The Devil is in the - IA de Investigación especializada en el MIT

The Devil is in the
(Histórico) Details:
Continental Drift as a
Case of Normatively
Appropriate Consensus?

Naomi Oreskes
Universidad de California, San Diego

In Social Empiricism, Miriam Solomon proposes a via media between tra-
ditional philosophical realism and social construction of scientiªc knowledge,
but ignores a large body of historical literature that has attempted to plough
just that path. She also proposes a standard for normatively appropriate con-
sensus that, arguably, no theory in the history of science has ever achieved, en-
cluding her own ideal type—plate tectonics. And while valorizing dissent,
she fails to consider how dissent has been used in recent decades as a political
tool to challenge scientiªc evidence on diverse issues, including the link be-
tween tobacco and cancer and the reality of anthropogenic global warming.

Introducción
Miriam Solomon presents Social Empiricism as a Hegelian synthesis emerg-
ing from the dialectic between the traditional philosophical thesis of indi-
vidual-based rationality and the SSK antithesis of social construction. I
concur wholeheartedly that a new synthesis is in order, but I ªnd three
difªculties with her claims. Primero, she exaggerates her novelty, neglecting
two decades of historical scholarship that has tracked the middle way she
advocates. Segundo, she proposes a standard that no theory in the history of
science has ever met, including her own ideal case. Tercero, she ignores the
difªculty that dissent can serve undemocratic political ends and can coun-
ter the goal of scientiªc understanding of the natural world.

I. Previous attempts to ªnd a middle ground
Thomas Kuhn famously argued nearly half a century ago that scientiªc
consensus is forged in communities of like-minded practitioners with
shared values, and agreement as to what constitutes both appropriate
questions and appropriate types of answers. Scientists who read Kuhn in

Perspectives on Science 2008, volumen. 16, No. 3
©2008 by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology

253

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254

Continental Drift as a Case of Normatively Appropriate Consensus?

the 1960s and ’70s were often pleased with his account, which resonated
with their own experience of community preferences and group loyalties,
but they mostly ignored the aspect that most excited (or exercised) histo-
rians, sociologists, and philosophers: incommensurability. How could sci-
ence be rational if it was characterized by leaps of faith? How could a ra-
tional result emerge from an irrational or at best a rational process?

Since then, many sociologists and historians have argued that it is in
the very sociability of science—the give and take of arguments, the push
and pull of replication and its discontents—that scientiªc knowledge
emerges. Bruno Latour emphasized in his early work, Laboratory Life, eso
science was an agonistic process resulting in a socially accepted product.

While Solomon cites Latour’s later work, she strangely ignores this
seminal text, which inspired historians of science to consider more deeply
the role of social processes in producing rational scientiªc outcomes. Chief
among them was Martin Rudwick, who in his path-breaking 1985 trabajar,
The Great Devonian Controversy, recounted in ªne detail how geologists es-
tablished a fact of nature—the existence of the Devonian period of geolog-
ical time—through a protracted process of negotiation in the socially artic-
ulated arena of the Geological Society of London (Rudwick 1985).

Rudwick’s most recent book, Bursting the Limits of Time—an analysis of
the emergence of modern geology in the late 18th century and early 19th
centuries—emphasizes that despite the diverse ways in which savants gen-
erated scientiªc ideas and information—alone or in pairs, in museums or
in the ªeld—scientiªc knowledge was always ªnally “consolidated in social
interaction” (Rudwick 2005, 640, énfasis añadido).

Recent historical studies have also explicitly rejected the view of
science that Solomon alleges to be widespread: generality, individualism,
and the pure/applied science distinction (Solomon 2001, Chapter 1,
páginas. 1–13). Solomon claims, Por ejemplo, that it is “generally assumed that
all scientiªcally rational work has in common the same scientiªc method,"
but this claim has been refuted at length in the work of historians such as
Peter Galison, Jane Maienschein, and Andrew Warwick, as well as philos-
ophers such as Alexander Rosenberg, John Dupré, and Alison Wylie
(Maienschein 1985; Galison 1987; Rainger et al. 1991; Dupre 1993;
Galison and Stump 1995; Galison 1997; Wylie 2002; Warwick 2003).
She similarly claims that scholars have remained ªxated on the idea of
scientiªc rationality as an individual process, ignoring the many impor-
tant recent works that track the ways and means in which social engage-
ments among communities of investigators conclude in the stabilization
of empirical facts about the natural world. Besides Rudwick’s work, she
might consider Peter Galison’s Image and Logic, which explicitly considers
the interplay between communities of practitioners, Andrew Warwick’s

