Opportunistic Repression
Opportunistic
Repression
Civilian Targeting by the State in
Response to COVID-19
Donald Grasse,
Melissa Pavlik,
Hilary Matfess, y
Travis B. Curtice
This article considers
whether governments have used the COVID-19 pandemic to cement their au-
thority through repression. A core feature of emergency responses is the sus-
pension of the rule of law, which permits states greater latitude to take actions
in order to protect the entire citizenry.1 We argue that crises create opportuni-
ties for governments to suppress the political opposition, which we refer to
as “opportunistic repression.” We test this theory by examining the relation-
ship between COVID-19 shutdown policies and state violence against civil-
ians in Africa. We conduct a subnational case study of repression in Uganda
to analyze whether patterns of repression after the shutdown mandate vary
along partisan lines across different districts of the country. We ªnd that
theories of preventive and responsive repression cannot explain why Uganda
experienced a surge in repression in 2020.
Understanding the effects of COVID-19 on governance is a pressing con-
cern. The measures taken in response to the coronavirus pandemic consti-
tute extraordinary government interventions into citizens’ lives. Across the
globe, states have attempted to contain COVID-19 by restricting movement,
closing schools and businesses, and banning large gatherings. Such measures
have signiªcantly expanded the degree of sanctioned state intervention into
civilians’ lives. The measures associated with the COVID-19 pandemic resem-
ble other expansions in state authority associated with crises and states of
emergency.2 Joan Barceló et al. go so far as to describe many of the measures
Donald Grasse is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at Emory University. Melissa Pavlik is a Ph.D. estu-
dent in political science at Yale University. Hilary Matfess is an assistant professor at the Josef Korbel
School of International Studies at the University of Denver. Travis B. Curtice is an assistant professor in the
Department of Politics at Drexel University.
The authors contributed equally to this article. They are grateful for comments and suggestions
from Daniel Arnon, Benjamin Valentino, the MacMillan Political Violence and its Legacies work-
shop at Yale University, and several anonymous reviewers. An online appendix is available at
doi.org/10.7910/DVN/U8LYW1.
1. Giorgio Agamben, “State of Exception,” Nova srpska politicka misao [New Serbian political
pensamiento], volumen. 12, No. 1–4 (2005), páginas. 135–145; Tiberiu Dragu and Mattias Polborn, “The Rule of
Law in the Fight against Terrorism,” Revista Estadounidense de Ciencias Políticas, volumen. 58, No. 2 (Abril 2014),
páginas. 511–525, doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12061; and Tiberiu Dragu and Xiaochen Fan, “Self-Enforcing Le-
gal Limits: Bureaucratic Constraints on Repression under Emergency Powers,” Journal of Politics,
volumen. 82, No. 2 (Abril 2020), páginas. 687–699, doi.org/10.1086/706981.
2. Lorraine Mazerolle and Janet Ransley, “Policing Health Regulations in Democratic Societies: A
Focus on COVID-19 Challenges and Opportunities in Australia,” International Journal of Compara-
Seguridad Internacional, volumen. 46, No. 2 (Caer 2021), páginas. 130–165, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00419
© 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
130
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Opportunistic Repression 131
adopted in response to the pandemic to be “observationally equivalent” to
government repression and ªnd that the history of state repression inºuences
the timing and likelihood of a lockdown.3
Several recent studies have examined the relationship between coronavirus-
related shutdown policies and political violence,4 building on extant research
regarding public health crises and political violence.5 But none of this re-
search provides a framework for understanding how public health measures
associated with the pandemic affect domestic repression. This gap reºects
the uneven and intermittent treatment of crises by the literature examining
political repression in general.
The study of crises and repression is complicated by the fact that emergen-
cies often involve political violence such as terrorism, civil conºict, or inter-
state war. In these contexts, it is difªcult to determine causation since an
underlying trend of escalating conºict may drive a government to declare a
state of emergency.6 To untangle the relationship between crises and political
repression, we study an acute public health crisis in which it is plausible that
underlying political violence trends are not driven by COVID-19-related
lockdown policies.
We show that state violence against civilians increased across several
African countries after states issued shutdown orders in response to the
spread of the COVID-19 virus. We also ªnd troubling evidence that, at least in
some contexts like Uganda, this repression was partisan. Our results suggest
that the coronavirus pandemic created a “window of opportunity” for gov-
tive and Applied Criminal Justice, volumen. 45, No. 3 (2021), páginas. 315–327, doi.org/10.1080/01924036.2021
.1907605; and Joan Barceló et al., “Windows of Repression: Using COVID-19 Policies against Politi-
cal Dissidents?” SocArXiv (baltimore: Universidad de Maryland, Noviembre 12, 2020), https://osf.io/
preprints/socarxiv/yuqw2/.
3. Barceló et al., “Windows of Repression.”
4. Nicolas Berman et al., “Shutdown Policies and Worldwide Conºict,” Economic Science Institute
Working Paper 20-16 (Irvine, California: Chapman University, 2020); Jeffrey R. Bloem and Colette
Salemi, “COVID-19 and Conºict,” World Development, volumen. 140 (Abril 2021), doi.org/10.1016/
j.worlddev.2020.105294; Marius Mehrl and Paul W. Thurner, “The Effect of the Covid-19 Pandemic
on Global Armed Conºict: Early Evidence,” Political Studies Review, volumen. 19, No. 2 (Puede 2021),
páginas. 286–293, doi.org/10.1177/1478929920940648; and Kim Yi Dionne and Fulya Felicity Turkmen,
“The Politics of Pandemic Othering: Putting COVID-19 in Global and Historical Context,” Interna-
tional Organization, volumen. 74, No. S1 (December 2020), páginas. E213–E230, doi.org/10.1017/S00208183
20000405.
5. Benjamin E. Bagozzi, “On Malaria and the Duration of Civil War,” Journal of Conºict Resolution,
volumen. 60, No. 5 (Agosto 2016), páginas. 813–839, doi.org/10.1177%2F0022002714550202; Ada González-
Torres and Elena Esposito, “Epidemics and Conºict: Evidence from the Ebola Outbreak in Western
África,” SSRN (2016), doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3544606; and Remi Jedwab, Noel D. Johnson, y
Mark Koyama, “Negative Shocks and Mass Persecutions: Evidence from the Black Death," Diario
of Economic Growth, volumen. 24 (2019), páginas. 345–395, doi.org/10.1007/s10887-019-09167-1.
6. Christian Bjørnskov and Stefan Voigt, “When Does Terror Induce a State of Emergency? Y
What Are the Effects?” Journal of Conºict Resolution, volumen. 64, No. 4 (Abril 2020), páginas. 579–613,
doi.org/10.1177/0022002719865994.
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Seguridad Internacional 46:2 132
ernments to use legitimate public health interventions as cover to engage in
physical repression.
We arrive at this conclusion through two steps. Primero, we exploit the within-
country timing of COVID-19-related shutdown policies to estimate the rela-
tionship between emergency orders from governments and state violence
against civilians across Africa. We ªnd a substantively large and statistically
signiªcant relationship between shutdowns and repression, which holds after
conditioning for the spread and lethality of the disease within-country and
con el tiempo. This result suggests that lockdown measures related to the corona-
virus pandemic expanded the ability of the state to intervene in citizens’ lives.
Además, the state often implemented these powers through force rather than
more proportionate measures.
Segundo, to better understand the mechanism driving this relationship and to
assess the targets of opportunistic repression, we use subnational variation
in support for the Yoweri Museveni regime in Uganda (as measured by the
district-level 2016 presidential vote share for Museveni) and the timing of
the national shutdown order (in March 2020) to estimate how repression
changed after the government clamped down on freedom of mobility and
public gathering. We ªnd that the increase in repression is concentrated in op-
position areas that showed less support for Museveni in the 2016 elecciones.
This ªnding complements our cross-national statistical analysis and suggests
that states can leverage ostensibly legitimate expansions in the scope of state
power produced by crises to repress political opponents.
Our study makes two crucial contributions, the ªrst of which is theoretical.
We introduce the concept “opportunistic repression,” which shifts the focus on
the drivers of state repression from the activities and capabilities of the opposi-
tion to those of the state. A large theoretical literature on repression examines
how governments choose an optimal level of state violence that balances the
need to stymie immediate threats to its power with the risk of catalyzing more
violence and resistance in response to a crackdown.7 This literature broadly
7. Sabine C. carey, “The Dynamic Relationship between Protest and Repression,” Political Research
Quarterly, volumen. 59, No. 1 (Marzo 2006), páginas. 1–11, doi.org/10.1177/106591290605900101; Will H.
moore, “The Repression of Dissent: A Substitution Model of Government Coercion," Diario de
Conºict Resolution, volumen. 44, No. 1 (Febrero 2000), páginas. 107–127, doi.org/10.1177/002200270004
4001006; Mark Irving Lichbach, “Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Re-
pression and Dissent,” Journal of Conºict Resolution, volumen. 31, No. 2 (Junio 1987), páginas. 266–297,
doi.org/10.1177/0022002787031002003; Conway W. Henderson, “Conditions Affecting the Use of
Political Repression,” Journal of Conºict Resolution, volumen. 35, No. 1 (Marzo 1991), páginas. 120–142,
doi.org/10.1177/0022002791035001007; Ted Robert Gurr, Political Rebellion: Causes, Outcomes, y
Alternatives (Nueva York: Routledge, 2019); and Ragnhild Nordås and Christian Davenport, “Fight
the Youth: Youth Bulges and State Repression,” Revista Estadounidense de Ciencias Políticas, volumen. 57, No. 4
(Octubre 2013), páginas. 926–940, doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12025.
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Opportunistic Repression 133
groups repression into two categories: preventive and responsive.8 Preventive
repression focuses on future challenges to the regime, whereas responsive re-
pression targets dissent.9 Preventive repression is typically modeled as a static
feature of autocratic governments.10 Responsive repression is that which
emerges in direct response to a challenge to the state.11 As the name suggests,
“opportunistic repression” accounts for the repression that emerges as a func-
tion of state opportunity rather than in response to actual or possible mobili-
zation against the incumbent.
The key feature distinguishing opportunistic repression from other theories
of repression is the focus on the changes in the tools at the incumbent’s dis-
posal. Although preventive repression is catalyzed by the threat of opposition
activity and responsive repression results from active challenges, opportunis-
tic repression emerges when there is an increase in the possible scope of re-
pressive activity available to the state, rather than a change in the opposition’s
activities or behaviors. The theory of opportunistic repression contributes to
the literature on how governments navigate and manipulate international
norms while consolidating power.12 We show how repressive regimes may lev-
erage changes in international norms during worldwide crises to repress citi-
zens and secure their positions. Como consecuencia, international critics are unlikely
to advocate sanctions or other measures to stop governments from attempt-
ing to slow the spread of a novel virus. Scholars can use our framework to
examine how other crises affect government repression.
