Anthony Milanowski
Consortium for Policy Research
in Education
Wisconsin Center for Education
Investigación
University of Wisconsin–Madison
1025 W.. Johnson Street
Madison, Wisconsin 53706-1796
amilanow@wisc.edu
PERFORMANCE PAY SYSTEM
PREFERENCES OF STUDENTS
PREPARING TO BE TEACHERS
Abstracto
This study explored the potential acceptability of per-
formance pay to new teachers by investigating attitudes
toward performance pay of students preparing to be
profesores. Focus groups and a survey of students prepar-
ing to be teachers at a large U.S. university were con-
ducted. Most students expressed a preference for some
form of performance pay and tended to prefer pay based
on individual performance or pay for knowledge and
skill development instead of pay based on school per-
rendimiento. Personality traits and work values were not
related to preferences for different performance pay ap-
proaches or performance pay in general. Estos resultados
suggest that teachers’ experiences rather than person-
ality or work values may be the dominant influences
on attitudes toward performance pay. This implies that
beginning teachers may view performance pay more
favorably than their more experienced colleagues, sug-
gesting a strategy of applying performance pay to new
teachers only.
C(cid:1) 2007 American Education Finance Association
111
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PERFORMANCE PAY SYSTEM PREFERENCES OF STUDENTS
INTRODUCCIÓN
1.
Performance pay for K–12 teachers is currently undergoing one of its periodic
revivals. A range of educational policy makers, academics, reformers, y
pundits (p.ej., Hesse 2004; Hunt 2004; Teaching Commission 2004) tener
championed the concept. Estados Unidos. Department of Education is seeking to give
$99 million to states or districts willing to pursue performance pay innovations in low-performing schools. The states of Texas, Florida, and Alaska have joined Minnesota, North Carolina, and Arizona in promoting the concept (McNeil 2006). This wave of interest follows one that began in the 1980s, aroused in part by the famous A Nation at Risk report (Timar 1992), which led to advocacy of interventions such as merit pay (Hartry, Greiner, and Ashford 1994) and career ladders (Brandt 1990). During both waves, it has been argued that differentiating teacher pay based on performance would improve teacher motivation, attract and retain more highly skilled teachers, and be a more efficient use of the education dollar. There is substantial evidence from other occupations that performance pay programs do contribute to improved performance of individuals or orga- nizations (mitchell, Lewin, and Lawler 1990; Heneman and Gresham 1998; Jenkins et al. 1998). Performance-based pay seems a plausible way both to motivate teachers to direct effort at performance goals and to attract and retain teachers who are high performers. The importance of this second effect of performance pay—attracting and retaining high-performing teachers—is im- portant and at times overlooked. Performance pay helps organizations direct scarce financial resources toward retaining high performers and, by limiting the pay of poorer performers, may encourage them to leave. A diferencia de, the current teacher pay system may encourage high-performing teachers to leave districts with more difficult students or poorer working conditions. Under the current pay regime, one of the few ways in which high-ability, high-performing teachers can obtain additional compensation for their higher skill and perfor- mance is by being hired by a district that pays a higher base salary and/or offers better working conditions. This would tend to concentrate higher-performing teachers in districts with higher pay and better working conditions. A perfor- mance pay system might give districts with less desirable working conditions a better chance to hold onto their high-performing teachers. Though there may be advantages to performance pay, teachers have not rushed to embrace the concept. The so-called single salary schedule remains almost universal as the method of setting teacher salaries in public school districts. En 2000, the National Education Association’s constituent assembly rejected a resolution supporting experimentation with new forms of pay. In May 2002, Cincinnati (Ohio) teachers overwhelmingly rejected a new pay sys- tem that would have linked base pay rates to evaluated teacher performance. 112 EDUCATION FINANCE AND POLICY l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / directo . mi t . / F / e d u e d p a r t i c e – pdlf / / / / / 2 2 1 1 1 1 6 8 9 0 2 6 e d p 2 0 0 7 2 2 1 1 1 pd . . . F . . f por invitado 0 8 septiembre 2 0 2 3 Anthony Milanowski While experimentation continues to take place—most notably in the Denver, Colorado, school district (see http://www.DenverProComp.org/) and among the approximately thirty schools and two districts using the Milken Foun- dation’s teacher compensation design (see http://www.mff.org/tap/tap.taf)— there does not appear to be a groundswell of interest on the part of teachers in changing from the traditional pay system based on seniority and educational attainment to one based primarily on performance. There are a number of reasons teachers might be unenthusiastic about, if not opposed to, performance pay. Though a comprehensive model of the determinants of teachers’ attitudes toward pay systems has not yet been devel- oped, studies of other types of employees have found that four broad types of influences operate: 1. Employee characteristics, such as age, capacidad, personality traits, and values (Turban and Keon 1993; Cable and Judge 1994; Mamman 1997; Kuhn and Yockey 2003); 2. Design and implementation of the system, including how directly effort can be linked to the performance rewarded (St-Onge 2000), how consistently pay system policies are followed, whether the procedures are viewed as fair, and whether the program is adequately funded (Miceli et al. 1991); 3. Employee beliefs about how the organization works, which influence attitudes such as trust in decision makers that in turn influence attitudes toward performance pay systems (St-Onge 2000; Siegall and Worth 2001); y 4. The outcome of a