From Crisis Management to Realignment - IA de Investigación especializada en el MIT

From Crisis Management to Realignment
of Forces

The Diplomatic “Geometry” of the 1969–1978
Sino-Soviet Border Talks

✣ Alsu Tagirova

On the early morning of 11 Septiembre 1969, the staff of Beijing Airport
observed an unlikely scene: Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and his Soviet coun-
terpart, Aleksei Kosygin, were having a polite conversation over breakfast. Para
the past several months the media in both countries had condemned the ac-
tions of the other. Newspapers featured hostile speeches by central and local
party elites, as well as collective proclamations from “workers and peasants.”
Some people even poured onto the streets in organized protests against the ag-
gressive policies of the other country. “Down with the new Tsars!” the Chinese
headlines read. “Rebuff the provocateurs!” the Soviet newspapers demanded.
On the eve of the meeting, Chinese ofﬁcials became concerned that the
session was a trick—a Trojan Horse—designed to get a Soviet airplane into
Beijing airspace and that the plane would actually be carrying Soviet special
forces rather than the Soviet premier and his delegation. The suspicion was
not unfounded. The Soviet Union had used a similar tactic the year before in
Czechoslovakia. Además, Soviet leaders had signaled through U.S. diplomats
and leaks to Western newspapers that they were considering a nuclear strike
against Chinese military sites (though whether they were genuinely consider-
ing it is as yet unknown).1 De este modo, the Chinese were forced to the negotiation
mesa. The discussion between the two premiers went on for about three hours,
and though often being described as yielding little to no result, it was the be-
ginning of a lengthy negotiation process that lasted for another nine years.

The existing scholarly literature on the border negotiations in both the
Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), with few exceptions,

1. Michael S.. Gerson, The Sino-Soviet Border Conﬂict: Deterrence, Escalation and the Threat of a Nuclear
War in 1969 (Alejandría, Virginia: Center for Naval Analysis, 2010), pag. 48.

Journal of Cold War Studies
volumen. 24, No. 1, Invierno 2022, páginas. 116–154, https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_01027
© 2022 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology

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Diplomatic “Geometry” of the 1969–1978 Sino-Soviet Border Talks

was produced by people who were personally involved in the negotiation pro-
cess.2 Even if those authors understood the decision-making process, a simple
comparison of the accounts from the Soviet and Chinese sides demonstrates
the general inability of former participants to consider their counterpart’s po-
sition reasonable, and this in turn limits their treatment of the subject. Por eso,
many of these works are used in my analysis as personal accounts of historical
events and not as academic publications per se. Western scholarship, mientras
providing a more balanced analysis of the events, has often focused on the
political or anthropological aspects of the Sino-Soviet border issue, offering
relatively meager historical background.3

Desafortunadamente, historical research on the Sino-Soviet border has always
been complicated by the limited access to PRC and Soviet archival documen-
tation. Many obstacles still exist but recently declassiﬁed documents in the
Russian State Archive of Recent History (RGANI), the State Archive of the
Russian Federation (GARF), and Khabarovsk Krai State Archive help to shed
new light on the Sino-Soviet negotiations of this period.

This article distinguishes three phases in the negotiation process. el primero
witnessed both sides preoccupied with addressing immediate security con-
cerns. The second revolved around a long-term commitment to maintaining
peace on the border and working out the basic principles for further negoti-
ación. In the third phase, discussions stalled and reached an impasse, pero el
two sides preserved the negotiation format, presumably to solve other diplo-
matic issues.

2. GRAMO. V. Kireev, Neizvestnye stranitsy pogranichnyh peregovorov (Moscow: Rosspen, 2006), pag. 60; Chai
Chengwen, “Zhou Enlai lingdao zhixia juxing de Zhong Su bianjie tanpan,” Dang de Wenxian, No. 3
(1991), páginas. 45–50; Yu Zhan, “Yici bu xun chang de shi ming—Yi Zhou Enlai zui hou yi ci fang wen
Sulian,” in Waijiaobu Waijiaoshi Yanjiushi, ed., Xin Zhongguo Waijiao Fengyun, volumen. 3 (Beijing: Shijie
Zhishi Chubanshe, 1994); Wang Bo, “Zhong E (Su) bianjie: Jian zheng lishi jianshe weilai,” Shijie
zhishi, No. 17 (2009); Li Fenglin, “Qinli Zhong Su (mi) bianjie tanpan,” Bainian Chao, No. 7 (2008),
páginas. 30–34; Fan Zhenshui, “Wang Youping tongzhi huiyi 1979 nian Zhong Su guojia guanxi tan-
pan,” in Waijiaobu Waijiaoshi Yanjiushi, ed., Xin Zhongguo Waijiao Fengyun, volumen. 4 (Beijing: Zhishi
Chubanshe, 1996); V. S. Myasnikov, Dogovornymi stat’yami utverdili, Rossiya i Kitai: 400 let mezh-
gosudarstvennyh otnoshenii, volumen. 3 (Moscow: Nauka, 2014); and Iu. METRO. Galenovich, Rossiya i Kitai v
XX veke: Granitsa (Moscow: Muravei, 2001). The exceptions are Qi Pengfei, Da guo jiang yu: Dang-
dai Zhongguo dalu bianjie wenti shulun (Beijing: Zhonggong Dangshi Chubanshe, 2013); Li Danhui,
“Zhengzhi dou shi yushou: 1960 niandai Zhong Su bianjie guan xi—Dui Zhong Su bian jie wenti
de lishi kaocha (zhi er),” Shehui kexue, No. 2 (2007), páginas. 146–167; y B. Tkachenko, Rossiya-Kitai:
Vostochnaya granitsa v dokumentah i faktah (Vladivostok: Ussuri, 1999).

3. METRO. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conﬂict in China’s Territorial Dis-
putes (Princeton, Nueva Jersey: Prensa de la Universidad de Princeton, 2008); Eric Hyer, The Pragmatic Dragon: China’s
Grand Strategy and Boundary Settlements (vancouver: UBC Press, 2015), Bruce A. Elleman, esteban
Kotkin, and Clive Schoﬁeld, editores., Beijing’s Power and China’s Borders: Twenty Neighbours in Asia (Nuevo
york: METRO. mi. Sharpe, 2013); and Steven Parham, China’s Borderlands: The Faultline of Central Asia
(Londres: I. B. Tauris, 2017).

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Tagirova

Several scholarly works underscore that these negotiations were a nec-
essary measure born out of fear of a nuclear conﬂict and that they aimed at
reducing the tensions and managing the border crisis.4 My analysis here shows
eso, although the ﬁrst phase of the talks was primarily about containing the
crisis, the second and third phases served as an instrument in the greater pro-
cess of realignment of forces, when both China and the USSR reconsidered
their alliances and sought to improve their strategic position in the world.

The article demonstrates that other political factors interfered with and
further complicated the “geometry” of the alliances. A NOSOTROS. triangular diplomacy
not only involved the three immediate participants, but also had a direct im-
pact on a larger spectrum of countries, creating the concepts of a “horizontal
line” and “big terrain” on one side and détente on the other. When relations
with the West began to show cracks, the PRC replaced earlier concepts with
the Theory of the Three Worlds, whereas the Soviet Union tried to stave off
the decline of détente. The formation of the Sino-U.S. “quasi-alliance” was
the ﬁnal moment in the realignment process. Throughout this period, el
Sino-Soviet border negotiations were used as a “card” that was often played
when one of the participants needed to inﬂuence its diplomatic opponent.

First Attempt at Border Resolution

The Sino-Soviet border issue never existed in a political vacuum. Various fac-
tores, both domestic and international, inﬂuenced the two countries’ border
policies and the political importance placed on them by their leaders. En 1949,
the new Communist regime in the PRC turned to the USSR for political and
economic support. Mao Zedong and other leaders of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party (CCP) had no hesitation about “leaning to one side.”5 According to
Soviet diplomats, the USSR raised the border problem with the Chinese mul-
tiple times throughout the early 1950s, including when Mao was in Beijing to
pay homage to Joseph Stalin in December 1949 and early 1950, but the PRC
always replied that “the issue was not worth discussing.”6 By the end of the
1950s, sin embargo, as relations deteriorated rapidly, the border dispute sparked
great tension in bilateral relations.

4. Gerson, The Sino-Soviet Border Conﬂict, páginas. 46–53; and Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, pag. 214.

5. Niu Jun, ed., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Duiwai Guanxishi Gailun (1949–2000) (Beijing: Beijing
Daxue Chubanshe, 2010), pag. 54.

6. Kireev, Neizvestnye stranitsy pogranichnyh peregovorov, pag. 51.

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Diplomatic “Geometry” of the 1969–1978 Sino-Soviet Border Talks

The Chinese ﬁrst brought up the border issue in August 1960 after an in-
cident on the Buz Aigyr Pass, but Soviet ofﬁcials reportedly insisted that nego-
tiations were not necessary.7 Former Soviet diplomats offer a different version
of events. As Chinese herdsmen crossed the border to graze their cattle—a
practice they had engaged in since the Soviet outpost in the area was liqui-
dated in 1954—they were intercepted by Soviet border troops, but instead
of retreating, as they usually did, the herdsmen refused to leave the territory,
claiming that instructions “from high up” prohibited them from doing so and
that this territory was, En realidad, Chinese.8

On 17 Agosto 1960 the Soviet Union sent a diplomatic note to the Chi-
nese embassy in Moscow expressing dissatisfaction with the illegal transit of
Chinese residents across the Soviet border. Beijing then proposed that the
sovereignty of the “disputed” territories be negotiated. The Soviet Union re-
jected this proposal and averred that the term “disputed” was inaccurate. En
response to these events, the ruling organs of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU) established a commission on border issues. Among its
members were representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry
of Defense, and the State Security Committee (KGB), which at the time had
jurisdiction over Soviet border guards. The new commission concluded that
the Soviet Union must negotiate with China to delimit and secure the borders
between the two countries.9

For the remainder of the year, relations between the PRC and the Soviet
Union eased and tensions diminished, but by late 1961, with multiple inter-
national and domestic factors in play, the two countries returned to a state
of ideological confrontation. In early March 1963 the main CCP newspaper
People’s Daily published an editorial claiming that treaties between China and
the Soviet Union were still unequal. Shortly thereafter, en 19 Abril, the Chi-
nese Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted a formal note to the Soviet Union
calling for negotiations on the border issue. In May, the Soviet embassy in
China expressed its readiness to delimit certain sections of the border.

Both sides tried to reach a compromise, mostly because Chinese and So-
viet policymakers believed the cost of delaying a settlement was unacceptably
alto, especially considering the rapid deterioration of bilateral ties, the eco-
nomic crisis and famine in the PRC after the Great Leap Forward, y el

7. Li Fenglin, “Qinli ZhongSu (mi) bianjie tanpan,” Bainian Chao, No. 8 (2008), páginas. 30–34; and Li
Fenglin, interviewed by Shen Qinglan, in Beijing, 4 Abril 2001.

8. Kireev, Neizvestnye stranitsy pogranichnyh peregovorov, páginas. 56–60.

9. Ibídem.

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Tagirova

Xinjiang unrest of May 1962, during which many Uighurs crossed the border
into the USSR.10

Before the negotiations began, the Chinese had already identiﬁed three
kinds of “borderlines” on the eastern section of the Sino-Soviet frontier. El
ﬁrst was the “treaty line,” the line that existing treaties stipulated. The sec-
ond was the borderline marked on Soviet maps; a saber, those published by
the Soviet Union after 1929, especially the large-scale maps prepared by the
Soviet military in accordance with the “red line” principle, a reference to the
red borderline shown on the Soviet map attached to the “Treaty of Peking”:
the red line passes through the right bank of the Amur (Heilongjiang) River
and the left bank of the Ussuri River toward the sea. Some sections of the
border were drawn directly through Chinese territory, and other sections also
deviated from the Chinese understanding. The third kind of borderline was
the line of actual control. The Soviet line of actual control in some areas
coincided or was basically the same with the treaty line or the line on the
Soviet maps. In other areas, sin embargo, it not only greatly surpassed the treaty
line and the line on the Soviet maps but extended into Chinese territory.
The line of actual control on the Chinese side basically did not surpass the
treaty line and surpassed the borderline on the Soviet maps only in some
places.11

Bilateral border negotiations ofﬁcially began on 25 Febrero 1964. Dur-
ing the meetings, the two sides not only discussed the border issue but also fre-
quently debated the general state of Sino-Soviet relations. Both countries put
forth terms on which they could not see eye to eye. For the Soviet Union, el
main stumbling block was the Chinese demand that the USSR recognize more
than 1.54 million square kilometers of land as territory that was occupied by
Tsarist Russia through unequal treaties. Although Chinese diplomats repeat-
edly emphasized that they had no intention of retrieving these territories—
with one 35,000-square-kilometer exception that they deemed a “disputed
territory”—Soviet ofﬁcials believed that making a concession on this issue and
ofﬁcially recognizing these treaties as unequal would allow China to argue in
the future that all subsequent agreements made on the basis of these treaties
were invalid.12

10. Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, pag. 70; and Alsu Tagirova, “Transgressing the Boundaries: El
Migration of Uighurs into Soviet Central Asia after World War II,” Asian Perspective, volumen. 42, No. 4
(2018), páginas. 575–596.