8. We use the terms preventive repression and preemptive repression interchangeably, as they
broadly reºect a similar logic: The state acts ªrst in response to political challengers.
9. Emily Hencken Ritter and Courtenay R. Conrad, “Preventing and Responding to Dissent: El
Observational Challenges of Explaining Strategic Repression,” American Political Science Review,
volumen. 110, No. 1 (2016), páginas. 85–99, doi.org/10.1017/S0003055415000623.
10. Tiberiu Dragu and Adam Przeworski, “Preventive Repression: Two Types of Moral Hazard,"
American Political Science Review, volumen. 113, No. 1 (2019), páginas. 77–87, doi.org/10.1017/S000305
5418000552.
11. Sabine C. carey, “The Use of Repression as a Response to Domestic Dissent,” Political Studies,
volumen. 58, No. 1 (Febrero 2010), páginas. 167–186, doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2008.00771.x.
12. Christian Davenport, “Licensing Repression: Dissent, Threats, and State Repression in the
United States,” Minnesota Journal of International Law, volumen. 16, No. 2 (2007), páginas. 311–333, https://
scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil/232; Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, “Human
Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises,” American Journal of Sociology,
volumen. 110, No. 5 (Marzo 2005), páginas. 1373–1411, doi.org/10.1086/428442; Emilie M. Hafner-Burton,
“Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem,” International
Organization, volumen. 62, No. 4 (Octubre 2008), páginas. 689–716, doi.org/10.1017/S0020818308080247;
James Raymond Vreeland, “Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into
the United Nations Convention against Torture,” International Organization, volumen. 62, No. 1 (Enero
2008), páginas. 65–101, doi.org/10.1017/S002081830808003X; Oona A. Hathaway, “Why Do Countries
Commit to Human Rights Treaties?” Journal of Conºict Resolution, volumen. 51, No. 4 (Agosto 2007),
páginas. 588–621, doi.org/10.1177%2F0022002707303046; and Nic Cheeseman and Brian Klaas, Cómo
Rig an Election (nuevo refugio, Conexión.: Prensa de la Universidad de Yale, 2018).
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Seguridad Internacional 46:2 134
Our second contribution is empirical. We examine state repression as-
sociated with COVID-19-related shutdown policies in Africa to provide evi-
dence on the ways in which crises threaten citizens’ health and their security.
Existing evidence on disease and conºict is mixed: some studies ªnd that
pandemic-related public health measures increase civil conºict,13 while others
show that shutdown policies reduced political violence in the early stages of
the COVID-19 pandemic.14 This article provides important evidence about
state violence against non-state actors. Although Tiberiu Dragu and Yonatan
Lupu assert that there is an endogenous constraint on state violence during a
crisis, we ªnd that COVID-19 has been associated with increases in repression
in Africa.15 Our cross-national ªndings underline that some African states
used physical repression to enforce lockdown policies to prevent the spread of
COVID-19, which constitutes an overstepping of loosened normative restric-
tions on state intervention. Además, through our subnational case study
of Uganda, we highlight the possibility that the brunt of such state violence is
borne by those in opposition-controlled areas. This paper thus contributes to
our understanding of the relationship between pandemics and conºict and
various secondary effects of COVID-19 on citizens.
Theoretical Framework: Crisis and Opportunistic Repression
Across regime types, those in ofªce seek to stay in power.16 Many incumbents
use force to remain in ofªce, and this repression can manifest in myriad forms.
Ofªceholders sometimes use violence to target opposition rallies or civil-
ians, to harass or detain journalists, or to intimidate political challenges to the
status quo. Despite the diversity of ways in which repression can emerge,
the literature has identiªed two broad categories of repression: responsive
and preventive.
responsive repression: quelling direct challenges to the incumbent
Responsive repression asserts a sort of Newtonian logic to repression, por lo cual
for every opposition action there is a repressive measure. Christian Davenport
13. González-Torres and Esposito, “Epidemics and Conºict.”
14. Berman et al., “Shutdown Policies and Worldwide Conºict.”
15. Tiberiu Dragu and Yonatan Lupu, “Collective Action and Constraints on Repression at the
Endgame,” Comparative Political Studies, volumen. 51, No. 8 (2018), páginas. 1042–1073, doi.org/10.1177/
0010414017730077.
16. David R. Mayhew, Congreso: The Electoral Connection, 2y ed.. (nuevo refugio, Conexión.: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 2004); Milan W. Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
Institutions under Dictatorship (Cambridge:
versity Press, 2012);
Prensa de la Universidad de Cambridge, 2008); and Beatriz Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party
Survival and Its Demise in Mexico (Cambridge: Prensa de la Universidad de Cambridge, 2006).
Jennifer Gandhi, Político
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Opportunistic Repression 135
calls this relationship the “Law of Coercive Responsiveness.”17 Such repres-
sion emerges to quell large-scale dissent to demobilize civilians who are
actively demanding change.18 As the name suggests, the catalyst for this re-
pression is opposition activity.
In line with the Law of Coercive Responsiveness, different forms of domes-
tic dissent are more likely to produce repression. Sabine Carey ªnds that
guerilla warfare is likely to produce severe state repression, while other milder
forms of dissent do not provoke crackdowns.19 Jennifer Earl et al. ªnd that pro-
tests that constitute a greater threat to the state (es decir., those that either attract
many participants or use “confrontational” tactics) are more likely to be po-
liced than smaller or less aggressive demonstrations.20
Images of state security ofªcials violently dispersing large protests and riots
in the capitol city, or putting down attempted coups, vividly illustrate the
prevalence of responsive repression. Todavía, including only responsive repression
is an incomplete assessment of political repression, and it portrays the state as
being perpetually ºat-footed in its response to domestic political challenges.
preventive repression: anticipating dissent
The theories of preventive or preemptive repression, in which incumbents
may use preventive measures to raise the costs of dissent ex ante, emerged to
explain those instances in which the incumbent represses to deter future or po-
tential dissent.21 Preventive repression can be driven by a variety of calcula-
tions and conditions,
including both the capacity of the opposition and
looming opportunities for it to mobilize. Work on preemptive repression
examines how autocrats consider local histories of dissent to plan their repres-
sion around electoral calendars,22 culturally relevant periods,23 and demo-
graphic proªling.24 Other work examines how governments detect and
17. Christian Davenport, “State Repression and Political Order,” Annual Review of Political Science,
volumen. 10 (2007), pag. 7, doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.101405.143216.
18. Ibídem., páginas. 1–23.
19. carey, “The Use of Repression as a Response to Domestic Dissent.”
20. Jennifer Earl, sara a. Soule, and John D. McCarthy, “Protest under Fire? Explaining the Po-
licing of Protest,” American Sociological Review, volumen. 68, No. 4 (Agosto 2003), páginas. 581–606, doi.org/
10.2307/1519740.
21. Tavishi Bhasin and Jennifer Gandhi, “Timing and Targeting of State Repression in Authoritar-
ian Elections,” Electoral Studies, volumen. 32, No. 4 (December 2013), páginas. 620–631, doi.org/10.1016/
j.electstud.2013.07.011; Christopher M. sullivan, “Undermining Resistance: Mobilization, Repres-
sión, and the Enforcement of Political Order,” Journal of Conºict Resolution, volumen. 60, No. 7 (Octubre
2016), páginas. 1163–1190, doi.org/10.1177/0022002714567951; and Rory Truex, “Focal Points, Dissident
Calendars, and Preemptive Repression,” Journal of Conºict Resolution, volumen. 63, No. 4 (Abril 2019),
páginas. 1032–1052, doi.org/10.1177/0022002718770520.
22. Bhasin and Gandhi, “Timing and Targeting of State Repression.”
23. Truex, “Focal Points.”
24. Janina Beiser-McGrath, “Targeting the Motivated? Ethnicity and the Pre-emptive Use of Gov-
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Seguridad Internacional 46:2 136
intervene in nascent opposition activities to prevent “overt” challenges.25 This
focus often underscores the endogeneity of repression, as previous experiences
with dissent and repression shape patterns of repression in the future. Coun-
tries that have experienced culturally signiªcant challenges to their legitimacy
may keep a “dissent calendar,” whereby states increase repression to prevent
the political opposition from capitalizing on the symbolic relevance of those
key dates.26 The “June Fourth Incident” in Tiananmen Square, Por ejemplo, es
associated with both responsive repression (on June 4, 1989, in response to the
protest) and preventive repression (leading up to subsequent June 4ths).27
New developments may also prompt states to plan for preemptive repression
against those whom they think might engage in dissent.28 For example, el
discovery of oil ªelds may lead states to repress citizens in expectation of fu-
ture conºict risk.29 Davenport’s study of how states “license” repression un-
derscores that domestic and international threats, more so than citizens’
comportamiento, predict repression in the United States.30
opportunistic repression: manipulating crises to suppress opposition
The literature on repression has largely (and perhaps paradoxically) exam-
ined the capabilities and activities of domestic opposition rather than the con-
texto
el
in which the state operates and the repressive capabilities of
gobierno. It is important to consider what other factors inºuence patterns
of political repression. Although there are material inºuences on a state’s ca-
pacity to use coercion (p.ej., the number of police or new technologies of sur-
veillance or repression),
this article considers the ideational constraints
imposed on states that the international community considers to be “legiti-
mate” or appropriate forms of intervention. Existing theories do not ac-
count for patterns of repression that such conditions produce. We build on
Davenport’s theory of “licensing repression,” which underlines that govern-
ernment Repression,” Swiss Political Science Review, volumen. 25, No. 3 (2019), páginas. 203–225, doi.org/
10.1111/spsr.12370.
25. sullivan, “Undermining Resistance.”
26. Truex, “Focal Points.”
27. Ibídem.
28. Considerar, Por ejemplo, how governments facing a “youth bulge” are more likely to engage in
repression. Nordås and Davenport, “Fight the Youth.” Another study ªnds that autocrats strategi-
cally shufºe their security apparatus to resolve principal-agent challenges of repression. Mai
Hassan, “The Strategic Shufºe: Ethnic Geography, the Internal Security Apparatus, and Elections
in Kenya,” Revista Estadounidense de Ciencias Políticas, volumen. 61, No. 2 (Abril 2017), páginas. 382–395, https://
www.jstor.org/stable/26384738.
29. Peter D. Carey II et al., “Oil Discoveries, Civil War, and Preventive State Repression," Diario de
Peace Research (próximo).
30. Davenport, “Licensing Repression.”
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Opportunistic Repression 137
ments can use both domestic and international threats to legitimize their re-
pression and ªnds that, throughout U.S. historia, the presence of such threats
were better predictors of repression than behavioral measures of dissent, semejante
as demonstrations or antigovernment violence.31 We examine how states will
respond when shifts in the international community’s norms legitimize greater
intervention into civilians’ lives.
