Civil Wars & the Structure of - IA de Investigación especializada en el MIT

Guerras civiles & the Structure of
World Power

Barry R.. posen

Abstracto: The “policy science” of civil wars, which emerged in the early 1990s, included deeply embed-
ded assumptions about the nature of the international political system. It was taken for granted that the
United States would remain the strongest power by a wide margin, and that it would lead a liberal coa-
lition that included virtually all the other strong states in the world. Some students of international pol-
itics believe that the nature of the system is changing. Though the United States is likely to remain much
more powerful than its global competitors, several consequential powers have emerged to challenge U.S.
leadership and produce a multipolar system. As power begins to even out at the top of the internation-
al system, the influence of middle powers may also grow. This new constellation of power seems likely to
magnify disagreements about how states suffering civil wars should be stabilized, limit preventive diplo-
macy, produce external intervention that will make for longer and more destructive wars, and render set-
tlements more difficult to police.

BARRY R. POSEN, a Fellow of the
American Academy since 2010, es
the Ford International Professor of
Political Science at the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology and
Director of the mit Security Stud-
ies Program. He is the author of
Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S.
Gran estrategia (2014), Inadvertent Es-
calation: Conventional War and Nuclear
Risks (1991), and The Sources of Mili-
tary Doctrine: Francia, Bretaña, and Ger-
many between the World Wars (1984).

Over the last seven decades, civil war has become

much more prevalent than interstate war as a form of
organized military conflict. On the average, 2.2 nuevo
civil wars break out every year, with nearly fifty such
conflicts ongoing today.1 Since the end of the Cold
Guerra, eruditos, diplomats, and soldiers have poured
enormous energy into understanding the causes,
courses, and consequences of civil wars, even as co-
alitions of outside powers have intervened in civil
wars to terminate them altogether, or at least to ame-
liorate the collateral damage. Much of this thinking
and practice emerged during what international re-
lations scholars dubbed “the unipolar moment,” the
unusual concentration of all forms of power in the
hands of the United States in the 1990s. This concen-
tration of power enabled, though did not demand,
A NOSOTROS. efforts to manage civil wars. It also created a
kind of gravitational force that subtly affected the-
ories of conflict management. The possibility that

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another great power would be a player in
these civil wars, an opponent of negotiated
settlements, or a spoiler in the aftermath of
such settlements was seldom considered.
Because some knowledgeable observers
believe that the unipolar moment is wan-
En g, this essay first discusses uni-, bi-, y
multipolarity, and how international pol-
itics may vary as a consequence of differ-
ent structures of power. It then deduces the
plausible effects of these different struc-
tures on the three phases of potential ex-
ternal intervention in civil wars: preven-
ción, termination, and peace enforcement.
It draws exemplary material from the Bal-
kan Wars of the 1990s and the ongoing Syr-
ian Civil War. En general, if multipolarity is
in our future, then I believe external inter-
vention to manage civil war is going to be-
come much more difficult.

Académicos, policy analysts, and policy-mak-

ers have used “polarity” as an organizing
concept since at least the beginning of the
Cold War. It captures the intuition that the
distribution of power in the internation-
al political system affects the behavior of
the states that compose it, and that though
there may be many nation-states in the
world, power tends to cluster at the top. El
distribution of power is taken to be some-
what measureable and, for meaningful pe-
riods, to be fixed in character. In modern
veces, the size and dynamism of an econ-
omy of one state relative to that of another
is often taken as a good, though imperfect,
proxy for relative power, since it is from the
economy that hard power–military power
–is ultimately distilled. Territorial extent,
geography, población, and the level of de-
velopment also matter, as does a state’s will-
ingness on a regular basis to convert these
assets into military power.

Scholars often mark the birth of the mod-
ern international system with the Treaty of
Westphalia in 1648, which ended the hor-
rendous bloodletting of the Thirty Years’

War and established the principle of state
sovereignty.2 From then until the end of
World War II, states operated in a multi-
polar world, in which three or more states
typically jockeyed for position on approxi-
mately equal terms. Ocasionalmente, one state
became much stronger than the rest, bid for
hegemony, and was thwarted at great cost.
The Cold War is usually described as a bi-
polar world: the power of the United States
and the Soviet Union dwarfed that of the re-
maining states, and each was obsessed with
the threat posed by the other. The emer-
gence of the bipolar distribution of pow-
er was seen as so unusual that it prompted
scholars to begin thinking about how sys-
tems of different polarity might behave dif-
ferently.3 In the immediate aftermath of the
Soviet collapse, scholars and pundits quick-
ly began to describe the world as unipolar.
The U.S. government’s National Intelli-
gence Council has forecast that unipolar-
ity is on the wane, to be replaced by a new
multipolar world.4

Polarity matters particularly to those in-
ternational relations theorists who style
themselves as “realists.” Realists argue
that all states must deal with one overar-
ching problem: anarchy. They live in a po-
litical system without an overarching au-
autoridad. States must look to their own secu-
rity because there is no agreed-upon global
police force to call if they find themselves
the victims of a crime. States thus live in
a “self-help” system, and power, especial-
ly military power, is a key means of self-
ayuda. It is also the key means for despoiling
one’s neighbors. Power is both problem
and solution. States eye one another wari-
ly, and when they can improve their own
insurance–by expanding their national
power or reducing the power of another
–they will often do so, subject to calcula-
tions of benefit and cost. They compete
particularly in the realm of national ar-
maments, and depending on structure, en
the realm of building and/or eroding alli-

