The Structure of Success - IA de Investigación especializada en el MIT

The Structure of Success

La estructura de
Success
How the Internal Distribution of Power
Drives Armed Group Behavior and
National Movement Effectiveness

Peter Krause

When do national
movements succeed? Speciªcally, when and why does the use of violence by
armed groups within such movements help to achieve their strategic objec-
tives, such as international recognition, territorial control, and the creation of
new states? Two recent struggles shed light on the debate among policymakers
and scholars.

Amid the ongoing civil war in Syria, the most common refrain heard among
opposition supporters has been that Syrian rebel groups must unite to topple
President Bashar al-Assad. In the fall of 2012, A NOSOTROS. Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton declared, “It is encouraging to see some progress toward greater oppo-
sition unity, but we all know there is more work to be done.”1 Subsequent
unity talks in Doha, Madrid, and Istanbul have failed to unite a fragmented
opposition, whose inªghting is symbolized by the July 2013 killing of a com-
mander of the Free Syrian Army by the group Islamic State of Iraq and Syria,
itself a sometime competitor of the jihadi group Jabhat al-Nusra. All three of
these groups are tenuous allies, a lo mejor, and hostile adversaries, at worst, con
the organization designed to unify the opposition movement: the Syrian
National Coalition. A similar effort has absorbed the Palestinian national
movement for decades, as foreign leaders and many of their own Palestinian
supporters have tried to push Fatah and Hamas to unite within a single insti-
tutional framework to further the strategic progress of their movement. El
leaders of both groups have publicly expressed support for the move, even if
unity remains elusive.2

Peter Krause is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Boston College and a Research Afªliate in the Se-
curity Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (CON).

For their helpful comments and suggestions, the author would like to thank Max Abrahms, Eva
Bellin, Timothy Crawford, Martha Crenshaw, David Deese, Jennifer Erickson, Shai Feldman, Kelly
Greenhill, Stathis Kalyvas, Ian Lustick, Marc Lynch, Jonathan Makransky, Roger Petersen, Barry
posen, Robert Ross, Paul Staniland, Stephen Van Evera, his interviewees, the anonymous review-
ers, and participants in seminars where this project was presented: CON, the Belfer Center for Sci-
ence and International Affairs, the Crown Center for Middle East Studies, the Project on Middle
East Political Science, the University of Chicago, the Institute for Security and Conºict Studies,
and Boston College.

1. Hillary Clinton, remarks at the Ad Hoc Friends of the Syrian People Ministerial, Nueva York,
Nueva York, Septiembre 28, 2012, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/09/198455.htm.
2. “Fatah, Hamas in Calls for Palestinian Unity,” Agence France-Presse, December 9, 2012; and Pe-

Seguridad Internacional, volumen. 38, No. 3 (Invierno 2013/14), páginas. 72–116, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00148
© 2014 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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The Structure of Success 73

These policy arguments rest on generations of scholarship that claim that
united movements are the most successful in achieving their strategic objec-
tives. As Bard O’Neill notes, “Few, if any, experts on and practitioners of insur-
gency have not stressed the importance of unity within insurgent ranks.”3
Wendy Pearlman makes a strong theoretical and empirical case that united
movements exhibit greater cohesion among groups, centralized command to
resolve disputes and direct a common strategy, and less of the inªghting and
spoiling that prevent strategic progress.4 In his landmark study of social
movimientos, William Gamson agreed with the relative effectiveness of unity.
As for the alternative, he argued, “The sorry reputation of factionalism is a de-
served one.”5

Sin embargo, a growing number of prominent scholars have suggested that
“internally divided movements are more likely to get concessions from their
host states,” and that therefore the Palestinians and the Syrian opposition
fragmentation.6 Kathleen
might be best served by continued internal
Cunningham, Herbert Haines, Mark Lichbach, Desirée Nilsson, and Jesse
Driscoll claim that movements with multiple factions can generate beneªcial
radical ºank effects, reduce the principal-agent problem for the movement’s
base of supporters, and provide ºexibility in coalitions that helps to resolve
conºict and offers incentives to the target state to make strategic concessions to
moderate groups.7 These ªndings also have roots in earlier scholarship on so-
cial movements. As Luther Gerlach and Virginia Hine concluded, “When the

ter Krause, “Many Roads to Palestine? The Potential and Peril of Multiple Strategies within a Di-
vided Palestinian National Movement,” Crown Center for Middle East Studies Brief, No. 60
(2012).
3. Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (Washington, CORRIENTE CONTINUA.:
Brassey’s, 1990), pag. 124.
4. Wendy Pearlman, Violence, Nonviolence, and the Palestinian National Movements (Cambridge:
Prensa de la Universidad de Cambridge, 2011); and Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: A Study of
Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics (Nueva York: McGraw-Hill, 1952), páginas. 126–163.
5. William A. Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest, 2d ed. (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1990),
pag. 101.
6. Kathleen G. Cunningham, “Divide and Conquer or Divide and Concede: How Do States Re-
spond to Internally Divided Separatists?” American Political Science Review, volumen. 105, No. 2 (Puede
2011), pag. 276.
7. Ibídem.; Herbert Haines, Black Radicals and the Civil Rights Mainstream, 1954–1970 (Knoxville: Uni-
versity of Tennessee Press, 1988); Mark I. Lichbach, The Cooperator’s Dilemma (ann-arbor: universidad-
sity of Michigan Press, 1996), pag. 167; Desirée Nilsson, “Turning Weakness into Strength: Militar
Capacidades, Multiple Rebel Groups, and Negotiated Settlements,” Conºict Management and Peace
Ciencia, volumen. 27, No. 3 (Junio 2010), páginas. 253–271; and Jesse Driscoll, “Commitment Problems or Bid-
ding Wars? Rebel Fragmentation as Peace Building,” Journal of Conºict Resolution, volumen. 56, No. 1
(Febrero 2012), páginas. 1118–1149.

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Seguridad Internacional 38:3 74

success of movements is reported as having occurred ‘because of’ rather than
‘in spite of’ organizational ªssion and lack of cohesion, we will have come to
understand the nature of movement dynamics much more clearly.”8

So, which type of national movement is the most successful? Neither. Alabama-
though the united-divided distinction effectively incorporates fragmentation
and institutions within movements that many scholars treat as unitary, it sys-
tematically discounts the most important factor that deªnes a movement’s
estructura: the distribution of power. By incorporating the distribution of power
into a typology of movement structure, this study ªnds that united and frag-
mented movements exhibit more similarities than differences, because they
both contain multiple signiªcant groups and therefore internally competitive
movement systems.

Hegemonic national movements with one signiªcant group are more likely
to be strategically successful. This movement structure provides incentives for
the dominant group to cement its position in the movement hierarchy through
strategic gains; reduces counterproductive violent mechanisms from within
and foreign meddling from without; and improves the movement’s coherence
in strategy, clarity in signaling, and credibility in threats and assurances.
Power thus drives both actions and outcomes in national movements. Si, cómo-
alguna vez, the hierarchy of a movement shifts over time but the number of sig-
niªcant groups in the movement system remains the same, the groups are
simply exchanging roles in a recurring play that is likely to have the same stra-
tegic ªnale.

Empirical analysis of this study’s power distribution theory of movements
and its competitors involves comparative, longitudinal analysis of seventeen
campaigns involving sixteen groups within the Palestinian and Algerian na-
tional movements. Both movements contained groups that shared the goal of a
new nation-state while engaged in competition for movement leadership. El
use of longitudinal analysis of a smaller number of campaigns within two
movements allows for the process tracing of key causal mechanisms as well
as improved isolation and assessment of the impact of movement structure
on political actions and outcomes. The number and hierarchy of signiªcant
groups within each movement shifted signiªcantly over time as they both ex-
perienced a mixed record of strategic success and failure. En suma, the number

8. Luther P. Gerlach and Virginia H. Hine, People, Fuerza, Cambiar: Movements of Social Transformation
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), pag. 64; and Frances F. Piven and Richard Cloward, Poor People’s
Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail (Nueva York: Pantheon, 1977).

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The Structure of Success 75

of signiªcant groups within the Palestinian and Algerian national movements
drove the effectiveness of their campaigns, and the hierarchical position of
their respective groups drove their behavior, with striking results.

This article consists of six main sections. The ªrst three sections present the
power distribution theory, including a typology of movements based on
the internal distribution of power, the dependent variable of strategic success,
and the hegemony and hierarchy hypotheses with their related causal mecha-
nisms. The fourth and ªfth sections conduct an empirical analysis of the effec-
tiveness of the Palestinian and Algerian national movements. The ªnal section
identiªes the implications of these arguments and ªndings for scholarship
and policy.

A Typology of Movement Systems

The structure of the international system is driven by the number of great
powers; the structure of party systems is driven by the number of effective
parties; and the structure of movement systems is driven by the number of
signiªcant groups. This basic but overlooked fact suggests that the most ne-
glected aspect of movement structure identiªed by Kristin Bakke, Kathleen
Cunningham, and Lee Seymour—power—is also the most crucial.9

The structure of a national movement is ªrst deªned by the number of
signiªcant groups it contains, because the most powerful groups play the
dominant role in campaign dynamics and outcomes.10 The structure of the in-
ternational system is based on the United States and China, not Belize and
Luxembourg; the structure of the American party system is based on the

9. Kristin M. Bakke, Kathleen G. Cunningham, and Lee J.M. Seymour, “A Plague of Initials: Frag-
mentation, Cohesion, and Inªghting in Civil Wars,” Perspectives on Politics, volumen. 10, No. 2 (Junio
2012), pag. 267. Social movements—of which national movements are one type—are deªned as “in-
formal interaction networks between a plurality of individuals, grupos, and/or organizations”
with “a shared set of beliefs and a sense of belonging” that are “engaged in political and/or cul-
tural conºicts, meant to promote or oppose social change.” Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani,
Social Movements: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), páginas. 14-15.
10. I deªne organized groups as those units that have an autonomous leadership that possesses
authority over group members, often identiªed through a general differentiation of roles among
internal elements and a duplication of roles when compared to other organized groups. Para examen-
por ejemplo, Mia Bloom notes that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was divided by specializa-
tion into the Black Tigers, Sea Tigers, Baby Tigers, Air Tigers, and Women’s Military Units, y
each possessed a differentiation of roles under a single leadership. Por otro lado, the Tamil
Eelam Liberation Organization was a different organized group as its units duplicated LTTE roles
and had a different, autonomous leadership. Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terrorism
(Nueva York: Columbia University Press, 2005), páginas. 58–62.