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Perspectives on Science

255

Masters of Theory, which stresses the creation of a culture of physical and
mental competition that trained “wranglers” at Cambridge to solve vex-
ing problems in mathematical physics, and Mary Terrall’s, The Man Who
Flattened the Earth, a reªned account of a man whose sociability was crucial
to his capacity for scientiªc demonstration and persuasion.

The point is not that Solomon necessarily needs to engage with any one
of these books particularly, but rather that the role of the social in produc-
ing the rational has been a central focus of history of science over the past
two decades. These are not minor books by obscure authors, but prize-
winning books by leading academicians.

Similarmente, Solomon argues that there has been “no recent change” in the
accepted demarcation of pure and applied science, ignoring the celebrated
debate between Dan Kevles and Paul Forman in the mid 1980s over the
impact of military funding on the direction of “basic” research in physics.
Forman in particular argued that the very deªnition of “basic” science was
altered by military priorities and its culture of “gadgeteering” (Forman
1987; Kevles 1990). Since then, numerous authors, myself included, tener
examined the intricate interconnections between the scientiªc, technolog-
ical, and political goals of the Cold War and how they blurred the “pure”
and “applied” distinction.1 None of this is to say that these works neces-
sarily refute her philosophical position, but rather simply to say that it
would be reasonable for her to acknowledge their existence and explain
how her work differs from theirs, if it does.

II. Continental drift and plate tectonics: A normatively appropriate
consensus?
Solomon’s neglect of existing historical literature comes to bear most im-
portantly in the central claim of her work: that consensus in science is nor-
matively appropriate if and only if one theory has all the available empiri-
cal successes. Her type example is continental drift and plate tectonics: she
claims that the consensus over plate tectonics in the 1960s was norma-
tively appropriate because it met the proposed standard. Aquí, I raise two
asuntos: uno, that Solomon mis-represents the continental drift debate, y
two, that plate tectonics does not meet the standard she has set.

Solomon’s starting point is the work of philosopher Henry Frankel,
who in the 1970s and ’80s used continental drift/plate tectonics to evalu-
ate reigning philosophical theories, and saw no signiªcant social dimen-

1. For continuing debate on this issue, see Dennis 1987, 1991, 1994, y 1997;
DeVorkin 1992, 1996; Doel 1997; Forman 1996; Galison and Hevly 1992; Hounshell
1997; hacker 2000; Kaiser 2002; Krige 2003; Leslie 1992, 1993; Mukerji 1989; Oreskes
and Doel 2002; Oreskes 2003; Rainger 2001; Solovey 2001.

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256

Continental Drift as a Case of Normatively Appropriate Consensus?

sion to that scientiªc debate. Solomon quotes Frankel: “continental drift
was not . . . a scientiªc controversy having signiªcant political, económico,
or social aspects” (Solomon 2001, 86). Unlike evolution or relativity, drift
was not interpreted through the lens of religion, política, or metaphysics,
and there is little or no evidence that “external factors” such as concern for
offending religious sensibilities, played a signiªcant role in the debate.
Solomon asserts that others who have analyzed the history, including me,
“have come to similar conclusions” (Solomon 2001, 86).

While I agree with both Frankel and Solomon that continental drift
was not interpreted to have broad political, metafísico, or religious
ramiªcations, it does not follow from this that the debate had no sig-
niªcant social dimensions, and to suggest that I think so is to misread my
trabajar.

The Rejection of Continental Drift shows how scientists’ evaluation of the
theory of drift and the evidence invoked to conªrm or deny it was perva-
sively interwoven in a fabric of epistemic, cultural, and social consider-
ations. One cannot understand any individual scientist’s epistemic posi-
tion vis à vis drift without understanding the cultural and social vectors
that deªned that position. This theme is explicit in my discussion of what
I call “epistemological afªnities.”

