Soldiers’ Dilemma

Soldiers’ Dilemma Renanah Miles Joyce

Foreign Military Training and
Liberal Norm Conºict

On April 14, 1979, el
“rice riots” broke out in Monrovia, Liberia. Several thousand protestors took to
the streets in frustration and desperation over a government proposal to in-
crease the price of rice, a food staple that most Liberians relied on for subsis-
tence. As demonstrators marched toward the president’s mansion, Presidente
William Tolbert ordered soldiers to ªre into the crowd.1 Over forty protestors
were killed in the ensuing chaos. Although the soldiers obeyed Tolbert’s or-
der, the command to shoot their fellow Liberians sparked deep animosity and
contributed to a bloody coup the following year.2

These rice riots illustrate the conºict that can occur between the two liberal
norms of respect for human rights and civilian control of the military. Cuando
political leaders order militaries to harm the population, these two norms
enter into conºict. Militaries are expected to obey political leaders, y ellos
are also expected to protect populations. When the rice riots broke out in
1979, the United States had been training the Liberian military for eighteen
años. The goal was to create a disciplined, democratic force, and this meant
training the military to both respect human rights and obey civilian authority.3
Tolbert’s order pitted these norms against each other, presenting the military
with a dilemma. This article examines how norm conºict drives militaries
to prioritize cohesion instead of either liberal norm.

Renanah Miles Joyce is Assistant Professor of Politics at Brandeis University.

The author is grateful to Brian Blankenship, Risa Brooks, Jonathan Caverley, Michael Desch, Vir-
ginia Page Fortna, Robert Jervis, Richard McAlexander, Barry Posen, Robert Ralston, laura
Resnick Samotin, Jack Snyder, Monica Duffy Toft, and the anonymous reviewers for helpful com-
mentos. She also thanks participants in seminars at Columbia University, Yale University, Jorge
Washington University, University of Notre Dame, Instituto de Tecnología de Massachusetts, Ohio
State University, and Cato Institute, as well as participants at the 2018 American Political Science
Association and 2019 International Studies Association conferences. An online appendix is avail-
able at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/OA2MTX.

1. Carey Winfrey, “After Liberia’s Costly Rioting, Great Soul-Searching,” New York Times,
Puede 30, 1979, https://www.nytimes.com/1979/05/30/archives/after-liberias-costly-rioting-great-
soulsearching-personally.html.
2. Advocates for Human Rights, A House with Two Rooms: Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission of Liberia Diaspora Report (Saint Paul, Minn.: DRI Press, 2009), páginas. 83–85; and William
O’Neill, “Liberia: An Avoidable Tragedy,” Current History, volumen. 92, No. 574 (1993), pag. 213, https://
www.jstor.org/stable/45316856.
3. For background on the U.S. military mission to Liberia, see U.S. Agency for International De-
velopment, Evaluation of the Public Safety Program for the Republic of Liberia (Washington, CORRIENTE CONTINUA.:
Department of State, 1972), pag. 100.

Seguridad Internacional, volumen. 46, No. 4 (Primavera 2022), páginas. 48–90, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00432
© 2022 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

48

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Soldiers’ Dilemma 49

Liberal great powers fail to acknowledge this dilemma as they seek to
spread liberal norms globally through foreign military training. Foreign mili-
tary training is a ºexible form of security assistance that seeks to modify recip-
ient militaries’ behavior by increasing warªghting capacity and transmitting a
set of professional norms or ideas about standards of appropriate behavior.4
Norm content and emphasis varies across providers, tiempo, and space. For lib-
eral democratic providers such as the United States, two of the most salient
norms are civilian control of the military and respect for human rights.5 The
theory and empirics that follow focus on the United States as a key liberal
fuerza. While the argument applies to all liberal providers, and all great pow-
ers use training as part of their security assistance repertoire, the United States
is the largest such provider.6 In 2019, Por ejemplo, the United States spent
cerca de $905 million to train over 71,000 military students from 157 states.7

Hoy, the United States ostensibly promotes these two liberal norms as a
primary foreign policy objective to nearly half of all states that receive its mili-
tary training.8 A mix of idealistic and strategic motives explains this emphasis.
Imparting liberal norms is partially bound up in Western states’ efforts to pro-
mote global democracy after the Cold War, which included providing security
assistance to liberalize militaries.9 But imparting liberal norms is also strategic.

4. This deªnition of norms follows Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm
Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization, volumen. 52, No. 4 (1998), pag. 891, https://
doi.org/10.1162/002081898550789. I use “norm” and “idea” interchangeably following Amitav
Acharya, “How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change
in Asian Regionalism,” International Organization, volumen. 58, No. 2 (2004), páginas. 239–275, https://
doi.org/10.1017/S0020818304582024.
5. For a discussion of human rights and civilian control of the military, see Defense Security Coop-
eration University [DSCU], Security Cooperation Management, ed. 41 (Arlington, Va.: DSCU,
Puede 2021), páginas.
16-1–16-15, https://www.dscu.mil/documents/publications/greenbook/24
_Greenbook_41_0_Complete.pdf?id(cid:2)1.
6. On repertoires of statecraft, see Stacie E. Goddard, pablo k. macdonald, and Daniel H. Nexon,
“Repertoires of Statecraft: Instruments and Logics of Power Politics,” International Relations,
volumen. 33, No. 2 (2019), páginas. 304–321, https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117819834625.
7. A diferencia de, Canada trained around 1,500 personnel from ªfty-six states that year. Directorate of
Military Training and Cooperation, Annual Report/Directorate of Military Training and Cooperation
(Ottawa: Canadian Department of National Defence, 2016), http://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/
9.850576/publication.html. A NOSOTROS. data are from the Department of Defense and Department of
Estado, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest, 2019–2020, volumen. 1, Sec. 3
(Washington, CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 2019), https://www.state.gov/reports/
foreign-military-training-and-dod-engagement-activities-of-interest-2019-2020/. The annual For-
eign Military Training Reports (FMTRs) exclude training conducted with NATO allies, Australia,
New Zealand, y japon.
8. This calculation is based on my coding of foreign policy objectives in the FMTRs.
9. Efforts to reform and liberalize military partners grew out of debates over international human
rights compliance in the 1970s. See Eric Rittinger, “Arming the Other: American Small Wars, Local
Proxies, and the Social Construction of the Principal-Agent Problem,” International Studies Quar-
terly, volumen. 61, No. 2 (Junio 2017), páginas. 396–409, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqx021. On the use of se-
curity assistance to build democratic defense institutions after the end of the Cold War, ver

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Seguridad Internacional 46:4 50

Shaping how partner militaries think is an inexpensive way to gain voluntary
policy compliance.10 Training also helps to inculcate a shared military identity,
common skills, and communication, indirectly strengthening a third norm of
cohesion. Training can thus reduce the costs of security management by creat-
ing more competent, cohesive, disciplined, and loyal partners.11

The empirical record, sin embargo, suggests that training often fails to deliver
on its promise of liberal norm transmission. Security assistance frequently pro-
duces noncompliant, norm-violating militaries that conduct coups and abuse
human rights.12 Policymakers and scholars offer divergent explanations for
these shortcomings. Some suggest that norm violations result from insufªcient
investment in training or inadequate emphasis on norm socialization.13 Most
eruditos, conversely, favor rationalist arguments that point to interest mis-
alignment between providers and recipients.14 While these arguments ascribe

Alexandra Gheciu, “Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the ‘New Eu-
rope,’” International Organization, volumen. 59, No. 4 (2005), páginas. 973–1012, https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0020818305050332; and Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas, “Democratization as a Global
Phenomenon and Its Impact on Civil-Military Relations,” Democratization, volumen. 13, No. 5 (2006),
páginas. 776–790, https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340601010669.
10. This follows the logic of “socialization as hegemonic power” outlined in G. John Ikenberry
and Charles A. Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” International Organization, volumen. 44,
No. 3 (1990), páginas. 283–315, https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081830003530X. Because states typically
enter into training arrangements voluntarily, providers hope that institutional change in the target
military will be cheaper and more effective than efforts to change regimes by force. On the latter,
see Alexander B. Downes and Jonathan Monten, “Forced to Be Free? Why Foreign-Imposed Re-
gime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization,” Seguridad Internacional, volumen. 37, No. 4 (Primavera 2013),
páginas. 90–131, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00117.
11. Estados Unidos. militar, Por ejemplo, fears that human rights abuses perpetrated by its proxies can
create backlash for U.S. interests. See U.S. Government Accountability Ofªce [GAO], Security As-
sistance: A NOSOTROS. Agencies Should Improve Oversight of Human Rights Training for Foreign Security Forces,
GAO-19-554 (Washington, CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: GAO, Agosto 2019), pag. 2, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-
19-554. Similarmente, coup-prone militaries may contribute to political instability, raising the specter of
costly military intervention.
12. On security assistance and coup propensity, see Jesse Dillon Savage and Jonathan D. Caverley,
“When Human Capital Threatens the Capitol: Foreign Aid in the Form of Military Training and
Coups,” Journal of Peace Research, volumen. 54, No. 4 (2017), páginas. 542–557, https://doi.org/10.1177/
0022343317713557; and Talukder Maniruzzaman, “Arms Transfers, Military Coups, and Military
Rule in Developing States,” Journal of Conºict Resolution, volumen. 36, No. 4 (1992), páginas. 733–755, https://
doi.org/10.1177/0022002792036004006. On human rights abuses, see Wayne Sandholtz, “United
States Military Assistance and Human Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly, volumen. 38, No. 4 (2016),
páginas. 1070–1101, https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.2016.0057; and Patricia L. sullivan, Leo J. Blanken,
and Ian C. Rice, “Arming the Peace: Foreign Security Assistance and Human Rights Conditions in
Post-Conºict Countries,” Defence and Peace Economics, volumen. 31, No. 2 (2020), páginas. 177–200, https://
doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2018.1558388.
13. Simon J. Powelson, “Enduring Engagement Yes, Episodic Engagement No: Lessons for SOF
from Mali,” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/38996;
and Tomislav Z. Ruby and Douglas Gibler, “U.S. Professional Military Education and Demo-
cratization Abroad,” European Journal of International Relations, volumen. 16, No. 3 (2010), páginas. 339–364,
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066109344659.
14. Esteban Biddle, “Building Security Forces and Stabilizing Nations: El problema de la agencia,"
Daedalus, volumen. 146, No. 4 (Caer 2017), páginas. 126–138, https://doi.org/10.1162/DAED_a_00464; Daniel

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Soldiers’ Dilemma 51

norm violations to different mechanisms, they share a common assumption
that socialization never occurred in the ªrst place. This assumption, sin embargo,
overlooks the dilemma that arises when these two liberal norms conºict.