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Seguridad Internacional 38:3 76

Republican Party and the Democratic Party, not the Modern Whig Party and
the Socialist Party; and the structure of a national movement such as that of the
Palestinians is based on Fatah and Hamas, not the Palestinian Arab Front and
the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front. Even though some movements experi-
ence periods when the unorganized grassroots or weaker organizations may
appear to be taking the lead—as in the Russian Revolution, the ªrst intifada, o
the recent uprisings in Egypt—strong organizations such as the Bolshevik
Party, Fatah, and the Muslim Brotherhood, respectivamente, soon (re)gain control
over the less organized masses and the movement itself.

For national movements, a signiªcant group is either the strongest group in
the movement or another strong group that has the capability to realistically
challenge the strongest group for predominance in the foreseeable future. Ser-
cause the strength of armed groups is far more volatile than that of states, este
study considers a group signiªcant if its membership size, economic wealth,
or seat distribution in common political institutions is one-third as large as
that of the strongest group.11 A group with one-third the recruits or funding of
another can realistically overtake it within the foreseeable future, mientras
such an outcome is unheard of among states.

A national movement with three signiªcant groups may mean more poten-
tial rivals, but the key distinction is between those movements with one
signiªcant group and those with two or more or, en otras palabras, entre
movements that contain a competitive and a noncompetitive internal environ-
mento. This distinction has precedent in party systems (hegemony vs. oligar-
chy) and economics (monopoly vs. oligopoly).12

A less important distinction in the structure of national movements that
weakly mimics some aspects of the number of signiªcant groups involves alli-
ances among these groups.13 In an alliance, individuals are generally loyal to

11. Scholars consider states that are 50 por ciento a 80 percent as strong as the strongest state in the
international system great powers. See Randall Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s
Strategy of World Conquest (Nueva York: Columbia University Press, 1998), páginas. 16–17; A.F.K.
Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), pag. 44; y
Douglas Lemke, Regions of War and Peace (Cambridge: Prensa de la Universidad de Cambridge, 2002), pag. 99.
On effective parties, see Markku Laasko and Rein Taagepera, “Effective Number of Parties: A
Measure with Application to West Europe,” Comparative Political Studies, volumen. 12, No. 3 (Abril
1979), páginas. 3–27.
12. Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge
Prensa universitaria, 1976); and James Friedman, Oligopoly Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Prensa, 1983).
13. Fotini Christia, Alliance Formation in Civil Wars (Cambridge: Prensa de la Universidad de Cambridge,
2012).

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The Structure of Success 77

Cifra 1. A Typology of National Movements

their groups ªrst, and individual group leadership maintains ultimate deci-
sionmaking power, even if groups agree to try to coordinate certain actions.
The power concentrated in a single alliance is therefore far less cohesive in or-
ganization, coherent in action, and stable in alignment than a single group.
These factors make a movement with a unifying alliance somewhat different
from a fragmented movement with no such ties, but even more distinct from a
hegemonic movement with a single dominant group. en este estudio, national
movements count as united if all signiªcant groups are in a single alliance.

Based on the number of signiªcant groups and their alliances, three types of
movement systems emerge given their internal distribution of power: hege-
monic, united, and fragmented (see ªgure 1).14

The Strategic Success of a National Movement

Although they may have different ideologies and additional goals, groups and
individuals within the same social movement are bound together by the desire
to achieve a shared strategic objective.15 To hold that objective constant across

14. The bottom left quadrant is a null set because a movement with one signiªcant group must
have all signiªcant groups united by deªnition.
15. For a more in-depth discussion of the distinction between strategic objectives—which are gen-
erally shared by a social movement and include ending military occupation and altering the na-
ture of the ruling government—and organizational objectives—which beneªt a single group and
include increased recruits and funding—see Peter Krause, “The Political Effectiveness of Non-
State Violence: A Two-Level Framework to Transform a Deceptive Debate,” Estudios de Seguridad,
volumen. 22, No. 2 (April/June 2013), páginas. 259–294.

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Seguridad Internacional 38:3 78

movements and best engage with the existing literature on effectiveness, este
study focuses on national movements whose common strategic objective is the
creation of a new state.

For national movements, a dichotomous measure of victory or defeat fails to
capture substantial, accessible variation in movement progress. The achieve-
ment of a new state does not easily lend itself to continuous measurement
either, sin embargo. Por lo tanto, the dependent variable—campaign outcome—is
assessed along a four-tiered ordinal scale, which has signiªcant precedent in
the literature on the effectiveness of nonstate violence and national move-
ments.16 The achievement of a new state is coded as “total success.” Gaining
sovereign control of territory for the future state or new protostate institutions
is coded as “moderate success.” Recognition as a legitimate national move-
ment by the United Nations is coded as “limited success.” A lack of any gains
in territory, institutions, or recognition is coded as “failure.” Under what
conditions are strategic success and failure more likely to occur?

Power Distribution Theory: Hegemony and Hierarchy

Power distribution theory makes three unique predictions that challenge exist-
ing scholarship. Primero, the hegemony hypothesis predicts that hegemonic na-
tional movements with one signiªcant group are more likely to be strategically
successful than united or fragmented national movements with two or more
signiªcant groups (ver tabla 1). As summarized in ªgure 2, there are three key
mechanisms that sustain the hegemony hypothesis.

Segundo, the hierarchy hypothesis predicts that a group’s position in the
hierarchical structure of the movement—hegemon,
leader, challenger, o
subordinate—drives whether the group pursues strategic objectives and
uses or restrains violence to do so (ver tabla 1). en este estudio, the hierarchy
hypothesis largely serves to support the hegemony hypothesis through its
causal mechanisms.

Tercero, power distribution theory agrees with its united and fragmented
competitors that movement structure drives movement outcome, at least in
some form. This places power distribution theory at odds with the broader ef-
fectiveness literature that treats movements as unitary and movement struc-
ture as insigniªcant. This literature applies the well-developed concepts and

16. Max Abrahms, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” Seguridad Internacional, volumen. 31, No. 2 (Caer
2006), páginas. 42–78; and Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Esteban, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Stra-
tegic Logic of Nonviolent Conºict (Nueva York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

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The Structure of Success 79

Mesa 1. Predictions of the Power Distribution Theory of Movements

Campaign

Movement
Sistema

Movement
Hierarchy

Predicted Group Actions

Campaign 1 fragmented

Campaign 2 fragmented

Campaign 3 united

1. group A
2. group B
3. group C

1. group C
2. group A
3. group B

Campaign 4 fragmented

1. group C
2. group A

Groups C and B use violence to
pursue pure organizational
objetivos. Group A initially attempts
to restrain them and partially
pursues strategic goals.

Groups B and A use violence to
pursue pure organizational
objetivos. Group C initially attempts
to restrain them and partially
pursues strategic goals.

Group A uses violence to pursue
pure organizational goals. Group
C initially attempts to restrain it
and partially pursues strategic
objetivos.

Predicho
Movement
Outcome

failure

failure or
limitado
success

failure

Campaign 5 hegemonic

1. group C

Group C pursues strategic goals
and resists any attempts at
outbidding, chain-ganging, o
spoiling.

moderate
or total
success

NOTE: This table frames the key predictions of the hegemony hypothesis, represented by the
large arrow, and the hierarchy hypothesis, represented by the small arrow. The predicted
movement outcomes should be understood as probabilistic predictions of relative suc-
cess between movement system types. Note that this table and tables 2 y 3 present the
hierarchy among signiªcant groups—hegemons, líderes, and challengers—for the pur-
poses of simplicity, but each movement is likely to have many less powerful subordinates
ranked below these groups as well.

theoretical frameworks of interstate bargaining and coercion to suggest that
variation in the effectiveness of nonstate violence and national movements is
driven by what the violence is meant to achieve (objetivo),17 how much power
one has to achieve it (strength),18 who the power is directed against (regime

17. Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist
Campaigns (Princeton, NUEVA JERSEY.: Prensa de la Universidad de Princeton, 2009), páginas. 77–82.
18. Charles Tilly, “From Interactions to Outcomes in Social Movements,” in Marco G. Giugni,
Doug McAdam, and Tilly, editores., How Social Movements Matter (Mineápolis: University of Minne-
sota Press, 1999).

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Seguridad Internacional 38:3 80

Cifra 2. How Hegemonic Movements Cause Strategic Success

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tipo),19 how one employs that power to achieve the desired goal (estrategia),20
and how clear and credible one is in making threats to employ violence and as-
surances to stop it (credibility and signaling).21 Power distribution theory
holds that many of the factors identiªed in these works—strategy, credibility,
and signaling—are driven by movement structure, and they serve as interven-
ing variables in the theory’s causal mechanisms. Sin embargo, theories that
treat movements as unitary suggest no variation in strategic success across
campaigns as movement system structure changes, ceteris paribus.

To sum up these three predictions, power distribution theory suggests that a
hierarchical shift will change group actions but not movement outcome; a sys-
temic shift will change both actions and outcome; and a shift in the distribu-

19. Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of
Insurgents and Regimes since 1956 (Princeton, NUEVA JERSEY.: Prensa de la Universidad de Princeton, 1992).
20. Ivan Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conºict (Cambridge: Leva-
bridge University Press, 2006); and Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson, “Rage against the Machines: Ex-
plaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars,” International Organization, volumen. 63, No. 1 (Enero
2009), páginas. 67–106.
21. Alexander L. George and William E. simons, editores., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Roca,
Colo.: Westview, 1994), páginas. 280–288; and Abrahms, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work.”

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The Structure of Success 81

tion of power that does not alter the movement hierarchy or movement system
is unlikely to lead to changes in either actions or outcome.

structuring incentives: movement hierarchy and strategic goals

The causal logic of power distribution theory starts with a basic yet over-
looked claim: group actions drive strategic success, but groups are not driven
primarily by strategic motivations. Power distribution theory assumes that
groups in national movements, like most organizations, are concerned with
ensuring their survival and maximizing their strength above all else. Cómo
then does strategic progress occur? Although the structure of a national move-
ment cannot alter the preferences of armed groups, it can alter how they pur-
sue and realize those preferences. To paraphrase Miles’ Law, the hierarchy
hypothesis argues that where you stand on strategic success and the use of vi-
olence depends on where you sit in the movement hierarchy.22

The achievement of a new state includes a mix of public goods (ending an
occupation), club goods (citizenship), and private goods (political ofªce,
wealth, and status). Pursuit of this strategic goal is costly, as it expends re-
sources and makes a group a potential target of the ruling regime. Por lo tanto, a
group will pursue strategic goals (1) when these private and club goods are
the best resources for a group to increase its power and (2) when the group is
more likely to capture these private and club goods. A group’s position in the
movement hierarchy drives both of these considerations.23

The dominant group in a hegemonic movement is no less self-interested
than groups in fragmented or united movements; the difference is that the
movement structure changes how the dominant group can best pursue its self-
interés. The hegemon’s survival and position at the top of the movement are
likely secure in the short term, as no viable internal rival exists to supplant it.
The lack of internal competition in a hegemonic movement means that the big-
gest threat to the dominant group is the regime itself, which means that the
group is more likely to focus its attention externally on strategic objectives and
the associated state enemy.24 Achievement of the ultimate strategic goal of

22. Rufus E. Miles, “The Origin and Meaning of Miles’ Law,” Public Administration Review, volumen. 38,
No. 5 (September/October 1978), páginas. 399–403.
23. A group’s position in the hierarchy is determined by whether the group is ahead or behind the
others in more of the three categories that make up group strength. Por ejemplo, if Group A has
more members and seats on a common political body, but less funding than Group B, Group A
would be ranked ªrst.
24. Hillel Frisch, “Strategic Change in Terrorist Movements: Lessons from Hamas,” Studies in
Conºict and Terrorism, volumen. 32, No. 12 (December 2009), páginas. 1049–1065.