11. Jiang Changbin, Zhong’E guojie dongduan de yanbian (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe,
2007), páginas. 292–293.

12. Miasnikov, Dogovornymi stat’yami utverdili, Rossiya i Kitai, páginas. 350–351.

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Diplomatic “Geometry” of the 1969–1978 Sino-Soviet Border Talks

At the beginning of the talks, Soviet ofﬁcials claimed that the river bor-
ders should go through the Chinese bank. The Chinese, in response, referred
to norms of international law requiring borders to be drawn through the thal-
weg (the midpoint of the main navigable channel).13 De 26 February to 16
Abril, the negotiations revolved primarily around the ideological differences
between the two countries, and discussion of the Sino-Soviet border was de-
layed until 18 Abril. The two sides maintained different interpretations and
usage of some terms, including “unequal treaties” and “disputed territories.”
Además, after preliminary study, the negotiators marked 22 areas for further
discussion, of which 17 were in the western section of the Sino-Soviet bor-
der and only 5 in the east. According to the Soviet diplomats, the exchange
of maps with a provisional border marked by both parties revealed that the
Chinese had extended only one unexpected territorial claim: the area near the
Bedel’ Pass in Soviet Kyrgyzstan.14

During these meetings, a wide range of topics pertaining to the border
dispute was discussed. In addition to the issues of managing and using the
land and water in the border regions, the two sides conversed about their
competing claims in Central Asia. According to a retired diplomat, Porcelana
sought to link its acceptance of Soviet control over the Pamirs to the two
disputed islands in the eastern section.15

Several months later, the two countries reached a consensus on 4,200
kilometers of the eastern section of the border, except for the Bolshoi Ussuri-
iski and Tarabarov Islands (Heixiazidao). Sobre esta base, the Soviet delegation
requested permission from the CSPU to initial related agreements.16

As the Soviet delegation awaited instructions from Moscow, the Chi-
nese unexpectedly made a move that worsened the already deteriorating re-
lationship between the two countries. On 10 Julio 1964, when Mao met with
Japanese Socialist Party members, he insisted that “the places occupied by the
Soviet Union were too numerous,” including Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, y
the Kamchatka Peninsula, and he declared that the Chinese “have not yet pre-
sented the bill for this roll call.”17 Soviet leaders responded to Mao’s comments

13. Hyer, The Pragmatic Dragon, pag. 133.

14. Galenovich, Rossiya i Kitai v XX veke, pag. 84.

15. Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, pag. 123.

16. Kireev, Neizvestnye stranitsy pogranichnyh peregovorov, pag. 60.

17. Mao subsequently attempted to walk back that statement by claiming he was just “ﬁring empty
cannons” (fang kongpao). “Minutes of Mao Zedong’s meeting with the leaders of Komeito," 10 Julio
1964, in Guangxi Zizhiqu Danganguan, X1/35/116, 37–45, in Li, “Zhengzhi dou shi yushou,"
páginas. 146–167.

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Tagirova

by instructing the delegation in mid-July that the agreement could be signed
only after agreement on all sections of the border, including the Bolshoi Us-
suriiski and Tarabarov Islands, had been achieved. The Soviet diplomat G. V.
Kireev wrote in his memoir that the instructions to change the negotiation
strategy came from Nikita Khrushchev himself.18

This particular part of the border, sin embargo, presented a great challenge.
Soviet ofﬁcials insisted that the borderline should be drawn through a trib-
utary of the Amur (Heilongjiang) River, whereas the Chinese believed the
borderline was on the mainstream of the river. Depending on which border-
line was accepted, the islands situated between the tributary and mainstream
of the Amur River would be on either the Soviet or the Chinese side of the
border. Historical documents were not able to provide enough evidence to
make a deﬁnitive conclusion on where the border was drawn originally. En
any case, after these events, the border talks reached an impasse.

En octubre 1964, Khrushchev was forced to step down, and Leonid
Brezhnev assumed leadership of the CPSU. That same month Brezhnev gave a
speech stating that the Soviet Union would continue to follow the general line
accepted at the 20th, 21st, and 22nd Party Congresses, implying that Soviet
policy toward China would continue along the lines set out by Khrushchev.
Por lo tanto, the negative outcome of Zhou Enlai’s visit to Moscow at the be-
ginning of November 1964 was not at all surprising. The CCP delegation
returned to Beijing empty-handed. The November visit was the ﬁnal attempt
by Chinese diplomats to initiate improvement in Sino-Soviet relations.19

En febrero 1965 the Soviet Union attempted to continue border ne-
gotiations. Kosygin stopped in Beijing on his way from Moscow to Hanoi.
After greeting Kosygin at the airport, Zhou Enlai accompanied him to his res-
idence. Soviet diplomats who witnessed Kosygin get out of the car claim that
he was in a good mood and that he and Zhou seemed to have had a friendly
conversation during the ride. After visiting Hanoi, the Soviet prime minister
made another stopover in Beijing and met Mao Zedong. The Chinese leader
reportedly took a sarcastic tone during the discussion, and many Soviet diplo-
mats later wrote that Kosygin was outraged by Mao’s conduct and returned
to the embassy without saying a word, remaining alone for half an hour as he,
apparently, tried to calm down.20

18. Kireev, Neizvestnye stranitsy pogranichnyh peregovorov, páginas. 72–78.

19. Li Danhui, “Cong fenlie dao duikang (1960–1978),” in Shen Zhihua, ed., Zhong Su guanxi shigang
(1917–1991) (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 2015), pag. 369.

20. Kireev, Neizvestnye stranitsy pogranichnyh peregovorov, pag. 86.

122

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Diplomatic “Geometry” of the 1969–1978 Sino-Soviet Border Talks

In March 1966, Chinese leaders refused to send delegations to partici-
pate in the 23rd CPSU Congress. The Cultural Revolution reached its zenith
en 1966-1967 and further deepened the split between the two countries. En
Agosto 1967, during violent demonstrations in front of the Soviet embassy in
Beijing, Zhou Enlai had to intervene personally to turn the Red Guards away
from the Soviet diplomats.21 Starting in 1963, the Soviet Union not only be-
gan to enhance its military and security forces in the region near the Chinese
border, but also sent troops and strengthened its military assistance to Mon-
golia.22 However, the stationing of Soviet troops in the Far East, Transbaikal,
Siberia, Central Asia, and Mongolia, as well as the USSR’s continued effort to
strengthen its Paciﬁc Fleet, was not necessarily aimed solely at China per se,
and the Chinese recognized this. Sin embargo, the presence of Soviet troops
in close proximity to the border undoubtedly put pressure on China and cre-
ated a potential military threat.23 Throughout the period from 1965 a 1968,
tensions between China and the Soviet Union reportedly gave rise to 8,690
incidents on the border, with about 35,000 Chinese residents participating,
of which only about 3,000 were military.24

Crisis Management (11 September–21
Octubre 1969)

Por 1969, as the Soviet patrols over islands on the Chinese side of the thalweg
intensiﬁed, tensions on the border surged. Internal political instability took a
toll on the Chinese authorities’ ability to respond to the threat. Eso, a lo largo de
with the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and the announcement of the
Brezhnev Doctrine, pushed the Chinese to believe that Moscow might use the
new political situation to bring matters to a head.25

On 2 Marzo 1969, one of the most serious border clashes occurred on
Damanskii-Zhenbao Island, causing signiﬁcant casualties on both sides. Alguno
in the Soviet government had foreseen the possibility of escalation over the

21. Sergey Radchenko, Two Suns in the Heavens (stanford, California: Prensa de la Universidad de Stanford, 2009),
páginas. 188–195.

22. Kireev, Neizvestnye stranitsy pogranichnyh peregovorov, pag. 92.

23. Wang Zhongchun, “Zhong Mei guanxi zhengchanghua jincheng zhong de Sulian yinsu (1969–
1979),” Dangde Wenxian, No. 4 (2002), páginas. 50–60.

24. Kireev, Neizvestnye stranitsy pogranichnyh peregovorov, pag. 92.

25. Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, pag. 211.

123

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patrol policies as early as 1964, when a draft resolution was prepared that
included a clause calling for patrols of the islands directly connected to the
Chinese territory to cease. But the resolution ultimately passed without that
clause.26

After the 1969 border clash, the two governments ﬁnally realized they
were facing a dangerous crisis. Scholars identify three periods in the process of
Chinese military pfreparations in 1969. During the ﬁrst period, from March
a julio, the Chinese focused on strategic defense against the Soviet Union.
In the second phase, from August to October, the focus was on preventing
“sudden attacks.” During the third phase, from November to December, el
Chinese military remained alert to new threats. Al mismo tiempo, the Chinese
had to be cautious not to let the enemy use any relaxation in the Chinese state
of high alert as an opportunity for a sudden attack.27

Desde marzo 1969 onward, tensions on the border continued to rise. De-
spite statements about readiness for a Sino-Soviet war, neither side was truly
interested in a full-scale military conﬂict. Even if one were to discount the
probability of a nuclear exchange, the Soviet Union had superior conventional
forces, and the Chinese acknowledged this, all the while pointing out that So-
viet artillery power, as well as Soviet tanks and armored vehicles, would play
only a limited role in any ﬁghting.28

On the Soviet side, ofﬁcials were deeply concerned by China’s enormous
superiority in human resources, as well as the instability of the political sit-
uation in Beijing. The CPSU Politburo regularly received reports from the
Soviet embassy warning that, amid the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, cer-
tain Chinese leaders might attempt to strengthen their position in the ongoing
power struggle by giving orders to begin military action along the Sino-Soviet
border.29

On 21 Marzo 1969, Kosygin, on behalf of the Soviet Politburo, tried to
call Mao and Zhou. Sin embargo, the operator at the telephone station in Beijing
rebuked him and refused to put the call through. On 29 Marzo 1969, en
light of an unsuccessful attempt to reach out to Chinese leaders, the Soviet

26. B. norte. Vereshchagin, V Starom I Novom Kitae: Iz vospominanii diplomata (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo
Instituta Dal’nego Vostoka, 1999), pag. 179.

27. Liu Zhinan, “1969 nian, Zhongguo zhanbei yu dui Mei Su guanxi de yanjiu he tiaozheng,” Dan-
gdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu, No. 3 (1999), páginas. 41–57.

28. Yang Kuisong, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American
Rapprochement,” Cold War History, volumen. 1, No. 1 (Agosto 2000), páginas. 21–52.

29. A. I. Elizavetin, “Peregovory A. norte. Kosygina i Chzhou En’laya v Pekinskom Aeroportu,” Problemy
Dal’nego Vostoka, No. 5 (1992), páginas. 39–63.

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Diplomatic “Geometry” of the 1969–1978 Sino-Soviet Border Talks

government issued an ofﬁcial statement regarding the events on Damanskii
Island.30

A few days later, en 1 Abril 1969, Lin Biao delivered a report to the CCP’s
9th National Congress expressing harsh criticism of Moscow’s actions and
calling for a “ﬁght against Soviet social-imperialism.” On 11 Abril, the Soviet
Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a note to its Chinese counterpart, propos-
ing to resume negotiations in Moscow either on 15 April “or at any time in
the near future that is convenient for the Chinese side.”31 The next day, el
Chinese government responded by saying the PRC would soon reply to the
proposal and that Soviet leaders should “calm down and not rush.”32

In mid-May, Zhou Enlai, following Mao’s instruction, asked four mar-
shals, Chen Yi, Ye Jiangying, Xu Xiangqian, and Nie Rongzhen, to “pay
attention to” international affairs. They were to work out a strategy for both
Sino-Soviet and Sino-U.S. relaciones. The four marshals contended that, para
China to be ready for a major confrontation with the Soviet Union, "el
American card” should be played. They proposed that, in addition to waging
a “tit-for-tat struggle against both the United States and the USSR,” China
should use “negotiation as a means to struggle against them.”33

Como resultado, en 24 Puede 1969, the Chinese issued a statement suggest-
ing that both sides reach an agreement on maintaining the status quo at the
border. By this, the Chinese meant that neither side would take unilateral
action to change the line of actual control (which the Chinese proposed to
deﬁne as the thalweg on the navigable rivers and the middle of the stream on
non-navigable rivers), and also that border troops would under no circum-
stances open ﬁre on the other side. On 13 June the USSR gave its ofﬁcial
response to the Chinese statement, suggesting that the two sides resume the
border negotiations within the next two to three months.34

Chinese leaders worried that the United States was trying to “provoke
China and the Soviet Union and instigate a ﬁght between China and the
USSR.” After the airport talks, Mao feared that U.S. ofﬁcials would “jump
to conclusions” (zuo wenzhang) and try to pit the Soviet Union and China
against one another. On 21 July the U.S. State Department announced that

30. Ibídem.

31. Ibídem.

32. Ibídem.

33. Danhui Li and Yafeng Xia, Mao and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1959–1973: A New History (Lanham,
Maryland: Lexington Books, 2018), pag. 252.