We conceptualize opportunistic repression as a form of repression that re-
sults from a shift in a state’s operating environment. Opportunistic repression
exists when incumbents make use of a widened scope of legitimized inter-
vention into citizens’ lives to engage in repression to maintain their positions
in power. We theorize that emergencies and crises—deªned in this article as
situations in which there is a globally recognized threat that necessitates in-
creased government intervention—will be associated with an increase in
government repression.32 Speciªcally, we build from constructivist interna-
tional relations theory to argue that states use the international community’s
increased tolerance for intervention into citizens’ lives as a pretext to en-
gage in political repression, particularly against those groups that oppose
the incumbent.33
Some incumbents seek to retain and consolidate power by using the coercive
power of the state against perceived threats (es decir., opposition groups, social
movimientos, and rival political candidates). Repression is one tool that states
can use to achieve these interests, but a variety of domestic and international
factors constrain how states can use repression, including fear of public back-
lash and international condemnation, or even international intervention to
prevent such activities. Crises and emergencies can produce rapid changes in
what degree of state intervention (and what forms) is tolerated. Article 4, segundo-
ción 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights clearly states
eso, “[. . .] in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation
and the existence of which is ofªcially proclaimed, the States Parties to the
present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under
the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the sit-
uation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obli-
31. Ibídem.
32. We leave for future study the possibility that opportunistic repression may arise from domes-
tic crises. Some scholars have covered this phenomenon, como: Davenport, “Licensing Repres-
sion”; and Jane Esberg, “The Audience of Repression: Killings and Disappearances in Pinochet’s
Chile,” SSRN (2018), doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3246120.
33. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program
in International Relations and Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science, volumen. 4, No. 1
(Junio 2001), páginas. 391–416, doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.4.1.391.
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Seguridad Internacional 46:2 138
gations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on
the ground of race, color, sexo, idioma, religion or social origin.”34 In some in-
posturas, increased intervention during a crisis is a legal expansion of state au-
autoridad; a crisis or the declaration of a state of emergency is legible to the
international community as a situation requiring unusually invasive state ac-
tivity.35 In short, emergencies provide more opportunities for the state to legiti-
mately intervene in citizens’ lives, which permits incumbents to secure their
positions by repressing the opposition. Wesley Widmaier et al. emphasize that
“no less than anarchy itself, wars and crises cannot be reduced to material
forces or socialization, but are what agents make of them.”36 We adopt the
framework of international legitimation to examine both how crises can shift
what is deemed to be appropriate interventions into citizens’ lives and how
this shapes the pattern of incumbent repression.
Building on previous studies of how international norms and constraints
shape domestic governance, our concept of opportunistic repression helps
shed light on how states respond during crises. Although studies have consid-
ered how the international environment affects state repression, they often fo-
cus on how patterns of repression do (and do not) change when states
voluntarily join human rights treaties and conventions,37 or when the interna-
tional community scrutinizes certain forms of repression.38 Other studies have
underlined how the international community can inºuence the manner in
which an incumbent “frames” or justiªes repression.39 Additional work exam-
ines how international factors, such as threats related to war contagion40 and
34. UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Treaty Series, volumen. 999
(Nueva York: United Nations, December 16, 1966), pag. 171, https://www.refworld.org/docid/
3ae6b3aa0.html.
35. John Reynolds, Empire, Emergency, and International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Prensa, 2017).
36. Wesley W. Widmaier, Mark Blyth, and Leonard Seabrooke, “Exogenous Shocks or Endogenous
Constructions? The Meanings of Wars and Crises,” International Studies Quarterly, volumen. 51, No. 4
(December 2007), páginas. 747–759, esp. 757, doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00474.x.
37. Hathaway, “Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?"; and Emilie M. Hafner-
Burton, “Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Inºuence Government Re-
presion,” International Organization, volumen. 59, No. 3 (Julio 2005), páginas. 593–629, doi.org/10.1017/
S0020818305050216.
38. Jacqueline H.R. DeMeritt and Courtenay R. Conrad, “Repression Substitution: Shifting Hu-
man Rights Violations in Response to UN Naming and Shaming,” Civil Wars, volumen. 21, No. 1 (2019),
páginas. 128–152, doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2019.1602805.
39. Mirjam Edel and Maria Josua, “How Authoritarian Rulers Seek to Legitimize Repression:
Framing Mass Killings in Egypt and Uzbekistan,” Democratization, volumen. 25, No. 5 (2018), páginas. 882–
900, doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2018.1439021.
40. Colton Hefªngton, “External Threat and Human Rights: How International Conºict Leads to
Domestic Repression,” Journal of Human Rights, volumen. 20, No. 1 (2021), páginas. 2–19, doi.org/10.1080/
14754835.2020.1803052; and Nathan Danneman and Emily Hencken Ritter, “Contagious Rebellion
and Preemptive Repression,” Journal of Conºict Resolution, volumen. 58, No. 2 (Marzo 2014), páginas. 254–279,
doi.org/10.1177/0022002712468720.
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Opportunistic Repression 139
transnational terrorist networks,41 may increase state repression.42 Recent
studies have also underscored how processes of “authoritarian learning”43 and
“authoritarian diffusion”44 shape the tactics that governments use to respond
to challenges to their rule. Davenport’s examination of “tyrannical peace”
and how the end of the Cold War affected domestic repression demonstrates
that different types of governments respond differently to shifts in the interna-
tional system, which suggests that there is a complex relationship between
tipo de régimen, international inºuences, and domestic repression.45 Furthermore,
Mirjam Edel and Maria Josua contend that authoritarian governments frame
repressive acts differently for domestic and international audiences to gain
legitimation from both groups.46 Although these studies suggest that the inter-
national community inºuences how domestic political repression manifests,
the threat of international sanctions or disapproval may be insufªcient to en-
tirely eradicate repression.
Our theory of opportunistic repression helps illuminate the understudied
phenomenon of how repression shifts in response to crises. Of the few aca-
demic studies that have considered how crises affect state repression, mayoría
have primarily focused on domestic audiences or factors. A game theoretic
model from Tiberiu Dragu and Xiaochen Fan suggests that the preferences of
security forces will act as an “endogenous constraint on the abuse of emer-
gency powers.”47 They ªnd that emergencies are associated with no change in
the degree of repression, all things held equal. Todavía, Dragu and Fan’s ªnding
stands in stark contrast to other studies that point to how states have lever-
aged crises to justify political repression.48 In their study about COVID-19-
related lockdowns, Barceló et al. ªnd that previous state repression predicted
the timing and likelihood of a state adopting a lockdown measure.49
De este modo, despite decades of research into the dynamics of state repression, es
41. Hefªngton, “External Threat and Human Rights.”
42. Danneman and Hencken Ritter, “Contagious Rebellion and Preemptive Repression.”
43. Steven Heydemann and Reinoud Leenders, “Authoritarian Learning and Authoritarian Resil-
ciencia: Regime Responses to the ‘Arab Awakening,’” Globalizations, volumen. 8, No. 5 (2011), páginas. 647–653,
doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2011.621274.
44. Stephen G.F. Hall and Thomas Ambrosio, “Authoritarian Learning: A Conceptual Overview,"
East European Politics, volumen. 33, No. 2 (2017), páginas. 143–161, doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2017.1307826.
45. Christian Davenport, “State Repression and the Tyrannical Peace,” Journal of Peace Research,
volumen. 44, No. 4 (Julio 2007), páginas. 485–504, doi.org/10.1177/0022343307078940. Además, hay
evidence of a complex relationship between regime type and the inºuence of international factors.
See Daniel W. Hill Jr. and Zachary M. jones, “An Empirical Evaluation of Explanations for State
Repression,” American Political Science Review, volumen. 108, No. 3 (Agosto 2014), páginas. 661–687, doi.org/
10.1017/S0003055414000306.
46. Edel and Josua, “How Authoritarian Rulers Seek to Legitimize Repression," pag. 893.
47. Dragu and Fan, “Self-Enforcing Legal Limits," pag. 688.
48. Davenport, “Licensing Repression," pag. 311; and Esberg, “The Audience of Repression.”
49. Barceló et al., “Windows of Repression.”
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Seguridad Internacional 46:2 140
Mesa 1. Types of Repression and Expectations during a Pandemic
Tipo
de
repression
responsive
repression
preventative
repression
opportunistic
repression
Catalyst of
repression
Ejemplo
informed by domestic political
condiciones; opposition
challenge or active, ongoing
threat to regime
An opposition leader
holds a rally, cual es
met with violence by
state forces.
informed by domestic political
historia; expectation of
opposition challenge,
anticipated upcoming threat
to regime
A state increases
patrolling and repression
prior to a politically
signiªcant anniversary of
unrest.
exogenous shock to the
state’s operating environment
(temporarily) expands
permissible levels of state
repression
A sudden disaster or
new threat legitimizes
expanded scope of state
intervention into citizens’
lives.
Expectations
durante
COVID-19
reduced
repression
no change
in repression
increased
repression
NOTE: The theory of responsive repression predicts that pandemic-related lockdown mea-
sures will reduce the opposition’s capacity to organize, whereas the theory of preventative
repression predicts that such measures will not affect repression levels. Opportunistic re-
presion, in contrast, predicts that repression levels will increase because COVID-19-
related shifts in international norms legitimize state intervention.
still unclear whether governments increase political repression during certain
types of crises. Crises may not always trigger political repression, but if they
hacer, the characteristics that inºuence this process remain undertheorized.
Existing theories of responsive and preventive repression do not offer clear
guidance about how states will respond to crises that produce shifts in the ac-
ceptable degree of intervention in citizens’ lives, absent a clear connection be-
tween the crisis and the domestic opposition’s capacity to engage in dissent or
physical displays of their opposition. Determining if, cómo, and against whom
states will use their expanded powers is a critical task for political science.
Our theory of opportunistic repression explains how crises and emergencies
affect governments’ patterns of repression. In our formulation, crises that pro-
duce shifts in internationally acceptable levels of state intervention provide the
backdrop for opportunistic repression. As table 1 emphasizes, the crises that
can catalyze opportunistic repression do not necessarily increase antigovern-
ment sentiment or affect the mobilization or capacity of domestic opposition
forces. An important difference between our theory of opportunistic repres-
sion and theories of preventive and responsive repression is that opportunistic
repression results from a shift in the operating environment of the incumbent
rather than increases in the capacity or activity of the opposition.