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Seguridad Internacional 38:3 82

statehood can cement the current movement hierarchy within a nascent gov-
ernment and capture the private beneªts of ofªce, wealth, and status for
the hegemon. The dominant group in a hegemonic movement is therefore
more likely to pursue strategic goals than any other type of group in any other
type of movement system.

Like hegemons, the strongest group in a fragmented or united movement—
the leader—will pursue the strategic goal of statehood to cement the current
movement hierarchy and capture the associated private and club goods. Y-
like hegemons, leaders face signiªcant challengers who could supplant them
in the short term, so they are more likely to pursue pure organizational goods
such as recruits and funding as well. The fragility of alliances, the anarchical
aspects of civil conºict, and the cumulative resources of state power greatly
limit the ability of leaders to credibly commit to distribute the selective
beneªts of statehood with challengers. Challengers therefore have incentives
to prevent strategic progress so as to deny the leader and preserve selective
beneªts for themselves (ver tabla 1). Hegemonic movements are thus likely to
have more resources working toward strategic success—and fewer working
against it—than are united or fragmented movements.

counterproductive dynamics of violence in competitive movements

The problem with nonhegemonic movements is not simply that leaders and
challengers often lack incentive to pursue strategic goals, but also that the
dynamics of violence among multiple strong groups in a competitive move-
ment frequently produce strategic failure, regardless of intent. Anarchical
movements and their constituent groups therefore face a version of the secu-
rity dilemma for nonstate actors: actions taken to make a group more secure
often make the group’s movement—and at times the group itself—less se-
cure and less strategically effective. Four counterproductive violent mecha-
nisms are likely to yield strategic failure: outbidding,25 chain-ganging,26
spoiling,27 and inªghting.

25. Outbidding occurs when groups use violence in larger quantities or more extreme forms to set
themselves apart in ways that relatively costless ªery speeches and unobservable backroom deal-
ings cannot. Adria Lawrence, “Triggering Nationalist Violence: Competition and Conºict in Upris-
ings against Colonial Rule,” Seguridad Internacional, volumen. 35, No. 2 (Caer 2010), páginas. 88–122.
26. Chain-ganging implies that many of these groups would prefer no conºict, but as one group
gets involved, others in the movement get pulled in. Tomas J.. Christensen and Jack Snyder,
“Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Orga-
nization, volumen. 44, No. 2 (Primavera 1990), pag. 137–168.
27. Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, “Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence,"

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The Structure of Success 83

In a fragmented or united movement, groups can shift hierarchical positions
quickly, making potential challenges via outbidding, chain-ganging, spoiling,
or inªghting both serious and common. Challengers dissatisªed with their po-
sition in the hierarchy are most likely to initiate escalatory outbidding violence
against the state or inªghting with other groups in attempts to improve their
posición. Attacks by a challenger may chain-gang the unprepared movement
into an uncoordinated conºict with the state, which is likely to yield strategic
failure. Outbidding or chain-ganging violence is particularly attractive to a
challenger because it allows the challenger to reap the beneªts while the leader
pays the costs. Supportive movement members are more likely to know which
group committed an attack and provide it with recruits or funding. Sobre el
other hand, the state often does not have good intelligence on weaker chal-
lengers and will therefore repress the leader, either because it thinks the leader
committed the attack, or because the state simply wants to “do something” in
response and so represses the group it knows better and perceives as a greater
amenaza. Spoiling is also more likely to occur and succeed in a competitive move-
ment system, given the presence of challengers with the incentive and capabil-
ity to scuttle a deal.

Leaders and stronger challengers are likely to initially attempt to restrain
such violence, but their position in a competitive movement means that
(1) they will often lack the capability to do so, y (2) once escalatory outbid-
ding or chain-ganging spirals get going, stronger challengers and then leaders
will often employ violence to avoid losing their tenuous hold on their top
positions. In any such movement, potential state sponsors with their own
agendas have multiple signiªcant groups as entry points, making the emer-
gence of these mechanisms even more likely.28 Collectively, movements with
two or more signiªcant groups are therefore more likely to experience stra-
tegically counterproductive violent mechanisms and less likely to achieve
strategic success.

International Organization, volumen. 56, No. 2 (Primavera 2002), páginas. 263–296; David Cunningham, “Veto
Players and Civil War Duration,” Revista Estadounidense de Ciencias Políticas, volumen. 50, No. 4 (Octubre 2006),
páginas. 875–892; and Kelly M. Greenhill and Solomon Major, “The Perils of Proªling: Civil War
Spoilers and the Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords,” Seguridad Internacional, volumen. 31, No. 3 (Invierno
2006/07), páginas. 7–40.
28. Patrick M. regan, “Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conºicts," Diario
of Conºict Resolution, volumen. 46, No. 1 (Febrero 2002), páginas. 55–73; Jennifer M. Keister, “States within
Estados: How Rebels Rule,"Doctor en Filosofía. disertación, Universidad de California, San Diego, 2011; and Jonah
B. Schulhofer-Wohl, “Dynamics of Civil Wars: The Causes and Consequences of Subsidies to
Armed Groups,"Doctor en Filosofía. disertación, Yale University, 2012.

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Seguridad Internacional 38:3 84

In a noncompetitive hegemonic movement, nonsigniªcant subordinate
groups are less likely to initiate outbidding, chain-ganging, spoiling, o
inªghting—and the hegemon has less need to respond—because such actions
are unlikely to bring about any signiªcant shifts in the movement hierarchy,
pull the hegemon into a conºict, prevent an agreement with the state, or pose a
serious threat via direct inªghting. Hegemonic movements further provide po-
tential state sponsors with only a single viable outlet for inºuence. In such a
seller’s market, state sponsorship is more likely to further strategic progress
and less likely to yield strategically counterproductive mechanisms. Given the
preferences and power of the dominant group, hegemonic movements are also
more likely to pursue an effective, cohesive strategy.

starting and stopping violence: credibility and signaling

Any target of coercive violence will ask itself three key questions: Qué
does the coercer want, how realistic is the threat, and can or will the coercer
uphold any deal? Hegemonic movements are more likely to have coher-
ent strategies that allow for clearer signaling to external audiences. A diferencia de,
fragmented and united movements send more mixed signals about the objec-
tivo, threats, and guarantees of a campaign.

The considerable power held by a dominant group increases the credibility
of a hegemonic movement in its ability to deliver on commitments to start or
stop violence. States further understand that spoilers are less likely to emerge
or succeed within hegemonic movements, which provides greater certainty
concerning the commitment problem that can emerge with fragmented or
united movements. En suma, hegemonic movements are more likely to be clear,
credible coercers with cohesive strategies of violence than are united or frag-
mented movements, and are therefore more likely to yield strategic success.

The Palestinian National Movement: Chronic Fragmentation

Comparative, longitudinal analysis of seventeen campaigns involving sixteen
groups within the Palestinian and Algerian national movements provides ini-
tial empirical tests of the power distribution theory and its competitors. Estos
are foundational most-likely cases for many rival theories, which predict either
that there is no variation in outcome as movement structure changes or that
the movement would be most successful when fragmented or united. Longitu-
dinal analysis of numerous campaigns within each movement allows for de-

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The Structure of Success 85

tailed process tracing of mechanisms across similar cases in which factors such
as the state enemy, the state’s regime type, and the strategic objective are held
constant, while movement system structure, movement hierarchy, and strate-
gic outcome vary signiªcantly over time.29

As seen in table 2, empirical analysis of the Palestinian national movement
lends strong initial support to the power distribution theory. Regardless of
changes in time or space, the Palestinian national movement met with strategic
failure when the movement was fragmented (1965–June 1967, July 1967–68,
1969–70, 1971–73, 1975–86, 1996–2000, 2000–06, and 2006–present), limited suc-
cess when it was united (1974), and the greatest success when the movement
was hegemonic (1986–96). As predicted by the hierarchy hypothesis, the posi-
tion of an armed group in the hierarchy of the Palestinian national movement
often played the dominant role in when, cómo, and why that group employed
or worked to restrain escalatory violence.30

Space limitations prevent analysis of each campaign period, but I examine
four in depth: 1965–June 1967, July 1967–68, 1969–70, and 1986–96. These four
campaigns present ideal variation for analysis, as the ªrst two represent “most
different” cases where the movement hierarchy and the movement system re-
mained the same but many other relevant variables changed. The third cam-
paign represents a signiªcant change in movement hierarchy but no change in
the movement system, and the fourth represents a change in the movement
sistema. The power distribution theory predicts no change in group actions or
outcomes between the ªrst two campaigns, a change in group actions but not
outcome in the third campaign, and a change in both action and outcome in
the fourth campaign.

29. Numerous excellent works have been penned on the Palestinian national movement. The rela-
tive few that have systematically analyzed movement structure point to the perils of division and
the preeminence of unity, sin embargo. See Bard E. O’Neill, Armed Struggle in Palestine: A Political-
Military Analysis (Roca, Colo.: Westview, 1978); Issa Khalaf, Politics in Palestine: Arab Factionalism
and Social Disintegration, 1939–1948 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991); Rashid
Khalidi, The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood (Cambridge: Oneworld,
2006); and Pearlman, Violence, Nonviolence, and the Palestinian National Movement.
30. Power distribution theory’s emphasis on the tension between organizational and strategic ob-
jectives is particularly interesting because it runs counter to a central argument in what is unques-
tionably the best book on the armed struggle within the Palestinian national movement: Yezid
Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993 (Ox-
ford: prensa de la Universidad de Oxford, 1997). Although I agree with Sayigh that the armed struggle did
help construct or strengthen a Palestinian identity, a leadership elite, and some basic institutions,
the coercive and constitutive aspects of violence were often at odds, as were the strategic and orga-
nizational objectives with which they were associated.