34. “Zayavlenie Pravitel’stva SSSR,” Pravda (Moscow), No. 165 (14 Junio 1969), pag. 1, in Elizavetin,
“Peregovory A. norte. Kosygina i Chzhou En’laya v Pekinskom Aeroportu,” páginas. 39–63.

125

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it would relax restrictions on U.S. tourists purchasing Chinese goods and on
A NOSOTROS. citizens traveling to China—gestures that were misconstrued in Beijing
as hostile.35

Although the dispute over whether to hold Sino-Soviet negotiations con-
tinued into the summer, by May the Chinese had agreed to hold the ﬁfteenth
meeting of the Joint Sino-Soviet Navigation Commission. This event, held
de 18 June to 8 Agosto, became a major rehearsal for the upcoming talks.
The head of the Soviet delegation wrote: “Keeping in mind the forth-
coming talks with the PRC on border issues, we could in the process of the
commission’s work establish how far the Chinese territorial claims on the bor-
der rivers go.”36 In another message to Moscow, he wrote that “the text of the
report of the Chinese part of the commission abounds with phrases like ‘Sino-
Soviet border rivers,’ etc., and the city of Khabarovsk is referred to as ‘Boli.’”37
The Soviet delegation refused to sign the report and legitimize the use of these
terms. As another report later described, “such a formulation would give the
Chinese side the opportunity to substantiate their claims not only on those
sections of rivers through which the . . . border is currently passing, pero también
on other sections which are the internal waters of the USSR (including the
Khabarovsk section of the Amur River).”38

Soon after, en 13 Agosto, another border incident near Lake Zha-
lanashkol and the Terekty River on the western section of the border resulted
in multiple casualties. Although Moscow and Beijing presented different nar-
ratives of these events (and still do even now), the clash had two important
implications. Por un lado, the USSR ceased patrols of Damanskii Island,
spurring the Chinese to conclude they had successfully defended the territory
they claimed; por otro lado, the Soviet Army’s increased presence in the
region pressured the Chinese into sitting down at the negotiating table.39

35. Liu, “1969 nian, Zhongguo zhanbei yu dui Mei Su guanxi de yanjiu he tiaozheng,” páginas. 41–57.

36. “Doklad predsedatelya sovetskoi chasti Smeshannoi sovetsko-kitaiskoi Komissii po sudokhod-
stvu na pogranichnyh rekah A. Smirnova Ministru Inostrannyh Del SSSR A. Gromyko i Ministru
Rechnogo Flota RSFSR S. Kuchkinu," 24 Junio 1969, in Khabarovsk State Archive, Fond (F.) П-35,
Opis’ (Op.) 96, Delo (D.) 405A, List (l.) 10–11.

37. “Telefonogramma po VCh ot predsedatelia sovetskoi chasti Smeshannoi sovetsko-kitaiskoi Komis-
sii po sudohodstvu na pogranichnyh rekah A. Smirnova Ministru Inostrannyh Del SSSR A. Gromyko
I Ministru Rechnogo Flota RSFSR S. Kuchkinu," 27 Junio 1969, in Rossiiskii Tsentr Gosudarstvennyi
Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii (RGANI), F. 5, Op. 61, D. 436, Ll. 3–5.

38. “Informatsiya k rabote ocherednoi XVIII sessii smeshannoi sovetsko-kitaiskoi komissii po sudoh-
odstvu na pogranichnyh uchastkah rek Amurskogo basseina," 17 December 1973, in RGANI, F. 5,
Op. 66, D. 664, Ll. 58–65.

39. Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, pag. 211

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Diplomatic “Geometry” of the 1969–1978 Sino-Soviet Border Talks

The Chinese understood the need to negotiate. Despite disagreeing with
the wording of the Soviet document, they agreed in principle to hold the
negotiations and therefore decided to exercise restraint. On 7 Octubre, cuando
discussing the 13 June statement of the Soviet government with the Chinese
delegation, Zhou Enlai pointed out that when the two premiers met, he had
already explained to the Soviet side that the Chinese must respond:

We must explain it to the people, not refuting it or not explaining it is not good.
But now that negotiations are about to begin, we are not willing to exacerbate
tensions. Por lo tanto, we have agreed with the [PRC] Ministry of Foreign Affairs
to prepare and publicize a document prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
instead of an ofﬁcial government statement. From the diplomatic point of view,
it will not be symmetrical, but it is more reasonable and beneﬁcial from the
political point of view.40

By then the Soviet Union had used multiple channels to convey to the Chi-
nese that a nuclear strike was being considered as a possible response to the
Chinese threat.41 On 11 Septiembre 1969, when Kosygin and Zhou Enlai met
at Beijing Airport and made the important decision to begin border talks, ellos
repeatedly stressed their desire to avoid full-scale military conﬂict.42

During the conversation, Zhou Enlai formulated the basic principles of
the talks as he saw them. Primero, both parties were to maintain the status quo
on the border; segundo, they were to avoid all military confrontations and ex-
changes of ﬁre; ﬁnally, the two countries were to recognize the existence of
disputed territories and pull their troops several kilometers away from the
border to avoid direct contact.43 Reportedly, Kosygin, in response, asked how
the “disputed territories” were to be determined. Zhou Enlai responded that
the disputed territories should be determined by who lived there. Taking a
pencil and a sheet of paper, he wanted to sketch what the Chinese side under-
stood by the term “disputed territories.” Kosygin stopped him, saying. “it was
not the business of the two premiers to determine this.”44

According to the memoirs of Boris Kulik, Kosygin met Zhou hoping
to improve Sino-Soviet relations and, por lo tanto, was not ready to discuss the

40. Chai Chengwen, “Zhou Enlai lingdao women jinxing Zhong Su bianjie tanpan,” in Dangde
Wenxian Bianjibu, Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi, and Zhongyang Dang’anguan, editores.,
Zhonggong Dangshi Zhongda Shijian Shushi (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 2008), páginas. 189–199.

41. Henry Kissinger, On China (Nueva York: Penguin Books, 2011), páginas. 215–235.

42. Elizavetin, “Peregovory A. norte. Kosygina i Chzhou En’laya v Pekinskom Aeroportu,” páginas. 107–119.

43. Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi, ed., Zhou Enlai Nianpu (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian
Chubanshe, 1997), volumen. 3, páginas. 320–321.

44. Elizavetin, “Peregovory A. norte. Kosygina i Chzhou En’laya v Pekinskom Aeroportu,” páginas. 107–119.

127

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border issue in detail.45 Despite the unfortunate use of the term “disputed
territories,” the Soviet side subsequently refused to add it to ofﬁcial documen-
tation. Aleksei Elizavetin, who was present during the negotiation, claimed
that Kosygin used the word derivatively, in a follow-up question, without any
intention to indicate his acceptance of its use.46 Li Fenglin explains the inci-
dent as follows: “After Kosygin returned to the USSR, he was criticized at a
Politburo meeting, [con] hardliners [saying that] he should not have recog-
nized the ‘disputed territories” and [eso] they were Soviet territory.”47

During the meeting with Zhou, Kosygin spoke about the principles the
Chinese premier had put forth as the basis for the border talks. On maintain-
ing the status quo, he said that the Soviet Union, también, wanted this principle to
be observed. On Zhou’s second point (concerning the withdrawal of troops
from disputed territories so that the Soviet and Chinese militaries would not
come into direct contact), Kosygin was not as forthcoming:

Let’s say we withdraw troops, and your people will occupy this territory. Qué
entonces? We ask you to give orders to your troops to resolve all issues arising at
the border through negotiations in order to avoid armed clashes. Let two border
posts meet and resolve the [day-to-day] issues in a constructive spirit. If the
frontier posts do not resolve the issues, [these issues] should be brought up with
the regiment [further up the chain of command] etcétera, pero [we should make
sure that] the issues are resolved without anger and insults.48

Zhou conﬁrmed the need to uphold the status quo on the border. By the end
of the discussion, Kosygin suggested that no one be present on the disputed
territories so that the parties would not exchange ﬁre. “If the parties want to
engage in economic activities on the disputed territories,” he continued, "el
border posts should resolve these issues in a benevolent manner.”49

On 18 September Zhou wrote a letter to Kosygin afﬁrming that tempo-
rary measures would be taken by both sides to maintain the status quo on
the border and to avoid armed clashes. But the areas where the provisional
frontiers coincide, he said, should be distinguished from the so-called dis-
puted territories, and the status quo should be maintained on both. Control
over the undisputed areas was to be maintained in accordance with the maps

45. B. t. Kulik, Sovetsko-kitaiskii raskol: Prichiny i posledstviya (Moscow: Institut Dal’nego vostoka,
2000), pag. 473.

46. Elizavetin, “Peregovory A. norte. Kosygina i Chzhou En’laya v Pekinskom Aeroportu,” páginas. 107–119.

47. li, interviewed by Shen.

48. Elizavetin, “Peregovory A. norte. Kosygina i Chzhou En’laya v Pekinskom Aeroportu,” páginas. 107–119.

49. Ibídem.

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Diplomatic “Geometry” of the 1969–1978 Sino-Soviet Border Talks

exchanged during the Sino-Soviet border negotiations in 1964; residence,
travel, and the economic activity of local populations on the disputed territo-
ries were to be facilitated by the two sides until the border issue was resolved.
De este modo, the foundation was laid for the subsequent Chinese demand to divide
the border into “disputed” and “undisputed” territories.50

Two days later, in another letter, Zhou wrote:

1. In those areas where the provisional borderline of the two parties does not
coincide, es decir., in areas that are disputed, both parties guarantee that the popu-
lations of both sides will continue to reside, engage in economic activity and
travel freely on the territories where they previously lived, engaged in economic
actividad, and traveled. 2. Both parties agree to avoid armed conﬂict;, this includes
the non-use of force, the respect of each other’s airspace, and the navigation of
vessels exclusively along the thalweg and in accordance with the rules of navi-
gation. 3. The armed forces of both sides shall avoid direct contact on disputed
territories of the Sino-Soviet border.51

En respuesta, Kosygin wrote that the Soviet side had already taken appropri-
ate measures to normalize the situation, but he did not distinguish between
disputed and undisputed territories, suggesting the preservation of the status
quo on the border as a whole. Kosygin also pointed out that Soviet troops had
been given the following order: “Provided that the Soviet and Chinese border
authorities have agreed in advance on terms and areas [of economic activity],
and they both observe the border regime, both sides shall allow the economic
activities of Chinese and Soviet citizens to be carried out in those areas where
this activity was previously systematically carried out.”52

Sin embargo, Zhou’s understanding of the temporary measures differed

dramatically from Kosygin’s understanding:

In your reply on 26 Septiembre, you did not conﬁrm the points on which agree-
ment was already reached between the two sides. . . . Some measures under-
taken by the Soviet side [y] mentioned in your letter are not in accord with
the verbal agreement between us. We concurred that once agreement has been
reached between the border authorities on both sides regarding the residence,
traveling and engagement in various types of economic activity by the [local]

50. Thus the Chinese laid the basis for the use of “disputed territories” as a speciﬁc term. Originally
the Chinese used you zhengyi de diqu (territories where the disputes exist) to express the meaning; más tarde
they used zhengyi diqu (disputed territories). “Tekst Pis’ma Chzhou En’laya Kosyginu razoslannyi V.
Kuznetsovym chlenam Politburo i kandidatam v chleny Politburo," 20 Septiembre 1969, in RGANI,
F. 5, Op. 61, D. 434, Ll. 21–23.

51. Ibídem.

52. “Pis’mo A. Kosygina Prem’eru Gosudarstvennogo Soveta KNR Chzhou Enlaiu," 26 Septiembre
1969, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 61, D. 434, Ll. 39–41.