particular type of pay system for the employee (Miceli et al. 1991). Note that some of these influences (p.ej., system design) are under the control of organizations, whereas others (p.ej., personality and values) are not. Applying this typology, we might consider whether teachers’ attitudes to- ward performance pay are due to their personality traits and values. People who become teachers may have values or characteristics that make them un- interested in or even uncomfortable with performance pay. People attracted to teaching may be less interested in financial rewards at the margin. Since most students going into the field already know it is a low-paid occupation, they are not likely to put as high a value on pay as students going into more highly paid occupations. Studies by Bradley (1983) and Young (1995) support the assertion that students preparing to be teachers do not put a high value on pay. Más, some have suggested that teachers are likely to be harmony seeking and conflict avoiding (p.ej., Sears, Kennedy, and Kaye 1997), which may make performance pay unattractive to them, given the differentiation inherent in l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / directo . mi t . / / partícula alimentada – pdlf / / / / / 2 2 1 1 1 1 6 8 9 0 2 6 e d p 2 0 0 7 2 2 1 1 1 pd . . . . . f f b y g u e s t t o n 0 8 septiembre 2 0 2 3 113 PERFORMANCE PAY SYSTEM PREFERENCES OF STUDENTS such systems. Similarmente, teachers and those preparing to be teachers may be risk averse (davis 1994; Wagner 2001) and therefore prefer the certainty of the traditional pay schedule. Several system design and implementation features could negatively affect teacher attitudes. Though few teachers have experienced a performance pay system, most have experienced the measurement of teaching performance. The literature on teacher performance evaluation tends to support teacher concerns about pay increases based on judgments about performance by prin- cipals or other administrators. Medley and Coker’s (1987) classic study of the relationship between performance evaluation ratings of teachers and the achievement of those teachers’ students concluded that the accuracy of prin- cipal judgment was low.1 After a qualitative review of the literature, Peterson (2000) concluded that principals are not accurate evaluators of teacher per- formance and that both teachers and administrators have little confidence in performance evaluation as a process. No es sorprendente, one frequently cited reason for teacher opposition to performance pay is the difficulty of accurately evaluating teacher performance. Murnane and Cohen (1986) have provided a good discussion of how the difficulty of assessing performance may limit the motivational impact of performance pay. The degree to which teachers believe they can influence the performance to be rewarded is also important and may be influenced by pay program design and teaching experiences. Designs such as school-based performance awards (a bonus paid to all teachers in a school when preset school-level performance goals are met) and knowledge- and skill-based pay (base pay increases determined by the acquisition of relevant knowledge and skills as demonstrated in the classroom; see Odden and Kelley 2002) are likely to be perceived differently as to the degree to which rewarded performance is under the teachers’ control. One might expect teachers to perceive that they have the most control over the development of their own knowledge and skills, and so they would favor performance pay systems based on knowledge and skill over systems that base rewards on meeting schoolwide goals. Teachers might prefer to be rewarded based on the performance of their particular students (p.ej., based on the classroom average learning gain or value added) rather than their school’s performance because they have more influence on the former. Por otro lado, teachers’ experience may suggest to them that student achievement is not easily separable into the contributions of 1. Milanowski, Kimball, and Odden (2005) present some evidence that better designed and imple- mented evaluation systems may yield ratings that have a stronger relationship to student learning than that found by Medley and Coker (1987). But these systems appear to be the exception rather than a common feature of teachers’ experience. 114 EDUCATION FINANCE AND POLICY l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / directo . mi t . F / / e d u e d p a r t i c e – pdlf / / / / / 2 2 1 1 1 1 6 8 9 0 2 6 e d p 2 0 0 7 2 2 1 1 1 pd . F . . . . f por invitado 0 8 septiembre 2 0 2 3 Anthony Milanowski individual teachers, so they may be more comfortable with a group basis for performance pay. Teachers’ experiences may also convince them that they have little control over student outcomes, or even their own classroom performance, due to frequently changing reform programs, pruebas, and curricula; uninvolved parents; and apathetic or disadvantaged students. Teachers may also have relatively little confidence that any type of perfor- mance pay system would be implemented consistently or have staying power. The “reform du jour” syndrome, the relatively short tenure of urban superin- tendents, and the experience of recurrent budget crises may prompt teachers to wonder how long any performance pay system is likely to last. Research on school-based performance awards (teacher bonuses) in Kentucky found that many teachers simply did not believe that the state would continue to fund or pay performance bonuses, even if schools achieved the performance goals the state set (kelly, Heneman, and Milanowski 2002). Teachers may also have little trust in district decision makers. Urban teachers seem to harbor considerable distrust toward both their principals and the central adminis- tration, which would likely reduce the attractiveness of pay systems allowing management discretion in setting goals or judging performance. Teachers are also likely to have concerns about whether they will fare better or worse under a performance pay system. Those employed more than five to seven years under the current seniority-based system may regard future seniority-based increases as deferred compensation. Given the