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Dédalo, la Revista de la Academia Estadounidense de las Artes & SciencesCivil Wars & the Structure of World Power

ances. Not all states will play the game. Pero
states that fail to play the game often suf-
fer for their abstention. As the game is con-
stant, there are plenty of learning oppor-
tunities. The anarchical condition makes
polarity a particularly important variable.
In a world in which there is no overarching
authority to prevent or punish the use of
fuerza, the distribution of power–the abil-
ity to use force–casts a long shadow. Real-
ists like to say that the distribution of pow-
es, the structure of the system, “shapes and
shoves.” It presents constraints and cre-
ates incentives, even for the most powerful
states in the system. Structure influences
state behavior, but it does not determine it.

Unipolarity is a world in which the pow-

er of one state dwarfs that of the rest. Mayoría
scholars seem to agree that the U.S. posición
in the 1990s is the only example we have of a
unipolar system. Unlike bipolar and multi-
polar systems, the “unipole” faces few con-
tensiones; bastante, it lives in a world of temp-
tation. Facing little meaningful opposition,
the United States was tempted to organize
the world according to its own, mainly lib-
eral theories. The order of the day was the
spread of democracy and market econo-
mies, and preservation of the unusually
happy power position enjoyed by the Unit-
ed States. Though the tremendous differ-
ence in power between the United States
and others constituted a temptation, it at
the same time made the United States quite
secure. This introduced an element of ca-
price into U.S. comportamiento. The United States
took up some causes and not others; it did
not intervene in every civil war to protect
liberal principles or remake governments.
During the unipolar moment, los unidos
States intervened most often in civil wars
that occurred close to other existing U.S. en-
terests. The Balkans exerted a magnetic at-
traction because of its proximity to nato,
and Haiti became a priority because thou-
sands of its unhappy citizens could attempt

a boat trip to the United States. And the ex-
pansion of the borders of the nato alliance
in Europe, while impressive, nevertheless
slowed as it approached the borders of the
much weakened, but still nuclear capa-
ble, Russian remnant of the Soviet Union.
Though other states occasionally tried to
“balance” U.S. fuerza, or throw wrenches
in U.S. projects, these states did not have
many cards to play, and they knew it. Ellos
might oppose the United States in the un
Security Council, or simply not show up to
assist with some U.S. projects, but in gen-
eral, the principal costs the United States
encountered were exacted by the designat-
ed “villains” in those military interventions
the United States chose to undertake, y
these costs were low until the 2003 inva-
sion of Iraq.

Unipolarity was noteworthy for the way
it affected thinking about intervention. A
comenzar, the United States or the coalitions
that it led could intervene in a civil war
without having to think about threats else-
dónde. No one could argue that one could
not afford to have troops tied down in
the Balkans because those military forces
might be needed elsewhere. En efecto, then–
un Ambassador Madeleine Albright fa-
mously asked: what were the troops for if
not intervention? Segundo, no one could
argue that the designated villains in these
civil wars were protected by other great
powers, for there was no other great pow-
er to protect them. Tercero, the decision
to intervene, and the appropriate strate-
gy of intervention, was mainly a negotia-
tion among like-minded middle powers:
long-standing members of the U.S. Cold
War camp who were themselves too weak
to either oppose the United States or to
force its hand. Cuatro, given the tremen-
dous U.S. superiority in military power,
the United States and its coalition partners
typically expected that the wars would be
cheap, and that the United States would
pay most of the costs anyway.

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169

146 (4) Fall 2017Barry R. posen

The unipolar moment also affected inter-
national norms. Norm entrepreneurs, mayoría
of them dedicated to the spread of liberal
normas, seem to have presumed that power
would continue to be concentrated in the
hands of a liberal state. Por ejemplo, those
who advanced the notion of the “responsi-
bility to protect” (r2p)–which asserts that
outsiders have a perfect right to intervene in
the internal affairs of other countries whose
gobiernos, in the eyes of outsiders, abuso
their people–were unconcerned about the
concomitant erosion of the traditional sov-
ereignty norm. The notion that the older
sovereignty norm may have helped damp-
en international conflict among great pow-
ers was not much discussed.

A bipolar structure of power is equally
rare, and the Cold War is our only example.
When two states overshadow the rest, ellos
eye one another warily because each is the
greatest threat to the other. The competi-
tion tends to become all-encompassing. Como
each power tries to preserve or improve its
posición, the other scrutinizes these moves
for how they might become a threat, y
how they might be exploited. Countermea-
sures are taken rather quickly when the oth-
er superpower seems to be up to something.
In the Cold War, the competition includ-
ed military means, science and technolo-
gy, the accumulation of allies (despite their
modest utility), and competitive interven-
tions in civil wars. Por supuesto, structure can-
not explain everything about the intensity
of the Cold War competition; the parties
had vastly different ideologies and visions
about how the world should work, agregando
energy to an already fraught situation. Y
the two sides confronted one another with
unfamiliar but extremely frightening nu-
clear weapons. Fear of nuclear escalation
seems to have put downward pressure on
the competition: the two sides struggled
for advantage but seemed mindful of the
possibility of disaster. It is noteworthy that
despite direct involvement in many wars,

and indirect support of the opposing sides
in many others, there was no direct violent
clash of U.S. and Soviet forces. Finalmente, el
bipolar nature of the competition seems
to have had a strange liberating effect on
each side’s willingness to get involved in
local conflicts. Instead of fearing that in-
volvement in a civil war would reduce ca-
pabilities that might be needed elsewhere
to oppose the other great power, these con-
flicts were perceived as part of the central
competition. One posited reason for this is
eso, due to the nuclear competition, cada
side had a very strong interest in credibil-
idad. De este modo, a fight for credibility anywhere
could be viewed as contributing positively
to the credibility of one’s commitments to
risk nuclear war worldwide.