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Opportunistic Repression 141
Though we test our theory of opportunistic repression on a public health cri-
hermana, there are many examples of states leveraging the international commu-
nity’s concern regarding transnational terrorist networks to provide cover for
domestic repression. Por ejemplo, China used repressive tactics against the
Uighur community after accusing it of being associated with transnational
jihadist groups.50 Max Bergmann and Alexandra Schmitt tie the leeway that
“stable” states engaging in repression have to the “‘building partnership ca-
pacity’ strategy” that the United States adopted following September 11, 2001,
“which called for increasing the capabilities of developing states to better po-
lice and patrol their neighborhoods and to close off space for insurgent
groups.”51 As a result of this approach, “U.S. aid was often provided to non-
democratic states or partners that violated human rights but were considered
critical partners in the ‘war on terror,’” to the point that “[a]lmost all U.S. secu-
rity aid provided year over year is driven by a strategic rationale that is cen-
tered on building better counterterrorism partners.”52 Some incumbent
regimes have adopted this frame, both to foster closer ties to Western govern-
ments like the United States and to exploit counterterrorism norms in order to
engage in repression. Edel and Josua note that “the diffusion of ‘war on terror’
rhetoric and practices on the global level” has altered “international learning
procesos,” enabling the global spread of political repression.53 In short, shifts
in what the international community considers legitimate grounds for inter-
vention can lower the costs of repression for incumbents by reducing the likeli-
hood of international sanction or censure for behavior that is framed within
the concerns of the international community.
Además, natural disasters and public health crises may also shift the
norms of the international community. States of emergency, declared for
whatever reason, are often accompanied by the suspension of certain rights or
liberties that are tolerated by the international community (within certain
boundaries and in response to certain threats). A crisis may thus represent an
opportunity for the incumbent to use the new state powers to engage in politi-
cal repression. We posit that extant theories of state repression generally over-
look the role that international norms play in shaping the scope, tactics, y
justiªcation of political repression. By examining the behavior and capabili-
50. Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Myunghee Lee, and Emir Yazici, “Counterterrorism and Preventive
Repression: China’s Changing Strategy in Xinjiang,” Seguridad Internacional, volumen. 44, No. 3 (Invierno
2019/20), páginas. 9–47, doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00368.
51. Max Bergmann and Alexandra Schmitt, “A Plan to Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center for
American Progress, Marzo 9, 2021, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/
2021/03/09/496788/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/.
52. Ibídem.
53. Edel and Josua, “How Authoritarian Rulers Seek to Legitimize Repression," pag. 893.
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Seguridad Internacional 46:2 142
ties of the state rather than the domestic opposition, our theory contributes
to a more holistic understanding of political repression dynamics and the
relationship between crises and political repression.54
Though some may suggest that repression following the adoption of lock-
down measures is a form of preventive repression, this reºects a misunder-
standing of how COVID-19 has shifted the capabilities of domestic opposition.
In many ways, lockdown measures hamstrung opposition forces by restricting
their ability to credibly threaten mass protest or other forms of dissent and mo-
bilizations against human rights violations. Por ejemplo, Melissa Pavlik shows
that demonstration activity fell by about one-third globally during the pan-
demic compared with pre-pandemic levels.55 Some burgeoning or resurgent
protest movements, like those in Iraq and Lebanon, were stymied following
lockdown orders. Though it is possible to organize an opposition rally with so-
cial distancing measures (as protests in Israel, Pakistán, Brasil, and the Black
Lives Matter movement in the United States demonstrate), and there are cer-
tainly other ways for domestic opposition groups to mobilize against the gov-
gobierno, we ªnd that pandemic-related restrictions increased collective action
problems.56 Previous theories of state repression would posit that states would
reduce their repressive activity in response to the weakened capacity and re-
duced activity of the opposition.
Testing a Theory of Opportunistic Repression
To test our theory, we consider how states respond to a plausibly exogenous
evento (es decir., the COVID-19 pandemic) that produces an internationally sanc-
tioned increase in the state’s scope of intervention but no increase in the oppo-
sition’s capabilities to challenge the incumbent’s hold on power. The pandemic
represents a unique opportunity for increased repression. Lockdown proce-
duro, increased scrutiny of civilians’ movements and interpersonal interac-
ciones, and COVID-19 testing and tracing represent signiªcant interventions
into civilian life. Although the international community may have previously
regarded such activities with suspicion, it has endorsed many of these policies
within the context of the pandemic. Considerar, Por ejemplo, the World Health
54. Davenport, “Licensing Repression," pag. 311.
55. Melissa Pavlik, “A Great and Sudden Change: The Global Political Violence Landscape before
and after the COVID-19 Pandemic” (Grafton, Wis.: ACLED, Agosto 4, 2020), https://acleddata
.com/2020/08/04/a-great-and-sudden-change-the-global-political-violence-landscape-before-and-
after-the-covid-19-pandemic/.
56. Roudabeh Kishi et al., “ACLED 2020: The Year in Review” (Grafton, Wis.: ACLED, Marzo
2021), https://acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/ACLED_AnnualReport
2020_WebMar2021_PubUpd.pdf.
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Opportunistic Repression 143
Organization’s (WHO) 2019 guidelines for responding to pandemics, cual
recommend measures such as school and workplace closures, avoiding crowd-
En g, and international travel restrictions. As Barceló et al. nota, the lockdown
measures are “observationally equivalent” to repression, and the authors
compare the policies that states adopted to prevent or slow the spread of
COVID-19 with curfews and restrictions on movement during clear-cut in-
stances of political repression.57 Under the conditions of COVID-19, sin embargo,
the government’s response to the crisis can be plausibly justiªed to interna-
tional actors who would otherwise sanction or punish rights violations. De-
spite language from the WHO regarding respect for human rights during
health emergencies, the body lacks the capability to enforce these regula-
tions.58 According to Human Rights Watch, “governments in at least 24 contar-
tries have enacted vague laws and measures that criminalize spreading
alleged misinformation or other coverage of Covid-19, or of other public
health crises, which the authorities claim threaten the public’s well-being.
Governments can easily use imprecise laws as tools of repression. At least ªve
countries have also criminalized the publication of alleged misinformation on
a range of other topics, including public health.”59 We argue that the interna-
tional backing of such interventions, and their relative silence regarding early
reports of abuse of these new powers, provides latitude for incumbents to in-
tervene more severely in some communities than in others.
En tono rimbombante, the WHO guidelines do not authorize physical integrity rights
violations, even while sanctioning greater regulations of citizens’ behaviors.
When public health measures are implemented appropriately, proportionately,
and within the bounds of the rule of law, we do not consider them to constitute
state repression. For many of these public health policies, nonviolent and pro-
portionate enforcement mechanisms (such as ªnes) for noncompliance are
feasible options.60 As UN High Commissioner on Human Rights Michelle
Bachelet stated in April 2020, “[mi]mergency powers should not be a weapon
governments can wield to quash dissent, control the population, and even per-
petuate their time in power. They should be used to cope effectively with the
pandemic—nothing more, nothing less.”61 These statements implicitly ac-
57. Barceló et al., “Windows of Repression.”
58. We thank the anonymous reviewers for this point.
59. “Covid-19 Triggers Wave of Free Speech Abuse,” Human Rights Watch, Febrero 11, 2021,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/11/covid-19-triggers-wave-free-speech-abuse#.
60. “Emergency Measures and COVID-19: Guidance” (Geneva: United Nations Human Rights
Ofªce of the High Commissioner, Abril 27, 2020), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Events/
EmergencyMeasures_Covid19.pdf. There were also calls for proportionality in the response to vio-
lations of these restrictions.
61. Michelle Bachelet, “COVID-19: Exceptional Measures Should Not Be Cover for Human Rights
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Seguridad Internacional 46:2 144
knowledge that loosened international norms regarding intervention in civil-
ians’ lives may tempt governments to repress the domestic opposition. En
this article, we consider the use of physical violence to enforce COVID-19
lockdown measures to be instances of government repression. The following
section describes, brieºy, how some governments have enforced lockdown
measures through unjustiªable means.
how incumbents use international norms to repress opposition
A number of countries have abused COVID-19 lockdown provisions since the
onset of the pandemic. According to Amnesty International, “[A]cross Europe,
there were several cases in Belgium, Francia, Greece, Italia, Romania, and Spain
in which law enforcement ofªcials resorted to the unlawful use of force to im-
pose lockdown measures on people who did not offer any resistance or consti-
tute a signiªcant threat.”62 In some instances, this repression has fallen along
preexisting fault lines. In India, Por ejemplo, there are reports of the govern-
ment using COVID-19 as an excuse to engage in repression in Kashmir.63 Kim
Yi Dionne and Fulya Felicity Turkmen also found a surge in “othering” of
marginalized communities in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, reºecting a
broader pattern of xenophobia and discrimination in response to pandemics.64
Although the United Nations has condemned the “toxic lockdown culture”
that has emerged in some places, the international community has done lit-
tle to sanction incumbents who have overstepped the bounds of appropriate
lockdown enforcement.65 The guidance that the United Nations released in
Abril 2020 states that “law enforcement ofªcials may use force only when
strictly necessary and to the extent required for the performance of their
duty and only when less harmful measures have proven to be clearly ineffec-
tivo,” and calls for prompt investigations into allegations of improper enforce-
ment.66 Yet, more than a year into the pandemic, there was evidence that
some states had abused their powers and were not being held accountable for
these violations. Human Rights Watch estimates that “authorities in at least
Abuses and Violations” (Geneva: United Nations Human Rights Ofªce of the High Commissioner,
Abril 27, 2020), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID
(cid:2)25828.
62. “COVID-19 Crackdowns: Police Abuse and the Global Pandemic” (Londres: Amnesty Interna-
tional, December 17, 2020), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/act30/3443/2020/en/.
63. Mehdi Khawaja, “Modi’s Government Is Exploiting the Pandemic to Ramp up Repression in
Kashmir,” Jacobin, Puede 3, 2020, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/05/india-modi-coronavirus-
police-repression-kashmir.
64. Dionne and Turkmen, “The Politics of Pandemic Othering.”
65. “‘Toxic Lockdown Culture’ of Repressive Coronavirus Measures Hits Most Vulnerable,” UN
Noticias, Abril 27, 2020, https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/04/1062632.
66. “Emergency Measures and COVID-19: Guidance," Abril 27, 2020.
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Opportunistic Repression 145
51 countries have used laws and regulations adopted to prevent the spread of
Covid-19, as well as counterterrorism and other measures predating the pan-
demic, to arbitrarily arrest, detain, and prosecute critics of government re-
sponses to the coronavirus, or of policies unrelated to the pandemic, resulting
in ªnes and imprisonment. Those targeted include journalists, bloggers and
others posting online, opposition ªgures and activists, protesters, academics,
healthcare workers, estudiantes, lawyers, cartoonists, and artists.”67 Their full in-
vestigation revealed “violations of the rights to freedom of expression and as-
sembly in 83 countries.”68
This brief overview illustrates how the COVID-19 pandemic expanded the
scope of what forms of intervention were considered legitimate and appropri-
ate by the international community and how some governments translated
their enhanced authorities to engage in political repression.
Data and Cross-National Design
Our theory predicts that the onset of an emergency will give states the oppor-
tunity to repress dissidents using crisis as a pretext. We study the relationship
between the COVID-19 pandemic and repression among African states to test
our argument, according to which the onset of the emergency should increase
repression, especially in areas with more opposition members. Our analysis
has two steps: ªrst, we show that repression generally increased after the onset
of the pandemic. Segundo, we use Uganda as a case study to show how repres-
sion changes in opposition areas compared with incumbent strongholds.
