El debate sobre la proliferación de drones
Separating Fact from
Fiction in the Debate
over Drone
Proliferation
miguel c.. Horowitz,
Sarah E. Kreps, y
Matthew Fuhrmann
In the last decade and
a half, the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), “drones,” has become
commonplace.1 In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
the United States launched its ªrst armed drone strike in Afghanistan in
that year. The strike missed its intended target—Mullah
November of
Akhund, the Taliban’s number three in command—but killed several others. A
year later, the United States used an armed drone to strike suspected al-Qaida
members in Yemen, including Qa’id Salim Sinan al Harithi, who was thought
to have plotted the attack against the USS Cole in 2000, which had killed seven-
teen U.S. sailors. Since then, A NOSOTROS. drone strikes have grown in both geographic
scope and number, extending to Pakistan in 2004 and Somalia in 2007, and in-
creasing from about 50 total counterterrorism strikes from 2001 a 2008 a
acerca de 450 de 2009 a 2014.2 A NOSOTROS. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta once
understandably referred to drones as “the only game in town” in terms of
stopping al-Qaida.3
Although the United States has been the most proliªc user of combat
drones, several other countries have employed them as well, including Iraq,
Israel, Nigeria, Pakistán, and the United Kingdom. Almost a dozen states, en-
cluding China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, reportedly now possess armed drones,
and many others—including India—are racing to acquire them. The spread of
armed drones has ignited considerable debate among scholars and policy-
miguel c.. Horowitz is Associate Professor of Political Science and Associate Director of Perry World
House at the University of Pennsylvania. Sarah E. Kreps is Associate Professor of Government at Cornell
Universidad. Matthew Fuhrmann is Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University and
Visiting Associate Professor at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation.
The authors would like to thank Neil Chitrao, Debak Das, Nicholas Miras, Rachel Stohl, Amy
Zegart, and Micah Zenko, as well as the anonymous reviewers, for their helpful feedback.
1. For the purposes of this article, we refer to UAVs and drones interchangeably, leaving aside de-
bates over terminology.
2. Data from New America Foundation, http://securitydata.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan-
analysis.html. See also Stephanie Carvin, “The Trouble with Targeted Killing,” Estudios de Seguridad,
volumen. 21, No. 3 (2012), páginas. 529–555; and Julia Macdonald and Jacquelyn Schneider, “Presidential
Risk Orientation and Force Employment Decisions: The Case of Unmanned Weaponry," Diario de
Conºict Resolution, próximo.
3. Noah Shactman, “CIA Chief,
‘Drones “Only Game in Town” for Stopping Al Qaeda,’”
Wired, Puede 19, 2009, https://www.wired.com/2009/05/cia-chief-drones-only-game-in-town-for-
stopping-al-qaeda/.
Seguridad Internacional, volumen. 41, No. 2 (Caer 2016), páginas. 7–42, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00257
© 2016 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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Seguridad Internacional 41:2 8
makers about the consequences of armed and unarmed drone proliferation for
international and regional security.
One camp views drones as an important, even transformative, military tech-
nología. Many within this camp caution that drones lower the costs of using
force to the point of making war too easy and therefore more likely.4 Addi-
cionalmente, because drones have a variety of commercial applications and because
drone exports are increasing, those in this camp generally believe that
militarily-relevant drones will spread very quickly.5 Drone proliferation, allá-
delantero, is both inevitable and highly consequential for the international security
ambiente. A diferencia de, a second camp views drones as a nontransformative
technology that replicates capabilities that many modern militaries already
possess.6 In addition, analysts in this camp contend that the technological re-
quirements of sophisticated drones are beyond the reach of many countries.7
Como consecuencia, drone proliferation is relatively insigniªcant for regional and
international security.
This article assesses the consequences of current-generation drone prolif-
eration, concluding that both of the above perspectives are misguided. Exam-
ining the effects of UAVs in six different contexts—counterterrorism, interstate
conºict, crisis onset and deterrence, coercive diplomacy, domestic control and
repression, and use by nonstate actors for the purposes of terrorism—we show
eso, although current-generation drones will introduce some unique capabili-
ties into conºicts around the world, they are unlikely to produce the dire con-
sequences that some analysts fear. En particular, drone proliferation carries
4. Ver, Por ejemplo, Micah Zenko, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies” (Washington, CORRIENTE CONTINUA.:
Council on Foreign Relations, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/reforming-us-drone-
strike-policies/p29736; miguel j.. Boyle, “The Race for Drones,” Orbis, volumen. 59, No. 1 (2015),
páginas. 76–94, at p. 78; Pedro W.. Cantante, “Do Drones Undermine Democracy?” New York Times, Janu-
ary 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/opinion/sunday/do-drones-undermine-
democracy .html; and Adam N. Stulberg, “Managing the Unmanned Revolution in the U.S. Air
Fuerza,” Orbis, volumen. 51, No. 2 (Marzo 2007), páginas. 251–265.
5. Patrick Tucker, “Every Country Will Have Armed Drones within 10 Años,” Defense One, Puede 6,
2014, http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2014/05/every-country-will-have-armed-drones-
within-ten-years/83878/.
6. Ver, Por ejemplo, Charli Carpenter and Lina Shaikhouni, “Don’t Fear the Reaper: Four Miscon-
ceptions about How We Think about Drones,” Foreign Policy,
Junio 7, 2011, http://
foreignpolicy.com/2011/06/07/dont-fear-the-reaper/; Megan Braun, “Predator Effect: A Phenom-
enon Unique to the War on Terror,” in Peter L. Bergen and Daniel Rothenberg, editores., Drone Wars:
Transforming Conºict, Law, y política (Cambridge: Prensa de la Universidad de Cambridge, 2014), páginas. 253–284;
Mark Moyar, “Drones—An Evolution, Not a Revolution, in Warfare,” Strategika, Enero 2014,
páginas. 11–13; and Lynn E. Davis et al., “Armed and Dangerous? UAVs and U.S. Security” (Santa
Monica, California: Corporación RAND, 2014).
7. Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli, “The Diffusion of Drone Warfare? Industrial, Organizational, y
Infrastructural Constraints: Military Innovations and the Ecosystem Challenge,” Estudios de Seguridad,
próximo.
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El debate sobre la proliferación de drones 9
potentially signiªcant consequences for counterterrorism operations and do-
mestic control in authoritarian regimes. Drones lower the costs of using force
by eliminating the risk that pilots will be killed, making some states—
especially democracies, which may be especially casualty sensitive—more
likely to carry out targeted attacks against suspected militants. Además, a nosotros-
ing drones could provide autocratic leaders with a new tool to bolster their do-
mestic regime security.8
Todavía, en general, current-generation drones are likely to have a minimal im-
pact on interstate relations. Armed or advanced unarmed drones are unlikely
instability. Además,
to provoke international crises or incite regional
current-generation drones offer little utility for coercion against other govern-
mentos. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, además, drones might enhance
security in disputed border regions by providing states with a greater ability
to monitor contested regions persistently at lower cost. Monitoring can help to
reassure states that potential adversaries are not attempting to change the
status quo through force. The limited signiªcance of current-generation drones
in interstate contexts beyond monitoring stems from a key technological lim-
itation: drones currently in operation are vulnerable to air defense systems, entonces
they are much less likely to be effective when operating in hostile airspace.9
The stakes in the debate about drone proliferation are signiªcant. por ejemplo-
if drone proliferation is inherently dangerous, the United States
amplio,
should be leery of other states acquiring drones, especially armed drones. El
United States should therefore attempt to limit drone proliferation, incluido
through its own exports. Such a policy might reduce drone proliferation, pero
could have adverse consequences for the U.S. industrial base, while causing
Washington to miss opportunities to build capacity among allies. Alterna-
activamente, if current-generation drones are no different from, and less capable
than, other comparable conventional military technologies, the United States
should be less concerned with the effect of drone proliferation on the regional
and international security environment.
The article proceeds as follows. Primero, we contextualize the drone debate by
discussing ongoing trends in drone proliferation. Segundo, we describe in more
detail the core arguments made by the two camps concerning the military and
political effects of drones. Tercero, we lay out our main claim that the reality is
8. See Matthew Fuhrmann and Michal C. Horowitz, “Droning On: Explaining the Proliferation of
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” International Organization, próximo.
9. As described below, the monitoring advantages of drones are likely to come from operating in a
state’s own airspace or in contested regions where states do not generally use force, not from oper-
ating in an adversary’s airspace.
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Seguridad Internacional 41:2 10
more complicated than either of these two perspectives suggests. Fundamen-
tally, current-generation drone proliferation will likely have heterogeneous
consequences, being more inºuential in the context of counterterrorism and in-
trastate conºict than interstate conºict. En la cuarta sección, we argue that the
consequences of drone proliferation could change dramatically with techno-
logical advancements over time. We conclude by identifying some of the na-
tional security implications for the United States.
Trends in Drone Proliferation
Unmanned aircraft have a rich history in world politics.10 The 1849 Italian War
of Independence and the American Civil War, Por ejemplo, featured the use of
unmanned balloons. En la Primera Guerra Mundial, the United States tested the Kettering
Bug, a “self-ºying aerial torpedo” that, driven by wind, released its bomb onto
the target. The war ended, sin embargo, before the aircraft became operational.11
During World War II, the United Kingdom and the United States developed
target drones, and Germany commissioned a project to develop an unmanned
vehicle for combat, which resulted in the V-1. The V-1, sin embargo, was more of
an early cruise missile than a drone.12 The 1960 U-2 incident, en el cual
American pilot Francis Gary Powers was shot down over the Soviet Union,
catalyzed further work on drones to try to reduce the vulnerability of pilots.13
The United States used Firebee UAVs to conduct frequent surveillance mis-
sions during the Vietnam War, and Israel used drones in the 1982 Lebanon War
to locate targets that piloted aircraft later destroyed.14 The United States de-
ployed the unarmed Predator for surveillance in the 1990s Balkans war, pero
moved to arm the aircraft only after the September 11 attacks, when it de-
ployed Predators with Hellªre missiles in Afghanistan.15
10. Michael Hastings points to a history of remote surveillance dating to the U.S. Civil War. Ver
Hastings, “The Rise of the Killer Drones: How America Goes to War in Secret,” Rolling Stone, Abril
16, 2012, http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-rise-of-the-killer-drones-how-america-
goes-to-war-in-secret-20120416.
11. Jimmy Stamp, “Unmanned Drones Have Been around since World War I,” Smithsonian.com,
Febrero 12, 2013, http://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/unmanned-drones-have-been-
around-since-world-war-i-16055939/?no-ist.
12. Sarah E. Kreps, Drones: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: prensa de la Universidad de Oxford, 2016).
13. Thomas P. Ehrhard, Air Force UAVs: The Secret History (Arlington, Va.: Mitchell Institute Press,
2011).
14. Mary Dobbing and Chris Cole, Israel and the Drone Wars: Examining Israel’s Production, Use, y
Proliferation of UAVs (Oxford: Drone Wars UK, Enero 2014), pag. 8, https://dronewarsuk.ªles
.wordpress.com/2014/01/israel-and-the-drone-wars.pdf.