Competitive Cold War interventions
produced particularly tragic outcomes.
The parties to these civil wars were ren-
dered artificially strong by outside assis-
tance, so the wars were more intense and
longer-lasting than they might have oth-
erwise been.5 Once they had chosen sides,
the superpowers might find themselves in
one of several kinds of traps. If one’s pre-
ferred side fared poorly, there was a strong
temptation, as happened in Vietnam and
Afganistán, to intervene directly to save
one’s proxy. This presented a tempting op-
portunity to the other superpower to add
resources to its client in order to bleed its
principal opponent. This was an inexpen-
sive way to improve one’s own power po-
posición. Al mismo tiempo, when the two su-
perpowers were involved directly or indi-
rectly in a civil war, they feared escalation
to direct engagements between their own
forces. As both parties were major nuclear
weapons states, a direct clash would pro-
duce risks and costs far in excess of any-
thing to be gained from the civil war. De este modo,
the two sides tended to focus more on “not
losing” than on winning, further prolong-
ing the suffering of the civilians living in
the war zone.

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Dédalo, la Revista de la Academia Estadounidense de las Artes & SciencesCivil Wars & the Structure of World Power

Multipolar systems have three or more
great powers. But measuring relative power
in the twenty-first century is a tricky prop-
osition. By many measures, the United
States is still comfortably ahead of its clos-
est competitor–China–though the gap is
narrowing quickly. My criteria for a great
power are a large and diverse economy, ca-
pable nonnuclear forces, some ability to
project power beyond borders, and nucle-
ar deterrent forces with the ability to retal-
iate against a state’s most plausible adver-
saries and maintain that ability in the face
of a determined arms race. (Possession of
an assured retaliatory capability is essential
for a state to pursue an independent securi-
ty policy in the nuclear age.) By these crite-
ría, the key powers are currently the United
Estados, Porcelana, and Russia. Francia, Bretaña,
and India constitute a second tier of impor-
tant powers. By mid-century, Russia and In-
dia will likely reverse positions. Strict pari-
ty among great powers is not a requirement
for viewing a system as multipolar; histor-
icamente, there has often been a very large gap
between the most and the least capable
“great powers.” This analysis assumes that
the world is trending toward multipolarity
and asks what difference it makes.

States compete for power and security in
multipolar systems, but the sheer number
of players changes the game. Primero, in mul-
tipolar systems, allies matter more than
they do in other systems. With a handful
of powers at the top of the global order, coa-
litions can often significantly outweigh the
capability of any single state. De este modo, aunque
states in a multipolar world must look to
their own armaments in order to be alli-
ance-worthy, they must also look to the di-
plomacy of coalitions. A second property
of multipolar worlds is divided attention.
With many possible allies or adversaries,
states will tend to see the possibility for
incremental gain; Por ejemplo, if State A
concludes that State B is otherwise occu-
pied with State C, that presents opportu-

nity. Tercero, the fear of countervailing co-
alitions imposes caution. In our time, el
presence of nuclear weapons imposes still
further caution. Cuatro, it is plausible that
multipolarity mutes ideological competi-
ción. The need to make one’s own alliances
and undermine those of an adversary may
cause states to submerge their ideological
diferencias.

If the world is trending toward multipo-
larity, this should affect external interven-
tion in civil wars. The great powers will be
more concerned about other great powers,
which should make civil wars generally
less important to them and thus make ear-
ly preventive intervention less likely. El
exception to this generalization may arise
when civil wars occur in regions of partic-
ular political importance for geographical,
económico, or ideological reasons, como
the greater Middle East. But in these cas-
es, great-power competition will be in-
tense from the outset, exactly when co-
operation would be most useful for pre-
vention. When multilateral intervention
is proposed in the collective interest of
the international community, the princi-
pal powers will still be concerned with rel-
ative gains. This will further complicate
the prospects for collaborative efforts to
settle the civil war. States may still wish
to involve themselves in particular civ-
il wars, for their own selfish reasons; ser-
cause the problems posed by civil wars are
often local, the most proximate great pow-
ers will be the most tempted to intervene.
Finalmente, once one great power does inter-
vene, and if its effort goes awry, it will be
tempting for others to exploit the situation
to improve their own position. Other great
powers may aid the opposing side simply
because the opportunity to enfeeble their
competition is too tempting. Alternative-
ly, they may offer assistance to continue
the intervention or offer to create a diplo-
matic fig leaf to cover a disengagement, en
a high cost to the intervener.

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171

146 (4) Fall 2017Barry R. posen

A final property of the emerging multi-
polar world that will affect intervention lies
just outside the realm of the great powers.
The National Intelligence Council ground-
ed its forecast of a multipolar world in a
larger discussion of a diffusion of power:
the post–Cold War spread of economic,
technological, and military capabilities to
states and to nonstate actors.6 Middle and
small powers themselves often intervene in
civil wars, especially in their own neighbor-
capuchas, and their capabilities will also grow.
Their interventions can produce some of
the same negative consequences as great-
power interventions.