In this article, I argue that norm conºict weakens military support for both
liberal norms, thus creating the conditions under which perverse behavioral
outcomes can occur despite socialization. The implicit expectation in U.S.
política, should norm conºict arise, is that militaries will privilege human
rights over civilian authority, temporarily defying civilian leaders to protect
the higher order of rights “rooted in natural law.”15 This expectation rests
on the assumptions that trained militaries share this rank-ordering, will easily
choose human rights over civilian control, and that norm conºict will
not damage either norm.16 If anything, conºict might clarify norms and pro-
mote socialization.17

I contend that these assumptions rest on shaky foundations. Rather than
strengthening liberal norms, I argue that conºict between norms makes them
less salient and undermines their power to restrain decision-making.18 Norm
conºict invites cost-beneªt calculations and creates openings to pursue self-
interest.19 Conºict thus produces incentives for militaries to strategically
choose among norms in an effort to satisfy both norms and interests. Cuando
this happens, they are more likely to fall back on the third norm of cohesion,
a norm that is tied to interests. Fraught domestic crises that pit liberal
norms against each other may further increase the salience of cohesion. Rango-
ordering happens, but not in the direction that the United States expects.

l. Byman, “Friends Like These: Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism,” International Secu-
rity, volumen. 31, No. 2 (Caer 2006), páginas. 79–115, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2006.31.2.79; and Walter C.
Ladwig III, “Inºuencing Clients in Counterinsurgency: A NOSOTROS. Involvement in El Salvador’s Civil
Guerra, 1979–92,” International Security, volumen. 41, No. 1 (Verano 2016), páginas. 99–146, https://doi.org/
10.1162/ISEC_a_00251.
15. See DSCU, Security Cooperation Management, pag. 16-1.
16. Jonathan Baron and Mark Spranca, “Protected Values,” Organizational Behavior and Human De-
cision Processes, volumen. 70, No. 1 (1997), páginas. 1-dieciséis, https://doi.org/10.1006/obhd.1997.2690; and Philip
mi. Tetlock, “Thinking the Unthinkable: Sacred Values and Taboo Cognitions,” Trends in Cognitive
Ciencias, volumen. 7, No. 7 (2003), páginas. 320–324, https://doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00135-9.
17. Antje Wiener, A Theory of Contestation (Heidelberg: Saltador, 2014); Antje Wiener, Contestation
and Constitution of Norms in Global International Relations (Nueva York: Prensa de la Universidad de Cambridge,
2018); and Acharya, “How Ideas Spread.”
18. Tomas M.. Dolan, “Unthinkable and Tragic: The Psychology of Weapons Taboos in War,” In-
ternational Organization, volumen. 67, No. 1 (2013), páginas. 37–63, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818312
000379; and Vaughn P. shannon, “Norms Are What States Make of Them: The Political Psychology
of Norm Violation,” International Studies Quarterly, volumen. 44, No. 2 (2000), páginas. 293–316, https://
doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00159.
19. Dolan, “Unthinkable and Tragic," pag. 48; Tetlock, “Thinking the Unthinkable," pag. 324; and Jona-
than Baron and Sarah Leshner, “How Serious Are Expressions of Protected Values?" Diario de
Psicología experimental: Applied, volumen. 6, No. 3 (2000), páginas. 183–194, https://doi.org/10.1037/1076-
898X.6.3.183.

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Seguridad Internacional 46:4 52

If a military prioritizes cohesion, then it will choose the path that best serves
su organización, which may entail violating human rights, civilian control, o
ambos. I thus seek to explain shifts in military support for liberal norms rather
than to predict speciªc instances of disobedience or abuse in any given politi-
cal context. I examine the conditions under which norm violations become
possible and shed light on the links between socialization efforts, attitudes,
and ultimate behavior.20 Norm conºict, yo discuto, can weaken liberal norms and
frustrate socialization over the long run.21 My study explores the determinants
of decision-making to explain how cohesion comes to occupy a central place in
military concerns, over and above liberal normative considerations.22

As a plausibility probe of these competing claims, I use experimental evi-
dence from a survey of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The United States
rebuilt the AFL after Liberia’s civil war ended in 2003. A NOSOTROS. trainers heavily
emphasized liberal norms, making Liberia a most-likely case for norm social-
ización. The survey experiment presents soldiers with a scenario in which a
political leader orders the military to put down protests with force, pitting the
norms of civilian control and respect for human rights against each other. El
scenario thus provides an experimental “stress test” of competing norms.23
Además, I conducted over ªfty elite-level interviews with U.S. ofªcials,
trainers, and Liberian military ofªcers.

My research indicates that when soldiers hear this scenario, their willing-
ness to choose between conºicting liberal norms decreases, and they express
more concern for maintaining cohesion. Liberal training conditions this re-
sponse but in unexpected ways: Soldiers with more U.S. training express less
willingness to prioritize human rights and are less supportive of democratic
norms.24 Importantly, the survey evidence also shows that soldiers with more
A NOSOTROS. training express the strongest support for liberal norms in the absence

20. For a similar approach to studying military decision-making, see Eric Hundman and Sarah E.
Parkinson, “Rogues, Degenerates, y héroes: Disobedience as Politics in Military Organiza-
ciones,” European Journal of International Relations, volumen. 25, No. 3 (2019), páginas. 645–671, https://doi.org/
10.1177/1354066118823891.
21. Diana Panke and Ulrich Petersohn, “Why International Norms Disappear Sometimes,” Euro-
pean Journal of International Relations, volumen. 18, No. 4 (2012), páginas. 719–742, https://doi.org/10.1177/
1354066111407690.
22. Cohesion is a group-oriented norm, whereas liberal norms tend to be individually held beliefs.
The dynamics explored here suggest that norm conºict could activate tension between individual
and group norms, which is an important question for future research.
23. Scott D.. sagan, Benjamin A. Valentino, Charli Carpenter, and Alexander H. Montgomery,
“Does the Noncombatant Immunity Norm Have Stopping Power? A Debate,” International Secu-
rity, volumen. 45, No. 2 (Caer 2020), páginas. 174–175, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00393.
24. In this article, I use “democratic norms” as a substitute for liberal conceptions of democracy
and civilian control of the military.

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Soldiers’ Dilemma 53

of norm conºict, undermining the alternative argument that socialization
never happened.

These ªndings shed light on a pathway by which norm violations can hap-
pen even in the presence of socialization. By highlighting a previously unrec-
ognized dilemma in the model of civil-military relations that liberal powers
seek to export, I contribute to studies that explore contradictions and complex-
ity in military norms,25 as well as studies that examine how norms and inter-
ests interact and shape behavior.26 Liberal great powers typically consider the
norms of civilian control of the military and respect for human rights to be mu-
tually reinforcing, even though they often are not, particularly in weak democ-
racies. My ªndings suggest that norm conºicts can have a corrosive effect on
military support for liberal norms by incentivizing militaries to privilege a
third norm of cohesion. This outcome indicates that the assumptions underly-
ing a major component of U.S. foreign policy may be ºawed, and it suggests
the need to fundamentally reevaluate the approach to norm transmission.

The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Primero, I describe liberal
powers’ efforts to impart ideas about civilian control of the military and
respect for human rights to the militaries that they train. Segundo, I lay out
my argument about the implications of conºict between these two liberal
norms—situating it within the literatures on norm contestation, psicología,
and sociology—and I generate testable hypotheses. Tercero, I discuss research
diseño, including case selection. The fourth section presents the experimental
results and explores mechanisms that aid in interpreting the results. I conclude
with a discussion of implications for theory and policy.

Foreign Military Training and Norm Transmission

Since the end of the Cold War, foreign military training by liberal democratic
powers has increasingly focused on promoting norms.27 British policy, for ex-

25. Risa Brooks, “Paradoxes of Professionalism: Rethinking Civil-Military Relations in the United
Estados,” Seguridad Internacional, volumen. 44, No. 4 (Primavera 2020), páginas. 7–44, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a
_00374.
26. shannon, “Norms Are What States Make of Them”; and Sonia Cardenas, “Norm Collision: Ex-
plaining the Effects of International Human Rights Pressure on State Behavior,” International
Studies Review, volumen. 6, No. 2 (Junio 2004), páginas. 213–232, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1521-9488.2004
.00396.X.
27. Bruneau and Trinkunas, “Democratization as a Global Phenomenon.” Although this article fo-
cuses on liberal norms, illiberal providers also use security assistance to impart norms. Para examen-
por ejemplo, China cites foreign assistance training as one way that it promotes human rights, which it
deªnes as “the rights to subsistence and development.” State Council Information Ofªce of the
People’s Republic of China, Progress in Human Rights Over the 40 Years of Reform and Opening Up
in China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2018), http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white
_paper/2018/12/13/content_281476431737638.htm.

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Seguridad Internacional 46:4 54

amplio, has stated that “support to build the capacity of security forces must be
matched with efforts to build accountability, legitimacy and respect for human
rights.”28 Similarly, Canada’s Military Training and Cooperation Program
seeks to “promote Canadian democratic principles, the rule of law and the
protection of human rights.”29 The United States likewise emphasizes human
rights and civilian control of the military. The Barack Obama administration
articulated a goal of U.S. security sector assistance as promoting “universal
valores, such as good governance, transparent and accountable oversight of se-
curity forces, rule of law . . . and respect for human rights.”30 As of 2017, A NOSOTROS.
law requires that all efforts to build foreign military capacity include training
on “observance of and respect for the law of armed conºict, human rights and
fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, and civilian control of the military.”31

En tono rimbombante, the United States emphasizes norms training in different re-
gions. I ªnd that this training tends to occur in places where policymakers be-
lieve that more liberal and professional militaries are key to long-term political
stability and democracy, or where they need to couch security assistance in lib-
eral values to sell U.S. involvement.

Adherence to the liberal norms of human rights and civilian control of the
military were primary foreign policy objectives of U.S. training in sixty-two
estados, as depicted in ªgure 1.32 Almost 90 percent of states in Africa receive
training on these norms each year. This prominence suggests that the United
States uses norms training in those places where it would prefer to delegate se-
curity management and avoid intervention.33 Because military training also
imparts human capital and technical skills, the United States hopes to simulta-
neously create more competent and more liberal armed forces, capable of pro-
viding security while avoiding repressive and corrupt behavior that can
jeopardize stability.

Foreign military training is a preferred tool to impart norms.34 Whereas

28. Ministry of Defence, Building Stability Overseas Strategy (Londres: Ministry of Defence, Depart-
ment for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Ofªce, 2011), pag. 12, https://
www.gov.uk/government/publications/building-stability-overseas-strategy.
29. Directorate of Military Training and Cooperation, Annual Report.
30. The White House, “Fact Sheet: A NOSOTROS. Security Sector Assistance Policy," Abril 5, 2013, https://
www.hsdl.org/?vista&did(cid:2)747214.
31. Foreign Security Forces: Authority to Build Capacity, 10 USC. § 333 (2016) https://www.law
.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/333.
32. This estimate counts only states where the FMTR foreign policy objectives include norms, no
states that receive training for other objectives that have a normative component tacked on to sat-
isfy a legal requirement.
33. In regions where the United States has more strategic interests, such as the Middle East and
Asia, it tends to emphasize more oblique norms of “professionalism.”
34. See Theo Farrell, “World Culture and Military Power,” Estudios de Seguridad, volumen. 14, No. 3 (2005),
páginas. 448–488, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410500323187; Roberto M.. Precio, “A Theoretical Ap-

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Soldiers’ Dilemma 55

Cifra 1. Recipients of U.S. Military Norms Training in 2019

FUENTE: Data are from the Department of Defense and Department of State, Foreign Military

Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest, 2019–2020.

NOTE: The dark-shaded states represent recipients of U.S. military norms training in 2019.

other forms of security assistance such as arms transfers may come with condi-
tions to modify behavior or extract policy concessions, training seeks to
change military preferences primarily through socialization. Training offers
opportunities for teaching and persuasion, which can be powerful in shap-
ing professional worldviews.35 “Professional training,” according to Martha
Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “actively socializes people to value certain
things above others.”36 Trainers use their expertise, información, and resources
to promote certain norms while discouraging others.37 Consistent messaging
plays a role; as a military instructor tasked with training the new AFL put it,
“You tell somebody something long enough, they’ll believe it. You have to cap-
ture their mind for their body to follow.”38 Additionally, training offers oppor-

proach to Military Rule in New States: Reference-Group Theory and the Ghanaian Case,” World
Política, volumen. 23, No. 3 (1971), páginas. 399–430, https://doi.org/10.2307/2009620; and Ruby and Gibler,
“U.S. Professional Military Education and Democratization Abroad.”
35. Gheciu, “Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization?"; Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Socialization
and Violence,” Journal of Peace Research, volumen. 54, No. 5 (2017), páginas. 592–605, https://doi.org/10.1177/
0022343317721813; Amelia Hoover Green, The Commander’s Dilemma: Violence and Restraint in War-
tiempo (Ítaca, N.Y.: Prensa de la Universidad de Cornell, 2018); Alastair Iain Johnston, “Treating International
Institutions as Social Environments,” International Studies Quarterly, volumen. 45, No. 4 (2001), páginas. 487–
515, https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00212; y James G.. March and Johan P. Olsen, Redis-
covering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (Nueva York: Free Press, 1989), pag. 30.
36. Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," pag. 905.
37. Ibídem., pag. 899.
38. Author interview via Zoom with former DynCorp instructor D, Junio 12, 2021.