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Mesa 2. Summary of Campaigns in the Palestinian National Movement, 1965–Present

Time
Período

Movement
Sistema
Estructura

Hierarchy of
Groups at Start
of Campaign

1965–
Junio 1967

fragmented

July 1967–68 fragmented

1969–70

fragmented

1971–73

fragmented

1974

united

1975–86

fragmented

1. PLO
2. ANM
3. JCP
4. Fatah

1. PLO
2. ANM/PFLP
3. JCP
4. Fatah

1. Fatah
2. Saiqa
3. PLF/PLA
4. PFLP

1. Fatah
2. Saiqa
3. PFLP

1986–96

hegemonic 1. Fatah

1996–2000

fragmented

2000–06

fragmented

1. Fatah
2. Hamas

2006–
present

fragmented

1. Fatah
2. Hamas

Summary of Group Actions

Fatah initiates violence, PLO
and ANM initially restrain,
ANM and PLO later use
violence, this helps spark the
disastrous Six-Day War

Fatah initiates violence, PLO
and ANM initially restrain,
ANM/PFLP and PLO later use
violence, attempted uprising in
the West Bank fails

Fatah captures PLO, continues
violence in Israel but restrains
PFLP in Jordan, PFLP launches
hijackings, sparks Black
September defeat

Fatah launches the Black
September Organization,
groups ªght a losing
insurgency in Gaza against
Israel, relocate to Lebanon and
Syria

Groups agree to PLO Phased
Program, subordinates and
PFLP then launch spoiling
attacks, Fatah follows suit

PFLP uses violence in
Líbano, Fatah and Saiqa try
to restrain but are pulled into
civil war with extensive
inªghting

Fatah able to control ªrst
intifada, limit violence, sign
Oslo accords

Fatah pursues negotiations
and restrains violence, Hamas
tries to spoil

Hamas and Islamic Jihad
initiate violence, Fatah later
uses violence amid second
intifada

Fatah pursues negotiations
and represses violence, Hamas
continues to champion armed
struggle

Strategic
Outcome of
Campaign

failure

limitado
success

failure

moderate
success

failure

NOTE: The four cases analyzed in this article in greater depth are shaded gray.
ANM: Arab Nationalists Movement
JCP: Jordanian Communist Party
PFLP: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLF/PLA: Popular Liberation Forces/Palestine Liberation Army
PLO: Palestine Liberation Organization

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The Structure of Success 87

“detonating the revolution” and chain-ganging to war, 1965–67

The mid-1960s to early 1970s were perhaps the most dynamic decade for the
Palestinian national movement.31 During this period, Palestinian nationalism
era (re)awakened; almost all of the key players for the next half century
emerged; and there was a great deal of shifting among groups within the
movement hierarchy. The movement remained fragmented and competitive,
sin embargo, leading to ineffective violence and strategic failure across time
and space.

There were four signiªcant groups in the Palestinian national movement
at the beginning of 1965: the Arab Nationalists Movement (ANM),32 el
Jordanian Communist Party (JCP),33 the Palestinian National Liberation
Movement (Fatah), and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Contrary
to popular notions, at the time Fatah was both the weakest of the four groups
and a major rival of the PLO, rather than its near synonymous ally of more re-
cent years (ver tabla 2). Fatah had a few hundred members led by Khalil al-
Wazir, Yasser Arafat, and a small number of other Palestinian activists from
Syria and Gaza.34 In comparison, the PLO became the leader in the movement
soon after it was founded in mid-1964 with the help of Egypt and other
Arab states. It included the foundations of tangible legislative, económico, y
military institutions in the form of the Palestinian National Council (PNC), el
Palestinian National Fund (PNF), and the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA).
Led by Ahmad Shuqeiri, the Palestinian representative to the Arab League, el
PLO had hundreds of ofªcial representatives, funding from Arab governments
and taxes on Palestinian citizens, a growing military force (albeit under de
facto Arab state control), y, most importantly, the sense that, as the strongest
grupo, it was the Palestinian entity in waiting that would form the new gov-
ernment of Palestine once the homeland was reclaimed.

The groups all shared the strategic objective of a Palestinian state, a pesar de

31. The phrase “detonate the revolution” comes from Fatah’s early strategic documents concern-
ing its use of violence in the mid-to-late 1960s. Fatah, Kayf Ttanfajir al-thawra al-musallaha, wa kayf
fajjarat ‘Fatah’ al-thawra al-Filastiniyya [How the armed revolution ignites, and how Fatah deto-
nated the Palestinian revolution], n.p., n.d.
32. The ANM had been founded by Palestinian George Habash and Syrian Hani al-Hindi, ambos
students at the American University of Beirut in the 1950s. Por 1965, ANM and its Palestinian
branch had grown from a few AUB students to a few thousand members dispersed across the
Middle East. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, páginas. 108–111.
33. The JCP was based in Jordan and the West Bank and faced sporadic crackdowns by King
Hussein. The majority of JCP members were Palestinian and the party sought a Palestinian state,
although the desired shape of that state shifted over time.
34. Abu Iyad, My Home, My Land (Nueva York: Times Books, 1981), pag. 29.

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Seguridad Internacional 38:3 88

somewhat different visions for what it would ultimately look like. El COM-
mon desire to unite was apparent from the national charter adopted by the
PLO as well as Fatah’s early strategic documents, which stated, “The armed
revolution is required to work to unite the powers of the people and create a
coalition, even one particular to this stage, between the different movements
or national factions because the stage of ªghting against direct colonialism dic-
tates national unity to increase the effectiveness of the revolution and its ability
to achieve the desired successes.”35 The PLO, the ANM, and Fatah each
sought to unite the movement under its organization. These efforts all failed,
sin embargo, because every group wanted unity on its own terms and no sig-
niªcant group wanted to lock itself into a subordinate position. Internal com-
petition soon yielded counterproductive outbidding and chain-ganging.

With Fatah’s attempts at favorable unity unrealized, the weakest challenger
in the movement looked for options to turn the tide of its organization’s for-
tunes. As the hierarchy hypothesis predicts, the group opted to launch attacks
against Israel and in the process distinguish Fatah from its competitors as a
group of action, as opposed to those groups whose tactic of choice was simply
revolutionary rhetoric. Fatah noted in its early strategic documents, “There
must be a period in which the armed revolutionary vanguard tries to embody
its real struggle in front of the public so that it can attract them in the end.”36
In addition to the desire to employ outbidding, Fatah sought to chain-gang
the rest of the movement and pull Arab states into war with Israel. As Khaled
al-Hasan reiterated in two separate interviews, Fatah wanted to liberate
Palestine “through action and reaction, action and reaction,” as “our military
action provokes an Israeli reaction against our people, who then become in-
volved [in the struggle] and are supported by the Arab masses.”37

Fatah had not originally planned to use violence so soon, but after the emer-
gence of the PLO, its leadership became concerned about the survival of the
grupo, arguing that “intensifying the military bases and starting operations
may limit the crumbling [of membership].”38 Therefore, Fatah decided to
launch the “armed struggle” on January 1, 1965. Despite its relatively meager

35. Fatah, Tahrir al-aqtar al-muhtalla wa uslub al-kifah al-musallah dud al-isti’mar al-mubashir [The lib-
eration of the occupied lands and the method of armed struggle against direct colonialism], n.p.,
n.d., páginas. 13–14.
36. Ibídem., páginas. 11–12.
37. Quoted in, respectivamente, Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Fuerza,
and Politics (Cambridge: Prensa de la Universidad de Cambridge, 1984), pag. 33; and Sayigh, Armed Struggle and
the Search for State, pag. 120.
38. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pag. 102.

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The Structure of Success 89

beginnings, which included a raid thwarted by the Lebanese and faulty ex-
plosive charges placed in the Israeli National Water Carrier, Fatah claimed
more than eighty attacks against Israel in the ªrst nine months of the cam-
paign, which involved laying mines on roads, canals, and rail lines, también
as strikes against power stations and security outposts.39 The attacks some-
what increased Fatah’s organizational strength, as al-Hasan explained: "El
real increase, the real support that comes from the people, and permanently,
started in ’65 when we started our military action. Then the people realized
that we were not just another movement, talking like the others.”40

Leading Palestinian organizations immediately took notice and tried to re-
strain Fatah’s use of violence, as power distribution theory suggests. El
ANM claimed that Fatah’s attacks were counterproductive and that Fatah
“aims to entangle [Egyptian President Gamal Abdel] Nasser in a battle for
which he is not prepared.”41 Indeed, the few Fatah members in attendance at
the second PNC openly told the press that they wanted “[t]o entangle the Arab
nations in a war with Israel.”42 The PLO denounced the raids by speciªcally
referencing its own organizational
leadership. Shuqeiri said, “Only the
Palestinian Liberation Army can authorize any Palestinian military opera-
ción,” and he resolved with the PLO Executive Committee to stop Fatah’s at-
tacks “whether through gentle words and promises or with threats.”43 Both
methods failed.

The most interesting aspect of the initial responses of Fatah’s rivals to its
attacks is not that they were nearly 100 percent correct, which they were, pero
that despite their accuracy, the ANM and PLO would in short order ªnd
themselves violently outbidding with Fatah and chain-ganged into the very
conºict they claimed should be avoided just two years later. This outcome
demonstrates the power of movement structure for group actions, as even
foreknowledge of the pitfalls of fragmentation could not prevent groups from
succumbing to its deleterious effects.

Despite their public denouncements, privately the ANM and others recog-
nized the increased support given to Fatah and the stark contrast the attacks

39. Guillermo B.. Quandt, Fuad Jabber, and Ann Mosely Lesch, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism
(berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), pag. 172.
40. Quoted in Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organization, pag. 25.
41. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pag. 108.
42. Ehud Yaari, Strike Terror: The Story of Fatah (Nueva York: Hebrew Publishing Company, 1970),
pag. 71.
43. Citado en ibídem., páginas. 63, 71.

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Seguridad Internacional 38:3 90

created in comparison to their own inaction. The impact was palpable. Poten-
tial ANM recruits were joining Fatah, and current ANM members were defect-
En g, as former ANM leader Abd al-Karim Hamad noted: “From 1965 onwards,
we were explaining to our militants that we must wait, that we must train, y
so on. Then we saw that our militants were joining Fatah. Because of the right-
ist leadership of the ANM [es decir., George Habash], we lost a historic opportu-
nity.”44 It was not just ªghters, but also funding that followed the violence.
Donations were often explicitly tied to evidence of attacks, as was the case
with Kuwaiti and Algerian donors before Fatah’s ªrst attack.

The ANM itself came close to initiating violence with the 1964 emergence of
the PLO, which threatened its position just as it threatened Fatah. A combina-
tion of its ties to Nasser and its position as the stronger challenger at the time,
sin embargo, led the ANM to hold off, although an increasing number of its mem-
bers called for attacks. Once Fatah started using violence and peeling away
ANM recruits, sin embargo, the group could no longer remain on the sidelines.

