In Plain Sight
In Plain Sight Valerie M. Hudson
The Neglected Linkage between
Brideprice and Violent Conºict
y
Hilary Matfess
Strapped to a gurney
and visibly shaken by the bloodied bodies of his fellow terrorists strewn about,
Mohammed Jamal Amir Kasab, aged twenty-one, begged his police interroga-
tors to turn off their cameras. They refused, and Kasab’s recorded confession
provided the world with a glimpse into the individual motivations of the
young men behind the four days of attacks in Mumbai, India. Kasab explained
that he “joined the militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba only for money.”1 His was
not solely an individual decision, sin embargo, and the money he earned from
participating in the attacks was not intended to be discretionary income. C.A-
cording to Kasab, his father had urged him to join so that Kasab and his sib-
lings could afford to marry.2 Kasab recounted that his father had told him that
his participation would mean that the family would no longer be poor and
that they would be able to pay the costs required to ªnalize a marriage con-
tract. One of the police ofªcers, seemingly ignoring Kasab’s response, pressed,
“So you came here for jihad? Is that right?” Crying, Kasab asked, “What
jihad?” Lashkar-e-Taiba deposited the promised money in his father’s account
after the successful attack; for his participation, Kasab was hanged in 2012
by the Indian government. Whether his siblings were subsequently able to
contract marriages as a result of the funds provided by Lashkar-e-Taiba
remains unknown.
In many ways, Kasab’s story lends itself to the narrative that terrorist re-
cruitment is a function of poverty and a lack of opportunity for young men. En-
deed, Kasab joined Lashkar-e-Taiba’s network while engaged in petty
Valerie M. Hudson is Professor and holds the George H.W. Bush Chair in the Department of International
Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&Universidad M, where she directs the
Program on Women, Peace, and Security. Hilary Matfess is a doctoral student in the Department of Politi-
cal Science, Yale University.
Valerie Hudson’s participation in this research was supported by the U.S. Army Research Labora-
tory and the U.S. Army Research Ofªce through the Department of Defense Minerva Research Ini-
tiative under grant number W911NF-14-1-0532 and by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New
york. Hilary Matfess would like to thank Khalifa Abulfathi, Emma Backe, and Matthew Page for
their assistance. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the
autores.
1. Vikas Bajaj and Lydia Polgreen, “Suspect Stirs Mumbai Court by Confessing,” New York Times,
Julio 20, 2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/world/asia/21india.html.
2. Mumbai Gunman Video, Channel 4 (India), n.d., http://link.brightcove.com/services/player/
bcpid1184614595?bctid(cid:2)27874456001.
Seguridad Internacional, volumen. 42, No. 1 (Verano 2017), páginas. 7–40, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00289
© 2017 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
7
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Seguridad Internacional 42:1 8
criminality and working as a laborer for a mere 60 cents a day. While in cus-
tody, he told police, “If you give me regular meals and money I will do the
same for you that I did for them.”3 Kasab’s decision to join Lashkar-e-Taiba,
his motivations for participating in the Mumbai attack, and his confession
after being captured all suggest that the appeal of membership in a terrorist
organization was material, rather than ideological.
Yet there is something else in this anecdote that helps explain the motiva-
tions of young men who take up arms not only for terrorist groups, but for the
broader purpose of engaging in group violence for political ends. Kasab’s
story casts light on something hidden in plain sight: poverty alone cannot ex-
plain participation in such organized groups because the vast majority of poor
people do not turn to violence.4 Rather, poverty and social marginalization
must manifest themselves in particularly vexing ways for grievances to lead to
such terrible violence. Kasab’s confession points to one such factor, which we
explore in this article. Across much of the world, especially in the shatter belts
of the Global South, customary law requires that young men and their families
pay a brideprice to marry.5 In this article, we identify the role of marriage mar-
ket obstruction caused by inºationary brideprice as an additional factor be-
yond those already identiªed in the literature as predisposing young men to
become involved in organized group violence for political purposes, incluido
terrorism, rebellion, intergroup aggression, raiding, and insurrection. Más-
más, we argue that this factor is critical not only in a theoretical sense but also
in a policy context.
The extant literature points to deprivation, identity, and socialization as pri-
mary risk factors for why young men take up arms. Most modern analysis
posits that it is not absolute poverty that motivates rebellion, but rather rela-
tive deprivation.6 Some scholars theorize that greed, rather than grievance,
animates conºict entrepreneurs to rebel against governments when it is ªnan-
cially viable or beneªcial to do so, thereby tying natural resource wealth
to conºict.7 Micro-level explanations also suggest that peer-group pressure to
3. “Know More about Ajmal Amir Kasab,” India TV, Noviembre 21, 2012, http://www.indiatvnews
.com/news/india/know-more-about-ajmal-amir-kasab-18703.html?página(cid:2)3.
4. Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Pobreza, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal
Connection?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, volumen. 17, No. 4 (Noviembre 2003), páginas. 119–144,
doi:10.3386/w9074.
5. The term “brideprice” refers to an overall net transfer of assets from the groom’s family to the
bride’s family. This includes brideprice, bridewealth, and bride-service. It also includes dower,
which should not be confused with dowry. Dowry refers to an overall net transfer of assets from
the bride’s family to the groom’s family.
6. See the seminal work by Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NUEVA JERSEY.: Universidad de Princeton
Prensa, 1970).
7. Paul Collier and Anke Hoefºer, “Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars” (Washington, CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: Mundo
Bank, 2001), doi:10.1093/oep/gpf064.
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In Plain Sight 9
Cifra 1. Brideprice/Dowry/Wedding Costs (Type and Prevalence) Scaled 2016
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join armed groups is a signiªcant motivating factor for young men; in-group
members are able to justify otherwise unacceptable actions through the
beneªts thereby obtained by the group.8 This new sense of identity, Sucesivamente,
incentivizes rebellious activity.9
Our research adds to this literature by analyzing how inºationary brideprice
contributes to marriage market obstruction. In many cultures, marriage is
much more than a social formality; it marks the transition to culturally deªned
manhood. When marriage includes brideprice, it is also an expensive eco-
nomic transaction. In these cultures, females are exchanged between kinship
groups in return for assets, whether those assets be cash, cattle, oro, or other
goods that serve as currency in the society. The map in ªgure 1 highlights
the prevalence of this arrangement in the twenty-ªrst century; in a sense, el
world is divided by this custom into two almost equal parts.
The map suggests three patterns: one economic, one regional, and one cul-
tural. Primero, more developed countries generally do not practice brideprice or
dowry. Segundo, Jack Goody notes that brideprice is common in all continents
8. Scott Atran, Talking to the Enemy: Faith, Brotherhood, y el (Y)Making of Terrorists (Nueva York:
Ecco, 2010).
9. Ver, among others, John Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from
Radical and Extremist Movements (Nueva York: Routledge, 2009).
Seguridad Internacional 42:1 10
except America.10 Third, the practice of brideprice is less common in predomi-
nantly Christian cultures. Sub-Saharan Africa is an interesting case in this
regard; despite a strong Christian presence (38 por ciento), the practice of bride-
price is endemic to the region (see ªgure 1). With minority status, brideprice,
though discouraged by most Christian denominations in Africa, may be a
practical necessity to contract marriage through customary law.11 Overall,
apenas 75 percent of the world’s population lives in regions where this prac-
tice is prevalent. It is important not to underestimate the prevalence and im-
portance of this custom in the twenty-ªrst century; although the United States
and many of its closest security partners do not practice brideprice, ellos tienen
security interests in many societies that do.12
Brideprice and its trajectory are an important cause of marriage market ob-
estructura, producing grievances among young males that have been linked to
violence and political instability.13 We begin our examination of this phenome-
non with a discussion of the logic and dynamics of brideprice and its potential
to obstruct marriage markets. We then illustrate our argument using three case
studies of countries that have been grappling with rising brideprice—Nigeria,
South Sudan, and Saudi Arabia. We conclude with recommendations for
policymakers interested in tracking and mitigating the risks associated with
brideprice, and we offer suggestions for further scholarly research.
Marriage in Patrilineal Cultures
Patrilineality is a social system wherein persons are accounted kin through the
masculino, or agnatic, line.14 A millennium ago, the overwhelming majority of soci-
eties were organized along patrilineal lines. In the twenty-ªrst century, por
10. Jack Goody, “Bridewealth and Dowry in Africa and Eurasia,” in Goody and S.J. Tambiah,
Bridewealth and Dowry (Cambridge: Prensa de la Universidad de Cambridge, 1973), pag. 51.
11. Bob Seidensticker, “Christianity Becomes an African Religion, Islam Overtakes Christian-
idad, and Other Upcoming Changes,” Patheos, Puede 11, 2015, http://www.patheos.com/blogs/
crossexamined/2015/05/christianity-becomes-an-african-religion-islam-overtakes-christianity-
and-other-upcoming-changes/.
12. This statistic comes from our estimates of the percentage distribution of world populations by
continent, which tally nearly 60 percent of the world’s population as residing in Asia and more
than 16 percent as residing in sub-Saharan Africa.
13. Ver, Por ejemplo, Valerie M. Hudson and Andrea M. Den Boer, Bare Branches: The Security Im-
plications of Asia’s Surplus Male Population (Cambridge, Masa.: CON prensa, 2004); and Bradley A.
Thayer and Valerie M. Hudson, “Sex and the Shaheed: Insights from the Life Sciences on Islamic
Suicide Terrorism,” Seguridad Internacional, volumen. 34, No. 4 (Primavera 2010), páginas. 37–62, doi:10.1162/
isec.2010.34.4.37. Raiding for resources to marry is typical in societies with obstructed marriage
markets. Because the obstruction is worst for poor, unskilled young men, less violent types of re-
source raiding are not feasible alternatives.
14. Linda Stone, Kinship and Gender: An Introduction (Roca, Colo: Westview, 2013).
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In Plain Sight 11
contrast, the international system is composed of states whose societies are ar-
rayed along a spectrum from nonpatrilineality to strong patrilineality, con un
sizable number of countries reºecting a more mixed proªle in transition from
one pole to the other.
Patrilineality is, at heart, a security-provision mechanism. In an anarchic
world, patrilineality solves the social cooperation problem for a given group of
hombres, providing them with natural allies in conºict situations because of the
trust created through blood ties among male group members. Eso es, the ªrst
priority in assuring security for the group requires managing males’ propen-
sity for risk-taking, violence, and aggression and harnessing these predisposi-
tions for pro-group ends, lest they destroy the group. With its focus on
prioritizing male kinship, patrilineality is the solution to which human socie-
ties have, generally speaking, historically resorted, with the vast majority
of traditional societies organized along agnatic lines. En un sentido, the purpose of
patrilineality is to create a fraternal alliance system of brothers, cousins, hijos,
uncles, and fathers capable of countering threats to the group. Although it is
not the only means of creating fraternity—fraternity can also be created in
matrilineal societies or, somewhat less successfully, through ideological ties—
patrilineality is the most straightforward and robust means of achieving
the fraternal alliance necessary to provide group security.15
Women, sin embargo, move between kinship groups in exogamous marriage
y por lo tanto, in a sense, are not full kin in patrilineal societies. Patrilocal mar-
riaje, in which a bride moves to her in-laws’ household, becomes the norm,
and the patriline acts to retain all signiªcant assets, particularly land and live-
stock. This situation typically precludes the conferral of signiªcant property
rights or marital rights on women. Not just physical security for men, entonces,
but economic security is afforded by the system of extended male kin
grupos. Women, por otro lado, suffer from a lack of both physical and eco-
nomic security.
