Contested Boundaries:

Contested Boundaries:
The String Theory Debates
and Ideologies of Science

Sophie Ritson
University of Sydney

Kristian Camilleri
Universidad de Melbourne

Over the last three decades, physicists have engaged in, sometimes heated, debates
about relative merits and prospects of string theory as a viable research program
and even about its status as a science. The aim of this paper is to provide a
deeper understanding of this controversy as a particular form of boundary
discourse. Drawing on the sociological work of Thomas Gieryn and Lawrence
Prelli, we bring to light the way in which protagonists appeal to, and rhetor-
ically construct, different views about the scientific method and the scientific
ethos, in an effort to legitimize or delegitimize string theory.

Introducción

1.
“The confrontation between string theory and its critics,” writes Jarod
Lanier, “is one of the great intellectual dramas of our age” (Lanier 2013).
String theory is widely regarded by its practitioners as the only the only
viable option for constructing a unified theory of gravity and elementary
particle physics. It has attracted an unprecedented number of researchers,
including many Nobel Laureates, and has been instrumental in opening
up new areas at the intersection of mathematics and physics. (Kragh
2011, pag. 314). Todavía, since the 1980s it has been mired in controversy, y
has been labelled science (Duff 2013, pag. 185), speculative metaphysics
(Richter 2006, páginas. 8–9), non-science (Woit 2001, pag. 2), pseudoscience
(Krauss 2005), beautiful (Schwarz 1996, pag. 698), ugly ( Woit 2007,
pag. 265), the first plausible candidate for a final theory (weinberg [1992]
1994, pag. 212), and a catastrophic failure (Smolin 2008, pag. 170). Over the
last three decades, physicists have engaged in, sometimes heated, public de-
bates about relative merits and prospects of string theory as a viable research
program and even about its status as a science. Indeed the debate has,
as Peter Galison rightly points out, “raised deep questions about the very

Perspectives on Science 2015, volumen. 23, No. 2
©2015 by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology

doi:10.1162/POSC_a_00168

192

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

Perspectives on Science

193

nature of physics as a discipline” (Galison 1995, pag. 403). Much of the con-
troversy surrounding string theory is born out of its continual failure to
make contact with experiment in any simple sense. In spite of the fact that
string theory has not yet found experimental support, it has been through
two self-proclaimed revolutions and continued to be at the forefront of
research in theoretical physics.

Over the last three decades string theory (broadly construed here to in-
clude its successor M-theory) has emerged as the leading hope for the uni-
fication of general relativity and elementary particle physics. Gravity is
currently explained by Einstein’s theory of general relativity. The electro-
magnetic, the strong and the weak forces are described by quantum field
theory, which forms the theoretical basis for the Standard Model of particle
física. From an empirical point of view, the standard model has provided
physicists with an immensely successful account of elementary particles,
but it ignores the effects of gravity, which is negligible at the quantum
level in all but very few scenarios (p.ej., agujeros negros). The result is two in-
compatible approaches: the theory of general relativity, which is applicable
at large scales, and the standard model, which is applicable at the quantum
escala. This situation is deemed extremely problematic and a successful uni-
fication of the four forces, or a quantum theory of gravity, has been become
for many theorists, the “Holy Grail” of physics (verde 1999, pag. 15).
Attempts at reconciling these two pillars of modern physics have been
plagued with problems. In spite of the immense difficulties, the search for
a unified theory has been a major stimulating force for theoretical research
since the 1980s (weinberg 1994, pag. 17).

While there exist a number of other current approaches to research on
quantum gravity, most notably loop quantum gravity, string theory is
unique in that it attempts to solve the problem of quantum gravity by
unifying gravitation with the three other fundamental forces in nature –
electromagnetism, the strong and the weak force. As Rovelli explains, "el
unification of the forces and the quantization of gravity are two concep-
tually distinct problems […]. String theory is an attempt to solve the two
problems at once” (Rovelli 2013, pag. 15).

While criticisms of string theory first appeared in the 1980s, the pub-
lication of Lee Smolin’s The Trouble with Physics and Peter Woit’s Not Even
Wrong in 2006–2007 brought the controversy to the attention of the media
and the wider public. These books were to mark the climax of what has
become an increasingly public debate, which has seen physicists trade
blows in blogs and online forums, the editorial pages of the New York Times
and the popular press, popular scientific books book reviews, public lectures,
and in staged public debates (Brian Greene and Lawrence Krauss 2011; Sotavento
Smolin, Michael Duff, and Nancy Cartwright 2007). String theorists have

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

194

String Theory and Ideologies of Science

reacted strongly to their critics, calling into question their integrity and mo-
tives, and in some cases engaged in bitter polemics. A number of string
theorists have refused to engage in debate with Woit or Smolin, or anyone
who has read their books. En 2006 George Johnson, the journalist in resi-
dence at the Kavli Institute for Theoretical Physics, labeled the escalating
controversy the “String Wars.”1

The public debate that has erupted over string theory in recent years raises
important philosophical questions, but also questions about the social dynam-
ics of scientific controversies. Critics like Smolin and Woit have argued that
their decision to write books addressed to the wider public was in part moti-
vated by a need to respond to what they saw as the misleading narratives
of progress and triumph, which appeared in the popular media and in the
popular books written by physicists like Steven Weinberg (1994), Kaku and
Thompson (1997), Brian Greene (1999), and Leonard Susskind (2005).2
Además, the recent criticisms, which address philosophical or sociological
concerns, are to some extent at least, beyond the sphere of physics proper.

The public nature of the recent controversy has itself been cause for con-
cern for many physicists. In defending string theory against its detractors,
Mike Duff has recently remarked that: “many critics of string theory, teniendo
lost their case in the court of Science are now trying to win it in the court of
Popular Opinion” (Smolin et al. 2007, pag. 7). Even some critics, like Gerard
‘t Hooft, have expressed concerns over the public nature of debates: “By
addressing a larger public, one generates the impression that quite general
arguments could suffice to disqualify this kind of research, but that is defi-
nitely not the case” (quoted in Chalmers 2007, pag. 47).

While some physicists have expressed serious reservations about respond-
ing publicly to critics like Smolin and Woit for fear of fuelling the contro-
versy, others like Carroll have welcomed the opportunity to engage in public
debate (Brumfiel 2006, pag. 491). Mike Duff has been more reluctant to en-
gage in public controversy, but sees it as important: “misguided though
some criticisms of string and M-theory may be, they can still be very dam-
aging and so require a response.” A public defence of string theory is there-
fore deemed necessary “not only because a public understanding of science is
a good thing, but also because decisions about the future direction of scien-
tific research are increasingly being made by non-scientists, some of which
are hostile to string theory” (Duff 2013, pag. 184). Duff underscores this

1. George Johnson, the science journalist in residence at the Kavli Institute for Theoretical
Physics, gave a talk titled “The String Wars” on October 20, 2006 about the reaction of the
media to Smolin and Woit’s books. ( Johnson 2006)

2. It would be interesting to conduct a sociological study of the in which the use of
different popular media―books, popular journal and magazine articles, public lectures,
radio, television, the internet have shaped the debate.

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

Perspectives on Science

195

point by drawing the reader’s attention to the fact that shortly after Smolin’s
and Woit’s books were published, “funding for the two European research
networks on string theory was withdrawn” (Duff 2013, pag. 188).

This paper focuses on two central issues that have acquired prominence
in the public controversy over string theory. el primero, which can be traced
back to the 1980s, concerns string theory’s lack of experimental support,
which has led some critics to cast doubt on its very status as science. Critics
and defenders of string theory have engaged in a discourse over whether
string theory legitimately counts as science. Thomas Gieryn has aptly described
this kind of discursive activity as “boundary work.” In this paper we
use and expand on Gieryn’s notion of boundary work (1983) by drawing
attention to the dialectical nature of demarcation discourse in the debates
over string theory. While there is widespread agreement that string theory
currently makes no testable predictions, we find a variety of responses as
to what conclusions we should draw from this state of affairs. A range of
nuanced positions and rhetorical strategies have emerged in response to such
criticisms over the past decade, which attempt to attack and defend string
theory’s legitimacy as a science.

The second dimension of the debate, which we focus on, and which has
arisen more recently, concerns the institutional dominance of string theory.
Some critics, most notably Lee Smolin, have argued that in spite of its failure
to generate empirically testable predictions, string theory has become dom-
inant in theoretical physics, to such an extent that it has now become
detrimental to further progress. Critics argue that other potentially fruitful
avenues of research, like loop quantum gravity, have been closed off. Aquí
the critical discourse turns from questions of methodology to the sociological
norms of scientific inquiry. Critics accuse string theorists of engaging in
power politics, groupthink and self-serving hiring practices. Protagonists
on both sides of the debate appeal to, and construct, different values under-
pinning the scientific ethos (Mertonian associations intended). Defenders of
string theory have been at pains to point out that such criticisms are mis-
guided and in many instances blatantly ideologically motivated by outsiders.
A new generation of theoretical physicists have gravitated towards string the-
ory research, they claim, not because of political pressures, or because of the
lack of professional opportunities in other avenues of research, but because
string theory is still the most promising, indeed the only viable, candidate
for a unified theory.

In drawing attention to these two dimensions of the controversy, este
paper aims to bring to light the discursive strategies and rhetorical argu-
ments employed by protagonists on both sides of the debate in their attempt
to construct an ideological definition of science. This paper does not offer a
philosophical analysis of the demarcation problem in the context of string

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

196

String Theory and Ideologies of Science

theory, nor do we provide an assessment of theoretical problems that have
plagued string theory in the quest to find a unified theory.3 Instead this
paper focuses on how rhetorical discourse has been deployed in the contro-
versy over string theory. In focusing on this ‘rhetorical’ aspect we do not
imply that there are no substantive philosophical or scientific issues at stake.
As Peter Galison has rightly pointed out: “This is a debate about the nature
of physical knowledge” (Galison 1995, pag. 403).

This paper cannot to do full justice to the complex, dynamic and shifting
nature of the debates over string theory. New theoretical developments,
alternative approaches to quantum gravity, recent experiments at the Large
Hadron Collider, and the funding for applied physics have transformed the
intellectual debate in the last few years. The discussions about the predictive
consequences of supersymmetry, Por ejemplo, have a complex history of their
own, and continue to unfold to the present day. En efecto, there are growing
signs that the controversy has subsided over the last few years, or has receded
into the background. If the recent Strings-conferences are any indication, él
appears that many string theorists have, at least temporarily, abandoned
work on unification and turned their attention to problems of cosmology
and quantum field theory.

A comprehensive social and intellectual history of the string theory con-
troversy remains a formidable task for the future, and remains beyond the
scope of this paper. Nevertheless it is clear that the methodological and
sociological aspects of the recent controversy surrounding string theory rep-
resent an intriguing and rather peculiar example of boundary work. En esto
controversy, unlike most studied cases of boundary work, it is the prevailing
orthodoxy in a well-established field that has been forced to defend its legit-
imacy as a science. This makes the string theory controversy particularly
interesting from both a historical and sociological perspective.