perception that starting salaries for teaching are lower than those for other occupations requir- ing a college degree, teachers may regard the pay increases they receive near the end of their careers as a recompense for their relatively low initial salaries. Whether or not discounted lifetime earnings streams are actually comparable to what teachers might have earned in another occupation, once teachers have put in several years they may perceive sunk costs (in the form of lost income) and want the certainty that they will receive a future payoff in the form of an automatic (seniority-based rather than performance-based) progression to the top of the pay schedule. The above discussion suggests that experienced teachers may be more likely to have negative attitudes toward performance pay, implying that states and school districts may want to consider applying such systems only to newly hired teachers. New teachers, who have not yet experienced the subjectivity of evaluation and the instability of programs and funding, and who have not become accustomed to the traditional pay schedule, might be more accept- ing of performance-based pay. Some evidence that less-experienced teachers may be more favorable toward performance pay was provided by a Public Agenda survey of new teachers (those with five years of experience or less), which found that 69 percent supported performance pay (Farkas, Johnson, l D o w n o a d e desde h t t p : / / directo . mi t . / F / e d u e d p a r t i c e – pdlf / / / / / 2 2 1 1 1 1 6 8 9 0 2 6 e d p 2 0 0 7 2 2 1 1 1 pd . . F . . . f por invitado 0 8 septiembre 2 0 2 3 115 PERFORMANCE PAY SYSTEM PREFERENCES OF STUDENTS and Foleno 2000). In the case of Denver’s performance pay system, only newly hired teachers would be required to participate; experienced teachers would be given the option of joining. This strategy might result over time in sustained implementation of performance pay systems, as experienced teachers paid under the current system are replaced with new teachers under performance pay. (Por supuesto, this presupposes that states or districts can effectively imple- ment systems that avoid encouraging negative attitudes, a subject addressed later in the article.) Sin embargo, if people who become teachers have values or personality traits that make them uninterested in or even uncomfortable with performance pay, then even beginning teachers may be unlikely to be inter- ested in performance pay or to support changes to the current system. And districts that require performance pay for new teachers may be at a competitive disadvantage in attracting them. 2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS To explore whether new teachers are likely to be predisposed against perfor- mance pay even before experience on the job, the preferences of students preparing to be teachers for various performance pay systems were investi- gated. This study also explored the role of personality and work values in these preferences. The study was guided by three research questions: 1. Do students preparing to be K–12 teachers view pay for performance as an undesirable attribute of a teaching job? 2. Do students preparing to be K–12 teachers prefer some forms of pay for performance (es decir., conocimiento- and skill-based pay, school-based perfor- mance pay, or individual performance pay based on objective indicators such as student achievement) over others? 3. Do students’ work values and personality characteristics influence their preferences for performance pay or for different performance pay systems? These questions were addressed by two related studies. Primero, a series of focus group discussions about pay for performance were held with univer- sity students, education majors or pre-majors, and students with other majors or pre-majors. Segundo, a survey of a sample of this population was conducted to assess preferences for different performance pay systems. 3. STUDY 1: FOCUS GROUPS Method Participants Four focus groups were held with students who were freshmen or sopho- mores at a large Midwestern public university and interested in a career in 116 EDUCATION FINANCE AND POLICY l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / directo . mi t . F / / e d u e d p a r t i c e – pdlf / / / / / 2 2 1 1 1 1 6 8 9 0 2 6 e d p 2 0 0 7 2 2 1 1 1 pd . . . . . f f b y g u e s t t o n 0 8 septiembre 2 0 2 3 Anthony Milanowski teaching. Freshmen and sophomores were chosen to limit the exposure partic- ipants might have had to the negative influences on attitudes to performance pay discussed above, since these students were unlikely to have experienced field placements or student teaching. Students were recruited in two ways: (a) through a short presentation and a handout distributed in several large mathematics classes, y (b) through an e-mail sent to the university e-mail addresses of students who had indicated an intention to major in education. Students were offered $25 to participate, and twenty-three students were re-
cruited. Nineteen participants were female, four were male. The average age
era 19.7 años, and the average self-reported grade point average (GPA) era
3.4.
Procedimiento
Prior to beginning the discussions, participants completed a short demo-
graphic questionnaire. Discussions were then conducted by a professional
facilitator guided by a preestablished protocol. The discussions lasted 60–
90 minutos. The sessions were taped, and the tapes were transcribed. Tran-
scripts were content analyzed to identify broad themes.
Resultados
Most students supported the concept of performance pay, citing reasons such
as the fairness of paying more to those who do more, the need to motivate
actuación, and the unfairness of paying high-performing new teachers less
than low-performing senior teachers. Students expressed concerns, sin embargo,
about how performance would be measured and about potential decision-
maker bias, and they found some forms of performance pay more attractive
than others. Pay increases based on improving knowledge and skills were
attractive to almost all participants. Many saw this approach as an extension of
the traditional pay system or as consistent with the need to keep on learning.