This system of social organization is still in use today. In a context in which
the state is virtually nonexistent and cannot provide security for its citizens
15. Por ejemplo, some matrilineal systems, such as those in Melanesia, also practice brideprice.
Although patrilineality makes male control over assets, women, and power more straightforward,
males are still able to exert almost the same level of control in brideprice-practicing matrilineal so-
cieties, and brideprice plays a role in creating grievances that lead violence in these societies, como
Bueno. We are indebted to Sue Ingram of the Australian National University for this insight. adi-
cionalmente, ideology is not as sturdy a basis for fraternity as kinship is, which is why some ideologi-
cally based groups attempt to shore up that fraternity with marriages that make men not only
ideological brothers, but in-laws and therefore kin. Osama bin Laden, Por ejemplo, attempted to
have his top lieutenants marry sisters to better ensure they would remain loyal to each other. Ver
Thayer and Hudson, “Sex and the Shaheed.”
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Seguridad Internacional 42:1 12
(p.ej., Somalia), or in which it is profoundly indifferent to human security, el
most viable alternative for an individual is to rely on extended kin groups for
basic security needs.
The status of males in patrilineal societies is strongly linked to marriage. No
only does marriage mark the transition to manhood in patrilineal societies, pero
it establishes the male as a source of lineage and inheritance within the larger
patriline. The marriage imperative is thus deeply felt among males in such cul-
turas. Y todavía, marriage is unobtainable without assets. In The Other Half of
Gender: Men’s Issues in Development, the World Bank observed: “The main so-
cial requirement for achieving manhood in Sub-Saharan Africa—for being a
man—is attaining some level of ªnancial independence, employment, or in-
come, and subsequently starting a family. In much of Sub-Saharan Africa,
brideprice is commonplace, and thus marriage and family formation are di-
rectly tied to having income or property.”16
These descriptions and conclusions are generalizable to many societies, pero
they take on an intensiªed meaning in more strongly patrilineal societies.
Although it is possible to be unmarried and still be regarded as an adult man
en, decir, the United States, it is not possible in a strongly patrilineal society. Mar-
riaje, entonces, is obligatory for men living in such societies. It is through marriage
and having legitimate male offspring that men maintain into the future a kin-
dred “presence” in the lineage. It is also the only way to claim a just share of
the patriline’s assets and rents, which are distributed to families and not indi-
viduals. Más, in this context males are not considered to be full adults until
they marry. Only then will they have a signiªcant voice in the male collective,
making marriage an important socialization ritual in addition to a valuable
economic practice.
Marriage in patrilineal societies is accompanied by asset exchange, wherein
brideprice offsets the cost to the natal family of raising the bride.17 The conse-
quences for women that grow out of this system, sin embargo, are deeply detri-
mental to their security and status. In addition to patrilocal marriage and the
lack of female property rights mentioned above, these societies are character-
ized by arranged marriage in the patriline’s interest; a relatively low age of
in female human capital;
marriage for girls; profound underinvestment
intense son preference, resulting in passive neglect of girl children or active fe-
16. Ian Bannon and Maria C. Correia, The Other Half of Gender: Men’s Issues in Development (Lavar-
ington, CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: Banco mundial, 2006), pag. 161, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/
7029.
17. If we turn our attention from brideprice to dowry, dowry is intended to offset the cost to the
groom’s family of feeding and sheltering the bride, who is viewed as nonproductive (es decir., solo
reproductive).
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In Plain Sight 13
male infanticide/sex-selective abortion; highly inequitable family and per-
sonal status law favoring men; and chronically high levels of violence against
women as a means to enforce the imposition of the patrilineal system on often
recalcitrant women. Consider the ªndings of a report by a Tanzanian women’s
organization following an extensive survey that, “due to brideprice,” women
suffer “insults, sexual abuse, battery, denial of their rights to own property, ser-
ing overworked and having to bear a large number of children.” The report
notes that “women also complained of some men’s tendency to reclaim the
bride price when marriages broke up, saying fear of this outcome forced
women to cling to their marriages even when abused.”18
There are two variants of this patrilineal syndrome that are worthy of ana-
lysts’ attention, given their effects on the status of women overall. Primero, dónde
women’s work is considered productively valuable, such as when women pro-
vide the preponderance of agricultural labor, brideprice and polygyny are of-
ten prevalent. Given that marriage is patrilocal and inheritance passes through
the patriline, buying or exchanging women between kinship groups becomes
essential, and brideprice becomes established. Goody ªnds that 78 por ciento de
the patrilineal cultures he has studied practice brideprice, and a further 6 por-
cent practice bride-service, a variant thereof in which a young man works off
the brideprice to compensate his father-in-law.19 Richer men within the kin
group can afford to pay the brideprice for more than one wife, and thus are
assured even greater returns on their investment than poorer men. Este
brideprice-with-polygyny-for-the-rich system is by far the most prevalent vari-
ant of patrilineality, according to Goody.20
A second, less frequent variant of the patrilineal system occurs when women
are not valued for their productive labor; en este caso, women are seen as a bur-
den, and the family providing the bride must be prepared to compensate the
groom and his family for assuming this burden through payment of a dowry.
Goody explains that brideprice “is more commonly found where women
make the major contribution to agriculture, whereas dowry is restricted to
those societies where males contribute most; this is the difference between hoe
agriculture and the use of the plough, which is almost invariably in male
hands.”21 The practice of brideprice differs from that of dowry in its effects on
the status of women; tellingly, dowry is often associated with female infanti-
18. “Human Rights Study Links Payment of Bride Price to Abuse of Women,” IRIN, Puede 16,
2006, http://www.irinnews.org/report/59032/tanzania-study-links-payment-bride-price-abuse-
women.
19. Goody, “Bridewealth and Dowry in Africa and Eurasia," pag. 50.
20. Ibídem.
21. Ibídem., pag. 52.
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Seguridad Internacional 42:1 14
cide because families can be bankrupted by the birth of daughters whose dow-
ries they will be required to pay in future years.22
Patrilineality, por lo tanto, cannot exist without the subordination of women to
the interests of the patriline. Women are either economic boons or burdens,
passed from one man to another with compensation for the economic loss in-
curred by her birth family if her labor is considered valuable or by the groom’s
family if it is lacking in value. A woman who wants to choose her marriage
partner, divorce, own land, or invest in her daughters is, in a very real sense,
undermining patrilineality and the security mechanism it offers male kin
grupos. A ªerce and often violent reaction against such women is typical.23
En otra parte, Valerie Hudson and others have argued that patrilineality,
though arguably effective in providing individual security for men in many
circumstances, produces, generally speaking, an inherently unstable society
prone to violent conºict and rentierism.24 While historically prevalent, patri-
lineality is linked to a host of destabilizing tendencies that have also been
historically prevalent, including food insecurity, demographic insecurity, un-
nihilative violence, economic predation, and corruption.25 Both this system of
security provision and the instability and violence it inevitably creates have
existed through millennia. The linkage we document here is not new or hid-
den, but has to date been rendered invisible by conventional explanations. Alabama-
though the broad-ranging effects of patrilineality on security is our overall
research aim, we focus in this article on the patrilineal custom of brideprice
and trace its destabilizing effects on society.26
brideprice and marriage market obstruction
In patrilineal systems, brideprice is essentially an obligatory tax on young
hombres, payable to older men. The young man’s father and male kindred may
help him pay the tax, but the intergenerational nature of the tax should be
comprendido, especially as regards poor young men whose male relatives
may likewise be too poor to help. The framing of brideprice as a tax and of
22. Hudson and Den Boer, Bare Branches.
23. Ver, Por ejemplo, David Jacobson, Of Virgins and Martyrs: Women and Sexuality in Global Conºict
(baltimore, Maryland.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013).
24. Valerie M. Hudson, Donna Lee Bowen, and Perpetua Lynne Nielsen, “Clan Governance and
State Stability: The Relationship between Female Subordination and Political Order,” American
Political Science Review, volumen. 109, No. 3 (Agosto 2015), páginas. 535–555, doi:10.1017/S0003055415000271.
“Rentierism” refers to an economic system based on appropriation of resources that produce rents,
which are then used to govern and control society. Rentier powers govern, in the ªrst place,
through corruption.
25. Ibídem.
26. Valerie M. Hudson et al., The First Political Order: Sex, Gobernancia, and National Security, Texas
A&M University and Brigham Young University, 2017.
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In Plain Sight 15
marital exchange as a market eschews the kind of moralizing that often accom-
panies discussions of unfamiliar social rituals and clariªes the functioning of
this market.
Important in this conceptualization is evidence that brideprice acts as a ºat
tax—for the most part, brideprice is pegged to what is considered the “going
rate” for a bride in a particular society at a given point in time. The brideprice
is nudged slightly upward or downward at the margin according to the status
of the bride’s kin, but it is not inºuenced greatly by the status of the man re-
sponsible for paying it. If the cost of brideprice rises, it will rise for every man,
rich or poor. The ºat-tax nature of brideprice has been noted across such geo-
graphically diverse states as Afghanistan, Porcelana, and Kenya.27
The tendency toward a consistent brideprice within a community is under-
standable. As Goody suggests, “In bridewealth systems, standard payments
are more common; their role in a societal exchange puts pressure towards sim-
ilarity.”28 The reason is that men pay for their sons’ brideprices by ªrst collect-
ing the brideprice for their daughters. Such transactions are another force
pushing down the age of marriage among girls in brideprice societies, in addi-
tion to the desire to stop providing for daughters who, socially, se convertirá
the responsibility of another family. Unless a family is very wealthy, daughters
in general must be married off ªrst, so that the family can accumulate enough
assets to pay the sons’ brideprices. Quoting anthropologist Lucy Mair, Goody
remarks, “‘When cattle payments are made, the marriage of girls tends to be
early for the same reason that that of men is late—that a girl’s marriage in-
creases her father’s herd while that of a young man diminishes it.’ . . . [METRO]en
chafe at the delay, girls at the speed.”29 If brideprice were not standardized
within the society, families could not count on the brideprices brought in by
their daughters being sufªcient to cover the costs of their sons’ marriages.
De este modo, con el tiempo, a fairly consistent brideprice emerges for the community at
any given time, though the actual cost may vary somewhat over time depend-
ing on local conditions.
Many accounts suggest that men are highly sensitive to new trends in
brideprice, and that the societal brideprice level is easily pushed upward but
very difªcult to push downward. Quoting Mair once more, Goody notes,
“Every father fears being left in the lurch by ªnding that the bridewealth
which he has accepted for his daughter will not sufªce to get him a daughter-
in-law; por lo tanto, he is always on the lookout for any signs of a rise in the rate,
27. Hudson, Bowen, and Nielsen, “Clan Governance and State Stability.”
28. Goody, “Bridewealth and Dowry in Africa and Eurasia," pag. 18.
29. Ibídem, pag. 10.
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Seguridad Internacional 42:1 16
and tends to raise his demands whenever he hears of other fathers doing so.