For this study, we limit our examination of the relationship between
pandemic-related lockdowns and repression to African countries. This choice
reºects data constraints as well as the region’s history and characteristics that
make it an especially relevant area to study. Many African governments have
previous experience responding to public health crises such as the HIV/AIDS
and the Ebola epidemics, which suggests that these governments would be
institutionally well-equipped to navigate the COVID-19 pandemic and
implement effective interventions.69 Additionally, the ªrst reported case of
COVID-19 in Africa was in February 2020, giving African heads of state the
67. “Covid-19 Triggers Wave of Free Speech Abuse,” February 11, 2021.
68. Ibídem.
69. Robert A. Blair, Benjamin S. Morse, and Lily L. Tsai, “Public Health and Public Trust: Survey
Evidence from the Ebola Virus Disease Epidemic in Liberia,” Social Science & Medicamento, volumen. 172
(Enero 2017), páginas. 89–97, doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2016.11.016; and “In the Face of Corona-
virus, African Countries Apply Lessons from Ebola Response,” World Bank, Abril 3, 2020, https://
www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2020/04/03/in-the-face-of-coronavirus-african-countries-
apply-lessons-from-ebola-response.
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Seguridad Internacional 46:2 146
opportunity to learn from other governments’ responses to the virus.70
The African context also provides the opportunity to explore the impact of
COVID-19 response measures across a wide variety of institutional contexts
and regime types.
Our outcome data for political violence and repression come from the
Armed Conºict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED).71 For more than two
décadas, ACLED has been coding data for African countries, which were the
original focus of the dataset. Apart from its robust coverage of Africa, ACLED
data have several unique features.72 First, ACLED data are precisely measured
in time and space: ACLED measures the timing (to the day) and speciªc loca-
tion of protests and political violence events, and records the fatalities, conºict
actors involved, and a description of the event. These details allow us to
conduct ªne-grained analyses of conºict at the subnational level. Segundo,
ACLED’s coding methodology relies on a team of researchers who code events
in more than twenty different languages using local, regional, national, y
international media sources.73 This robust data collection methodology sub-
stantially increases the number of political violence events captured compared
with other datasets, especially in rural and remote areas. ACLED codes a
wider variety of violent and nonviolent political confrontations than other
conjuntos de datos, which allows us to more accurately measure how patterns of protest
and violence change over time. Además, other prominent observational
datasets of political violence (p.ej., Uppsala Conºict Data Program [UCDP] y
Global Terrorism Database [GTD]) are inappropriate for our analyses because
the universe of events and modes of collection are different than ACLED’s.74
Notablemente, many datasets have strict limits on the type of events that they in-
clude in their data. Por ejemplo, GTD only codes events that qualify as “ter-
rorism,” whereas UCDP includes only events that occur within a predeªned
contest between conºict dyads, which results in an arbitrary number (es decir.,
70. “In the Face of Coronavirus," Abril 3, 2020. See also Ciara Staunton, Carmen Swanepoel, y
Melodie Labuschaigne, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: COVID-19 and South Africa’s Re-
respuesta,” Journal of Law and the Biosciences, volumen. 7, No. 1 (January–June 2020), doi.org/10.1093/jlb/
lsaa052.
71. Clionadh Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED: An Armed Conºict Location and Event Dataset:
Special Data Feature,” Journal of Peace Research, volumen. 47, No. 5 (Septiembre 2010), páginas. 651–660,
doi.org/10.1177/0022343310378914.
72. Además, two of the authors of this paper, Hilary Matfess and Melissa Pavlik, have previ-
ously worked as analysts for ACLED.
73. Clionadh Raleigh and Roudabeh Kishi, “Comparing Conºict Data: Similarities and Differ-
ences Across Conºict Datasets," (Grafton, Wis.: ACLED, Agosto 2019), https://www.acleddata
.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/ACLED-Comparison_8.2019.pdf.
74. Ibídem.
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Opportunistic Repression 147
twenty-ªve or more fatalities each year). The universe of events coded by these
datasets is therefore not conducive to the types of repression that we study.
ACLED data have important limitations, sin embargo, many of which are inher-
ent to observational data generally and to cross-national, observational data of
political violence speciªcally. ACLED probably does not capture a complete
universe of political violence events, and those events that are missing are
nonrandom. To the extent that missing data would be correlated with the onset
of shutdowns, we believe that bias would be downward because COVID-19
caused an underreporting of repression events. Primero, it is more likely that the
operations of the free press are curtailed during emergencies. Segundo, social
distancing and isolation would have made transmitting information more
costly than before shutdowns. For missing data to bias our results upward, re-
pression events would have to have been underreported before the pandemic
and overreported after shutdowns began, without any corresponding changes
in the levels of state violence. Given the conditions on the ground in several
states across the continent during lockdowns, this possibility is unlikely.
To measure repression, we rely on a conservative measure that captures one-
sided state violence against civilians. For this article, we deªne civilians as
unarmed individuals who are not partaking in collective action, such as protest-
ing or rioting. En tono rimbombante, although we believe that state dispersal of protesters
or rioters or violence against citizens who are engaging in public demonstra-
tions constitutes oppression, such instances do not capture our main phenome-
non of interest because they are examples of responsive repression.
Although ACLED covers all ªfty-four African countries, we restrict our
analysis to the forty-nine African states that are also covered by the Oxford
COVID-19 Government Response Tracker, our data source for COVID-19
políticas. We use data from January 1, 2017, until June 30, 2020. This period
goes back far enough to capture potential pre-COVID-19 trends but not too far
such that the control period becomes unlike the shutdown period.75
We measure exposure to COVID-19 restrictions using the Oxford COVID-19
Government Response Tracker.76 The database records the country-date of
COVID-19-related policies, deaths, and cases. For this article, we are interested
in the measurement of government shutdown policies rather than economic
75. Por ejemplo, using months in 2005 may not capture a valid counterfactual for what repression
would have looked like in a given country in 2020 in the absence of COVID-19 restrictions.
76. For a more applied discussion of this source, see Berman et al., “Shutdown Policies and World-
wide Conºict”; and Thomas Hale et al., “A Global Panel Database of Pandemic Policies (Oxford
COVID-19 Government Response Tracker),” Nature Human Behaviour, volumen. 5 (2021), páginas. 529–538,
doi.org/10.1038/s41562-021-01079-8.
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Seguridad Internacional 46:2 148
relief packages or information campaigns. Speciªcally, we measure whether a
government has enacted at least one policy that shuts down public transit,
closes workplaces and schools, cancels public gatherings, implements stay-at-
home orders, or limits internal movements. It is most likely, we argue, eso
governments will use coercion to enforce shutdown policies. We use measures
of deaths and cases to capture the lethality and spread of the virus over time
and space, but it is important to note that the exact numbers are likely to con-
tain some measurement error. Sin embargo, the information on case numbers
and deaths represents the best available data sources to capture the prevalence
de COVID-19.
We aggregate our data by the country-month to construct a balanced panel
dataset of African states from January 2017 until June 2020. We ªrst study the
cross-national impact of COVID-19 shutdown policies on repression. In March
2020, nearly all African countries issued some form of shutdown order, incluir-
ing restricting public gatherings, closing schools and places of work, shutting
down public transportation, canceling public events, as well as issuing stay-at-
home orders and policies constraining internal movements. En efecto, of those
African countries with data, only Burundi and Chad did not shut down
in March 2020. Oxford data does not track the following states: Comoros,
Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and São Tomé and Príncipe. We exclude
these states from our analysis because there is no variation in their enacted
shutdown policies. Including them, sin embargo, does not substantively change
our results because our estimation procedure computes the average change in
repression within states that enact lockdowns. A list of all countries in the sam-
ple is included in online appendix A.
We use an interrupted time series (ITS) design to study the relationship
between shutdown enactment and state repression. Our design exploits the ex-
ogenous timing of the policies within states to estimate the change in repres-
sion resulting from state-ordered shutdowns. The infectious nature of the virus
forced states to quickly enact restrictive measures that limited citizens’ free-
dom of movement in order to prevent rapid spread of COVID-19. The timing
of shutdowns is plausibly unrelated to underlying political violence trends
within countries because government policies did not control or inºuence the
development of the COVID-19 emergency. Once enacted, sin embargo, we ªnd
that lockdown orders licensed repression. Under this assumption, we estimate
the relationship between shutdowns and repression using an ITS methodol-
ogia. The goal of ITS is to identify changes in levels of an outcome at the time of
some event that is expected to interrupt the trend of the outcome over time. En
nuestro estudio, the time series is repression within a country, and the interruption
to the trend is the onset of COVID-19-related lockdowns. Our core identifying
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Opportunistic Repression 149
assumption is that the level of repression within a country before the onset of
shutdown policies is a valid counterfactual for what repression would have
looked like in the absence of lockdowns. En otras palabras, we expect that if the
COVID-19 crisis had not occurred, repression trends in the country would
have remained consistent. Under this assumption, our estimates represent the
change in repression caused by the COVID-19 emergency. We describe the esti-
mating equation below, and the econometric speciªcation appears in online
appendix C.
The outcome of interest is our narrowly deªned concept of repression, cosa-
sured using ACLED data regarding state violence toward civilians (interacción
código 17 in the ACLED dataset). Our baseline estimates measure the number of
events. We include binary coding because whether repression occurred in
a country-month is less prone to measurement error than the exact count
of events.
Our exposure variable of interest is a binary indicator for the month in
which shutdown policies started. This variable is coded as 1 after states imple-
ment shutdown policies and 0 de lo contrario. Exposure to shutdown is a determin-
istic function of time. Once lockdowns begin, states are scored as being
exposed to a shutdown policy, meaning that the status of being shut down is
correlated with time itself. Por lo tanto, a natural confounding variable is the un-
derlying time trend in repression. To account for this potential confounder, nosotros
include a linear time trend and its interaction with shutdown to allow for a
slope change in the repression time trend post-shutdown.
We are interested in the discrete change in repression levels that occurs
during the month of a shutdown within a country. The sudden change repre-
sents the government’s repression that is made possible by the emergency.
Our empirical approach identiªes a change in repression at the onset of shut-
downs. If repression discontinuously increases on average within countries af-
ter lockdown, then state violence is responsive to exogenous emergencies.
críticamente, we claim that lockdown policies are a type of public health meas-
ure that may give the state license to repress under the guise of public safety.
This article does not argue that states always enact lockdown measures with
the intention of repressing civilians. The choice to shut down the country was
largely forced onto states because remaining open during March 2020 would
have risked unmitigated spread of COVID-19 and, relatedly, international con-
demnation. Por lo tanto,
the onset of shutdowns represents an exogenous
change in the operating environment.
To account for unobservable country traits, we include country ªxed effects.