Pay increases based on school performance were attractive to relatively few. El
students were well aware of problems associated with free riders. Many cited
experiences with group projects in which some students did not pull their
weight. The students were also concerned about putting their potential pay
raise in the hands of colleagues they could not be sure would perform. Otro
concern was the fairness of school-based incentives for teachers working in
low-performing schools. Increases based on individual performance measured
by objective criteria were seen as more acceptable, though concerns were
expressed about criteria for performance, the risk of getting no raise, y el
additional stress this approach might add to the first year of teaching.
These results suggest
least some students preparing to be
teachers are open to pay for performance, though they are aware of the
that at
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117
PERFORMANCE PAY SYSTEM PREFERENCES OF STUDENTS
potential difficulties with measuring performance. The results also suggest
that some forms of pay for performance may be more attractive than others.
More participants seemed more comfortable with pay based on individual
performance or knowledge and skill development than with pay based on
school performance. It was notable that nearly all were comfortable with pay
based on developing knowledge and skills, even after being told that a supervi-
sor or peers would judge skill development. Many participants attributed their
comfort to the expectation that they would be learning on the job in any event.
Perhaps participants’ experiences as students, in which their major focus is
aprendiendo, also influenced their comfort with this concept.
4. STUDY 2: SURVEY
Método
In order to assess the attitudes of a larger sample of prospective teachers, a
survey of attitudes toward performance pay was designed and conducted.
Participantes
The sample consisted of students who were sophomores or juniors at a
large Midwestern public research university and who had declared educa-
tion or pre-education as their major. Sophomores and juniors were cho-
sen because these students had had less exposure to teaching than seniors
and thus were less likely to have picked up negative attitudes toward perfor-
mance pay. Seniors were more likely to have done student teaching, poten-
tially exposing them to experienced teachers’ attitudes toward performance
pay. The choice of university was based on convenience in this exploratory
estudiar.
The university registrar’s office provided a list of juniors and sophomores
with an education or pre-education major. Students whose programs were
not related to classroom teaching (p.ej., arte, dance, kinesiology, occupational
therapy, and rehabilitation psychology, programs included in this university’s
school of education) were dropped, leaving 295 sophomores and 308 juniors
likely to intend to be classroom teachers. All of these students were sent in-
vitations to participate. Because students might have changed their minds
since they declared majors or pre-majors, they were asked to list their current
major. Respondents who indicated they were no longer majoring in education
or pre-education were then excluded from the sample. Un total de 80 sopho-
mores and 105 juniors provided enough data to be included in the analyses,
resulting in a response rate of 27 percent for the sophomores and 34 por ciento
for the juniors. The achieved sample was 79 percent female, with an average
age of 20.1 años.
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EDUCATION FINANCE AND POLICY
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Anthony Milanowski
Procedimiento
Students in the sample were invited to participate in the study via an e-mail
message sent to their university e-mail address. They were asked to log on to a
Web site and complete a survey, which they were told would take about thirty
minutos. They were also told that they would receive $15 for completing the
survey. Five days after the initial invitation, students who had not responded
received a second invitation. A third and final invitation was sent one week
after the second. Sophomores were invited to participate in the fall and juniors
in the spring. The survey included 159 mostly closed-ended items (incluido
items relevant to another study). Students responded to the items by clicking
on the radio button associated with the chosen response option. Some open-
ended items were also included, such as the occupation respondents were
planning to pursue when they finished their education, the annual salary they
expected to receive in this job, and the occupations of their parents.
Measures
Performance pay preferences. Students’ performance pay preferences were as-
sessed in three ways. Primero, students were asked to rate the desirability of four
different methods of providing pay increases: (a) pay for individual perfor-
mance based on objective indicators such as student achievement; (b) pay
for developing knowledge and skills, as judged by administrators and peers;
(C) pay for school performance, as measured by objective factors such as school-
wide improvement in student achievement; y (d) pay increases not tied to
actuación, as long as performance was good enough to keep the job. Cada
pay increase method was described in a short paragraph presented above a
rating scale (see the appendix for the descriptions). Students were asked to
rate each method on a 9-point scale ranging from −4 (highly undesirable) a +4
(highly desirable), con 0 as the neutral point. Segundo, students were asked to
rank the desirability of the four alternatives, from high to low. Tercero, estudiantes
were asked to rate the extent to which one of the three pay-for-performance
methods would make a job more or less attractive compared with a similar job
without pay for performance. A 5-point rating scale was used, que van desde
−2 (much less attractive) a +2 (much more attractive), con 0 labeled neither
more nor less attractive.