15. Ehrhard, Air Force UAVs.
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El debate sobre la proliferación de drones 11
Although the Predator and its successor, the Reaper, are armed and can
travel long distances at medium altitude to strike targets, most drones ªelded
by militaries around the world are tactical and unarmed; they can ºy for only a
few hours at a time and are designed exclusively to provide local surveillance
data.16 Of the nearly ninety countries that now have military drones of
algún tipo, the majority do not yet possess armed and advanced drones. Still,
the number of states with those capabilities is growing. According to Matthew
Fuhrmann and Michael Horowitz, by the end of 2014, twenty-seven countries
possessed “advanced” drones, deªned as UAVs that can stay in the air for at
least twenty hours, operate at an altitude of at least 16,000 pies, and have a
maximum takeoff weight of at least 1,320 pounds.17 In addition, seven coun-
tries possessed armed drones, and nearly two dozen others had programs in
place to acquire a lethal UAV capability. Advanced unarmed and armed
drones continued to spread internationally in 2015 y 2016. The United States
agreed to arm Italy’s previously unarmed Reapers; it also agreed to sell un-
armed Reapers to Spain and the Netherlands; and several European states be-
gan a new joint armed drone program that seems more likely to succeed than
prior joint efforts.18
En 2015, Iraq, Nigeria, and Pakistan used armed drones in combat for the
ªrst time—against domestic insurgents.19 All three of these states acquired
their armed drones from China, a country that has solidiªed its role as a global
provider of armed drones.20 In addition, after using unarmed surveillance
16. Avery Plaw, Matthew S. Fricker, and Carlos R. Colon, The Drone Debate: A Primer on the U.S.
Use of Unmanned Aircraft (Lanham, Maryland.: Rowman y Littleªeld, 2015), pag. 7.
17. Fuhrmann and Horowitz, “Droning On.”
18. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, ed., “The Netherlands—MQ-9 Reapers” (Washington,
CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2015), http://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/ªles/
mas/netherlands_14-55.pdf; Esteban Villarejo, “Spain Eyes Offer of Reaper, Heron,” Defense News,
Septiembre 11, 2015, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/isr/2015/09/11/
spain-eyes-offer-reaper-heron/72057400/; Tom Kington and Pierre Tran, “New Effort at European
UAV Raises Hopes,” Defense News, Puede 23, 2015, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/
air-space/isr/2015/05/23/france-germany-italy-uav-male-design-study/27545807/; and Jonathan
marco, “China Helps Iraq Military Enter Drone Era,” BBC News, Octubre 12, 2015, http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34510126.
19. Usman Ansari, “Pakistan Surprises Many with First Use of Armed Drone,” Defense News,
Septiembre 10, 2015, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/strike/2015/09/08/
pakistan-surprises-many-ªrst-use-armed-drone/71881768/.
20. marco, “China Helps Iraq Military Enter Drone Era”; W.J. Hennigan, “A Fast Growing Club:
Countries that Use Drones for Killing by Remote Control,” Los Angeles Times, Febrero 22, 2016;
“Pakistan’s Indigenous Armed Drone Conducts First Night-time Strike,” Express Tribune, Octo-
ber 22, 2015; Zachary Keck, “Pakistan Seeks Chinese Drones?” Diplomat, Puede 20, 2014, http://
thediplomat.com/2014/2005/pakistan-seeks-chinese-drones/; Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Cantante, “Chi-
nese Drones Soon Flying over Saudi Arabia,” Popular Science, Abril 29, 2014, http://www
.popsci.com/blog-network/eastern-arsenal/chinese-drones-soon-ºying-over-saudi-arabia; y
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Seguridad Internacional 41:2 12
drones in Kashmir and witnessing Pakistan’s use of armed drones, India
sought armed UAVs from the United States.21 It also reached a deal with Israel
to acquire the Heron, a drone capable of conducting air strikes.22
The capabilities of current-generation armed drones vary considerably. Mayoría
armed UAVs lack the capabilities of the U.S. Predator or Reaper, cual, com-
bined with data processing and logistical capacity, give the United States the
ability to conduct drone strikes around the world. Other armed drones, semejante
as variants of the Chinese CH-3 or Wing Loong, may lack global positioning
sistema (GPS) integration or over-the-horizon strike capabilities, and thus have
limited reach. Además, an armed CH-3 can reportedly remain in the air for
about six hours, or less than half as long as the U.S. Reaper can, and its range is
justo 250 kilometers. Además, it can carry only two missiles, or half of the pay-
load of the Reaper.23
Even less capable armed drones have military relevance, sin embargo. Estafa-
sider the Pakistani Buraaq, which many analysts believe is a variant of China’s
CH-3, the same system used by Nigeria. The Pakistan government’s intended
use for this platform is either within Pakistan or against India, so the plat-
form’s relatively short endurance and range are less limiting than they might
be for the United States, whose stated operational demands are more expan-
sive. Además,
incluido
manned aircraft, a country can extend the “reach” of its drones even without
GPS integration.
in combination with other military assets,
Unarmed, short-range drones may have military relevance as well; they can
increase a state’s monitoring abilities and provide greater situational aware-
ness. Because most interstate disputes occur between neighbors, states’ pri-
mary security concerns often involve surveillance or limited military actions
across relatively shorter distances. Armed and unarmed drones without global
reach are thus sufªcient for most national military requirements.
En suma, militarily relevant drones are spreading widely, though the most ad-
vanced drones remain beyond the reach of many countries, a trend that likely
will continue in the short term. The logistical challenges for longer-range
drone operations are daunting even for a country such as the United States.
Sarah Kreps, “China Swooping In on Military Drone Market,” CNN, Abril 1, 2016, http://
www.cnn.com/2016/04/01/opinions/china-drone-sales-kreps/.
21. Claire Groden, “India Is Beeªng Up Its Combat Drone Bench,” Fortune, Noviembre 10, 2015,
http://fortune.com/2015/11/10/india-combat-drones/.
22. Ankit Panda, “India Wants Its New Armed Israeli Drones Fast,” Diplomat, Septiembre 28, 2015,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/india-wants-its-new-armed-israeli-drones-fast/.
23. China’s CH-4, sin embargo, is more capable than the CH-3.
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El debate sobre la proliferación de drones 13
Given these challenges, it is unlikely that many states will use drones the way
the United States sometimes does for global strike operations.
Two Narratives on Drone Proliferation
What are the implications, if any, of drones and drone proliferation for the in-
ternational security environment? Two competing narratives dominate de-
bates about drone proliferation, with cleavages emerging based on divergent
assumptions about the inherent nature of the technology. We sketch the core
arguments here to illustrate the competing claims. Our discussion reºects the
broad contours of the debate, but it is important to note that arguments
lumped in the same camp may be analytically distinct.
a transformative technology
Many analysts and policymakers argue that drones will transform warfare in
the twenty-ªrst century. Scholars and journalists in this camp routinely de-
scribe drones as a revolutionary military technology. As Adam Stulberg wrote
en 2007, “It is now conventional wisdom that we stand at the dawning of the
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) revolution in military affairs.”24 More recently,
Amy Zegart stated: “Drones are going to revolutionize how nations and
nonstate actors threaten the use of violence.”25
From the above perspective, drones are revolutionary because they lower
the costs of using military force. In his annual report on extrajudicial, sum-
mary, or arbitrary executions, United Nations special rapporteur Christof
Heyns noted that “drones make it not only physically easier to dispatch long-
distance and targeted armed force, but the proliferation of drones may lower
social barriers in society against the deployment of lethal force and result in at-
tempts to weaken the relevant legal standards.”26 Drones change decision-
making because they do not inherently risk the life and limb of the user.27
States with armed drones can conduct strikes without risking the lives of their
pilots. This capability is particularly useful when governments fear the domes-
24. Stulberg, “Managing the Unmanned Revolution in the U.S. Air Force," pag. 251.
25. Amy Zegart, “The Coming Revolution of Drone Warfare,” Wall Street Journal, Marzo 18, 2015,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/amy-zegart-the-coming-revolution-of-drone-warfare-1426720364.
26. Christof Heyns, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Ex-
ecutions,” United Nations General Assembly, 68th sess., Septiembre 13, 2013, pag. 5, http://www.un
.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol(cid:2)A/68/382.
27. For an interesting assessment of this phenomenon with regard to George W. Bush and Barack
Obama, see Macdonald and Schneider, “Presidential Risk Orientation and Force Employment
Decisions.”
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Seguridad Internacional 41:2 14
tic political or diplomatic consequences of taking military action that could re-
sult in casualties. Además, drone strikes often involve secrecy and therefore
shield leaders from domestic blowback. As U.S. President Barack Obama said
in May 2013, the typical decisionmaking barriers to the use of force become
eroded when using drones because they do not attract “the public scrutiny
that a troop deployment invites.”28
By lowering the political threshold for using force, this argument suggests,
drones make states more willing to deploy their military assets. Military de-
ployments, Sucesivamente, make the use of lethal force more likely. Proponents of this
vista (though not necessarily of the uses of force themselves) cite the preva-
lence of U.S. drone strikes in countries such as Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen,
arguing that the United States would have used military force less frequently
in these countries if it did not have drones at its disposal.29 Lowering the
threshold for military deployments also includes the use of unarmed drones
such as surveillance aircraft that may be more likely to transgress an adver-
sary’s airspace because they can do so at a lower cost. The second-order effect
of deploying even unarmed surveillance drones is that other countries may be
more willing to shoot down drones than manned aircraft, which some analysts
worry could cause tense situations to escalate.30
Some analysts therefore conclude that drones will be destabilizing for the se-
curity environment. As Michael Boyle argues, “[t]he race for this technology is
resetting the terms of global competition and quietly altering the rules of the
game for many long-simmering conºicts and rivalries.”31 In this view, drone
proliferation has mostly undesirable consequences for international security,
and the rapid diffusion of armed and advanced drones around the globe may
exacerbate this destabilizing tendency.32 Drones are the tip of the spear for the
spread of robotics writ large, a commercially driven enterprise that renders
28. Jason Koebler, “Obama: Administration Saw Drone Strikes as ‘Cure-All’ for Terrorism,” U.S.
Noticias, Puede 23, 2013, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/05/23/obama-administration-
saw-drone-strikes-as-cure-all-for-terrorism.
29. Zenko, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies.”
30. Kelley Sayler, “A World of Proliferated Drones: A Technology Primer” (Washington,
CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: Center for a New American Security, 2015), http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/ªles/
publications-pdf/CNAS%20World%20of%20Drones_052115.pdf.
31. Boyle, “The Race for Drones," pag. 78.
32. Davis et al., “Armed and Dangerous?” http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
research_reports/RR400/RR449/RAND_RR449.pdf; Sayler, “A World of Proliferated Drones”;
Samuel J. Brannen, “Sustaining the U.S. Lead in Unmanned Systems: Military and Home-
land Considerations through 2025” (Washington, CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: Center for Strategic and International
Estudios, International Security Program, 2014), http://csis.org/ªles/publication/140227_Brannen
_UnmannedSystems_Web.pdf; and Rachel Stohl, Rosa Brooks, and John P. Abizaid, “Recommen-
dations and Report of the Tasks Force on U.S. Drone Policy” (Washington, CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: Stimson Cen-
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El debate sobre la proliferación de drones 15
many key components of drones as fundamentally dual-use technologies.33
Although many countries may ªnd state-of-the-art armed drones hard to oper-
ate, continuing technological advances eventually will make it easier for them
to do so, just as they have with other military technologies, such as combat air-
craft. For all of these reasons, armed drone proliferation is an important inter-
national security issue from this perspective.
just another platform
A second camp questions whether current-generation drones will transform
how states conduct military operations, and whether UAVs will fundamen-
tally increase the mobility or destructive power of armed forces.34 Drones can
be used to carry out targeted strikes, but states may also carry out targeted kill-
ings through other means, such as manned F-16 strikes or, in the case of the
raid that ended with the death of Osama bin Laden, Special Operations forces.