129

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populations of the disputed territories . . . there will be no further need for noti-
ﬁcation in each case. Sin embargo, you say in your letter that the border authorities
on both sides must [each time] agree in advance on the time and areas [del
economic activities performed by the local population] and observe the border
regime.53

Some scholars even maintain that “the letter [de 26 Septiembre] failed to men-
tion the cooperative tension-reduction measures mutually accepted at the
Kosygin-Zhou airport talks and noted in Zhou’s letter to Kosygin on the
eighteenth” and that “the Chinese interpreted this as [Soviet] backtracking
and became even more convinced that the Kremlin was not sincere and might
even be plotting an attack under the cover of the upcoming negotiations.”54
The letter, En realidad, listed the measures the Soviet side had already taken, pero
the Chinese believed those steps to be insufﬁcient.55

To avoid becoming embroiled in a debate on speciﬁc issues, Kosygin
wrote a low-key reply to Zhou’s obvious protest: “Through the letters ex-
changed between the Chinese and Soviet sides, certain speciﬁc issues concern-
ing the border were touched upon, along with some [otro] issues that went
beyond boundary lines, and the viewpoint of the Soviet side on them is stated
in our letter dated 26 September of this year.”56 The disparate understandings
of the agreement reached between the two premiers on 11 Septiembre 1969
overshadowed all subsequent negotiations. Among the topics on which the
two sides could not reach mutual understanding was the question of whether
these negotiations should be on border disputes in particular or on Sino-Soviet
relations in general. Finalmente, Soviet ofﬁcials gave in and agreed to accept the ne-
gotiations as focusing exclusively on the border.57 Despite that, the exchange
between the highest leaders of the two countries was indispensable in address-
ing immediate concerns. Both sides took measures, even if partial, to eliminate
violent military clashes on the border.

Al mismo tiempo, the prospect of upcoming negotiations did not ease Bei-
jing’s suspicions and fears. If anything, Chinese leaders grew more concerned

53. “Pis’mo Chzhou Enlaya predsedatliu Soveta Ministrov SSSR A. Kosyginu," 6 Octubre 1969, en
RGANI, F. 5, Op. 61, D. 434, Ll. 65–67.

54. John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War (stanford,
California: Prensa de la Universidad de Stanford, 2006), pag. 60.

55. “Pis’mo A. Kosygina Prem’eru Gosudarstvennogo Soveta KNR Chzhou En’layu," 26 Septiembre
1969.

56. “Pis’mo A. Kosygina Prem’eru Gosudarstvennogo Soveta KNR Chzhou En’layu," 14 Octubre
1969, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 61, D. 434, Ll. 105–106.

57. Elizavetin, “Peregovory A. norte. Kosygina i Chzhou En’laya v Pekinskom Aeroportu,” páginas. 107–119.

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Diplomatic “Geometry” of the 1969–1978 Sino-Soviet Border Talks

about a preemptive nuclear attack. Chinese National Day, an annual celebra-
tion commemorating the founding of the PRC, was scheduled for 1 Octubre,
and Lin Biao became concerned that the Soviet Union might “[llevar] advan-
tage of our holiday to launch a surprise attack.”58 After the holiday passed
without incident, the Chinese focused on a new date for a potential Soviet
assault: the eve of the beginning of bilateral negotiations in Beijing on 20 Oc-
tober. When that attack, también, did not happen, both parties proceeded with the
talks.59 A crisis was averted.

Border Talks and Triangular Diplomacy (1969–1973)

The most detailed discussions were held from 21 Octubre 1969 to14 June
1973. This period coincided with the beginning of a new U.S. foreign policy
seeking parallel, coordinated rapprochement with both Beijing and Moscow.
Henry Kissinger referred to it as “triangular diplomacy”; its aim was to exploit
the rivalry between the two Communist states to create a new diplomatic
environment.60 Both China and the USSR were at this time trying to improve
their relations with the United States, and the Sino-Soviet talks played an
indispensable role in the process.

For the United States, the Sino-Soviet border conﬂict of 1969 provided
a crucial opportunity to improve relations with Beijing.61 In 1970 y 1971,
Soviet production of new weapons systems and deployment of nuclear missiles
had sparked even greater U.S. concern.62 U.S. political elites for the most part
agreed that far-reaching changes were needed in U.S. policy toward the two
Communist great powers, especially toward China.63

In early 1969, the Chinese had dispatched large numbers of engineering
and anti-artillery forces to North Vietnam, increasing the risk that Chinese
and U.S. troops would come into conﬂict.64 But in the aftermath of the bor-
der clashes with the USSR, as the former Chinese diplomat Li Fenglin has

58. Gerson, The Sino-Soviet Border Conﬂict, pag. 59.

59. Ibídem.

60. Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), pag. 210.

61. Cual, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969,” pp. 21–52.

62. Robert S. ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969–1989 (stanford, California:
Prensa de la Universidad de Stanford, 1997) pag. 21.

63. Yafeng Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks during the Cold War, 1949–1972 (Bloom-
ington, EN: Indiana University Press, 2006), pag. 136.

64. Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy, pag. 136.

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noted, the PRC came to seek improved relations with the United States.65
The clear signs of improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations under the new U.S
president Richard Nixon, made the Chinese even more concerned. Shortly
after the beginning of the Sino-Soviet talks, the USSR and the United States
had announced that a preparatory meeting for the Strategic Arms Limitation
Treaty negotiation would be held in Helsinki on 17 Noviembre 1969. On 24
November the Soviet Union and the United States signed the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. On 8 December, the USSR and the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) began to hold talks in Moscow on an
agreement to renounce the use or threat of force in bilateral relations.66

All of these changes were conditioned by a shift in Soviet foreign policy
toward the West. En octubre 1969, when Willy Brandt, who had campaigned
on a platform of Ostpolitik, became chancellor of West Germany, the Soviet
Union became hopeful of achieving a rapprochement with the FRG.67 KGB
Chairman Yuri Andropov had long since decided that economic, technolog-
ical, and cultural cooperation with West Germany would facilitate Moscow’s
quest to end U.S. domination in Western Europe. He was also reportedly
hopeful that closer relations with and technology transfers from West Ger-
many could help in modernizing the Soviet economy.68 Kissinger claimed
that the Soviet Union’s deeper motivation was “to practice selective détente—
to ease tension with some allies while maintaining an intransigent position
toward us.”69

The United States, sin embargo, proved to be an indispensable part of the
relaxation process. Por 1971, Nixon and his national security adviser, Kissinger,
had indicated a strong interest in rapprochement with the USSR. As a quid
pro quo for Soviet assistance in helping the United States to withdraw from
Vietnam, Nixon and Kissinger promised to facilitate a settlement on Berlin.70
De este modo, in the wake of the 1969 border conﬂict, the Soviet Union and the
PRC each found itself bidding against the other in attempting to secure better
relations with the West. Ofﬁcials in both Moscow and Beijing believed that
Nixon’s foreign policy would suffer a hard blow if the two Communist coun-
tries were to revive their ties. Por lo tanto, maintaining contact and continuing
negotiations between the two was important not only for keeping peace in

65. li, interviewed by Shen.

66. Chai, “Zhou Enlai lingdao women jinxing Zhong Su bianjie tanpan,” páginas. 189–199.

67. Zubok, A Failed Empire, pag. 211.

68. Ibídem.

69. Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Bostón: Pequeño, Marrón, 1979), pag. 410.

70. Zubok, A Failed Empire, pag. 212.

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Diplomatic “Geometry” of the 1969–1978 Sino-Soviet Border Talks

the region but also for leverage vis-à-vis the United States. Al mismo tiempo,
having been forced to the negotiating table after the Soviet Union hinted at
the possibility of a nuclear attack, the Chinese continued to perceive Moscow
as the PRC’s most imminent military threat.71

Before the negotiations began, the Soviet KGB gathered information
about the members of the Chinese delegation and assessed possible outcomes
of the talks. One of the KGB reports, which used a high-ranking Chinese
defector as a source, stated:

As for the forthcoming negotiations, at the present stage a ﬁnal decision and
an agreement between the parties seem impossible. During the talks, either an
interim agreement will be reached, or they [the negotiations] will be delayed, como
the Sino-American talks in Warsaw, o [the negotiations will be] interrupted,
like the Sino-Indian talks on the border issue. Judging by the composition of
the delegation, at least some of the Chinese leaders intend to probe the state of
Sino-Soviet relations and test the limits of the Soviet concessions.72

The Chinese also prepared for the negotiations. During a meeting of the
delegation on 7 Octubre 1969 Zhou Enlai divided the Chinese leaders who
worked on the issue of the Sino-Soviet border into three “lines.” The head
of the Chinese delegation, Qiao Guanhua, and his deputy Chai Chengwen
were deemed “the ﬁrst line.” Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Ji Pengfei
and Chief of Staff of the People’s Liberation Army Huang Yongsheng were
“the second line,” and the CCP ruling organs constituted “the third line.”
Zhou Enlai asked all members of the delegation to concentrate on the talks
immediately, put down all other work, and go all-out to prepare for the nego-
tiations: primero, by studying the statements and notes that the two governments
had already exchanged, and then by studying the history of and the current
situation on the border.73

On 9 Marzo 1970, as the U.S.-China opening was about to material-
ized the Chinese delegation submitted a draft status quo agreement to the
Soviet side stipulating that both sides should “strictly maintain the position
on the border that existed on 11 Septiembre 1969, at the moment when two

71. Gerson, The Sino-Soviet Border Conﬂict, páginas. 46–52.

72. “Material KGB po voprosu o granitse," 18 Octubre 1969, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 61, D. 434, Ll. 94–
97. Even though full diplomatic relations between the United States and the PRC were established only
en 1979, the two countries had maintained communications via Sino-American ambassadorial talks in
Warsaw that lasted from August 1955 through February 1970. After skirmishes in late 1959, the PRC
and India sat down at the negotiation table in April 1960. When the talks reached an impasse, el
Indians adopted a more straightforward policy. In an effort to force the Indians back to the negotiation
mesa, the Chinese launched an attack.

73. Chai, “Zhou Enlai lingdao women jinxing Zhong Su bianjie tanpan,” páginas. 189–199.

133

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premiers met.” The Soviet Union’s failure to have withdrawn its troops far
enough from the border remained one of Beijing’s main concerns. Such a
withdrawal was understood to be a part of the tension-reduction measures that
would facilitate bilateral negotiations.74 Other actions of the Soviet side close
to the border seemed equally troubling. Por ejemplo, en 18 Noviembre 1969
the USSR established a Central Asian Military District in the area bordering
Xinjiang.75

The Chinese draft was also of great signiﬁcance for the Soviet Union.
Soviet ofﬁcials later emphasized that the draft made no mention of the two
types of territories, “disputed” and “undisputed,” and that the status quo was
to be maintained on the border as a whole.76 The Chinese further developed
their understanding of the border dispute as the negotiations progressed, más tarde
demanding that on undisputed territories the status quo should be maintained
in accordance with a borderline that both sides agreed on, whereas on disputed
territories the status quo was to be maintained in accordance with the situation
on the border on 11 Septiembre 1969.

Mientras tanto, A NOSOTROS. contacts with China continued to develop. On 12
Febrero 1970 the Chinese Politburo passed a resolution welcoming the U.S.
government’s decision to send a ministerial-level representative or presidential
envoy to Beijing to negotiate with Chinese leaders. The Chinese government
also decided to hold ambassadorial talks in Warsaw on 20 Febrero. But on
18 March in Cambodia, General Lon Nol, con estados unidos. apoyo, staged a mili-
tary coup d’état, overthrowing the government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk,
the Cambodian head of state.77 On 28 April Nixon approved a U.S. incursion
into Cambodia to support Lon Nol, thereby expanding the war from Vietnam
and Laos to all of Indochina. U.S.-China contacts froze.78

The Sino-Soviet talks, mientras tanto, presented a unique opportunity to
relay a message to the United States. On 20 Marzo, Mao had the representa-
tives of the Soviet delegation participate in Labor Day celebrations at Tianan-
men Square. Yurii Gankovskii, the deputy chairman of the Soviet delegation,
was then introduced to Mao. The two men talked about the commitment

74. “Zapis’ besedy L. F. Il’icheva s glavoi kitaiskoi pravitel’stvennoi delegatsii Tsiao Guan’-hua," 5
Octubre 1971, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 63, D. 437, Ll. 245–262.

75. Chai, “Zhou Enlai lingdao women jinxing Zhong Su bianjie tanpan,” páginas. 189–199.

76. “Zapis’ besedy L. F. Il’icheva s glavoi kitaiskoi pravitel’stvennoi delegatsii Tsiao Guan’-hua," 5
Octubre 1971.

77. Kuisong Yang and Yafeng Xia, “Vacillating between Revolution and Détente: Mao’s Changing
Psyche and Policy toward the United States, 1969–1976,” Diplomatic History, volumen. 34, No. 2 (Abril
2010), páginas. 395–423.

78. Jussi Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect (Oxford, Reino Unido: prensa de la Universidad de Oxford, 2004), pag. 70.