The unipolar moment plausibly affected

the theory and practice of preventive di-
plomacy, direct intervention, and postwar
settlements. Primero, decisions to intervene
could then be made in a kind of geopolit-
ical vacuum. The argument for noninter-
vention based on scarcity of resources and
a concomitant fear that being tied down
in a small war might make one vulnerable
elsewhere to a large challenge was irrele-
vant. Al mismo tiempo, given the great se-
curity enjoyed by the victorious Cold War
liberal coalition, the security case for in-
tervention was usually weak. The situation
caused analytic attention to be focused else-
dónde. The main problems became how to
get great powers to pay attention to emerg-
ing civil wars and engage in preventive ac-
tion of some kind. The responsibility to
protect is the expression of this problem.
Advocates of r2p seem to have hoped that
an agreed-upon international norm would
create a predisposition to act, if it seemed
that a government had lost its willingness
or ability to look after all of its citizens. El
existence of this normative predisposition
would also motivate great powers to devel-
op early-warning indicators so they could
substitute early preventive diplomacy for
the use of military power later. These two
strands have in some sense come to frui-

ción. Though arguments continue on what
r2p means practically, and how strong the
norm is, the notion that outside military
intervention is warranted in cases of ex-
treme violence is a part of the foreign pol-
icy debate. Western intelligence agencies
have tried to develop better an ability to
warn of impending civil wars and of mass
atrocities. Given the low interests that great
powers have in most civil wars, these tools
were never destined to be particularly ef-
fective.7 But a multipolar world will likely
make them even less effective.

Preventive diplomacy often either does
not occur, or is ineffective. Attention then
turns to how outside powers can help bring
a civil war to an end. Once a civil war be-
gins, the combatants hope to decisively de-
feat one another and do so quickly. Semejante
splendid victories are rare, and it is more
often the case that the wars settle into at-
trition battles.8 In such battles, the com-
batants must “measure” relative power
and relative will. This helps them assess
the future costs of fighting relative to their
perceived benefits and the odds of achiev-
ing them. Analysts suggest that “hurting
stalemates” can develop: a combination of
high costs and perceived futility that will
make the warring parties more prone to
negotiate, if given a nudge by outside pow-
ers, and assurances that outsiders will po-
lice any agreement to prevent defection.
The values that underlie the r2p norm
suggest that it can be difficult for outside
observers to wait for a hurting stalemate.
This has led some analysts to suggest that
outsiders should intervene militarily to
terminate the conflict and midwife a set-
tlement. Intervention could involve aid-
ing one side to defeat another, or simply
intervening militarily to choose the win-
ner and the loser. Outsiders are often moti-
vated to intervene because one side is seen
to be committing more human rights vi-
olations than another, and that side be-
comes the chosen target. The important

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Dédalo, la Revista de la Academia Estadounidense de las Artes & SciencesCivil Wars & the Structure of World Power

thing to note about this kind of thinking is
that it assumes that outsiders could agree
on a strategy, and could bring to bear over-
whelming power if they chose to do so. Él
also assumes that once outside powers tar-
geted their villains, they could simply iso-
late them from significant outside support.
The military involvement of the powerful
United States would ensure that the costs
of the intervention would remain low, y
thus induce other states to join a coalition.
After prevention and termination, el
search for a stable settlement is the third
phase of outside intervention in civil wars.
Civil wars have a tendency to recur, y
there is a risk that an ostensible settlement
is really only a kind of break for rest and
recuperation. The combatants retreat to
their corners, and perhaps each hopes for
the best; but insofar as they have been liv-
ing in a Hobbesian state of nature for the
duration of the fighting, each assumes the
worst of the other. They arm against the
possibility of the others’ defection, ellos
view any evidence of preparation for de-
fection in the worst possible light, y ellos
are tempted to engage in a preemptive or
preventive return to war. Practitioners and
scholars alike have concluded that outside
interveners might be able to sustain peace
agreements by acting as an enforcer of the
peace agreement and the protector of any
party victimized by another’s cheating. El
term “peace enforcement” was added to the
term “peacekeeping” to capture this more
muscular form of external assistance. El
peace enforcers would need to be more ca-
pable and more willing to fight than tradi-
tional un peacekeepers. It helps if they are
also significantly more capable militari-
ly than any of the combatants in the war.
There are only a few militaries in the world
large enough, competent enough, y con
the strategic reach to do this kind of work,
especially following wars in which the com-
batants themselves have developed some
real capability.9