In this view, UAVs are just another platform that militaries may employ to
achieve an objective.35 As Canada’s chief of staff, generación. Thomas Lawson, said in
2013: “If a kinetic round is propelled toward a conªrmed enemy for strategic
purposes by a riºe, by an artillery piece, by an aircraft manned, or an aircraft
unmanned, any of those that end up with a desired effect is a supportable
point of view.”36
Scholars and policymakers in this camp suggest that the policy of targeted
killing is more important than the technology used to carry out strikes. Charli
Carpintero, Por ejemplo, argues that, to the extent that one is concerned about
drone strikes violating international law, the problem is U.S. policy.37 Drones
are merely the delivery system, which could just as easily be a soldier or
manned aircraft. Some current and former policymakers have expressed a sim-
ilar view. In his memoirs, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Panetta states: “[t]oh
call our campaign against Al Qaeda a ‘drone program’ is a little like calling
ter, 2014), http://www.stimson.org/sites/default/ªles/ªle-attachments/recommendations_and
_report_of_the_task_force_on_us_drone_policy_second_edition.pdf.
33. miguel c.. Horowitz, “The Looming Robotics Gap: Why America’s Global Dominance in Mili-
tary Technology Is Starting to Crumble,” Foreign Policy, Puede 5, 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/
2014/2005/2005/the-looming-robotics-gap/.
34. Moyar, “Drones—An Evolution, Not a Revolution, in Warfare," pag. 13.
35. Plaw, Fricker, and Colon, The Drone Debate, pag. 305.
36. Quoted in Micah Zenko and Sarah Kreps, “Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation” (Washington,
CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2014), pag. 8, http://www.cfr.org/drones/limiting-armed-drone-
proliferation/p33127.
37. Charli Carpenter, “Parsing the Anti-Drone Debate,” Duck of Minerva, Noviembre 12, 2013,
http://duckofminerva.com/2013/11/parsing-the-anti-drone-debate.html. See also Braun, “Preda-
tor Effect.”
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Seguridad Internacional 41:2 16
World War I a ‘machine gun program.’ Technology has always been an aspect
of war . . . what is most crucial is not the size of the missile or the ability to de-
ploy it from thousands of miles away” but how the munitions are used.38 In
2012 generación. Norton Schwartz, chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force, stated that “if it
is a legitimate target, then I would argue that the manner in which you engage
that target, whether it be close combat or remotely, is not a terribly relevant
question.”39 What militaries do, in this view, is more signiªcant than how they
do it. Drones themselves are not especially unique, even if the way in which
the United States has employed this technology after the September 11 attacks
is novel.
Proponents of this perspective point out that current-generation drones
have signiªcant technological limitations, which we discuss in greater detail
abajo. Because they ºy at low altitudes and slow speeds, por ejemplo, drones
are highly vulnerable to enemy air defenses. In light of these limitations,
drones have little utility in interstate disputes—especially compared to tech-
nologies such as nuclear weapons. As the authors of a 2014 RAND report put
él, “By themselves, armed UAVs do not win wars, and wars can be won with-
out them.”40 Drones may have aided U.S. operations against the Taliban, para
instancia, but they have not helped the United States achieve a decisive victory.
According to those in this camp, given the technological limitations dis-
cussed above, the effects of drone diffusion on the international security envi-
ronment are likely to be modest. Además, some scholars question the
notion that armed drones will spread at a rapid rate. Andrea Gilli and Mauro
Gilli, por ejemplo, argue that armed drones are expensive and difªcult to buy,
build, and operate.41 Referencing the massive logistical support that the
United States requires to conduct drone strikes—including forward operating
bases in far-ºung places in Central Asia and the Horn of Africa42—they argue
that few other countries will be able to acquire and use armed drones as ex-
pansively.43 This is yet another reason that concerns about the consequences of
drone proliferation are overblown, these scholars contend.
38. Leon Panetta with Jim Newton, Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace (Nuevo
york: Pingüino, 2014), pag. 388
39. Quoted in Zenko and Kreps, “Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation," pag. 8.
40. Davis et al., “Armed and Dangerous?" pag. 15.
41. We do not engage in depth the debate about the relative cost of current-generation drones be-
cause of the lack of signiªcant apples-to-apples comparisons on relative costs across multiple
countries. As time progresses, researchers will be better able to resolve this debate.
42. Ty McCormick, “U.S. Operates Drones from Secret Bases in Somalia,” Foreign Policy,
Julio 2, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/2007/2002/exclusive-u-s-operates-drones-from-secret-
bases-in-somalia-special-operations-jsoc-black-hawk-down/.
43. Gilli and Gilli, “The Diffusion of Drone Warfare?"
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El debate sobre la proliferación de drones 17
The Advantages and Limitations of Drones
Neither of the above perspectives is complete. Those who argue that drones
are transformative overlook important operational limits. The more dismissive
vista, por el contrario, fails to appreciate how removing pilots from aircraft changes
the decisionmaking calculus of using drones versus manned alternatives.
Missing from the current debate about the consequences of drone proliferation
is a realistic understanding of what today’s drones can and cannot do. Accu-
rately capturing the capabilities of current-generation drones is critical to un-
derstanding how drones may (or may not) change military affairs or world
politics more generally. We take up this task in the following sections.
why drones are not a silver bullet
Some observers may view drones as a panacea for many national security
challenges that could involve the use of force. Current-generation drones have
at least ªve serious limitations, sin embargo. Primero, as noted previously, drones ºy
signiªcantly slower than manned aircraft (the cruise speed of an F-16 is about
six times that of a Reaper). One U.S. Air Force general therefore described even
the most advanced current-generation drones as “useless in a contested envi-
ronment”44 (es decir., in a scenario where the United States is ªghting an adversary
with air defenses). Countries with anti-air defense systems are well positioned
to shoot down the slow-moving drones. Hamas discovered this in 2014
when it ºew what it referred to as an armed drone—though it was very
rudimentary—into Israel, only to have the drone shot down.45
Segundo, the data link that connects drones to remote pilots creates a poten-
tial vulnerability, because it introduces the risk of jamming, hacking, y
spooªng.46 Smaller drones must be linked by radio to their controllers,
and the data links can be easily jammed and disabled. One study showed how
hackers could mimic GPS signals and fool the navigation systems.47 Cyber at-
tacks could cause a drone, at the least, to be unable to calculate its position,
44. Dave Majumdar, “Air Force Future UAV Roadmap Could Be Released as Early as Next Week,"
USNI News, Noviembre 13, 2013, http://news.usni.org/2013/2011/2013/air-force-future-uav-
roadmap-released-early-next-week.
45. Bill Chappell, “Israel Shoots Down Drone as Clash with Hamas Continues,” NPR, Julio 14,
2014, http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/2007/2014/331321398/israel-shoots-
down-drone-as-clash-with-hamas-continues.
46. Nota, sin embargo, that this risk exists for ªfth-generation ªghters such as the F-35 that also rely
heavily on electronics.
47. Aliya Sternstein, “How to Hack a Military Drone,” Defense One, Abril 29, 2015, http://
www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/04/how-hack-military-drone/111391/.
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Seguridad Internacional 41:2 18
allowing it to be brought down fairly easily. Responding to these vulnerabil-
ities, Estados Unidos. Defense Department has developed a software program de-
signed to prevent the hacking of drone control and navigation systems.48
Tercero, current-generation drones do not possess air-to-air capabilities or
countermeasures. The U-2, a manned reconnaissance platform, has sophisti-
cated countermeasures to defend against Russian-made air defense systems
such as the S-300. The Global Hawk, the unmanned equivalent, lacks these
countermeasures.49 Upgrades that would bring the Global Hawk’s air defense
system to a level of rough parity with the U-2s would cost $1.9 billion over ten years, reducing the hourly-usage-cost advantage of the Global Hawk over the U-2.50 Fourth, UAVs duplicate many of the features of other systems that advanced militaries already possess, including ªghters, helicopters, and other related systems. De este modo, in only a limited number of operational circumstances do drones provide unique operational capacity. Por ejemplo, even though the use of Hellªre missiles by the Reaper receives considerable media attention, the manned Apache helicopter ªres more Hellªre missiles per year than any other platform in the U.S. militar. En general, helicopters, ballistic missiles, and manned aircraft can perform many of the same functions as current-generation armed drones, and they are less vulnerable to anti-air defense systems. China’s manned JH-7, Por ejemplo, is more maneuverable and able to defend itself than the CH-4 armed drone. Además, compared to the CH-4, the JH-7 has a much larger payload and holds heavier bombs. Estados Unidos. manned A-10 is more effective for close air support—eliminating ground troops at close range—than the MQ-9 Reaper, because it ºies low and is reinforced with tita- nium to protect it from ground ªre.51 Fifth, the ubiquitous deployment of drones in a conventional conºict is po- tentially limited by the difªculty of retaining pilots to guide them.52 Operators 48. Ibídem. 49. “U-2 Has the Edge over Global Hawk,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, Marzo 10, 2014, http://aviationweek.com/awin/u-2-has-edge-over-global-hawk. 50. This includes a camera that has a wider panorama than the sensors that are currently on the Global Hawk as well as an airborne electro-optical sensor that can survey seven parts of the spec- trum. See Seth Robson, “Air Force Plans Drone Upgrade to Replace U-2 Planes,” Stars and Stripes, Marzo 15, 2014, http://www.stripes.com/news/air-force-plans-drone-upgrade-to-replace-u-2- planes-1.272289. 51. Christian Davenport, “The F-35 vs. the A-10 Warthog, Head-to-Head in Close-Air Support,El Correo de Washington, Agosto 27, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/ 2015/08/27/as-it-ªghts-for-its-life-the-a-10-will-face-off-against-the-f-35-in-close-air-support- test/. 52. It is important to note, sin embargo, that this is an organizational problem rather than one inher- ent to the military technology. l D o w n o a d e desde h t t p : / / directo . mi t . e d u / i s e c / a r t i c e – pdlf / / / / 4 1 2 7 1 8 4 3 7 1 5 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 2 5 7 pd . f por invitado 0 7 septiembre 2 0 2 3 El debate sobre la proliferación de drones 19 sit behind consoles for long shifts, putting in thirteen to fourteen hour days and logging about three to four times as many ºight hours as pilots of manned aircraft, about 900–1,100 compared to 200–300 ºight hours per year.53 The long hours in front of a console create a “mix of boredom, soledad, and stress,”54 sometimes resulting in high levels of post-traumatic stress as operators de- velop a sense of familiarity with the targets whom they may be responsible for killing. De este modo, despite having been trained at rates far higher than ªghter and bomber pilots combined, drone pilots have left the service at three times the rate of those operating manned aircraft. Como resultado, Estados Unidos. Government Accountability Ofªce reported in 2014 that the Air Force had only 85 percent of the drone pilots needed to carry out its missions.55 In 2015, the ªgure dropped to 65 por ciento,56 with about 1,000 active-duty pilots. One source sug- gests that although the U.S. Air Force trains 180 drone pilots a year, it loses an- otro 240 to attrition.57 If these challenges exist for the United States, the country with the most extensive pilot training system in the world, they very likely exist for others as well. the unique features of drones Despite their limitations, drones can still have important battleªeld conse- quences. En efecto, the perspective that suggests that drones are just another platform, substitutable with manned airborne or ground equivalents, glosses over some key advantages of drones. Como se discutió anteriormente, one obvious beneªt is that drones operate without a pilot in the cockpit. States with armed drones can conduct strikes without risking the lives of their forces, thus minimiz- ing casualties. Al mismo tiempo, current-generation drones—manned and unmanned—operate most effectively in permissive airspace, where there is a relatively low risk of being shot down. 53. Deborah Lee James and Mark A. Welsh III, “State of the Air Force Press Brieªng by Secretary James and General Welsh in the Pentagon Brieªng Room” (Washington, CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: A NOSOTROS. Department of Defense, Enero 15, 2015), http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/ Article/606995. 54. James Dao, “Drone Pilots Are Found to Get Stress Disorders Much as Those in Combat Do,” New York Times, Febrero 22, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/23/us/drone-pilots- found-to-get-stress-disorders-much-as-those-in-combat-do.html. 55. United States Government Accountability Ofªce, “Actions Needed to Strengthen Manage- ment of Unmanned Aerial System Pilots” (Washington, CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: United States Government Account- ability Ofªce, 2014), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-316, pag. 17. 56. Jeff Schogol, “Air Force Raises Monthly Incentive Pay for Drone Pilots,” Air Force Times, Janu- ary 16, 2015, http://www.airforcetimes.com/story/military/2015/01/15/more-pay-for-drone- pilots/21829659/. 57. Brendan McGarry, “Fewer Than 10 Drone Pilots to Receive $1,500 Monthly Bonus This Year,"
Military.com, Febrero 13, 2015, http://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/02/13/fewer-than-
10-pilots-to-receive-monthly-bonus-incentive.html.