134

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Diplomatic “Geometry” of the 1969–1978 Sino-Soviet Border Talks

of both parties to the non-use of force. During the conversation, Mao said,
“We should negotiate well so that they [negotiations] lead to friendly, neigh-
borly relations. We must struggle through words, not through force.”79 In this
manner, the Chinese vividly demonstrated the feasibility of a Sino-Soviet rap-
prochement, a gesture that only a few days later was followed by canceling the
U.S.-China ambassadorial meeting in Warsaw as a protest against the U.S.
invasion of Cambodia.80

The United States withdrew its troops from Cambodia at the end of June
1970, reviving hope of a Sino-American rapprochement.81 In light of these
events Kosygin wrote a letter to Zhou on 8 Julio 1970 asking whether the
two premiers could make a public statement on behalf of their two govern-
mentos. He proposed that they emphasize that neither side was making territo-
rial claims for the other, that they were determined to maintain the status quo
and the normal situation on the border, and that neither country intended to
negotiate using the threat of force.82

The letter proposed several measures. Primero, pick up the border negoti-
ations from where the two delegations had left off during the 1964 consul-
taciones, which were meant to formalize the intergovernmental understanding
reached by the working groups on the eastern section of the borderline in 1964
and continue negotiating over other sections of the border. Segundo, simultane-
ously have the delegations of the two countries begin negotiating a draft treaty
between the USSR and the PRC on the non-use of force, including nuclear
fuerza, and prohibiting propaganda of war and preparation for war against the
other side, bearing in mind that such a document could then be signed at a
higher state level along with the conclusion of a new border agreement. Tercero,
continue negotiations in Beijing on the measures to maintain the status quo
on the border and other issues related to ensuring the continuation of border
talks.83

Behind the Soviet attempt to facilitate a joint public statement was the
need to downplay the scale of Sino-Soviet disagreement and make sure Bei-
jing’s rapprochement with the West did not further shift the balance of power.
Kosygin’s letter, sin embargo, went unanswered. The Chinese were preoccupied

79. Kireev, Neizvestnye stranitsy pogranichnyh peregovorov, pag. 138.

80. Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy, pag. 240.

81. Iver Peterson, “Last Combat Unit Out of Cambodia after 2 Months,"El New York Times, 30
Junio 1970, pag. 1; and Kissinger, On China, páginas. 202–203. Although U.S. forces withdrew, the South
Vietnamese army continued to conduct military operations in Cambodia until late July.

82. Kireev, Neizvestnye stranitsy pogranichnyh peregovorov, pag. 139.

83. Ibídem.

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with the prospect of Sino-American rapprochement, and on 10 July Bei-
jing released Bishop James Walsh, a U.S. citizen who had been imprisoned
in China since 1958 on espionage charges. This was Beijing’s signal to the
United States that the PRC was keenly interested in improving relations.84

Desperate to get a message through, the Soviet Union turned to the Viet-
namese, who conveyed Kosygin’s letter to Beijing. Más tarde, Zhou Enlai explained
these events:

If I had replied [to the letter], we would have begun to quarrel, especially because
the situation after 11 Septiembre 1969, has not improved, but has worsened.
Then Comrade Kosygin through Pham Van Dong and Le Thanh Nghi conveyed
to me some of his considerations. I, Sucesivamente, through Comrade Pham Van Dong
thanked Comrade Kosygin for good intentions and explained why I cannot meet
with the Premier of the USSR Council of Ministers and cannot reply to his
letter: what we agreed on at the meeting on 11 Septiembre 1969 has not been
implemented.85

The Chinese thus chose to ignore the Soviet attempt to facilitate a public
statement and create an image of improved Sino-Soviet relations.

Mientras tanto, the Chinese put up their navigation signs on Damanskii,
Kirkinskii, Sychevskii, and Kultuk Islands along the Amur and Ussuri Rivers
because “the border was to be drawn along the thalweg, and these islands
were to remain on the Chinese side of the border.”86 This behavior was not
limited to a few instances, and therefore it could have sparked clashes. El
Soviet section of the Joint Navigation Commission on the border rivers urged
the CPSU Politburo to adopt a resolution requiring the KGB’s Main Border
Guards Directorate to employ all necessary measures to guarantee the safety
of Soviet technicians when they tried to access the signs on the Chinese side
of the thalweg.87

Unable to make progress with the Chinese, the USSR signed the Moscow
Treaty with the FRG on 12 Agosto 1970. The treaty renounced the use of
force and recognized the existing borders, thus legitimizing the divide between

84. Yang and Xia, “Vacillating between Revolution and Détente,” páginas. 395–423.

85. “Zapis’ besedy L. F. Il’icheva i V. S. Tolstikova s Prem’erom Gosudarstvennogo Soveta KNR
Chzhou En’-laem," 21 Marzo 1971, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 63, D. 41, Ll. 1–40.

86. “Informatsiya v Kraikom KPSS tov. A. k. Chernomu ot nachal’nika upravleniya KGB I. Petrov,"
31 Agosto 1970, in Khabarovsk Krai State Archive, F. П-35, Op. 96, D. 408A, Ll. 22–29.
87. “Proekt postanovleniya TsK KPSS o merah po obespecheniyu bezopasnosti proizvodstva putevyh
rabot na pogranichnyh rekah Amurskogo basseina v navigatsii 1970 goda," 15 Septiembre 1970, en
Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), F. A562, Op. 1, D. 4273, l. 9.

136

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Diplomatic “Geometry” of the 1969–1978 Sino-Soviet Border Talks

the two German states.88 Meanwhile, the Chinese were trying to conﬁrm to
the United States that the time was ripe to improve Sino-U.S. relaciones. On
1 Octubre 1970 Mao’s old friend Edgar Snow, a leftist U.S. journalist and
escritor, and his wife were invited to China to view the annual National Day
celebration parade from the wall of the Forbidden City overlooking Tianan-
men Square.89 In a Time magazine interview four days later, Nixon stated, “If
there is anything I want to do before I die, it is to go to China.” In the ﬁnal
few months of 1970, the two sides secretly communicated through a Pakistani
channel and agreed to conduct high-level talks in Beijing.90

In the meantime, Sino-Soviet negotiations revolved solely around the sta-
tus quo agreement. The parties submitted four drafts each. Different variants
contained ten to thirteen articles, and the two sides had different interpreta-
tions of almost all the provisions. Among the issues discussed was the question
of whether to conclude an agreement on the basis of ﬁve principles or four.
The Chinese were unwilling to include the term “proletarian international-
ism” in the document, but they insisted on keeping the principle of “peace-
ful coexistence.”91 The Soviet side pointed out that the principle of peaceful
coexistence was mentioned in the PRC’s treaties with Equatorial Guinea and
Ethiopia, but not in Chinese treaties with Italy, Canada, and Chile. The Soviet
side objected to being placed on a par with Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia.92
This seemingly trivial dispute underscored the differences in how Beijing and
Moscow viewed the Sino-Soviet relationship.

In early 1971, the Soviet side still maintained hope that the atmosphere
would allow the border issue to be positively resolved: “First of all, the Soviet
delegation would like to emphasize that now, with the exception of a few cases,
a businesslike atmosphere has generally been established, objectively creating
favorable conditions for Sino-Soviet negotiations. We can not only accelerate

88. Margot Light, “Anglo-Soviet Relations: Political and Diplomatic,” in Alex Pravda and Peter J. S.
Duncan, editores., Soviet British Relations since the 1970s (Cambridge, Reino Unido: Prensa de la Universidad de Cambridge,
1990), pag. 134.

89. Yang and Xia, “Vacillating between Revolution and Détente,” páginas. 395–423.

90. Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy, pag. 241.

91. The remaining four principles were: mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and
sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, and equal-
ity and cooperation for mutual beneﬁt. El 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mu-
tual Assistance was the ﬁrst in Chinese history to include all ﬁve principles; por lo tanto, the use of these
terms was not all that surprising. Niu Jun, ed., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Duiwai Guanxishi Gailun
(1949–2000), pag. 86.

92. “Zapis’ besedy L. F. Il’icheva s glavoi kitaiskoi pravitel’stvennoi delegatsii Tsiao Guan’-hua," 9
Febrero 1971, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 63, D. 436, Ll. 37–54.

137

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the course of the talks, but also bring them to a successful conclusion.”93 As
the discussions became more heated, the Chinese grew dissatisﬁed with the
conduct of Soviet delegates, accusing them of engaging in “quixotism” and
bringing up “unsubstantiated accusations” mostly about recent incidents on
the border: “you yourselves painted a nonexistent object, and now you shoot
at it.”94

Military actions in Vietnam further complicated bilateral relations. On
15 Enero 1971, Soviet Ambassador Vasilii Tolstikov was received by PRC
Deputy Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua, to whom the Soviet ambassador
handed a draft of the treaty on non-use of force.95 Three days later, en 18
Enero, Kosygin met with Chinese Ambassador Liu Xinquan, and during
their conversation he brieﬂy discussed the article on the non-use of force.
Zhou Enlai later discussed the same issue with Ambassador Tolstikov:

In our meeting with comrade Zhou Enlai, he expressed his wish to discuss the
issue regarding an agreement or a document on mutual renunciation of the use
of force, including the use of nuclear missiles. This was the ﬁrst question that
Comrade Zhou Enlai raised. He also expressed a wish that the negotiations take
place in conditions that exclude any threat. Our side agreed with this. Sin embargo,
on the way in which to formalize this commitment, the parties did not agree.96

On 26 Febrero, on instructions from Zhou Enlai, the acting Chinese Foreign
Minister Ji Pengfei met with Tolstikov. The Soviet ambassador handed over
a statement from his government regarding the “American-Saigon aggression
in Laos.” The statement called for immediate consultations at any level with
the leadership of the PRC regarding the possibility of joint actions by the
two countries “in support of the Indochinese people in their heroic struggle
against the aggression of American imperialism.”97

Al mismo tiempo, the full text of the Soviet government’s statement on

this issue appeared in the Soviet press, sparking a rebuff from the PRC:

93. “Protokol piatnadtsatogo plenarnogo zasedaniya pravitel’stvennyh delegatsii Sovetskogo Soiuza i
Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki na peregovorah po utochneniyu prohozhdeniya linii sovetsko-kitaiskoi
granitsy," 21 Enero 1971, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 63, D. 435, Ll. 1–13.

94. “Zapis’ besedy L. F. Il’icheva s glavoi kitaiskoi pravitel’stvennoi delegatsii Tsiao Guan’-hua," 9
Febrero 1971.

95. “Zapis’ besedy L. F. Il’icheva I V. S. Tolstikova s Prem’erom Gosudarstvennogo Soveta KNR
Chzhou En’-laem," 21 Marzo 1971.

96. “Protokol vosemnadtsatogo plenarnogo zasedaniya pravitel’stvennyh delegatsii Sovetskogo Soiuza
i Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki na peregovorah po uregulirovaniyu pogranichnyh voprosov," 23 Abril
1971, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 63, D. 435, Ll. 70–90.

97. “Zapis’ besedy L. F. Il’icheva i V. S. Tolstikova s Prem’erom Gosudarstvennogo Soveta KNR
Chzhou En’-laem," 21 Marzo 1971.

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Diplomatic “Geometry” of the 1969–1978 Sino-Soviet Border Talks

We could tell you this: about the situation in Indochina we have long had the
opportunity to make statements together with the Soviet side. We argue that
there are great differences between the PRC and the Soviet Union on positions
toward the United States, and we told you that we could not make statements
together.98

Still the Soviet Union continued to pursue an improvement of bilateral rela-
tions with China. At the CPSU’s 24th Congress held in March 1971, Soviet
leaders emphasized that the Soviet Union was “willing not only to promote
the normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and the People’s Re-
public of China, but also to pursue the restoration of neighborly and friendly
relations between the two countries.”99

Mientras tanto, the Chinese continued to seek better relations with the
United States. Although Beijing had already used several channels to signal
its desire for a rapprochement, it was puzzled by the U.S. ping-pong team’s
request to visit the PRC after the 31st International Table Tennis Tournament
in Nagoya, Japón, in late March 1971. After Chinese leaders discussed the
matter at length, they granted the team permission to visit.100

Around the same time, the Soviet side submitted another draft of the
status quo agreement to the PRC that omitted any mention of mutual non-
use of force.101 From the beginning of the talks, the Chinese had stressed the
need to adopt a document that eliminated the threat of attack. They claimed
that “an atomic bomb [era] hanging over the [negotiating] table” and that
the signing of a status quo agreement was a prerequisite for conducting border
talks.102 Soviet ofﬁcials suggested that two documents be signed: one to secure
the status quo on the border and another to guarantee the elimination of the
threat or use of force.

On 21 Marzo 1971, Zhou held a meeting with Ambassador Tolstikov
and the head of the Soviet delegation, Leonid Ilichev. The conversation lasted
four hours and forty minutes. During their talk, the two sides discussed the
status quo agreement. Zhou sharply pointed out:

98. Ibídem.

99. Niu Jun, “Zouxiang ‘Zhengchanghua’ (1979–1991),” in Shen Zhihua, ed., Zhongsu Guanxi
Shigang 1917–1991 nian: Zhongsu Guanxi Ruogan Wenti Tantao (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian
Chubanshe, 2016), páginas. 611–612.

100. Yang and Xia, “Vacillating between Revolution and Détente,” páginas. 395–423.

101. “Protokol vosemnadtsatogo plenarnogo zasedaniya pravitel’stvennyh delegatsii Sovetskogo Soiuza
i Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki na peregovorah po uregulirovaniyu pogranichnyh voprosov," 23 Abril
1971.