Personality and work values measures. To explore the potential impact of per-
sonality and work values on performance pay preferences, students were asked
to respond to several measures of personality and value-related constructs. Por-
sonality was measured using Saucier’s (1994) “mini-markers” of the “Big 5”
personality dimensions: agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotionality, ex-
troversion, and openness to experience. Respondents were required to choose
how well each of forty adjectives (p.ej., bold, kind, shy) applied to them. Cada
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119
PERFORMANCE PAY SYSTEM PREFERENCES OF STUDENTS
personality dimension was represented by eight adjectives. The response scale
osciló entre 1 (does not apply to me) a 9 (applies a great deal). Ratings of related
adjectives were summed to form the scale for each trait. en este estudio, solo
two dimensions, openness and conscientiousness, were used. Openness was
intended to reflect students’ comfort with challenges, while conscientiousness
was intended to reflect persistence in achieving goals. Both personality fea-
tures would be expected to be associated with confidence that performance
goals would be reached. Work values were assessed using the Comparative
Emphasis Scale (Ravlin and Meglino 1987; Meglino and Ravlin 1998). Este
measure has a forced-choice format, asking respondents to choose which of
two statements better describes the work value they feel should receive greater
emphasis if a choice of action were called for. The scale produces a rank order-
ing of four work values (individual achievement, concern for others, fairness,
and honesty) or an interval scale value for one work value, when only one is
de interés. This study used the subscale for individual achievement, sobre el
rationale that more achievement-oriented students would prefer to see per-
formance rewarded. To assess risk aversion, Cable and Judge’s (1994) career
risk aversion scale was used. Cable and Judge found a relationship between
attitudes toward career risk measured by this eight-item scale and pay system
preferences. Participants were asked to agree or disagree, on a five-point Likert
escala, with items such as “I am not willing to take risks when choosing a job
or company to work for” and “I prefer a high-security job with a steady salary
over one offering high risks and high rewards.” Attitude toward evaluation was
assessed using a four-item scale created for this study. Representative items
included “I usually feel uncomfortable having my performance evaluated” and
“I never worry about being evaluated since I know I can do well in almost any
situation.” The motivation for assessing this attitude was that other research
on teacher performance evaluation has reported teacher discomfort with rigor-
ous evaluation (davis, Pool, and Mits-Cash 2000; Heneman and Milanowski
2003).
Treatment of missing values. Though participants were asked to complete all
elementos, sporadic missing values occurred for several items of the personality
and career risk scales. Missing values within these scales were imputed using
the method of adjusted mean substitution described by Raaijmakers (1999).
Data were imputed for one or more scales in eight cases.
Resultados
Performance pay preferences. As discussed above, attitudes toward pay for perfor-
mance were assessed using three methods. The first involved asking respon-
dents to directly rate the desirability of four pay increase scenarios, incluido
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Anthony Milanowski
Mesa 1. Mean Desirability Responses and Response Distribution
Pay Increase
Based On:
−4 or −3
Highly
0
+3 o +4
Highly
Significar (Dakota del Sur) Undesirable −2 or −1 Neutral +1 o +2 Desirable
Individual performance
1.7 (2.1)
Developing knowledge
1.8 (1.8)
and skills
5%
3%
School performance
0.3 (2.3)
14%
Not based on
actuación
−0.4 (2.2)
23%
12%
9%
25%
23%
4%
10%
9%
18%
32%
38%
32%
26%
46%
40%
19%
10%
Notas: N = 183–85. All differences in means except between “Individual performance” and “Devel-
oping knowledge and skills” are significant at 1%. SD = standard deviation.
receiving a straight percentage not based on performance. Mesa 1 muestra (a)
the means and standard deviations of the ratings of the different pay increase
scenarios and (b) the distribution of respondents’ ratings. Recall that a negative
rating means the respondent perceived the pay increase method as undesir-
capaz, and a positive rating indicates that he or she perceived it as desirable.
The mean ratings for pay for individual performance and for developing
knowledge and skills were similar and were significantly higher than ratings
of pay based on school performance and pay increases not based on per-
rendimiento. The distributions of ratings show that clear majorities rated pay
increases based on knowledge and skills and on individual performance as
desirable. Respondents showed less consensus on the desirability of pay for
school performance and pay increases not based on performance.
Respondents were also asked (a) to rate the attractiveness of a job under
each of the three performance pay methods compared with that of a job in
which pay increases are not based on performance and (b) to rank the overall
attractiveness of the four pay increase methods. Mesa 2 shows the average rat-
ing of each of the three performance pay systems compared with pay increases
not based on performance, the percentage of respondents ranking each system
most attractive, and the mean rank of each system.
Both the individual performance and knowledge- and skill-based systems
were rated as more attractive than pay increases not based on performance,
and by about the same degree. Pay based on school performance, in contrast,
was seen as no more attractive than pay increases not based on performance.
The distributions of ratings of attractiveness of the three pay-for-performance
methods versus pay increases not based on performance (not shown) eran
quite similar to those for the simple rating of desirability. Considerably more
than half the students in the sample rated pay for individual performance or
for knowledge and skill development as desirable compared with a straight
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121
PERFORMANCE PAY SYSTEM PREFERENCES OF STUDENTS
Mesa 2. Results for Other Measures of Pay Increase System Preference
Pay Increase Based On:
Rating of Attractiveness vs.
Pay Not Based on Performancea Most Desirableb Mean Rankc
Percent Ranking
Individual performance
0.9 (1.0)
Developing knowledge and skill
0.8 (0.9)
School performance
−0.0 (1.1)
Not based on performance
aStandard deviations in parentheses.
bOf the 176 respondents who ranked without ties.
cAll 185 respondents, including those who gave ties.
49%
30%
9%
12%
1.8
2.2
2.9
3.2
percentage increase, whereas pay for school performance was rated as com-
paratively desirable by only a small proportion of students. Consistent with
the rating results, respondents ranked pay for individual performance and pay
for knowledge and skill as more attractive than pay for school performance or
a system based on a similar increase for all, regardless of performance. Sixty
percent of the respondents ranked either pay for individual performance or
pay for knowledge and skill either first or second.