In mid-1966, the ANM decided to form a commando group, Abtal al-Awda
(Heroes of Return), in cooperation with a few anti-Shuqeiri members of the
PLO, although the ANM largely controlled the group. Abtal al-Awda launched
its ªrst attack on October 19, 1966, followed by seven more from December
1966 a junio 1967. Although still dwarfed by Fatah’s attacks, the ANM and
PLO actions contributed to the ramping up of attacks by multiple organiza-
tions that preceded the Six-Day War of 1967. The JCP did not get involved this
round, but smaller groups such as the Palestinian Liberation Front and the
Palestinian National Liberation Front did, contributing to the upsurge in vio-
lent competition and revealing the lack of any dominant group or alliance to
direct the action. The increase in violence even spurred Shuqeiri in mid-1967
to start claiming (falsely) that the PLO had been funding the Fatah attacks,
and to note the PLO’s support for such violence, despite the group’s concerns
about entanglement with Israel.

The increasing tempo of attacks brought harsh Israeli reprisals, En cual-
creased tensions between Israel and its Syrian, Jordanian, and Egyptian neigh-
bors, especially as Nasser and the Syrians started to more openly support
different Palestinian armed groups by 1967.45 Most important, Palestinian at-

44. Quoted in Alain Gresh, The PLO: The Struggle Within: Towards an Independent Palestinian State
(Totowa, NUEVA JERSEY.: Zed, 1983), pag. 24.
45. Indicative of the earlier attacks were the April 29, 1966, Israeli raids on the Jordanian village of
Qal’at and the village of Hirbet Rafa near Hebron, in which the Israelis destroyed twenty-eight
houses and killed eleven Jordanian civilians. Ami Gluska, The Israeli Military and the Origins of the

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The Structure of Success 91

tacks helped to spark the crisis that led to the Six-Day War: the April 1967
Israeli air raid against Syria, which included 171 sorties and the downing of
six Syrian MiGs inside Syrian and Jordanian territory.46 The Six-Day War was
a well-documented disaster for the Palestinians. The Israelis took control
of the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights; hundreds of thousands of
Palestinians became refugees (some for the second time); the Arab armies were
routed; and the Palestinian armed groups fared little better. The outcome can-
not be understood as anything but a strategic failure—one to which the use of
violence by Palestinian armed groups directly contributed.

The competitive, fragmented national movement played a clear, dominant
role in the use and effectiveness of violence by Palestinian armed groups. Como un
weaker challenger in the movement hierarchy, Fatah used violence in response
to the emergence of the PLO at a time when it was not prepared or planning to
do so in an attempt to outbid its rival. As predicted, the ANM and the PLO
ªrst tried to restrain Fatah’s attacks and, when those efforts failed, más tarde
launched some of their own, with the ANM leading the way. These contradic-
tory actions make little sense from a strategic perspective, but they are directly
in line with the power distribution theory’s predictions concerning the impact
of movement structure on group actions. The fragmented Palestinian national
movement further allowed competing Arab states entry to play out their own
rivalries within the movement, as Syrian-backed Fatah faced off against the
Egyptian-backed PLO and ANM in another layer of competition that had any-
thing but the Palestinians’ collective strategic interests at its heart.47 A textbook
case of outbidding and chain-ganging resulted, against the wishes of the vast
majority of the actors, which led to a strategically unsuccessful campaign.

the more things change . . . : armed struggle in a post–1967 world

Those who suspect that the 1965–June 1967 campaign was a unique case
in which a speciªc time or space played the key role should note that the struc-

1967 Guerra: Government, Armed Forces, and Defence Policy, 1963–1967 (Nueva York: Routledge, 2007),
pag. 72.
46. As William Quandt conªrmed, “Syrian-sponsored raids by the commandos into northern Is-
rael were the immediate cause for the crisis that triggered the Six-Day War.” Quandt, Jabber, y
Lesch, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, pag. 157; and Charles W. Yost, “How It Began,” Foreign
Affairs, volumen. 46, No. 2 (Enero 1968), páginas. 304–320.
47. Nasser and King Hussein themselves nominated most of the original delegates to the PNC,
who represented the Palestinian “old guard.” Fatah’s struggle with the PLO therefore represented
a simultaneous ªght over the leadership of the Palestinian national movement with Arab regimes,
which for so long had sought to control, appropriate, and exploit the Palestinian cause to their
own ends.

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Seguridad Internacional 38:3 92

ture of the Palestinian national movement remained the same as the dust set-
tled after the Six-Day War, even though pretty much everything else—territory
held, enemy and supporting state strength, base population geographical dis-
tribution, and campaign location—changed dramatically. The post-1967 cam-
paign thus represents a “most different” comparison with the pre-1967
campaign. So much of the political landscape had changed, but the movement
system and group positions in the hierarchy of the Palestinian national move-
ment stayed the same. As predicted by the power distribution theory, lo mismo
groups initiated violence; the same groups attempted to restrain it; y el
campaign resulted in strategic failure—all in strikingly similar fashion.

Having experienced the problems that result from the uncoordinated use of
violence within a fragmented movement, the ANM met with Fatah in mid-July
1967 to ensure that the postwar period would not be a repeat of the prewar pe-
riod. The two groups came to an agreement on this issue, supported by the
PLO, with all consenting to hold off on attacks for the next one to ªve months
so the groups could rebuild their organizations.48 In a shining example of “the
tragedy of fragmented national movements,” the best of intentions were
thwarted by the inherently competitive movement system. As before, Fatah
jumped the gun, in part to get an organizational upper hand. As before, el
ANM and PLO were forced to revise their plans and employ violence earlier
than desired to prevent the loss of their positions in the hierarchy. As before,
strategic concerns did not drive the use of violence, nor did it produce strate-
gic success.

Yasser Arafat inªltrated the West Bank with a number of Fatah cadres in
mid-June, and the organization launched its ªrst attacks at the end of August,
followed by ªfty more over the next four months.49 Fatah’s early launch was
driven in part by its organizational desire to prevent a deal between Israel
and Arab regimes, the PLO, or West Bank Palestinians that would establish a
Palestinian state on part of the territory in the aftermath of the war. Fatah did
this not simply because it did not like the deal, but also because it would be cut
out of it.50 Fatah thus desired to simultaneously outbid other Palestinian
armed groups and spoil initiatives by local Palestinians to beneªt its organiza-
tional ends.

48. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pag. 161.
49. Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conºict, 1881–1999 (Nueva York:
Alfredo A.. Knopf, 1999), pag. 366.
50. A este respecto, it is also instructive that the Palestinians whom Fatah targeted for death during
this period were West Bank leaders who called for a separate Palestinian state. Yaari, Strike Terror,
pag. 148.

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The Structure of Success 93

Fatah’s position as a challenger meant that others could not easily stop or ig-
nore its use of violence. Soon after Fatah’s ªrst attack, ANM leaders came to
the realization that they were losing both recruits and funding to their rival. En
Noviembre 1967, Ahmad Khalifa, a member of the ANM’s central command,
summed it up by saying, “The battle might start without us. . . . Fatah and
[Palestinian Liberation Front leader Ahmad] Jibril will be the only ones to reap
the credit . . . and that will ªnish us.”51 The ANM leadership instructed its
cadres to initiate attacks despite their lack of adequate preparation.52 The ªrst
attack, a failed operation against Ben Gurion Airport on December 11, came
the same day as the ANM announced the formation of a new organization that
was to serve as Fatah’s main rival for the next two decades: the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Unfortunately for the ANM/PFLP,
Fatah, and other Palestinian groups, the lack of preparation and coordination
doomed the attempt to launch a “popular struggle” in the West Bank to a
swift, costly end. Fighters’ cursory training, inadequate weapons, and lack of
experience with proper operational security allowed the Israelis to quickly roll
up Palestinian networks. Forced to admit that the campaign was a strategic
failure by the beginning of 1968, the groups moved their headquarters across
the border to Jordan.

Fatah again led the way with cross-border attacks against the Israelis, incluso-
tually joined by the PLO, which announced the creation of its own guerrilla
branch in early March 1968: the Popular Liberation Forces (PLF/PLA). Después
the Palestinian armed groups launched thirty-six attacks in March, Israel de-
cided to launch a massive reprisal raid on March 21, 1968, to knock out the
guerrillas’ headquarters at the village of Karameh and send a message to
Jordan’s King Hussein, whose country was serving as a wary but ultimately
willing host.53 While the PFLP followed classic guerrilla strategy of withdraw-
ing in the face of a superior, massed foe, Fatah decided to stand and ªght.
Although the Israelis won a clear military victory—destroying the village and
returning to Israel hours later after killing 100 guerrillas and capturing more
than 100 others—the defenders had exacted a signiªcant price. The Israeli
press reported that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) suffered twenty killed

51. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pag. 166.
52. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Al-Fikr al-‘Askari li al-Jabha al-Sha’biyya li-Tahrir
Filastin [Military thinking of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine] (Beirut: n.d.), pag. 7.
53. See Boaz Atzili and Wendy Pearlman, “Triadic Deterrence: Coercing Strength, Beaten by
Weakness,” Estudios de Seguridad, volumen. 21, No. 2 (April/June 2012), páginas. 301–335; and Keren Fraiman,
“Not in Your Backyard: Coercion, Base States, and Violent Non-State Actors,"Doctor en Filosofía. disertación,
Instituto de Tecnología de Massachusetts, 2013.

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Seguridad Internacional 38:3 94

and ninety wounded, as well as the loss of four tanks, two armored cars, y
one airplane.