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Seguridad Internacional 41:2 20
The reduction in casualty risk afforded by UAVs nonetheless has implica-
tions for the way in which many actors—especially in democracies—think
about the use of military force. Precisely because drones reduce the cost of war
in terms of casualties, they risk creating a sense of distance from the conºict,
which the philosopher Immanuel Kant warned could remove important
checks on the use of force.58 As Kant put it, “[I]f the consent of the citizens is
required in order to decide that war should be declared . . . nothing is more
natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor
juego, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war. Among the latter
would be: having to ªght, having to pay the costs of war from their own re-
sources.”59 As scholars who study the constraints faced by democracies in war
observe, when citizens bear the direct burdens of war, in part through incur-
ring casualties, they pressure leaders to be more selective about the wars that
they ªght.60
The use of drones remains popular among the U.S. público, allowing it to
conduct counterterrorism strikes without producing U.S. military casualties.
Levels of support in the United States for U.S. use of UAVs from 2011 a 2014
hovered around 65 percent.61 Given the responsiveness of democratic legisla-
tures to public attitudes,62 reducing the risk to soldiers may also loosen legis-
lative constraints on the use of force. With foreign interventions, en general,
Congress has incentives to grant the executive latitude in deciding when to use
fuerza. The reason is simple: legislators receive little credit for foreign policy ac-
tions that go well and get the blame for those that do not.63 Congressional
opposition has therefore been limited to isolated cases of members who are
concerned not with the overall policy but rather with the prospect of the
58. John Kaag and Sarah Kreps, “Drones and Democratic Peace,” Brown Journal of World Affairs,
volumen. 19, No. 2 (Spring/Summer 2013), páginas. 1–13.
59. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, Lewis White Beck, trans. (Indianapolis: Boss-Merrill, 1957).
60. Dan Reiter y Allan C.. estampar, Democracias en guerra (Princeton, NUEVA JERSEY.: Prensa de la Universidad de Princeton,
2002); and T. Clifton Morgan and Sally Howard Campbell, “Domestic Structure, Decisional Con-
tensiones, and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight?” Journal of Conºict Resolution, volumen. 35, No. 2
(Junio 1991), páginas. 187–211.
61. Sarah Kreps, “Flying under the Radar: A Study of Public Attitudes towards Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles,” Research & Política, volumen. 1, No. 1 (April/June 2014), pag. 107. On a related issue, público
opinion and autonomous weapons, see Michael C. Horowitz, “Public Opinion and the Politics of
the Killer Robots Debate,” Research & Política, volumen. 3, No. 1 (2016), páginas. 1–8.
62. James A. Stimson, Michael B. MacKuen, and Robert S. Erikson, “Dynamic Representation,"
American Political Science Review, volumen. 89, No. 3 (Septiembre 1995), páginas. 543–565.
63. Kenneth A. Schultz, “Tying Hands and Washing Hands; Estados Unidos. Congress and Multilateral
Humanitarian Intervention,” in Daniel W. Drezner, ed., Locating the Proper Authorities: The Interac-
tion of Domestic and International Institutions (ann-arbor: Prensa de la Universidad de Michigan, 2003),
páginas. 105–142.
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El debate sobre la proliferación de drones 21
United States using drones to target its own citizens. Senator Rand Paul cited
the potential of drones to target U.S. citizens in attempting to delay the conªr-
mation of John Brennan as director of central intelligence in 2013 with a parlia-
mentary procedure known as the ªlibuster, arguing that Americans should
ªrst be found guilty of a crime before being executed.64
Segundo, and perhaps more signiªcantly, drones have operational advan-
tages, because they allow for sustained and persistent ºights over potential
objetivos. The existing U.S. arsenal of armed drones—primarily the Predator and
Reaper—can remain aloft, fully loaded with munitions, for more than fourteen
horas, compared with four hours or fewer for F-16 ªghter jets and A-10
ground attack aircraft.65 Naval air platforms such as the F-18 E/F have an ef-
fective mission time of slightly more than two hours.66 These systems can be
refueled in the air, but that requires more resources and does not address
the fundamental constraint arising from the limits of human endurance.
These advantages could be magniªed in some next-generation systems. Para
ejemplo, the efªcient electronic motors and long wingspan of the SolarEagle, a
solar-powered drone that Boeing and the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency are developing, will allow the aircraft to remain in the air for ªve
años, making it a possible replacement for satellites that are costly to both de-
velop and maintain.67 Next-generation armed UAVs at the high end, como
Estados Unidos. Navy’s recently scrapped Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne
Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) programa, could have ºight times ranging
from six to twelve hours, though they could have air-to-air refueling capabili-
ties and be able to carry a weapons load similar to that of an F-18.68
The ability of UAVs to “loiter,” to ºy slowly over a small area, offers clear
advantages in terms of identifying and engaging targets. Greater endurance
enhances situational awareness, such that UAV pilots can more carefully verify
64. Jim Michaels, “Rand Paul Filibustering Brennan Nomination to Lead CIA,” USA Today,
Marzo 7, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/03/06/brennan-nomination-
nears-senate-vote/1967709/.
65. Sarah Kreps, “Ground the Drones? The Real Problem with Unmanned Aircraft,” Foreign Af-
fairs, December 4, 2013, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2013-12-04/ground-drones.
66. Federation of American Scientists, “F/A-18 Hornet” (Washington, CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: Federation of Ameri-
can Scientists, Abril 25, 2000), http://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/f-118.htm; and Winslow
Rodador, “The MQ-9’s Cost and Performance,” Time Magazine, Febrero 28, 2012, http://
nation.time.com/2012/02/28/2-the-mq-9s-cost-and-performance/.
67. Darren Quick, “Boeing SolarEagle Solar-Powered UAV to Fly in 2014,” Gizmag, Septiembre 16,
2010, http://www.gizmag.com/boeing-solareagle-solar-powered-uav/16399/.
68. Sam LaGrone, “Navy Conducts Successful Test of Aerial Refueling with X-47b, UCAS-D Pro-
gram Ending,” USNI News, Abril 22, 2015, https://news.usni.org/2015/04/22/navy-conducts-
successful-test-of-aerial-refueling-on-x-47b-ucas-d-program-ending.
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Seguridad Internacional 41:2 22
targets than an attack aircraft pilot with mere seconds to accomplish the same
objective.69 The ability to divert missiles launched from a UAV in response to
changes on the ground, combined with the UAV’s greater overall situational
awareness, makes UAV strikes more likely to be accurate than strikes by alter-
native platforms at the same targets.70
Por último, drones might reduce the diplomatic fallout associated with the use
of force. En particular, drones allow the country ºying them to maintain
some semblance of diplomatic cover given that the pilots are thousands of
miles away rather than directly ºying overhead. Although countries such as
Pakistan sometimes publicly protest about drones operating above their terri-
conservador, such complaints are most likely displays of domestic political theater.71
As a number of sources suggest, Pakistan has approved foreign drone strikes
on its territory; en efecto, the high frequency of such strikes suggests that at least
tacit approval would have been essential.72 Yet drones give the government
conducting the strikes greater plausible deniability than alternatives such as
ground forces, which require a considerable logistical footprint, or manned air-
craft. The amount of diplomatic cover that drones provide obviously has
limits—a CH-4 with a Chinese ºag painted on its side is still a Chinese military
platform—but the belief that drones provide some degree of diplomatic cover
could make countries more likely to use them.
En suma, current-generation drones have unique political, operational, y
diplomatic advantages, all else equal, and those advantages could make it eas-
ier for states to use force in some settings. These advantages point to an impor-
tant corrective of the perspective that maintains that drones are just another
platform and therefore do not in and of themselves shape how states are likely
to consider using force.
69. Davis et al., “Armed and Dangerous?” páginas. 11–12.
70. Michael W. Luis, “Drones: Actually the Most Humane Form of Warfare Ever,” Atlantic, Au-
gust 21, 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/2008/drones-actually-
the-most-humane-form-of-warfare-ever/278746/. The issue of drone strikes and civilian casual-
ties is covered in more detail below.
71. Tim Craig, “Drone Kills Taliban Chief Hakimullah Mehsud; Pakistan Accuses U.S. of Derailing
Peace Talks,El Correo de Washington, Noviembre 2, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
asia_paciªc/pakistani-ofªcial-accuses-us-of-sabotage-as-drone-targets-taliban-leaders-in-north-
west/2013/11/01/1463d0c2-431d-11e3-b028-de922d7a3f47_story.html.
72. Greg Miller and Bob Woodward, “Secret Memos Reveal Explicit Nature of U.S., Pakistán
Agreement on Drones,El Correo de Washington, Octubre 24, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/top-pakistani-leaders-secretly-backed-cia-drone-campaign-secret-
documents-show/2013/10/23/15e6b0d8-3beb-11e3-b6a9-da62c264f40e_story.html.
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El debate sobre la proliferación de drones 23
The Strategic Consequences of Drone Proliferation
Given the preceding discussion, what are the strategic consequences of
drone proliferation? It depends. Drones may be transformative in some con-
texts but not others. En esta sección, we assess the impact of drone prolif-
eration in six contexts: (1) counterterrorism; (2) interstate conºict; (3) crisis
onset and deterrence; (4) coercive diplomacy; (5) civil war and domestic con-
ºict; y (6) operations by nonstate actors. Research on the strategic effects of
military technology identiªes these particular contexts as potentially salient.73
We therefore focus our attention on them here, recognizing that they are by no
means the only areas in which drones might matter.74
As the following analysis shows, the effects of drone proliferation are hetero-
geneous. Current-generation drones are likely to be consequential for counter-
terrorism and domestic conºict, but less transformative in most other settings.
counterterrorism: helping to kill terrorists in uncontested airspace
Estados Unidos. experience suggests that drones shape the way policymakers think
about counterterrorism operations. Echoing the argument developed earlier,
some members of the U.S. foreign policy establishment have indicated that the
availability of drones has affected how they view the use of force. Por ejemplo,
former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted that drones cause leaders to
view war as “bloodless, painless, and odorless,” allowing them to take actions
that would not be permissible were American casualties part of the calcula-
ción. As the Washington Post put it, Gates had come to see new technologies
such as drones as providing an antiseptic form of warfare: “Remarkable ad-
vances in precision munitions, sensors, information and satellite technology
and more can make us overly enamored with the ability of technology to
transform the traditional laws and limits of war. . . . A button is pushed in
Nevada and seconds later a pickup truck explodes in Kandahar . . . [war is
seen as] kind of video game or action movie. . . . En realidad, war is inevitably
73. Ver, Por ejemplo, Tomas C.. Schelling, Arms and Inºuence (nuevo refugio, Conexión.: Yale University
Prensa, 1966); Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, “Rage against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes
in Counterinsurgency Wars,” International Organization, volumen. 63, No. 1 (Enero 2009), páginas. 67–106;
and Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge:
Prensa de la Universidad de Cambridge, 2016).
74. An alternative might be analyzing drones operating in permissive versus denied airspace.
Given the limited ability of current-generation drones to operate in denied environments, cómo-
alguna vez, this is a task better left for future research.