2.
The Discourse of Demarcation
2.1 The Concept of Boundary Work
Critics of string theory have argued that in the absence of empirical foun-
dations or testable experimental predictions, string theory represents a
serious crisis in physics and even fails to qualify as science. In response to
such criticisms, defenders of string theory have deployed a series of argumen-
tative strategies to reaffirm its status as a science. To this extent, physicists
have engaged in what the sociologist of science, Thomas Gieryn, has called

3. String theory has recently begun to attract the attention of historians and philosophers of
science such as Helge Kragh 2011, Nancy Cartwright and Roman Frigg 2007, pag. 20, Dean
Rickles 2013, pag. 43, Richard Dawid 2006, pag. 73, 2013a, 2013b, Elena Castellani 2012, y
Reiner Hedrich 2007, pag. 38.

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

Perspectives on Science

197

boundary work (Gieryn 1983, 1999). Gieryn’s notion of boundary work has
proved extremely useful as an analytic tool in sociological and rhetorical
studies of certain scientific controversies. Simplemente pon, boundary work refers
to the attempt by scientists to demarcate science from non-science. Mientras
the demarcation problem is normally a subject reserved for philosophers,
Gieryn pointed out that in certain situations, scientists embroiled in a con-
troversy will attempt to construct a ‘boundary between science and non-
science’ for “ideological” reasons (Gieryn 1999, pag. 26).

Recognising the label “science” carries with it intellectual legitimacy,
professional opportunities and material resources, scientists endeavour to
construct the boundary in such a way as to ensure that their own work
qualifies as scientific, while at the same time discrediting other theories
or activities they deem to be non-scientific or pseudo-scientific. As Prelli
puts it; “scientists engage in boundary work, not for the lofty epistemo-
logical reasons philosophers often cite […] but as a rhetorical means of
solving practical problems that can block achievement of professional
goals” (Prelli 1989, pag. 91). Boundary work, as Prelli explains, trades on
the inherent ambiguities of demarcation:

If it were possible to draw a sharp line of demarcation between
science and nonscience, there would be little ambiguity involved in
classifying discursive aims and claims as “Scientific” or other; hence,
there would also not be any need for rhetoric to clarify the scientific
standing of those aims and claims. Sin embargo, wherever we seek
to differentiate “science” from “nonscience”, there will always be
working ambiguities. In these rhetorical situations, scientists will
likely choose rhetorical strategies that help construct “boundaries”
that are favourable to their own professional goals and interests
and unfavourable to their competitors. (Prelli 1989, 34: 91)

As we shall argue below, the debates over string theory offer an interest-
ing case of boundary work. In this controversy, we find no single view of
what constitutes science, but instead “its boundaries are drawn and redrawn
in flexible, historically changing and sometimes ambiguous ways” (Gieryn
1983, pag. 781). In his book Defining Science, Charles Taylor develops this
dimension of boundary work further, by drawing attention to the way in
which “the intersubjective negotiation of demarcation standards” reveals
the dialectical nature of demarcation discourse. To this extent “rhetorical de-
marcation practices are both rhetorically and historically adaptive” (taylor
1996, pag. 92). As we shall see, this nicely captures what has unfolded in
the string theory debates, in which physicists have responded in a variety
of ways. Here we find, the “contours of science are shaped by the local
contingencies of the moment” (Gieryn 1983, pag. 5).

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

198

String Theory and Ideologies of Science

2.2 Is String Theory Really Science?
The rise to prominence of string theory in the 1980s contrasted sharply
with the era of physics preceding it. Whereas the success of the standard
model of particle physics had been largely based on experiment, the quest
to unify physics which gathered momentum in the mid-1980s embraced
a different ideal, in which a lack of contact with experiment was not
considered to be problematic (Kragh 2011, páginas. 300–301) instead relying
on theoretical consistency checks. String theorists argued that many of
the experimental successes of the past century including the standard
model would be encompassed by a new, unified theory, which would
reveal itself as a mathematically and theoretically consistent framework.
Todavía, a number of physicists were less than enthusiastic about these new
directions―experimentalists tended to either ignore them, or treated this
emerging style of theoretical physics with suspicion, if not downright hostil-
idad (Kragh 2011, pag. 306). Quizás no sea sorprendente, high-energy experimental
physicists expressed serious concerns about string theorists’ preference for
theoretical abstraction over the laboratory (Richter 2006, páginas. 8–9). Después
more than four decades, Smolin points out, there is still “no realistic possi-
bility for a definitive confirmation or falsification of a unique prediction from
it by a currently doable experiment” (Smolin 2008, pag. 179).

Nobel laureate, Sheldon Glashow, was perhaps the leading figure among
an earlier generation of physicists to voice concerns about the legitimacy of
string theory in the 1980s. Glashow claimed that string theory “might be
the sort of thing that Wolfgang Pauli would have said was ‘not even wrong”
(Ginsparg and Glashow 1986, pag. 39).4 These sentiments were echoed by the
former director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Centre, Burton Richter,
who declared, “some of what passes for the most advanced theory in particle
physics today is not really science” (Richter 2006, páginas. 8–9). Much of this
criticism stems from a broadly Popperian point of view. As Glashow put it:
“I have been brought up to believe that systems of belief which cannot be
falsified are not in the realm of science” (quoted in Chalmers 2007, pag. 35). En
2001, vocal critic, Peter Woit reiterated these concerns:

String theory not only makes no predictions about physical
phenomena at experimentally accessible energies, it makes no
predictions whatsoever. This situation leads one to question whether
string theory really is a scientific theory at all. At the moment
[string theory] is a theory which cannot be falsified by any
conceivable experimental result. (Woit 2001, 2)

4. This Pauli quotation has been quoted extensively and was used by Woit as the title of
a blog he began in March 2004 which was dedicated to discussions about and criticisms of
string theory. It also serves as the title of his book published in 2007.

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

Perspectives on Science

199

Here Woit called into question whether string theory can be properly
regarded as a scientific theory. Yet opinion is divided, even among critics,
as to what to make of the lack of testable predictions. For Dan Friedan,
the repeated failure of string theory to “give any definite explanations of
existing knowledge of the real world” and to “make any definite predictions”
means that it “has no credibility as a candidate theory of physics” (Friedan
2003, pag. 10). Gerard ‘t Hooft, por otro lado, notes that while string
theory “has not led to genuine explanations of well-known features of the
Standard Model,” nor has it made any “definitely testable predictions,
[…] there is nothing wrong with this; such explanations and predictions are still
way out of reach for respectable theories of physics” (’t Hooft 2013, pag. 47).
According to Carlo Rovelli, “loop quantum gravity is in no better shape
than string theory in making verifiable predictions. There are no experiments
supporting loops, nor any other quantum theory of gravity” (Rovelli 2013,
pag. 18).

The difficulties in drawing any clear demarcation between science and
non-science emerge clearly when we take into account the fact that string
theory is not really a theory, in any logical sense, but rather an attempt to con-
struct a unified theory of quantum gravity and elementary particle physics.
Here the demarcation discourse shifts from an assessment of whether string
theory qualifies as a scientific theory, to an assessment of whether it legitimately
qualifies as a scientific research program.5 As Woit acknowledges: “By the falsi-
fication criterion, superstring theory would seem not to be a science, pero
the situation is more complex than that. Much theoretical activity by scien-
tists is indeed speculative” (Woit 2007, pag. 213). What counts as scientific
can be broadened to include forms of speculative theorizing “that would
definitely make superstring theory a science” (Woit 2007, pag. 213). Aquí
Woit offers the following remarks:

So the question of whether a given speculative activity is science
seems not to be one admitting an absolute answer, but instead is
dependent on the overall belief system of the scientific community
and its evolution as scientists make new theoretical and experimental
descubrimientos. […] [I]f a large part of the scientific community thinks
a speculative idea is not unreasonable, then those pursuing this
speculation must be said to be doing science. The speculation known
as superstring theory continues to qualify as science by this criterion.
(Woit 2007, páginas. 214-15)

5. Nancy Cartwright and Roman Frigg have also explored string theory as a research pro-
gram in an attempt to determine, in the Lakatosian sense, if it is progressing or degenerating
(Cartwright and Frigg 2007, pag. 20).

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

200

String Theory and Ideologies of Science

As Woit points out, in the case of string theory, the demarcation of sci-
ence from non-science becomes a matter of scientific judgment. Porque
string theory is not an established theory, but a work in progress, its le-
gitimacy cannot be judged simply on the basis of whether the theory in its
current form makes predictions or has successfully survived attempts at
falsification. Bastante, the question of whether string theory qualifies as sci-
ence, or is worth pursuing, is one that ultimately must be decided by the
scientific community. Such judgments may of course be contested, and in
ambiguous cases, boundary work assumes critical importance.

The sticking point for many physicists is not whether string theory as it
currently stands is falsifiable, but whether it is showing signs of heading in
the right direction. As Johansson and Matsubara recently pointed out, incluso
within a broadly Popperian viewpoint “speculative assumptions, even meta-
physical ones, are admissible in science, if they help develop testable hy-
potheses” (Johansson and Matsubara 2011, pag. 204). Todavía, critics have been
sceptical of claims that string theory will eventually lead to testable predic-
ciones. Such concerns were raised as early as 1986 by Ginsparg and Glashow,
who expressed the fear that string theory “may evolve into an activity […] a
be conducted at schools of divinity by future equivalents of medieval theolo-
gians.” The over-reliance on speculative theorizing, they contended, “may
end, with faith replacing science” (Ginsparg and Glashow 1986, pag. 7). Mientras
Glashow has softened his tone more recently, he has continued to harbour
serious reservations about current trends in theoretical physics. He acknowl-
edges that string theory has provided useful results in mathematics and quan-
tum field theory, however his commitment to testability is unwavering―it
remains to be seen whether string theory “may someday evolve into a testable
theory (aka science)" (quoted in Chalmers 2007, pag. 37).

Here it is worth reflecting on the rhetorical use of language. Critics have
often resorted to insulting comparisons with religion, theology, intelligent
diseño, and speculative metaphysics in an attempt to label string theory
as unscientific.6 Glashow’s repeated comparisons with medieval theology
during the 1980s serve as a case in point. Por 1986 string theory had, en
his view, become a “new version of medieval theology where angels are re-
placed by Calabi-Yau manifolds” (Glashow 1986, páginas. 143–53). Reiterating
this point in a paper with Ginsparg, he argued: “Superstring arguments
eerily recall ‘arguments from design’ for the existence of a Supreme Being”
(Ginsparg and Glashow 1986, pag. 7). En 1988 Glashow again attacked string

6. Michael Duff has responded to such criticisms. “Support for superstrings and M-theory
is based on their ability to absorb quantum mechanics and general relativity, to unify them in a
mathematically rigorous fashion, and to suggest ways of accommodating and extending the
standard models of particle physics and cosmology. No religion does that.” (Duff 2011b,
pag. viii)

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

Perspectives on Science

201

theory, characterizing it as a form of inquiry “more appropriate to de-
partments of mathematics or even to schools of divinity than to physics
departments” (Glashow 1988; quoted in Galison 1995, pag. 399).

Burton Richter engaged in a similar strategy in a Physics Today article
entitled, “Theory in Particle Physics: Theological Speculation versus Practi-
cal Knowledge” (2006), and more recently cosmologist Lawrence Krauss
infuriated many string theorists by drawing comparisons between string
theory and Intelligent Design in his New York Times op-ed entitled “Science
and Religion Share Fascination in Things Unseen” (Krauss 2005).7 Como
Gieryn points out, this kind of strategy is typical of boundary work: “just
as readers come to know Holmes better through contrasts to his foil Watson,
so does the public better learn about ‘science’ through contrasts to ‘non-
science’” (Gieryn 1983, pag. 791). By inviting the comparison between string
theory and medieval theology or intelligent design, Glashow, Richter and
Krauss attempt to create doubt by association.