Although the Israelis achieved their tactical objectives, their signiªcant
losses and withdrawal under ªre created an image of determined, powerful
Palestinian fedayeen that were willing to stand up and bloody the noses of the
supposedly invincible IDF. One Palestinian teenager described his reaction as
follows: “When the news of Karameh came over the radio, all of the students
and teachers ran out and celebrated in the streets for the rest of the afternoon.
We were all proud to be Palestinians that day, and we were proud of the feda-
yeen who had done what the Arab armies could not do less than a year earlier
against the Israelis.” Soon after, this teenager, Jibril Rajoub, joined Fatah, y
would decades later become Arafat’s head of security in the West Bank.54

Fatah’s stand at Karameh led to a tidal wave of recruits, fondos, and popu-
lar support for the Palestinian armed groups. Disproportionate amounts of
each went to Fatah, demonstrating that violence could indeed be organization-
ally effective under certain conditions. Even the JCP, the last holdout, decided
to form a guerrilla group the year after Karameh in response to its fading orga-
nizational fortunes.55 Fatah became the most powerful group in the move-
mento, and even came to control the PLO after Arafat was elected chairman in
Febrero 1969.56 Sin embargo, although Fatah’s ascendance brought hierarchi-
cal change, the movement remained fragmented as a result of the continued
presence of the PFLP and the emergence of two new factions: the Syrian-
sponsored Saiqa organization and the most inºuential subordinate group, el
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), which split from
the PFLP in 1969.57 Por lo tanto, although Palestinian groups’ roles would

54. Author interview with Jibril Rajoub, Julio 2009.
55. De este modo, the group that had argued most vociferously that violence was futile and counterpro-
ductive introduced Quwwat al-Ansar (Partisan Forces) in early 1970 after seeing its size and
inºuence shrink relative to other groups. Author interview with Ghassan Khatib, former JCP
member, Junio 2013; and author interview with Hanna Amireh, former JCP member, Junio 2013.
This suggests the need for a reexamination of the conditions under which outbidding occurs. Ver
Morgan L. Kaplan, “How Civilian Perceptions Affect Patterns of Violence and Competition in
Multi-Party Insurgencies,” University of Chicago, 2013.
56. Financial contributions “poured in from Palestinian circles,” and 5,000 Palestinians attempted
to join Fatah within forty-eight hours after Karameh. By May, Fatah claimed that it had been ap-
proached by 20,000 would-be recruits in Egypt and 1,500 per week in Iraq. Although Fatah could
not accommodate even close to these numbers, the group nonetheless tripled in size by June, con
the surge further revealing the extensive popular support for the now public organization.
Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, páginas. 179; and Sayigh, Armed Strug-
gle and the Search for State, pag. 181.
57. Fatah had around 3,500 ªghters in Jordan by the summer of 1969. The PFLP and Saiqa each

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The Structure of Success 95

change in the years after Karameh, the strategic outcome would remain the
same yet again.

new roles, same outcome: fatah and the pºp in jordan, 1967–70

As the power distribution theory predicts, Fatah’s and the PFLP’s changed po-
sitions in the hierarchy led the two to swap approaches to escalatory violence,
even though their ideology, leadership, and strategic goals remained the same.
Although still clearly a signiªcant group, the PFLP leadership recognized by
1968–69 that its organization was trending downward relative to its rivals, y
was now third or fourth in the movement hierarchy. Recognizing that, porque
of the ongoing violence, it could not paint a quantitative contrast the way
Fatah had with its ªrst cross-border attacks, the PFLP opted for a qualitative
outbid, deploying tactics that it hoped would allow it to retain its current sup-
porters and gain new ones in its drive for inºuence.

In the months after the ªghting at Karameh, the PFLP decided to embark
on what it labeled “external operations,” including the hijacking of civilian
airplanes, bombing of stores in London, and grenade attacks on Israeli embas-
sies.58 The PFLP was aiming not only to outbid Fatah, but also to chain-gang
the Palestinian national movement into a direct conºict with King Hussein for
control of Jordan. The PFLP and later the DFLP launched provocative verbal
and violent attacks against the monarch, including the public claim of “no au-
thority over the authority of the [Palestinian] resistance” in mid-1970, cual
was a direct challenge to Hussein’s rule.59

In striking evidence of the hierarchy hypothesis at work, William Quandt
describes the strategy of the DFLP during this period as follows: "El
DFLP during 1969 and early 1970 seemed to believe that direct clashes with
the Jordanian army might lead to Hussein’s overthrow, but that Fatah, not the
DFLP, would come to power as a nonrevolutionary movement. Fatah would
then be likely to turn against the PFLP and DFLP to maintain its domi-

had about 1,200 ªghters in Jordan at that time, although each also had signiªcant concentrations of
guerrillas based elsewhere, be it in Gaza (PFLP) or Syria (Saiqa). The refusal of the PFLP to take its
PNC seats due to disagreements over seat distribution ensured the movement remained frag-
mented. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, páginas. 181–182.
58. The PFLP attempted to justify its actions by noting the link between the Israelis and their
Western supporters. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Limadha? Darabat al-Jabha
al-Sha’biyya li-Tahrir Filastin dud al-mu’assasat sl-Isra’iliyya wa al-Sahyuniyya wa al-imbiryaliyya ª
al-kharij [Por qué? The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine strikes against the Israeli, Zionist,
and imperialist institutions abroad] n.p., n.d., páginas. 33–36.
59. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pag. 232.

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Seguridad Internacional 38:3 96

nant position. De este modo, until the revolutionary forces held the balance of power,
the DFLP favored the avoidance of a showdown with any Arab regime.”60 The
PFLP’s decision to carry out “external operations” inside Jordan subsequently
put the movement on the verge of war with its hosts and, soon after, plunged it
into one.

The most surprising role reversal—especially for theories that point to
the role of ideology or other internal group characteristics to explain group
action—may not have been the PFLP’s attempts to violently outbid and chain-
gang, but rather Fatah’s efforts to restrain them. The formerly weaker group,
which just a few years earlier was launching and relaunching the armed
struggle in campaigns to outbid and chain-gang, was now the leader in the
movimiento, looking to prevent conºict that could threaten its position and asso-
ciated beneªts. As power distribution theory suggests and as J. Gaspard noted
at the time, “The small groups have nothing to lose and much to gain from revo-
lutionary chaos in the host countries. Fatah has much to lose: the subsidies from
the ‘moderate’ Arab states; its pool of heavy arms and more or less trained mili-
tary formations that might get broken up in a revolutionary free for all; an estab-
lished diplomatic and political position in the Arab world and in certain
international circles; ofªces in many Arab countries which are small centers of
local government; and a fairly well-oiled propaganda machine.”61

Fatah understood what the PFLP was trying to do, having done the same in
previous campaigns. As Fatah leader Salah Khalaf noted, “Other small organi-
zations are engaged in leftist overbids which are altogether unrealistic.”62 In
Junio 1970, the PFLP took sixty Westerners hostage in two hotels in Amman in
a challenge to King Hussein. Fatah stepped in and negotiated a cease-ªre that
brought the crisis to an end, in yet another example of its newfound role.63 In
early September 1970, Fatah and the movement were not so lucky, as the PFLP
hijacked three airplanes with more than 300 Western civilians and held them
hostage on a desert airstrip a few miles from Amman.64 As captured hijacker

60. Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, pag. 116.
61. j. Gaspard, “Palestine: The Struggle of a People to Become a Nation,” New Middle East, volumen. 16
(Septiembre 1970), pag. 31.
62. A Dialogue with Fateh (Palestinian National Liberation Movement, Fateh, and Al-Tali’a, 1969),
pag. 13.
63. This was not the ªrst time that Fatah’s leadership had to mediate. En febrero 1970, clashes be-
tween the guerrillas and Jordanians broke out while Arafat was in Moscow, and he had to rush
home to negotiate a cease-ªre. Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism,
pag. 120.
64. Another PFLP-hijacked plane was ºown to Cairo and destroyed after its passengers were re-

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The Structure of Success 97

Leila Khaled later noted, “We had a number of objectives in that operation, en-
cluding not only raising the issue of the Palestinian people to the world, pero
also challenging the Jordanian regime.”65

Outraged at the PFLP’s attempts to chain-gang the movement to war, Fatah
pushed the PFLP to return the airplanes. The PFLP blew them up instead.
Fatah then brokered a cease-ªre. The PFLP rejected it. Fatah’s leading position
in the hierarchy gave it an interest in maintaining the status quo, but the group
was not powerful enough to stop the PFLP’s actions, just as the PLO and ANM
had been unable to restrain Fatah a few years earlier. Even though Fatah had
noted its desire to avoid a war for months, the Jordanian army shelling of
Palestinian guerrilla positions and refugee camps around Amman helped to
convince Fatah that it could no longer hold back. Unfortunately for the PFLP,
Fatah, and the rest of the Palestinian national movement, the campaign was a
total failure. The Jordanian army routed the divided guerrillas in what became
known as Black September, killing thousands and beginning the process of ex-
pelling all Palestinian armed groups from the country, which was completed
the following year. This strategic setback would haunt the Palestinians for de-
cades, because they would not ªnd as favorable a political and geographical
situation again.

A hegemonic movement would have been more likely to have avoided the
competitive outbidding and provocative tactics that sparked the ill-advised
guerra, to have reached a better deal with King Hussein short of expulsion, or to
have avoided alienating the local populace and some of its Arab allies, de este modo
making military victory either unnecessary or far more likely.66 As Abu Iyad of
Fatah noted, sin embargo, “Even in historic and critical decisions, the leadership
of the various groups used to put hierarchical gain before the general good.”67

leased. The third of the three planes held in Jordan was hijacked after El Al security thwarted an-
other planned hijacking, leading to the capture of PFLP operative Leila Khaled.
65. Author interview with Leila Khaled, 2010.
66. Khaled al-Hassan of Fatah argued as much: “Had the resistance movement not been divided
and full of contradictions, it would have been able, with the support of the masses, to overcome
the conspiracies of the [Jordanian] government.” “Khalid al-Hassan, Fatah,” in Clovis Maksoud,
ed., Palestine Lives: Interviews with Leaders of the Resistance (Beirut: Palestine Research Center and
Kuwaiti Teachers Association, 1973), páginas. 28–29. Adnan Abu Odeh, a Palestinian who is a former
Jordanian minister and adviser to King Hussein, argumentó: “Fatah’s toleration of the leftists was its
biggest mistake. The leftists alienated the people and shifted the image of the guerrillas from those
who want to liberate to those who want to rule.” Author interview with Adnan Abu Odeh, Sep-
tember 2009.
67. “Abu Iyad [Salah Khalaf], Fatah,” in Maksoud, Palestine Lives, pag. 44. Even when the Palestinian
movement achieved a brief moment of unity in 1974 and initial UN recognition, the alliance
quickly faltered as a result of resistance from those who had less power and therefore accrued

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Seguridad Internacional 38:3 98