This means in general terms that individual cases of over-payment produce a
general rise in the rate all around.”30
Almost universally, entonces, the amount required for an acceptable brideprice
rises continually over time. The result of this persistent brideprice inºation is
that marriage is either delayed or even put out of reach for many young men,
particularly in situations of economic stagnation, rising inequality, o ambos. A
summary of the average brideprice from a number of different periods and
countries found that the burden equated to as much as twelve to twenty times
the per capita holdings of large livestock or two to four times gross household
income.31 As Bradley Thayer and Valerie Hudson note in an article on mar-
riage market obstruction and suicide terrorism in Islamic societies:
Delayed marriage has become a new norm in the Middle East. Por ejemplo,
in Egypt, one study documents that families of young adult males must save
ªve to seven years to pay for their sons’ marriages. De 2000 a 2004, wed-
ding costs in Egypt rose 25 por ciento. Como resultado, the average marriage age for
Egyptian men has risen sharply, from the early twenties to the late twenties
and early thirties. In one study, cerca de 25 percent of young adult males in
Egypt had not married by age twenty-seven; the average age was thirty-one.
In poverty-stricken Afghanistan, wedding costs for young men average
$12,000–$20,000. . . . In Saudi Arabia, men usually are unable to marry before
age twenty-nine; often they marry only in their mid-thirties. In Iran, 38 por ciento
of twenty-ªve-year-old to twenty-nine-year-old men are unmarried. Across
the Middle East, only about 50 percent of twenty-ªve-year-old to twenty-nine-
year-old men are married, the lowest percentage for this group in the de-
veloping world. Whether in Afghanistan, Iran, Líbano, or the United Arab
Emirates, the exorbitant costs of marriage have delayed the age at which
Muslim men marry.32
Given the tendency toward brideprice inºation, an unequal distribution of
wealth will amplify market distortions by facilitating polygyny.33 Wealthy men
are able to pay even when poor men cannot. Because additional wives produce
greater wealth for their husband both through their productive labor and
through the birth of additional daughters who will fetch a brideprice for their
father, brideprice inºation may cause a rise in the average number of wives in
30. Ibídem, pag. 5 (emphasis in the original).
31. Siwan Anderson, “The Economics of Dowry and Brideprice,” Journal of Economic Perspectives,
volumen. 21, No. 4 (Caer 2007), páginas. 151–174, doi:10.1257/jep.21.4.151.
32. Thayer and Hudson, “Sex and the Shaheed," pag. 54.
33. Polygyny is also a custom that has not died out to the extent that some would imagine. Para
visual representation of the prevalence of polygyny in the world today, see “Prevalence and Legal
Status of Polygyny,” WomanStats Project, 2016, http://www.womanstats.org/substatics/PW-
SCALE-1-2016.png.
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In Plain Sight 17
the households of such wealthy men. Este, también, feeds into the predisposition to
push down the age of marriage for girls where brideprice is present. Goody re-
marks, “Polygyny . . . is made possible by the differential marriage age, early
for girls, later for men. Bridewealth and polygyny play into each other’s
manos. . . . [t]he two institutions appear to reinforce each other.”34 Polygyny is
also a marker of higher social status, and it is practiced even in societies where
women’s labor is not considered valuable (p.ej., in the United Arab Emirates).
A ªnal source of marriage market distortion often found in brideprice socie-
ties is higher female mortality. To the degree that patrilineal-based societies
profoundly devalue the lives of women and girls, resulting in signiªcant
underinvestment in women’s health when resources are scarce and poverty is
endemic, one sees higher rates of morbidity and mortality for females after
marriage. In no area is this more evident than in that of maternal mortality.
Given both low investments in women’s health and the early age of marriage
for girls in these societies, maternal mortality rates in most patrilineal societies
tend to be egregiously high.35 If a young wife dies in childbirth, the logic of the
patrilineal syndrome dictates that she will need to be replaced, usually by a
girl the same age the ªrst wife was when she married. Despite the economic
cost of having to pay brideprice once again when a woman dies in childbirth,
adequate attention to the physical well-being of women and girls is often not
culturally supported within the society.36 Indeed, brideprice helps to reinforce
and justify this underinvestment in women: as a women’s rights activist in
Uganda noted, women “cannot negotiate safer sex because of brideprice. Ellos
cannot limit the number of children that they have because of brideprice.
They cannot go to school and do their own thing because they were bought.”37
De este modo, both polygyny and higher rates of post-marriage female mortality in-
crease the ratio of marriageable males to marriageable females. Sometimes this
scarcity produces extreme downward pressure on the marriage age of girls in a
34. Goody, “Bridewealth and Dowry in Africa and Eurasia," pag. 10.
35. That is not the case in some patrilineal societies. Por ejemplo, in Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates, there are sufªcient resources to justify the expense of investing in maternal health
care. Además, the average age of marriage has been creeping upward in these societies. Para
both these reasons, maternal mortality in these Gulf States tends to be lower than in other
patrilineal cultures. Porcelana, también, has made a successful push toward lowering maternal mortality
tarifas, and it strictly regulates both fertility and age of marriage.
36. This phenomenon is difªcult to explain in solely economic terms. Whereas in some regions
with brideprice (such as sub-Saharan Africa), childhood sex ratios are normal, indicating that fam-
ilies understand the economic value of keeping girls alive until married, in other regions with
brideprice (p.ej., Pakistan and Albania), childhood sex ratios are abnormal and favor males.
37. Jessica Heckert and Madeline Short Fabic, “Improving Data Concerning Women’s Empower-
ment in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Studies in Family Planning, volumen. 44, No. 3 (Septiembre 2013), pag. 335,
doi:10.1111/j.1728-4465.2013.00360.x.
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Seguridad Internacional 42:1 18
given society, with some marrying off girls as young as eight.38 In most socie-
corbatas, sin embargo, the alteration in sex ratio results in a greater number of young
men unable to ªnd wives, even if they could afford the brideprice.
The patrilineal syndrome, por lo tanto, is primed to produce chronic mar-
riage market obstruction because (1) brideprice acts as a ºat tax on young
men that they cannot refuse to pay without suffering profoundly adverse so-
cial consequences; (2) brideprice catalyzes polygyny among the wealthier
segments of society; y (3) the devaluation of women’s lives leads to high fe-
male mortality
Marriage market obstruction, Sucesivamente, can be an important factor driving
young men to join violent groups. The ºat and inºationary nature of bride-
price guarantees that poor young men will be hard-pressed to marry. Like
Jamal Kasab, they may not be able to raise the funds for brideprice without re-
sorting to desperate measures. These young men are not taking up arms
against the institution of brideprice. Bastante, at the individual level, a young
man engages in violence to become more successful within the patrilineal sys-
tema. A nivel de grupo, it is merely the identity of the men who dominate the
sociopolitical system that the group wishes to change, and not the system of
male-bonded security provision itself: the recruits hope one day to replace
those wealthy, powerful men themselves.
Además, if a family has many sons, it may strive mightily to get the ªrst
son married, but then the younger, higher birth-order sons (such as the third,
fourth and ªfth sons) are typically expected to ªnd their own sources of fund-
ing to pay brideprice. As Goody notes, these younger sons often “leav[mi] el
countryside to swell the growing population of the towns. . . . [I]t is people
with a high bridewealth payment that have the highest rates of labor migra-
tion.”39 In sum, entonces, the marriage market in brideprice societies is obstructed
for poor young men and sons of higher birth orders.
young male grievance
The destabilizing effects of a “youth bulge” in some countries have received
scholarly attention, but would proªt from a concomitant analysis of marriage
markets.40 According to scholars investigating this phenomenon, a large co-
38. Cynthia Gorney, “Too Young to Wed: The Secret World of Child Brides,” National Geographic,
Junio 2011, http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2011/06/child-brides/gorney-text/1; y
George Thomas, “India’s Innocent: Secret Weddings of Child Brides,” CBN News, Agosto 24, 2015,
http://www1.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2012/June/Innocence-Lost-Indias-Children-Marrying-
at-Age-8.
39. Goody, “Bridewealth and Dowry in Africa and Eurasia,” páginas. 8–9.
40. Henrik Urdal, “A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence,” International
Studies Quarterly, volumen. 50, No. 3 (Septiembre 2006), páginas. 607–629, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006
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In Plain Sight 19
hort of young adults may feel aggrieved when they experience high unem-
ployment and diminished future prospects. What is left unsaid is that the
young for whom such grievances may turn explosive are overwhelmingly
masculino. Además, to have a youth bulge in the ªrst place, a country must
have a high fertility rate. Only in certain countries—that is, predominantly
patrilineally based cultures where women enjoy few rights of possession, incluso
over their own bodies—will one ªnd such high fertility rates.41 If such
destabilization is found primarily in patrilineally organized countries, we ar-
gue that the youth bulge literature would beneªt from examining the close re-
lationship between young male grievance and obstructed marriage markets in
patrilineal cultures. An overlay of maps indicating where brideprice is prac-
ticed and where there are signiªcant youth bulges is revealing (see ªgure 2),
and should be noted by security analysts for likely synergistic effects.
Glimpses of the linkage between young male grievance and marriage mar-
ket obstruction do occasionally surface. Por ejemplo, one commentator noted
en 2011, “Communications recently made public by WikiLeaks reveal that U.S.
diplomats identiªed delayed marriage as a source of discontent in Libya two
years ago. Other scholars have called the problem a regional ‘marriage crisis,'
born out of low incomes and the high cost of marriage. They point out that in
conservative Middle Eastern countries, unmarried young adults are generally
denied intimate relationships, and the social status that comes along with be-
ing an adult.”42 Without an understanding of the dynamics of brideprice, ex-
planations of the sources of instability in societies that practice brideprice are
woefully incomplete. Being unemployed is never good, but being unemployed
in a society where you can only become an adult man by marrying and in
which marriage requires signiªcant ªnancial resources produces a clear intens-
iªcation of vexation and desperation.43
.00416.X; Justin Yifu Lin, “Youth Bulge: A Demographic Dividend or a Demographic Bomb in De-
veloping Countries?" (Washington, CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: Banco mundial, 2012); and Ragnhild Nordås and Christian
Davenport, “Fight the Youth: Youth Bulges and State Repression,” American Journal of Political Sci-
ence, volumen. 57, No. 4 (Abril 2013), páginas. 926–940, doi:10.1111/ajps.12025.
41. Compare our scaling of birth rates and our scaling of patrilineal clan governance in the follow-
ing two maps: “Birth Rates, Scaled 2015,” WomanStats Project, 2015, http://www.womanstats
.org/substatics/BirthRates2015correctedstatic.png; and “Clan Governance Index (Degree of Fe-
male Subordination in Marriage/Family), Scaled 2015,” WomanStats Project, 2015, http://www
.womanstats.org/substatics/ClanGovernanceIndex_2correctstaticmiddle.png. All countries in the
highest two categories of birth rates also score in the highest category of patrilineal clan
governance.