The experience of the Balkan Wars in
the 1990s provided both the object lesson
of failure to engage in preventive diploma-
cy, and the template for intervention and
peace enforcement. Outsiders did little to
forestall the dissolution of Yugoslavia, y
let the Slovenian and Croatian armed re-
bellions and secessions proceed without
much diplomacy to prevent them. Secre-
tary of State James Baker famously averred
that the United States did not have a “dog in
this fight.” Bosnia similarly disintegrated,
and after years of bloody warfare, the Unit-
ed States and several allies helped to build
up the Bosnian and Croatian forces against
the Serbs, and then contributed nato air-
power as these revived forces went on the
offensive. Though Russia supported Serbia
diplomatically, it had few cards to play at
el tiempo, and thus the central obstacle to
Western direct intervention was the inabil-
ity of Western countries to decide on an ap-
propriate objective. The Europeans would
have been content to partition Bosnia; el
Clinton administration was not. It took ad-
ditional years of bloody warfare, covert U.S.
assistance to the Bosniaks and Croats, y
the emerging possibility of a large prestige
loss to nato to produce agreement among
outsiders about a political objective. En el
mismo tiempo, the Bosniaks and Croats were
subjected to some outside discipline during
the final battles of the war, and were told
by the United States that the complete de-
feat of the Serbs would also not be tolerated.
As part of the Dayton Accords, nearly six-
ty thousand Western peacekeeping forces
and political administrators were commit-
ted to Bosnia, with another twenty thou-
sand nearby in support, to police a settle-
ment that gave each of the three sides some
of what it had fought for, but left all some-
what unsatisfied. Though admirers of the
peace settlement observe correctly that the
killing stopped and has not resumed, el
Bosnia-Herzegovina thus created is politi-
cally unstable. De facto partition, proxim-

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146 (4) Fall 2017Barry R. posen

ity to Europe and its power, the eu’s con-
stant supervision, and Bosnian dependence
on Europe for a livelihood keep the country
together, but only in name.10

Kosovo did see an effort at preventive
diplomacy, but the political solution rec-
ommended in the Rambouillet Accord
amounted to the Serbian surrender of
Kosovo to nato. Though a bit of a surprise
to nato, the Serbs tested nato’s serious-
ness in battle, and by all accounts the war
was a surprisingly close thing. A un reso-
lution provided a face-saving exit for Serbi-
an troops from Kosovo, after which nato
installed the peace-enforcement operation
kfor (Kosovo Force) to assure that Serbi-
an forces would not return, a mission that
continues with some 4,500 troops today.
Kosovo has since formally seceded from
Serbia, though many countries do not rec-
ognize its independence. Responding to
the arrival of nato’s troops in Kosovo,
a small unit of Russian troops in Bosnia
raced for the Pristina airport to protect
what the Russians perceived as their eq-
uities in the conflict. This could have pre-
cipitated a major crisis, but the kfor com-
mander on the ground, British Army Lieu-
tenant General Michael Jackson, chose to
avoid a confrontation. The episode was a
harbinger of how the intervention prob-
lem is likely to change as more great pow-
ers emerge and begin to see the course,
management, and outcome of civil wars
as matters of national interest.

For several reasons, early intervention to

forestall outright civil war is less likely to
occur in a world with more than one conse-
quential power. Primero, simply because more
traditional security challenges exist, incluso
those liberal powers most prone to inter-
vene have more to worry about from a se-
curity standpoint than they did in the “uni-
polar moment.” Potential civil wars will
receive even less attention. Segundo, cuando
a state becomes politically unstable, otro

consequential powers are likely to look at
that instability through their own power
and security interests. If one of them wish-
es to organize preventive diplomacy, otros
may ask how the outcome might affect their
power and security. Tercero, because of these
concerns, it will likely be more difficult to
get the issue in front of the un Security
Council and produce a resolution authoriz-
ing legitimate preventive diplomacy. Final-
ly, as we have seen, new consequential pow-
ers do not wish to legitimate certain kinds
of intervention. As Chuck Call and Susan-
na Campbell observe in the forthcoming
companion to this volume: “Many states
are therefore extremely focused on avoid-
ing any transgression against the principle
of state sovereignty that might set a prec-
edent for intervention (including against
their own government).”11 If an interven-
tion is couched in terms of the responsibil-
ity to protect, these states are likely to mo-
bilize the traditional sovereignty norm as a
counterargument.

The coexistence of several consequential
powers should also influence the course
of civil wars. If the notion of a “hurting
stalemate” has any traction as a poten-
tial source of settlements, then competi-
tive outside interventions may make this
less likely. Not all political instability that
erupts into actual warfare will attract the
interest of major powers, but some will.
Though hardly dispositive, the number
of civil wars that feature direct outside in-
tervention has grown noticeably over the
last decade.12 Outside powers could have
a range of motivations attracting them
to support one side or the other in a civil
guerra. These include the possibility of actu-
al gain of an ally or base in the event that
their side wins, the cultivation of a “proxy”
who might serve their interests at a later
fecha, the domestic or international reputa-
tion that may emerge from demonstrating
one’s ability to influence such conflicts, o
the desire simply to stymie the perceived

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interests of those outside powers that sup-
port the other side. Though the number of
such cases cannot be predicted, it is likely
that there will be some civil wars in which
all the combatants attract outside backing,
and thus they can call upon a steady stream
of financial and military assistance. Civ-
il wars that measure the power and will
of the combatants must now measure the
power and will of their external support-
ers. And the longer the wars go on, el
more the citizens of the societies host-
ing the conflicts will suffer, and therefore
the greater the number of internally dis-
placed persons and refugees. These refu-
gee populations are often seen as a securi-
ty problem, which may motivate some of
the neighbors to advocate more intensive-
ly for a settlement, but given the complexi-
ty of negotiating such a settlement with in-
siders and outsiders simultaneously, refu-
gee-receiving countries may themselves be
tempted to pick a side in the war.13

Finalmente, a changed structure of power
should affect the nature of any achieved
settlement, though the implications are
a bit less clear. If one legacy of a war sup-
ported by consequential powers is that
the combatants have become more capa-
ble than they would have otherwise, entonces
settlements will require a visiting “levia-
than” to police them. En otras palabras, a
keep such combatants safely in their respec-
tive corners, the peace-enforcement force
will need to be quite capable itself. Those
outside powers who supported one side
or the other in the civil war probably pos-
sess the best forces for such a mission, pero
by virtue of their partisanship, lo harían
not be trusted. Hence the peace-enforce-
ment force may lack the capability to en-
force against plausible spoilers. On the oth-
er hand, there may be a selection effect that
cuts the other way. Any civil war with out-
side intervention that does achieve a nego-
tiated peace will do so because the outsiders
have agreed to it. De este modo, the outsiders may

have the greatest influence on their respec-
tive sides keeping to the peace agreement.