2.3 String Theory is a Testable in Principle. Just not yet in Practice
Both critics and supporters of string theorists engage in rhetorical strategies
that exploit the inherent ambiguity in the criterion of falsifiability. Many
defenders of string theory have argued that, contrary to what critics allege,
string theory is falsifiable in principle. Brian Greene concedes that string the-
orists “have not as yet made predictions with the precision necessary to con-
front experimental data” (verde 1999, pag. 211), but he remains hopeful that
with further technological developments and a deeper understanding of its
underlying mathematical structure, string theory will become capable of
making falsifiable predictions (verde 2006). It is simply the case that cur-
rent experimental techniques do not yet allow us to test certain aspects of the
theory. All we can say at this point is that string theory is not testable yet.
By drawing the distinction between falsifiable in practice and falsifiable in
principle, string theorists can affirm their commitment to falsifiability as a
criterion for demarcating science from non-science, while maintaining the
view that string theory qualifies as science. This position is taken up by
a number of prominent defenders of string theory, notable among them
Gabriele Veneziano, who resolutely maintains that “string theory is falsifiable”
(Veneziano 2010, pag. 18).

String theory is not the first theory to be in this position, as advocates like
to point out. They list examples such as black holes, neutrinos and neutron
stars, all of which were predicted by theories, but were not falsifiable when

7. The scientific status of Intelligent Design became a controversy that was argued all the
way up to the high court of the United Stated of America. Intelligent Design was deemed not
to be science, not just once but twice, partly on the basis that it was an unfalsifiable theory.

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

202

String Theory and Ideologies of Science

they were first proposed. In this vein, Mike Duff contends, that “gravitational
ondas (1916), the cosmological constant (1917) […] [y] the Higgs boson
(1964)” serve as instructive examples of theoretical predictions that were
untestable when they were first announced (Duff 2013, pag. 191). leonardo
Susskind and Brian Greene also defend string theory in their popular
accounts along similar lines. Greene argues: “The history of science is filled
with ideas that when first presented seemed completely untestable […] ideas
that we now accept fully but that, at their inception, seemed more like mus-
ings of science fiction than aspects of science fact” (verde 1999, pag. 226). Aquí
Greene suggests that confining ourselves to hypotheses that could be tested at
the time they were proposed would be detrimental to the progress of science.
Defenders of string theory typically draw a distinction between predictions
and testable predictions. As Veneziano points out, contrary to what is some-
times maintained by critics, “string theory makes definite predictions, como
for instance the existence of very heavy (by particle physics standards) ‘string
excitations’, or modifications of gravity at very short distances.” The question
is “whether any conceivable experiment, now or in the foreseeable future,
will ever be able to test those predictions” (Veneziano 2010, pag. 18). David
Gross expands on this point, in pointing out that critics tend to impose un-
fairly high standards of predictive power. “String theory is full of qualitative
predicciones, such as the production of black holes in the LHC or cosmic
strings in the sky, and this level of prediction is perfectly acceptable in
almost every other field of science” (quoted in Chalmers 2007, pag. 36). Solo
in experimental particle physics is it the case that “a theory can be thrown
out if the 10th decimal place of a prediction doesn’t agree with experiment.”
The real issue, as Veneziano and many other string theorists see it, is that
“the theory is not developed enough” to make precise predictions that “can
be studied by presently available techniques” (Veneziano 2010, pag. 18). Prog-
ress in string theory will therefore depend “not on improvement in experi-
mental techniques, but rather of the theory itself ” (Veneziano, 2010, pag. 21).
This is a view shared by many string theorists. As Mike Duff explains, “it
frequently takes a long time for an original theoretical idea to mature to a
stage where it can be cast into a smoking gun prediction, that they can
test experimentally” (Smolin et al. 2007, pag. 11). Here the falsifiability of
string theory turns not on whether we are capable of finding new experi-
mental techniques to test predictions of the current theory, but whether
the mathematical structure of string theory can be refined and developed to make
sufficiently precise testable claims.

2.4 Self-Immunization Strategies and Ad Hoc Maneuvers
The introduction of a new form of symmetry, dubbed supersymmetry,
into string theory in the 1970s, constitutes one of the more important

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

Perspectives on Science

203

developments and forms an important part of discussions of the testability
of string theory.8 The introduction of supersymmetry into string theory
enabled physicists to develop string theories that included both bosons
and fermions, and was immediately seen to have potentially experimentally
testable consequences. In supersymmetric theories, each known elementary
particle has a partner (known as a superpartner). If the symmetry were
exact, the partners would have the same mass, and would have been ob-
served. Given that this is not the case, some form of spontaneous symmetry
breaking must take place (Polchinski 1998, páginas. 512–13). In order for the
predicted particles of supersymmetry to exist, they must be heavier than
all particles previously observed.

During the 1990s and especially in the lead up to the construction of
the Large Hadron Collider, supersymmetry was frequently presented as
a testable consequence of string theory. String theorists were optimistic
that supersymmetric particles might be discovered by the next generation
of particle accelerators within the next decade. This meant that the predic-
tions of string theory could become testable in the foreseeable future. John
Schwarz, por ejemplo, expressed the view that “supersymmetry is the
major prediction of string theory that could appear at accessible energies.”
Here he pointed out that “the characteristic energy scale associated to
supersymmetry breaking should be related to the electroweak scale,” and
one could therefore expect “that some of these superpartners should be
observable at the CERN Large Hadron Collider (LHC)" (Schwarz 2000,
pag. 4). Ed Witten referred to supersymmetry as a “genuine prediction” of
string theory (Witten 1998, pag. 1124). Articles such as “String Theory Is
Testable, Even Supertestable” reinforced the impression that within a matter
of years, one could have an experimental test of string theory (kane 1997,
pag. 50).

Todavía, it is important to note that supersymmetry can, a lo mejor, provide
limited support for the testability of string theory. As string theorist Gubser
explained in 2010, “Supersymmetry and string theory are logically distinct.
But they are deeply intertwined. Discovering supersymmetry would mean
that string theory is on the right track.” While it is possible there could be
“supersymmetry without string theory,” such a scenario “would be too great
a coincidence to be believed” (Gubser 2010, pag. 120). Brian Greene ex-
plains, “if the superparticle partners are found, string theory will not be
proved correct,” but it “will give circumstantial evidence that this approach
to unification is on the right track” (verde 2011). The testability of

8. Pierre Raymond first introduced the idea of supersymmetry into hadron theory in
1971, enabling the Dual Resonance Model of strong interactions to incorporate fermions
(half integer spin particles like electrons and protons).

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

204

String Theory and Ideologies of Science

supersymmetry, configured as a prediction of string theory, is claimed to pro-
vide qualified support for a connection between string theory and experiment.
Yet in spite of the hopes of a generation of string theorists, superpart-
ners have not been discovered.9 String theorists point out that there are
many factors, quite separate from those posed by string theory, cual
make discovering supersymmetric particles at experimentally accessible
energies especially difficult, such as the problem of separating the electro-
weak scale from the GUT/Planck scale. As Brian Greene explains, “even if
superpartner particles are not found by the Large Hadron Collider, this fact
alone will not rule out string theory, since it might be that the superpart-
ners are so heavy that they are beyond the reach of this machine as well”
(verde 1999, pag. 222). Schwarz had also foreshadowed this possibility in
1998: “even though I do expect supersymmetry to be found, I would not
abandon this theory if supersymmetry turns out to be absent.” Here
Schwarz remained convinced that string theory “must certainly be cor-
rect” as it is “the unique mathematical structure that consistently com-
bines quantum mechanics and relativity” (Schwarz 1998, pag. 2). Critics
like philosopher Reiner Hedrich see this kind of commitment as symp-
tomatic of a strategy of self-immunisation against empirical control.
“Should there be no indications for these particles, one could simply insist
eso, obviamente, they have masses beyond the range of the experimental
device” (Hedrich 2007, pag. 269).10

Some critics of string theory see this as a kind of ad hoc maneuvering,
typical of its historical development. String theorists have consistently re-
acted to, and neatly sidestepped new developments. Supersymmetry can
only provide support for string theory if it is found, but would not falsify
string theory if not found. Smolin identifies this as a weakness: “while
supersymmetry is not precisely unfalsifiable, it is difficult to falsify” in
practice because “negative results can be―and often are” accommodated
simply “by changing the parameters of the theory” (Smolin 2007b, pag. 9).
The different roles of supersymmetry throughout the history of string theory
illustrate this point. It was originally introduced to string theory to render
the theory free of instabilities and to include fermions, whereupon it became
so integral to the theory as to be a “genuine prediction.” Yet the absence
of any experimental evidence for supersymmetry does not pose a fatal threat
to the theory.

9. Recent developments at the Large Hadron Collider have cast doubts over finding

evidence for supersymmetry at an energy scale below 1 TeV.

10. We may note that similar strategy was employed in the defence of Copernican astron-
omy against Tycho’s objection that we cannot observe stellar parallax. Here it was assumed the
orbits of the planets must be 700 times larger than was thought to be the case in the geocentric
universe.

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

Perspectives on Science

205

2.5 Retrodictions and Counterfactual Histories
Some defenders of string theory have sought to respond to these attacks
on its scientific legitimacy by using a different strategy. Rather than
point to the possibility of making novel predictions, they instead have
instead emphasized that string theory predicts certain observed phe-
nomena for which experimental evidence “already exists” (verde 2008,
pag. 378). En este sentido, string theorists often define gravity as a ‘prediction’
of string theory. As Witten contends: “these theories have (or this one
theory has) the remarkable property of predicting gravity” (Witten 1996,
pag. 24).

Here it is important to appreciate that string theory originated, not as a
teoría de la gravedad, but as a theory of the strong nuclear force. En 1974 John
Schwarz and Joël Scherk discovered that the massless spin-2 particle,
which emerged as a consequence of quantizing the dynamics of relativistic
string states, could be interpreted as the graviton―the theoretical messenger
particle of the gravitational field. The prediction of a massless spin-2 par-
ticle, which initially had been seen as an anomaly of the theory, was now
seen as pointing to a unified theory of quantum mechanics and gravitation.
Gravity emerged, surprisingly, as a necessary consequence of the theory. Ambos
Greene and Witten acknowledge that this kind of prediction is better termed
‘retrodiction’ given the phenomena of gravitation was already well known
to physicists (verde 1999, pag. 225).

Here physicists employ counterfactual histories in their writings to convey
the impression that string theory can predict phenomena that are already
known to exist. Witten has speculated that perhaps other advanced life forms
in the galaxy discovered string theory first and “a theory of gravity found as
a stunning consequence” (Witten paraphrased in Greene 1999, pag. 211).
Brian Greene has also speculated along these lines: “had history followed a
different course―and had physicists come upon string theory some hundred
years earlier―we can imagine that these symmetry principles would have
been discovered by studying its properties” (verde 1999, pag. 375). El
intended impact of this argument is to make the string theory’s lack of pre-
dictive power a consequence of its contingent history. This is an attempt to
undermine criticism that string theory is not scientific because it does not
make predictions. Instead string theory is a casualty of the history of science
and in this context the ability to ‘retrodict’ is deeded to be sufficient to
make a claim to be scientific.