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Seguridad Internacional 46:4 56

tunities for interpersonal interaction and relationship-building, which may
help foster shared preferences.39

Training takes diverse forms. Military ofªcers attending regional seminars
or courses in U.S. military schools are exposed to liberal norms through pro-
grams such as the International Military Education and Training program.40
Tactical training can also include a normative component. Por ejemplo, cuando
Estados Unidos. military trains African counterterrorism forces, they spend up to a
week on human rights education in the context of targeting practices.41 Finally,
trainers try to tailor their application of norms to the local context. In Liberia,
Por ejemplo, Michigan National Guard advisers explained human rights in
terms such as “it’s wrong to shoot individuals with 50-caliber bullets.”42

cultivating cohesion

But U.S. training imparts more than liberal norms—it also helps to cultivate
cohesion, which refers to the bonds that enable military forces to operate in a
uniªed, grupo- and mission-oriented way.43 The imperative to preserve these
bonds functions as a norm that motivates soldiers to prioritize loyalty and
commitment to their unit, the military, and shared goals. It is almost always in
the individual’s best interest to pursue cohesion, even though doing so can
sometimes require self-sacriªce for either the group or certain strategic goals.44
En efecto, at the military institutional level, cohesion represents a core interest.

39. Carla Martinez Machain, “Exporting Inºuence: A NOSOTROS. Military Training as Soft Power," Diario de
Conºict Resolution, volumen. 65, No. 2/3 (2021), páginas. 313–341, https://doi.org/10.1177/002200272095
7713.
40. DSCU, Security Cooperation Management, pag. 16-1. The Defense Department conducts norms
training around the world. Por ejemplo, the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies con-
ducts over 100 events globally each year on “human rights, international humanitarian law, y
the law of armed conºicts.” See Defense Institute of International Legal Studies, “About Us,"
https://globalnetplatform.org/diils/about-diils/.
41. Author interview via telephone with Defense Department ofªcial, Noviembre 30, 2018.
42. Author interview via telephone with Michigan National Guard adviser, Octubre 13, 2014.
43. Terence Lee, “Military Cohesion and Regime Maintenance: Explaining the Role of the Military
en 1989 China and 1998 Indonesia,” Armed Forces and Society, volumen. 32, No. 1 (2005), pag. 84, https://
doi.org/10.1177/0095327X05277906; and Defense Management Study Group on Military Cohe-
sión, Cohesion in the U.S. Militar (Washington, CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: Prensa Universitaria de la Defensa Nacional, 1984), ix.
Cohesion has affective and instrumental dimensions, encompassing how military members feel
about each other as well as their commitment to shared goals. Some scholars distinguish between
these dimensions, calling the former “social cohesion” and the latter “task cohesion.” See Guy L.
Siebold, “The Essence of Military Group Cohesion,” Armed Forces and Society, volumen. 33, No. 2 (2007),
páginas. 286–295, https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X06294173; and Anthony King, “The Existence of
Group Cohesion in the Armed Forces: A Response to Guy Siebold,” Armed Forces and Society, volumen.
33, No. 4 (2007), páginas. 638–645, https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X07301445.
44. Cohesion is “mutually beneªcial” to group members because it increases the likelihood of mis-
sion success and survival in combat situations. See Guy L. Siebold, “Key Questions and Chal-
lenges to the Standard Model of Military Group Cohesion,” Armed Forces and Society, volumen. 37, No. 3
(2011), pag. 459, https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X11398451; y Roberto J.. MacCoun, Elizabeth Kier,

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Soldiers’ Dilemma 57

“Cohesion, discipline, and morale within the corps” are key to the military’s
self-preservation as well as its ability to secure other organizational interests.45
As David Pion-Berlin et al. nota, “preservation of institutional unity has al-
ways been the centerpiece of military interests.”46

Cohesion functions as both a military norm (particularly at the individual
nivel) and an interest (particularly at the institutional level). Because this
article’s theory and tests focus on individual decision-making, I treat cohesion
as a norm, albeit one that is aligned to interests in ways that are difªcult to
fully separate.47

Cohesion reºects societal and political factors as well as military factors
such as operational practices and training.48 This article focuses on training,
which fosters a common military identity, habilidades, and modes of communication
that help to create cohesion over time.49 Cohesion is not taught as a principle
seguir (p.ej., “do not abuse civilians”); bastante, it is instilled through training
and practices that emphasize solidarity, shared identity, and teamwork to ac-
complish goals. Over time, this emphasis on solidarity, shared identity, y
teamwork contributes to a sensemaking process through which cohesion

and Aaron Belkin, “Does Social Cohesion Determine Motivation in Combat? An Old Question
with an Old Answer,” Armed Forces and Society, volumen. 32, No. 4 (2006), pag. 652, https://doi.org/
10.1177/0095327X05279181.
45. Eva Bellin, “Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons
from the Arab Spring,” Comparative Politics, volumen. 44, No. 2 (2012), pag. 131, https://doi.org/10.5129/
001041512798838021; and Barbara Geddes, “What Do We Know About Democratization after
Twenty Years?,” Annual Review of Political Science, volumen. 2, No. 1 (1999), pag. 126, https://doi.org/
10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.115.
46. David Pion-Berlin, Diego Esparza, and Kevin Grisham, “Staying Quartered: Civilian Upris-
ings and Military Disobedience in the Twenty-First Century,” Comparative Political Studies, volumen. 47,
No. 2 (2014), pag. 247, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414012450566.
47. The social psychology and military sociology literatures often treat cohesion as a process of in-
tegration or a pattern of bonding. Ver, Por ejemplo, Noah E. Friedkin, “Social Cohesion,” Annual
Review of Sociology, volumen. 30, No. 1 (2004), páginas. 409–425, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.30
.012703.110625. Treatment of cohesion as a norm or interest is more common in the political science
literature.
48. Societal and political factors include ethnic identities, regime policies, and historical legacies.
Ver, Por ejemplo, Jasen J. Castillo, Resistencia y guerra: The National Sources of Military Cohesion
(stanford, California: Prensa de la Universidad de Stanford, 2014); Theodore McLauchlin, “Loyalty Strategies and
Military Defection in Rebellion,” Comparative Politics, volumen. 42, No. 3 (2010), páginas. 333–350, https://
doi.org/10.5129/001041510X12911363509792; and Alex Neads, “You’re in the Army Now: The Pol-
itics of Cohesion During Military Integration in Sierra Leone,” Estudios de Seguridad, volumen. 29, No. 5
(2020), páginas. 894–926, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2020.1859126. On training and operational
practicas, see Anthony King, “The Word of Command: Communication and Cohesion in the Mili-
tary,” Armed Forces and Society, volumen. 32, No. 4 (2006), páginas. 493–512, https://doi.org/10.1177/
0095327X05283041; and Elizabeth Kier, “Homosexuals in the U.S. Militar: Open Integration and
Eficacia del combate,” Seguridad Internacional, volumen. 23, No. 2 (Caer 1998), páginas. 5–39, https://doi.org/
10.1162/isec.23.2.5.
49. Anthony King, “On Combat Effectiveness in the Infantry Platoon: Beyond the Primary Group
Thesis,” Estudios de Seguridad, volumen. 25, No. 4 (2016), páginas. 699–728, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2016
.1220205; y kier, “Homosexuals in the U.S. Military.”

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Seguridad Internacional 46:4 58

emerges as a norm. In Liberia, Por ejemplo, trainers frequently used competi-
tion between small groups to both foster team-building and hold squad mem-
bers accountable to one another.50 AFL ofªcers described basic training as a
“culture shock”51 and that training ideas ranged from “intriguing” to “goofy,"
such as doing push-ups as punishment for not shining boots. Eventualmente,
sin embargo, the need for discipline and teamwork began to make sense to the
trainees.52 Although U.S. training does not explicitly seek to teach cohesion
in the same way that it teaches liberal norms, it increases capacity for uniªed
acción, strengthens organizational interests, and it indirectly imparts a third
norm of cohesion.

explaining norm violations

The return on investment for imparting liberal norms often appears meager.
Evidence suggests that U.S.-trained militaries launch coups, subvert the rule of
law, and oppress the people they are supposed to protect.53 Infamously,
Estados Unidos. Army’s School of the Americas—created in 1946 to educate Latin
American military ofªcers on “the virtues of democratic civilian control over
the armed forces”—produced a generation of coup-makers instead.54

The international relations literature offers contrasting explanations for
norm violations. One set of arguments suggests that the problem is insufªcient
training or attention to norms.55 As the head of U.S. Africa Command said af-
ter U.S.-trained soldiers were implicated in the 2012 coup d’état in Mali: “We
didn’t spend, probably, the requisite time focusing on values, ethics, and mili-
tary ethos.”56 In this view, norm violations reºect a failure to successfully so-
cialize militaries to new norms in the ªrst place. A second set of arguments, el

50. Author interview via Zoom with former DynCorp instructor D, Junio 12, 2021.
51. Author interview with AFL ofªcers A and B, Monrovia, Julio 19, 2017. Basic aspects of soldier-
ing were new to most recruits because of the decision to disband the old AFL and extensively vet
new recruits. Como resultado, relatively few recruits had prior combat experience either as rebels or as
government forces.
52. Author interview with AFL ofªcer C, Monrovia, Julio 20, 2017.
53. Savage and Caverley, “When Human Capital Threatens the Capitol”; and Sandholtz, “United
States Military Assistance and Human Rights.”
54. “School of the Dictators,” New York Times, Septiembre 28, 1996, https://www.nytimes.com/
1996/09/28/opinion/school-of-the-dictators.html.
55. Powelson, “Enduring Engagement Yes, Episodic Engagement No”; Ruby and Gibler, “U.S.
Professional Military Education and Democratization Abroad”; and Carol Atkinson, “Constructiv-
ist Implications of Material Power: Military Engagement and the Socialization of States 1972–
2000,” International Studies Quarterly, volumen. 50, No. 3 (2006), páginas. 509–537, https://doi.org/10.1111/
j.1468-2478.2006.00412.x.
56. Tyrone C. Marshall Jr., “Africom Commander Addresses Concerns, Potential Solutions in
Mali,” American Forces Press Service, Enero 24, 2013, https://military-veteran.com/newsart/
afps/art/649.

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Soldiers’ Dilemma 59

rationalist perspective, uses a principal-agent framework to explain recipient
behavior.57 Providers function as principals that arm and equip weaker states
to act as agents on their behalf, but divergent priorities and asymmetric infor-
mation lead to agent-shirking and noncompliance.58 These studies suggest that
norm transmission, if attempted at all, will be anemic compared with the pow-
erful interests that motivate behavior.

Both explanations oversimplify decision-making in different but problem-
atic ways. The ªrst perspective, which emphasizes socialization, discounts the
power of interests in motivating behavior. It also fails to consider which norms
will exercise the most inºuence over decision-making. En cambio, the ratio-
nalist perspective discounts the role of norms in shaping preferences and con-
straining behavior. A diferencia de, I treat military decision-making as the joint
product of norms and interests, contributing to scholarship that examines
the conditions under which utilitarian or normative considerations govern
decision-making.59 Next, I look at how conºict between two liberal norms
weakens support for those norms and opens a pathway for other, more utili-
tarian norms to dominate.60

Theorizing Liberal Norm Conºict

I argue that in moments of norm conºict, militaries will prioritize cohesion
over the two liberal norms of respect for human rights and civilian control
of the military. My argument begins with the premise that norms mediate
decision-making because they serve as social constraints that people follow for

57. For an overview of principal-agent theory, see Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort, El
Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (Princeton, NUEVA JERSEY.: Prensa de la Universidad de Princeton, 2002);
and Gary J. Molinero, “The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models,” Annual Review of Political
Ciencia, volumen. 8, No. 1 (2005), páginas. 203–225, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.082103.104840.
58. These studies examine why the United States often fails to achieve its goals working with
proxies in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns. See Eli Berman and David A. Lago,
editores., Proxy Wars: Suppressing Violence through Local Agents (Ítaca, N.Y.: Prensa de la Universidad de Cornell,
2019); Esteban Biddle, Julia Macdonald, and Ryan Baker, “Small Footprint, Small Payoff: The Mili-
tary Effectiveness of Security Force Assistance,” Revista de Estudios Estratégicos, volumen. 41, No. 1/2 (2018),
páginas. 89–142, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2017.1307745; Byman, “Friends Like These”;
Barbara Elias, “The Big Problem of Small Allies: New Data and Theory on Deªant Local Counter-
insurgency Partners in Afghanistan and Iraq,” Estudios de Seguridad, volumen. 27, No. 2 (2018), páginas. 233–262,
https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1386935; and Walter C. Ladwig III, The Forgotten Front: Pa-
tron-Client Relationships in Counterinsurgency (Nueva York: Prensa de la Universidad de Cambridge, 2017).
59. On the need for “both/and” arguments, see Michael Zürn and Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Getting So-
cialized to Build Bridges: Constructivism and Rationalism, Europe and the Nation-State,” Interna-
tional Organization, volumen. 59, No. 4 (2005), pag. 1046, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818305050356.
60. Utilitarian norms refer to norms that maximize the military’s well-being as opposed to norms
that reºect moral rules, such as not abusing human rights.