The Syrian Civil War, which began in 2011,

has proven long, bloody, and immensely de-
structive. Disputes among the great powers
stymied international preventive diploma-
cy, while direct and indirect military inter-
vention by great and middle powers in-
creased the strength of all sides, contribut-
ing to their ability and will to sustain the
guerra. Por 2016, there were at least four sides
fighting within Syria, and at least five exter-
nal states or clusters of states that had in-
tervened on one or more sides.14 The war
has many unique properties, and it would
be wrong to attribute its terrible trajecto-
ry solely to the emergence of multipolarity.
Resurgent Russia made it difficult to co-
ordinate international action to stabilize
Syria. By spring 2013, Moscow had “issued
three un Security Council vetoes, bent over
backwards to water down the Geneva Com-
munique calling for a peaceful transition of
authority, and fastidiously avoided joining
the call for ‘Assad to go.’”15 Close observ-
ers suggest that Russia has many overlap-
ping interests in Syria, an important one
of which seems to be normative. Russia
opposes regime change, including regime
change under the rubric of humanitarian
intervention or r2p, partly because of the
risk that this could ultimately legitimate an
international effort to bring about regime
change in Russia.16 China seems to share
Russia’s view, and also cast a veto in the un
Security Council in October 2011.17 Brasil,
India, and South Africa all abstained from
supporting the resolution because they, también,
oppose outside intervention in internal po-
litical disputes.18

In this arena for normative contestation,
Russia and China have both exploited the
legitimacy of the Security Council to sti-
fle the effort to develop a new intervention
norm. In contrast to its role in the Balkans,
in which the United States and its Western

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146 (4) Fall 2017Barry R. posen

allies bypassed the Security Council and at-
tempted to assert that the victorious Cold
War liberal coalition could legitimate its
own wars, the United States has seemed less
willing to go around the Council in the Syr-
ian context. This may be because in a mul-
tipolar world, it is more important to the
United States to protect the integrity of the
sole institution in which great powers coop-
erate as equals; or it may be, as some have
suggested, that Barack Obama was simply
personally disinclined to go around the
Council.

From the outset, the Syrian Civil War
saw a pattern of external intervention in
which bids for quick victory, in many cases
enabled by outside aid, precipitated more
outside intervention to stalemate initially
successful offensives. These external inter-
ventions were often motivated by outsider
interests in regional strategic objectives.19
Rather than producing either a victory or a
hurting stalemate, competitive interven-
tions produced a dynamic military compe-
tition, in which the competitors could al-
ways believe that with a bit more outside
ayuda, they might prevail. In contrast to
the Bosnia endgame, in which the United
States built up the Bosniak forces and then
orchestrated a hurting stalemate to bring
all to the table, no diplomatically useful
balance of military forces has yet emerged
in Syria. In Bosnia, almost all outside inter-
veners worked in favor of the Croats or the
Bosniaks; the Serbs could slowly be stran-
gled. This is clearly not the case in Syria.

Precipitated by political activity across
the Middle East associated with the
“Arab Spring,” regime opponents in Syr-
ia launched protests and demonstrations
starting in March 2011. Regime repression
was often violent, but the regime also at-
tempted to deal with the demonstrations
politically, both with messaging and mod-
est reforms. By May, sin embargo, the interac-
tions between demonstrators and securi-
ty forces became increasingly violent. El

United States and Europe imposed a range
of economic sanctions on Syria in response
to the regime’s behavior, but Russia and
China vetoed the un Security Council res-
olution calling for an end to the regime’s
crackdown. During these early months
of the struggle, regime opponents them-
selves turned increasingly to violence. El
history of external intervention in this pe-
riod has not been written, but by the last
quarter of 2011, the “rebels” appeared well-
armed and well-funded.20 Observers focus
on the rebels’ many weaknesses relative to
the regime, which are real. But we should
also note the rapid escalation of the fight-
En g. Once the rebels began to have success
against the regime, the regime found sup-
port abroad from both Iran and Russia. Iran
seems to have committed itself to the re-
gime in January of 2012.21 This precipitat-
ed still more outside assistance to the rebels,
which prompted still more assistance to the
regime. Theorists have observed this pat-
tern in other wars, finding that it generally
contributes to duration and destruction.22
Finalmente, the complexity of the battle map,
featuring multiple international actors,
seems to be affecting Western notions of
a settlement. As previously noted, the Syr-
ian Civil War consists of four major internal
jugadores. From a simple conflict between re-
gime and rebels, the map is now character-
ized by a multiplicity of rebel groups, muchos
of which are at war with each other. The “Is-
lamic State,” in fact, formed when one reb-
el faction split from the others and aligned
with like-minded Iraqis. Of the remaining
rebel groups, the other offshoots of Al Qae-
da seem to be the strongest, though they do
not control the larger coalition, cual es
loosely organized at best. The Kurds have
emerged as a faction in their own right,
aligning themselves with the United States
to fight the Islamic State, pero, to the extent
posible, staying out of fights with other
groups while they try to carve out an auton-
omous zone. Given the military power of

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long enough for political and economic re-
construction to take hold. These problems
will not characterize every civil war, porque
multipolarity also means that consequential
powers are often busy with their own par-
ticular security problems. But they will be
more prevalent than they were during the
short lived “unipolar moment.”