42. Heather Murdock, “‘Delayed’ Marriage Frustrates Middle East Youth,” Voice of America,
Febrero 22, 2011, http://www.voanews.com/a/delayed-marriage-frustrates-middle-east-youth-
116744384/172742.html.
43. Curiosamente, a report by Nava Ashraf, Natalie Bau, Nathan Nunn, and Alessandra Voena
found that increasing girls’ education may raise the rate of brideprice in the community. Noting
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Seguridad Internacional 42:1 20
Cifra 2.
Incidence of Brideprice/Dowry/Wedding Costs and Global Median Age
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3
Journalist Michael Slackman notes that “in Egypt and across the Middle
East, many young people are being forced to put off marriage, the gateway to
independence, sexual activity, and social respect. . . . In their frustration, el
young are turning to religion for solace and purpose, pulling their parents and
their governments with them.”44 One Egyptian young man whom Slackman
interviewed, stated, “Sometimes, I can see how it [this frustration] does not
make you closer to God, but pushes you toward terrorism. Practically, it killed
my ambition. I can’t think of a future.”45 The competition to fund brideprice,
though most immediately an economic one, often translates into intergener-
ational resentment because it is older men who are typically in a ªnancial posi-
tion to acquire more wives. According to the World Bank, “The concentration
of power in the hands of big men and male elders leads to power struggles be-
this unintended side-effect is not meant to discredit girls’ education as a development objective,
but rather highlights how girls’ gains may feed other sources of female oppression as well as mar-
riage market obstruction. See Ashraf et al., “Bride Price and Female Education” (Cambridge,
Masa.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22417.pdf.
44. Michael Slackman, “Stiºed, Egypt’s Youth Turn to Islamic Fervor,” New York Times, Febrero
17, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/02/17/world/middleeast/17youth.html.
45. Ibídem.
In Plain Sight 21
tween older and young men, and is related to some insurgencies in Sub-
Saharan Africa. The institutionalized stratiªcation of age groups frequently
puts younger men at the service of elders, and the control of property and
women by older men creates a structural conºict between younger and older
generations of men. A major tension is over access to women.”46
High levels of grievance open up an opportunity for anti-establishment
groups to exploit young men attempting to gain the status and the assets
needed to marry. Delayed marriage and, importantly, the threat that one may
never father a son in a culture deªned by patrilineality are common elements
exploited by groups seeking young adult men interested in redressing the in-
justice they feel on a personal level, by force if necessary.
It is fascinating to see how many terrorist and rebel groups are so concerned
about the marriage prospects of the young men in their ranks. Por ejemplo,
Diane Singerman notes, “To mobilize supporters, there were many reports of
radical Islamist groups in Egypt in the 1990s arranging extremely low-cost
marriages among the group’s members.”47 In the 1970s, Black September, a ter-
rorist offshoot of the Palestine Liberation Organization, offered its members
brides, cash, apartments in Beirut, and even a baby bonus of $5,000 if they had a baby within a year of marriage.48 In 2008 Taghreed el-Khodary wrote that “Hamas leaders have turned to matchmaking, bringing together single ªghters and widows, and providing dowries and wedding parties for the many here who cannot afford such trappings of matrimony.”49 The Islamic State also provides its foreign ªghters with opportunities to marry that they may not have had in their own country. In one such campaign, the group of- fered “its ªghters a $1,500 bonus to go towards a starter home along with a
free honeymoon in their stronghold city of Raqqa.”50 Ariel Ahram found that
“ISIS foreign ªghters paid $10,000 dowries to the families of their brides,” sug- gesting that the group was attracting foreign ªghters by promising resources (and available women) to marry.51 Esther Mokuwa and her colleagues have 46. Bannon and Correia, The Other Half of Gender. 47. Diane Singerman, “The Economic Imperatives of Marriage: Emerging Practices and Identities among Youth in the Middle East” (Dubai: Wolfensohn Center for Development at the Dubai School of Government, 2007), pag. 49, http://www.meyi.org/uploads/3/2/0/1/32012989/ singerman_-_the_economic_imperatives_of_marriage-_emerging_practices_and_identities_among _youth_in_the_middle_east.pdf. 48. Bruce Hoffman, “Gaza City, All You Need Is Love: How the Terrorists Stopped Terrorism,” At- lantic, December 2001, https://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/2001/12/hoffman.htm. 49. Taghreed El-Khodary, “For War Widows, Hamas Recruits Army of Husbands,” New York Times, Octubre 31, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/10/31/world/middleeast/31gaza.html. 50. “ISIS Fighters Get Marriage Bonus, Including Honeymoon,” CBSNews, Puede 26, 2015, http:// www.cbsnews.com/news/isis-ªghters-get-marriage-bonuses-including-honeymoon/. 51. Ariel I. Ahram,”Sexual Violence and the Making of ISIS,” Survival, volumen. 57, No. 3 (Puede 2015), páginas. 57–78, at p. 69. l D o w n o a d e desde h t t p : / / directo . mi t . e d u / i s e c / a r t i c e – pdlf / / / / 4 2 1 7 2 0 7 9 7 4 2 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 2 8 9 pd . f por invitado 0 8 septiembre 2 0 2 3 Seguridad Internacional 42:1 22 Mesa 1. Cross Tabulation of Brideprice (Yes/No) con (Rounded) Global Peace Index, 2016 (norte (cid:2) 163) Global Peace Index (1 is most peaceful) Brideprice No (0) Sí (1) Total 1 16 0 16 2 53 68 121 3 8 14 22 4 0 4 4 Total 77 86 163 described the great success of rebel-group recruitment in those areas of Sierra Leone with high rates of polygyny. In such areas, where wealthy older men can easily afford multiple wives, impoverished young men have little hope of marrying.52 summary Having identiªed patterns of patrilineality, brideprice, marriage market ob- estructura, and young male grievance, we illustrate in the next section how these forces have played out in three recent conºicts. To set the stage for the case studies, we performed a prefatory exploratory empirical analysis. The as- sociations are signiªcant: Por ejemplo, in a one-way ANOVA using as the dependent variable the 2016 multivariate Global Peace Index score operation- alized by Vision of Humanity to scale how stable and peaceful a society is,53 and the four-point version of the 2016 WomanStats Brideprice Scale as the in- dependent grouping variable (norte (cid:2) 163),54 the results were signiªcant at the 0.0001 level.55 We also performed a cross tabulation between those same variables, with brideprice here discretized as a simple “no” or “yes” indicating whether any form of brideprice is practiced, and the Global Peace Index discretized by rounding to the nearest whole-number scale point. The results of this cross tabulation are striking (ver tabla 1): no society with brideprice fell into the most peaceful quartile of this sample of 163 nación- estados. No society without brideprice fell into the least peaceful quartile of the 52. Esther Mokuwa et al., “Peasant Grievance and Insurgency in Sierra Leone: Judicial Serfdom as a Driver of Conºict,” African Affairs, Julio 2011, páginas. 339–366, doi:10.1093/afraf/adr019. 53. “Global Peace Index, 2016" (Nueva York: Vision of Humanity, Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016), http://visionofhumanity.org/indexes/global-peace-index/. 54. “Brideprice/Dowry/Wedding Costs (Type and Prevalence), Scaled 2016,” WomanStats Proj- etc., 2016, http://www.womanstats.org/substatics/Brideprice_Dowry_Wedding_Costs_2correct static.png. 55. Results can be found at doi:10.7910/DVN/SPZSJZ/. l D o w n o a d e desde h t t p : / / directo . mi t . e d u / i s e c / a r t i c e – pdlf / / / / 4 2 1 7 2 0 7 9 7 4 2 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 2 8 9 pd . f por invitado 0 8 septiembre 2 0 2 3 In Plain Sight 23 sample. Additional exploratory statistical results can be found in the supple- mental material online.56 These exploratory empirical results are interesting, but only suggestive. Pro- cess tracing is required to understand the causal mechanisms at work, prior to conducting any conªrmatory analysis, and that requires a more detailed exam- ination of relevant cases. Case Studies In this section, we describe the linkages between marriage market obstruction and the resort to organized violence with the help of three case studies. We chose these cases as plausibility probes of the thesis that brideprice can de- stabilize societies. The ªrst two cases, Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin and various militias in South Sudan, illustrate the dynamics of brideprice and re- bellion in practice. These are cases in which observers and participants have explicitly acknowledged the role of brideprice in the emergence of group- based violence. The third case, Saudi Arabia, demonstrates how some states, having recognized the risk posed by brideprice, are attempting to mitigate that risk through the creation of programs and policies to prevent or ameliorate the destabilizing effects of brideprice inºation. how brideprice bolsters boko haram’s recruitment in nigeria Inºationary brideprice in northern Nigeria led to, and then continued to fuel, the rise of the Salaª-jihadist group Boko Haram. The group ªrst gained inter- national attention following its abduction of 276 schoolgirls from Chibok, a town in the northeastern state of Borno in Nigeria, in April 2014. Although this episode, and the international community’s rallying behind efforts to free the girls, thrust Boko Haram onto the global agendas of Western countries and hu- man rights advocates for the ªrst time, the group has been active for more than a decade. Hasta ahora, Boko Haram–related actions have claimed more than 35,000 lives and have led to the displacement of an estimated 2.5 million peo- ple throughout the Lake Chad Basin. As one of the most lethal insurgencies in Africa, Boko Haram is responsible for one of the world’s worst humanitar- ian disasters.57 Despite a renewed military offensive against the group in 2015, the conºict 56. Ibídem. Johns Hopkins School of Advanced Interna- 57. Nigerian Social Violence Project dataset, tional Studies, Washington, CORRIENTE CONTINUA., http://www.connectsaisafrica.org/research/african-studies- publications/social-violence-nigeria/. l D o w n o a d e desde h t t p : / / directo . mi t . e d u / i s e c / a r t i c e – pdlf / / / / 4 2 1 7 2 0 7 9 7 4 2 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 2 8 9 pd . f por invitado 0 8 septiembre 2 0 2 3 Seguridad Internacional 42:1 24 is ongoing. Boko Haram continues to engage in bombing campaigns and has thwarted the government’s efforts to exercise control over much of Borno State. It also has expanded its activities into neighboring Chad, Niger, and Cameroon, drawing on existing trade and kinship networks. As part of its recruitment strategy, Boko Haram has continued to organize inexpensive weddings for its members, a practice dating back to the group’s founder, Muhammad Yusuf. Given rising brideprice, underemployment, and polygamy-related bride scarcity, many of the young men who marry in these weddings would have probably