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Seguridad Internacional 41:2 24
tragic, inefªcient and uncertain.”75 President Obama himself acknowledged
that the ability of drone strikes to alleviate risks introduced by deploying
ground forces had turned drones into a “cure-all for terrorism” for him and his
national security team.76
De este modo, the operational advantages of drones, including their precision and
low risk to their operators, have made drones the platform of choice for some
A NOSOTROS. counterterrorism operations. en un 2012 Department of Justice memo, el
Obama administration highlighted what it deemed to be a restrictive set of
conditions under which it would engage in drone strikes. In this memo, el
administration stated that it would order the killing of an individual who pre-
sented an “imminent threat” and if capture were not “feasible.”77
According to data analyzed by Micah Zenko and Sarah Kreps, as of June
2014, fewer than 2 por ciento de la 473 non-battleªeld targeted killings from 2002
a 2014 were conducted by ground raids or armed aircraft, with the remaining
98 percent by armed drones.78 One reason to kill rather than capture a sus-
pected terrorist is that arresting militants in the war zones and unstable areas
where they are found is far more risky for U.S. forces than killing via an un-
manned drone, for the reasons that Gates alludes to in his memoirs.79 Another
reason is that there may be political costs associated with capturing suspected
militantes. The Guantánamo Bay detention camp no longer accepts new detain-
ees, and the process of trying suspected terrorists in U.S. civilian courts re-
mains fraught from a domestic politics standpoint, with members of Congress
from the president’s own party resisting trials in their states or districts. Alabama-
though some of the domestic political opposition is simply political theater,
there are unresolved questions of safety and security concerning the logistics
of transporting suspected terrorists. Against this backdrop, killing rather than
capturing suspects has become a critical element of the United States’ counter-
terrorism strategy.80
75. Greg Jaffe, “Former Defense Secretary Gates Warns against Lure of Drone Warfare,” Washing-
ton Post, Octubre 23, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/former-defense-secretary-
gates-warns-against-lure-of-drone-warfare/2013/10/23/c5bdc734-3c2d-11e3-a94f-b58017bfee6c
_story.html.
76. barack obama, “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University” (Washington,
CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: Casa Blanca, Puede 23, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofªce/2013/05/23/
remarks-president-national-defense-university.
77. A NOSOTROS. Department of Justice, “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed against a U.S. Citi-
zen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or an Associated Force,” http://
msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf.
78. Zenko and Kreps, “Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation," pag. 9.
79. Robert Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (Nueva York: Alfredo A.. Knopf, 2014).
80. Daniel Klaidman, Kill or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the Obama Presidency (Nuevo
york: Houghton Mifºin Harcourt, 2012).
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El debate sobre la proliferación de drones 25
The United States’ experience is not necessarily unique. Por ejemplo, el
Israel Defense Forces use armed drones to target suspected militants in Syria,81
Gaza,82 and Sinai.83 As with the United States, sin embargo, Israel is not forthcom-
ing with details of its operations because of the military sensitivity of the
strikes and the political sensitivity of diplomatic relationships that facilitate
those strikes, such as with the Egyptian government with respect to strikes
in the Sinai.84
The above evidence suggests that, particularly for democratic regimes, y
perhaps for others as well, armed drones may lower the barriers for using
force in a counterterrorism context where capture is unpalatable and adversar-
ies are armed and dangerous but do not have sophisticated air defenses that
can shoot down the low and slow-ºying drones. This observation does not im-
ply that using lethal drones is necessarily in the attacking state’s national inter-
est.85 While a number of individuals argue that drones are useful for killing
suspected terrorists,86 critics of the U.S. drone policy argue that drone strikes
may result in political blowback.87 They could, Por ejemplo, generate anti-
American sentiment in the local population, potentially aiding terrorists’
recruiting efforts.88 Nonetheless, even critics acknowledge the tactical effec-
tiveness of drone strikes in eliminating suspected militants,89 and the U.S. ex-
perience highlights the tactical gains of targeting militants over potential
strategic costs (blowback from using force). If the United States’ use of drones
to date is any indication, future drone proliferation is likely to mean a greater
use of drones globally for targeting suspected terrorists.
81. “Israeli Drone Strike in Syria Kills Two near Frontier: Hezbollah’s Al-Manar TV,” Reuters,
Julio 29, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-attack-idUSKCN0Q311T201
50729.
82. Amira Haas, “Clearing the Fog on Israeli Drone Use in Gaza,” Haaretz, Marzo 1, 2014, http://
www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.577283.
83. Ashraf Swilam, “Ofªcials: Israeli Drone Strike Kills 5 in Egypt,El Correo de Washington, Au-
gust 9, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ofªcials-israeli-drone-strike-kills-5-in-
egypt/2013/08/09/75d3619c-0132-11e3-9711-3708310f6f4d_story.html.
84. David Schenker, “How the Israeli Drone Strike in the Sinai Might Backªre,” Atlantic, Agosto
13, 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/2008/how-the-israeli-drone-
strike-in-the-sinai-might-backªre/278628/.
85. For one assessment of targeted killing policies, see Carvin, “The Trouble with Targeted
Killing.”
86. Daniel Byman, “Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington’s Weapon of Choice,” Foreign Af-
fairs, volumen. 92, No. 4 (July/August 2013), pag. 32; and Patrick Johnston and Anoop Sarbahi, “The Im-
pact of U.S. Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan,” International Studies Quarterly, próximo.
87. Ver, Por ejemplo, miguel j.. Boyle, “The Costs and Consequences of Drone Warfare,” Interna-
tional Affairs, volumen. 89, No. 1 (Enero 2013), páginas. 1–29.
88. Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Why Drones Fail: When Tactics Drive Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, volumen. 92,
No. 4 (July/August 2013), pag. 48.
89. Ibídem.
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Seguridad Internacional 41:2 26
interstate conºict: limited utility in contested airspace
While providing important new capabilities for counterterrorism operations,
drones appear to be less valuable in conventional military campaigns against
other states given their operational limitations—namely, that they ºy low and
slow and are susceptible to air defenses. De este modo, in interstate conºicts where the
incluido
adversary is likely to have sophisticated military capabilities,
the ability to shoot down aircraft, drones would be less valuable and be more
likely to be employed in combination with other methods of using force in an
overall campaign, rather than alone. Por ejemplo, in the context of a U.S.-
China or NATO-Russian engagement, where both China and Russia would
have deployed sophisticated air defenses, current-generation drones would be
less valuable for the United States than an F-22 that is faster and stealthier and
therefore more likely to evade air defenses.
Similarmente, drones have not been the platform of choice for the militaries op-
erating in Syria in part because the operational limitations noted above create
susceptibility to anti-air defenses. Although the conºict in Syria is an interna-
tionalized civil war rather than a typical interstate conºict, it nonetheless un-
derscores the limitations of armed drones in contested airspace. In March 2015,
Syria shot down a U.S. Predator and has also downed a Turkish RF-4E recon-
naissance aircraft, likely with one of its SA-22 systems.90 Unlike the tribal areas
of Pakistan and Yemen, which lack robust air defense systems capable of
bringing down a Reaper, Syria is thought to have hundreds of active surface-
to-air missile sites (including advanced SAMS such as the SA-17 and SA-22)
and several thousand man-portable air-defense systems that provide coverage
of major cities and industrial centers. Air defense systems aside, other opera-
tional limitations have curtailed drone usage in Syria. Por ejemplo, los unidos
Kingdom’s Reapers only have the ability to ªre 18–20 pound Hellªre missiles,
which may not be adequate to destroy certain targets, such as oil ªelds.
Como resultado, the United States and the United Kingdom have not relied on
drones in Syria to the extent that they have elsewhere. Even after the British
Parliament authorized the use of force in Syria on December 3, 2015, the Royal
Air Force has generally used manned Tornadoes and Typhoons to conduct
armed strikes.91 The United States has used drones with greater frequency in
Syria, but has relied mostly on manned platforms for strike missions: armed
drones carried out about 875 de 3,800 air strikes (fewer than 25 por ciento) de
90. Chandler P. Atwood and Jeffrey White, “Syrian Air-Defense Capabilities and the Threat to Po-
tential U.S. Air Operations” (Washington, CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: Washington Institute, Puede 23, 2014).
91. “Syria Air Strikes: RAF Tornado Jets Carry Out Bombing,” BBC News, December 3, 2015, http://
www.bbc.com/news/uk-34992032.
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El debate sobre la proliferación de drones 27
Agosto 2014 to May 2015.92 Several media outlets reported that the United
States would increase the use of drone strikes conducted jointly by the CIA
and Joint Special Operations Command against the Islamic State, making it a
“signiªcant escalation of the CIA’s involvement in the war in Syria.”93
To be clear, current-generation drones could have some value for wars that
include conventional operations. Their limited capabilities, sin embargo, prevent
them from being a “cure-all” for armed attacks in this context.94 Indeed,
drones are unlikely to fundamentally alter the way that states conduct warfare
against adversaries with air defenses. Advanced current-generation drones
may help militaries carry out some missions more effectively—especially with
respect to surveillance, given the high ceiling of platforms such as the Global
Hawk. Sin embargo, drones will probably not make a critical difference for
winning or losing an interstate (or internationalized civil) war.95
crisis onset and deterrence: low risk with potential reward
Beyond the use of drones in ongoing military conºicts is the question of how
UAV deployments may inºuence stability in contested regions of the world.
Pessimists concerned about drone proliferation fear that states might take
cross-border actions with fewer reservations if they can attack without placing
their soldiers at risk. Such action could be particularly destabilizing in areas
where countries are already prone to mistrust, such as the East China and
South China Seas. Michael Boyle argues, por ejemplo, “The risks of a conºict
spiral arising from the shoot-down of the drone or an accident of some kind in
the East China Sea are real and potentially dangerous.”96 Despite the technical
limitations of armed drones, it is possible that a state might attempt to carry
out drone strikes on an adversary’s territory, potentially triggering a crisis if
the UAV is shot down. It is more likely, sin embargo, that countries would use
drones for persistent surveillance in a contested area. En efecto, this is a case
where unarmed drones could carry signiªcant, possibly salutary, implications
for international security.
92. David Axe, “Drones Take Over America’s War on ISIS,” Daily Beast, Junio 17, 2015, http://
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/06/17/the-war-on-isis-is-a-drone-war.html.
93. Greg Miller, “U.S. Launches Secret Drone Campaign to Hunt Islamic State Leaders in Syria,"
Washington Post, Septiembre 1, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
us-launches-secret-drone-campaign-to-hunt-islamic-state-leaders-in-syria/2015/09/01/723b3e04-
5033-11e5-933e-7d06c647a395_story.html.
94. Obama, “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University.”
95. This point is consistent with one of the conclusions in Davis et al., “Armed and Dangerous?"
pag. 15.
96. Boyle, “The Race for Drones," pag. 89.
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Seguridad Internacional 41:2 28
Most international disputes arise from border disagreements,97 donde el
primary risk of escalation stems from miscommunication and misinterpreta-
ción, rather than from a decision to change the status quo. In the maritime
arena alone, there are more than 430 bilateral boundaries that are not governed
by formal agreements.98 States concerned with upholding their claims in these
boundary areas might be especially drawn to using drones for persistent sur-
veillance given the technology’s superior endurance, and because states could
“test the waters” with less risk than would be incurred with a manned equiva-
lent.99 Moreover, the ability to substitute robots for people might make coun-
tries more likely to deploy drones into contested regions and behave more
assertively because the costs of losing drones seem lower.100 If deployments
move from close to the border to inside an adversary’s territory, there is some
risk of triggering an armed confrontation.