If this analysis is correct, it provides a
bit of advice for those statespersons who
wish to take up the cause of the interna-
tional management of civil wars. Dip-
lomats may find it useful to be more cir-
cumspect in their purposes. Rather than
assuming agreement, or the potential for
agreement, among ideologically like-mind-
ed great powers, diplomats may need to re-
turn to a more traditional approach of find-
ing elements of agreement among powers
who largely see themselves in a competitive
relationship. Post–Cold War approaches to
civil war management tended to combine
humanitarian and ideological (usually lib-
eral) purposes. People needed help, pero
was often believed that short-term help had
to be combined with major political reform
to ensure against future violence. Finding
agreement on both sets of issues is difficult
in any case, but will be much harder as more
capable powers see more security interests
at stake in these conflicts. The diplomacy of
civil war management is no easier than any
other kind of diplomacy, and cannot be re-
duced to a formula. But perhaps if outsiders
reach for less, they will get more.

all these groups, outside interveners would
have a difficult peacekeeping task ahead of
a ellos, even if those who had backed differ-
ent sides could agree on a settlement. En-
creasingly, one hears of proposals based on
de facto partition of the country.23 In the
early phases of the war in Bosnia, the Unit-
ed States in particular would not support
such an outcome, though the Dayton Ac-
cords ultimately produced a nominally uni-
tary state that left the principal combatants
in control of their own regions. Even this
agreement required enormous policing in
its first years. In Syria, it appears that ob-
servers now have even smaller ambitions:
stabilizing group borders along the existing
battle lines, with the exception of the Islam-
ic State, which insiders and outsiders seem
to agree must be annihilated.

Recent and plausible future changes in

the global distribution of power demand
analysis of their potential impact. Here I
have probed how a shift from a unipolar to
a multipolar world might affect the problem
of international cooperation to prevent, ter-
minate, and settle civil wars. This was main-
ly a deductive enterprise, supplemented
with examples from two cases: the Balkan
Wars of the early 1990s and the Syrian Civil
Guerra. Cases selected for their strong exem-
plary utility cannot prove an argument. El
analysis is, sin embargo, suggestive. Preventive
diplomacy will likely be fraught with com-
petitive behavior among the strong powers
possessing the capacity to suppress an esca-
lating civil conflict; and this same compet-
itive behavior will likely add military and
diplomatic resources to the competing civ-
il war factions, allowing them all to believe
that another round of fighting and exter-
nal assistance will bring victory. Finalmente, el
Darwinian process of extended warfare may
so increase the combat power of the parties
that any negotiated settlement will require
very capable peace-enforcement/peace-
keeping forces to separate the combatants

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146 (4) Fall 2017Barry R. posen

notas finales
1 James D. Fearon, “Civil War & the Current International System,Dédalo 146 (4) (Caer 2017);
and Chuck Call and Susanna Campbell, “Is Prevention the Answer?Dédalo 147 (1) (Invierno
2018).

2 Henry Kissinger, World Order (Nueva York: Pingüino, 2014), 23–31; and Hendrik Spruyt, “Civil

Wars as Challenges to the Modern International System,Dédalo 146 (4) (Caer 2017).

3 For the seminal discussion of the bipolar influence, see Kenneth N. Vals, “Structural Causes
and Military Effects,” in Theory of International Politics (Bostón: McGraw Hill, 1979), 161–193;
and Kenneth N. Vals, “The Stability of a Bipolar World,Dédalo 93 (3) (Verano 1964):
881–909.

4 See the graphs under “Aggregate Power of Developing States Set to Surpass U.S. Power by
2030,” in National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds (Washington,
CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, December 2012), 16. Challenging the
notion that unipolarity is waning is Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “The Rise
and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-First Century: China’s Rise and the Fate of Amer-
ica’s Global Position,” Seguridad Internacional 40 (3) (Invierno 2015/2016): 7–53.

5 Noel Anderson, Competitive Intervention and Its Consequences for Civil Wars (Doctor. diss., Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology, Septiembre 2016) argues that the bipolar competition incentiv-
ized great-power intervention in civil wars, but fear of escalation to war between great pow-
ers at the same time made the superpowers chary of helping their clients achieve complete
success, thus tending to lengthen civil wars. Anderson demonstrates this dynamic mainly
during the Cold War, with reference to the bipolar U.S.-Soviet competition.

6 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030, 15–20; and National Intelligence Council,
Global Trends: Paradox of Progress (Washington, CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: Office of the Director of National Intel-
ligence, 2017), 25–28.

7 On the political barriers to preventive action within states and multilateral organizations, ver

Call and Campbell, “Is Prevention the Answer?"