In the core of the book, I argue that the problem of continental drift
was not under-determination, as might appear on ªrst examination, given
the various competing hypotheses that ºourished at the time, but rather
over-determination: no one theory was consistent with all the evidence.
Había, en efecto, too much evidence, and different individuals and
groups of scientists preferred to emphasize certain sets of data over others.
I call these preferences “epistemological afªnities,” because they “ex-
pressed themselves epistemologically”—in terms of differential weight-
ings of evidence—but I stress that “their sources were largely social”
(Oreskes 1999, 53). And I explicitly declined to describe such factors as
“external,” because the point of the argument is to say that social factors
are not external—imposed on or imported by scientists from outside their
expert communities—but integral to their scientiªc practice.

I further argued that a major obstacle to American acceptance of conti-
nental drift was a commitment to the method of multiple working hy-
potheses—the idea that good scientiªc practice requires resistance to sin-
gular, over-arching theories—and that American scientists viewed this
method as an instantiation of American democracy—a social and political
commitment if ever there were one! It was characteristically American to
be open and fair-minded, or so they believed, and this is why Americans
would ultimately produce a better science than their autocratic European
counterparts (they believed).

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Perspectives on Science

257

Through detailed analysis of published papers, unpublished letters,
course notes and ªeld notebooks, I showed that the method of multiple
working hypotheses was really used, and that commitment to the ideals it
represented led many Americans to reject continental drift. Sin embargo,
I concluded, the process was rational insofar as it was explicit and consis-
tent; it involved weighing of evidence and serious argument; and the out-
come was acceptable to nearly all of the parties involved (even Alfred
Wegener himself). Most important, the door was left open for reconsidera-
tion of the question when new evidence and arguments developed.

Fast forward to the 1960s, when the idea of moving continents was ac-
cepted with revisions under the new title of plate tectonics. Solomon en-
shrines plate tectonics as her ideal type for a normatively appropriate con-
sensus, because “plate tectonics had all the empirical successes.”

This is just plain wrong. In the 1960s, plate tectonics did have a very
large number of empirical successes. It explained the homologies across
continents that the advocates of continental drift had pointed to in the
1920s, as well as new data from the sea ºoor, continental magnetism, y
seismology. These were enormously signiªcant. But it is simply incorrect
to say that plate tectonics had all the empirical successes. One speciªc
difªculty was widely discussed by scientists at the time, and has been fur-
ther discussed in retrospect: the problem of the Earth’s internal structure
and strength.

Throughout the 1930s and ’40s, seismologists argued that continental
drift was impossible because the Earth’s interior was too rigid to permit
large-scale motions. In the 1960s, this point was taken up by one of the
most brilliant geophysicists of his generation, Gordon J. F. macdonald. En
1957, macdonald, working with colleague Walter Munk, analyzed the
available empirical data regarding seismic propagation, and the available
experimental data concerning the Earth’s internal composition. These data
suggested that the Earth would not yield by viscous ºow as theories of
crustal mobility required.

A principios de los años 1960, a dramatically increased quantity and quality of
seismic data became available through the World Wide Standard Seismo-
graph Network. En 1963 y 1964, MacDonald published two articles an-
alyzing these data, En particular, the Earth’s “free oscillations”—vibrations
produced in response to earthquakes. He concluded that the planet was
too rigid to support large-scale crustal movements. Además, early satel-
lites had produced better measures of regional gravity, which indicated
that the density differences between continents and oceans extended to
very great depths—MacDonald concluded 300 miles—inconsistent with
the ºat plate model. MacDonald’s objections were a major obstacle to
many people’s acceptance of plate tectonics; several scientists have re-

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258

Continental Drift as a Case of Normatively Appropriate Consensus?

counted that they accepted the new theory not because his objections had
been answered, but because the theory performed so well in other respects
(Oreskes and Le Grand, 2001).