The deployment of drones could increase the risk of accidents and unin-
tended clashes in this context. When one state deploys UAVs, the other side
may not clearly understand whether the drones are intended for offensive or
defensive purposes.101 This uncertainty may cause a state to adopt worst-case
thinking, potentially leading to a forceful response. The likelihood of using
force increases insofar as a pilot knows that his or her actions would not result
in another individual being killed. Porcelana, Por ejemplo, is reported to have a
policy of shooting down unannounced drones with surface-to-air missiles or
ªghter aircraft.102 Compounding matters further, the rules of engagement for
responding to drone incursions—whether and when to shoot down a drone
that transgresses a state’s borders—are currently ambiguous. This ambiguity
could lead to mutual misunderstandings and further escalation of a crisis.
Considerar, Por ejemplo, the numerous incidents involving the U.S. y
Chinese militaries in the last couple of decades that have spilled into the public
sphere, including the EP-3 incident in 2001, the confrontation between a
97. This observation is well established in international conºict research. Ver, Por ejemplo, Juan A..
Vasquez, “Why Do Neighbors Fight? Proximity, Interaction, or Territoriality,” Journal of Peace Re-
buscar, volumen. 32, No. 3 (Agosto 1995), páginas. 277–293; and John A. Vasquez, “The Probability of War,
1816–1992,” International Studies Quarterly, volumen. 48, No. 1 (Marzo 2004), páginas. 1–27.
98. For more on maritime claims, see Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook (Washington,
CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: Central Intelligence Agency, 2012), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/ªelds/2106.html.
99. Zenko and Kreps, “Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation," pag. 10.
100. Boyle, “The Race for Drones.”
101. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,“Política mundial, volumen. 30, No. 2 (Janu-
ary 1978), páginas. 167–214.
102. Olivia Geng, “The Chinese Military’s Response to Unannounced Drones: Blow ’Em out of the
Sky,” Wall Street Journal, December 15, 2014, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/2012/
2015/the-chinese-militarys-response-to-unannounced-drones-blow-em-out-of-the-sky/.
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El debate sobre la proliferación de drones 29
Chinese naval frigate and the USNS Impeccable in 2013, and the reported near
miss between a U.S. surveillance plane and a Chinese ªghter jet in 2014.103 El
spate of Russian air incursions into NATO airspace in the Baltic Sea region
likewise underscores the potential for diplomatic incidents resulting from mili-
tary deployments. During 2014, Russia conducted more than 400 patrols in the
región, which corresponded with deteriorating relations with the West.104 With
the addition of long-range drones, the number of incursions into NATO air-
space could signiªcantly escalate as the costs of incursion decrease for Russia.
The potentially destabilizing consequences could be more intense because of
the unclear rules of engagement that attend the use of armed drones.105
The concerns outlined above certainly have merit. Still, it is important not to
overstate the risk of drone deployments for regional or international stability.
Por ejemplo, none of the aforementioned incidents led to armed military en-
gagement. On the contrary, emerging norms regarding the consequences of
shooting down a drone, though clearly still in the early stages, suggest that
states distinguish between the shooting down of manned and unmanned sys-
tems. De este modo, even if there is an accident and a drone is brought down, it is less
likely to trigger a crisis or military escalation than those in the pessimistic
camp imply. Por ejemplo, when Pakistan shot down an Indian surveillance
drone in the Kashmir region in the summer of 2015 that it said strayed beyond
the line of control, India did not escalate the long-simmering conºict to war.106
Similarmente, compare the muted international discussion when Turkey shot
down a drone ºying on its border with Syria in the fall of 2015 with the diplo-
matic crisis between Turkey and Russia that erupted when Turkey brought
down a manned SU-24.107 Countries appear to know that opponents will value
drones differently from manned aircraft, and behave accordingly. De este modo, drones
carrying out surveillance and reconnaissance missions need not be destabiliz-
103. Armin Rosen, “That U.S.-China Near Miss in the South China Sea Is a Sign of Things to
Come,” Business Insider, Agosto 22, 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/the-us-china-near-
miss-in-the-south-china-sea-2014-8.
104. Erik Pineda, “2 Signs Russia Remains Combat-Ready vs. U.S., NATO: Increased Baltic Sea In-
cursions and Relentless Naval Build-Up,” International Business Times, December 10, 2014, http://
www.ibtimes.com.au/2-signs-russia-remains-combat-ready-vs-us-nato-increased-baltic-sea-
incursions-relentless-naval.
105. Zenko and Kreps, “Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation.”
106. Katharine Houreld, “Pakistan Says It Shot Down Indian Drone near Disputed Border,"
Reuters, Julio 15, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-drone-idUSKCN0PP1O6201
50715.
107. Neil MacFarquhar and Steven Erlanger, “NATO-Russia Tensions Rise after Turkey Downs
Jet,” New York Times, Noviembre 24, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/25/world/europe/
turkey-syria-russia-military-plane.html.
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Seguridad Internacional 41:2 30
En g. This may not always be the case, sin embargo, because the rules of engage-
ment in this context are not yet clearly deªned.
There are also reasons to think that using drones for surveillance could be
stabilizing. Drones could give both sides in a dispute real-time information
about the situation at lower cost, and with lower risk to personnel, than is pos-
sible at present. Countries can use drones deployed near or at their borders to
surveil more persistently over contested areas or even over their adversaries’
territorio. Improved surveillance from persistent drone deployments could re-
duce the risk of conºict for two reasons. Primero, information provided by drones
could reassure a state that its enemy is not planning to launch an attack, de este modo
lowering the risk of destabilizing countermeasures.
Segundo, the existence of surveillance drones could decrease the ability of po-
tential aggressors to conduct surprise attacks or covert activities. With the aid
of surveillance drones, potential targets can take appropriate preparations if
they observe military deployments. Drones, entonces, may be useful for deterrence
by denial:108 if the potential aggressor believes that the element of surprise is
critical to operational success, and that drones ºying near the border would
give the other state adequate notice, it may be less likely to launch an attack.
Both of these mechanisms could reinforce stability, even when their relative
impact is small.
To illustrate, consider the dispute between China and Japan over the
Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. Japan currently maintains situational
awareness mostly using satellites and manned maritime vessels. Japan could
gain even better situational awareness if it had more robust unmanned sys-
tems in the air and on the sea. Although this type of capability would not
make a conºict less likely in the case of a deliberate Chinese attempt to take
the islands, it could help reassure Tokyo about Beijing’s intentions (if China
deployed similar capabilities at a longer standoff range, it might be similarly
reassured). Y, in a world where China would want to take the islands only
if it could catch Japan unaware, Japanese surveillance drones might reduce the
feasibility of a surprise attack.
This scenario is not just hypothetical. Japan’s purchase of Global Hawk,
conªrmed in November 2014, suggests that UAVs are likely to play a growing
role in maritime surveillance.109 Given the large number of maritime disputes
in the Asia Paciªc, especially in the South China Sea, unmanned surveillance
108. For classic work on deterrence by denial, ver, Por ejemplo, Glenn H. Snyder, “Deterrence and
Fuerza,” Journal of Conºict Resolution, volumen. 4, No. 2 (Junio 1960), páginas. 163–178.
109. James Hardy, “Japan Announces Global Hawk, Osprey, Hawkeye Purchases,” Jane’s Defence
Weekly, Noviembre 20, 2014.
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El debate sobre la proliferación de drones 31
systems could provide a new type of conªdence-building measure that would
make inadvertent escalation less likely. Además, such surveillance systems
could make it easier for regional actors to monitor Chinese actions such as
building airstrips on the Spratly Islands.110 In some cases, actors may not be-
come aware of Chinese activities until it is too late to stop them. Unmanned
surveillance systems, if they provide real-time monitoring, could therefore
serve a deterrent role as well, because those actors attempting to change
the status quo in disputed regions will have to do so in the public eye.
coercive diplomacy: a poor tool for changing the status quo
Drones may deter military conºict in some scenarios, but can they help states
change the status quo with greater ease? Military technologies may bolster co-
ercive diplomacy—that is, the use of military threats to extract concessions—
in three ways.111 The ªrst is augmenting a state’s ability to impose its will.
Coercive threats will be more effective, todo lo demás es igual, if an adversary be-
lieves that it will not be able to maintain a desired possession (or policy) incluso
if it resists. During the Cuban missile crisis, por ejemplo, A NOSOTROS. Attorney General
Robert Kennedy told Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that Moscow had
a choice: remove the missiles from Cuba or the United States would remove
a ellos. This coercive demand worked, en parte, because the Soviet leadership
recognized that it probably would not be able to keep its missiles in Cuba even
if it ignored the U.S. amenaza. The second way in which military technologies
may enhance the effectiveness of coercion is by raising the costs of conºict for
an opponent. States are more likely to heed an adversary’s demand when their
opponents can inºict high levels of pain through violence.112 Third, technolo-
gies that lower the physical costs of conºict for an attacker may also be helpful
in this context. Aircraft carriers are a potentially useful coercive tool, for in-
postura, because they allow states to project power and carry out offensive mili-
tary operations with greater ease.
At ªrst glance, drones might appear useful for coercive diplomacy because,
in theory, they allow the attacker to inºict pain or impose its will at a lower
cost.113 Indeed, a coercive threat might seem more credible when the threaten-
ing party can implement it without putting its own forces in harm’s way. El
110. Ankit Panda, “China’s Spratlys Airstrip Will Raise South China Sea Stakes,” Diplomat, No-
noviembre 25, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/2011/chinas-spratlys-airstrip-will-raise-south-
china-sea-stakes/.
111. This discussion draws on the conditions for successful coercion developed in Sechser and
Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy.
112. Ver, Por ejemplo, Schelling, Arms and Inºuence.
113. Amy Zegart, “Coercion in a Drone World,” Stanford University, Marzo 18, 2016.
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Seguridad Internacional 41:2 32
problema, sin embargo, is that current-generation drones cannot operate effectively
in hostile airspace, which makes them ill-equipped for denial or punishment.
A threat to launch drone strikes against a recalcitrant government, por ejemplo,
carries little weight because of the vulnerability of drones to air defenses.
States with lethal drones seemingly recognize this, as they have rarely, if ever,
issued drone-related coercive threats against other states. This could change in
the future as the capabilities of drones evolve, a point that we revisit in a sub-
sequent section. Cases where drones have exhibited a punishment capability
may reºect situations where there is already a large imbalance of power—for
ejemplo, the use of drones against a country that lacks air defenses (significado
that it would also lack the air defenses to defeat manned aircraft).
Al mismo tiempo, drones may have coercive utility against nonstate actors.
When operating in permissive airspace, given their loitering-related advan-
tages, drones increase a state’s ability to track and kill members of rebel
grupos. It is plausible, entonces, that states could credibly threaten to carry out
drone strikes against insurgents to extract political concessions. En efecto, estados
could engage in a form of coercion that has been called “targeted hurting.”114
A leader might say (or imply) that a rebel’s family members will be killed or
her village destroyed unless she ceases violent attacks against the government.
That threat would raise obvious ethical considerations as well as concerns
about blowback and precedent setting. Those issues aside, the low cost of
using drones may make them useful for implementing a policy of targeted
punishment in this context.
Success is by no means guaranteed, sin embargo, because factors other than
technology inºuence the efªcacy of military threats. The balance of resolve
(es decir., which side places greater value on the issues at stake in the dispute) a menudo
plays a critical role.115 This may be bad news for governments hoping to ex-
tract coercive leverage from their drones given that rebels are often highly mo-
tivated to achieve their objectives. States must threaten to impose costs that are
sufªciently large to offset the beneªts that rebels expect to derive from
ªghting. Despite being relatively low-cost tools of punishment, drones—or
any military technology—may not inºict enough pain on rebels to accomplish
this objective.
114. Zegart, “The Coming Revolution of Drone Warfare.”
115. Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon
(Ítaca, N.Y.: Prensa de la Universidad de Cornell, 1989); and Sechser and Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Co-
ercive Diplomacy.