2.6 String Theory Makes Progress by Solving Problems
Critics have typically portrayed string theory as a degenerating research
programa, in a Lakatosian sense, for its failure to make novel testable

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

206

String Theory and Ideologies of Science

predictions.11 Yet string theorists maintain that string theory has made
considerable theoretical progress over the last three decades, in solving
long-standing problems, such as non-renormalizability, that had plagued
earlier efforts in quantum gravity. In a critical review of Smolin’s book, Joe
Polchinski pointed out that in spite of the absence of experimental predic-
ciones, string theory has continued to make progress because it has been
“able to solve some key problems that otherwise seemed insurmountable”
(Polchinski 2007a).

This view, adopted by most string theorists, is in many respects close to
view of scientific progress articulated by Larry Laudan, which highlights that
scientists working within a research tradition attempt to solve conceptual, como
well as empirical, problemas (Laudan 1977). As Duff puts it, string theory has
continued to “make remarkable theoretical progress”, through the develop-
ment of new symmetry principles, new techniques in re-normalizable per-
turbation theory, the application of Calabi-Yau manifolds, y el
discovery of and dualities between different kinds of physical theories (Duff
2013, pag. 184). Indeed in a recent interview, Brian Greene declared that the
“enormous amount of progress in string theory” over the past decade had only
strengthened his conviction “that this is a worthwhile direction to pursue”
(Moskowitz 2011).

Here we draw attention to two classic examples of problem-solving from
the history of string theory. En 1984 Michael Green and John Schwarz pub-
lished a landmark paper, in which they solved one of the crucial problems
that had confronted earlier versions of string theory, and indeed all previous
attempts to unify quantum theory and general relativity. (Green and
Schwarz 1984, pag. 49). Green and Schwarz showed that certain quantum-
mechanical anomalies in superstring theory (which violated gauge invariance)
could be made to cancel each other out with the application of one of
two symmetry groups if they were formulated in ten dimensions. Para el
first time, physicists could construct finite, perturbative string theories
that encompassed a symmetry group from the standard model and which
neatly avoided the renormalization problem of infinite self-energies for the
gravitational field (Chalmers 2007, pag. 38). This result, which heralded the
beginning of the “first superstring revolution,” perhaps more than anything

11. According to Lakatos: “A research program is said to be progressing as long as its the-
oretical growth anticipates its empirical growth, eso es, as long as it keeps predicting novel
facts with some success (‘progressive problemshift’): it is stagnating if its theoretical growth lags
behind its empirical growth, eso es, as long as it gives post hoc explanations of either chance
discoveries or of facts anticipated by, and discovered in, a rival programme (‘degenerating problem-
shift’)" (Lakatos 1978, pag. 112). Nancy Cartwright and Roman Frigg concluded in their
Lakatosian analysis of string theory that string theory can be characterised as a degenerating
research program (Cartwright and Frigg 2007, pag. 20).

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

Perspectives on Science

207

else, was responsible for the enormous interest in string theory during the
1980s.

A second often-cited triumph of string theory is the resolution of the par-
adox of black hole entropy first raised by Stephen Hawking in the 1970s.
The development of new non-perturbative tools such as the anti-de Sitter/
conformal field theory correspondence (AdS/CFT duality) in the latter half of
the 1990s made possible the application of string theory to thermodynamic
properties of black holes at the quantum level, and provided “the first
microscopic derivation of the black hole entropy formula first proposed
by Hawking in the mid-1970s” (Duff 2013, pag. 184). This result is often
touted as one of the resounding successes of string theory. As Duff has
put it, “Solving long outstanding theoretical problems such this indicates
that we are on the right track” (Smolin et al. 2007, pag. 9).

Whereas critics portray string theory as languishing in a state of crisis,
highlighting its failure to make testable predictions, defenders argue that
string theory has made theoretical progress and has solved many of the key
problems that have stood in the way of the realization of a unified theory. Como
Richard Dawid has argued: “The disputes between critics and exponents of
string physics in this light appear as disputes between defenders of the tra-
ditional paradigm of theory assessment and adherents of a newly emerging
one.” (Dawid 2013a, pag. 82). According to Dawid, whereas “critics of string
theory stick to the traditional understanding” of scientific progress based on
empirical confirmation, string theorists see “their theory is the only viable
option for constructing a unified theory of elementary particle interactions
and gravity” (Dawid 2013a pp. 86–7).12

2.7 The Usefulness of String Theory
String theorists have also responded to the charge that string theory is not a
science by pointing out that many of the mathematical tools developed by
string theorists have been applied in many other branches of physics and
matemáticas. To this extent, string theory has already proved it worth as a
science “whether or not ‘a theory of everything’ is forthcoming” (Duff 2013,
pag. 199). Leonard Susskind points out, “string theory has had relevant
things to say to a wide community of physicists and mathematicians, de
black hole theorists to nuclear physicists to particle phenomenologists to

12. Dawid bases this conclusion on the understanding that “supergravity cannot provide a
satisfactory solution to the problems of non-renormalisability that arises in field theoretical
attempts to carry out such unification.” Moreover, “analysis within the framework of string
physics could have but has not led to the emergence of alternative theories” and “there are
vague arguments that even attempts to sacrifice very basic physical principles in order to find
alternative scenarios to string theory would, if made coherent, lead back towards the string
theoretical approach” (Dawid, 2013a, pag. 88).

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

208

String Theory and Ideologies of Science

geometers” (quoted in Chalmers 2007, pag. 47). As Mikhail Shifman explains,
string theory “exhibits a very rich mathematical structure, and provides us
with new, and in a sense superior, understanding of mathematical physics
and quantum field theory” (Shifman 2012, pag. 10).

The anti-de Sitter/conformal field correspondence (AdS/CFT duality), primero
proposed by Juan Mandelcena in 1997, marked a major theoretical break-
through by providing physicists with a non-peturbative definition of string
theory. However it has also found practical application in areas of cosmology
and condensed matter physics, by making possible calculations in strongly
coupled gauge theories that would otherwise be intractable. (Chalmers
2007, pag. 42). Through this new tool, it has become possible to model certain
aspects of the strong force in situations in which quarks behave as if they are
free particles, which cannot be solved analytically in perturbative quantum
field theory. String theory research has also led to new advances in algebraic
geometría, the topology of higher dimensional spaces, conformal field theory,
and quantum information theory (Chalmers 2007, pag. 42).

Critics point out that these spin-offs have increasingly become largely
divorced from the original program of string theory unification ( Woit
2011). Topological string theory, Por ejemplo, uses “simplified versions of
string theory” that “do not unify the forces and particles observed in nature”
(Smolin 2008, páginas. 195–6). Smolin argues that in evaluating the progress of
string theory, one must “separate the question of whether string theory is a
convincing candidate for a physical theory from the question of whether or
not research into the theory has led to useful insights for mathematics and
other problems in physics” (Smolin 2008, pag. 177). Yet in shifting the terms
of the debate in this way, even Peter Woit has conceded that there is “a
reasonable case to be made for continuing interest in string theory” (Woit
2012). If string theory has proved so useful for branches of physics whose
scientific status is not in question, it can be argued it forms a legitimate
part of physics.

2.8 Against Falsificationism
As should be clear from the preceding section, much of the criticism of
string theory’s legitimacy as a science has revolved around the question of
whether string theory is falsifiable. This may well strike many readers as
somewhat odd, given that very few philosophers of science would subscribe
to a Popperian view of science today. Yet as Peter Godfrey-Smith observes,
whereas Popper no longer commands the status he once did within academic
philosophy of science, among professional scientists “Popper’s standing is
quite different.” As the string theory debates show “Popper’s philosophy is
a resource drawn on by scientists in internal debates about scientific matters”
(Godfrey-Smith 2007).

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

Perspectives on Science

209

Sin embargo, a few string theorists, most notably, Leonard Susskind,
have explicitly attacked the appeal to falsifiability, and argued that the
criticisms of string theory as unfalsifiable and therefore unscientific, son
based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the way science works. A
this end, Susskind has strongly defended the scientific status of string theory,
labelling critics like Smolin and Woit as the “Popperazzi” (Susskind 2005,
pag. 192).

Here Susskind responds to the critics by construing their arguments as
‘philosophical’ objections, which are largely irrelevant to the actual practice
of science. Quoting Feynman, he states: “philosophers say a great deal about
what is absolutely necessary for science, and it is always, so far as one can
ver, rather naive, and probably wrong”13 (Feynman quoted in Susskind
2005, pag. 192). By labelling the criticism as philosophical and not scientific,
Susskind engages in what Gieryn has called “a second-order cartographic
squabble” about “who really has the epistemic authority to map science”
(Gieryn 1999, pag. 28). Scientists, not philosophers, in Susskind’s view,
may determine what legitimately counts as science and what does not:
Good scientific methodology is not an abstract set of rules dictated
by philosophers. It is conditioned by, and determined by, the science
itself and the scientists who create the science. What may have
constituted scientific proof for a particle physicist of the 1960’s―
namely the detection of an isolated particle—is inappropriate
for a modern quark physicist who can never hope to remove and
isolate a quark. Let’s not pull the cart before the horse. Science is the
horse which pulls philosophy. (Susskind 2005, 192)

In defence of this view, Susskind attempts to marshal support from the
history of science in refuting falsifiability as a satisfactory criterion of de-
marcation. This imposes too stringent and restrictive a criterion on what
constitutes science. Here Susskind compares the Darwinian and Lamarckian
theories of evolution, insisting that Lamarck’s erroneous view of the inher-
itance of acquired characteristics was falsifiable, while Darwin’s theory of
natural selection was not. Naturally enough, Susskind allies himself with
the victor: “Lamarckian theory is scientific because it is falsifiable,” but
“the theory is easily falsified―too easily” (Susskind 2005, pag. 194). Susskind’s
basic strategy here is to draw attention to the way that different scientific
disciplines draw different methodological and epistemological norms and
standards based on the nature of their inquiry. What holds for experimental
particle physics will not hold for string theory.

13. There is a certain irony here, given that Feynman was one of the physicists who

expressed serious concerns about the legitimacy of string theory in the 1980s.

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

210

String Theory and Ideologies of Science

Susskind also argues that confirmation, not falsification, should be the
desired goal: “Falsification in my opinion is a red herring, but confirmation
is another story. By confirmation I mean direct positive evidence for a hy-
pothesis rather than the absence of negative evidence” (Susskind 2005, pag.
195). His claim is that it is possible to find evidence that confirms Dar-
winian evolution, but impossible to have a test that could falsify it without
the ability to travel back in time (Susskind 2005, pag. 194). The rhetorical
nature of this argument should be obvious. By drawing examples of good
ciencia, which are not falsifiable in any simple sense, Susskind attempts to
defend the legitimacy of string theory as a science.14

2.9 The Landscape of String Theory: Physics or Metaphysics?
In spite of Susskind’s attempts to rescue string theory from the “Popper-
azzi,” concerns about the slide from physics into speculative metaphysics
continue to be raised. One of the major difficulties that has confronted
string theorists since the 1980s is that there is no way of deriving a unique
set of properties which describe the properties like mass and charge of the
known elementary particles and forces from the mathematical framework
of string theory (or M-theory). As Brian Greene explains, physicists have
found that the equations of superstring theory “have many solutions”, cada
“corresponding to a universe with different properties” (verde 1999,
páginas. 284–5). Initially it was hoped that theoretical constraints and consistency
requirements would enable physicists to pick out a single solution that
corresponds to our universe, however the recent discovery of the positive
cosmological constant have only served to exacerbate the problem. Mientras
some string theorists, such as David Gross, have argued that we should not
abandon the hope that string theory will lead to a unique vacuum state,
many physicists now see this increasingly remote possibility. Taking into
account the more than one hundred million known Calabi-Yau spaces
together with the problem of vacuum degeneracy, it is now estimated that
there are in the order of 10500 string theories, perhaps more, each one
describing different set of particles and forces (Conlon 2006, pag. 47).