102. Kireev, Neizvestnye stranitsy pogranichnyh peregovorov, pag. 134.

139

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Replying to Comrade Kosygin through comrade Le Thanh Nghi, I said that
the Soviet side is now proposing not one document, pero dos, and I called these
actions “tricks.” It means that these are not serious negotiations, but some kind
of juggling.103

When discussing temporary measures that were to secure the status quo on
the border, including withdrawal of military personnel from the region, el
Soviet ofﬁcials said to Zhou: “We are against such suspicion; we need mu-
tual trust. Without it, negotiations are difﬁcult to conduct. We are in doubt;
do you not mean to turn temporary measures into permanent ones.” Soviet
documents show that, at this point in the conversation, Zhou leaned toward
Qiao Guan-hua and asked him whether the term “temporary measures” was
in the title of the draft agreement. Qiao replied that it was not in the title
but in the preamble.104 Zhou then said that if the Soviet delegation so wished,
the Chinese could omit or take out the word “temporary” from the text of
the agreement. Zhou also spoke about the long-existing Treaty of Friendship,
Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the two countries. He said that if the
treaty needed to be amended, this could be discussed after the conclusion of a
new border treaty.105

The Soviet ofﬁcials proposed that the withdrawal of troops from direct
contact be carried out in the following manner: On the river sections of the
border, armed personnel (military units) of both sides would not travel to is-
lands whose sovereignty had yet to be determined by mutual agreement of the
parties; on the land sections of the border in places where economic activity
was conducted, the armed forces of both sides would withdraw from direct
contact from the line where they were located to equal minimum-required
distances agreed by the parties; on the abovementioned sections, the admin-
istrative management of the parties would remain unchanged, and existing
border posts (outposts)would be preserved.106

The Chinese side maintained that these proposals could not actually
achieve the stated goals. On the river sections of the border, the new So-
viet draft did not raise the question of withdrawing armed forces stationed
on the disputed islands. On the land sections of the border, the point about

103. “Zapis’ besedy L. F. Il’icheva i V. S. Tolstikova s Prem’erom Gosudarstvennogo Soveta KNR
Chzhou En’-laem," 21 Marzo 1971.

104. Ibídem.

105. “Protokol vosemnadtsatogo plenarnogo zasedaniya pravitel’stvennyh delegatsii Sovetskogo Soiuza
i Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki na peregovorah po uregulirovaniyu pogranichnyh voprosov," 23 Abril
1971.

106. Kireev, Neizvestnye stranitsy pogranichnyh peregovorov, pag. 142.

140

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Diplomatic “Geometry” of the 1969–1978 Sino-Soviet Border Talks

prohibiting armed forces from entering the disputed territories was not raised.
As for the Soviet proposal to withdraw armed forces from the borderline as it
was on 11 Septiembre 1969, such a proposal, the Chinese believed, would
merely cause disputes between the parties about where the line passed and did
not help in reaching agreement. During the meeting, Zhou also pointed out
“you, Por ejemplo, suggest maintaining all border outposts. If you mean at the
same time to leave all the border troops in these border outposts, entonces, En realidad,
it would mean ultimately revoking the [measures facilitating] withdrawal of
the armed forces from contact.”107

The atmosphere during the meeting was tense. Zhou referred to Brezhnev
as “comrade” and then added, “I did not really have to say ‘comrade.’” The
Soviet ofﬁcials, nevertheless, were not taken aback; they hoped it was just
Zhou trying to correct himself in front of the other members of the Chinese
delegation.108 The Chinese also addressed recent news about the prospect that
a Japanese delegation would visit the Sino-Soviet border regions:

Recently there were reports in the Japanese press that you are inviting a Japanese
military delegation which is to visit the Soviet Far East in April, including areas
bordering China. Does this look like a relationship between the allied countries?
You have not had any refutations on this score.

The Soviet ofﬁcials responded that even if such a plan existed, it would not
be a violation of the alliance treaty.109 The meeting concluded with little
progress.

By then, the Chinese had already approved the visit of the U.S. ping-pong
team to Beijing. For four days, starting on 11 Abril 1971, the team toured his-
torical landmarks of the city, including Tiananmen Square. Estados Unidos. jugadores
and the journalists who accompanied them were among the ﬁrst U.S. los ciudadanos
allowed to enter China since 1949. Bilateral relations were beginning to gain
momentum.110

Sin embargo, the Sino-Soviet negotiations continued. During the discus-
sion on 23 Abril, the Soviet side expressed a sincere desire to ﬁnd a solution
to this issue that would allow both parties to remove it from the agenda once

107. “Poyasneniya k proektu soglasheniya kitaiskoi storony ot 17 marta 1971 goda," 17 Marzo 1971,
in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 63, D. 435, l. 65–69.

108. “Zapis’ besedy L. F. Il’icheva i V. S. Tolstikova s Prem’erom Gosudarstvennogo Soveta KNR
Chzhou En’-laem," 21 Marzo 1971.

109. Ibídem.

110. Ruth Eckstein, “Ping Pong Diplomacy: A View from behind the Scenes,” The Journal of
American-East Asian Relations, No. 3 (1993), páginas. 327–342.

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and for all and “put an end to all conversations that someone is being threat-
ened with the use of force.”111 The Soviet side proposed two options: either
sign two documents (one temporary agreement on the status quo and a long-
term treaty on the non-use of force) or include a conﬁrmation of the 1950
bilateral alliance treaty while omitting the clause about the non-use of force in
the status quo agreement. The Chinese side believed that both conﬁrmation
del 1950 treaty and an additional clause committing the two sides to the
non-use of force should be included in the status quo agreement. The Chi-
nese also pointed out that, because the 1950 treaty said nothing about not
using nuclear weapons, the Chinese wanted to include this issue in the status
quo agreement. The Soviet side proposed signing a separate treaty as a way to
reduce the nuclear threat.112

On 7 Puede 1971 the Soviet delegation introduced its third draft of the
status quo agreement, including an article on the non-use of force. The draft
underscored that such obligations should not be limited in time. On 26 Junio
the Chinese side introduced the fourth (and last) draft agreement on the sta-
tus quo. In it, the Soviet provisions on the non-use of force were taken into
cuenta, with that part of the Chinese draft almost fully mirroring the Soviet
one from 7 May.113

U.S.-China relations, mientras tanto, continued to develop. By June, el
United States had lifted its embargo against China. Acting in the spirit of
a 29 May CCP Politburo report, which primarily addressed the issue of Sino-
American rapprochement, the Chinese side received Kissinger from 9 a 11
Julio 1971.114 During their talks, Zhou and Kissinger focused on Taiwan,
which had been tied to the United States since 1954 with a mutual defense
treaty. Zhou secured much needed, although not completely satisfactory, A NOSOTROS.
assurances regarding Taiwan. Kissinger promised Zhou that the United States
would soon disengage itself from Taiwan and that the Nixon administration
would not seek “two Chinas” or a “one China, one Taiwan” policy, would not
support Nationalist action against the mainland, and would not support the
Taiwanese independence movement.115 By 15 July of the same year, Nixon

111. “Protokol vosemnadtsatogo plenarnogo zasedaniya pravitel’stvennykh delegatsii Sovetskogo
Soyuza i Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki na peregovorakh po uregulirovaniyu pogranichnykh vo-
prosov," 23 Abril 1971.

112. Ibídem.

113. Kireev, Neizvestnye stranitsy pogranichnyh peregovorov, pag. 144.

114. Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy, páginas. 167–172.

115. Ibídem., pag. 181.

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Diplomatic “Geometry” of the 1969–1978 Sino-Soviet Border Talks

had gone on U.S. national television and declared that he was planning an
ofﬁcial visit to Beijing.116

Mientras tanto, the Sino-Soviet talks continued. On 6 Julio, during another
reunión, the head of the Chinese delegation, Qiao Guanhua, discussed the
second and third articles of the status quo agreement with his Soviet coun-
terpart, Ilichev. Qiao claimed that since 7 Puede, when the Soviet Union had
offered a new draft, Soviet planes had violated Chinese airspace ﬁve times.
Qiao expressed hope that such incidents would not be repeated in the future.
Ilichev vehemently denied that any such incidents had occurred.117

The Soviet side also tried to separate the issue of the economic activity
of the local populations and their permanent residence in these regions. El
Chinese always listed the two together. The Soviet Union was willing to per-
mit the Chinese citizens to engage in the former, but the latter, they feared,
would be used as a pretext to assert claims on some of the border territories.
The issue of economic activity was tied to the notion of disputed territories,
and therefore the two sides ultimately reached an impasse.118

On 17 Septiembre 1971 the Soviet side submitted the fourth and ﬁnal
draft of the status quo agreement. In addition to editorial changes aimed at
“harmonizing individual formulations,” it contained additions to Article 1,
“reﬂecting word for word the notion of status quo expressed by Zhou Enlai on
11 September 1969.”119

The atmosphere during the negotiation was becoming tenser. During one
of the meetings, Yu Zhan pointed out that Ilichev did not understand the sit-
uation, to which Ilichev retorted that he had “understood quite a few things
long before Yu Zhan was born.”120 Despite these testy exchanges, both parties
agreed “the negotiation was held in a calm atmosphere.”121 To Soviet and Chi-
nese ofﬁcials alike, the beneﬁts of maintaining the negotiations while seeking
to improve relations with the United States outweighed any minor difﬁculties.
The Soviets continued working toward détente with the West. In Septem-
ber 1971 a preliminary four-power agreement on Berlin was signed between

116. “Nixon Announces His Visit to China” 15 Julio 1971, in Associated Press Archive, http://www.
aparchive.com/.

117. “Zapis’ besedy L. F. Il’icheva s glavoi kitaiskoi pravitel’stvennoi delegatsii Tsiao Guan’-hua," 6
Julio 1971, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 63, D. 437, Ll. 16–32.

118. Ibídem.

119. Kireev, Neizvestnye stranitsy pogranichnyh peregovorov, pag. 145; énfasis añadido.

120. “Zapis’ besedy L. F. Il’icheva s glavoi kitaiskoi pravitel’stvennoi delegatsii Tsiao Guan’-hua," 6
Julio 1971.

121. Ibídem.

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Tagirova

the United States, Bretaña, Francia, and the Soviet Union. The agreement spec-
iﬁed various rights and responsibilities, including a Soviet guarantee that the
ﬂow of trafﬁc between East and West Berlin would not be impeded.122

The following month, en 5 Octubre, Estados Unidos. and Chinese governments
issued a joint statement that, “in order to make basic arrangements for Pres-
ident Nixon’s visit,” a delegation led by Kissinger would visit China on 20
Octubre 1971. Al mismo tiempo, the United Nations (UN) General Assem-
bly placed the Albanian resolutions that supported the membership of the
PRC on the agenda ahead of the U.S. resolutions for dual representation. On
25 October the UN General Assembly voted by an overwhelming majority
to let Beijing have China’s seat at the UN and to expel Taiwan. In the PRC,
this development was hailed as a triumph for Chinese foreign policy, greatly
enhancing the country’s international status and reputation.123

Coinciding with Kissinger’s visit, these events reinforced the progress
achieved by Beijing and Washington ahead of Nixon’s visit. Kissinger, con-
out getting a mutually acceptable formulation of the traditional joint commu-
niqué, assured Zhou that his aide Alexander Haig would travel to China in
January with a new formulation. The dates were already set for Nixon’s visit:
21 a 28 Febrero 1972.124

Although U.S.-China relations were developing rapidly, unpleasant ex-
changes between Soviet and Chinese ofﬁcials during the border talks became
more frequent. On 13 Octubre 1971, during a plenary meeting, the Chinese
were displeased by Ilichev’s remark that the use of the term “disputed territo-
ries” suggested by the Chinese actually meant that China had territorial claims
on the Soviet Union. After Ilichev asked his counterpart to stop demonstrat-
ing “malign reactions,” the Chinese referred to Soviet leaders as “imperialists.”
Soviet ofﬁcials at the time suspected that “raising the temperature in the ne-
gotiations” had been China’s plan all along.125 Ilichev and his colleagues evi-
dently perceived the heated exchange as having stemmed from Kissinger’s visit
to China and the recent Chinese diplomatic success in the UN.

De 20 Noviembre 1971 a través de 20 Marzo 1972, Sino-Soviet nego-
tiations were paused while the head of the Soviet delegation returned to

122. Richard W. stevenson, The Rise and Fall of the Détente: Relaxations of Tension in US-Soviet Rela-
tions 1953–84 (Houndmills, Reino Unido: Palgrave Macmillan, 1985), pag. 149.

123. Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy, pag. 181.

124. Ibídem.

125. “Zapis’ besedy L. F. Il’icheva s glavoi kitaiskoi pravitel’stvennoi delegatsii Tsiao Guan’-hua," 13
Octubre 1971, RGANI, F. 5, Op. 63, D. 437, Ll. 267–289.

