap-
parently by some amount of reason. Al-
though man, as just remarked, has no
special instincts to tell him how to aid
his fellow-men, he still has the impulse,
and with his improved intellectual facul-
ties would natur ally be much guided in
this respect by reason and experience.
Instinctive sympathy would also cause
him to value highly the approbation of
his fellows; für, as Mr Bain has clearly
shewn, the love of praise and the strong
feeling of glory, and the still stronger
horror of scorn and infamy, ‘are due
to the workings of sympathy’. Conse-
quently man would be influenced in
the highest degree by the wishes, appro-
bation, and blame of his fellow-men,
as expressed by their gestures and lan-
Spur. Thus the social instincts, welche
must have been acquired by man in a
very rude state, and probably even by
his early ape-like progenitors, still give
the impulse to some of his best actions;
but his actions are in a higher degree de-
termined by the expressed wishes and
judgment of his fellow-men, and unfor-
tunately very often by his own strong
sel½sh desires. But as love, sympathy and
self-command become strengthened
by habit, and as the power of reasoning
becomes clearer, so that man can value
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justly the judgments of his fellows, Er
will feel himself impelled, apart from
any transitory pleasure or pain, to cer-
tain lines of conduct. He might then
declare–not that any barbarian or
uncultivated man could thus think–
I am the supreme judge of my own
conduct, and in the words of Kant,
I will not in my own person violate
the dignity of humanity.
[. . .]
A moral being is one who is capable
of comparing his past and future actions
or motives, and of approv ing or disap-
proving of them. We have no reason to
suppose that any of the lower animals
have this capacity; daher, when a
Newfoundland dog drags a child out
of the water, or a monkey faces danger
to rescue its comrade, or takes charge
of an orphan monkey, we do not call
its conduct moral. But in the case of
man, who alone can with certainty be
ranked as a moral being, actions of a
certain class are called moral, ob
performed deliberately, after a struggle
with opposing motives, or impulsively
through instinct, or from the effects of
slowly-gained habit.
[. . .]
Concluding Remarks–It was assumed for-
merly by philosophers of the derivative
school of morals that the foundation
of morality lay in a form of Sel½shness;
but more recently the ‘Greatest happi –
ness principle’ has been brought promi-
nently forward. Es ist, how ever, more cor-
rect to speak of the latter principle as
the standard, and not as the motive of
conduct. Trotzdem, all the authors
whose works I have consulted, with a
few exceptions, write as if there must be
a distinct motive for every action, Und
that this must be associated with some
pleasure or displeasure. But man seems
often to act impulsively, that is from
instinct or long habit, without any con-
sciousness of pleasure, in the same man-
ner as does probably a bee or ant, Wann
it blindly follows its instincts. Under cir-
cum stances of extreme peril, as during
a ½re, when a man endeavours to save a
fellow-creature without a moment’s hes-
itation, he can hardly feel pleasure;
and still less has he time to reflect on
the dissatisfaction which he might sub-
sequently experience if he did not make
the attempt. Should he afterwards re-
flect over his own conduct, he would
feel that there lies within him an im-
pulsive power widely different from
a search after pleasure or happiness;
and this seems to be the deeply plant-
ed social instinct.
In the case of the lower animals
it seems much more appropriate
to speak of their social instincts, als
having been developed for the gener-
al good rather than for the general hap-
piness of the species. The term, allgemein
good, may be de½ned as the rearing of
the greatest number of individuals in
full vigour and health, with all their fac-
ulties perfect, under the conditions to
which they are subjected. As the social
instincts both of man and the lower an-
imals have no doubt been developed
by nearly the same steps, it would be
advis able, if found practicable, to use
the same de½nition in both cases, Und
to take as the standard of morality, Die
general good or welfare of the commu-
nity, rather than the general happiness;
but this de½nition would perhaps re-
quire some limitation on account of
political ethics.
When a man risks his life to save that
of a fellow-creature, it seems also more
correct to say that he acts for the gener-
al good, rather than for the general hap-
piness of mankind. No doubt the wel-
fare and the happiness of the individual
Mental
Powers
of Man
und das
Lower
Animals
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Dædalus Summer 2009
63
Charles
Darwin
on being
menschlich
usually coincide; and a contented, happy
tribe will flourish better than one that
is discon tented and unhappy. Wir haben
seen that even at an early period in the
history of man, the expressed wishes of
the community will have naturally influ-
enced to a large extent the conduct of
each member; and as all wish for happi-
ness, the ‘greatest happiness principle’
will have become a most important sec-
ondary guide and object; the social in-
stinct, Jedoch, together with sympa-
thy (which leads to our regarding the
approbation and disapprobation of oth-
ers), having served as the primary im-
pulse and guide. Thus the reproach is
removed of laying the foundation of
the noblest part of our nature in the
base principle of sel½shness; unless,
In der Tat, the satisfaction which every
animal feels, when it follows its proper
instincts, and the dissatisfaction felt
when prevented, be called sel½sh.