Sean Carroll and Michael Green have argued that while this might seem
disastrous, we should not despair about the inability to derive the param-
eters of the Standard Model. Carroll argues we may well be forced to aban-
don the “the hope that string theory would predict a unique vacuum state.”

14. Historians and philosophers of science, such as Peter Galison (1995) y ricardo
Dawid (2013a) have also suggested that the emergence of string theory in the 1980s
brought with it a more radical departure from the strictures of a traditional empiricist
methodology than even Susskind recognizes. Dawid has developed this position in his re-
cent work, String Theory and the Scientific Method (2013b).

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

Perspectives on Science

211

Sin embargo, much as we would have liked to make such predictions, “the in-
ability to do so doesn’t render string theory non-scientific” (Carroll 2005). Aquí
Carroll draws an analogy with quantum field theory, in which “the observ-
able spectrum of low-energy string excitations and their interactions […]
depends not only on the fundamental string physics, but on the specific
vacuum state in which we find ourselves” (Carroll 2005). Michael Green
makes a similar point in drawing a comparison with general relativity:
“This supposed problem with a theory having many solutions has never
been a problem before in science. There is a “landscape” of solutions to
generate general relativity, yet nobody says the theory is nonsense because
only a few of them describe the physics we observe while the rest appear to
be irrelevant” (quoted in Chalmers 2007, pag. 44). Todavía, as Green points out,
the case in string theory is admittedly different, insofar as “each different
solution defines a different set of particles and fields,” not merely a differ-
ent space-time geometry (quoted in Chalmers 2007, pag. 44).

In recent years a number of string theorists, most notably Susskind, tener
interpreted this situation, not as a failure of string theory, but as an indication
that our conception of the universe must be radically revised. Desde 2003
Susskind has argued that the fact that the failure of string theory to explain
the particular combination of particles and forces described by the Standard
Model reflects a deeper reality that no such unique combination exits in nature. Como
he puts it, “blinded by the myth of uniqueness,” string theorists in the 1980s
and 90s “continued to hope that some mathematical principle would be dis-
covered that would eliminate all but a single possibility.” It now appears that
“although the theory may be correct, their aspirations were incorrect. El
theory itself is demanding to be seen as a theory of diversity, not of unique-
ness” (Susskind 2005, pag. 274). Here Susskind advances the controversial view
of the multiverse, in which the different solutions of the theory represent dif-
ferent universes, or pocket universes, which may exist in different space-time
regions or at different epochs, or some combination of the two. Thus the
apparent failure of string theory to predict a unique set of properties corre-
sponding to the Standard Model has, for Susskind, opened up fundamental
new insights in cosmology.

The consequences of this view are indeed startling, and have divided the
string theory community. Indeed many string theorists like David Gross
have strongly opposed the multiverse, and argued that despair is prema-
tura. As Mikhail Shifman explains, Susskind’s proposal constitutes “prob-
ably the most dramatic change of paradigms from Newton times. en un
sense it was born out of desperation” (Shifman 2012, pag. 11). Here the “fail-
ure of the original program” becomes “a triumph” (Shifman 2012, pag. 11).
Todavía, there is a cost. The other universes “are causally disconnected from
nuestro, so there is no physical way to confirm their existence or non-existence

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

212

String Theory and Ideologies of Science

in experiment” (Shifman 2012, pag. 11). Steven Weinberg goes so far as to sug-
gest that the multiverse may well constitute “a new turning point” in our
conception of science, forcing “a radical change in what we accept as a legit-
imate foundation of a physical theory” (weinberg 2007, pag. 30). Critics of
string theory see this as further evidence of the extraordinary lengths string
theorists will go to in order to protect the theory from falsification (Kragh
2011, pag. 303). Rather than a “theory of everything.” string theory may well
degenerate into a “theory of anything,” or perhaps “a theory of nothing”
(Smolin 2008, pag. 150).15 Smolin calls for physicists to strongly resist “special
pleading that the standards of science should be lessoned to admit explana-
tions with no falsifiable consequences, in order to keep alive a bold specula-
tive idea” (Smolin 2013, pag. 24).

Smolin insists that speculative cosmological scenarios (such as eternal in-
flation, cyclic and pluralistic cosmological models, and cosmological natural
selección) are admissible in physics, but they can only be taken seriously
if they “make falsifiable or strongly verifiable predictions” (Smolin 2013,
pag. 23). Indeed there have been recent attempts to develop models that do
just this (Smolin 2013; Susskind 2013). Indeed some cosmologists, semejante
as Aurélien Barrau, argue, “the multiverse remains within the realm of
Popperian science. It is not qualitatively different from other proposals asso-
ciated with the usual ways of doing physics” (Barrau 2007). Both Smolin
and Woit make a plea for physicists to be vigilant in upholding “strong
internal norms of rationality” in an effort “to ensure that science continues
to deserve that name” (Woit 2007, pag. 216). Here they make explicit appeal
not only to methodological, but also to sociological, norms of scientific
inquiry. It is to this that we now turn our attention.

The Sociology of String Theory and the Scientific Ethos

3.
3.1 The Crisis of String Theory?
This sociological dimension of the critique of string theory has been partic-
ularly emphasised by Smolin in his book The Trouble with Physics, but one can
find similar criticisms from a number of authors (Smolin 2008). Here we find
a different kind of boundary work, not between science and non-science, pero
between good science and pathological science. The fundamental question
which Smolin seeks to address in his book is: “Why despite so much effort
by thousands of the most talented and well-trained scientists, has fundamen-
tal physics made so little definitive progress in the last twenty-five years?" (Smolin
2008, pag. 261). Smolin’s diagnosis of this crisis in theoretical physics goes
beyond methodological criticisms―he identifies a dysfunctional “sociology”

15. Reiner Hedrich has argued that string theory has morphed from a prospective theory of

physics into a “mathematically inspired metaphysics of nature” (Hedrich 2007, pag. 269).

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

Perspectives on Science

213

as responsible for the current situation. Here it is worth quoting Smolin at
length:

I have become convinced we have to talk about the sociology of
theoretical physics, because the phenomena we refer to collectively as
its “sociology” are having significant negative effects on its progress.
Even though most string theorists are people of integrity who pursue
their work with the best of intentions, there are aspects of the field’s
sociology that are aberrant, compared with the ideals that define the
larger scientific community. These have led to pathologies in the
methodology of theoretical physics that delay progress. The issue is
not whether string theory is worth doing or should be supported, pero
why string theory, in spite of a dearth of experimental predictions,
has monopolised the resources available to advance fundamental
física, thus choking off the investigation of equally promising
alternative approaches. (Smolin 2008, páginas. 267–8)
Smolin’s sociological analysis, and the form of boundary work he engages
in here (in distinguishing good from bad science), has both a descriptive
and a normative aspect. It weaves together a descriptive sociological analysis
of certain trends which have enabled string theory to maintain its posi-
tion “as the dominant paradigm of theoretical physics” (Smolin 2008,
pag. 199), and a normative view of the scientific ethos. While Smolin’s work
constitutes the most elaborate attempt to develop this sort of sociological
critique of string theory, we will draw on the writings of other physicists
like Woit and Friedan, who have contributed to this sociological critique
in certain ways, before turning our attention to the way string theorists have
responded.

Smolin’s agenda is stated clearly from the outset. Given the current situ-
ación, and the absence of experimental results, other theoretical approaches to
quantum gravity deserve more: more funding, more publicity, more re-
sources, more opportunities, and more recognition. Here we should note that
while Smolin has published on string theory, his recent theoretical work is
on loop quantum gravity―a research program that adopts a background-
independent approach to quantum gravity. While he acknowledges that
“string theory is certainly among the directions that deserve more inves-
tigation,” he insists that “there is compelling evidence that something has
gone wrong” (Smolin 2008, pag. 198). Teniendo esto en cuenta, Smolin calls for a
more democratic view of theoretical research that encompasses a plurality
of theoretical viewpoints. Unsurprisingly string theorists have dismissed
Smolin’s attacks as misguided, and have argued that, in spite of the obvious
difficulties, string theory remains by far the most promising theoretical
approach to a theory of quantum gravity.

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

214

String Theory and Ideologies of Science

3.2 A Sociology of String Theory
One of the striking aspects of Smolin’s recent book is his focus on the
sociological dimension of current practices in theoretical physics. Aquí
Smolin emphasizes: “my concern is not with string theorists as individuals,
some of whom are the most talented and accomplished physicists I know,"
but rather with a “trend in which only one direction of research is well
supported while other promising approaches are starved” (Smolin 2008,
pag. xxiii). Here Smolin defends the right of the individual researcher “to pur-
sue the research they think is the most promising,” but argues that string
theory has acquired too much institutional power and this is reflected in two
lugares; in the limited career options for aspiring theoretical physicists and
the tenured positions offered.

In an atmosphere of intense competition for research positions, those that
seek to join the field of theoretical physics are only presented with one
professionally realistic option if they want to pursue research on a unified
theory―“string theory now has such a dominant position in the academy that
it is practically career suicide for young theoretical physicists not to join the
field” (Smolin 2008, pag. xx). As one New York Times article reported, “string
theorists are already collecting the spoils that ordinarily go to the experimental
victors, including federal grants, prestigious awards and tenured faculty posi-
tions” (Glanz 2001; quoted in Smolin 2008, pag. 338) Institutional practices
requiring positive references from those already established in the field and
statistical measures of achievement such as levels of citation are largely to
blame. These factors combine to ensure that the majority view continues to
propagate. Smolin sees these practices and mindsets as detrimental to the field.
As an advocate for a research program which is in the minority Smolin argues
that this is harmful to physics, “because it chokes off the investigation of
alternative directions, some of them very promising” (Smolin 2008, pag. xxii).
Both Smolin and Woit identify a number of other psychological and
sociological factors that in their view have contributed to the dominance
of string theory. The first is that string theorists must invest an enormous
amount of time and intellectual effort mastering the subject before they
can hope to make a worthwhile contribution. As Woit explains, “the huge
degree of complexity at the heart of current research into superstring theory
[…] means that a huge investment in time and effort is required to master
the subject well enough to begin such research” (Woit 2007, pag. 205). En
order to grasp superstring theory, young researchers must first master quan-
tum field theory―which is itself a very demanding subject. Here Woit
suggests that the immense intellectual investment required to enter the field
makes it “psychologically and professionally very difficult to give up” (Woit
2007, pag. 206). Put simply, “the difficulty of superstring theory […] makes
it hard for researchers to leave” (Woit 2007, pag. 206).