These results suggest that many prospective teachers may not find per-
formance pay unattractive, at least as operationalized in the scenarios. Mayoría
respondents preferred the pay for knowledge and skill development or pay
for individual performance measured by objective indicators over the straight
percentage pay increase not based on performance. Respondents also found
some pay-for-performance systems more attractive than others, with pay based
on knowledge and skill development and on objective indicators of individ-
ual teacher performance preferred over school-based performance pay. Este
finding is consistent with the focus group results.
Though there is some tendency for those who find pay for individual, objec-
tively measured performance attractive to also find knowledge- and skill-based
pay attractive, the ratings of the different performance pay alternatives were
only moderately correlated. The average correlation between the ratings of
pay for individual, objectively measured performance and pay for knowledge
and skill was .49; between pay for individual, objectively measured perfor-
mance and pay for school performance, .35; and between pay for knowledge
and skill and pay for school performance, .26. Though a substantial number
of respondents appeared to find all pay-for-performance alternatives relatively
attractive, many of those who found knowledge- and skill-based pay or individ-
ual pay for performance attractive did not appear to find school-based pay for
performance attractive. Those who favored no pay for performance also tended
to rate knowledge- and skill-based pay or individual pay for performance as
more attractive or desirable than school-based performance pay.
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Anthony Milanowski
Mesa 3. Relationship of Work Value and Personality Factors to Global Pay for Performance Preference
Measure
Regression
Coefficient
Standard Error Coefficient
Standardized Regression
−.315
.187
−.336∗
−.149
.025
.016
.012
−.118
.176
.190
.168
.154
.037
.010
.009
.123
−.134
.075
−.147
−.076
.050
.121
.105
−.075
Variable
Grade point average
Gender (F = 1)
Parent in education (Y = 1)
Career risk aversion
Achievement work value emphasis
Openness
Conscientiousness
Aversion to evaluation
R2 = .094
Nota: norte = 180.
∗Significant at 5%.
To address the third research question (Do students’ work values and per-
sonality characteristics influence their preferences for performance pay or for
different performance pay systems?), two sets of analyses relating attitudes
toward pay for performance to personality and work values were conducted.
The first involved regressing a global pay-for-performance attitude score on the
personality and values measures. The global score was intended to represent
respondents’ attitudes toward the general concept of performance pay. Fue
constructed by (a) standardizing the two forms of desirability ratings for each
of the three performance pay systems, (b) conducting a principal components
analysis of the six items, y (C) constructing a factor score from the first
principal component. The first component explained 45 percent of the vari-
ance, and all items loaded at .50 o superior. Because a few respondents did not
respond to all of the items making up the scale, the sample size was reduced
a 180 for this analysis. The results of this analysis are shown in table 3.
The personality and values variables had, individually, only weak and non-
significant relationships to the global pay-for-performance attitude, aunque
their coefficients generally had the signs expected. Only having a parent work-
ing in K–12 education had a statistically significant relationship with the global
attitude. This relationship was negative, as might be expected if the kinds of
experiences teachers have that cause them to be suspicious of pay for perfor-
mance are communicated to their children.
Separate regression analyses were performed for each type of performance
pay using the average of the two standardized preference rating measures
for each of the three pay-for-performance approaches. The results (not shown)
were generally similar to those in table 3 in that the personality and work values
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123
PERFORMANCE PAY SYSTEM PREFERENCES OF STUDENTS
factors did not have a strong relationship with the performance pay desirability
or attractiveness ratings. There was a small but statistically significant negative
effect of having a parent in education on preference rating for school-based
performance pay, and a similarly sized significant positive effect of being
female on preferences for pay based on individual performance. A small but
significant negative effect of reported GPA on preference for pay based on
individual performance was also found.
The second type of analysis conducted was a discriminant analysis that
explored the potential relationships between the rankings participants made of
the performance pay systems and the personality and work values variables, como
well as GPA, género, and having a parent in education. The type of pay system
the respondent ranked first was taken as the group membership indicator. De
el 173 respondents who ranked a system first without giving ties, 81 ranked
pay for individual performance measured objectively first, 52 ranked pay for
knowledge and skills first, 15 ranked pay for school performance first, y 22
ranked pay not based on performance first. (Eight respondents gave ties for the
first rank.) A backward stepwise method of selecting variables resulted in none
of the personality or work values variables being retained in the discriminant
función. Only GPA was retained, but a discriminant function based on this
variable was unable to reproduce the four-group structure and could correctly
classify only 33 percent of the cases into pay for individual performance and no
pay for performance groups. These results are consistent with the regression
resultados, supporting the conclusion that personality and work values variables
were not strongly associated with the respondents’ pay system preferences.