The solution, aunque, was not a new spirit of altruism or fresh alliances among
Palestinian groups, but a change in the movement system structure. Después
subsequent united and fragmented failures in campaigns in Lebanon and be-
yond over the next ªfteen years, the movement ªnally reached its lone hege-
monic moment.68

the hegemonic moment: fatah’s dominance yields gains, 1986–96

For most observers, the conditions in 1987 could not have been worse for the
Palestinian national movement. The Palestinians were pushed to the bottom of
the Arab League summit agenda; they had been ªghting costly conºicts in
Lebanon for more than a decade; their leadership was languishing in faraway
Tunis; and millions of their people were marking twenty years or more in
squalid refugee camps or under Israeli military control. These factors pointed
to likely strategic failure, yet structurally the Palestinian national movement
had never been in a better position for success according to the power distribu-
tion theory. By 1986–87, a conºuence of factors had made the movement hege-
monic for the ªrst and only time in modern history. The Lebanese civil war
had decimated Fatah’s rivals;69 Fatah gained control of Arab state funding of-
fered in the wake of the Camp David accords;70 and Fatah defeated a
signiªcant splinter group that had risen to challenge its leadership after the de-

fewer beneªts, and were backed by foreign inºuences that easily inªltrated the movement given
its multiple signiªcant groups.
68. Despite the clear strategic problems resulting from the PFLP’s “external operations,” the
strength of violent competition amid fragmentation was demonstrated yet again when Fatah itself
engaged in such operations under its auxiliary Black September Organization (BSO), formed in
late 1971 and named after the Jordan debacle. The PFLP and Fatah had thus reversed roles from
1965 a 1967, when Fatah started launching what the PFLP considered foolhardy attacks, only to
have the PFLP later follow suit. The group’s operations, including the attack on Israeli athletes at
the Munich Olympics in 1972, initially captivated world attention and drove some recruits to the
BSO. Fatah was quick to disband the BSO, sin embargo, once it became clear that its operations hurt
Fatah’s standing both internationally and with large portions of the Palestinian public, putting
larger organizational gains at risk.
69. Leftist groups such as the PFLP and the DFLP were signiªcantly weakened in the struggle into
which they had helped pull the movement. Saiqa, formerly the second strongest group, sufrió
from mass Palestinian defections in 1976 when its leadership forced the group to ªght PLO fac-
tions in support of the Syrians. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, not one of these represented a
signiªcant group that could seriously challenge Fatah. Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organiza-
ción, páginas. 78–79.
70. In the Arab League summit in Baghdad in 1978, Arab governments agreed to pay hundreds of
millions of dollars to the Palestinians as a result of the Camp David accords, incluido $150 mil- lion annually to be distributed by the PLO in the West Bank and Gaza and another $250 millón
paid directly to the PLO. The factions fought over distribution of the funds, with Fatah ultimately
receiving two-thirds, compared to one-third for all other groups combined. See also Sayigh, Armed
Struggle and the Search for State, páginas. 437, 441, 479–481.

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The Structure of Success 99

feat in Lebanon.71 In short, “[Fatah had] more ªghters, mas dinero, y un
broader range of support among Palestinians, Arab states, and the interna-
tional community than all the other PLO groups combined.”72 Internal dissent
remained, but Fatah became so powerful politically, militar, y económicamente
that no other group could realistically unseat it for the foreseeable future. El
movement’s ªrst taste of hegemony led to the most signiªcant strategic gains
in forty years.

Fatah did not start the ªrst intifada in December 1987, but the group’s over-
whelming power soon allowed it to gain considerable control of what began as
a grassroots uprising in response to the two-decade-old Israeli military occu-
pation of the West Bank and Gaza. By January 1988, Fatah and the PLO had set
up a Uniªed National Command (UNC), which gave Palestinian civilians in
the West Bank and Gaza guidelines for resistance and coordinated action. El
UNC helped to organize many of the activities of civil resistance that deªned
the ªrst intifada, including strikes by Palestinian workers, refusal to pay taxes,
boycotts on Israeli goods, and mass protest marches.73 The symbol of the ªrst
intifada—the Palestinian youth (shabab) throwing rocks at Israeli soldiers—
was not entirely unorganized either. Fatah had previously developed youth or-
ganizations such as the Shabiba, which claimed tens of thousands of members
and led many of these demonstrations.74 Fatah’s dominance thus helped to en-
sure a cohesive strategy of coercion that was lacking in previous (and future)
campaigns amid fragmentation.

The coercive tactics of the movement were largely nonlethal, if not nonvio-
lent. From the start of the intifada until 1993, fewer than 100 Israelis were killed
in the territories, and fewer than 100 were killed in Israel as a result of the upris-
En g, numbers that would later be dwarfed by the fragmented second intifada.
En cambio, Israeli security forces killed more than 1,000 Palestinians during this
período; these lopsided casualty ªgures and contrasting tactics helped to boost
popular support for the Palestinian national movement across the globe.75
Even when the intifada became more militarized in 1989, partly in response
to the Israelis relaxing their rules of ªre and increasing the use of plastic bul-

71. Ibídem., páginas. 596–601.
72. Aaron David Miller, The PLO and the Politics of Survival (Nueva York: Preger, 1983), pag. 42.
73. Author interview with Sari Nusseibeh, Fatah strategist with the UNC, December 2009.
74. Khalil al-Wazir, known as Abu Jihad, was a founding Fatah leader who had been building the
group’s networks in the West Bank and Gaza since the early 1980s using the grassroots model of
the PCP. Author interviews with Shabiba leaders, Junio 2013.
75. Nigel Parsons, The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to Al-Aqsa (Nueva York:
Routledge, 2005), páginas. 264–265.

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Seguridad Internacional 38:3 100

lets, the movement did not devolve into major spirals of violent outbidding.
Weaker groups did not have the power to threaten Fatah’s leadership, y
Fatah’s dominance meant that it did not need to outbid violently to maintain
its position. En cambio, Fatah saw that the best way to increase its strength was
through strategic gains, by pressuring the Israelis and negotiating with Israel
and the United States over the future of Palestine, thus cementing the group’s
position within a new state.

With no major organized challengers on the horizon and the momentum of
the intifada at his back, Arafat announced the founding of the Palestinian state
at the nineteenth PNC in November 1988. The timing of the move was driven
in part by Jordan’s recent announcement that it was giving up its claim to the
West Bank (an organizational and strategic success in and of itself), as Fatah
feared Israeli annexation. Eighty-four countries offered full recognition of the
Palestinian state and twenty offered qualiªed recognition within two months
of the declaration.76 This was a diplomatic coup for Fatah and Arafat, who also
secured PNC acceptance of United Nations Resolutions 242 y 338, clearing
the way for Palestinian negotiations with the United States and Israel over the
ªnal status of Israel and Palestine.

Allied insigniªcant groups that disagreed with some of these steps, incluir-
ing the PFLP, nonetheless remained in the PLO and did not engage in
spoiling attacks. Subordinates outside of the PLO, such as the PFLP–General
Command and Islamic Jihad, launched a few attacks against Israeli and
American targets. Rather than chain-gang the movement or drive Fatah to out-
bid, Fatah’s strength and position allowed it stay the strategic course even if,
predictably, it did so largely for organizational reasons. The continued domi-
nance of Fatah prevented subsequent violent spoiling attempts by a relatively
weak Hamas from derailing strategic progress in the early 1990s, which began
in earnest with the signing of the Declaration of Principles on the White House
lawn in September 1993.77

The power distribution theory does not attempt to explain all of the ins and
outs of the Madrid and Oslo negotiations, on which numerous valuable works
already exist.78 More broadly, sin embargo, the theory helps to reveal that the in-

76. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pag. 624.
77. Hamas was founded at the start of the ªrst intifada, but it had little support outside the territo-
ries, did not even form an armed wing until the early 1990s, and was not a signiªcant group that
could potentially challenge Fatah’s leadership until the mid-to-late 1990s.
78. Moshe Ma’oz, Robert L. Rothstein, and Khalil Shikaki, editores., The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process:
Oslo and the Lessons of Failure: Perspectives, Predicaments, Prospects (Brighton, REINO UNIDO.: Sussex Academic

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The Structure of Success 101

creased focus on strategic objectives, the decrease in strategically counterpro-
ductive violence and foreign meddling, the cohesiveness of the ªrst intifada,
the increased credibility of the movement, and the acceptance of a political
program that made these negotiations possible were all a direct result of the
hegemony of the Palestinian national movement. The Oslo accords are far less
popular today than they were at the time, but they nonetheless represent the
most signiªcant strategic success of the Palestinian national movement either
before or since. They led to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza and ma-
jor cities in the West Bank, the creation of a Palestinian Authority with varying
degrees of control in these areas, the return of thousands of refugees into the
territories, and the prospect of a resolution to the conºict creating a Palestinian
state within a signiªcant part of the West Bank and all of Gaza.

Por último, the Oslo negotiations and their critics highlight some of the great
strengths and weaknesses of the power distribution theory. The theory is cor-
rect that the Palestinian movement was more strategically effective during pe-
riods of hegemony than in periods of unity or fragmentation, but it does not
necessarily deªne precisely how much more.79 The mechanisms of the theory
suggest that groups will pursue strategic gains as far as these gains are likely
to beneªt the groups themselves. En este caso, the gains of Oslo deªnitely
beneªted Fatah, and in the process did secure some strategic progress that
beneªted the larger movement. Was Fatah selªsh in this? Absolutely. It was no
less selªsh than other groups that took positions in the newly formed Palestin-
ian Authority, sin embargo, or arguably those such as Hamas, which launched at-
tacks in part because it was excluded from the deal. De hecho, Fatah’s actions
in this regard conªrm the predictions of the hierarchy hypothesis, as Fatah
accepted strategic gains that it had castigated and killed others for even sug-
gesting two decades earlier, in no small part because its new position in the hi-
erarchy allowed it to enjoy the selective beneªts of the formation of the
Palestinian Authority.80 Could further strategic gains have been achieved? Por-

Prensa, 2004); and Aaron David Miller, The Much Too Promised Land: America’s Elusive Search for Arab-
Israeli Peace (Nueva York: Bantam, 2008).
79. The Oslo accords did not give the Palestinians any control over Jerusalem; they left the vast
majority of refugees outside of Palestine; they made no agreement on the ªnal borders of a Pales-
tinian state; and they did nothing to stop or dismantle Israeli settlements.
80. En efecto, organizational objectives were the reason why Fatah had initiated the secret Oslo ne-
gotiations in the ªrst place. Arafat was concerned that the ongoing negotiations in Madrid under
the auspices of the United States, which Fatah was partially controlling on the Palestinian side but
not directly participating in, could revive the local elites in the territories to form an organized
signiªcant group and eventually challenge Fatah for leadership.

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Seguridad Internacional 38:3 102

haps, but any answer must acknowledge the three prior decades and two sub-
sequent decades that experienced fragmented and united movements with
much less to show for it.81 The strategic gains at Oslo were not everything the
Palestinians desired, but they were far more than previous or subsequent cam-
paigns have achieved.

The Algerian National Movement: Struggling to Hegemony

The Palestinians in the 1960s were perhaps most inspired by the Algerian
national movement, which had ties to the broader Arab nationalist movement
and found success just a few years before the founding of the PLO and Fatah’s
launch of the armed struggle. Like the Palestinian national movement, el
Algerian national movement was strategically successful during its one period
of hegemony (1958–62) and largely unsuccessful during periods of fragmenta-
ción (1946–51, 1952–54, 1954–56, 1956–57) and unity (1944–45, 1951) (see ta-
ble 3). Whereas the fragmented and united periods were marked by mixed
strategies and signals, greater efforts expended on internal ªghts than exter-
nal ones, and failed attempts at side deals, the movement under the Front
de Libération Nationale’s (FLN’s) dominance yielded clear, consistent signals;
a massive, concerted strategic effort at expelling the French; and a single, cred-
ible negotiator with limited potential for spoiling or sellout given the lack of an
internal challenger, which ultimately spelled strategic success.

united or fragmented: the failure of divided power, 1944–54

The Algerian national movement contained multiple signiªcant groups dur-
ing the ªrst few decades of its existence. Early on, political organizations
such as the Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA), the Algerian Association of
Ulama (AAU), and Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté (AML) competed
and allied in failed bids to achieve Algerian independence.82 Although the
Algerian national movement was nonviolent until the mid-1940s, the multiple
signiªcant groups in the movement nonetheless inhibited progress through
their associated lack of cohesive effort, mixed signaling, and internal struggles
for power.