Fixed effects adjust for unmeasured time-invariant confounds that could ex-
plain shutdown policies and repression in a country by removing the aver-
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Seguridad Internacional 46:2 150
age level of repression and shutdown probability within a state. Por ejemplo,
country ªxed effects control for factors such as regime type, colonial heritage,
and legal system, all of which may inºuence patterns of state violence. Nuestro
estimation strategy compares countries both before and after they enact
shutdown policies. Rather than identifying “early” or “late” adopters of shut-
downs, our research design exploits variation in shutdown policies by com-
paring countries to themselves before and after shutdowns. Our aggregated
acercarse (compared to the daily level of analysis), por lo tanto, avoids the
pitfalls of comparing repression trends among those countries that shut
down only days before other countries. We report standard errors clustered
by country.
We adjust our estimates to account for three threats to causal inference. Primero,
other time-varying factors could explain the relationship between the timing
of shutdowns and repression events. One obvious time-varying confound
would be the prevalence and lethality of COVID-19 itself, both of which can
inºuence how governments and citizens behave. Our assumption that the pre-
trend of repression is a valid counterfactual for repression after shutdowns
may depend on covariates. We include one-month lags of COVID-19 case lev-
els and lethality from the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker.77
Más, we adjust for the lagged dependent variable to account for serial de-
pendence in the outcome variable.
The second inferential threat is related to the timing of COVID-19, y cómo
it overlaps with the change in weather from February to March. Exposure to
the emergency potentially overlaps with a change between the dry and wet
seasons, which is possibly associated with increased levels of opposition activ-
ism that could explain an increase in repression. To account for this possibility,
online appendix A shows that our results are unchanged when we restrict our
analysis to March–June 2019 as the counterfactual period.
The third inferential threat to our analysis is that our approach could
mistake a change in levels of repression after shutdowns with a nonlinear rela-
tionship between time and repression. If the relationship between time and re-
pression within countries follows a nonlinear pattern, what appears to be a
jump in repression after shutdowns could instead reºect a disruption in the
overall trend of violence. To adjust for this possibility, we include a squared
term for time to account for nonlinearity.
The intuition of our design is visualized in ªgure 1a. The horizontal axis is
a timeline that shows the months until COVID-19 lockdown, normalized to 0
77. Hale et al., “A Global Panel Database of Pandemic Policies.”
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Opportunistic Repression 151
Figura 1a. Monthly Repression Trend before and after COVID-19
A
South Africa
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months until COVID-19 lockdown
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C Kenya
D Uganda
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NOTE: Vertical axis plots the count of repression events from ACLED over time. Vertical line
indicates the month of each country’s respective shutdown. Vertical axis in ªgure 1a
scaled differently than in ªgure 1b to illustrate trends. Illustrative countries selected on
the basis of qualitative evidence surrounding human rights abuses amid the govern-
ments’ COVID-19 responses.
for March 2020, and the vertical axis is the count of repression events recorded
by ACLED. The vertical line shows the month COVID-19 lockdowns began.
During COVID-19 lockdowns, repression levels in South Africa, Nigeria,
Kenya, and Uganda had not been this high in years. Our selection to visualize
these cases are illustrative. En efecto, as ªgure 1b shows, the general trend
among African countries in our sample is that repression peaked in 2020 como
lockdown stringency increased.
Results across Africa
We show baseline results in ªgure 2. Throughout the empirical results sec-
ción, we present our ªndings by plotting the average difference in the outcome
of interest post-lockdown as point estimates, and present 90 y 95 por ciento
conªdence intervals constructed from standard errors that allow serial correla-
tion within countries around these estimates. The point estimates (es decir., cir-
cles, triangles, and squares in the ªgure) represent the relationship between
lockdowns and the outcome(s) de interés, and the lines surrounding them
characterize the uncertainty around each estimate.
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Seguridad Internacional 46:2 152
Figura 1b. Monthly Repression Trend before and after COVID-19 in Africa
repression and shutdown enforcement over time
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stringency index
NOTE: Repression trends from ACLED data (thick line) and Stringency Index from Oxford
COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (dashed line), rescaled for presentation. Datos
aggregated to daily level. The ªgure shows an increase in repression coinciding with an
increase in response stringency. This ªnding is consistent with our theory of opportunistic
repression, which predicts that emergencies license repression.
Cifra 2. Baseline Interrupted Time Series Results for Repression (Africa Sample)
A repression (niveles)
B repression (binario)
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NOTE: ITS results from three different models. The baseline model includes an indicator for
post–March 2020, a linear time trend, post–March 2020 interacted with the time trend, y
country ªxed effects. The covariate model includes lagged repression, lagged cases,
lagged fatality rates. The quadratic model includes the time trend and its squared term in-
teracted with the post indicator. Robust errors clustered at the country level used to con-
struct 90 y 95 percent conªdence intervals. See online appendix C for estimating
ecuaciones.
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Opportunistic Repression 153
Panel A reports the outcome variable measured in levels and panel B reports
a binary outcome. By levels, we mean the count of events that occur within a
country (p.ej., four repression events in a month), and by binary we mean a 1/0
measure for whether any repressive event was reported. We choose to report
both sets of estimates because the occurrence of a repression event is less sus-
ceptible to measurement error than the exact number of repression events. Nosotros
test three sets of models: a baseline equation including only country ªxed ef-
efectos, the time trend, an indicator for post-COVID, and the interaction of the
post indicator with the time trend; a second model adds lagged repression,
casos, and case lethality to the baseline; and a third model adds a squared term
for time. Our results are robust to the addition of different covariates; the esti-
mates remain very similar across speciªcations.
Our results for the levels estimates suggest that nearly two additional re-
pression events occurred in the average country after COVID-19 shutdown
orders. This increase corresponds to 0.63 of the pre-COVID standard devia-
ción, which represents a substantively large spike in state violence. The aver-
age number of repression events per month before March 2020 era 1.63.
A simple calculation suggests that there were nearly seventy-nine more rep-
ression events across the forty-nine African countries in our sample after
shutdowns. These results are statistically signiªcant at the 95 nivel porcentual, en-
dicating high conªdence that repression rose following the implementation of
COVID-19 shutdown orders.
The binary (panel B) measures show that the probability of a repression
event in a country increases by 17 percent in response to shutdown policies.
The average probability of a repression event pre-COVID is 31 percent with a
0.46 standard deviation. Substantively, the binary outcome suggests a similar,
and substantively large, impact of the COVID-19 emergency on state repres-
sión. Results are unchanged when adjusting for seasonality and when using a
continuous measure for policy intensity (see online appendix A).
Próximo, we consider whether the change in the repression trend can be attrib-
uted to citizen dissent, as measured through public demonstrations. To reiter-
ate, the increase in repression captured in ªgure 2 reºects instances in which
the state engaged with unarmed civilians who were not participating in acts of
public dissent. For the theories of responsive or preemptive repression to have
explanatory power in this context, in the aftermath of lockdown policies one
would expect to observe increased civilian demonstrations. An increase in
such demonstration activity could catalyze the state to respond to immediate
protest activities and would suggest that the crisis had advanced the capabili-
ties of the domestic opposition to dissent. We use two different ACLED mea-
sures to test these alternative explanations: protests, during which citizens
peacefully dissent; and riots, during which citizens violently dissent. We em-
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Seguridad Internacional 46:2 154
Cifra 3.
Interrupted Time Series Results for Protests and Riots (Africa Sample)
A protests (niveles)
B protests (binario)
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D riots (binario)
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modelos
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quadratic
NOTE: ITS results from three different models. Baseline model includes an indicator for post–
Marzo 2020, a linear time trend, post–March 2020 interacted with the time trend, and coun-
try ªxed effects. Covariate model includes lagged repression, lagged cases, lagged fatality
tarifas. Quadratic model includes the time trend and its squared term interacted with the
post indicator. Robust errors clustered at the country level used to construct 90 y 95 por-
cent conªdence intervals. See online appendix C for estimating equations.
ploy the terms protesters and rioters in this article for two reasons. Primero, estos
terms reºect the coding schema adopted by ACLED. For both protest and riot
events, we code their occurrence using the “Event Type” variable in ACLED.
This includes protest and riot events that are allowed to progress without in-
terference, as well as those events in which protestors or rioters engaged with
another political actor (p.ej., the state, rebel groups, or political militias). Sec-
ond, in this article, we are explicitly testing whether repression of civilians is in
response to public displays of dissent. Our use of the terms protesters and riot-
ers is not intended to suggest that those engaging in public protest (si
violent or nonviolent) are not civilians. We are not suggesting that by engaging
in dissent protesters or rioters have forfeited some of their civil rights, nor are
we condoning state repression of these demonstration activities.78 We display
the results in ªgure 3. Panel A shows that the level of protests declines after
shutdowns. Substantively, the decline in protests is not very large compared
with the increase in repression. Relative to the pre-COVID period, the number
of protests decreased by 8, o 0.34 of the pre-COVID standard deviation, cual
is nearly half of the standardized effect of shutdowns on repression. Coherente
with this idea, panel B shows that the probability of protest is unchanged after
78. We thank the members of the MacMillan Political Violence and its Legacies workshop at Yale
University for raising this point.
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Opportunistic Repression 155
Marzo 2020. We ªnd no increase in the level or probability of violent collective
action in the form of riots (panels C and D).
Opportunistic Repression in Uganda
Although our cross-national test provides suggestive evidence that supports
our theory of opportunistic repression, these results are incomplete. Mea-
suring repression at the country level obscures rich subnational variation in
state behavior, which can provide insight into who bears the brunt of opportu-
nistic repression. The locations of repression events could reveal that the state
has taken advantage of the pandemic to engage in targeted repression.
Namely, if the state violence differential increases in localities that are less
aligned with the regime, it may suggest that the increase in state violence after
shutdown is differentially borne by the political opposition.
We test for this possibility by conducting an in-depth study of political re-
pression in Uganda. Facing what promised to be a tight presidential election in
2021, particularly given the rise of the charismatic young musician-turned-
opposition-leader Robert Kyagulanyi (also known as Bobi Wine), Uganda’s sit-
ting president Museveni may have faced incentives to use the state’s coercive
apparatus, the Ugandan Police Force in particular, to consolidate authority in
opposition areas.79 After gaining power in 1986, Museveni and his ruling polit-
ical party, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), have relied on repres-
sion to establish and maintain control.80 Acts of repression involve targeting
opposition areas or members of ethnic groups afªliated with political oppo-
nents.81 Despite the excessive use of force against civilians by Ugandan secu-
rity forces, the regime often justiªes these acts as maintaining law and order or
ªghting terrorism.82
Qualitative evidence suggests that opportunistic repression is at play in sev-
eral aspects of the COVID-19 response in Uganda.83 Politicized enforcement of
79. Travis B. Curtice, “How Repression Affects Public Perceptions of Police: Evidence from a Nat-
ural Experiment in Uganda,” Journal of Conºict Resolution (2021), doi.org/10.1177/0022002721
1013097.