8 Fearon notes that the average duration of civil wars has been going up, but those wars that do
end are more likely to end with victory by one side than by negotiated settlements. See Fearon,
“Civil War & the Current International System,” Figure 3, “Accumulation of Long-Running
Conflicts, 1945–2014.” This tells us that civil wars are hard to end under any circumstanc-
es, but military success is often the key. In his essay in the forthcoming Winter 2018 issue of
Dédalo, Sumit Ganguly notes that the twenty-five-year-long Sri Lankan civil war was brought
to an end only with an extremely brutal offensive, after the Tamil Tigers were entirely iso-
lated internationally and the regime received significant assistance from China and Pakistan.
Sumit Ganguly, “Ending the Sri Lankan Civil War,Dédalo 147 (1) (Invierno 2018).

9 Jean-Marie Guéhenno, “The United Nations & Guerras civiles,Dédalo 147 (1) (Invierno 2018) transmisión exterior-
serves that local combatants have become sufficiently strong that even un peacekeeping op-
erations require “a much greater engagement from the best-equipped armies of the world,
which must provide the un with the mobility, firepower, and intelligence that will allow un
peacekeepers to act early and decisively.”

10 Tanja A. Börzel and Sonja Grimm discuss the eu missions in Bosnia and Kosovo in “Build-
ing Good (Enough) Governance in Postconflict Societies & Areas of Limited Statehood: El
European Union & the Western Balkans,Dédalo 147 (1) (Invierno 2018). Their assessment
tracks roughly with mine.

11 Call and Campbell, “Is Prevention the Answer?"
12 Internationalized armed conflicts are “conflicts in which one or more states contributed troops
to one or both warring sides.” Therése Pettersson and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflicts,
1946–2014,” Journal of Peace Research 52 (4) (2015): 536. See also Nancy Lindborg and Joseph
Hewitt, “In Defense of Ambition: Construyendo Pacífico & Inclusive Societies in a World on Fire,"
Dédalo 147 (1) (Invierno 2018), in which the authors suggest: “Today internationalized inter-

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nal conflicts account for one-third of all global conflicts, have contributed to the 500 por ciento
increase in global battle deaths over the past ten years, and have pushed conflict deaths to a
twenty-five-year high.” These data understate the problem, because they omit strictly indi-
rect foreign intervention in the form of money and weaponry.

13 In her contribution to this volume, Sarah Lischer reviews why refugee-receiving states often
perceive their guests as security problems, and how these concerns may contribute to the re-
gional spread of conflict. Sarah Kenyon Lischer, “La crisis mundial de refugiados: Regional De-
stabilization & Humanitarian Protection,Dédalo 146 (4) (Caer 2017).

14 Max Fisher, “Straightforward Answers to Basic Questions about Syria’s War,"El New York Times,
Septiembre 18, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/19/world/middleeast/syria-civil
-war-bashar-al-assad-refugees-islamic-state.html?_r=0.

15 Samuel Charap, “Russia, Syria and the Doctrine of Intervention,” Survival 55 (1) (2013): 35–41,

esp. 36.

16 Ibídem. See also Roy Allison, “Russia and Syria: Explaining Alignment with a Regime in Cri-
hermana,” International Affairs 89 (4) (2013): 795–823, which reviews the range of reasons that Rus-
sia has supported the Syrian regime and suggests that an unwillingness to legitimate un ac-
tion to change regimes is one of the most important (817–820).

17 alison, “Russia and Syria,” 799–800.
18 Howard La Franchi, “Syria Vote May Prove Costly for Three Countries Seeking More un

Clout,” Christian Science Monitor, Octubre 5, 2011.

19 For a review of the interests and actions of the principal regional powers, especially Saudi Ara-
bia, Iran, Qatar, y, en un grado menor, Pavo, see Emile Hokayem, “Iran, the Gulf States and
the Syrian Civil War,” Survival 56 (6) (2014): 59–86. Dating Turkey’s intervention to fall 2011,
see Aaron Stein, “Turkey’s Evolving Syria Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs
.com/articles/turkey/2015-02-09/turkeys-evolving-syria-strategy. On Turkey’s motivation to
expand its regional influence, see International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Turkey’s Dimin-
ishing Policy Options in Syria,” Strategic Comments 22 (7) (2016).

20 Roula Khalaf and Abigail Fielding-Smith date arms deliveries from Qatar through Turkey be-
ginning in “early 2012,” which, by mid-2013, may have been worth $3 billion. Roula Khalaf
and Abigail Fielding-Smith, “How Qatar Seized Control of the Syrian Revolution,” Financial
Times, Puede 17, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/f2d9bbc8-bdbc-11e2-890a-00144feab7de.
html#. See also “German Magazine says Libya Arms, Funds, Trains Syrian Rebels,” Focus,
December 5, 2011, accessed through bbc Monitoring Europe, December 6, 2011; and “Leba-
non: Arms Smugglers Thrive on Syrian Uprising,” The Daily Star, Noviembre 25, 2011, accedido
through bbc Monitoring, Noviembre 26, 2011.

21 Hokayem, “Iran, the Gulf States and the Syrian Civil War,” 73–75.
22 Max Fisher, “Syria’s Paradox: Why the War Only Ever Seems to Get Worse,” The New York
Times, Agosto 26, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/27/world/middleeast/syria-civil
-war-why-get-worse.html?_r=0.

23 David Iaconangelo, “Would Decentralizing Syria Offer a Path to Peace?” Christian Science Monitor,

Septiembre 17, 2016.

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