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El debate sobre la proliferación de drones 33
civil war and domestic conºict: augmenting the autocrat’s toolkit
If one of the main reasons why states do not use drones in some settings is
their vulnerability to air defenses, then intrastate conºicts (es decir., those in which
insurgents, domestic protest groups, or suspected terrorists are less likely to
have sophisticated air defense systems) are best-suited to the use of drones. En-
deed, for some of the same reasons that states ªnd drones attractive in an
interstate setting—primarily that they seem to come at low risk and low cost—
they might be inclined to use them against perceived domestic enemies. Many
of the countries that have or are pursuing armed drones, such as China, Iraq,
Pakistán, Russia, and Turkey, have opposition movements that potentially
threaten their leaders’ hold on power. Unmanned drones might be attractive to
these leaders, who may prefer to target insurgents or suspected terrorist net-
works with drones rather than ground forces or manned aircraft. With their
precision and long loiter time, drones might be seen as able to perform tasks
that otherwise could expose regime forces to unacceptable risk.116
States dealing with an internal insurgency or a civil war, by deªnition, hacer
not have a monopoly on the use of force. They are therefore inherently dis-
trustful of at least a subset of their population.117 This is especially true for au-
tocratic regimes, even those not confronting active insurgencies. Autocratic
leaders often face an inherent contradiction when seeking to create military
forces. Por un lado, developing efªcient and effective military forces is of-
ten necessary to defeat regime opponents, whether domestic or international.
Por otro lado, efªcient and effective military forces are precisely those
that might present the largest challenge to an autocrat’s power.118 This di-
lemma has surfaced throughout history, from Spartan concern about Hoplite
slaves in the Peloponnesian War to Joseph Stalin’s purges of the Soviet military
in the 1930s.
Drones, as well as military robotics as a more general category, could in the-
ory provide new means for autocrats (or others engaged in domestic repres-
sión) to overcome some of these challenges and more generally repress their
poblaciones locales. Drones can operate from centralized locations where those
most loyal to the regime can directly supervise their use. To the extent that the
unwillingness of large numbers of troops to ªre weapons at their fellow citi-
zens stymies autocratic repression, drones could signiªcantly reduce the num-
116. Zenko and Kreps, “Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation.”
117. Max Weber, The Vocation Lectures, David Owen and Tracy B. Strong, editores., Rodney Living-
stone, trans. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2004).
118. Caitlin Talmadge, “The Puzzle of Personalist Performance: Iraqi Battleªeld Effectiveness in
the Iran-Iraq War,” Estudios de Seguridad, volumen. 22, No. 2 (2013), páginas. 180–221.
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Seguridad Internacional 41:2 34
ber of military personnel who have to be persuaded before engaging in such
action.119 Moreover, the act of persuasion could be much easier when the per-
sonnel ªring on the civilian population represent a small set of those most
loyal to the regime and they are being directly monitored from within a cen-
tralized installation.120 To illustrate, the Iraqi military under Saddam Hussein
performed relatively poorly because his stafªng and training decisions fo-
cused more on weakening regime opponents than on preparing for external
threats.121 With more centralized control over the use of force through drones
and less concern over armies in the ªeld turning against him, he might have
been able to ªeld more effective forces.
The risk of autocrats using armed drones for domestic control reºects grow-
ing concerns held by some senior U.S. defense ofªcials about their potential
usar. Por ejemplo, in a discussion about the future of military robotics in
December 2015, A NOSOTROS. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work argued that
“authoritarian regimes who believe people are weaknesses in the machine,
that they are the weak link in the cog, that they cannot be trusted . . . they will
naturally gravitate towards totally automated solutions.”122 There are signs
that this is already happening. Considerar, Por ejemplo, that when facing pro-
tests in Xinjiang in 2014, the Chinese government reportedly ordered the de-
ployment of surveillance drones to monitor the situation.123
operations by violent nonstate actors: a legitimate concern
Drones may also be a useful military tool for nonstate actors. But why would
militant groups need them? They already have a variety of potential means to
attack targets, including nail bombs and explosives that may be less expensive
and more deadly.124
Small drones could generate military beneªts for militant groups as a preci-
119. Tucker, “Every Country Will Have Armed Drones within 10 Years.”
120. Autocratic countries monitoring their soldiers to ensure that they comply with orders are
nada nuevo, por supuesto. The Soviet Union, in World War II, famously employed “blocking battal-
ions” designed to shoot anyone retreating from the front. See Richard J. Overy, The Dictators: Hit-
ler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia (Nueva York: W.W. norton, 2004). What drones enable is the use of
these techniques without the mass mobilization necessary in the Soviet case.
121. Talmadge, “The Puzzle of Personalist Performance.”
122. Robert O. Work, “Deputy Secretary of Defense Speech at CNAS Defense Forum,” JW
Marriott, Washington, CORRIENTE CONTINUA., December 14, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/
Speech-View/Article/634214/cnas-defense-forum.
123. Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “China Said to Deploy Drones after Unrest in Xinjiang,” New York Times,
Agosto 19, 2014, http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/2008/2019/china-said-to-deploy-
drones-after-unrest-in-xinjiang.
124. Davis et al., “Armed and Dangerous?" pag. 6.
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El debate sobre la proliferación de drones 35
sion weapon where the drone, likely with explosives attached, is the weapon
itself.125 Some groups initially turned to suicide bombing partially because this
tactic provided accuracy against either important civilian or hard military tar-
gets.126 Drones offer a similar level of precision, potentially allowing groups
facing personnel shortages to use drones instead of suicide bombs in some sit-
uations. Groups might even be able to accomplish useful (para ellos) levels of
destruction without advanced drones. A hobbyist drone mounted with a small
amount of explosive could potentially have the ability to generate damage and
terrorize the population, while having the advantage of being too small to de-
tect for air or even ground defenses that keep more traditional threats in their
sights.127 Take, Por ejemplo, the drone that landed on the White House lawn in
2015. Although the drone was unarmed, its ability to transgress fortiªed
boundaries illustrates how drones could be used for more sinister purposes.128
Smaller drones could also be attractive for lone-wolf actors inspired by mili-
tant groups around the world. Por ejemplo, individuals similar to those who
carried out attacks in Sydney, Australia, in December 2014 and at the Boston
Marathon in April 2013 might consider using hobbyist drones armed with
explosives or simple ªrearms to create psychological terror.129 In 2014, el
Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested a suspect who allegedly planned to
ºy a drone armed with a bomb into a school.130
Militant groups may also value larger drones for the same reason that states
do—namely, their utility for surveillance and strike operations. To be sure, el
ability to launch and ºy drones from a distance could make it easier for mili-
tant groups to conduct strikes. Some nonstate actors have already demon-
strated the capacity to operate drones. Hezbollah possesses an array of drones
125. Eugene Miasnikov, “The Threat of Terrorism Using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Technical As-
pects” (Moscow: Center for Arms Control, Energía, and Environmental Studies, 2005), http://
www.armscontrol.ru/UAV/UAV-report.pdf.
126. Bruce Hoffman, “The Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” Atlantic Monthly, Junio 2003, páginas. 40–47.
127. Sarah Kreps’s interview with U.S. Air Force colonel stationed in South Korea, Marzo 2014.
For an example of the use of small drones to evade surveillance by a nation-state, see North Ko-
rea’s use of surveillance drones in South Korea. The drones crashed but evaded detection by air
defense systems. As Van Jackson writes, “[I]t’s the low-performance qualities of North Korea’s
drones that enable them to evade South Korean defenses, which are optimized for more traditional
threats from bigger, faster, higher-altitude aircraft.” See Jackson, “Kim Jong Un’s Tin Can Air
Fuerza,” Foreign Policy, Noviembre 12, 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/2011/2012/kim-jong-
uns-tin-can-air-force/.
128. Michael S.. Schmidt, “Secret Service Arrests Man after Drone Flies near White House,” New
York Times, Puede 14, 2015.
129. Ibídem.
130. Alex Brandon, “FBI: Man Plotted to Fly Drone-Like Toy Planes with Bombs into School,"
Associated Press/CBS News, Abril 8, 2014, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fbi-man-in-
connecticut-plotted-to-ºy-drone-like-toy-planes-with-bombs-into-school/.
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Seguridad Internacional 41:2 36
acquired from Iran, including the Ababil, a surveillance drone. En 2012, Israel
shot down a Hezbollah-owned drone that reportedly had the ability to com-
municate surveillance data back to the group’s leaders, illustrating the poten-
tial for nonstate actors to use drones for military purposes.131 Hezbollah also
allegedly has an Iranian-made Shahed-129 drone, which carries Sadid-1 mis-
siles. The group claimed to use this drone in a strike against al-Nusra forces in
Syria in late 2014, though these reports are unconªrmed. Hamas has similar
drones. Although Israel has had success at shooting them down, Hamas
advertises its drone capabilities as a way to signal strength to its followers.132
Por supuesto, the logistical constraints that make it difªcult for some nation-
states to operate state-of-the-art drones will undoubtedly apply to nonstate
actors as well. Sin embargo, Hezbollah’s and Hamas’s use of drones for sur-
veillance purposes demonstrates the way that violent nonstate actors may be
able to use even simple surveillance drones to do the kind of reconnaissance
necessary to plan attacks. Además, if operating armed drones, even at rea-
sonably short ranges, continues to become easier for militaries without vast lo-
gistical support as the technology improves, they could become more useful
for militant groups as well.
Evaluating the Drone Debate
En años recientes, the proliferation of drones has shifted from a theoretical
concern to a reality with which countries must grapple. The most advanced
current-generation drones, those that give nations the ability to conduct strikes
around the world, require intense logistical support and global bandwidth of
the sort that will likely remain outside the realm of possibility for many coun-
intentos. Yet military-relevant drones, both armed and unarmed, are spreading, en
contrast to predictions that useful drones would diffuse slowly: Italy now
ªelds armed drones, and relatively underdeveloped states—Iraq, Nigeria, y
Pakistan—have also employed them. Al mismo tiempo, sophisticated surveil-
lance drones, which can be used to monitor other countries or domestic regime
opponents, are also spreading quickly, as acquisition by France, España, y el
Netherlands demonstrates.
131. Carlo Muñoz, “Iran Claims Drones Gained Access to Secret Israeli Facilities,” The Hill,
Octubre 29, 2012, http://thehill.com/policy/defense/264691-iran-claims-drones-gained-access-to-
secret-israeli-facilities.
132. “Hamas Flexes Muscles with Gaza Drone Flight,” Agence France-Presse, December 14, 2014,
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/12/14/Hamas-ºies-drone-over-Gaza-
during-anniversary-parade-.html.
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El debate sobre la proliferación de drones 37
Mesa 1. Overall Consequences of Current-Generation Drone Proliferation
Context
Counterterrorism operations
Interstate war
Crisis onset and deterrence
Coercive diplomacy
Domestic control and repression
Use by nonstate actors
Consequences of Current-Generation
Drone Proliferation
alto
bajo
moderate
bajo
alto
moderate
In light of these trends, this article shows the potential effects of drone pro-
liferation in six different contexts, making our study one of the most compre-
hensive assessments of this topic carried out to date. Mesa 1 resume
the main results from our analysis. As the table shows, the implications of
drone proliferation for the international security environment are more hetero-
geneous and complex than most of the existing scholarship and policy com-
mentary suggests. Drones are neither a game changer across every dimension
of international security nor simply a redundant military technology with little
signiªcance for peace and stability. Based on our analysis, several main correc-
tives to the narratives that appear in the scholarship on drone proliferation are
worth emphasizing.
Primero, advanced armed drones have advantages over manned alternatives in
ways that make them attractive in certain settings. By not putting the life of the
user at risk, offering some cost advantages, and providing greater endurance
than manned aircraft, drones are often easier to employ than manned aircraft.
De este modo, when there are missions for which drones are appropriate, como
counterterrorism operations, drones may make the use of force more likely.