80. Travis B. Curtice and Brandon Behlendorf, “Street-Level Repression: Protest, Policing, y
Dissent in Uganda,” Journal of Conºict Resolution, volumen. 65, No. 1 (Enero 2021), páginas. 166–194,
doi.org/10.1177/0022002720939304.
81. Max Bearak, “Ugandan Opposition Reels from Widespread Repression ahead of Thursday’s
Election,El Correo de Washington, Enero 12, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/
uganda-election-opposition/2021/01/12/187af55c-54c5-11eb-acc5-92d2819a1ccb_story.html.
82. For a discussion of counterterrorism policies in East Africa, see Beth Elise Whitaker, “Compli-
ance among Weak States: Africa and the Counter-Terrorism Regime,” Review of International
Estudios, volumen. 36, No. 3 (Julio 2010), páginas. 639–662, doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510000641.
83. Elizabeth Katana et al., “Violence and Discrimination among Ugandan Residents during the
COVID-19 Lockdown,” BMC Public Health, volumen. 21 (2021), doi.org/10.1186/s12889-021-10532-2. Él
is important to note that this survey is skewed toward urban respondents.
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Seguridad Internacional 46:2 156
bans on rallies, the design of COVID-19 relief programs, and the relationship
between the state’s response to the pandemic and the possibility of elections
en 2021 all suggest that COVID-19 has enabled opportunistic repression in
Uganda. Early in the pandemic, Por ejemplo, Human Rights Watch reported
that the Ugandan police shot two men on March 26 for “riding a motorcycle
taxi in Mukono, outside of Kampala, despite the ban on motorcycle transport
with multiple passengers.”84 That same day, members of the Local Defense
Unit “used wires and sticks to beat people, including vendors selling fruit and
vegetables and motorcycle riders, in downtown Kampala in an apparent at-
tempt to punish non-compliance with the measures to close non-food mar-
kets.”85 In July 2020, the Kampala Metropolitan Deputy Police spokesperson
justiªed using force against those rallying as a part of the People Power oppo-
sition movement, saying that participants “were blocking roads, in and around
Kamwokya, which is also not allowed in the current situation where we are
supposed to keep distance. So, we had to use a bit of tear gas to disperse
them.”86 A protest led by activist Stella Nyanzi over the lockdown’s dis-
proportionate effect on the country’s poor was also dispersed. The Kampala
Metropolitan Deputy Police spokesperson claimed that Nyanzi “is exploiting
the COVID-19 situation to advance her political motives.”87 Because of the in-
cumbent’s media inºuence, opposition parties and social movements cannot
easily transition to remote campaigns.88 Even when the media tried to inter-
view opposition candidates, the state physically blocked them. Bobi Wine,
Por ejemplo, was physically blocked by the army when trying to enter a ra-
dio station.89
Pairing partisan sticks with carrots, the public health response to the crisis
was also designed to bolster the reputations of Museveni and the ruling NRM
party leading up to the 2021 elecciones. Museveni banned food distributions—
a common electoral strategy—following the COVID-19 lockdown, and when
independent MP Francis Zaake was caught distributing food to his constitu-
84. “Uganda: Respect Rights in COVID-19 Response,” Human Rights Watch, Abril 2, 2020, https://
www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/02/uganda-respect-rights-covid-19-response.
85. Ibídem.
86. Halima Athumani, “Ugandan Police Tear Gas Opposition People Power Supporters,” Voice of
America, Julio 17, 2020, https://www.voanews.com/africa/ugandan-police-tear-gas-opposition-
people-power-supporters.
87. “Uganda Arrests Stella Nyanzi at Protest over Coronavirus Response,” Al Jazeera, Puede 19,
2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/5/19/uganda-arrests-stella-nyanzi-at-protest-over-
coronavirus-response.
88. Martina Schwikowski, “Uganda’s Unequal Political Campaigns during COVID-19 Times,"
Deutsche Welle, Agosto 8, 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/ugandas-unequal-political-campaigns-
during-covid-19-times/a-54488099.
89. Ibídem.
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Opportunistic Repression 157
ents, he was arrested and tortured while in police custody.90 Forbearance is re-
served for members of Museveni’s party; politicians afªliated with the NRM
have continued to engage in food distributions. Además, pandemic-
related “task forces” throughout the country are headed by either Museveni
appointees or those who report directly to the president.91 Innocent Anguyo
suggests that these task forces designed food distribution as part of the NRM’s
political strategy in the period leading up to the election, and that distributions
were determined by political factors, rather than designed to target those with
the greatest need. COVID-19 seems to have heightened rather than miti-
gated the pre-pandemic habit of pairing patronage with coercion in urban
areas ahead of elections.92
Despite the abuses that occurred during the COVID-19 lockdown, interno-
tional criticism (aside from reports from human rights watchdogs) ha sido
tepid. A Reuters report in August 2020 quoted the head of the Africa Centres
for Disease Control and Prevention as saying, “Uganda knew where to con-
duct their surveillance. . . . The lesson from them is you should know your
pandemic.”93 Other reports noted that Uganda was “widely lauded” for the
stringency of its public health measures.94
Finalmente, Museveni’s discussion about the feasibility of the election also sug-
gests that the NRM politicized the pandemic to keep its grip on power. El
president, who has been in power since 1986, suggested that holding elections
en 2021 would be “madness,” which can be interpreted as a cloaked bid to ex-
pand his time in power.95
We test for politicized enforcement of the shutdown using a difference-in-
diferencias (DD) diseño, which compares the difference in repression before
and after lockdown in districts that are either less or more supportive of
Museveni. To measure changes in repression in both opposition areas and in-
cumbent strongholds, we use the month prior to lockdown as the reference pe-
riod. Estimating changes in repression for months prior to and after lockdown
90. Innocent Anguyo, “The Politics of Food Relief in Uganda’s COVID-19 Era,” Africa at LSE
blog, Julio 1, 2020, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2020/07/01/politics-food-relief-aid-uganda-
c19/.
91. Ibídem.
92. Ibídem.
93. Elias Biryabarema, “Uganda’s Tough Approach Curbs COVID, Even as Africa Nears 1 Million
Cases,” Reuters, Agosto 5, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-uganda/
ugandas-tough-approach-curbs-c-even-as-africa-nears-1-million-cases-idUSKCN251159.
94. Evelyn Lirri, “How Uganda’s Tough Approach to C-19 Is Hurting Its Citizens,” Telegraph, Au-
gust 26, 2020, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/global-health/science-and-disease/ugandas-tough-
approach-covid-19-hurting-citizens/.
95. Elias Biryabarema, “‘Madness’ to Hold Uganda Vote If Virus Persists: Museveni,” Reuters,
Puede 12, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-uganda-politics/madness-
to-hold-uganda-vote-if-virus-persists-museveni-idUSKBN22O10R.
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Seguridad Internacional 46:2 158
Cifra 4. Repression Trends in Uganda by District Support for Museveni
A repression
B COVID-19 policy stringency
shutdown
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NOTE: Descriptive plot showing the repression trends in areas more and less opposed to
Museveni (panel A) and the COVID-19 Policy Stringency (panel B) con el tiempo. Horizontal
axis is the months until March 2020 (es decir., the beginning of shutdowns) and is marked by
the vertical line labeled “shutdown begins.” Vertical axis is the count of repression events
in panel A and the average COVID-19 Policy Stringency in panel B. “Opposed” is a binary
indicator scored 1 when district vote share in favor of Museveni falls below the median,
y 0 de lo contrario.
allows us to identify both the pre-COVID-19 levels of repression across dis-
tricts and the dynamics of repression after lockdown.
Cifra 4 visualizes the intuition of our design. Panel A shows repression
trends in Ugandan districts above and below the median level of support
for Museveni in the 2016 election. The levels of repression look similar until
Marzo 2020, when the government substantially increased the stringency of its
COVID-19 response, including bans on public transportation and restrictions
on gatherings. After the policy change, the level of repression in districts that
voted against Museveni at a higher margin in 2016 experienced a dispropor-
tionate increase in repression.96
96. In ªgure B1 in the online appendix, doi.org/10.7910/DVN/U8LYW1, we map the increase in
repression before and after shutdown policies in March 2020 against Museveni’s 2016 vote share.
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Opportunistic Repression 159
Cifra 5. Difference-in-Differences Results for Repression in Opposition Districts in
Uganda
state violence in opposition areas
att: 0.36***
st.dev(opposition):0.15
pre-lockdown
post-lockdown
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months from lockdown
lockdown
NOTE: Event study plotting coefªcients from regression of repression (binario) on opposition
vote share interacted with time dummies (Febrero 2020 as the reference) with time and
district ªxed effects. Each coefªcient is a difference-in-differences estimate, computing
the change in repression in opposed versus aligned areas from February 2020. Shaded
region represents the post-lockdown period. Vertical dashed line shows the reference
período, normalized to zero (since the change in February 2020 from February 2020 es 0).
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level used to construct 95 por ciento
conªdence intervals. See online appendix C for estimating equations.
case study results
We graphically display our results in ªgure 5. We use February 2020, el
month prior to the shutdown, as the reference period. Each coefªcient plotted
is a DD estimate between opposed and aligned areas from this period, y el
estimates represent the change in repression between opposed and aligned
areas compared with February 2020. If the design assumptions are valid, nosotros
would not ªnd a large difference in repression between opposed and aligned
areas prior to lockdown. Mientras tanto, after lockdown, we would expect a dif-
ferential increase in repression in areas that opposed Museveni.
Pre-policy coefªcients are plotted in the white space of the plot and show no
evidence of a pre-trend in violence against civilians leading up to March
2020. In March 2020, sin embargo, violence against civilians from state forces sig-
niªcantly increased (shaded region). A standard deviation increase in op-
position vote share corresponds to a 6.6 percentage point increase in the
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Seguridad Internacional 46:2 160
probability of state violence against civilians in March. The upper right corner
shows the DD point estimate replacing the leads and lags with a binary indica-
tor for post-shutdown. Results are consistent with the event study: a stan-
dard deviation increase in opposition vote share increases the probability
of state violence by 5.4 percentage points on average after the government-
imposed restrictions.
The DD estimates attenuate two months after lockdown and return to their
Febrero 2020 nivel. The result suggests that the increase in repression was
transitory: the opportunity to repress more during lockdown did not result in
a permanent shift toward more repression overall. En cambio, repression spiked
in the short term and began to subside.
alternative explanations for increased repression in opposition areas
The increase in repression that we detect may be because of other underlying
factors that are correlated with regime support. Por ejemplo, if Museveni’s
vote share is a function of underlying demographic or developmental factors,
ethnicity or economic inequality may bias our estimates.