remained bachelors.58 According to S.P. Reyna, brideprice in Nigeria’s Lake Chad Basin serves to “partially socialize younger men into their mature economic roles.”59 The re- gion’s marriage market constitutes a reward system in which men are incentivized to become economically productive and thus socially signiªcant. Although the past three decades have witnessed changes in Lake Chad Basin social norms, Reyna’s 1985 observation about the town of Bama, in Borno State, still holds true for the larger region. He writes, “The crucial point is that the spoils of deference cannot begin to accrue to a man until he has married.”60 Within the social strata, the older, married men receive the most respect, then younger, married men, and lastly unmarried men. As Reyna describes, “There are gatherings of men that convene in each ward every day. Though informal, these sessions play a vital role in communicating information and formulating opinions about affairs that touch village and ward. Mature, married men sit on cushions or stools in the center of large mats laid out beneath trees. Younger, married men sit on these mats, but on the edges and without stools or cush- ions. Joven, unmarried men sit in the dirt beside the mat.”61 This sort of social hierarchy also appears in anthropological accounts of the Kanuri ethnic group, whose members are thought to have made up a sig- niªcant proportion of Boko Haram’s organization and leadership, particularly in its early years. Among the Kanuri and other ethnic groups in the Lake Chad Basin, prestige is tied to the size of a man’s family and household unit, which includes his family and other members of the community who live under his care. This system further incentivizes the taking of multiple wives and the ex- pansion of patronage systems. Young men are often taken under the wing of a 58. Hilary Matfess, interviews with persons who wish to remain anonymous, North East Region, Nigeria, 2015-dieciséis. 59. S.P. Reyna, “Bridewealth Revisited: Socialization and the Reproduction of Labor in a Domestic African Economy” (Durham: University of New Hampshire, 1985), pag. 1, http://pdf.usaid.gov/ pdf_docs/PNAAX355.pdf. 60. Ibídem, pag. 9. 61. Ibídem, pag. 8. l D o w n o a d e desde h t t p : / / directo . mi t . e d u / i s e c / a r t i c e – pdlf / / / / 4 2 1 7 2 0 7 9 7 4 2 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 2 8 9 pd . f por invitado 0 8 septiembre 2 0 2 3 In Plain Sight 25 local “big man,” whose wealth and social status facilitate the process of ªnding them wives. In return, the young men pledge loyalty to their patron—a commitment that often entails the younger men providing labor.62 Only after taking a wife is a young man able to act as a “real man,” exercising autonomy and accumulating social capital.63 In northern Nigeria, obtaining the ªnancial resources to pay brideprice has become increasingly difªcult. The country’s oil wealth has disincentivized in- vestment in the manufacturing sector and made non-agricultural, non-oil sec- tor employment difªcult to obtain. Youth unemployment remains a constant concern; less discussed is the impact of the lack of jobs on the psychology of unemployed young men. A 2015 survey found that, para 57 percent of Nigerian men, “insufªcient income” was a source of stress; 44 percent experienced stress as a result of “not having enough work.” Despite these economic stress- ors, 98 percent of the men surveyed reported that “bride price is important and should remain [entonces]"; 29 percent reported that “a real man in Nigeria is one with many wives.”64 These high percentages are all the more striking when one considers that the survey included regions in Nigeria where polygamy is not widely practiced, as well as regions with higher employment statistics and annual incomes.65 According to the spiritual leader Khalifa Abulfathi, in the communities sur- rounding Maiduguri, where Boko Haram was founded, the cost of “items re- quired for [a] successful [marriage] celebration kept changing in tune with inºation over the years.”66 The Kanuri and Shuwa Arabs, two prominent eth- nic groups in the area, “primarily demand payment of dowries in gold coins.”67 Increases in the price of gold over time have made it difªcult for young men to pay brideprice, further adding to their strain. Maiduguri has also witnessed shifts in the marriage practice known as Toshi 62. Ronald Cohen, “Marriage Instability among the Kanuri of Northern Nigeria,” American An- thropologist, volumen. 63, No. 6 (December 1961), páginas. 1231–1249. 63. Ronald Cohen, “The Analysis of Conºict in Hierarchical Systems: An Example from Kanuri Political Organization,” Anthropologica, volumen. 4, No. 1 (1962), páginas. 87–120. 64. If brideprice is quick to rise, why is it so resistant to falling? Primero, individuals and families want to maintain social face and standing in the male hierarchy. Which man wants to be the ªrst to accept a lower-than-normal brideprice for his daughter? Similarmente, perhaps to a lesser degree, which family wants to be the ªrst to pay a lower price for a bride, signaling potential economic woes? Segundo, an economic calculus helps maintain high brideprices: those who have already paid the going rate, and those who have daughters of marriageable age, will see their investment degraded by lowered brideprice and will resist any decrease. Voices 4 Cambiar, Being a Man in Ni- geria: Perceptions and Realities (Londres: UKAID, 2015), pag. 22, www.v4c-nigeria.com/being-a-man- in-nigeria-perceptions-and-realities/. 65. Ibídem. 66. Hilary Matfess interview with Khalifa Abulfathi, email correspondence, 2016. 67. Ibídem. l D o w n o a d e desde h t t p : / / directo . mi t . e d u / i s e c / a r t i c e – pdlf / / / / 4 2 1 7 2 0 7 9 7 4 2 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 2 8 9 pd . f por invitado 0 8 septiembre 2 0 2 3 Seguridad Internacional 42:1 26 (literally, “blocking”), in which the ªancé, often with his family’s support, pro- vides gifts to his ªancée and her family to ward off other suitors. According to Abulfathi, “the Toshi became monetized and progressively included the fund- ing for the Turaren wuta (scents) and kayan lalle (henna),” which women use in the wedding ceremony.68 He noted that “these were later included in the brideprice that resulted in a spike in the bride-price in the 2000s.”69 It was dur- ing this period that “economic hardship began playing a role in the marriage processes in Borno.”70 It was also during this period that Boko Haram came into its own, with founder Mohammed Yusuf breaking away from his patron, Ja’far Adams, and establishing his own mosque in 2002. Yusuf had been put in charge of the youth wing of Adams’s politically connected Salaªst group because of his skill in mobilizing young men. In exchange for building political support for the governor of Borno State, Adams and Yusuf inºuenced the terms under which Borno State adopted and implemented Sharia law. Over time, sin embargo, Yusuf became increasingly frustrated with what he perceived as the government’s in- adequate implementation of Sharia law. This frustration would eventually lead him to reject the legitimacy of the government at both the state and fed- eral levels, as well as Western institutions and inºuences. In the early days of Boko Haram, Yusuf provided the types of social services that Borno State, the federal government, and traditional authorities had failed to supply. In addition to increasing access to education and farmland, the group helped to arrange marriages for young men. A resident of the Railroad neighborhood of Maiduguri, where Yusuf established his mosque, recalled that in just a few years, Yusuf had facilitated more than 500 weddings. The group also provided support for young men to become “okada drivers,” who gained popularity for their affordable motorbike taxi services. Some even saved enough to marry. En este momento, Boko Haram was a relatively nonviolent group that focused its aggression toward local political and religious ªgures who criticized the group’s rejection of the government’s legitimacy on reli- gious grounds. Violence ramped up, sin embargo, when the police began targeting okada drivers for not wearing protective helmets, which the drivers argued interfered with their religious head-dressings. En 2009, government forces killed 700 suspected Boko Haram members in a massive security sweep in Maiduguri that included door-to-door raids and the extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf. Following this crackdown, the group went underground 68. Ibídem. 69. Ibídem. 70. Ibídem. l D o w n o a d e desde h t t p : / / directo . mi t . e d u / i s e c / a r t i c e – pdlf / / / / 4 2 1 7 2 0 7 9 7 4 2 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 2 8 9 pd . f por invitado 0 8 septiembre 2 0 2 3 In Plain Sight 27 for a year or so before re-emerging with a deepened sense of grievance and a new leader, Abubakar Shekau.71 Under Shekau, Boko Haram has engaged in a wholesale war against the Nigerian state. Through raids in rural areas, suicide bombings, attacks on mili- tary posts, and the bombings of cities, the insurgency has killed more than 35,000 people and displaced more than 2.5 million.72 Hundreds of suicide bombers have detonated their devices against civilian targets such as bus sta- tions and markets, killing thousands.73 In rural areas, fear of Boko Haram has been so pervasive that farmers have left their ªelds fallow, contributing to a re- gional food security crisis thought to have affected 11 million people in the Lake Chad Basin. The World Bank estimates that Boko Haram has caused $9 billion worth of damage throughout the country’s north since 2010.74
Under Shekau, Boko Haram also has begun to abduct women to be
“wives” for its members. In many cases, these women are essentially sex
slaves. Amnesty International estimated in 2015 that the group had abducted
más que 2,000 women, and it is likely that this ªgure has risen since then. En
interviews, women who voluntarily joined Boko Haram reported that they
were often attracted to the group because the brideprice, though smaller than
those accompanying “traditional” weddings, was paid directly to the women,
not to their fathers. At least in the beginning, sin embargo, a token brideprice was
left for the fathers of kidnapped girls: one man recounted how Boko Haram
kidnapped girls in his community, “tossing 5,000 naira [acerca de $25] on the ºoor as a brideprice.” Another offered the following account: Bawagana, a shy 15-year-old living in Sanda Kyarimi camp, one of the ofªcial Internally Displaced People sites, said that a Boko Haram ªghter had come to her home in Dikwa, 90 kilometres east of Maiduguri, and asked, “Do you love me?” Of course I answered, "No!" ella dijo, with her eyes ªxed on the ground. The boy got very angry and said, “If you do not come with me, I will kill your father, but if you come with me I will let him live.” I followed to save my father. The boy left 10,000 naira (acerca de $50) sobre el
ºoor. It was a bride price in Boko Haram’s eyes.75
71. The description of the sect’s evolution is drawn from author ªeldwork and from Andrew
Caminante, “Eat the Heart of the Inªdel”: The Harrowing of Nigeria and the Rise of Boko Haram (Londres:
Hurst, 2016)
72. Nigerian Social Violence Project dataset.
73. Jason Warner and Hilary Matfess, “Trends and Demography in Boko Haram’s Suicide Bomb-
ings,” Harvard University and Center for Democracy and Development, Abuja, Nigeria, 2017.