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Seguridad Internacional 46:4 60

psychological and sociological reasons. Nonconformity with group norms
can lead to social sanctions and shaming;61 violating personal beliefs can af-
fect self-esteem.62 People thus forgo pursuit of naked self-interest to maintain
their positive self-image and social standing. Similarmente, collective actors com-
ply with norms to legitimize their behavior and minimize resistance from
other actors.63

Determining which norms to follow, sin embargo, is not always clear. Allá
are many different norms with potentially countervailing implications for
behavior—what Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro call the “ubiquity” of norms
problem.64 The problem of conºicting norms is well-noted in the literatures on
law, sociology, and international relations.65 For example, the international
relations literature has explored the tension between the norm of state sover-
eignty and humanitarian norms such as the “responsibility to protect.”66 More-
encima, following certain norms may come at a cost to other values, even if the
decision is not framed as a choice between them.67 As Jon Elster puts it, "En

61. Samuel A. Stouffer, “An Analysis of Conºicting Social Norms,” American Sociological Review,
volumen. 14, No. 5 (December 1949), páginas. 707–717, https://doi.org/10.2307/2086672; and Philip E.
Tetlock, “Social Functionalist Frameworks for Judgment and Choice: Intuitive Politicians, Theolo-
gians, and Prosecutors,” Psychological Review, volumen. 109, No. 3 (2002), páginas. 451–471, https://doi.org/
10.1037/0033-295X.109.3.451.
62. Dolan, “Unthinkable and Tragic," pag. 42; Jon Elster, Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the
Emotions (Cambridge: Prensa de la Universidad de Cambridge, 1999); and Tetlock, “Social Functionalist
Frameworks for Judgment and Choice.”
63. Ian Hurd, “Breaking and Making Norms: American Revisionism and Crises of Legitimacy,"
International Politics, volumen. 44, No. 2/3 (2007), páginas. 194–213, https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ip
.8800184; and Martha Finnemore, “Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity:
Why Being a Unipole Isn’t All It’s Cracked Up to Be,“Política mundial, volumen. 61, No. 1 (2009), páginas. 58–
85, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887109000082.
64. Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, “Norms, Identity and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise,” in
Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (Nuevo
york: Columbia University Press, 1996), pag. 486.
65. Por ejemplo, see Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions on the Conditions of Practi-
cal and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Nueva York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1989); Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice (Norwell, Masa.: Desorden
Academic Publishers, 1991); Stouffer, “An Analysis of Conºicting Social Norms”; James G. Marzo
and Johan P. Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1976); jeffrey
W.. Legro, “Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the ‘Failure’ of Internationalism,” International Orga-
nization, volumen. 51, No. 1 (1997), páginas. 31–63, https://doi.org/10.1162/002081897550294; and Wayne
Sandholtz, “Dynamics of International Norm Change: Rules against Wartime Plunder,” European
Journal of International Relations, volumen. 14, No. 1 (2008), páginas. 101–131, https://doi.org/10.1177/
1354066107087766.
66. Jennifer M. galés, “Norm Contestation and the Responsibility to Protect,” Global Responsibility
to Protect, volumen. 5, No. 4 (2013), páginas. 365–396, https://doi.org/10.1163/1875984X-00504002.
67. En 1994, Por ejemplo, the State Department legal counsel advised against jamming Rwandan
hate radio broadcasts partly over concerns about U.S. commitment to free speech. Samantha
Fuerza, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (Nueva York: Libros Básicos, 2002).

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Soldiers’ Dilemma 61

some contexts, following the lodestar of outcome-oriented rationality is easy
compared with ªnding one’s way in a jungle of social norms.”68

Asombrosamente, scholars and policymakers have neglected the problem of
norm conºict that is at the heart of liberal civil-military relations.69 In the lib-
eral formulation, the norms of human rights and civilian authority are mutu-
ally reinforcing. The empirical record underscores this assumption: donde el
United States provides norms training, it typically bundles both norms as a
package deal. Almost every country in sub-Saharan Africa, Por ejemplo, re-
ceives military training on both norms every year (see ªgure 1).

Liberalism’s inherent support for civilian control of the military assumes
that this civilian control represents the best way to protect both human rights
and democracy.70 Although these two norms usually are mutually reinforcing
in strong democracies, this assumption may fail in precisely the places where
norms training is most prevalent: weak democracies and fragile states. Semejante
states often lack strong legal institutions to rein in executive leaders, and their
militaries often lack robust military justice systems to establish the legality of
orders. Despite Eric Nordlinger’s warning that “liberalism’s abiding and in-
discriminate preference for civilian control is a debatable issue,” the problem
of norm conºict in liberal civil-military relations has avoided scrutiny.71

When situations arise with conºicting implications for behavior, militaries
face consequential choices without clear answers. The following section exam-
ines competing predictions about the effects of norm conºict on military
Toma de decisiones.

military responses to norm conºict

How will militaries respond to the conºicting norms of respect for human
rights and civilian control? Although U.S. policy discourse rarely broaches the
problem of norm conºict, there is an implicit expectation, should contradic-
tions arise, that the military will temporarily prioritize human rights rather
than defer to civilian authority. This expectation derives from liberal under-
standings of natural law; as the Defense Department notes, “the English phi-
losopher John Locke believed that human rights, not governments, came ªrst

68. Jon Elster, The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order (Nueva York: Cambridge University
Prensa, 1989), pag. 100.
69. An exception is Jesse Savage and Jonathan Caverley, OMS, although skeptical about socializa-
ción, note “the tension built within the stated goals of promoting both human rights and civilian
supremacy.” Savage and Caverley, “When Human Capital Threatens the Capitol," pag. 544.
70. DSCU, Security Cooperation Management, pag. 16-5.
71. eric a. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (Acantilados de Englewood, NUEVA JERSEY.:
Prentice Hall, 1977), pag. 8.

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Seguridad Internacional 46:4 62

in the natural order of things.”72 Given that orders to abuse human rights vio-
late natural law, the military can justiªably disobey such presumably illegal
orders. This understanding reºects a long tradition in U.S. military norms,
which holds that military personnel must disobey orders that are “manifestly
illegal.”73 Less clear is whether ofªcers should obey orders that they perceive
to be immoral but not necessarily illegal.74 Still, the preference ordering is
clear: people ªrst, governments second. If norms conºict, the military should
choose human rights over civilian control.

There is some evidence that the United States tries to impart this rank-
ordering of norms. In testimony before U.S. Congreso, the commander of U.S.
Africa Command said, “We recognize building legitimate defense institutions
is critical for African governments that prioritize the security of their citizens
over that of the state” (énfasis añadido).75 Evidence from my interviews sug-
gests that U.S. ofªcers at least occasionally socialize other militaries to follow
only legal orders. Por ejemplo, the AFL’s top ofªcers, intensively trained by
the United States, said that the United States prepared the AFL to be “very
bold” in telling political leaders when they were asking the military to do
something they could not or should not do. A diferencia de, one ofªcer said, otro
actors in Liberia lacked “courage” to defy illegal orders.76

Estados Unidos. policy expectation that militaries will choose human rights rests
upon two assumptions. Primero, it assumes that choosing between conºicting
norms is easy. At the individual level, people are presumed to choose between
values with relative ease. Although people may resist substituting deeply
held values for less important ones, when the choice is between two important
valores, they can frame the problem as a “tragic tradeoff” and avoid damage to
self-esteem or social standing.77 Moreover, the choice of which norm to privi-

72. DSCU, Security Cooperation Management, pag. 16-1.
73. See James B. Insco, “Defense of Superior Orders before Military Commissions,” Duke Journal of
Comparative & International Law, volumen. 13, No. 2 (2003), páginas. 389–418, https://scholarship.law.duke
.edu/djcil/vol13/iss2/4.
74. Lindsay Cohn, Max Margulies, and Michael A. robinson, “What Discord Follows: El
Divisive Debate over Military Disobedience,” Guerra en las rocas, Agosto 2, 2019, https://
warontherocks.com/2019/08/what-discord-follows-the-divisive-debate-over-military-
disobedience/.
75. A NOSOTROS. Africa Command, Testimony of Gen. Thomas D. Waldhauser, Commander, United States Africa
Dominio, 115th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: 2018), pag. 5, https://www.africom.mil/
document/30467/u-s-africa-command-2018-posture-statement.
76. Author interview with AFL ofªcer C, Monrovia, Julio 20, 2017; author interviews with U.S. en-
structors and a review of the civics curriculum conªrm that instructors conveyed this rank-
ordering in Liberia; author interview via Zoom with former DynCorp instructor A, Puede 27, 2021;
and author interview via Zoom with former DynCorp instructors B and C, Junio 5, 2021.
77. Philip E. Tetlock et al., “The Psychology of the Unthinkable: Taboo Trade-Offs, Forbidden Base
Rates, and Heretical Counterfactuals,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, volumen. 78, No. 5

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Soldiers’ Dilemma 63

lege should be facilitated by the presence of a blueprint for prioritization
(“people ªrst”).

The second assumption is that norm conºict will not damage either norm.
Rank-ordering norms in a crisis should not make the violated norm any less
salient; bastante, it is temporarily downgraded to accommodate the more impor-
tant principle in that moment.78 If anything, the process of adjudicating be-
tween the norms might strengthen them both. Research on norm contestation
suggests that norm conºicts can drive norm violations, but these violations ul-
timately strengthen socialization in the long term by clarifying ambiguity and
resolving future norm conºict.79

Insomuch as liberal powers think about other norms and interests beyond
these two central liberal norms, they treat them as unproblematic for crisis
Toma de decisiones. Norm conºicts are not viewed as problematic for cohesion; si
cualquier cosa, cohesion should make militaries more uniªed in doing the right
thing. Properly socialized military personnel, according to the liberal training
logic, should be willing to make costly choices even as liberal normative con-
siderations should continue to guide decisions.

Counter to U.S. policy expectations, I argue that these assumptions rest on
shaky foundations. En cambio, when liberal norms clash, military members fall
back on a third norm of cohesion that is consistent with group interests. Rango-
ordering of norms does happen but not in the direction that the United States
expects. Rather than choosing human rights over civilian control, militar
decision-making is less likely to be constrained by either liberal norm in favor
of cohesion.