The wishes and opinions of the
members of the same community, ex-
pressed at ½rst orally, but later by writ-
ing also, either form the sole guides of
our conduct, or greatly reinforce the so-
cial instincts; such opinions, Jedoch,
have sometimes a tendency directly
opposed to these instincts. This latter
fact is well exempli½ed by the Law of
Honour, das ist, the law of the opinion
of our equals, and not of all our coun-
trymen. The breach of this law, sogar
when the breach is known to be strict-
ly accordant with true morality, hat
caused many a man more agony than
a real crime. We recognise the same in-
fluence in the burning sense of shame
which most of us have felt, selbst nach
the interval of years, when calling to
mind some accidental breach of a tri-
fling, though ½xed, rule of etiquette.
The judgment of the community will
generally be guided by some rude expe-
rience of what is best in the long run for
all the members; but this judgment will
not rarely err from ignorance and weak
powers of reasoning. Hence the strang-
est customs and super stitions, in com-
plete opposition to the true welfare and
happiness of mankind, have become all-
powerful throughout the world. We see
this in the horror felt by a Hindoo who
breaks his caste, and in many other
such cases. It would be dif½cult to dis-
tinguish between the remorse felt by a
Hindoo who has yielded to the tempta-
tion of eating unclean food, from that
felt after committing a theft; but the for-
mer would probably be the more severe.
How so many absurd rules of conduct,
as well as so many absurd religious be-
liefs, have originated, we do not know;
nor how it is that they have become, In
all quarters of the world, so deeply im-
pressed on the mind of men; aber es ist
worthy of remark that a belief constant-
ly inculcated during the early years of
life, whilst the brain is impressible, ap-
pears to acquire almost the nature of
an instinct; and the very essence of an
instinct is that it is followed indepen-
dently of reason. Neither can we say
why certain admirable virtues, wie zum Beispiel
the love of truth, are much more highly
appreciated by some savage tribes than
by others; nor, wieder, why similar dif-
ferences prevail even amongst highly
civilised nations. Knowing how ½rmly
½xed many strange customs and super-
stitions have become, we need feel no
surprise that the self-regarding virtues,
supported as they are by reason, should
now appear to us so natural as to be
thought innate, although they were not
valued by man in his early condition.
Notwithstanding many sources of
doubt, man can generally and readily
distinguish between the higher and low-
er moral rules. The higher are founded
on the social instincts, and relate to the
welfare of others. They are supported
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by the approbation of our fellow-men
and by reason. The lower rules, obwohl
some of them when implying self-sacri-
½ce hardly deserve to be called lower,
relate chiefly to self, and arise from pub-
lic opinion, matured by experience and
cultivation; for they are not practised by
rude tribes.
As man advances in civilisation, Und
small tribes are united into larger com-
munities, the simplest reason would tell
each individual that he ought to extend
his social instincts and sympathies to all
the members of the same nation, obwohl
personally unknown to him. This point
being once reached, there is only an arti-
½cial barrier to prevent his sympathies
extending to the men of all nations and
races. Wenn, In der Tat, such men are separated
from him by great differences in appear-
ance or habits, experience unfortunately
shews us how long it is, before we look
at them as our fellow-creatures. Sympa-
thy beyond the con½nes of man, das ist,
humanity to the lower animals seems to
be one of the latest moral acquisitions.
It is apparently unfelt by savages, except
towards their pets. How little the old Ro-
mans knew of it is shewn by their abhor-
rent gladiatorial exhibitions. The very
idea of humanity, as far as I could ob-
serve, was new to most of the Gauchos
of the Pampas. This virtue, one of the
noblest with which man is endowed,
seems to arise incidentally from our
sympathies becoming more tender
and more widely dif fused, until they
are extended to all sentient beings. Als
soon as this virtue is honoured and
practised by some few men, it spreads
through instruction and example to
the young, and eventually becomes in-
corporated in public opinion.
The highest possible stage in moral
culture is when we recognise that we
ought to control our thoughts, Und
‘not even in inmost thought to think
again the sins that made the past so
pleasant to us’. Whatever makes any
bad action familiar to the mind, ren-
ders its performance by so much the
easier. As Marcus Aurelius long ago
sagte, ‘Such as are thy habitual thoughts,
such also will be the character of thy
Geist; for the soul is dyed by the
thoughts.’
Our great philosopher, Herbert Spen-
cer, has recently explained his views on
the moral sense. He says, ‘I believe that
the experi ences of utility organised and
consolidated through all past genera –
tions of the human race, have been pro-
ducing corresponding modi½cations,
welche, by continued transmission and
accumula tion, have become in us cer-
tain faculties of moral intuition–certain
emotions responding to right and wrong
conduct, which have no apparent basis
in the individual experiences of utility.’