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

Perspectives on Science

215

The difficulties of mastering current work in string theory carry further
important consequences. One of these is a perceived over-reliance on the
judgment of leaders in the field. Both Woit and Smolin stress the enormous
weight that Edward Witten’s views carry within the physics community. Como
Woit explains, because of the immense difficulty and complexity of the the-
ory involved, physicists “often rely to an unusual extent not on their own
understanding of the subject, but on what others say about it. The fact that
Witten took up string theory with such enthusiasm in 1984 had a lot to
do with it becoming so popular, and his continuing belief that it remains
the most promising idea to work on has a huge influence” (Woit 2007,
páginas. 205–6). Critics argue that this has reached the level of hero-worship
within the string community. As Smolin puts it, string theorists “typically
want to know what senior people in the field, such as Edward Witten think
before expressing their views” (Smolin 2008, pag. 274). Alguno, like Magueijo,
have argued that Witten’s genius has made him something of a “guru”
within the string theory community (Magueijo 2003, pag. 239). In Smolin’s
vista, “the string community’s huge regard for the views of a few individ-
uals” has produced an “unusually monolithic community” (Smolin 2008,
pag. 284). Woit presents a similar view: “based on my experience, I’m pretty
sure that if you sample non-string theorist physicists, you’re going to find
many people who would describe the behaviour of string theorists as “cult-
like” (Woit 2006).

In Smolin’s view, this unhealthy reliance on the professional judgment of
leaders has led to an increasing “narrowness of the research agenda” (Smolin
2008, pag. 284). Which problems are deemed worth working on at any given
time is dictated to a large extent by trends driven by leaders in the field.
Other physicists have offered similar accounts. Mikhail Shifman has argued
that in the post-empiricist era of theoretical physics, novel ideas capture the
attention of researchers, only to be abandoned just as quickly, meaning that
“alternative lines of thought by and large dry out.”16 Both Smolin and Woit
see this trend as cause for deep concern. As Woit puts it: “Without any new
experimental data to provide clues as to which direction to go in order to
make further progress”, research on string theory has become too dependent

16. According to Shifman: “In this mode each novel idea, once it appears, spreads in an
explosive manner in the theoretical community, sucking into itself a majority of active the-
orists, especially young theorists. Naturally alternative lines of thought by and large dry
afuera. Then before the idea brings fruit in understanding of phenomena occurring in nature
(ambos, due to the lack of experimental data and due to the fact that on the theory side
crucial difficult problems are left behind unsolved), a new novel idea arrives, the old one
is abandoned, and a new majority jumps onto the new train. Note that I do not say here
that this is good or bad. This is just a fact of life of the present day theoretical community”
(Shifman 2012, pag. 2).

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

216

String Theory and Ideologies of Science

on the views of a few individuals, and consequently it has “stagnated and
worked itself a long way into a blind alley” ( Woit 2007, pag. 258). El
dangers posed by this situation may be avoided, in Smolin’s view, by a
renewed commitment to the scientific ethos.

3.3 The Rhetorical Construction of the Scientific Ethos
In a chapter devoted to What is Science? Smolin argues that there is no single
scientific method on which the progress of science fundamentally depends
(Smolin 2008, páginas. 289–307). En cambio, he insists, “the success of science is
due to the formation of communities tied together by ethical principles.”
This sociological conception of science, Smolin argues, is “the major theme
of the book” (Smolin 2007a). Scientific progress is contingent on the exis-
tence of a scientific community “that is defined and maintained by adherence
to a shared ethic” (Smolin 2008, pag. 301). Smolin’s commitment to the
scientific ethos, rather than any one version of the scientific method puts
him closer to a Mertonian than a Popperian view of science. “The ethos of
science” as Merton defined it, is constituted by the “complex of vales and
norms which is held to be binding on the man of science.” Such values
and norms “are legitimized in terms of institutional vales” (Prelli 1989,
pag. 87).

Smolin articulates the core values he sees as underpinning the scientific
ethos. “If we are forced to reach a consensus by the evidence, we should do
so” (Smolin et al. 2007, pag. 4). Si, sin embargo, “rational argument from the
publicly available evidence does not succeed in bringing people of good
faith to agreement on an issue, society must allow and even encourage
people to draw diverse conclusions” (Smolin 2008, pag. 301). This view of
science requires that in situations where there are no rational and empirical
grounds to forge a scientific consensus, “we should encourage a wide di-
versity of viewpoints” (Smolin et al. 2007, pag. 4). Smolin’s articulation of
the scientific ethos represents an attempt to define certain sociological
normas, which are binding on the scientific community and which are es-
sential to good science. Deviation from these norms results in pathological
ciencia, in which progress grinds to a halt. Contemporary theoretical phys-
ics has, according to Smolin, failed to adhere to the democratic values of
the scientific ethos.

In engaging in this kind of discourse, Smolin engages in what Lawrence
Prelli has appropriately termed, “the rhetorical construction of the scien-
tific ethos.” This discourse is characterized by the attempt to define the set
of norms and values, which are taken to be constitutive of “good science.”
Here we have a different kind of boundary work to that examined in the
previous section. Protagonists on both sides seek to construct an idealized
image of science for their readers. Such constructions serve an important

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

Perspectives on Science

217

rhetorical function, which can “be explained only partly by the […] need
to address the scientific laity that is incapable of following the relevant
technical arguments” (Prelli 1989, pag. 98). As Prelli explains:

[…] when scientists resort to these common themes in discussing,
justifying or evaluating actions, the alleged norms and counter-norms
of science serve a rhetorical function, regardless of whatever other
functions they may be said to serve […]. Scientific ethos is not given; él
is constructed rhetorically […]. Whatever is said or done to influence
perception of a scientist’s ethos will arise from a finite set of values
implied by the notion of doing “good science” […]. [Typically]
attention to the constituents of the scientific ethos becomes salient
only when the discourse of one scientist is made and evaluated by
others in scientific situations that are rhetorical; that is problematic
or ambiguous situations that involve inducing adherence to ideas
presented as “scientific.” (Prelli 1989, páginas. 88–9)
Prelli’s analysis provides an extension of Gieryn’s notion of boundary
trabajar, through which we can better appreciate an important aspect of
the string theory controversy. En efecto, one may also find examples of other
virtues or norms, which physicists take to be integral to the scientific
ethos. As we shall see, critics such as Woit and Friedan also construct no-
tions of the scientific ethos, embodying norms such as honesty, humility,
and open-mindedness, which they allege have not been adhered to by the
string theory community. String theorists like Polchinksi, Bruto, Susskind,
and Duff have responded to such charges, by providing alternative socio-
logical views of string theory, and taking issue with Smolin’s view of the
scientific ethos.

Smolin has been especially critical of many recent popularizations of
string theory, which in his view have tended to overstate their claims to
have definitively solved a range of crucial problems such as quantum grav-
idad, black hole entropy, moduli stablization, background-independence in
presenting a misleading image of string theory as triumphantly marching
towards a “theory of everything” (Duff 2011a, pag. 210). Here he reminds
the reader that “we physicists require significant resources, which are pro-
vided largely by our fellow citizens” and to this extent “physicists, OMS
communicate with the public, whether through writing, public speaking,
television or the internet, have a responsibility to tell the story straight.”
Lamentablemente, some physicists “have been less than careful about explaining
just how far the new ideas are from experimental and mathematical proof ”
(Smolin 2008, xxi–xxii). Woit makes a similar complaint in his blog a
category titled “This Week’s Hype” where he provides links to various
popular pieces that engage in hubris about string theory without making

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

218

String Theory and Ideologies of Science

important qualifications (Woit 2004–2013). Smolin and Woit see it as
their obligation as scientists to set the record straight in countering what
they see as misleading and exaggerated claims made by string theorists. Como
we shall see, string theorists have responded by accusing their critics of sys-
tematic bias, and misinformed and damaging distortions.

Woit sees the refusal of the theoretical physics community to acknowledge
the failures of string theory as perhaps the most disturbing recent trend in
recent years. Like Smolin, Woit argues that string theory has failed to deliver
on its original promise of unifying a quantum theory of gravitation with ele-
mentary particle physics. “As years go by and it becomes increasingly clear
that superstring theory has failed as a viable idea about unification, the refusal
to acknowledge this begins to take on ever more worrying connotations”
(Woit 2007, pag. 216). Another critic of string theory, Dan Friedan, has stressed
the importance of recognizing failure as an integral “part of the scientific strat-
egy”. Scientists, according to Friedan, have “a responsibility to recognize failure.
Recognizing failure is an essential part of the scientific ethos” (Friedan 2003, pag. 8; em-
phasis added). This offers yet another characterization of the scientific ethos,
and the values that underpin it. Friedan argues that the refusal to recognize
failure is detrimental to scientific progress. Friedan’s view can be usefully con-
trasted with that articulated at the “Strings2003” conference by David Gross,
who closed his lecture by quoting Winton Churchill. Gross appealed to his
fellow string theorists to: “never, never, never, never, never give up” (quoted
in Woit 2007, pag. 10). Here Gross identified persistence, not a readiness to
acknowledge failure, as the virtue most befitting the theoretical physicist.

3.4 A Sociological Defence of String Theory
No es sorprendente, string theorists and have mounted a vigorous defence of
string theory. Mike Duff argues that Smolin’s book represents “a venomous
attack on string theory and its practitioners” (Smolin et al. 2007, pag. 5).
Smolin’s characterization of string theory, his allegations of institutional
bias and self-serving hiring practices, and claim has made virtually no
progress over the last twenty-five years has infuriated many theorists, muchos
of whom have simply refused to engage in public debate. While Duff
concedes that “some string theorists are arrogant, exclusive and unwilling
to listen to unorthodox views”, he maintains that Smolin’s book gives a
distorted and misleading account of the situation (Smolin et al. 2007,
pag. 5). As Polchinski puts it, “much of what Smolin and Woit attribute to
sociology is really a difference of scientific judgment” (2007a). La razón
that theoretical physicists have worked on string theory is that it has made
genuine progress in solving many outstanding theoretical problems, y
represents by far the most promising―indeed for many physicists, the only
viable―approach to realizing the goal of a unified theory of quantum gravity.