Norm conºicts make it more likely for soldiers to fall back on cohesion in at
least two ways. Primero, conºict makes the contested norms less salient during
the crisis. The assumption that norm conºict does not adversely affect norms
misses the alternative possibility that it makes them easier to ignore instead.80
Scholarship has shown that norm conºicts can weaken support for prohibition
norms in warfare, such as norms against the use of chemical weapons.81

(2000), páginas. 853–870, https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.78.5.853; Baron and Leshner, “How Seri-
ous Are Expressions of Protected Values?"; Philip E. Tetlock, Barbara A. Mellers, y j. Peter
Scoblic, “Sacred versus Pseudo-Sacred Values: How People Cope with Taboo Trade-Offs,” Ameri-
can Economic Review, volumen. 107, No. 5 (2017), páginas. 96–99, https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20171110; y
Dolan, “Unthinkable and Tragic.”
78. This assumption is shared in the psychology literature on value tradeoffs. See Baron and
Spranca, “Protected Values," pag. 1; and Dolan, “Unthinkable and Tragic," pag. 47.
79. Wiener, A Theory of Contestation; and Wiener, Contestation and Constitution of Norms in Global
International Relations.
80. shannon, “Norms Are What States Make of Them.”
81. Dolan, “Unthinkable and Tragic”; Charli Carpenter and Alexander H. Montgomery, "El
Stopping Power of Norms: Saturation Bombing, Civilian Immunity, and U.S. Attitudes toward the

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Seguridad Internacional 46:4 64

Contestation eliminates the “taken for granted” quality of norms; once chal-
lenged, norms may no longer “operate as either a focal point for mutual expec-
tations or as a naturalized guide for behavior.”82 Conºict between liberal
norms invites cost-beneªt calculations because the norms are no longer un-
cuestionable. It can be costly to choose between either disobeying leaders and
protecting civilians or, conversely, obeying leaders and brutalizing civilians.
Weighing costs and beneªts thus creates incentives to instrumentally follow
other norms that best serve soldiers’ interests. Militaries have another such
norm as recourse: cohesion, which is neither inherently liberal nor conºictive
with their self-interest.

Segundo, liberal norm conºicts are often situations that also threaten cohe-
sión. Crises that pit political leaders against the population, with the military
in the middle, are fraught situations that can threaten cohesion. Disagreement
over whether to obey orders may create fears of ªssures in the ranks.83 Indi-
viduals may be reluctant to make choices that they perceive as potentially divi-
sive and harmful to cohesion. En efecto, insights from the literature on military
obedience show that militaries often prioritize cohesion when deciding
whether to obey or defect during crises.84 I argue that psychological dynamics
explain why cohesion dominates decision-making. Structurally, cohesion be-
comes more salient even as the clashing liberal norms become less salient.

Prioritizing cohesion offers military members a way to behave normatively
while protecting their interests and preserving the organization. Contrary to a
purely instrumental logic under which norms are cast aside as soon as they
clash with interests, people still try to justify their actions in normative terms.85
But people can also choose strategically among norms. Because cohesion satis-

Laws of War,” Seguridad Internacional, volumen. 45, No. 2 (Caer 2020), pag. 147, https://doi.org/10.1162/
isec_a_00392; Scott D.. Sagan and Benjamin A. Valentino, “Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran: Qué
Americans Really Think about Using Nuclear Weapons and Killing Noncombatants,” International
Security, volumen. 42, No. 1 (Verano 2017), páginas. 41–79; and Sagan, Valentino, Carpintero, and Montgom-
ery, “Does the Noncombatant Immunity Norm Have Stopping Power?"
82. Hurd, “Breaking and Making Norms," pag. 197.
83. Incentives to avoid fracturing the ranks explain different military behaviors, including coup
attempts. See Geddes, “What Do We Know About Democratization after Twenty Years?"; y
Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (Roca, Colo.: Westview
Prensa, 1988).
84. See Lee, “Military Cohesion and Regime Maintenance”; Zoltan Barany, How Armies Respond to
Revolutions and Why (Princeton, NUEVA JERSEY.: Prensa de la Universidad de Princeton, 2016); Julien Morency-Laºamme,
“A Question of Trust: Military Defection during Regime Crises in Benin and Togo,” Democratiza-
ción, volumen. 25, No. 3 (2018), páginas. 464–480, https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2017.1375474; y
McLauchlin, “Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion.”
85. shannon, “Norms Are What States Make of Them”; and for a related argument on norm
cambiar, see Aisha Ahmad, “‘We Have Captured Your Women’: Explaining Jihadist Norm
Cambiar,” Seguridad Internacional, volumen. 44, No. 1 (Verano 2019), páginas. 80–116, https://doi.org/10.1162/
isec_a_00350.

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Soldiers’ Dilemma 65

ªes both interests and norms, I argue that it is more likely to be selected in a
crisis. This dynamic explains both the ascendance of cohesion and interests to
the forefront of decision-making and the descendance, even if temporary, of re-
gard for liberal norms. This dynamic does not mean that cohesion is funda-
mentally at odds with liberal norms, nor does it automatically predict norm
violations. Bastante, conºict between liberal norms creates the conditions that
make violations possible. By vitiating liberal normative restraints, military cri-
sis decision-making will be driven by whatever best serves cohesion, cual
may involve violating human rights, civilian control, or both norms. While this
argument seeks to explain changes in support for norms rather than speciªc
behavioral outcomes, I consider implications for behavior below.

Finalmente, several factors may exacerbate norm conºict. Primero, the liberal prefer-
ence ordering of “people ªrst, governments second” is not always communi-
cated clearly in practice. U.S.-trained militaries are not taught to choose
human rights nearly as systematically as the rhetoric suggests. One reason for
the disconnect between theory and practice is that policymakers may deny the
possibility of norm tradeoffs between human rights and civilian control be-
cause of the tendency to engage in wishful thinking.86 In private conversa-
ciones, A NOSOTROS. military ofªcers have described this potential for norm conºict as a
“conundrum” or “third rail” in security assistance, admitting that they try to
avoid addressing it altogether. When civilians order the military to do things
that are illegal, A NOSOTROS. advice tends to be inchoate, offering һfty-four different
answers” depending on the situation.87

Another reason for the disconnect may be divergent preferences between
Estados Unidos. military and its own civilian leaders; the Defense Department’s public
Lockean position has been undercut in unofªcial presidential rhetoric.88 Bu-
reaucratic silos may also play a role: Different entities conduct U.S. entrenando en
civil-military relations and on human rights.

Segundo, militaries with histories of factionalism or civil war may be more
prone to prioritizing cohesion. Not only might these militaries be more sensi-
tive to the risk of internal rifts, but they often lack robust military justice sys-

86. On value tradeoffs, see Baron and Spranca, “Protected Values," pag. 1; Robert Jervis, “Under-
standing Beliefs,” Political Psychology, volumen. 27, No. 5 (2006), páginas. 641–663, https://doi.org/10.1111/
j.1467-9221.2006.00527.x; and Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics
(Princeton, NUEVA JERSEY.: Prensa de la Universidad de Princeton, 1976).
87. Author interview via telephone with Defense Department ofªcial, Noviembre 30, 2018.
88. An example of such rhetoric is President Ronald Reagan’s position on denying arms to El Sal-
vador over human rights abuses committed in their civil war: “We don’t throw out our friends just
because they can’t pass the ‘saliva test’ on human rights.” President Ronald Reagan, “Minutes of a
National Security Council Meeting,” February 6, 1981, Foreign Relations of the United States, volumen. III,
Doc. 15, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, (Washington, CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: Government Printing
Ofªce, 2016).

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Seguridad Internacional 46:4 66

tems and doctrines to evaluate the legality of orders and provide guidance for
acción. Illustrative evidence points to this kind of sensitivity in the Liberia
caso. When asked in the survey what the Liberian military’s motto (“A Force
for Good”) meant to them, many soldiers’ responses emphasized cohesion:
“a force that can’t ever be factionalized,” “united,” and “here to stay.”

hypotheses

I predict that norm conºict will weaken support for liberal norms, undermin-
ing their robustness by making them less salient in crises.89 Rather than
prompting soldiers to choose human rights over civilian control, como el
United States expects, moments of norm conºict are more likely to under-
mine support for both norms and prompt militaries to select a third norm, co-
hesion, which is consistent with their interests. This argument produces the
following hypotheses:

H1: Moments of norm conºict reduce soldiers’ willingness to prioritize human
rights over civilian control.

H2: Moments of norm conºict reduce soldiers’ support for democratic norms.

H3: Moments of norm conºict increase soldiers’ prioritization of cohesion.

A diferencia de, A NOSOTROS. policy expectations predict that soldiers experiencing norm
conºict will prioritize human rights. Although this choice temporarily rank-
orders human rights over civilian control, norm conºicts may enhance—or at
least not undermine—support for democratic norms. This outcome suggests
the following hypotheses:

H4: Moments of norm conºict increase soldiers’ willingness to prioritize hu-
man rights over civilian control.

H5: Moments of norm conºict increase soldiers’ support for democratic
normas.

89. In the analyses that follow, I look at individual-level support as one dimension of norm ro-
bustness. Other dimensions beyond the scope of this article include “concordance, third-party
reactions to norm violations . . . and implementation.” See Nicole Deitelhoff and Lisbeth Zimmer-
mann, “Norms under Challenge: Unpacking the Dynamics of Norm Robustness,” Journal of Global
Security Studies, volumen. 4, No. 1 (2019), pag. 2, https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogy041.

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Soldiers’ Dilemma 67

Finalmente, I consider how liberal foreign military training might condition how
militaries respond to norm conºict. Por un lado, insomuch as training
promotes liberal norms and actively socializes a norm hierarchy of “people
ªrst,” then U.S. training should strengthen the propensity to prioritize human
rights. Por otro lado, training cultivates a common identity and solidarity
at the individual level, increases military autonomy, and indirectly bolsters
organizational interests. Should norm conºict arise, training may strengthen
cohesion, at the expense of liberal norms. These alternatives suggest two
ªnal hypotheses:

H6a: Soldiers with U.S. training will be less likely to prioritize human rights or
support democratic norms in moments of norm conºict.

H6b: Soldiers with U.S. training will be more likely to prioritize human rights
and support democratic norms in moments of norm conºict.

scope conditions

Before turning to the empirical analyses, I consider the conditions under
which norm conºicts are more likely to occur and where their effects may be
more severe. The ªrst two scope conditions are regime type and institutional
strength—the likelihood and severity of norm conºict may increase in weak
democracies. Primero, democratic or pseudo-democratic90 states typically at least
attempt (or feign) to adhere to both norms. These are also the states that are
most likely to receive norms training, which means that the seeds of the di-
lemma are present. Other mechanisms can drive norm violations, but for norm
conºict to occur, both liberal norms must be present—otherwise there is no
contradiction. Más, sometimes the preferences of the government and the
population diverge in new or weak democracies, and these divergences may
prompt elites to use the military against the public.91

Además, such states typically have weak institutions and fragile rule of
law. Strong courts, legislatures, and military justice systems both constrain

90. Pseudo-democratic refers to states that have the trappings of democratic institutions without
true democracy. Such states are also known as “hybrid regimes.” See Larry Diamond, “Elections
Without Democracy: Thinking About Hybrid Regimes,” Journal of Democracy, volumen. 13, No. 2 (2002),
páginas. 21–35, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2002.0025.
91. Cases of political upheaval in the developing world often feature embattled governments or-
dering militaries to repress protests, which forces the military to choose sides. Coups occurred in
Nigeria in the 1960s, Por ejemplo, after military commanders had to choose between ªghting to
“maintain the government in power or overthrowing it themselves.” Nordlinger, Soldiers and Poli-
tics, pag. 91.

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Seguridad Internacional 46:4 68

leaders from making illegal orders and hold militaries accountable. These in-
stitutional restraints are one reason why norm conºicts surface less frequently
in established democracies and, if they do, why their effects tend to be less se-
vere. Por ejemplo, when U.S. President Donald Trump suggested in 2018 eso
soldiers would shoot any migrants who threw rocks along the Mexican border,
military leaders and analysts quickly emphasized that such a disproportionate
response would be illegal.92 Even if norm conºicts vitiate normative consider-
ations, institutions restrain behavior. Estados Unidos. Uniform Code of Military
Justicia, Por ejemplo, provides legal guidance for military decision-making. Ro-
bust legal institutions capable of adjudicating between such conºicts, sin embargo,
are almost always missing in weak states where most norms training occurs.