74. Michael Olukayode and Yinka Ibukun, “Boko Haram Caused $9 Billion Damage in Nigeria’s North,"Bloomberg, Marzo 6, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-06/boko- haram-caused-9-billion-damage-in-nigeria-s-north-un-says. 75. Hilary Matfess, “Boko Haram Is Enslaving Women, Making Them Join the War,” Newsweek, l D o w n o a d e desde h t t p : / / directo . mi t . e d u / i s e c / a r t i c e – pdlf / / / / 4 2 1 7 2 0 7 9 7 4 2 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 2 8 9 pd . f por invitado 0 8 septiembre 2 0 2 3 Seguridad Internacional 42:1 28 Those familiar with Boko Haram’s practices state that women are given to ªghters to reward them for their service and to cultivate loyalty. A ªfteen-year- old who worked as a driver for Boko Haram before defecting to the Civilian Joint Task Force (a vigilante group that assists the government’s forces against Boko Haram) reported that “wives are ‘earned,’ they are a reward for those who stay six months.” Once you have proven your commitment to the group, “if you see someone who you like, you can pick the wife you want.”76 The women are often groomed before becoming wives, a process that can involve days of “Quranic education,” in which they are subjected to lectures on Boko Haram’s ideology. Women who were married before being abducted are told to forget their “inªdel” husbands and accept a Boko Haram husband. Alabama- though the media often describe the abductions of women and girls who later become wives of insurgents as cases of purely sexual and physical violence, re- ports suggest that the process of marrying an insurgent is always formalized for purposes of legitimation. The ªfteen-year-old driver-turned-vigilante re- ported that marriages are often accompanied by a large ceremony; the young man observed that a Boko Haram wedding is “like a regular marriage.”77 Since its founding as a dissident sect through its transformation into one of the most lethal insurgencies in sub-Saharan Africa, Boko Haram has recog- nized the importance of marriage to young men, and has capitalized on male grievances related to brideprice inºation. By providing members access to wives, and thus a sense of self as “real men,” Boko Haram has gained a follow- ing of 3,000–5,000 young men, with shockingly few reports of defection. “These men can take a wife at no extra charge,” explained Kaka, a young woman orphaned, capturado, and raped by Boko Haram members. “Usually it is very expensive to take a wife, very hard to get married, but not now.”78 In sum, the intergenerational nature of the brideprice tax in Nigeria’s Lake Chad Basin, coupled with other grievances common to the region’s young men, has galvanized some of these men to obtain wives (and social standing) in ways that have destabilized the state and augmented the power of anti-state groups. The most visible of these groups is Boko Haram. Without taking into account the effect of brideprice, one cannot fully understand why Boko Haram emerged, why it persists, and how it could be successfully challenged. Febrero 8, 2016, http://www.newsweek.com/2016/02/19/nigeria-boko-haram-buhari-chibok- girls-424091.html. 76. Hilary Matfess, ªeldwork, North East Region, Nigeria, 2015-dieciséis. 77. Ibídem. 78. Matfess, “Boko Haram Is Enslaving Women, Making Them Join the War.” l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / directo . mi t . e d u / i s e c / a r t i c e – pdlf / / / / 4 2 1 7 2 0 7 9 7 4 2 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 2 8 9 pd . f por invitado 0 8 septiembre 2 0 2 3 In Plain Sight 29 brideprice, cattle raiding, and civil war in south sudan South Sudan is another state where brideprice inºation has had destabilizing effects by incentivizing violence. It is the world’s newest state, its population having voted overwhelmingly to declare independence from Sudan in a 2011 referendum after decades of violence and instability. Even before the ref- erendum, the dynamics of marriage markets in the region had contributed to insecurity in areas now a part of South Sudan by incentivizing young men’s participation in armed groups. One such group, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)—a key participant in the 1983–2005 Second Sudanese Civil War—acknowledged the importance of marriage to its members. Alabama- though the SPLA’s recruitment efforts might not have been explicitly predi- cated on access to women, en la práctica, members were rewarded with wives. As Clemence Pinaud observed, “Although John Garang,” the leader of the SPLA, “had just one wife (rebeca), he was an exception; most SPLA commanders had multiple wives. They were reputed to marry numerous women—as many as 51 in some cases—especially in the countryside, where levels of scrutiny were lower than in the towns.”79 Commanders were not the only ones to use their “war wealth” to increase their number of wives. The SPLA hierarchy al- lowed subordinates to marry multiple wives, leading one awestruck inter- viewee to observe that SPLA soldiers “married from each location! They had so many wives!”80 Since the 2011 referendum, the violence plaguing the young country has taken a number of forms. In addition to ongoing border disputes between Sudan and South Sudan, the country has been wracked by a civil war since December 2013, aggravated by continuing inter-ethnic violence from the age- old practice of cattle raiding and resulting vengeance feuds. Having roots in the distribution of power under the country’s constitution, as the result of ma- nipulation by President Salva Kiir and Vice President–cum-rebel leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement In Opposition Riek Machar, the civil war consuming the country pits the Dinka and the Nuer against each other, and has led to a regional humanitarian crisis. Ethnic differences, coupled with governmental dysfunction, created an opening for nonstate security groups; for decades, the region has witnessed the proliferation of militias. As James Copnall has observed, “Ethnic militias and community ‘defense forces’ are not new in what is now South Sudan. 79. Clemence Pinaud, “South Sudan: Civil War, Predation, and the Making of a Military Aristoc- racy,” African Affairs, Abril 2014, pag. 203, doi:10.1093/afraf/adu019. 80. Ibídem, pag. 203. l D o w n o a d e desde h t t p : / / directo . mi t . e d u / i s e c / a r t i c e – pdlf / / / / 4 2 1 7 2 0 7 9 7 4 2 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 2 8 9 pd . f por invitado 0 8 septiembre 2 0 2 3 Seguridad Internacional 42:1 30 They are a consequence of an ethnically divided society, with a long and desta- bilising history of conºict, and Khartoum’s divide and rule tactics. It was hoped that separation from Sudan would, con el tiempo, create the conditions in which ethnic militias would not ºourish. In the three years since independ- ence, the opposite has happened.”81 The war’s politicization of ethnicity, as well as the massive inºux of small arms into the region, has devastated South Sudan. Desde 2013, an estimated 50,000 people have been killed and 1.6 million displaced by the various partici- pants in war. According to the Armed Conºict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), which is dedicated to tracking political violence in developing countries, much of the violence is driven by rebel targeting of civilians; this “communal violence” is thought to be linked to “post-war tensions over ad- ministrative and traditional leadership, resource distribution, and access to services and opportunities (p.ej. education, employment).” ACLED also identi- ªes “pressures on service systems and land and other resources, [cual] en- creased with the return of displaced populations after 2005,” as having driven violence.82 Frequently overlooked, sin embargo, is the role that rising brideprice has played in encouraging cattle raiding and the spiraling intercommunal vio- lence stemming from it. Throughout the region’s history, the Dinka and the Nuer have raided each other’s cattle herds, often stealing cattle in the night, without the conºict ex- panding much beyond localized violence. According to the Environment, Conºict, and Cooperation (ECC) Platform, a clearinghouse for information on the intersection of environmental, económico, and social stability, “Cattle raids and conºicts over pastures and wells between the Dinka and Nuer, South Sudan’s two largest ethnic groups, have a long history, a pesar de, at times, rela- tions between both communities have been marked by intermarriage and co- operation.”83 In the context of South Sudan’s post-independence civil war, sin embargo, cattle raiding has become even more deadly, driven not only by the militarization of the region but also by skyrocketing brideprice and ensuing economic desperation. Where once a bride would cost twelve cows, marrying an educated woman in South Sudan after the referendum would require ªfty 81. James Copnall, “Ethnic Militias and the Shrinking State: South Sudan’s Dangerous Path,” Afri- can Arguments, Agosto 21, 2014, http://africanarguments.org/2014/08/21/ethnic-militias-and- the-shrinking-state-south-sudans-dangerous-path-by-james-copnall/. 82. Armed Conºict & Event Location Data Project, “Country Report: Sudan and South Sudan” (sussex, REINO UNIDO.: University of Sussex, 2015), pag. 7, http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/ 2015/01/ACLED-Country-Report_Sudan-and-South-Sudan.pdf. 83. “Conºict between Dinka and Nuer in South Sudan” (Berlina: ECC Platform Library, 2014), https://library.ecc-platform.org/conºicts/natural-ressource-conºict-south-sudan-dinka-vs-nuer. l D o w n o a d e desde h t t p : / / directo . mi t . e d u / i s e c / a r t i c e – pdlf / / / / 4 2 1 7 2 0 7 9 7 4 2 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 2 8 9 pd . f por invitado 0 8 septiembre 2 0 2 3 In Plain Sight 31 cows, in addition to 60 goats and 30,000 Sudanese pounds (en 2011, the equiva- lent of $12,000 in cash).84
Cattle, masculinity, and livelihoods have been inexorably connected in the
region’s history; the civil war is now being woven into this political and eco-
nomic tapestry According to Hannah Wright, “Owning a gun and participat-
ing in a cattle raid are rites of passage for adolescent boys, and for men these
are symbols of manhood and virility which confer social status.”85 Those who
successfully carry out cattle raids are doubly rewarded: ªrst, stealing cattle
gives them the ability to afford a now-exorbitant brideprice. Además,
those who steal another tribe’s cattle enjoy the social standing conferred
through livestock ownership, including being honored in public ceremonies in
which women praise them in song.
Although brideprice is sometimes paid in cash or through a mixture of live-
stock, the use of cattle as the primary measurement of brideprice remains
widespread. One pastoralist in South Sudan states simply, “You cannot marry
without cows, and you cannot be called a man without cows.”86 According
to the ECC Platform, “Traditionally, cattle raids are a livelihood sustaining
práctica, which allows restocking herds after droughts” and also serves an im-
portant social function, “as it provides the means for young men to get mar-
ried.”87 And as in Nigeria, polygamy is practiced across South Sudan, y
social status is linked to the number of wives a man has. En efecto, as a male
elder explained, “One of the reasons for polygamy is that when you have ten
daughters, each one will give you thirty cows, and they are all for [the father].
So then you have three hundred cows. That is why one marries very many
wives: so that you can have very many daughters. If you have a wife who can
only give you one child, then you must get another wife.”88 Thus, in South
Sudan there has been an upward pressure on brideprice that, coupled with
economic stagnation and the prevalence of polygyny, has incentivized partici-
pation in intercommunal violence.
According to a report by Marc Sommers and Stephanie Schwartz, “Male and
female youth must marry to be recognized as adults; sin embargo, male youth are
84. Matt Richmond and Flavia Krause-Jackson, “Cows-for-Bride Inºation Spurs Cattle Theft in
South Sudan,"Bloomberg, Julio 26, 2011, www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-26/cows-for-bride-
inºation-spurs-cattle-theft-among-mundari-in-south-sudan.html.
85. Hannah Wright, Masculinities, Conºict, and Peacebuilding: Perspectives on Men through a Gender
Lens (Londres: Saferworld, 2014), pag. 7, www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/862-
masculinities-conºict-and-peacebuilding-perspectives-on-men-through-a-gender-lens.
86. Marc Sommers and Stephanie Schwartz, “Dowry and Division: Youth and State Building in
South Sudan” (Washington, CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: United States Institute of Peace, 2011), pag. 4, https://www.usip
.org/publications/2011/11/dowry-and-division-youth-and-state-building-south-sudan.
87. “Conºict between Dinka and Nuer in South Sudan.”
88. Sommers and Schwatrz, “Dowry and Division," pag. 5.
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Seguridad Internacional 42:1 32
under severe pressure to meet escalating dowry [brideprice] costs.”89 An un-
published report by the United Nations Development Project found that
brideprice rose by 44 percent in the ªve years after the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement was signed in 2005. Brideprice inºation occurred even though eco-
nomic opportunities in the country had stagnated and, in some places, estafa-
tracted; not only was employment increasingly difªcult to obtain, but cattle
were also becoming scarcer. Interviews conducted by the UN Development
Project revealed that “a single traditional marriage would cost a family up
a 100 heads of cattle—a very high amount for a typical family.”90 In Bahr
al Ghazal, a region in northwestern South Sudan, a man needs 200–300 head of
cattle to pay for a wife. For young men, the acquisition of of so many cattle
through legitimate means is nearly impossible—extended families can provide
only so much support, and legitimate economic opportunities are scarce.