144

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Diplomatic “Geometry” of the 1969–1978 Sino-Soviet Border Talks

Moscow.126 Meanwhile, the PRC’s relations with the United States continued
to improve. On 15 Noviembre 1971, the Chinese delegation headed by Qiao
Guanhua was present for the ﬁrst time at the UN General Assembly.127 On
21 Febrero 1972, Nixon came to China for a one-week visit that was widely
televised and promoted in both countries and around the globe. The visit also
marked the beginning of a new era of bilateral relations.128

Sino-Soviet relations outside the negotiations were complicated by the
two countries’ competition for the loyalty of the North Vietnamese ally. En
January and March 1972, China signed an agreement with the Soviet Union
and East European countries regarding the transportation of military aid for
North Vietnam through Chinese territory. While encouraging the transfer of
a greater amount of weaponry, China tried to limit the Soviet Union’s ability
to control the transportation of commodities through Chinese territory, de este modo
preventing Hanoi and Moscow from excluding Beijing and negotiating the
aid directly. Another big incentive for the Chinese to expand the amount of
military aid to North Vietnam was to end the Vietnam War and eliminate this
major obstacle to rapprochement with the United States.129

After Ilichev returned to Beijing in March 1972, the meetings of the dele-
gations resumed. They held an item-by-item discussion of draft agreements on
the status quo and reviewed the points on which the two parties disagreed.130
These exchanges did not help the negotiation process. An internal document
prepared by the Chinese Foreign Ministry claimed that Soviet ofﬁcials in-
volved in the negotiations not genuinely want to improve bilateral relations
and instead were “attempting to gain [political] capital before Nixon’s visit
to the Soviet Union, deceive the people, enhance their position in bargain-
ing with the United States, and place the responsibility on us for the lack of
progress in the Sino-Soviet border negotiations and in bilateral relations.”131

En efecto, U.S.-Soviet relations at the time also saw rapid development. En
Puede 1972 Nixon made a historic visit to the Soviet Union, only a few months
after his visit to Beijing. On 26 Puede 1972, he and Brezhnev signed the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty and an interim accord to limit long-range nuclear

126. Kireev, Neizvestnye stranitsy pogranichnyh peregovorov, pag. 147.

127. Ver, por ejemplo, Zhang Yi, Waijiao Fengyun Qinliji (Wuhan: Hubei Renmin Chubanshe, 2004).

128. Kissinger, On China, páginas. 255–275.

129. Li Danhui, “Zhongsu zai Yuan Yue Kang Mei wenti shang de maodun yu chongtu (1965–1972),"
in Zhang Baijia and Niu Jun, editores., Zhongguo yu Lengzhan (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 2002),
páginas. 372–415.

130. Kireev, Neizvestnye stranitsy pogranichnyh peregovorov, pag. 147.

131. “Waijiaobu guanyu Zhong Su guanxi biaotai koujing de tongbao," 4 Abril 1972, in Fujian
Provincial Archive, 222-4-297, páginas. 8–10.

145

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armas. They also signed agreements on space development, environmen-
tal issues, and health care. Displeased, in December 1972, Mao announced
the “dig tunnels deep” slogan, calling on ordinary Chinese to construct large-
scale underground tunnels and exhibit them to foreign visitors as a sign of
their determination to resist Soviet aggression.132

Around the same time, Yu Zhan was promoted to head the Chinese del-
egation at the Sino-Soviet border talks.133 The former head, Qiao, had by
then long been in charge of the negotiations with Kissinger and drafting a
joint U.S.-Chinese communiqué. Although the Sino-Soviet border negoti-
ations continued, little progress was made. In an interview with Scandina-
vian journalists on 10 Noviembre 1972, Zhou Enlai said: “China has patience
and will not rush during the negotiations on border issues with the Soviet
Union.”134 Thus, Beijing’s approach to the Sino-Soviet border talks was of-
ﬁcially stated: China was not going to speed up the negotiations, seeing
them as quite beneﬁcial for the development of closer ties with the United
Estados.

Despite all of these changes in the power dynamic among the three coun-
intentos, the Chinese tried at the local level to reinstate control over the territories
situated on the Chinese side of the thalweg. Before 1970, the Soviet Union
was responsible for maintaining 48 navigation signs on 80 islands on the Chi-
nese side of the rivers of the Amur Basin. En 1970, the Chinese took over the
maintenance of 8 signs on 4 islands, and by 1971 they had begun servicing
otro 14 signs on 12 islands. Although Soviet ofﬁcials formally protested,
they never took military measures to regain control.135

From Horizontal Line to Quasi-Alliance (1973–1978)

On 17 Febrero 1973, in a meeting with Kissinger, Mao proposed for the
ﬁrst time his strategy of establishing “‘a horizontal line [yitiaoxian]’—the
United States—Japan—China—Pakistan—Iran—Turkey and Europe” that

132. Kazushi Minami, “Re-Examining the End of Mao’s Revolution: China’s Changing Statecraft and
Sino-American Relations, 1973–1978,” Cold War History, volumen. 16, No. 4 (Septiembre 2016), páginas. 359–
375.

133. “Zapis’ besedy L. F. Il’icheva s glavoi kitaiskoi pravitel’stvennoi delegatsii Yui Chzhanem," 16 Julio
1973, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 66, D. 661, Ll. 132–149.

134. Kireev, Neizvestnye stranitsy pogranichnyh peregovorov, pag. 138.

135. “Spravka o poryadke obsluzhivaniya znakov navigatsionnoi obstanovki, raspolozhennykh v
storonu KNR ot glavnogo farvatera na pogranichnykh uchastkakh rek Amurskogo basseina,” June
1976, in GARF, F. A562, Op. 1, D. 5685, l. 271.

146

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Diplomatic “Geometry” of the 1969–1978 Sino-Soviet Border Talks

would “commonly deal with a bastard [es decir., the Soviet Union].” Later, durante
a meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira in early January
1974, Mao replaced the horizontal alignment with an even broader concept
of a big terrain (yidapian), referring to countries that were adjacent to the
horizontal line.136 The strategy that incorporated these two notions aimed at
creating an “international anti-hegemonic united front.”137

During this period, discussion within the Chinese government on the
prospects of Sino-Soviet normalization continued. A principios de los años 1970, el
Chinese representative at the talks had proposed to the Soviet Union that
the relationship between the two countries be based on the Five Principles
of Peaceful Coexistence. Después, the Chinese approach seemed to change
very little. en septiembre 1973, the CCP held its Tenth National Congress.
The political report presented there highlighted the challenge posed by “So-
viet hegemonism” for the world and for Chinese foreign policy. Even so,
the report still considered the possibility that Sino-Soviet relations could be
normalized.138

As the Chinese effort to solidify relations with the United States began
to bear fruit, U.S.-Soviet relations became more complicated. In the wake
of Soviet human rights violations and the subsequent 1974 Jackson-Vanik
Amendment, acute tensions sparked by the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war,
and the Watergate scandal of 1972–1974, détente began to decline.139

By late 1974, the Chinese might have surmised that U.S. triangular diplo-
macy was no longer equidistant. As the balance of power in the region began
to shift, the Chinese grew to believe that the probability of a Soviet nuclear
attack had been reduced signiﬁcantly. Por lo tanto, por 1974, the Chinese cut
their military budget and markedly reduced their armed forces.140

The plenary sessions of the ongoing Sino-Soviet border negotiations were
not held until March 1973, and by that point the two sides had become en-
tangled in ideological polemics, unable to deal with the issues at hand. El
number of minor border incidents also increased, and the meetings therefore
often focused solely on those incidents.141

On 7 Puede 1973, the PRC sent a telegram to Soviet personnel on the
Joint Navigation Commission notifying them that three Chinese ships were

136. Yang and Xia, “Vacillating between Revolution and Détente,” páginas. 395–423.

137. Ibídem.

138. Niu Jun, “Zouxiang ‘Zhengchanghua’ (1979–1991),” páginas. 611–612.

139. Zubok, A Failed Empire, páginas. 229–247.

140. Elizavetin, “Peregovory A. norte. Kosygina i Chzhou En’laiem v Pekinskom Aeroportu,” páginas. 39–63.

141. Kireev, Neizvestnye stranitsy pogranichnyh peregovorov, pag. 147.

147

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planning to pass by Khabarovsk. The Soviet personnel responded that they
were not authorized to resolve such issues.142 A few days later, en 11 Puede
1973, the head of the Far Eastern Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry,
Mikhail Kapitsa, passed to Ma Lie, the Chinese chargé d’affaires in the USSR,
a diplomatic note about the perceived military buildup in “Soviet internal
waters.”143

At that moment, Chinese military and civilian vessels were moving to-
ward Khabarovsk. Soviet ofﬁcials claimed that by 10 May some 25 Chino
ships were already approaching. Además, the Chinese personnel reportedly
removed 16 coastal navigation signs installed by the Soviet side on 7 Soviet
islands on the Middle Amur and put up their own signs, in contravention of
el 1951 Agreement on Navigation and Facilitation of Navigable Situation
on the River Section of the Border. Soviet ofﬁcials stressed that “the ques-
tion of passage of Chinese ships through the internal waters of the USSR in
Khabarovsk would be easy to resolve if the Chinese side raised the issue in
an appropriate form, as is customary in relations between sovereign states.”
The Chinese were reluctant to do so because they disagreed that the pas-
sage was, En realidad, through Soviet internal waters, instead believing it to be a
part of the Sino-Soviet border.144 In 1973, the Chinese took over the mainte-
nance of another 29 signs on 16 islands. De este modo, by the end of the navigation
season in 1973, the Chinese had 51 signs on 32 islands under their direct
control.145

Mientras tanto, the maintenance of a dialogue using the border negotiations
format was becoming more difﬁcult. Even organizational issues could not
be resolved. During a meeting on 16 Julio 1973 between the heads of two
delegations, the Soviet side informed the Chinese that Ilichev needed to ﬂy
back to Moscow on state business. The Soviet delegation also contended that,
“based on the principles of parity and equality,” talks should be continued
in Moscow after having taken place in Beijing for the previous four years.
Yu Zhan, the head of the Chinese delegation, expressed displeasure with the
suggestion. The Chinese, he said, perceived this as an attempt to “depart from
the understanding reached by the two premiers” during the airport meeting in

142. “Zapis’ besedy M. S. Kapitsy so vremennym poverennym v delakh KNR v SSSR Ma Le," 11 Puede
1973, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 66, D. 661, l. 24–28.

143. Ibídem.

144. Ibídem.

145. “Spravka o poryadke obsluzhivaniya znakov navigatsionnoi obstanovki, raspolozhennykh v
storonu KNR ot glavnogo farvatera na pogranichnykh uchastkakh rek Amurskogo basseina,” June
1976.

148

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Diplomatic “Geometry” of the 1969–1978 Sino-Soviet Border Talks

Septiembre 1969. With the two parties unable to see eye to eye even on the lo-
cation of the talks, the subsequent conversation never went beyond discussing
the border incidents.146

The exchanges between the delegations were also becoming more heated.
During one of the meetings, Yu Zhan accused the USSR of racism, arguing
eso, according to Soviet leaders, “the Chinese are the inferior race.” To this,
Ilichev responded angrily: “Shame on you, colleague. . . . Do you want to
end the discussion in a poisoned atmosphere?! Pull yourself together.”147 The
will to continue constructive dialogue was weakening on both sides of the
mesa.

Breaks between the plenary sessions were becoming increasingly lengthy,
lasting from one year to almost a year-and-a-half at a time. The ﬁrst pro-
longed break, from June 1973 a julio 1974, coincided with several develop-
ments in Sino-Soviet-U.S. relaciones. Cuando, in June 1973, Washington and
Moscow negotiated the Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement, the Chinese
started to criticize Washington for “step[ping] on the Chinese shoulders to
reach the USSR” in the hopes of pitting Beijing and Moscow against each
other.148 Mao criticized a Chinese Foreign Ministry report that character-
ized the Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement as creating “a stronger at-
mosphere of US-Soviet domination.” The “unsatisfactory” report, he said,
focused on “the superﬁcial”—namely, superpower collusion—while ignoring
“the essence”; eso es, “great chaos, great disintegration, and great reshufﬂe”
resulting from their hidden competition.149 In February 1974, during a meet-
ing with Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, Mao laid out the Theory of
the Three Worlds, thus marking the abandonment of the “horizontal line”
and “big terrain.”150

By this point, Yu Zhan had suffered health problems and been replaced
by Han Nianlong as the head of the Chinese delegation to the Sino-Soviet
border talks. Four meetings were held in July 1974, followed by a nine-
month break until April 1975. During this period Deng Xiaoping emphasized
strategic concurrence with the United States from the viewpoint of economic
and geopolitical realism. Economically, he linked, albeit subtly, U.S.-China

146. “Zapis’ besedy L. F. Il’icheva s glavoi kitaiskoi pravitel’stvennoi delegatsii Yui Chzhanem," 16 Julio
1973.