The military’s orientation toward external defense or internal security may
also affect the likelihood of norm conºict and the severity of its effects. Militar-
ies tasked with law enforcement or regime protection are far more likely to
face crisis scenarios where norm conºicts can surface.93 Conversely, estab-
lished democracies generally avoid using the military for domestic law en-
necesariamente. Tension between respect for human rights and civilian control of
the military would not seem as remote a possibility in the United States if the
military were used for law enforcement, a problem avoided by the 1878 Posse
Comitatus Act, which banned use of the military in policing functions. Incluso
still, the United States has had historic ºashpoints during which states have
used their national guards to repress protests or to resist desegregation.94
President Trump’s deployment of active-duty troops to Washington, CORRIENTE CONTINUA., en
Junio 2020 to contain protests against police brutality and systemic racism
prompted one analyst to write: “Such action weakens the fundamental con-
tract between the military and the American people.”95

92. Associated Press, “Equating Rocks with Riºes, Trump Proposes Radical New Rules of Engage-
ment for Troops along Border,” Military Times, Noviembre 1, 2018, https://www.militarytimes
.com/news/your-military/2018/11/01/equating-rocks-with-riºes-trump-proposes-radical-new-
rules-of-engagement-for-troops-along-border/; and Tara Copp, “Here Are the Rules of Engage-
ment for Troops Deploying to the Mexican Border,” Military Times, Noviembre 2, 2018, https://
www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2018/11/02/here-are-the-rules-of-engagement-for-
troops-deploying-to-the-mexican-border/.
93. The military’s mission orientation might also affect the degree to which soldiers perceive there
to be a norm conºict (p.ej., in orders to repress protests), a question for future research.
94. An example of using the national guard to repress protests includes when members of the
Ohio National Guard ªred on student protestors at Kent State University on May 4, 1970, killing
four and injuring nine. See Jerry M. Lewis and Thomas R. Hensley, “The May 4 Shootings at Kent
State University: The Search for Historical Accuracy,” M4Y, Kent State University, https://
www.kent.edu/may-4-historical-accuracy; and Jonathon Berlin and Kori Rumore, “12 Times the
President Called in the Military Domestically,” Chicago Tribune, Junio 1, 2020, http://www
.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-national-guard-deployments-timeline-htmlstory.html.
95. Paula Thornhill, “‘Beyond the Beltway’—What’s the Civil-Military Crisis?,” Guerra en las rocas,

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Soldiers’ Dilemma 69

The theoretical argument presented here focuses on military decision-
making rather than military behavior. The argument does not predict
which norms may be violated in a given crisis, only that conºict weakens lib-
eral norms, which increases the likelihood that norm violations will occur. A
explore the empirical implications, the analyses that follow look at the path-
ways by which individual shifts in attitudes occur.

The decision to focus on attitudinal shifts, rather than behavioral outcomes,
has theoretical justiªcation. Studying how beliefs and attitudes change is valu-
able in its own right. We cannot assume that beliefs change just because behav-
ior changes (or vice versa). Robert Jervis noted that while beliefs often drive
comportamiento, “such a correspondence is not automatic.”96 Studying each stage sep-
arately allows scholars to assess whether and how changes in attitudes affect
behavior.97 This separation is particularly important when dealing with com-
plex social processes such as military behavior in domestic crises. This separa-
tion also has precedent in the psychology literature, which tends to study
either attitude changes as the dependent variable or the effects of attitudes on
behavior as independent or intervening variables.98

While this article focuses on how norm conºict affects military attitudes to-
ward norms (rather than behavior), a large psychology literature shows that
attitudes are strong predictors of intentions, which in turn shape behavior.99
These studies show that when people have competing attitudes, they act ac-
cording to their strongest attitude.100

These insights allow us to consider the predicted behavioral implications, Alabama-
though direct tests remain an important step for future research. En el uno

Junio 17, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/beyond-the-beltway-whats-the-civil-military-
crisis/.
96. Jervis, “Understanding Beliefs," pag. 657.
97. Jack Levy also calls for two-stage approaches that measure both belief and behavior change.
See Jack S. Exacción, “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Mineªeld,” International
Organization, volumen. 48, No. 2 (1994), páginas. 279–312, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300028198.
98. Alice H. Eagly, “Uneven Progress: Social Psychology and the Study of Attitudes," Diario de
Personality and Social Psychology, volumen. 63, No. 5 (1992), pag. 705, https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.63.5.693.
99. The theory of planned behavior argues that attitudes and norms shape intentions, cuales son
the immediate predictors of behavior. See Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen, Belief, Attitude, Inten-
ción, and Behavior: An Introduction to Theory and Research (Reading, Masa.: Addison-Wesley, 1975);
and Icek Ajzen, “The Theory of Planned Behavior,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, volumen. 50, No. 2 (1991), páginas. 179–211, https://doi.org/10.1016/0749-5978(91)90020-t. El
theory of planned behavior has been used to predict a wide range of behaviors, from road rage to
vaccination. Other models linking attitudes to behavior include Alice H. Eagly and Shelly
Chaiken, The Psychology of Attitudes (Fort Worth, Texas: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1993).
100. andres. Davidson and Diane M. Morrison, “Predicting Contraceptive Behavior from Atti-
tudes: A Comparison of Within- Versus Across-Subjects Procedures,” Journal of Personality and So-
cial Psychology, volumen. 45, No. 5 (1983), páginas. 997–1009, https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.45.5.997.

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Seguridad Internacional 46:4 70

mano, Estados Unidos. policy expectation is that militaries will continue to prioritize
liberal norms, which should in turn continue to shape behavior in benign
maneras. Even if prioritizing human rights means defying civilian orders, nosotros
would expect to see fewer abuses and less intervention if the policy expecta-
tion is correct that temporarily choosing human rights does not erode the
norm of civilian control. Por otro lado, if norm conºict reduces support
for liberal norms and soldiers prioritize cohesion instead, the potential for
norm-violating behavior increases. Cohesion does not automatically predict
liberal norm violations, but it does predict that soldiers will do whatever best
serves cohesion, whether that means violating one or both liberal norms.

A broad comparative literature picks up the question of behavioral out-
comes, investigating what happens when militaries repress revolutions or de-
fect from the regime instead.101 These works examine how the regime, y
those in opposition to the regime, can activate different military interests
and identities.102 Many studies suggest that the decision to defect hinges on
military cohesion and whether militaries think that repression will undermine
cohesion.103 In short, this literature explains the paths that behavior can take
once cohesion is a dominant factor in military decision-making.

Cases in Tunisia and Egypt tentatively illustrate these divergent behavioral
resultados. In Tunisia, mass protests in 2011 jeopardized Zine El Abidine Ben
Ali’s grasp on power. Rather than repress the protests, the military withdrew
support from the regime, allowing Ben Ali to fall—but the decision to pri-
oritize human rights did not correspond with reduced support for civilian
control.104 In short, the behavioral outcomes in this case aligned to U.S. expec-

101. Revolutions are an extreme case; my argument does not require revolutionary moments, justo
a conºict between the imperatives to protect people and to obey political leaders, which could
happen during unrest short of widescale rebellion.
102. Ver, Por ejemplo, Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, and Tanja Eschenauer, “The ‘Dictator’s End-
game’: Explaining Military Behavior in Nonviolent Anti-Incumbent Mass Protests,” Democracy and
Security, volumen. 14, No. 2 (2018), páginas. 174–199, https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2017.1423471; Holger
Albrecht and Dorothy Ohl, “Exit, Resistance, Loyalty: Military Behavior during Unrest in Authori-
tarian Regimes,” Perspectives on Politics, volumen. 14, No. 1 (2016), páginas. 38–52, https://doi.org/10.1017/
S1537592715003217; Bellin, “Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle
East”; and Michael Makara, “Coup-Prooªng, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring,” Democracy
and Security, volumen. 9, No. 4 (2013), páginas. 334–359, https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2013.802983.
103. Sotavento, “Military Cohesion and Regime Maintenance”; Barany, How Armies Respond to Revolu-
tions and Why; Morency-Laºamme, “A Question of Trust”; and McLauchlin, “Loyalty Strategies
and Military Defection in Rebellion.” David Pion-Berlin et al. and Eva Bellin suggest that militar-
ies are more likely to disobey orders when they worry that repression will undermine cohesion.
Pion-Berlin, Esparza, and Grisham, “Staying Quartered”; and Bellin, “Reconsidering the Robust-
ness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East.” The implication is that cohesive militaries will
be more likely to repress civilians, but cohesion could also make units more likely to defy or-
ders. See Jesse Paul Lehrke, “A Cohesion Model to Assess Military Arbitration of Revolutions,"
Armed Forces and Society, volumen. 40, No. 1 (2014), páginas. 156–157, https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X1
2459851.
104. David Kuehn, “Midwives or Gravediggers of Democracy? The Military’s Impact on Demo-

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Soldiers’ Dilemma 71

taciones. Egypt’s case initially followed a similar trajectory. When protests
erupted against Hosni Mubarak in 2011, the chief of staff of the armed forces
assured the U.S. military “that the armed forces would defend Egyptian insti-
tutions, not individuals, and would not open ªre on civilians.”105 Yet after
Mubarak’s fall and democratic elections in 2012, the military intervened again
Un año después, seizing power. Under General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, elected presi-
dent in 2014, human rights abuses soared, pointing to an erosion of both liberal
normas. The argument advanced in this article presents a causal pathway by
which liberal norm conºict may have created the conditions that allowed in-
terests to dominate the Egyptian military’s decision-making. The Egyptian
case is noteworthy because it serves as a behavioral model for other militaries.
In an interview with two AFL ofªcers, I asked what they might do if the norms
of human rights and civilian control came into conºict. Without pausing, ellos
answered: “Egypt [the Egyptian military in 2011].”106

Research Design

To explore the seven hypotheses, I designed an experiment embedded in a sur-
vey of active-duty AFL personnel across military bases in Liberia. The experi-
ment primes soldiers in the treatment group to think about liberal norm
conºict by asking them to consider a scenario in which the president orders
the military to put down protests with force. To avoid potentially biased re-
sponses, the soldiers were asked to evaluate the commander’s response rather
than provide their own preferences directly.107

In Liberia, liberal norm conºict might not only occur but also lead to perni-
cious outcomes. Dysfunctional civil-military relations contributed to fourteen
years of civil war that ravaged the country between 1989 y 2003.108 Hoy,

cratic Development,” Democratization, volumen. 24, No. 5 (2017), pag. 786, https://doi.org/10.1080/
13510347.2017.1324421; and Risa Brooks, “Abandoned at the Palace: Why the Tunisian Military
Defected from the Ben Ali Regime in January 2011,” Journal of Strategic Studies, volumen. 36, No. 2
(2013), páginas. 205–220, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2012.742011.
105. Scott Shane and David D. Kirkpatrick, “Military Caught between Mubarak and Protesters,"
New York Times, Febrero 10, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/11/world/middleeast/
11military.html.
106. Author interview with AFL ofªcers A and B, Monrovia, Julio 19, 2017.
107. The alternative would be to ask people directly what they would do in such a situation. Pero
such questions could result in biased estimates if people perceived truthful answers as being so-
cially undesirable. See Theresa DeMaio, “Social Desirability and Survey Measurement: A Review,"
in Charles F. Turner and Elizabeth Martin, editores., Surveying Subjective Phenomenon, volumen. 2 (Thousand
Oaks, California: Sage, 1984). Another problem is that people may not correctly identify their true pref-
erences. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions,"
Revista de negocios, volumen. 59, No. 4 (1986), páginas. S251–S278, https://doi.org/10.1086/296365; and Amos
Tversky and Richard H. Thaler, “Anomalies: Preference Reversals,” Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, volumen. 4, No. 2 (Primavera 1990), páginas. 201–211, https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.4.2.201.
108. For background on the war, as well as historical U.S. security assistance in Liberia, see Josef

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Seguridad Internacional 46:4 72

Liberia is a transitional democracy; elections in 2017 marked the ªrst peaceful
transfer of power in over seventy years.109 Rule of law has yet to fully mature;
as of 2017 (when the survey was conducted), the AFL still lacked a functioning
military justice system.110 Although Liberia is a typical case for liberal norm
conºict, it is not an easy case for my theory. After the war, the United States re-
built the AFL.111 The U.S. training program heavily emphasized liberal norms,
socializing the Liberian military to respect human rights and civilian authority.
The program architects believed that these norms were key to preventing a
repeat of the brutal civil war; by trainers’ accounts, the message was well re-
ceived.112 The war had shattered old norms and AFL recruits were eager for
cambiar, making Liberia a most-likely case in which liberal norms could take
raíz. Interviews with the AFL leadership further reveal that the United States
tried to instill a preference ordering among the norms, teaching the AFL to
obey only legal orders.