5. DISCUSIÓN
The results of this exploratory study suggest that students preparing to be
teachers may have favorable attitudes toward pay for performance. Most of
the students participating in the study indicated a preference for some form
of pay for performance compared with pay not based on performance. Focus
group results suggested that these students accept the general idea that those
who contribute more should be rewarded more, despite being aware of the
difficulties of measuring performance. These students also tended to prefer
performance pay based on individual performance, as measured by objective
factores, or pay for knowledge and skill development to performance pay based
on school performance. Focus group results suggested that this preference was
based on concerns about free riders, lack of control over others’ performance,
and potential disadvantages of teaching in low-performing schools under such
a system. Given the concerns that teacher associations and others have raised
about holding individual teachers accountable for the performance of their
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Anthony Milanowski
particular students, it is somewhat surprising that this form of pay for per-
formance was the most favored by study participants. The study also found
that the personality traits and work values measured were not related to pref-
erences for different performance pay systems or performance pay in general,
suggesting that teacher attitudes toward performance pay are not due to these
factores.
Though this study was exploratory and is based on a relatively small sample,
it does have a potential implication for designers of performance pay systems
for teachers. If those preparing to teach do not come to the teacher labor market
set against performance pay, it is likely that a system requiring that only new
teachers participate, while giving more experienced teachers the option, may
gain acceptance.
Sin embargo, even if required only for new teachers, performance pay systems
will be sustainable only if the experiences new teachers have after hire do
not counteract favorable initial attitudes. Based on studies of the typology of
influences presented at the beginning of this article, program administrators
should be concerned with (a) system design and implementation, incluido
effort-reward linkage, fairness, and funding; (b) the ability to foster trust in
decision makers; y (C) the potential earnings under the performance pay
sistema.
Other things equal, programs that reward performance that is within teach-
ers’ control are more likely to be accepted. This implies that performance
rewards might be best focused on teachers’ own skill level, classroom per-
rendimiento, or their own students’ performance, rather than on schoolwide
actuación. It also suggests that value-added indicators of student achieve-
ment should be used in place of attainment indicators. Measures of perfor-
mance, whether they apply to teacher skill, classroom performance, or student
logro, also need to be reliable and valid. En particular, more attention
to preventing test scoring snafus, like those that affected Tennessee (Galley
2003), Nueva York, and Indiana (Steinberg and Henriques 2001), is needed,
as is attention to issues affecting the attribution of student achievement to
profesores, such as nonrandom assignment and controls for background char-
caracteristicas (bola, Lijadoras, and Wright 2004). Performance measures must
be not only reliable and valid, but also perceived by teachers as such, sugerir-
ing that the procedures adopted to ensure reliability and validity should be
communicated to them. Teachers need to believe that the district or state has
the capacity to run the program fairly and to fund it consistently. Investigación
on Cincinnati’s proposed performance pay plan (Heneman and Milanowski
2003) showed that implementation problems and doubts about the adequacy
of funding for the program can reduce the credibility of the performance pay
system and contribute to its rejection.
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PERFORMANCE PAY SYSTEM PREFERENCES OF STUDENTS
Program administrators also need to be concerned with maintaining trust
toward the people who make the design and distribution decisions. Más
transparency in decision processes, fewer arbitrary-seeming changes in pro-
gramos, and more teacher involvement in decision making would all help
to prevent teachers from viewing management as inconsistent or punitive.
Trust may also be increased if teachers believe that management has provided
the resources they need to improve performance (p.ej., books and curricular
materiales, targeted professional development, and task-specific feedback on
actuación). These are especially important for promising new teachers who
may not initially perform well enough to be rewarded. Those who are not
performing well enough to receive a performance-based pay increase need to
perceive that support is available to help them improve their performance.
Performance pay systems will be more acceptable when designed so that
teachers have a reasonable chance to receive more pay than under the tradi-
tional schedule. Acceptance will be higher if performance pay is treated as a
supplement over and above the traditional schedule. But this commits pro-
gram administrators to funding the existing schedule at competitive levels
and providing additional money for performance pay. If the total amount to be
devoted to pay is not to be increased, the amount that a teacher with acceptable
performance can earn needs to be greater than what could have been earned
under the traditional schedule, or greater than what could be earned working
for other districts with traditional schedules. Note that in this case pay will
be redistributed based on the performance measures. Since most employees
believe they are good performers, not receiving a performance-based increase
is likely to create cognitive dissonance, which could develop into rejection of
the performance measurement system and the pay system as a whole. No
doubt some who do not receive the expected increases will make comparisons
and leave the district or profession, which may be desirable if it is the poor
performers who leave. But it could also result in agitation to change back to
the traditional system.
It is an open question whether states and school districts will be able to
design and run performance pay programs that do not reverse the positive atti-
tudes this study suggests new teachers may have toward performance pay. El
implementation and scaling-up literatures (p.ej., Odden 1991; Elmore 1996;
berends, Bodilly, and Kirby 2002) illustrate as many failures as successes in
the execution of complex reforms. But some hopeful signs do exist. North
Carolina and Dallas have consistently funded their school-based performance
award programs over long periods. Denver has attempted to lock in stable
funding for its program. Increasing attention has been paid to the validity of
teacher performance assessments. The National Board for Professional Teach-
ing Standards has developed a highly reliable performance assessment process
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Anthony Milanowski
that could serve as a model (Jaeger 1998; Myford and Engelhard 2001). Iowa
and Cincinnati have developed teacher evaluation approaches using multiple
raters and substantial rater training, which promise improved reliability and
validity. At least one performance pay program has been able to develop a cul-
ture in which teachers believe that they can trust decision makers to act fairly
and give them the resources they need to succeed (Kellor 2005). The chal-
lenge for those wishing to implement sustainable performance pay programs
is to combine sound program design, consistent funding, comunicación,
and support for improving performance.