Numerous other anomalies were also noted at the time (macdonald
2001). Most of these had to do with how the theory explained (or failed to
explain) persistent continental features, such as the Rio Grande Valley, el
mid-continent rift, or the Colorado mineral belt. If mountains, volcanoes,
and rifts formed at plate boundaries, then how to explain the Rockies, a
thousand miles from the western boundary of the North American plate,
or the mid-continent rift, whose very named revealed the problem?

And then there was Hawaii: volcanic islands smack dab in the middle
of the Paciªc plate. The new theory had no explanation for this, and so Ja-
son Morgan introduced the concept of a “hot spot”—a locus of intra-plate
volcanic activity. Here was an ad hoc adjustment if ever there was one:
there was not a shred of independent evidence to support it. Todavía, the em-
pirical failure that Hawaii represented did not impede consensus forma-
ción. Scientists just worked around it.

Solomon may respond that empirical anomalies do not matter if no the-
ory can explain them, but in the cases described here, competing theories
did explain at least some of them. The free oscillation data were consistent
with reigning notions of crustal mobility, including the geosyncline the-
ory previously dominant in the United States, and whole Earth expansion
theory, promoted particularly by scientists at Columbia University, podría
explain intra-continental rifts. These other theories did not explain most
of the other data, but that is precisely the point: no one theory had all the em-
pirical successes.

How can good scientists in good conscience ignore empirical anoma-
lies? I suggest the answer lies in what I call “productive indifference.”
Historical studies show that scientists frequently ignore small failures in
favor of bigger successes. Scientists saw the promise of plate tectonics and
concluded that it made sense to accept it and worry about the details later.
Grasping what the theory could do, they considered it productive to be in-
different to what it could not. Since no one theory could explain every-
thing, it made sense to go with the theory that explained the most.

Does any theory in the history of science meet Solomon’s
standard?
If plate tectonics fails to provide Solomon with an ideal type, perhaps she
has simply chosen a bad example. I think not. From a distance, a highly
successful theory may appear to have all the empirical successes, particular-
larly insofar as scientists crowing in the wake of a scientiªc revolution will

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Perspectives on Science

259

rarely highlight the problems that have been swept under the rug. But on
closer examination, I suggest, all theories look like plate tectonics.

Consider Darwin’s theory of the origin of species by natural selection.
We all know that it engendered ontological outrage in certain religious
and cultural circles, but it prevailed among scientists, at least in its
gradualistic account of evolution if not in its mechanistic explanation. So,
did Darwin have all the empirical successes? No. Historians have de-
scribed at length how Darwin unsuccessfully grappled with the awkward
fact that the fossil record did not reveal gradual change at all. As known in
1859, it recorded long intervals of stasis, punctuated by apparently in-
stantaneous change. Life suddenly appeared at the base of the Cambrian;
dinosaurs and ammonites suddenly disappeared at the end of the Creta-
ceous. Darwin’s response that the fossil record was “incomplete” was to
many contemporaries altogether too convenient. Darwin did not explain
the fossil record, he explained it away.

Similar conclusions can be drawn about the Copernican universe, el
atomic theory of matter, and quantum mechanics. No theory in the his-
tory of science has ever explained everything that was on the table;
difªculties have always been explained away, pushed aside, or left to be
solved another day. Scientists have always been productively indifferent.

According to Solomon’s standard, por lo tanto, no consensus in the history
of science has ever been appropriate. She may be willing to allow that the
set of theories that meets her standard is an empty one, but then her claim
to naturalism collapses.

III. The political dimensions of dissent
An important component of Solomon’s position is her argument that
funding agencies should support dissenting voices. Following feminist
and standpoint epistemologists, she holds that “members of marginalized
groups often have special abilities, deriving from their social locations, a
identify particular kinds of decision vectors” (Solomon 2001, 147). Like
many in science studies, she makes the default assumption that minority
voices are under-privileged, with highly constrained access to social and
material resources. Por lo tanto, giving them pride of place (or at least more
pride than they have had in the past) will lead to a fairer, more just out-
come. “Social empiricism,” she concludes, “is primarily interested in
bringing about democratic science” (Solomon 2001, 149).