We include pre-treatment covariates interacted with year ªxed effects to ad-
dress potential confounding differences between districts. Speciªcally, nosotros en-
clude gross domestic product proxied through nighttime lights to capture
desarrollo,97 ethnic fractionalization to measure group heterogeneity,98 y
population density to capture more urbanized areas. Results are shown in
ªgure 6. The baseline estimate with time and district ªxed effects is repre-
sented by the circle at the far left of the plot; the triangle-shaped estimate in the
center of the plot includes the aforementioned controls. The size of the esti-
mate attenuates but remains relatively stable and statistically precise. Estos
models underline that the probability of a repressive event increases by
apenas 30 percent in opposition districts in the aftermath of a shutdown.
The square estimate on the far right of ªgure 6 includes region by time ªxed
effects and pre-treatment covariates. Region by time ªxed effects compare dis-
tricts with different levels of support for Museveni that are in the same major
region of Uganda in the same month. This approach helps guard against the
possibility that the results are driven by regional trends, since districts that
are more proximate to one another are more likely to share unobserved traits
97. Tilottama Ghosh et al., “Shedding Light on the Global Distribution of Economic Activity,"
Open Geography Journal, volumen. 3 (2010), páginas. 148–160, doi.org/10.2174/1874923201003010147.
98. Carl Müller-Crepon and Philipp Hunziker, “New Spatial Data on Ethnicity: Introducing
SIDE,” Journal of Peace Research, volumen. 55, No. 5 (Septiembre 2018), páginas. 687–698, doi.org/10.1177/
0022343318764254.
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Opportunistic Repression 161
Cifra 6. Difference-in-Differences (Covariate Adjustment)
repression (binario)
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shutdown
opposition
modelos
base
covariables
covariables
región
time FE
NOTE: Difference-in-differences results including covariate adjustment (year ªxed effects in-
teracted with pre-COVID district traits and region, respectivamente). Robust standard errors
clustered at the district level used to construct 90 y 95 percent conªdence intervals. Ver
online appendix C for estimating equations.
than districts in the opposite end of the country. The estimates are substan-
tively similar.
responsive repression
The theory of responsive repression would predict that the patterns that we
demonstrate are the result of the Ugandan government politically repressing
those areas that are engaging in more dissent. Por ejemplo, areas that are less
trusting of the central government may engage in more collective dissent
against lockdown orders. If this were the case, then the repression that we ob-
serve would be responsive rather than opportunistic or preventive.
We test for this possibility using ACLED data on public demonstrations
(either protest or riot events). These events capture the demand for responsive
repression because they entail collective action from citizens. If we detect a
similar trend for riots and protests as we do for state violence against civilians,
it may suggest a pattern of responsive repression. Alternativamente, if the results
show no difference in protests and riots in opposition areas, they would sug-
gest that the state is unilaterally using force irrespective of observed citi-
zen dissent.
We plot our results in ªgure 7. We do not ªnd evidence that state repression
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Seguridad Internacional 46:2 162
Cifra 7. Riots and Protests Test
A protests (binario)
B riots (binario)
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shutdown
opposition
shutdown
opposition
modelos
base
covariables
covariables
región
time FE
NOTE: See online appendix C for estimating equations.
against protesters or rioters differed in opposition and incumbent districts.
The DD estimate for protests is imprecisely estimated at 0.03, con -0.029 para
riots. The negligible size of the point estimates combined with their statistical
insigniªcance—even after we include covariates—suggests that incentives for
responsive repression remained the same in opposed and aligned districts be-
fore and after the shutdown.
These trends provide evidence against the alternative hypothesis that citizen
malcontent or distrust in government caused repression to increase. If repres-
sion differentially increased in districts that were reluctant to comply with
government mandates, one would expect to ªnd more protests or riots decry-
ing stay-at-home orders. Todavía, we do not ªnd any evidence that citizen dissident
behavior differs over time among districts that mostly supported Museveni in
the last election. Our theoretical framework provides an explanation for
why this is the case: COVID-19 provided states with opportunities to repress
their citizens at a lower cost. Además, it is worth emphasizing that even if
there were higher rates of noncompliance with COVID-19-related shutdown
policies in opposition-controlled areas, this would not justify the use of force to
compel adherence.99
99. One study, Por ejemplo, shows that public compliance with COVID-19 requirements in
Uganda is positively associated with trust in the government, incluyendo la policía. See Robert A.
Blair et al., “Public Trust, Policing, and the COVID-19 Pandemic: Evidence from an Electoral Au-
thoritarian Regime,” Center for Effective Global Action (CEGA) Working Paper Series No. 164
(berkeley: University of California Berkeley CEGA, 2021), doi.org/10.26085/C3D01C.
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Opportunistic Repression 163
preventive repression
eso
the repression in Uganda during the
Some scholars may suggest
COVID-19 pandemic is preemptive, reºecting the Ugandan government’s an-
ticipation of future dissent from opposition neighborhoods. Although it is
nearly impossible to attribute intention in this instance, theories of preven-
tive repression do not explain several empirical and theoretical characteris-
tics of the Uganda case. Unlike other instances of preventive repression, el
COVID-19 lockdown did not meaningfully increase the opposition’s capacity
to dissent, which is reºected in the pattern of public demonstrations. Bastante,
the costs of collective action increased because social distancing protocols and
lockdown dynamics complicated in-person meetings, which are important fea-
tures of opposition organizing. The COVID-19 lockdown reduced the capacity
for the opposition in several concrete ways, including reducing opposition
ªgures’ ability to distribute food to citizens, a common approach to engaging
with Ugandan citizens.100
Although it is possible that in the months following the lockdown the
Ugandan government engaged in preventive repression in anticipation of criti-
cism of its COVID-19 response, there are two reasons to question this assump-
ción. Primero, Uganda has been applauded for adopting many pandemic-related
international recommendations and for its response to the crisis. De este modo, we ar-
gue that it is not credible to link the spread of the virus to the government’s be-
havior, which could be the source of domestic dissent.101 Although Human
Rights Watch has criticized the Ugandan government for “weaponiz[En g]"
COVID-19-related regulations to repress the political opposition, attributing
such repression to the government’s fear of criticism over its repression is cir-
cular logic.102 Second, the relatively brief increase in the number of repression
events suggests that this shift is attributable to lockdown policies rather than a
more general pattern of state preelection violence.
If the government was not confronting a domestic opposition with meaning-
100. Anguyo, “The Politics of Food Relief in Uganda’s COVID-19 Era.”
101. Ahmed M. Sarki, Alex Ezeh, and Saverio Stranges, “Uganda as a Role Model for Pandemic
Containment in Africa,” American Journal of Public Health, volumen. 110, No. 12 (December 2020),
páginas. 1800–1802, doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2020.305948; and Lirri, “How Uganda’s Tough Approach to
Covid-19 Is Hurting Its Citizens.” In contrast, consider the spread of COVID-19 in Tanzania, dónde
the government under President John Magufuli resisted adopting lockdown measures. Nicholas
Bariyo, “Tanzania Shunned Lockdowns. Now It’s Rejecting Covid-19 Vaccines,” Wall Street Journal,
Febrero 3, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/tanzania-shunned-lockdowns-now-its-rejecting-
covid-19-vaccines-11612364606.
102. “Uganda: Authorities Weaponize Covid-19 for Repression,” Human Rights Watch, Novem-
ber 20, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/20/uganda-authorities-weaponize-covid-19-
repression.
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Seguridad Internacional 46:2 164
fully increased capacity to dissent and still engaged in repressive behavior, este
would suggest the need to revisit both preventive and responsive theories of
repression. We argue that our theory of opportunistic repression provides a
more holistic and nuanced understanding of repression in the Uganda case be-
cause it shows how repression may arise opportunistically for governments
that are facing moments of crisis.
Conclusión
In this article, we argue that the patterns exhibited in the aftermath of
COVID-19-related lockdowns suggest that states are opportunistically engag-
ing in repression against their civilians. The loosened norms regarding the ac-
ceptable level of state intervention into civilians’ lives in response to a public
health crisis were leveraged by incumbents to secure their positions.
We ªnd that, across Africa, COVID-19 lockdowns were associated with in-
creases in physical repression by the state. A case study of political repression
in Uganda revealed that the brunt of the pandemic-era repression in that coun-
try was borne by opposition areas. These ªndings have implications for both
the abstract study of political repression, as well as for the tangible and ongo-
ing efforts to protect human rights and demand accountability for violations.
Primero, we have contributed to the study of state repression by introducing the
concept of opportunistic repression. In contrast to existing theories of repres-
sion that focus on the activities or capacity of the domestic opposition, oppor-
tunistic repression refers to instances in which shifts in the state’s ability to
legitimately intervene in citizens’ lives are manipulated to repress the domes-
tic opposition. Analyzing how governments deploy these new authorities and
against whom is a pressing concern.
Our theory of opportunistic repression underlines how crises generate
threats that are both immediate (es decir., to citizens’ security and health) and sec-
ondary (by generating opportunities for government repression). This ªnding
has implications for how the international community helps design and sup-
port interventions for states in crises, whether the threat emerges from a natu-
ral disaster, a public health crisis, or terrorism. Politics are not paused in a time
of crisis. Although a comforting ªction, we argue that assuming that politics
are paused is not a suitable foundation for approaching crisis response. Op-
portunistic repression provides a helpful analytical lens because it shows how
changes in international norms brought about by emergencies may permit
states to repress their citizens. Policymakers will hopefully use this insight to
produce safeguards to deter such repression. Además, more effort must be
placed into holding accountable those states that clearly and repeatedly violate
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Opportunistic Repression 165
the international community’s guidance on how to enforce public health mea-
sures in a manner that respects citizens’ rights.
Segundo, our empirical investigation on a pressing topic—the impacts of the
COVID-19 pandemic on civilian well-being—makes an important contribution
to the literature. Understanding the fallout from COVID-19 in the short term is
important for the aid agencies and human rights organizations that are devel-
oping programs to respond to the lingering effects of the pandemic. The pan-
demic’s long-term political effects remain unknown, sin embargo. Por ejemplo, hacer
our ªndings that repression in Uganda began to fade two months after the
lockdown indicate that opportunistic repression is short-lived, or that states
need only a brief window of opportunity to consolidate their authority? El
legacies of repression are a burgeoning ªeld of study, which suggests that
there are long-term effects for the ways in which repression affects political
preferences.103 Repression associated with the COVID-19 crisis could well be a
critical juncture that alters how the international community views abuses by
estados, and it remains unclear whether this particular emergency represents a
permanent or transitory shock to state coercion and autocratic power. adi-
tional research on the persistence of power grabs during emergencies, después-
tentially using historical case studies, could provide important insights for
scholars and practitioners as they weigh the more long-term consequences of
repression in the wake of COVID-19.
103. Arturas Rozenas, Sebastian Schutte, and Yuri Zhukov, “The Political Legacy of Violence: El
Long-Term Impact of Stalin’s Repression in Ukraine,” Journal of Politics, volumen. 79, No. 4 (2017),
páginas. 1147–1161, doi.org/10.1086/692964.
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