Cattle raiding is often the only way that young men can afford to pay for a
esposa. A 2012 report by the Institute for Security Studies, a think tank focused
on security in Africa, concluded that “with the current market rates of $300 per head, the cost usually ranges between $10,000 y $60,000. Taken from these ªgures, one would therefore conclude that South Sudanese marriages . . . are no doubt some of the most expensive marriages in the world.”91 A young man trying to pay the brideprice for his future wife expressed the frustration of many in South Sudan: “It took me to work three years basically, to be able to afford the 100 cows. I’ve tried everything I could because I really want to marry my wife.”92 Participation in cattle raiding and militias is both a means of economic ad- vancement that enables marriage and a valuable social outlet for men denied the rite of passage that marriage provides. As Hannah Wright notes, not only is participation in militias/military activities one of the few economic opportu- nities available in the region, but “recruitment into the SPLA or non-state armed groups is closely linked with masculinity, and can provide a sense 89. Ibídem, pag. 4. En este caso, “dowry” is being incorrectly used by the authors as a term for dower or brideprice. 90. South Sudan Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control, South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission, United Nations Development Programme, “Community Consul- tation Report, Lakes State, South Sudan” (Juba: United Nations Development Programme, 2012), http://www.ss.undp.org/content/dam/southsudan/library/Documents/CSAC%20Reports/ UNDP-SS-Lakes-consult-12.pdf. 91. Ding Yual, “The Complex Causes of Cattle Raiding in South Sudan” (Pretoria: Institute for Se- curity Studies Africa, 2012), https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-complex-causes-of-cattle-raiding- in-south-sudan. 92. Rising brideprices also fuel corruption, as families of government ofªcials turn to government coffers for the needed funds for their sons to marry. See “Negotiating for a Wife: The Australian Men Paying Dowries So They Can Marry,” Special Broadcasting Service, Septiembre 22, 2015, http:// www.sbs.com.au/news/thefeed/story/negotiating-wife-australian-men-paying-dowries-so- they-can-marry. l D o w n o a d e desde h t t p : / / directo . mi t . e d u / i s e c / a r t i c e – pdlf / / / / 4 2 1 7 2 0 7 9 7 4 2 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 2 8 9 pd . f por invitado 0 8 septiembre 2 0 2 3 In Plain Sight 33 of identity and self-worth which would otherwise be difªcult to ªnd.”93 That identity is dependent on the group’s ability to facilitate the accumulation of brideprice assets. Frank Langªtt similarly observed that young men “used to steal cattle with spears, but now they use AK-47s left over from the war. The result is carnage.”94 Cattle-stealing raids often produce revenge attacks, and given the clan structure of South Sudan, the violence can quickly escalate. It was estimated that in 2009—before the acceleration in violent conºict—more than 2,500 people died in tribal violence in the region, often as the result of cattle raids and retributive attacks.95 According to Sommers and Schwartz, in addition to joining militias and cat- tle raids, some young men “seek wives from different ethnic groups or coun- tries” where brideprice may be lower or no longer practiced.96 Other young men have attempted to avoid the trap of brideprice inºation by eloping. Alabama- though a risky proposition, it is not unheard of; communities in South Sudan, sin embargo, have developed systems to disincentivize the practice. The UN mis- sion in South Sudan reported that “if marriage begins with elopement or preg- nancy, considered illegal and embarrassing among the Dinka, other steps are followed to legalize the union.”97 Such inauspicious courting practices are re- ferred to as “coming through a window” and are punished through the levy- ing of ªnes payable in cattle, essentially increasing the brideprice.98 If a young man is caught eloping with a woman, custom requires that “[el] boy’s family to pay an expectant heifer (akolchok) each to the girl’s father and mother and bulls (adhiamhotkou) to young men helping the father search for a daughter who had eloped. . . . If a boy had eloped with the girl but denied impregnating her, he was ªned ªve cows. . . . But when he accepts responsibility for the preg- nancy and his father is hesitant to pay the bride price, traditional law requests that he make available 30 heads of cattle . . . (para) the family of the girl and his son receives the girl as his wife.”99 After this, “the normal procedure [incluir- ing the payment of cattle as brideprice] is conducted.”100 The consequences of elopement are not always so civil, and many families 93. Wright, Masculinities, Conºict, and Peacebuilding, pag. 7. 94. Frank Langªtt, “Cattle Rustling a Deadly Business in Sudan,” NPR, Abril 17, 2011, www.npr.org/2011/04/17/135486358/cattle-rustling-a-deadly-business-in-sudan. 95. Skye Wheeler, “Tribesmen Kill 139 in South Sudan Raid: Ofªcial,” Reuters, Enero 7, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-south-tribal-idUSTRE6061NC20100107. 96. Ibídem, pag. 1. 97. Felix Waya Leju, Marriage and Cattle (Juba: United Nations Mission in Sudan Public Informa- tion Ofªce, 2010), pag. 5, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q(cid:2)cache:5IOLPfd8XMsJ: docplayer.net/29814883-United-nations-mission-in-sudan-january-marriage-and-cattle- published-by-unmis-public-information-ofªce.html(cid:3)&cd(cid:2)6&hl(cid:2)en&ct(cid:2)clnk&gl(cid:2)ng. 98. Ibídem, pag. 5. 99. Ibídem. 100. Ibídem. l D o w n o a d e desde h t t p : / / directo . mi t . e d u / i s e c / a r t i c e – pdlf / / / / 4 2 1 7 2 0 7 9 7 4 2 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 2 8 9 pd . f por invitado 0 8 septiembre 2 0 2 3 Seguridad Internacional 42:1 34 resort to vigilante justice. Sommers and Schwartz describe extrajudicial kill- ings as a frequent response to this social trespass. And according to one gov- ernment ofªcial, “If the girl is found with a boyfriend, her family can kill her. If she is impregnated by a boyfriend, she can be beaten to death.”101 Another man stated, “If you elope and you’re caught, [the male youth] will be killed.” Sommers and Schwartz concluded that “stories of male youth who attempted to elope and were captured by the family of their new brides were common- place and gruesome.”102 In South Sudan, brideprice inºation and the wide availability of small arms have resulted in increasingly violent cattle raids and facilitated the prolifera- tion of militias. Juntos, these forces have fueled an intercommunal conºict that has destabilized the young country. A comprehensive security analysis would of necessity acknowledge the signiªcant role that brideprice has played in fostering instability in South Sudan since independence. Policymakers in South Sudan and its international partners must ªnd a way to circumvent the instability resulting from brideprice inºation if the country is to break the cycle of violence. stabilization efforts in saudi arabia’s marriage market There is at least one state that takes brideprice inºation as a serious policy issue: Saudi Arabia. And arguably, the Saudi regime has seen some measure of success from its efforts in addressing this concern. Despite the intersection of regime characteristics and population indicators that would suggest Saudi Arabia is ripe for violent rebellion, the country has been remarkably stable. Saudi Arabia’s stability is rightly puzzling, given the thesis of this article. Alabama- though there are a number of important differences between Saudi Arabia, Por un lado, and Nigeria and South Sudan, en el otro, all three countries have strong brideprice traditions. Además, as in the Nigeria and South Sudan case studies, concepts of masculinity and social standing in Saudi Arabia are deeply connected to a man’s ability to take a wife. Polygyny is also a feature of the marriage market in Saudi Arabia, which could be expected to have the same sorts of effects on the distribution of potential wives as in Nigeria and South Sudan—and thus to pose the same threat to intergenera- tional relations. Similarmente, all of these countries have experienced the inºation- ary pressures in brideprice that threaten obstruction of marriage markets. There is, sin embargo, at least one critical difference between Saudi Arabia and Nigeria and South Sudan: the Saudi regime’s activism on the issue of 101. Sommers and Schwatrz, “Dowry and Division," pag. 5. 102. Ibídem. l D o w n o a d e desde h t t p : / / directo . mi t . e d u / i s e c / a r t i c e – pdlf / / / / 4 2 1 7 2 0 7 9 7 4 2 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 2 8 9 pd . f por invitado 0 8 septiembre 2 0 2 3 In Plain Sight 35 brideprice inºation and its recognition of the threat to national stability from marriage market obstruction. Unlike the Nigerian and South Sudanese gov- ernments which have largely refrained from intervening in the marriage mar- ket to dampen brideprice inºation—whether because of a lack of interest or a lack of capacity—Saudi Arabia, through both the government and civil-society groups, has undertaken vigorous efforts to cap brideprice and reduce the cost of weddings. Although marriage and marriage markets are infrequently dis- cussed in purely economic terms by governments, it is clear from the Saudi Arabian case that, just as in other economic markets (p.ej., housing and credit), targeted governmental intervention is possible and helpful.103 In the early 2000s, brideprice in Saudi Arabia was on the rise. One anecdotal account reported that the average price for a virgin bride was 70,000 SAR (más que $18,500). Por 2015, there were reports of brideprice payments “as
high as SR100,000.”104 Following consultations with religious leaders, the gov-
ernment released a decree asking for local cooperation with enforcement of a
ceiling for brideprice. Ostensibly the government framed its legislative cap on
brideprice—limiting the payment for a virgin bride to 50,000 SAR and a previ-
ously married woman to 30,000 SAR—as a means of combating the rise in un-
married women. The government claimed that “the number of spinsters in
Saudi Arabia [had] surged from around 1.5 million at the end of 2010 to more
than four million” in 2015.105
The government’s actions following the decree generally met with approval,
at least in the media coverage. One young man named Fahd, interviewed by
Arab News, asserted that the cap “shows the authorities are concerned about a
situation where marriage expenses are too high.”106 Others suggested that the
cap did not do enough; Wafa, a housewife quoted in the Saudi Gazette, com-
plained that 50,000 SAR was still too heavy of a burden for many men, assert-
ing “middle-income men ªnd it difªcult to afford all these expenses.”107 In
103. Although both Nigeria and Saudi Arabia subsidize fuel, and South Sudan has subsidized
food in the past, only Saudi Arabia has intervened to control the rising costs of this other critical
household expenditure.
104. Carol Fleming, “What Is a Typical Dowry in the Kingdom?” American Bedu, Junio 23,
2008, https://delhi4cats.wordpress.com/2008/06/23/what-is-a-typical-dowry-in-the-kingdom/.
“Dowry” is the wrong term here; “dower” or “brideprice” would be more accurate.
105. Mugdha Variyar, “Saudi Arabia Sets Dowry Limit for Virgin Brides to Combat Rise in Spin-
sters,” International Business Times, Agosto 19, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.co.in/saudi-arabia-sets-
dowry-limit-virgin-brides-combat-rise-spinsters-643419. De nuevo, “dowry” is the wrong term here;
“dower” or “brideprice” would be more accurate.
106. Raid Qustia, “The High Cost of Tying the Knot,” Arab News, Agosto 3, 2003, www
.arabnews.com/node/235181.
107. “Lightening the Dowry Burden,” Saudi Gazette, Octubre 15, 2015. De nuevo, “dowry” is the
wrong term here; “dower” or “brideprice” would be more accurate.