147. Ibídem.

148. A NOSOTROS. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, volumen. XVIII, Doc.
39, quoted in Minami, “Re-Examining the End of Mao’s Revolution,” páginas. 359–375.

149. Ibídem.

150. Ibídem.

149

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normalization to the “four modernizations” (agricultura, industria, defense,
and science and technology).151

The next round of talks was completed in April–May 1975, después de lo cual
the longest break—a year and seven months—was taken.152 At the same time,
the annual meeting of the Joint Navigation Commission, which was sched-
uled to be held in China in 1975, was canceled—another sign of souring
relations.153 By the end of the year, the Chinese had gained control over 67
navigation signs on 41 islands. By the beginning of navigation season in 1976,
the Soviet had control of only 13 navigation signs on 7 islands. Finalmente, en 30
Puede 1976, the Chinese section of the Joint Commission informed the Soviet
Union that the PRC was now servicing all remaining signs on the Chinese
side of the thalweg and that on 9 islands the Chinese had installed signaling
equipment.154 Despite that, Soviet leaders were unwilling to use military force
to restore control over the signs. The USSR’s Main Border Guards Directorate
declined to provide troops to replace signs installed by the Chinese side.155

En cambio, Soviet ofﬁcials took measures to restrain Chinese actions around

Bolshoi Ussuriiski (Heixiazi) Island. Jiang Changbin points out:

The Soviet Union built an international airport in Khabarovsk (Boli) cerca de
Heilongjiang and built a cross-river bridge from Boli to the Heixiazi Island. Este
bridge had strategic meaning: it could open and close, [y] after the closure, No
Chinese vessel could sail through the river. For many years, whenever a Chinese
ship wanted to sail between the two rivers [Amur and Ussuri Rivers], it could
go only through the Fuyuan [Kazakhevich] waterway, which has a lot of shallow
water and mud and must be dredged frequently. It is just a small tributary.156

The bridge described by Jiang Changbin was a pontoon structure installed
and dismantled by the Soviet Union every year starting in 1975.157

151. Ibídem.

152. Niu Jun, “Zouxiang ‘Zhengchanghua’ (1979–1991),” páginas. 611–612.

153. “Spravka o polozhenii na pogranichnykh uchastkakh rek Amurskogo basseina podgotovlennaya
zamestilelem ministra rechnogo ﬂota RSFSR L. V. Bagrovym," 1 Puede 1976, in GARF, F. A562, Op. 1,
D. 5685, Ll. 249–251.

154. “Spravka o polozhenii na pogranichnykh uchastkakh rek Amurskogo basseina podgotovlennaya
zamestilelem ministra rechnogo ﬂota RSFSR V. A. Kurdinym," 1 Junio 1976, in GARF, F. A562, Op. 1,
D. 5685, Ll. 252–255.

155. “Spravka k soveshchaniyu MRF o sudokhodstve na pogranichnykh uchstkakh rek Amurskogo
basseina,” May 1976, in GARF, F. A562, Op. 1, D. 5685, Ll. 19–22.

156. Wang Bo, “Heixiazidao Huiguiji,” Shejie Zhishi, No. 21 (2008), páginas. 46–53.

157. Tatiana Dmitrakova, “V Khabarovskom Krae Navedut Pontonnyi Most Cherez Amurskuiu Pro-
toku,” Rossiiskaya gazeta, 3 May 2012p. 3.

150

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Diplomatic “Geometry” of the 1969–1978 Sino-Soviet Border Talks

Even at this point, sin embargo, Soviet leaders seemed to hope that Sino-
Soviet relations could be improved once the “normalization based on the
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” was implemented. After the deaths
of Zhou and Mao in January and September 1976, the Soviet Union aspired
to forge better relations with the new Chinese leaders.158 After Mao’s death in
the early morning of 9 Septiembre 1976, the Soviet Union quickly broadcast a
simple announcement without comment. The CPSU Politburo sent a message
of condolence to the CCP. Most observers saw this as an attempt to improve
relaciones. On 13 September Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and
others went to the Chinese embassy to express their condolences on the death
of Chinese leader, and the main media outlets in the Soviet Union broadcast
news of the visit. The Soviet leaders’ gestures received no signiﬁcant response
from Beijing.159

The Sino-Soviet negotiations resumed in December 1976 and continued
until February 1977. On almost all diplomatic occasions, the new Chinese
leaders reiterated that they would adhere to Mao’s foreign policy, incluido
treating the Soviet Union as the new source of war. en agosto 1977 the CCP
held its Eleventh National Congress and issued a political report declaring:
“The USSR and the USA are the places where the new world war would orig-
inate, and Soviet social imperialism speciﬁcally is the greater danger.” China
faces the “threat of imperialism, especially social imperialism, the desire of the
Soviet social imperialists to destroy China is not dead.” The Soviet Politburo
was dismayed by the new Chinese leaders’ harsh stance toward the USSR, y
en la primavera de 1977 the Soviet Union returned to earlier diplomatic practices
in its relations with the PRC, and Soviet media resumed their anti-Chinese
rhetoric.160

The next round of Sino-Soviet border talks began in April 1978, y
the 40th plenary meeting, which became the ﬁnal one in the nine-year ne-
gotiation period, was held on 27 Junio 1978.161 Not long before that, in May
1978, President Jimmy Carter’s national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezin-
ski, visited China. As a result of that trip, the United States decided to reori-
ent its policy from “triangular diplomacy” toward a “quasi-alliance” with the

158. Niu Jun, “Zouxiang ‘Zhengchanghua’ (1979–1991),” páginas. 611–612.

159. Ibídem., páginas. 613–614.

160. Fan Chao, “1980 Niandai Zhongguo Waijiao Zhanlüe Tiaozheng de Yuanqi,” Guoji Zhengzhi
Yanjiu, volumen. 1 (2013), páginas. 121–134.

161. Kireev, Neizvestnye stranitsy pogranichnyh peregovorov, pag. 159.

151

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Chinese.162 Cognizant of this change, Soviet ofﬁcials looked for additional
support in the region. On 3 Noviembre 1978, Vietnam and the Soviet Union
signed a bilateral Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which cemented the
military alliance between the two countries. Moscow played an important role
in encouraging Vietnam to seek regional hegemony. On 25 November Viet-
nam established a puppet government in Cambodia and immediately sent a
large army to invade the country. On 7 Enero 1979 it captured the Cambo-
dian capital, Phnom Penh.163

In response to these events, en 17 Febrero 1979, Chinese border
troops launched a military offensive against Vietnam in Longzhou and Jingxi
(Guangxi Province) and the Hekou and Jinping areas of Yunnan Province.
The Chinese government publicly declared that the military strike against
Vietnam was meant as a crackdown on Soviet expansion in Southeast Asia,
arguing that “the big and small hegemonies of the Soviet Union and Vietnam
have united and carried out aggression and expansion. The peace in Indochina
has been destroyed and that is the core of the threat to security and stability
of Southeast Asia.”164

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 eliminated any
near-term prospect of Sino-Soviet normalization. Yet the bilateral negotiations
of 1969–1978 had by then served multiple purposes. Both countries used
the sessions as a “card” in building a relationship with the United States and
changing the geometry of their alliances. Al mismo tiempo, the talks became
one of the few remaining channels of communication between China and the
USSR during this period, ensuring that the conﬂict between the two countries
did not return to open military confrontation.165

Conclusión

The Sino-Soviet border negotiations were more than just a way to de-escalate
the border conﬂict. The Soviet and Chinese governments gradually moved
from crisis resolution toward a realignment of forces, creating a new political

162. Robert Legvold, “Sino-Soviet Relations: The American Factor,” in Robert S. ross, ed., Porcelana,
the United States, and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity and Policy Making in the Cold War (Armonk, Nueva York:
Routledge, 1993), pag. 69.

163. Niu Jun, “Zouxiang ‘Zhengchanghua’ (1979–1991)," pag. 615.

164. Ibídem., pag. 624.

165. Kireev, Neizvestnye stranitsy pogranichnyh peregovorov, pag. 159.

152

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Diplomatic “Geometry” of the 1969–1978 Sino-Soviet Border Talks

environment in which China and the Soviet Union competed against each
other in trying to improve their relations with the United States.

The talks began in late 1969 after a series of military clashes on the bor-
der. Initially, the Soviet Union attempted to normalize Sino-Soviet relations,
whereas the Chinese focused more on containing the border conﬂict. Unable
to convince the Chinese that the threat of Soviet attack was not imminent, So-
viet ofﬁcials shifted their focus to reducing tensions on the border. A pesar de
both sides continued to be displeased by the other’s actions, the talks secured
peace and facilitated the implementation of limited measures to prevent mil-
itary conﬂict between the two countries. De este modo, the early period of the talks
served the primary purpose of the negotiations: it facilitated crisis manage-
mento. Al mismo tiempo, the process was continually overshadowed by mutual
distrust and concerns about the counterpart’s intentions.

Analysis of the drafts prepared by both sides shows that the Soviet ap-
proach to signing the agreement was conditioned by a fear that if the status
quo stretched for decades and was coupled with recognition of the existence
of “disputed territories,” it would give the Chinese the right to use the dis-
puted territories for an undetermined amount of time, thereby increasing the
strength of their territorial claim. Soviet representatives repeatedly tried to
convey these concerns to their counterparts during the talks.

Al mismo tiempo, the Soviet Union was ready to conﬁrm the 1950 Treaty
of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. The Chinese, nevertheless,
pointed out throughout the negotiations that the treaty was insufﬁcient be-
cause it did not include a clause on the non-use of nuclear weapons, a concern
that was most relevant during the early stages of the negotiations. Soviet with-
drawal from certain border regions and a status quo agreement without an ex-
piry date were beneﬁcial for the Chinese. Each weakened the Soviet Union’s
actual control over the “disputed” territories. Todavía, Moscow was unwilling to
compromise on the “disputed territories” issue, primarily because of concern
that the Chinese would then stall the resolution of the border problem.

The reaction of the West became crucial to the development of the talks.
Regardless of the actual state of bilateral relations, both sides had to depict
the situation in a certain way. The Soviet Union emphasized that progress
was being achieved, thus suggesting the possibility of a rapprochement with
Beijing. Por el contrario, the Chinese, who wanted to facilitate the rapprochement
with the United States, argued that only meager progress was made during the
negotiations with the USSR.

For the Chinese, the decision to maintain the negotiation channel with-
out settling the dispute was inﬂuenced by both domestic and international
factores. Primero, the USSR still had a signiﬁcantly more powerful military than

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Tagirova

the Chinese did, and simultaneous defense against two superpowers was
impossible. A Sino-U.S. rapprochement was thus one of Beijing’s most vi-
able security options. Al mismo tiempo, further deterioration of the Sino-
Soviet relationship was not beneﬁcial for Beijing. Both countries were nuclear
weapons states, and as the incidents on Damanskii Island and Zhalanashkol
vividly demonstrated, it was quite difﬁcult to keep a military clash limited. En
addition, A NOSOTROS. triangular diplomacy prevented the Chinese from fatally wors-
ening their relations with the Soviet Union because the tacit threat of Sino-
Soviet normalization helped to improve relations with the United States.166
The U.S.-Soviet détente was perceived by the Chinese as part of the “great
reshufﬂe,” or realignment of forces, and in response to these changes the PRC
departed from the concept of the horizontal line and moved on to the Theory
of the Three Worlds, wherein China stood apart from both superpowers.

For the Soviet Union, the goal of improved relations with the West was
to be accomplished through a show of strength. Securing better relations with
China was thus perceived as a factor that would help achieve détente. Más tarde, como
détente began to fall apart, improving Sino-Soviet relations became even more
important for the USSR. The U.S.-China rapprochement was perceived as a
failure of Soviet diplomacy. Soviet ofﬁcials sensed that, in the realignment of
forces, the United States and PRC had ended up in a closer relationship with
each other than either had with Moscow—they had built a “quasi-alliance.”
Eso, in addition to an open military conﬂict with Vietnam, showed that
the border talks had outlived their usefulness. The realignment of forces was
complete, and talks no longer played an important role.

The negotiations lasted for nine years but did not result in the signing of
either a status quo agreement or a treaty on the non-use of force. A pesar de
the talks did not secure a breakthrough on the border issue, they did help to
prevent a military conﬂict. They also became an instrument that Beijing and
Moscow could use to reshape the balance of power in the world. From trian-
gular diplomacy propelled by Washington to the “horizontal line” envisioned
by Beijing to the selective détente sought by Moscow, all three sides were en-
gaged in a prolonged attempt to secure better relations with at least one of
their counterparts. The border talks helped them implement their respective
políticas.

166. Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, páginas. 119–123; and Hyer, The Pragmatic Dragon, páginas. 38–39.

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