I applaud any effort that makes the world a fairer place, but the pre-
sumption that dissenting voices in science are underprivileged is demon-
strably false. In recent years in the United States, minority scientiªc opin-
ions have been trumpeted by powerful interests group to advance political
and economic agenda. These groups include major industrial interests,

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260

Continental Drift as a Case of Normatively Appropriate Consensus?

such as the tobacco, fossil fuel, and pharmaceutical industries, who have
supported research to create dissenting opinions where they did not previ-
ously exist, or to amplify and expand what were previously peripheral or
minority views (Micheals 2005; Michaels and Monforton, 2005; Michaels,
2008; Yach and Bialons, 2001). The most obvious example is tobacco.

In the mid 1970s, Estados Unidos. tobacco industry launched a biomedical re-
search program intended to highlight the uncertainties surrounding the
causal mechanisms of cancer and other degenerative diseases, y por lo tanto
confound the link between tobacco use and ill health. Between 1975 y
1989, R.J. Reynolds Corporation spent $45 million dollars on this pro- gram.2 To oversee the distribution of grants, Reynolds hired a retired dis- tinguished physicist, Frederick Seitz, a former President of the U.S. Na- tional Academy of Sciences and former President of the Rockefeller University. En 1979, Seitz explained how he become connected with R.J. Reynolds: About a year ago, when my period as President of the Rockefeller University was nearing its end, [Era] asked if I would be willing to serve as advisor to the Board of Directors of R.J. Reynolds Indus- intentos, Cª, as it developed its program on the support of biomedical research related to degenerative diseases in man—a program which would enlarge upon the work supported through the consortium of tobacco industries. . . . Desde . . . R.J. Reynolds had provided very generous support for the biomedical work at The Rockefeller Uni- versity, I was more than glad to accept (Seitz 1979). Directly challenging the existing consensus of scientiªc opinion, Reynolds Executive Colin Stokes explained that the charges that tobacco was linked to cancer, hardening of arteries, and carbon monoxide poisoning were “tenuous,” and that the Reynolds Corporation was reacting to the “these scientiªcally unproven claims by intensifying our funding of objective re- search into these matters” (alimenta 1979). While most epidemiologists and oncologists in the 1979 would have said that the link between cancer and smoking was demonstrable, Stokes insisted that “. . . science really knows little about the causes or develop- ment mechanisms of chronic degenerative diseases imputed to cigarettes, including lung cancer, emphysema, and cardiovascular disorders.” Many of the studies that linked smoking to these diseases were either “incom- plete or . . . relied on dubious methods or hypotheses and faulty interpre- 2. For comparison, the entire NSF budget for systematic biology in 1977 era $6.9 mil-

lion.

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Perspectives on Science

261

tations.” The program strategy would be “to identify . . . highly promis-
ing young investigators who are underfunded at present . . ." (Seitz 1978).
No doubt many aspects of chronic degenerative diseases were (and re-
principal) poorly understood, but the context of the Reynolds program was
not to build a better, more democratic science. The context was the value
of conºicting or complicating scientiªc evidence in creating “reasonable
doubt”—which could be used in court. Stokes explained:

Due to favorable scientiªc testimony, no plaintiff has ever collected
a penny from any tobacco company in lawsuits claiming that smok-
ing causes lung cancer or cardiovascular illness—even though one
hundred and seventeen such cases have been brought since 1954
[sic] (alimenta 1979).

En años recientes, similar tactics have been applied to political campaigns to
challenge the scientiªc evidence that sulfate emissions cause acid rain, eso
chlorinated ºuorocarbons destroy stratospheric ozone, and that greenhouse
gases are causing global warming. In each of these campaigns, “minority”
scientiªc views have been trumpeted in the name of fairness, equal time,
and other attractive virtues, but the goal has not been to advance under-
standing of the natural world. The goal has been to protect the ªnancial
and ideological interests of the patrons (Rampton and Stauber, 2002;
Oreskes and Conway, 2008). En breve, dissent can be a potent political
tool, and nurturing minority opinions does not necessarily advance sci-
ence, democracy, or rationality. One needs to consider the political context
in which dissent is formulated. For while there are certainly contexts in
which promotion of minority voices advances democracy, there can also be
contexts in which it does the reverse.

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