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Seguridad Internacional 42:1 36
addition to the ban, there are also loans and grants available to young men
from local charities to help cover the cost of marriage and brideprice.108
Saudi Arabia’s government and civil society have also sought to move away
from holding large, elaborate weddings, combatting some of the social norms
that inºate brideprice by, Por ejemplo, holding mass marriages. The Charity
Society for Simplifying Marriage and Family Care of Ahsa alone has organized
thirteen mass marriages for nearly 2,000 young men and women. The chair-
man of the group, Nasser Al-Nuaem, argues that “mass marriages promote the
values of cooperation and social solidarity between different social categories
in the Kingdom.” At some of these mass weddings, charities reward low
brideprices with cash prizes. In Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, the couples
with the lowest brideprice exchange were given 15,000 SAR (cerca de $4,000) “to help newlyweds start their families.”109 To further ameliorate the destabilizing effects of brideprice, the government has begun to promote the concept that brideprice must be proportional to the man’s economic situation, thus dampening somewhat the regressive nature of brideprice. En 2015, Morgan Windsor reported that “the average dowry for middle-class families in Saudi Arabia is SR30,000 or $8,000, but it can be hun-
dreds of thousands of riyals for the wealthy.”110 Although this sum still consti-
tutes a signiªcant burden, a sliding scale of brideprice would reduce the
concentration of wives in the hands of the few and the obstruction of marriage
markets by opening up the possibility of marriage to a wider range of social
classes. Además, heavy government subsidization of health care has
brought about an enviably low rate of maternal mortality in the kingdom, re-
ducing the typically high mortality rates of married women of childbearing
age seen in other strongly patrilineal cultures.
Some analysts would suggest that the relatively high number of Saudi
Arabians joining terrorist organizations undermines the thesis of this article. Él
was estimated in 2016 that more than 2,500 Saudis were ªghting for the Islamic
State.111 Although the Saudi government has taken steps to address bride-
108. One interviewee, insistent on anonymity, asserted to Hudson that it was well known that the
Saudi military pays the brideprices for its recruits so that there will be no brideprice-related dis-
content in the ranks. We have not been able to independently verify that claim, but offer it as an in-
triguing assertion worth investigating.
109. Morgan Windsor, “Saudi Brides Demanding Lowest Dowry Are Rewarded with Cash
Prize at Mass Wedding,” International Business Times, Junio 3, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/
saudi-brides-demanding-lowest-dowry-are-rewarded-cash-prize-mass-wedding-1951522. De nuevo,
“dowry” is the wrong term here; “dower” or “brideprice” would be more accurate.
110. Ibídem.
111. Ashley Kirk, “Iraq and Syria: How Many Foreign Fighters Are Fighting for ISIL?” Tele-
graph, Marzo 24, 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/29/iraq-and-syria-how-many–
foreign-ªghters-are-ªghting-for-isil/.
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In Plain Sight 37
price’s destabilizing effects, the capped level is still relatively burdensome
even for middle-class families. Brideprice is certainly not the only reason
a young Saudi man would join an insurgent group, but in the absence of
the government’s efforts to cap brideprice, the ªgure cited above could be
much higher.
Conclusión
The brideprice system associated with patrilineality is an important underly-
ing cause of chronic instability within some societies. Like other marketized
commodities, brideprice is subject to destabilizing inºation, obstructing mar-
riage markets by pricing marriage out of the reach of many young men. Este
tendency toward marriage market obstruction is aggravated by polygyny,
an early age of marriage for girls, and the high post-marriage female mortal-
ity rates that
typically accompany brideprice systems. These structural
problems incentivize violence to obtain brideprice resources, as we have dem-
onstrated in the case of South Sudan, and offer insurgent groups a ready-made
recruitment tool, as we have shown in the case of Boko Haram in north-
ern Nigeria.
Brideprice functions as a profoundly regressive tax, disproportionately
affecting poorer and higher birth-order young men and creating a large, ag-
grieved base from which violent groups can more easily recruit. The demands
of brideprice in places where the economy is stagnating or jobs are scarce leave
young men with few options. Without an income, they cannot get a wife; con-
out a wife, they cannot be regarded as so-called real men in their patrilineal so-
ciety. For many young men, the only means to accumulate the assets needed to
marry may be looting, raiding, or joining a rebel or terrorist group.
This analysis offers two important takeaways. Primero, no comprehensive secu-
rity analysis of many of today’s conºicts can be complete without an examina-
tion of how the structuration of male/female relations affects those conºicts.
How those relations are structured has cascading effects on macro-level state
phenomena, as the case of brideprice demonstrates. Marriage market obstruc-
ción, fueled by brideprice and polygyny, can destabilize nations by incentiv-
izing violence and facilitating recruitment into insurgent groups. As former
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has asserted, “The subjugation of women is
a threat to the common security of our world and to the national security of
our country.”112
112. Hillary Clinton, “Remarks at the TEDWomen Conference,” Washington, CORRIENTE CONTINUA., December 8,
2010.
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Seguridad Internacional 42:1 38
Scholars in the ªeld of security studies and analysts in the state security sec-
tor must begin to gather the type of information necessary to include these im-
portant factors in their analysis, and consider the linkages between the
security concepts conventionally employed and the structuration of male/
female relations. Given the role of brideprice inºation in facilitating grievance,
violent conºict, raiding, and even insurrection, monitoring ºuctuations in
marriage markets is a critical task for the security analyst—and yet such moni-
toring is not taking place. That must change. Part of this neglect no doubt
stems from conventions in security analysis circles, which assign what are too
often considered “soft” social issues a lower priority. Marriage, with all of its
associations with women and family, perhaps seems to those in these circles
to be a far cry from the logic of conºict. Concerned with the movements and
weapons of violent nonstate actors, national security scholars and analysts in
the United States and around the globe may thus unintentionally overlook the
social forces that prompt so many young men to take up arms.
Similar to the development of early warning systems for mass atrocities, en-
dicators related to marriage market dynamics should be conceptualized and
monitored by those seeking early warning of destabilization. En particular,
marking the rise in brideprice should be as much a part of predicting instabil-
ity as increases in the cost of bread and fuel. Brideprice trajectory should be a
metric adopted alongside other indicators of social stability to improve the in-
ternational scholarly and analytic community’s ability to predict and respond
to violent social unrest. Cultivating partnerships with community leaders and
social institutions to convey this information is crucial—not only for integrat-
ing marriage market dynamics into stability and risk assessments, but also as a
way of improving human intelligence capabilities generally. Tracking changes
in brideprice and marriage market obstruction requires little formal training or
capital humano, and can help cultivate relationships between the central gov-
ernment and subnational formal and informal governing structures (incluido
state governments, traditional leaders, and members of civil society) a través de
regular interaction.
Lack of data stymies analytic progress, and overcoming that obstacle
must be the ªrst priority. Por ejemplo, we did not include the Islamic State and
al-Qaida in our case studies given the lack of sufªcient information to create
full case studies. We challenge scholars who research these groups to begin to
collect the information that would tease out whether marriage market obstruc-
tion through customs such as brideprice is a factor in recruitment and re-
tention. While information on brideprice trends is critical, there is ancillary
information that would also be helpful. Por ejemplo, what is the birth order of
foreign jihadis ªghting for these groups? Are they ªrst- or second-born sons
for whom their family has a better chance of raising brideprice, or are they
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In Plain Sight 39
tercero, fourth, or ªfth sons for whom there is no chance of familial provision of
brideprice? One looks in vain at databases on known terrorists for any such in-
formación, and so these important research questions cannot be answered.
Además, the conºuence between the destabilizing effects of the global
youth bulge and those of brideprice is another phenomenon hiding in plain
sight because the conceptual lenses to make the connection have been missing:
eso es, the subjugation of women is not only effected through practices of
brideprice and polygyny, but also engenders unsustainably high fertility rates.
Por ejemplo, the countries and regions anticipated to be most affected by the
youth bulge are among the least capable of providing social services and eco-
nomic opportunities for young men in need of resources to pay brideprice. El
limited resources that these states can muster (and the foreign aid that they re-
ceive) must be used as effectively as possible.
The second major takeaway of our analysis is that even though marriage is a
deeply socialized practice, governments are not powerless; they can act to mit-
igate the heightened risk of destabilization caused by brideprice inºation, como
the Saudi case makes plain. Given the linkages among brideprice inºation,
grievance, and violent conºict, governments can, Por ejemplo, place caps on
brideprices or subsidize marriage costs to avoid marriage market obstruction.
Initiatives to end child marriage and make it harder to contract polygynous
marriages take on even greater signiªcance once their relevance for national
stability and security are recognized. This sort of regulation represents a
market intervention that not only protects the rights of girls and women, pero
inhibits the market’s tendency toward concentration and inequality.
Civil society groups also play an important role in curbing harmful bride-
price practices. In Uganda, a ªfteen-year campaign to end harmful brideprice
practices marked a victory when in 2015, the high court ruled that the prac-
tice of refunding brideprice in order for a woman to get a divorce was uncon-
stitutional. The campaign continues with the hope that brideprice, which has
hurt the status of women and made “marriage a competition that many young
people cannot afford to enter,” will be banned entirely one day.113 In rural
Afganistán, efforts to lower brideprice (dower) have been effective; a group
of young teachers in Dawlatywar observed the deleterious impact of the high
cost of marriage and put pressure on community leaders to informally cap
el costo, leading to a 40 percent reduction in brideprice.114 Related efforts to
dampen polygyny are also useful, given its role in brideprice inºation. Nota-
113. Eliza Anyan, “Imagine Having to Pay to Divorce Your Abuser,” CNN, Agosto 19, 2015, http://
edition.cnn.com/2015/08/19/africa/bride-price-uganda-mifumi-atuki-turner/.
114. Ali M. Latiª, “Giving Women in Rural Afghanistan a Seat at the Table,” Muftah, Septiembre 7,
2015, muftah.org/rural-afghanistan-women-table.
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Seguridad Internacional 42:1 40
bly, the emir of Kano—a province in Northern Nigeria that has been the target
of attacks by Boko Haram—is trying to ban polygyny. His rationale? “Those of
us in the north have all seen the economic consequences of men who are not
capable of maintaining one wife, marrying four. They end up producing
20 niños, not educating them, leaving them on the streets, and they end up
as thugs and terrorists.”115 In addition to this type of direct policy initiative
against brideprice and polygyny, efforts to reconceptualize gender norms to
attempt to culturally disconnect manhood from violence in the context of frus-
tration are also valuable.116
All these initiatives are worth resourcing from national security funding.
Not only will affected nations beneªt from this expenditure, but also third-
party governments concerned with international and regional ºashpoints. Ef-
forts to cap brideprice, raise the marriage age of girls, and curb polygyny are
hard security matters in many shatter belts where spillover threats easily
destabilize entire regions and where military intervention by great powers
may one day be contemplated. The time has come to recognize what has been
hiding in plain sight.
115. “Why Does a Nigerian Muslim Leader Want to Ban Polygamy?” BBC News, Febrero 22,
2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39038459.
116. Ver, Por ejemplo, Julie Pulerwitz et al., “Changing Gender Norms and Reducing Intimate
Partner Violence: A Quasi-Experimental Intervention Study with Young Men in Ethiopia,” Ameri-
can Journal of Public Health, volumen. 105, No. 1 (Enero 2015), páginas. 132–137.
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