Limitaciones
This research was exploratory, and the usual qualifications related to small
sample size and a single geographical area apply. En particular, generalizabil-
ity to the U.S. population of teachers in training may be limited, porque
teachers in training at different universities in different parts of the country
may face different teacher labor markets or may have received different mes-
sages about performance and pay in their preparation programs. Por ejemplo,
in areas where teacher associations and labor unions have more influence and
the political climate is more collectivist, teachers in training may have been
socialized by their parents to view terms of employment that provide employer
discretion, like performance-based pay, with suspicion.
Another limitation is that the questionnaire to which students were asked to
respond was relatively long, potentially lowering the response rate and the level
of attention paid to individual items. The latter could have reduced reliability,
attenuating relationships between work values and personality measures and
attitudes toward performance pay. A further limitation is that due to space
limitations, the pay systems were not described in as much detail as might be
desirable, perhaps limiting respondents’ ability to fully understand how the
systems would work.
Future Research
This line of research could be continued in several ways. A comprehensive
model of the determinants of pay system preferences should be developed
to guide future empirical work. Future empirical studies could also assess
the attitudes of teachers in training from other universities and other parts
of the country, using performance pay scenarios based on programs being
developed in places like Denver. This research would give program designers
more relevant information on teacher preferences. It would also be useful to
assess the performance pay preferences of more experienced teachers, especialmente-
cially teachers who have had three to five years of experience. This group may
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PERFORMANCE PAY SYSTEM PREFERENCES OF STUDENTS
still be new enough to accept performance pay but will have had some of the
experiences that might reduce enthusiasm for it. If experience is an important
influence on performance pay attitudes, one would expect to see less accep-
tance of the concept from this group. Idealmente, one might follow a cohort of
teachers in training from the decision to major in education through the first
three to five years on the job to see if attitudes change and, if they do, qué
are the contributing factors. Continued research on teacher preferences for
performance pay systems is likely to help dispel myths about teacher pay pref-
erences and may help both districts and organizations representing teachers
design performance pay systems that can win teacher acceptance.
A previous version of this article was presented at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the
American Education Finance Association, held in Louisville, Kentucky. The research reported
herein was partially supported by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York
to the Consortium for Policy Research in Education (CPRE) and the Wisconsin Center
for Education Research, Escuela de Educación, University of Wisconsin–Madison (Grant
#B7136). The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the institutional partners of CPRE, the Carnegie Corporation of New
york, or the Wisconsin Center for Education Research. The assistance of Linda Smith
Brothers of the University of Wisconsin–Madison Graduate School of Business in
conceptualization and data collection for this project is gratefully acknowledged.
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APPENDIX
Pay System Scenarios
Below are descriptions of four different methods of providing pay increases to
workers. Please read each description, then circle the number that indicates
how desirable or undesirable you would find that pay increase method for your
first job in your chosen occupation or career field.
1. Pay for individual performance
In this system, you could get up to a 10 percent pay increase each year, de-
pending on your individual job performance, as measured by objective factors
such as improvements in student achievement, parental satisfaction, or stu-
dent attendance. If your job performance was excellent, you would get a 10
percent increase; if very good, a 6 percent increase; if minimally acceptable, a
3 percent increase; and if poor, 0 por ciento (no increase).
Highly
Undesirable
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 Highly
Desirable
2. Pay for developing your knowledge and skills
In this system, you could get up to a 10 percent pay increase each year,
depending on how well you develop a specified body of teaching knowledge
and skills, as judged by your supervisor and a group of more experienced peers.
If you developed all of the specified skills to a high level, you would receive a
10 percent pay increase. If you developed all of the skills to a satisfactory level,
you would receive a 6 percent increase. If you developed some but not all of
the skills, you would receive a 3 percent increase. If you did not develop any of
the skills, you would get 0 por ciento (no increase).
Highly
Undesirable
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 Highly
Desirable
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PERFORMANCE PAY SYSTEM PREFERENCES OF STUDENTS
3. Pay for team performance
In this system, you would get up to a 10 percent pay increase each year
depending on your team’s (p.ej., school’s) actuación. Performance would be
measured by objective factors such as improvements in student achievement,
parental satisfaction, or student attendance. If your team’s performance was
excellent, you would get a 10 percent increase; if very good, a 6 percent increase;
if about average, a 3 percent increase; and if poor, 0 por ciento (no increase).
Highly
Undesirable
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 Highly
Desirable
4. Pay not based on performance
In this system, you would get a 5 percent pay increase each year regardless of
how well or poorly you or your team performed, or how well you developed
your skills, as long as you performed well enough to keep your job. All other
teachers would also get this increase, and there would be no opportunity to get
more and no risk of getting less.
Highly
Undesirable
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 Highly
Desirable
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