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

Perspectives on Science

219

In an exchange with Smolin following the publication of The Trouble
with Physics in 2007, Polchinski engaged in a sustained critique of what
he saw as Smolin’s deeply flawed account of the developments in theoret-
ical physics over the past two decades. Many problems that Smolin had
claimed were ignored or remained unsolved, such as the moduli-stablization
problema, were in fact, successfully solved once the appropriate tools became
disponible. In his reply to Smolin, Polchinski writes, this “is an example of
something that that happens all too often in your book: you have a story that
you believe, or want to believe, and you ignore the facts […]. You are por-
traying a crisis where there is actually a major success, and you are creating
an ethical issue where there is none” (Polchinski 2007b). In response to
Smolin’s characterization of the string theory community as “unusually
monolithic,” Polchinski argues:

Overwhelmingly the concentration on string theory is a scientific
judgment, made by a very diverse group of theorists. Look at any of
the several dozen most well-known string theorists: my own
scientific experiences and tastes, both inside and outside string
theory, are very different from any of theirs, just as they are from each
otro […]. String theorists can be rather focused, but they are not as
closed to new ideas as you portray. Por ejemplo, such ideas as
holography and eternal inflation were developed outside of string
theory, and might have become “alternative ideas.” Instead they were
recognized as likely parts of the big picture. (2007b)

Here Polchinksi offers both a sociological description of the string theory
community and a normative account of the scientific ethos. In addressing
the first, Polchinski draws attention to the diversity of approaches within
string theory, as well as the fruitful interconnections that have emerged in
recent years between string theory and other areas of research in contem-
porary physics, such as inflationary cosmology. The emergence of such
interconnections and the openness to new ideas explains why string theory
occupies the prominent place it currently does in fundamental physics.
This descriptive account stands in sharp contrast to Smolin’s view of the
string theory community as “monolithic,” but Polchinski’s characteriza-
tion of the ethos of science is in some respects similar to Smolin’s. Aquí
Polchinski demands that “scientists take responsibility for what they
say.” Scientists have a responsibility to present their ideas as clearly and
precisely as possible, and to engage in a process of transformative criticism.
When counterarguments are presented, they must be responded to, “and
the original assertion modified if necessary.” In view of this, Polchinski
sees it as “ironic” that Smolin attempts to take the moral high ground
(2007b).

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

220

String Theory and Ideologies of Science

In the end, Polchinski acknowledges that “sociological effects exist;
they must, since science is a human activity,” but he finds little evidence
to support Smolin’s claim that sociological factors have ultimately been
harmful to the progress of physics. “To make the case for a strong socio-
logical effect, at each turn you are forced to stretch the facts beyond recog-
nition” (Polchinski 2007b). Here it is clear that for Polchinski, it is Smolin,
not string theory community, who is guilty of an ethical failing.

In a similar vein, Sean Carroll has argued that string theory has be-
come the dominant paradigm of theoretical physics “for intellectual rea-
hijos, not socio-psycho-political ones”. En efecto, one should defer to the
judgment of “trained experts who think that this is the best way to go,
based on the results they have seen thus far.” (Carroll 2006). This is an
ethotic argument of a different sort. Rather than direct their attacks on
the scientific community at large, defenders of string theory appeal to the
critical consensus that has emerged in the theoretical community, y
launch a counter-attack on the credibility of the critics. In this context, él
is instructive to see how Susskind attempts to turn the tables on critics like
Smolin and Woit:

What in the multiverse is going on? Could it really be that a secret
cabal of scientific priests have plotted to overthrow the rules of good
scientific method and have absconded with the nation’s scientific
fondos? Have America’s greatest universities―Harvard, Princeton,
stanford, berkeley, Instituto de Tecnología de Massachusetts, California
Institute of Technology―all become infected with the same cancer
of meaningless metaphysical speculation? Has serious science been
driven out by string theorists bent on world domination? Or are the
critics a bunch of disgruntled conspiracy theorists, angry at being
ignored? And might there be a bit of opportunism at work, un
opportunity for gaining 15 minutes of scientific fame―without the
real work? (Susskind 2006)

Susskind here offers a different assessment of what is really going on,
along with an alternative view of the scientific ethos. He makes an implicit
appeal to the credibility and reputation of America’s leading research institu-
tions such as Berkeley, Princeton, Stanford and Harvard in defending the
legitimacy of string theory. Critics are here compared to “disgruntled,"
“angry,” “conspiracy theorists.” Susskind here implies that there are ulte-
rior motives at play, thus rendering their judgments as suspect. As Geoff
Brumfiel has commented, the recent criticisms of string theory are “written
by outsiders” and “have stirred deep resentment in the tight knit community”
(Brumfiel 2005, pag. 491). Smolin is typically portrayed as an outsider in spite

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

Perspectives on Science

221

of the fact that he has published on string theory.17 In defence of Smolin,
Michel André, Adviser to the Director General of the European Union re-
sponsible for research policy issues, has argued that: “Smolin has all too readily
been labelled a frustrated scientist bent on revenge for his lack of personal
recognition” (Duff 2013, pag. 197). Here the debate becomes a debate over
credibility.

As the debate spilled over into the public arena, a number of defenders of
string theory have also attempted to further discredit their critics by pointing
out that in going public they have bypassed the established channels for
scientific criticism. Woit’s criticisms of string theory have been dismissed
by some physicists because his primary medium is a blog, and that makes
them science journalism rather than science proper. In his reply to critics,
Duff emphasizes the problems associated with the public nature of the con-
troversy: “The internet, where everyone is an expert, now provides their ideal
forum. Attempts at sensible commentary or discussion on the blogosphere
are usually quickly overwhelmed by a cacophony (the collective noun?) de
crackpots” (Duff 2013, pag. 192). Here string theorists attempt to construe
the debate on their own terms. The debate about the merits and legitimacy
of string theory as a science is not primarily a sociological or philosophical
uno, as some critics would have us believe, but rather it is essentially a scientific
debate. To this extent, serious commentary should not be left to those who
have little or no grasp of the physics involved.

Here defenders of string theory shift the onus back onto their critics.
“The most effective way for critics of M-theory to win their case,” Duff
contends, “would be to come up with a better alternative. So far nobody
has” (2011a, pag. viii). Here the claim is clear: Put up or shut up. In a simi-
lar manner, Carroll argues: “The way to garner support for alternative ap-
proaches is not to complain about the dominance of string theory; it’s
to make the substantive case that some specific alternative is more promis-
ing” (Carroll 2006). Loop quantum gravity theorists, like Rovelli and
Smolin, argue that they have made progress in developing a fully back-
ground-independent formulation of quantum gravity, which has thus far
eluded string theory (Rovelli 2003). String theorists, por otro lado,
maintain that it is far from obvious that background-independence, como
it is defined by loop quantum gravity, is an essential prerequisite of the
theory.18 Here we may characterize the situation in the terms set out by

17. As Prelli has noted, scientific “insiders” and “outsiders” typically “construct conflicting

perspectives on scientific ethos” (Prelli 1989, pag. 97).

18. A deeper analysis of the debate over what constitutes a background-independent
theory, and how the problem is construed differently by different researchers is beyond
the scope of this paper, sin embargo, we plan to discuss its implications for theory appraisal
in a forthcoming paper.

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

222

String Theory and Ideologies of Science

Larry Laudan. Different judgments about the progress of string theory rest on
“divergent views about the attributes our theories should possess” (Laudan
1990, pag. 42).

The String Theory Debates and the Ideology of Physics

4.
While many of the points of disagreement between critics and defenders of
string theory turn on complex, highly technical matters not discussed in
this paper, the debate raises a number of issues that go well beyond the
sphere of theoretical physics. Prescriptions concerning the nature of scien-
tific progress, the demarcation of science from non-science, the sociological
norms of scientific inquiry and the scientific ethos feature prominently.
Critics have attempted to highlight what they see as serious methodolog-
ical problems of string theory and have called into question both its legit-
imacy as a science and its institutional dominance and virtual monopoly of
resources. In defending string theory against these attacks, string theorists
have employed various strategies in attempting to construct a boundary
between science and non-science, good science and bad science, cual
casts their own activities in a favourable light. The dialectical nature of
boundary work is in evidence here, as both critics and defenders of string
theory have responded to one another in changing ways.

The string theory controversy also brings into sharp focus the impor-
tance of the public nature of boundary work and the rhetorical function
of popular science. As Gieryn has noted, in controversies of this kind, “sci-
entists describe science for the public and its political authorities, alguno-
times hoping to enlarge the material and symbolic resources of scientists or
to defend professional autonomy” (Gieryn 1983, pag. 781). This seems an
entirely apt description of the recent controversy over string theory.

The attempts to define what constitutes good science can be considered
as ideological in Gieryn’s sense, insofar as protagonists are motivated in
part by “the pursuit of professional goals: the acquisition of intellectual
authority and career opportunities” (Gieryn 1983, pag. 781). But the debates
about string theory may also be said to be ideological in the sense that the
protagonists on both sides attempt to set out their views on the normative
structure of science, which they hope may shape the direction of physics in
the future. A este respecto, Woit has said that he would like his book to be
thought of as useful reading for those interested in entering the field so
they could make better-informed decisions. Smolin describes his work as
“a serious book,” which attempts to deal with the current crisis in physics,
“not a popularisation.” Indeed, Smolin explains that his decision to write
The Trouble with Physics was motivated primarily by philosophical and
sociological concerns. His aim was to present “a view of what science is
and how science works” (Smolin et al. 2007). The responses by Greene,

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

Perspectives on Science

223

Susskind, Polchinski, and Duff also take up this challenge. Here we see
how these works of popular science do more than merely disseminate
complex scientific ideas for the wider public (Daum 2009, pag. 100). Ellos
present different ideologies of physics.

While Gieryn’s notion of boundary work provides a useful way of fram-
ing a certain aspect of the debate, there is an important sense in which the
string theory controversy differs in certain crucial respects from most of
the cases typically studied by sociologists of science. In most scientific
controversies in which we find scientists engaging in boundary work, el
boundary dispute is generally over whether an unorthodox or minority view
or approach should be regarded as science, pseudoscience, or pathological
ciencia. UFOology, parapsychology, intelligent design, and cold fusion all
represent cases of this sort. The “ideological attempts to define science,"
as Gieryn explains, are largely motivated by the desire “to justify and protect
the authority of science by offering principled demarcations from poachers or
impostors” (Gieryn 1999, pag. 26). Sin embargo, in the case of string theory, es
the dominant research program in a well-established field of science that has
been forced to defend its credentials as “scientific” (taylor 1996, páginas. 177–9).
This presents an intriguing departure from most studied episodes of
boundary work. String theory currently enjoys a privileged status by virtue
of being the dominant paradigm within theoretical physics. Yet string the-
orists have found themselves forced to defend the scientific legitimacy of
their research against charges that it has degenerated into a form of “meta-
física,” “non-science,” or “bad science.” In doing so, string theorists have
attempted to “loosen” the methodological definition of science, mientras
critics try to impose a stricter definition. This appears to be the reverse
of the usual practice in boundary disputes, in which the prevailing scien-
tific orthodoxy attempts to impose more stringent demarcation criteria
in an effort to exclude certain intellectual activities they deem pseudo-
scientific (taylor 1996, pag. 91). In this way, the string theory debates serve
to enrich our understanding of the nature of boundary work, y el
specific historical contexts in which scientists engage in the ideological
discourse over what legitimately counts as science.

Referencias
Barrau, A. 2007. “Physics in the Multiverse.” CERN Courier. http://cerncourier.

com/cws/article/cern/31860

Brumfiel, GRAMO. 2006. “Theorists Snap over String Pieces.” Nature 443 (7111):

491.

Brumfiel, GRAMO. 2005. “In Search of Hidden Dimensions.” Nature 433 (7021): 10.
Castellani, mi. 2012. Early String Theory as a Challenging Case Study
for Philosophers. Pp. 65–80 in The Birth of String Theory. Edited by

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

224

String Theory and Ideologies of Science

A. Cappelli, mi. Castellani, F. Colomo, y P. Di Vecchia. Cambridge:
Prensa de la Universidad de Cambridge.

Carroll, S. 2006. “The String Theory Backlash.” http://blogs.discovermagazine.
com/cosmicvariance/2006/06/19/the-string-theory-backlash/#.UbfM-
uffC8A

Carroll, S. 2005. “Two Cheers for String Theory.” http://www.
preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2005/07/21/two-cheers-for-string-theory/
Cartwright, NORTE., y r. Frigg. 2007. “String Theory under Scrutiny.” Physics

Mundo 20 (9): 14.