Liberia is also a valuable case for assessing the effects of U.S. training be-
cause of the high level of U.S. involvement, which helps to shed light on causal
pathways. Cases with “extreme” values on independent variables are useful
for illustrating mechanisms.113 Furthermore, as exposure to postwar U.S. train-
ing varied across recruits, who joined the military in eight waves, hay
built-in variation in the army-building program, which tapered off partially by
design and partially because it ran out of money before completion.114 In the
end, roughly one-third of the rebuilt AFL received the full U.S. training se-

Teboho Ansorge and Nana Akua Antwi-Ansorge, “Monopoly, Legitimacy, Fuerza: DDR–SSR Libe-
ría,” in Melanne A. Civic and Michael Miklaucic, editores., Monopoly of Force: The Nexus of DDR and
SSR (Washington, CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: Prensa Universitaria de la Defensa Nacional, 2011).
109. Reuters Staff, “White House: Liberia Transfer of Power a ‘Major Milestone,’” Reuters,
December 29, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-liberia-election-usa/white-house-liberia-
transfer-of-power-a-major-milestone-idUSKBN1EN1K7.
110. Author interview with UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) ofªcials A and B, Monrovia, Julio 17,
2017.
111. The United States and the United Nations (UN) shared post-conºict security sector reform in
Liberia, with the United States supporting military reform and UNMIL supporting police and
rule-of-law reform. This article focuses on U.S. efforts to rebuild the AFL. On UN efforts, ver
“Background,” United Nations Mission in Liberia,
last modiªed March 20, 2018, https://
unmil.unmissions.org/background.
112. Author interview via Zoom with former DynCorp instructor A, Puede 27, 2021; and author in-
terview via Zoom with former DynCorp instructors B and C, Junio 5, 2021.
113. Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social
Ciencias (Cambridge, Masa.: CON prensa, 2005); and Jason Seawright, Multi-Method Social Science:
Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Tools (Nueva York: Prensa de la Universidad de Cambridge, 2016).
114. The program was funded by a one-time appropriation from Congress. When the money ran
afuera, the program ended. Author interview via telephone with State Department ofªcial A, Au-
gust 21, 2014; and Sean McFate, Building Better Armies: An Insider’s Account of Liberia (Carlisle, Pa.:
Strategic Studies Institute, A NOSOTROS. Army War College Press, 2013), pag. 30, https://www.jstor.org/
stable/resrep11245.

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Soldiers’ Dilemma 73

quence, one-third received partial U.S. training, and one-third received no U.S.
training. I leverage this variation to explore differences in experimental treat-
ment effects across levels of training.

I partnered with a local ªrm, q&A, to administer the survey in December
2017 a 270 AFL respondents.115 A multistage sampling process drew a random
sample of respondents from every unit roster on bases across Liberia.116 AFL
rosters indicated that it had fewer than 2,000 soldiers, and thus the sample rep-
resents around 15 percent of the force. Because of the small sample size, I treat
the results that follow as a plausibility probe of the argument. The survey sam-
ple is representative of the force, with AFL recruitment group, rank, and gen-
der distributions tracking closely to the population. Ranks in the sample
ranged from private to colonel; the median rank of the survey respondents
was specialist, and the median age was thirty-seven years old.117

experimental design

I designed the experiment to prime respondents to recognize a conºict between
the liberal norms of human rights and civilian control. Respondents who were
randomly assigned to the treatment group heard the following scenario:

After a big tariff increase, local business owners go on strike and there are pro-
tests in the streets. The Liberian National Police are managing it, but the presi-
dent wants to send a forceful message and calls on the military to intervene
to stop the protests. The military commander refuses to send soldiers into
the streets to stop the protests.

Immediately afterward, as part of the treatment condition, respondents se-
lected the statement that was the closest match to their own opinion about the
caso: “The military should not have intervened, it was an illegal order”;
“The military should have intervened, it was a legal order”; or “It does
not matter, as long as the military follows the commander’s orders and
sticks together.”

I worked with AFL leadership to identify and design a treatment scenario
that was a salient example of norm conºict (es decir., an illegal order that soldiers
should refuse to obey). The AFL’s constitutional role is modeled on that of the
United States; it similarly restricts military involvement in domestic law en-

115. Two factors drove the survey’s timing: el 2017 elecciones, and the March 2018 closure of
UNMIL. December 2017 represented a window of opportunity to evaluate the effects of training
on the AFL after the main effort had ended but before the political status quo changed.
116. See the online appendix for additional details.
117. There were only two general ofªcers in the military as of 2017, both of whom participated in
in-depth, semi-structured interviews. Summary statistics are in the online appendix.

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Seguridad Internacional 46:4 74

forcement.118 The 1979 rice riots, a civil-military ºashpoint in Liberia, also give
this scenario historical precedence.119

Respondents who were randomly assigned to the control group did not hear
any scenario. Because the treatment condition included a follow-up question
that I used to construct a measure of prioritizing cohesion (described below),
respondents in the control group received a similarly structured question
about an unrelated topic. They were asked to choose the statement closest to
their own opinion about AFL participation in international peacekeeping:120
“International peacekeeping should be a primary mission for the AFL”; “It is
okay to contribute to international peacekeeping occasionally, but not as a pri-
mary mission”; or “It does not matter, as long as the military executes the mis-
sion successfully.”121

After hearing the scenario (or control prompt), respondents were asked a
series of outcome measure questions. Primero, I tested respondents’ willingness to
prioritize human rights. Respondents were asked whether they agreed with
the following statement on a scale from 1 (“not at all”) a 4 (“a lot”): “The mil-
itary should follow an approach that prioritizes the security of the people over
the security of the government.”122 Second, I tested respondents’ support for
democracy and its alternatives, such as military rule, which represents a rejec-
tion of liberal civilian authority. These questions used standardized language
from Afrobarometer public opinion surveys.123 Respondents were asked
whether they would disapprove or approve of the following alternatives:
“Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold ofªce”;

118. According to the 2008 National Defense Act, the AFL may intervene in emergencies “only as
a last resort, when the threat exceeds the capacity of law enforcement agencies to respond.” The
scenario notes that the police are “managing” the situation, which AFL leaders felt clearly signaled
that the order was illegal.
119. Although the rice riots were important, they occurred thirty-eight years prior to the survey.
To the extent that effects persisted, it is unclear in what direction they might affect results.
“Pretreatment” through real-world events can lead to underestimating treatment effects. If any-
thing, the events of 1979 might make respondents more attuned to human rights, biasing results in
favor of U.S. policy expectations.
120. International peacekeeping is not controversial in Liberia. It is an AFL mission outlined in the
2008 National Defense Act, although opinions vary over whether it should be a primary or sec-
ondary mission.
121. Figure A3 in the online appendix summarizes the experimental design.
122. I use the term “security of the people” to capture the concept of human rights because the Li-
berian and U.S. militaries use similar terms to talk about the military’s role in protecting human
rights. Author interview with AFL ofªcer C, Monrovia, Julio 20, 2017; and U.S. Africa Command,
Testimony of Gen. Thomas D. Waldhauser, pag. 5.
123. See “Summary of Results, Afrobarometer Round 6, Survey on Liberia, 2015,” Practical
Sampling International, Afrobarometer, https://afrobarometer.org/publications/liberia-round-6-
summary-results-2015. Afrobarometer considers respondents as “fully demanding democracy”
when they explicitly support democracy and reject its alternatives.

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Soldiers’ Dilemma 75

“The army comes in to govern the country”; and “Elections and the House of
Representatives are abolished so that the president can decide everything.”
For each alternative, respondents expressed disapproval or approval on a scale
de 1 (“strongly disapprove”) a 5 (“strongly approve”).

Respondents were then asked to choose the statement closest to their own
opinion from three options: “Democracy is preferable to any other kind of gov-
ernment”; “In some circumstances, a nondemocratic government can be pref-
erable”; and “For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government
we have.” Because these response options are categorical, the results that fol-
low used a dummy variable that I coded as 1 if the respondent chose the ªrst
option and 0 de lo contrario.

To evaluate whether respondents prioritized cohesion after hearing the
scenario, I coded a dummy variable that took a value of 1 if the respondent
chose the third response option to the treatment question (“It does not matter,
as long as the military follows the commander’s orders and sticks together”)
or control question (“It does not matter, as long as the military executes the
mission successfully”). These options were designed to capture a rough meas-
ure of prioritizing cohesion in each case. This measure cannot provide conclu-
sive evidence of causality because the questions were not worded identically.
But it offers suggestive evidence for how norm conºict may affect preferences
over cohesion. I also used additional tests to further probe the relationship be-
tween norm conºict and cohesion.

measuring u.s. training

To evaluate how foreign military training affects soldiers’ responses to norm
conºict, I leveraged individual-level data on exposure to U.S. training. El
A NOSOTROS. program to rebuild the AFL began in 2006, with recruits entering the new
force in eight groups called “batches” from 2006 a través de 2015.124 The ªrst
batch of recruits were, as the instructors called them, the “guinea pigs.”125 In
this “proof of concept” class, 105 soldiers entered basic training in July 2006,
y 102 graduated ªve months later.126 The entire batch moved together
through eleven weeks of Initial Entry Training, four weeks of Advanced Indi-
vidual Training, and a four-week Basic Non-commissioned Ofªcer Course
(BNOC).127 Eleven candidates with bachelor’s degrees entered an additional

124. The majority of soldiers were inducted in batches 2–5, with smaller classes in batches 1 y
6–8.
125. Author interview with AFL ofªcer C, Monrovia, Julio 20, 2017.
126. Author interview via telephone with former U.S. Embassy ofªcial, Junio 13, 2017.
127. Mark Malan, Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Mixed Results from Humble Beginnings (Carlisle,
Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, A NOSOTROS. Army War College Press, 2008), páginas. 33–34, https://

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Seguridad Internacional 46:4 76

six-week Ofªcer Candidate School (OCS), forming the ºedgling AFL ofªcer
corps. The second batch entered basic training in July 2007.