Segundo, some analysts exaggerate the capabilities of current-generation
drones. With limited weapons capabilities, the ability to operate only at rela-
tively slow speeds, and no ability to defend themselves against ground-based
or airborne threats, there are signiªcant limits on the types of operations where
drones are useful. Current-generation drones are unlikely to be useful in con-
tested environments. Como resultado, the utility of drones for interstate operations
or coercive diplomacy is quite limited when an adversary has sophisticated
air defenses.
Tercero, existing views on drone proliferation gloss over a key point: drones
may have stabilizing effects on the international security environment in some
casos. Our analysis suggests that by enhancing the ability of states to monitor
disputed territories and borders, drones can potentially reduce uncertainty
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Seguridad Internacional 41:2 38
about an adversary’s behavior, which could promote peace if the enemy’s in-
tentions are benign. If the adversary is making preparations for an attack,
drones could increase the likelihood of early detection. Particularly given the
ºedgling, albeit shaky, norm that shooting down drones does not constitute
grounds for escalating a conºict, this is a signiªcant aspect of drone prolifera-
tion that existing studies ignore. Pero, because they make countries more likely
to use force in certain circumstances and are easier to deploy, there is always a
risk that drones could encourage crisis escalation in a case where an actor
views the shooting down of its drones as especially provocative, or where
the deployment of a drone leads to a diplomatic incident that might not other-
wise occur.
Cuatro, current-generation drones could have signiªcant consequences for
domestic politics. Democracies likely value drones in part because they reduce
the risk of casualties, making the use of force more acceptable to the public.
Por otro lado, authoritarian leaders may ªnd drones attractive for moni-
toring and repressing domestic opponents. Drones may also allow leaders to
exert greater control over the military and become less dependent on large
number of soldiers on the battleªeld. In this context, the technical constraints
of drones are minimized because governments generally control their airspace,
reducing the risk that a drone would be shot down. Hasta la fecha, there have been
relatively few uses of drones domestically, but this may change in the future.
Leaders in Nigeria and Pakistan have used already drones to address regime
threats, and it is not inconceivable that other states, such as Saudi Arabia, may
employ armed drones to deal with similar threats in the future.
Quinto, even small drones could prove useful for militant groups that deploy
drones attached with inexpensive and rudimentary explosives as weapons.
Countries such as the United States tend to have sophisticated air defenses that
are focused on larger aerial objects, or advanced ground defenses geared to-
ward stopping a truck full of explosives, but nonstate groups seeking to wreak
havoc could do so with drones that become the equivalent of suicide bombs.
Future Developments
One challenge in assessing the consequences of drone proliferation is the
speed of technological change. This article focuses on current-generation
drones, but next-generation systems already in development could improve
the capabilities of drones to perform the types of surveillance and strike mis-
sions they do now, as well as gain the ability to conduct new missions cur-
rently limited to manned aircraft.
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El debate sobre la proliferación de drones 39
Por ejemplo, China is currently pursuing the development of a stealth
drone, reportedly named the Sharp Sword, which has already undergone ini-
tial ºight testing. The Sharp Sword would not only have a larger weapons bay
than China’s CH-4 or Wing Loong; it would also have low observability char-
acteristics that could make it harder for Western radars to detect. Until early
2016, Estados Unidos. Navy was considering acquiring a next-generation armed drone
(UCLASS, as mentioned above) as the follow-on to the X-47B, an experimental
platform. The X-47B has an air-to-air refueling capability, allowing it to extend
its range. También, it is reportedly designed to support stealth technology, y eso
uses a piloting algorithm to take off from and land on an aircraft carrier. Alguno
plans for follow-on programs included a large weapons bay capable of launch-
ing a wide variety of munitions, not just the Hellªre used by the Reaper and
the Predator.133
The United States decided, sin embargo, to turn the UCLASS program into an
unmanned, carrier-based, air-to-air refueling program—the MQ-25 Stingray/
Carrier-Based Aerial Refueling System (CBARS)—and delay acquisition of
a next-generation armed platform.134 The capabilities demonstrated by the
X47-B show, sin embargo, that if bureaucratic political support exists, los unidos
States could build a drone with the ability to do what current-generation
drones cannot do (es decir., operate in environments with adversary air defenses
and complete strike missions more like those conducted by manned aircraft
now). Similarmente, one version of plans for the U.S. Air Force’s Long Range
Strike Bomber includes an “optional manning” feature that would allow
the aircraft to go from a manned to an unmanned platform, “meant to give the
bomber the best attributes of a killer drone (long endurance, no risk to air-
crews) and a manned warplane (greater ºexibility and the ability to respond to
a fast-acting enemy).”135
These advances would make drones more useful in conventional, interstate
settings given that they would be less vulnerable to air defenses. Como resultado,
armed drones might assume a larger role in the context of wars such as the
conºict in Syria or in a potential U.S.-China or NATO-Russia conºict. Alabama-
though more operationally capable drones could translate into more capabili-
133. LaGrone, “Navy Conducts Successful Test of Aerial Refueling with X-47b, UCAS-D Program
Ending.”
134. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Navy Hits Gas on Flying Gas Truck, CBARS: Will It Be Armed?"
Breaking Defense, Marzo 11, 2016, http://breakingdefense.com/2016/03/navy-hits-gas-on-ºying-
gas-truck-cbars-will-it-be-armed/.
135. David Axe, “Bombs Away: How the Air Force Sold Its Risky New $55 Billion Plane,” Wired,
Marzo 26, 2012, https://www.wired.com/2012/03/airforce-bomber-gamble/ (emphasis in the
original).
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Seguridad Internacional 41:2 40
ties for striking in contested environments, it is unlikely that they would make
interstate conºict—which is rare for a number of reasons136—signiªcantly
more likely.
Además, ongoing trends in the development of commercial drones
could reduce the cost of drones and make them ªnancially advantageous for
militaries to acquire. Military technologies based on underlying commercial
capabilities generally experience faster relative price declines than military
technologies such as stealth, which have only military markets.137 As the com-
mercial drone market continues growing around the world, price competition
in the high-end commercial market is likely to make more capabilities (exclud-
ing the military aspects of those capabilities, such as the most advanced sur-
veillance packages and launching weapons) available at a lower price point.
Trends in the development of military robotics suggest that drones are
merely the beginning with regard to the integration of robotics in militaries
around the world. Por ejemplo, Israel already deploys an armed, remotely pi-
loted, naval surface ship to patrol its sea borders.138 The U.S. Navy is develop-
ing the Knifeªsh, an unmanned underwater vehicle that will help protect its
ships from sea mines.139 Russia is reportedly developing ground-based drones
to help guard the perimeters of its ballistic missile bases.140 These systems are
likely to be among the ªrst of many developed and deployed by militaries
around the world. From European countries facing labor shortages and budget
crunches to autocracies concerned with regime stability above all, drones and
related military robotic systems are likely to appear increasingly attractive
over the next decade. As drones move from a niche capability to part and par-
cel of how militaries generate and deploy military power, their effects will un-
doubtedly change.
Over the longer term, as technological uncertainty increases, the effects of
military robotics could further shift the development and use of military
136. John E. Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (Nueva York: Libros Básicos,
1989). In Jon R. Lindsay’s analysis of why cyber conºict between China and the United States is
unlikely to escalate to militarized war, he notes that the cost of warfare and foregone trade is pro-
hibitive. See Lindsay, “The Impact of China on Cybersecurity: Fiction and Friction,” International
Security, volumen. 39, No. 3 (Invierno 2014/15), páginas. 7–47.
137. miguel c.. Horowitz, La difusión del poder militar: Causes and Consequences for International
Política (Princeton, NUEVA JERSEY.: Prensa de la Universidad de Princeton, 2010).
138. Inbal Orpaz, “Israel Navy’s First Unmanned Surface Vehicle Keeps an Eye on the Sea,"
Haaretz, Abril 17, 2013, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israel-navy-s-ªrst-
unmanned-surface-vehicle-keeps-an-eye-on-the-sea.premium-1.515978.
139. Daniel Perry, “Navy ‘Mine-Hunter’ AUV Sets Mission Endurance Record,” U.S. Naval Re-
search Laboratory, Noviembre 20, 2013, http://www.nrl.navy.mil/media/news-releases/2013/navy-
mine-hunter-auv-sets-mission-endurance-record.
140. Kelvin Wong, “Russia to Deploy Armed UGVs at Ballistic Missile Bases,” Jane’s IHS Interna-
tional Defense Review, Marzo 2014.
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El debate sobre la proliferación de drones 41
fuerza. Por ejemplo, a shift to smaller, cheaper swarming platforms—which
involve many drones flying together in formation—as opposed to large plat-
forms could drive changes in how military operate. Given the signiªcant un-
certainty about technological trends in these areas, sin embargo, such outcomes
remain speculative.
Conclusión
To whatever extent a U.S. monopoly on cutting-edge drones existed, it is over.
Given ongoing proliferation trends and the technological advancements made
by countries such as China, drones (and military robotics more generally) ap-
pear to be a critical area of military investment for many states over the next
generación. How should the United States respond to this trend? Washington
has placed signiªcant restrictions on UAV exports, but if widespread prolifera-
tion is likely anyway, especially as countries such as China and Israel seem to
be less discriminate in the marketplace, the United States could increase its
level of drone exports. Which policy would best advance U.S. strategic inter-
ests in the coming years and decades?
There is no easy answer, as there are costs and beneªts associated with each
acercarse. One contribution of our study is to underscore the trade-offs that
the United States must consider as it responds to the proliferation of drones.
The global spread of militarily useful UAVs could affect U.S. national security,
but in more limited ways than the alarmist view suggests—namely, by lower-
ing barriers to the use of force domestically or in uncontested airspace. Eso
drones are unlikely to prompt new interstate conºicts or transform interna-
tional relations, sin embargo, suggests that the United States could reap the
beneªts of exporting UAVs in some cases while avoiding the most signiªcant
costos. Además, given the potential for drones to provide useful information
about an adversary’s maneuvers and possibly ease tension in some cir-
cumstances, A NOSOTROS. exports could help provide reassurance to Washington and
its allies.
Sin embargo, there are several potential concerns for the United States re-
garding drone proliferation. As described above, technological advancements
will likely make some drones more suitable for use in contested airspace, después-
tentially increasing their military and political effects. En efecto, as drones con-
tinue proliferating and are used for a much broader array of missions than
counterterrorism strikes, Estados Unidos. military will have to consider how to deal
with the use of drones by potential adversaries in areas where its forces
are present.
The use of armed drones also raises important ethical dilemmas that may
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Seguridad Internacional 41:2 42
become more acute as the technology spreads globally. The United States has a
potential role to play in shaping global norms for drone use. More transpar-
ency by the United States concerning its decisionmaking process for drone
strikes could give it more credibility in seeking to convince other countries to
use their newly acquired drone capabilities in ways that comply with interna-
tional law.141
Finalmente, one long-term risk for the United States is that its edge in more tradi-
tional, manned systems causes it to underestimate the potential uses of drones
and other military robotic systems as the technology continues to advance.
Leading militaries often struggle in the face of innovation, as it can be dif-
ªcult to combine new technologies with human capital and organizational
processes to effectively ªeld them.142 That the U.S. Air Force has no program of
record for the development of a next-generation armed drone and the U.S.
Navy canceled the UCLASS program suggests that the bureaucratic politics of
drones remain an important obstacle.
In any case, it seems likely that drones are here to stay.143 It would therefore
behoove the international community to anticipate the regional and interna-
tional consequences of further drone proliferation. Our analysis shows that
understanding these consequences first requires identifying the contexts in
which drones may be used. Based on that perspective, it is clear that current-
generation drones are not uniformly transformative. When it comes to future
developments, sin embargo, it may be a different story.
141. Zenko and Kreps, “Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation.”
142. Horowitz, La difusión del poder militar.
143. Byman, “Why Drones Work," pag. 32.
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