Chalmers, METRO. 2007. “Stringscape.” Physics World 20: 35–47.
Conlon, j. PAG. 2006. “The String Theory Landscape: A Tale of Two Hydras.”

Contemporary Physics 47 (2): 119–129.

Daum, A. W.. 2009. “Varieties of Popular Science and the Transforma-
tions Of Public Knowledge: Some Historical Reflections.” Isis 100 (2):
319–332.

Dawid, R. 2013a. “Theory Assessment and Final Theory Claim in String

Theory.” Foundations of Physics 43: 81–100.

Dawid, R. 2013b. String Theory and the Scientific Method. Cambridge:

Prensa de la Universidad de Cambridge.

Dawid, R. 2006. “Underdetermination and Theory Succession from the
Perspective of String Theory.” Philosophy of Science 73 (3): 298–322
Duff, METRO. 2013. “String and M-theory: Answering the Critics.” Foundations

of Physics 43 (1): 182–200.

Duff, METRO. 2011a. “Theory of Everything: Answering the Critics.” New Sci-

Duff, METRO. 2011b. “Theory of Everything: Have We Now Got One?” New

duró 210: v.

Scientist 210: vi–vii.

Friedan, D. 2003. “A Tentative Theory of Large Distance Physics.” Journal of
High Energy Physics 10. http://jhep.sissa.it/archive/papers/jhep102003063/
jhep102003063.pdf

Galison, PAG. 1995. Theory Bound and Unbound: Superstrings and Experi-
ment.” Pp. 369–408 in Laws of Nature: Essays on the Philosophical, Scientific
and Historical Dimensions. Nueva York: Walter de Gruyter

Gieryn, t. F. 1999. Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line.

chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Gieryn, t. F. 1983. “Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from
Non-Science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists.”
American Sociological Review 48 (6): 781–795.

Ginsparg, PAG., and S. Glashow. 1986. “Desperately Seeking Superstrings.”

Glanz, j. 2001. “With Little Evidence, String Theory Gains Influence.”

Physics Today 39 (5): 7–9.

New York Times, 13 Marzo.

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

Perspectives on Science

225

Glashow, S. l. 1986. “Does Elementary Particle Physics Have a Future?"
PAG. 143 in The Lesson of Quantum Theory, papers from the Neils Bohn
Centenary Symposium held 3–7 October, 1985 in Copenhagen, Dinamarca.
Edited by Jorrit de Boer, Erik Dal, and Ole Ulfbeck. Ámsterdam: North
Holland Publishing.

Godfrey-Smith, Peter. 2007. “Popper’s Philosophy of Science: Looking
Ahead.” http://petergodfreysmith.com/PGSonPopper.pdf. (próximo
in The Cambridge Companion to Popper)

Verde, METRO. y j. Schwarz. 1984. “Anomaly Cancellations in Supersymmetric
re = 10 Gauge Theory and Superstring Theory.” Physics Letters B 149:
117–22.

verde, B. 2011. “String Theory.” Encyclopædia Britannica Online. http://www.

britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/574576/string-theory

verde, B. 2008. The Fabric of the Cosmos: Space, tiempo, and the texture of reality.

Camberwell: Pingüino.

verde, B. 2006. “The Universe on a String.” The New York Times 20 Octubre.
verde, B. 1999. The Elegant Universe: Superstrings, hidden dimensions, y el

quest for the ultimate theory. Nueva York: W.. W.. norton.

verde, B. & Krauss, l. 2011. “The Great String Theory Debate.” http://archivo.
org/details/TheGreatStringTheoryDebateBrianGreeneAndLawrenceKrauss
Gubser, S. 2010. The Little Book of String Theory. Princeton: Princeton Uni-

versity Press.

Hedrich, R. 2007. “The Internal and External Problems of String Theory:
A Philosophical View.” Journal for General Philosophy of Science 38 (2):
261–278.

Johansson, L.-S. & Matsubara, k. 2011. “String Theory and General
Methodology.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 42:
199–210.

Johnson, GRAMO. 2006. “The String Wars.” http://online.itp.ucsb.edu/online/

resident/johnson2/

Kaku, METRO., & Thompson, j. t. 1997. Beyond Einstein: The Cosmic Quest for the

Theory of the Universe. Nueva York: prensa de la Universidad de Oxford

kane, GRAMO. 1997. “String Theory Is Testable, Even Supertestable.” Physics

Hoy 50: 40.

Kragh, h. 2011. Higher Speculations: Grand Theories and Failed Revolutions in

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

Physics And Cosmology. Oxford: prensa de la Universidad de Oxford

Krauss, l. METRO. 2005. “Science and Religion Share Fascination in Things

Unseen.” New York Times, 8 Noviembre.

Lakatos, I. (1971) 1978. “History of Science and its Rational Reconstruc-
tions.” Pp. 102–138 in The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes.
Philosophical Papers, volumen. 1, Edited by J. Worrall & GRAMO. Currie. Cambridge:
Prensa de la Universidad de Cambridge.

226

String Theory and Ideologies of Science

Lanier, j. 2013. “Review of Lee Smolin, The Trouble with Physics.” http://

timereborn.com/wp/writings/the-trouble-with-physics/

Laudan, l. 1990. “Normative Naturalism.” Philosophy of Science 57: 44–59.
Laudan, l. 1977. Progress and Its Problems. berkeley: California University Press.
Magueijo, j. 2003. Faster than the Speed of Light. Londres: William Heineman.
Moskowitz, C. 2011. “Theory of Everything: Holy Grail or Fruitless Pursuit?"
Interview with Brian Greene, 8 Marzo 2011. http://www.livescience.com/
13129-physics-string-theory.html

Polchinski, j. 2007a. “All Strung Out?” The American Scientist Online.

http://www.americanscientist.org/bookshelf/pub/all-strung-out

Polchinski, j. 2007b. “Guest Post: Joe Polchinski on Science or Sociology?"
http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/cosmicvariance/2007/05/21/guest-
post-joe-polchinski-on-science-or-sociology/#.USHeA83grsJ

Polchinski, j. 1998. String Theory Volume II: Superstring Theory and Beyond.

Cambridge: Prensa de la Universidad de Cambridge

Prelli, l. j. 1989. “The Rhetorical Construction of Scientific Ethos.” Evolution

34 (5): 87–104.

Richter, B. 2006. “Theory in Particle Physics: Theological Speculation versus

Practical Knowledge.” Physics Today 59 (10): 8.

Rickles, D. 2013. “Mirror Symmetry and Other Miracles in Superstring

Theory.” Foundations of Physics 43 (1): 54–80.

Rovelli, 2003. “A Dialog on Quantum Gravity.” International Journal of Modern

Physics D 12: 1509–1528. http://arXiv:hep-th/0310077.pdf

Rovelli, C. 2013. “A Critical Look at Strings”. Foundations of Physics 43: 8–20.
Schwarz, j. h. 2000. “Introduction to Superstring Theory.” http://arxiv.

org/pdf/hep-ex/0008017.pdf

Schwarz, j. h. 1998. “Beyond Gauge Theories.” http://arxiv.org/pdf/hep-th/

9807195.pdf

Schwarz, j. h. 1996. “Superstrings—A Brief History.” Pp. 695–705 In
History of Original Ideas and Basic Discoveries in Particle Physics. Edited by
Harvey B. Newman and Thomas Ypsilantis. Nueva York: Plenum Press.
Shifman, METRO. 2012. “Frontiers Beyond the Standard Model: Reflections and
Impressionistic Portait of the Conference.” Modern Physics Letters A, 27 (40):
1–12.

Smolin, l. 2013. “A Perspective on the Landscape Problem.” Foundations of

Physics, 43 (1): 21–45.

Smolin, l. 2008. The Trouble With Physics: the Rise of String Theory, the Fall of

a Science, and What Comes Next. Londres: Penguin Books.

Smolin, l. 2007a. “Response to Review of The trouble with Physics by Joe
Polchinski.” http://www.thetroublewithphsyics.com/ResponsetoPolchinski
Smolin, l. 2007b. “Scientific Alternatives to the Anthropic Principle.” Pp. 323–
366 in Universe or Multiverse. Cambridge: Prensa de la Universidad de Cambridge.

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

Perspectives on Science

227

Smolin, l., METRO. Duff, y N. Cartwright. 2007. “Transcript of the Royal
Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce
Debate between Professor Lee Smolin, Professor Michael Duff, Professor
Nancy Cartwright and Chaired by Professor Chris Isham” (5th March).
http://www.thersa.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0013/661/The-Trouble-
with-Physics-smolin-050307.pdf

Susskind, l. 2013. “String Theory.” Foundations of Physics, 43 (1): 174–181.
Susskind, l. 2006. “Hold Fire! This Epic Vessel Has Only Just Set Sail.” in

The Times Higher Education Supplement, 25 Agosto.

Susskind, l. 2005. The Cosmic Landscape: String Theory and the Illusion of Intel-

ligent Design. Nueva York: Pequeño, Brown and Co.

taylor, C. A. 1996. Defining Science: A Rhetoric of Demarcation. Madison:

Prensa de la Universidad de Wisconsin.

’t Hooft, GRAMO. 2013. “On the Foundations of Superstring Theory.” Foundations

of Physics 43: 1–8.

Veneziano, GRAMO. 2010. “String Theory: Physics or Metaphysics?” Humana Mente:

Journal of Philosophical Studies 13: 13–21.

weinberg, S. 2007. Living in the Multiverse. Pp. 29–42 in Universe or Multi-
verso? Edited by Bernard Carr. Cambridge: Prensa de la Universidad de Cambridge.
weinberg, S. (1992) 1994. Dreams of a Final Theory. Nueva York: Vintage Books.
Witten, mi. 1998. “Magic, Mystery, and Matrix.” Notices of the American

Mathematical Society 45 (9): 1124–1129.

Witten, mi. 1996. “Reflections on the Fate of Spacetime.” Physics Today 49: 24.
Woit, PAG. 2004–2013. “This Week’s Hype.” http://www.math.columbia.edu/

∼woit/wordpress/?cat=8

Woit, PAG. 2012. “Strings 2012.” http://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/

wordpress/?p=4925

Woit, PAG. 2011. “Strings 2011.” http://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/

wordpress/?p=3811

Woit, PAG. 2007. Not Even Wrong: The Failure of String Theory and the Continuing

Challenge to Unify the Laws of Physics. Londres: Vintage Books.

Woit, PAG. 2006. “Aaron Bergman Review of Not Even Wrong.” http://www.

math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpress/?p=446

Woit, PAG. 2001. “String Theory: An Evaluation.” http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/

0102051

yo

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

/

mi
d
tu
pag
oh
s
C
/
a
r
t
i
C
mi

pag
d

yo

F
/

/

/

/

2
3
2
1
9
2
1
7
8
9
9
7
9
pag
oh
s
C
_
a
_
0
0
1
6
8
pag
d

.

/

F

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

t

oh
norte
0
7
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3
Descargar PDF