The period of U.S. training ran from 2006 a 2009 and was primarily
executed by two ªrms, DynCorp International and Paciªc Architects &
Engineers.128 The early training heavily emphasized liberal norms because the
program designers believed “that after 14 years of civil war, most Liberians
knew how to ªre an AK-47 but did not know when or at what.”129 To inculcate
liberal norms, DynCorp invited civics trainers, Liberian academics, and other
experts to conduct three weeks of intensive training on the laws of war, civil-
military relations, and human rights that “dwarfed all other training.”130 This
three-week curriculum was the ªrst casualty of funding shortfalls,131 pero
norms training continued alongside technical training from basic training
through OCS.132 As the AFL soldiers went through basic training, their U.S. en-
structors “kept beating it into [su] heads that the military’s role was to serve
la población,” subject to civilian control.133 This emphasis on liberal norms
was “surprising”; there was “a lot of new doctrine being preached.”134

En tono rimbombante, exposure to U.S. training varied across the recruitment batches,
which allowed me to test for heterogeneous treatment effects. Batches 1–3 re-
ceived the full U.S. training sequence, the middle batches (4–5) received vary-
ing amounts of training,135 and the ªnal three batches received no U.S.
training.136 By 2009, all training responsibilities had transitioned to a Liberian
dirigir; DynCorp only observed the training for batch 6.137 Four years later, el
AFL managed its own recruitment and basic training for batch 7, seguido por
the ªnal batch in 2015.

ssi.armywarcollege.edu/2008/pubs/security-sector-reform-in-liberia-mixed-results-from-
humble-beginnings/.
128. The State Department awarded a contract to DynCorp and Paciªc Architects & Engineers to
conduct the training, partly because the ªrms emphasized their commitment to norms training.
Author interview with former DynCorp ofªcial A, Washington, CORRIENTE CONTINUA., Junio 28, 2017. For detailed
accounts of the program, see McFate, Building Better Armies; and Malan, Security Sector Reform in
Liberia.
129. McFate, Building Better Armies, pag. 85. Other program architects conªrmed this belief. Author
interview via Zoom with former DynCorp ofªcial C, Puede 14, 2021.
130. Ibídem.
131. The State Department ordered DynCorp to pare down the curriculum after batch 1 as a cost-
saving measure. Author interview with former DynCorp ofªcial B, Monrovia, December 14, 2017.
See also McFate, Building Better Armies, pag. 87.
132. Author interview with AFL ofªcers A and B, Monrovia, Julio 19, 2017.
133. Author interview with AFL Chief of Staff, Monrovia, Julio 18, 2017.
134. Author interview with AFL ofªcers A and B, Monrovia, Julio 19, 2017.
135. Batches 1–3 received the entire sequence, from Initial Entry Training through Ofªcer Can-
didate School, with most soldiers then attending specialized training in the United States. Batches
4–5 had an abridged sequence, with Basic Non-commissioned Ofªcer Course dropping out for
ofªcers’ training, and fewer soldiers receiving additional training than soldiers in batches 1–3. Au-
thor interview with AFL ofªcers A and B, Monrovia, Julio 19, 2017.
136. Batches 6–8 did not receive comparable training from any other international actors.
137. Estados Unidos. military began a mentoring and advising mission, Operation Onward Liberty, en
2010, but the new mission did not provide basic or advanced training.

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Soldiers’ Dilemma 77

The amount and quality of training that the Liberian-led batches received
declined after batch 5, owing to the lack of Liberian resources or capacity to
conduct training on their own. Because the Liberians were not prepared
to ªeld their own BNOC or OCS classes, the training sequence was trun-
cated and batches 6–8 failed to produce more than a handful of noncommis-
sioned ofªcers and ofªcers. En 2017, a U.S. military training team went to
Liberia to help design new OCS and BNOC courses. They found only one
working computer on the training base and no sign of prior curricula.138
The emphasis on norms, which had been rooted in the trainers’ beliefs
about the causes and effects of Liberia’s war, also faded as the U.S. instructors
cycled out of the training sequence.

For the tests that follow, I operationalized U.S. training by collapsing the
“batch” variable into a dummy “training” variable that I coded as 1 if the re-
spondent joined the AFL in batches 1–5 (any U.S. training) y 0 otherwise.139

Testing Effects of Liberal Norm Conºict on Decision-Making

This section presents results from empirical tests of my argument about the ef-
fects of liberal norm conºict on military decision-making, along with alterna-
tive arguments about socialization and the mechanisms that connect norm
conºict with prioritization of cohesion. Primero, I conduct difference-in-means
tests across the experimental groups. These tests compare average responses
across the treatment and control groups, which allows me to evaluate the ef-
fects of respondents’ hearing the norm conºict scenario. Because my argument
and U.S. policy expectations make opposing predictions, the hypothesis tests
are two-tailed. Mesa 1 reports the results.140

The results show that respondents who were exposed to norm conºict—the
treatment—are less likely to support prioritizing human rights. The scenario
about the government ordering the army to repress protests corresponds with
a nearly 0.25 unit decrease in a four-point scale for prioritizing human rights.
This ªnding is consistent with H1, which predicts that moments of norm
conºict will reduce soldiers’ willingness to prioritize human rights over civil-
ian control. This ªnding contradicts the U.S. policy expectation laid out in H4,

138. Author interview with mobile training team members A and B, Monrovia, Julio 14, 2017. El
ªrst Liberian-led OCS class graduated in July 2017, but the Liberian government refused to com-
mission any of the graduates, a decision that U.S. ofªcials felt reºected a lack of conªdence in the
training.
139. Robustness tests in the online appendix use an alternative variable speciªcation.
140. Because two of the outcome measures are binary variables, I run these models using robust
standard errors to account for heteroskedasticity. For an alternative speciªcation of a logistic re-
gression model, see the online appendix.

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Seguridad Internacional 46:4 78

Mesa 1. Difference in Means for Respondents Assigned to Treatment and Control

Variable

Prioritize human rights
Support army rule
Support one-party rule
Support one-person rule
Prefer democracy
Prioritize cohesion

Control
Significar

Tratamiento
Significar

Diferencia

3.42
2.42
1.73
1.44
0.81
0.15

3.19
2.60
1.62
1.45
0.80
0.30

(cid:3)0.23
(cid:3)0.18
(cid:3)0.11
(cid:3)0.01
(cid:3)0.01
(cid:3)0.15

(Estándar
Error)

(0.13)*
(0.18)
(0.12)
(0.09)
(0.05)
(0.05)***

NOTE: *** pag (cid:4) 0.01, ** pag (cid:4) 0.05, * pag (cid:4) 0.01.

Cifra 2. Distribution of Support for Prioritizing Human Rights

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which is that soldiers ought to be more willing to prioritize human rights. Higo-
ura 2 graphs the distribution of support for prioritizing human rights across
experimental conditions.141

The results in table 1 also suggest that exposure to norm conºict drives sol-
diers to prioritize cohesion. The likelihood that respondents prioritize cohe-
sion doubles from no norm conºict (control) to norm conºict (treatment). Este

141. Four respondents either said that they “did not know” or refused to answer this question. Ser-
cause the “missingness rate” is very low, I dropped these observations from the sample, following
Cyrus Samii, “Perils or Promise of Ethnic Integration? Evidence from a Hard Case in Burundi,"
American Political Science Review, volumen. 107, No. 3 (2013), pag. 566, https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305
5413000282.

Soldiers’ Dilemma 79

ªnding provides additional support for my argument, consistent with H3,
which predicts that moments of norm conºict will lead soldiers to prioritize
cohesion. Because of how this measure is constructed, sin embargo, these results
must be interpreted with caution. Additional tests, described below, provide
further evidence that a connection between liberal norm conºict and prioritiz-
ation of cohesion exists.

The other variables, which measure support for democratic norms, are not
signiªcantly different across treatment and control groups. I argue that norm
conºict will weaken support for democratic norms (H2), while U.S. policy ex-
pectations predict that conºict will sharpen support for them (H5). The signs
of the baseline results are generally in the expected direction—respondents ex-
posed to norm conºict are slightly more likely to support army rule and one-
person rule, and slightly less likely to always prefer democracy—but none of
these effects are statistically signiªcant. En breve, the results do not clearly sup-
port either hypothesis.

One interpretation of these null results is that while moments of norm
conºict produce immediate decisions over which norms to prioritize,
norm support erodes more slowly over time.142 Another possibility is that sub-
sequent acts of norm violation weaken norm support, as soldiers attempt to
minimize cognitive dissonance caused by divergence between beliefs and be-
havior. If prioritizing cohesion leads soldiers to defy civilian orders, for exam-
por ejemplo, then we might expect to see a sharper drop in support for democratic
normas. Because the survey only measures shifts in support for norms in
the immediate moment of norm conºict, assessing the effects of subsequent
behavior on attitudes remains an important question for future investigation.

En general, these initial results provide mixed support for my argument. Estos
baseline results suggest that norm conºict reduces soldiers’ willingness to pri-
oritize human rights and increases their inclination to prioritize cohesion, Alabama-
though the effects on support for democratic norms are muted. En tono rimbombante,
these shifts in support for norms undercut two common policy assumptions.
Primero, liberal training policy hinges on the expectation that soldiers will priori-
tize human rights when faced with norm conºict; if anything, the opposite is
true. Segundo, liberal policy ignores the possibility that soldiers will prioritize
cohesion, but the results suggest that soldiers may choose this norm instead—
creating the conditions under which liberal norm violations can occur. Estos
initial comparisons, sin embargo, mask the variation across subgroups that I ex-
plore next.

142. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.

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Seguridad Internacional 46:4 80

Cifra 3. Effects of Norm Conºict, Conditioned on Level of Training

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NOTE: The ªgure graphs the contrasts between treatment and control groups for soldiers

with and without U.S. training. Results shown with 95 percent conªdence intervals.

conditional effects of training

To examine how U.S. training affects responses to norm conºict, I compare dif-
ferences in means across treatment and control groups conditioned on level of
prior training. I use the “training” dummy variable that takes a value of 1 si
the respondent was in an AFL recruitment group that had U.S. training, y
0 de lo contrario. Cifra 3 presents the results.

En general, respondents with U.S. training were signiªcantly less likely to ex-
press willingness to prioritize human rights after hearing the norm conºict
scenario. They were somewhat less likely to express absolute support for de-
mocracy and somewhat more likely to express support for army rule, a pesar de
these results are not statistically distinguishable from zero. A diferencia de, respon-
dents without U.S. training were signiªcantly less likely to express support for

Soldiers’ Dilemma 81

one-party rule and somewhat less likely to support one-person rule.143 Finally,
U.S.-trained respondents were signiªcantly more likely to emphasize cohesion
when exposed to norm conºict. Even though not all of the differences are sta-
tistically signiªcant, the pattern of coefªcients is consistent across measures
and provides support for H6a, which predicts that U.S. training will make re-
spondents less willing to prioritize liberal norms.

It is possible that these results are an artifact of small sample size because
there were only forty-nine respondents in the “no U.S. training” category.144
More likely, sin embargo, is that these results reºect growing identiªcation with
the military institution associated with training and time in service. I hypothe-
size that people who have been in the military longer, receiving more training
and socialization, perceive a higher need to protect the organization and be-
come more likely to prioritize cohesion. If this is the case, entonces, the apparent
willingness to prioritize human rights among the least-trained soldiers might
reºect less loyalty to the military institution—a quality that would, paradoxi-
cally, make them worse soldiers. It is also worth considering that militaries
are hierarchical institutions: leaders give orders and the rank and ªle obey. En
the Liberian case, respondents with more U.S. training are also more likely to
have command roles. In a crisis, these respondents would be the decision-
makers issuing orders. Their unwillingness to prioritize human rights or sup-
port liberal norms when exposed to the norm conºict scenario has troubling
implications for behavioral outcomes in a real-world crisis.

effects of training without norm conºict

Próximo, I conduct tests to probe the mechanisms and rule out alternative expla-
naciones, including that socialization never happened and that time in service
alone explains attitudes toward norms. Primero, respondents in the survey sam-
ple with the most U.S. training are also the soldiers with the most time in
servicio; en otras palabras, A NOSOTROS. training is collinear to tenure in the military.
Rather than U.S. training conditioning the effects of norm conºict, it is possible
that tenure in the military conditions attitudes toward norms. If that is the
caso, then the ªndings may reºect the failure of training to impart norms in
the ªrst place, in line with prevailing arguments about the causes of norm vio-
lations among U.S.-trained forces.145

143. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and the Unity Party held the presidency in Liberia from 2006 a 2018.
The political makeup of the country was consistent between the ªrst and last batches, which helps
rule out the possibility that other factors drive this result.
144. Of the forty-nine respondents, twenty-seven were assigned to the control group and twenty-
two to the treatment group.
145. Powelson, “Enduring Engagement Yes, Episodic Engagement No”; Savage and Caverley,
“When Human Capital Threatens the Capitol”; and Biddle, macdonald, and Baker, “Small Foot-
print, Small Payoff.”

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r
2
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Seguridad Internacional 46:4 82

To test this alternative explanation, I evaluate the relationship between
A NOSOTROS. training and support for liberal norms in the absence of norm conºict.
I limited the survey sample to respondents who were randomly assigned to
the control group and did not hear the treatment scenario (norte (cid:2) 144). I then esti-
mated models that regress the outcome measures on U.S. training, using the
“batch” variable that ranges from batch 1 to batch 8. For ease of interpreting
the results, I ºipped the values of the variable so that higher values indicate
earlier batches that received more training.