There is not the least inherent improba-
bility, as it seems to me, in virtuous ten-
dencies being more or less strongly in-
herited; für, not to mention the various
dispositions and habits transmitted by
many of our domestic animals to their
offspring, I have heard of authentic
cases in which a desire to steal and a
tendency to lie appeared to run in fami-
lies of the upper ranks; and as stealing
is a rare crime in the wealthy classes,
we can hardly account by accidental co-
incidence for the tendency occurring in
two or three members of the same fami-
ly. If bad tendencies are transmitted, Es
is probable that good ones are likewise
transmitted. That the state of the body
by affecting the brain, has great influ-
ence on the moral tendencies is known
to most of those who have suffered from
chronic derange ments of the digestion
or liver. The same fact is likewise shewn
by the ‘perversion or destruction of the
moral sense being often one of the earli-
est symptoms of mental derangement’;
Mental
Powers
of Man
und das
Lower
Animals
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Dædalus Summer 2009
65
Charles
Darwin
on being
menschlich
and insanity is notoriously often inherit-
Hrsg. Except through the principle of the
transmission of moral tendencies, Wir
cannot understand the differ ences be-
lieved to exist in this respect between
the various races of mankind.
Even the partial transmission of virtu-
ous tendencies would be an immense as-
sistance to the primary impulse derived
directly and indirectly from the so-
cial instincts. Admitting for a moment
that virtuous tendencies are inherited,
it appears probable, at least in such
cases as chastity, temperance, menschlich-
ity to animals, &c., that they become
½rst impressed on the mental organi-
zation through habit, instruction and
Beispiel, continued during several
genera tions in the same family, and in a
quite subordinate degree, oder gar nicht,
by the individuals possessing such vir-
tues having succeeded best in the strug-
gle for life. My chief source of doubt
with respect to any such inheritance,
is that senseless customs, superstitions,
and tastes, such as the horror of a Hin-
doo for unclean food, ought on the same
principle to be transmitted. I have not
met with any evidence in support of the
transmission of superstitious customs
or senseless habits, although in itself it
is perhaps not less probable than that
animals should acquire inherited tastes
for certain kinds of food or fear of cer-
tain foes.
Finally the social instincts, which no
doubt were acquired by man as by the
lower animals for the good of the com-
munity, will from the ½rst have given
to him some wish to aid his fellows,
some feeling of sympathy, and have
compelled him to regard their approba-
tion and disapprobation. Such impulses
will have served him at a very early pe-
riod as a rude rule of right and wrong.
But as man gradually advanced in intel-
lectual power, and was enabled to trace
the more remote consequences of his
Aktionen; as he acquired suf½cient know –
ledge to reject baneful customs and su-
perstitions; as he regarded more and
mehr, not only the welfare, but the hap-
piness of his fellow-men; as from habit,
following on bene½cial experience, In-
struction and example, his sympathies
became more tender and widely dif-
fused, extending to men of all races,
to the imbecile, maimed, and other
useless members of society, and ½nal-
ly to the lower animals–so would the
standard of his morality rise higher
and higher. And it is admitted by mor-
alists of the derivative school and by
some intuitionists, that the standard
of morality has risen since an early pe-
riod in the history of man.
As a struggle may sometimes be seen
going on between the various instincts
of the lower animals, it is not surprising
that there should be a struggle in man
between his social instincts, with their
derived virtues, and his lower, obwohl
momentarily stronger impulses or de-
sires. Das, as Mr Galton has remarked,
is all the less surprising, as man has
emerged from a state of barbarism with-
in a comparatively recent period. Nach
having yielded to some temptation we
feel a sense of dissatisfaction, shame,
repentance, or remorse, analogous to
the feelings caused by other powerful
instincts or desires, when left unsatis-
½ed or baulked. We compare the weak-
ened impression of a past temptation
with the ever present social instincts,
or with habits, gained in early youth
and strength ened during our whole
Leben, until they have become almost
as strong as instincts. If with the temp-
tation still before us we do not yield, Es
is because either the social instinct or
some custom is at the moment predom-
inant, or because we have learnt that it
66
Dædalus Summer 2009
l
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will appear to us hereafter the stronger,
when compared with the weakened im-
pres sion of the temptation, and we real-
ise that its violation would cause us suf-
fering. Looking to future generations,
there is no cause to fear that the social
instincts will grow weaker, and we may
expect that virtuous habits will grow
stronger, becoming perhaps ½xed by
inheritance. In this case the struggle be-
tween our higher and lower impulses
will be less severe, and virtue will be tri-
umphant.
From Charles Darwin, “The Descent of
Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex,”
2nd ed. (1879; London: Penguin, 2004),
119–123, 130–133, 135, 144–150.
Mental
Powers
of Man
und das
Lower
Animals
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Dædalus Summer 2009