81. The second intifada saw Fatah get dragged into strategically counterproductive violence yet
again given the fragmented structure brought about by Hamas’s rise from subordinate to chal-
lenger. See Bloom, Dying to Kill.
82. The concept of Algerian nationalism did not develop until a century after the French invasion
en 1830, although this potentially unifying ideology failed to unite the competing groups.

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The Structure of Success 103

Mesa 3. Summary of Campaigns in the Algerian National Movement, 1944–62

Time
Período

Movement
Sistema
Estructura

Hierarchy of
Groups at Start
of Campaign

1944–45 united

1. AML
2. PPA
3. AAU

Summary of Group Actions

Groups unite initially, but PPA
helps launch violence at Sétif
and after, AML tries to restrain

1946–51

fragmented

1. UDMA (AML)
2. MTLD (PPA)

UDMA and MTLD contest
elecciones, avoid violence

1951

united#

1. MTLD
2. UDMA

1952–54

fragmented 1. MTLD
2. UDMA

1954–56

fragmented

1. MTLD/MNA
2. UDMA
3. NAC
4. FLN

1956–57

fragmented

1. FLN
2. MNA

1958–62 hegemonic

1. FLN

Groups unite brieºy after 1951
electoral fraud by French, cada
largely avoids violence

NAC splits from MTLD, inªghting
begins between them, no large-
scale violence against French

FLN uses violence to initiate a
revolution against France, otro
groups ªrst denounce and try to
restrain it, MNA later uses
violence

FLN becomes strongest group,
absorbs UDMA, NAC, y otros,
FLN and MNA use violence
against the French and (mostly)
entre sí

FLN largely destroys armed
wings of MNA, continues war
against France, negotiates for
Algerian independence

Strategic
Outcome of
Campaign

failure

total
success

#Although not signiªcant groups by this time, the AAU and Algerian Communist Party also
joined this alliance.
AAU: Algerian Association of Ulama
MTLD: Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques
AML: Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté
NAC: National Algerien Congress
FLN: Front de Libération Nationale
PPA: Parti du Peuple Algérien
MNA: Mouvement National Algérien
UDMA: Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien

The movement was ªrst united in 1944 under AML leader Ferhat Abbas,
who issued the “Manifesto of the Algerian People” and brought his group into
an alliance with the AAU and PPA—led by Messali Hadj—to win independ-
ence from France. Some Algerians argued that this represented the greatest pe-
riod of unity among the political factions and the people, more so than during

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Seguridad Internacional 38:3 104

the later dominance of the FLN.83 Despite these developments, power in the
movement remained divided among multiple signiªcant groups, even if they
were united. Tal como, the autonomous factions continued to compete for
power internally, which led to strategically counterproductive dynamics.

Although he had agreed to unite with the AML, Messali had maintained the
PPA as a separate entity in part because he believed his group should lead
the movement. En 1945 Messali took two steps that reºected this desire for
organizational power and spelled the end of the alliance. Primero, at the AML
Congress in March 1945, which was designed to strengthen movement unity,
Messali’s followers attempted to gain control of movement policy. They then
passed a motion naming Messali “the incontestable leader of the Algerian peo-
por ejemplo,” a clear challenge to Abbas and his organization.84 Although these steps
did not bring the collapse of the alliance, the PPA’s subsequent move to vio-
lence did.

With the Allies’ triumph over Germany in World War II, many Algerians be-
lieved that signiªcant political reforms were (or should be) in the ofªng. On
Puede 8, 1945 (VE Day), Algerians turned out for marches across the country, en-
cluding in Sétif, a major town in the northeast. Some of the marchers displayed
banners in support of Messali and Algerian independence. When police
stepped in, shots were ªred; it was unclear by which side. Sin embargo, what is
clear is that soon after, the marchers—some of whom were armed and pre-
pared for a ªght—overwhelmed the mere twenty policemen in the town.
The Algerians then began attacking the colons in Sétif and the surrounding
areas.85 Over the next four days, 103 colons were killed and another 100 eran
herido, with many victims having been mutilated or raped. The French mil-
itary responded by killing 500–600 Algerian civilians, and the colons organized
vigilante groups that killed many thousands more. The police ultimately ar-
rested thousands of nationalists of all stripes, and the short-lived uprising was
put down.

As Alistair Horne relates, “To this day, Abbas believes that Messali, in collu-
sion with the colonial police, instigated [Sétif] with the aim of destroying the

83. This provides further evidence of the importance of hegemony as compared to unity, given
that the latter yielded failure at its peak despite even greater grassroots support. Guillermo B..
Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954–1968 (Cambridge, Masa.: CON prensa, 1969),
pag. 50.
84. Ibídem.
85. By this time, colons included signiªcant proportions of Italians and Greeks, among others, en
addition to French.

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The Structure of Success 105

unity achieved by his Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté created the previous
year.”86 Messali and the PPA had partially organized the massacre and pub-
licly called for insurrection thereafter, while Abbas and the AML had not been
involved and denounced the attacks. Sin embargo, the AML and PPA were
both dissolved and their members arrested, while any hope of strategic success
for the movement ªzzled. Each of these aspects of Sétif—the challenger
launching attacks to change campaign dynamics and rise to the top, the leader
attempting to restrain violence, competition yielding strategic defeat—are con-
sistent with the power distribution theory.

In direct reference to his 1943 manifesto, Abbas founded the Union
Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien (UDMA) after the dissolution of the
AML. The group aimed to consolidate its top position and pursue independ-
ence in part through electoral means. Jail did not prevent Messali from reorga-
nizing, as he remained president of his group, the Mouvement pour le
Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD), which emerged from the ashes
of the PPA. The UDMA and MTLD contested numerous elections in the com-
ing years amid their nationalist struggle, even uniting again brieºy in 1951,
but signiªcant French concessions were not forthcoming.87 Increasing numbers
of Algerians were convinced that the electoral path would not lead to inde-
pendence, as the French committed increasing electoral fraud that undermined
any supposed concessions to the Algerians. The continued fragmentation of
the movement created incentives for challengers to strike out with riskier,
more violent tactics. One such group soon did just that, and it was to change
the shape of the Algerian national movement and, subsequently, the future of
its homeland.

the emergence of the ºn and the pitfalls of inªghting, 1954–58

Rather than turn away from the violence that had damaged the movement af-
ter Sétif, the MTLD—still the weaker group in 1947—prepared for another up-
rising. The organization hoped that this time the use of violence would result

86. Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954–1962 (Nueva York: New York Review of
Books, 2006), pag. 73.
87. In mid-1946, the UDMA won eleven of thirteen seats for nationalist parties in the French Con-
stituent Assembly elections. Although this helped conªrm the UDMA’s strength, the margin re-
sulted in part from the absence of Messali and many of his followers, who were in prison. El
MTLD performed better in the 1947 municipal elections, garnering 31 percent of the vote com-
pared with 27 percent for the UDMA among Muslim electors. See Alf Andrew Heggoy, Insurgency
and Counterinsurgency in Algeria (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), pag. 31; and Horne, A
Savage War of Peace, pag. 70.

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Seguridad Internacional 38:3 106

in mass support, the predominance of the MTLD, and French withdrawal. En
this spirit, the MTLD had formed a secret paramilitary branch in 1947, cual
helped the MTLD to become the strongest nationalist group. The MTLD re-
mained the leader after a French crackdown, but two smaller challengers split
off in the early 1950s: the National Algerian Congress (NAC), which engaged
in reciprocal violent attacks with their former cohorts, and the FLN.88

The FLN—the weakest challenger at the time—met in July 1954 and voted
unanimously to initiate a long-term, nationalist revolt against France until its
withdrawal from Algeria. The hierarchy hypothesis explains variation in the
reactions of the other groups to the FLN’s launch of the revolution, which be-
gan with the sabotage of communications systems, the burning of stores, y
attacks on police barracks on November 1, 1954. The leading MTLD, cual
had 60,000 supporters in Paris at the time in addition to tens of thousands
more in Algeria, had previously assaulted members of the FLN leadership.
Messali was outraged at the outbreak of violence and denounced it as ill ad-
vised, although to reap popular support he allowed rumors to percolate that it
was his group that had launched the attacks.89 Ironically, if predictably accord-
ing to the power distribution theory, the MTLD was now playing the role of its
old rival from Sétif, the UDMA, while the FLN had assumed the MTLD’s his-
toric role as a weaker challenger looking to shift campaign dynamics using vi-
olence. For their part, the UDMA and NAC initially denounced the FLN’s
attacks and warned their supporters away from the group.

In part because of this lack of support from other competing factions, en el
winter of 1954 the FLN was down to 350 rebels in the eastern region of the
Aurès Mountains, which was the hub of the revolt. Against such odds, es ap-
pears difªcult to label the FLN “self-interested,” given that its members put
themselves at great individual risk. Their own statements, sin embargo, make it
clear that national liberation was not all that was on the organization’s mind.
As FLN leader Ahmed Ben Bella later recounted, “We knew that, if the situa-
tion became really serious, the French government would not fail to dissolve
the MTLD and to imprison its leaders. To our unspeakable relief, this was ex-

88. The FLN was originally named the Comité Révolutionnaire d’Unité et d’Action (Revolution-
ary Committee for Unity and Action or CRUA). When it quickly became clear that maintaining
unity among the factions was impossible—and, perhaps more important, CRUA itself began to
lose members to the NAC—CRUA pushed for a hegemonic movement under the auspices of its
own organization, which it renamed the FLN. Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership, páginas. 90–
91.
89. Mohamed Harbi, Aux origines du FLN: Le populisme révolutionnaire en Algérie [The origins of the
FLN: Revolutionary populism in Algeria] (París: Christian Bourgois, 1975), páginas. 145, 149.

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The Structure of Success 107

actly what happened. The government thereby relieved us of the presence of a
lot of political meddlers who were assumed to be our accomplices but who, en
hecho, were a terrible hindrance to our movement because of the confusion
which they created in the mind of the public. Thanks to the enemy, [the FLN]
became the only political force in Algeria.”90 Although the FLN would eventu-
ally become the only signiªcant group in the national movement years later,
the initial French crackdown on the MTLD was helpful, but far from sufªcient
for such a smashing organizational success. Sin embargo, Ben Bella conªrmed
that organizational position played a signiªcant role in the FLN decision to
initiate violence and anticipate repression of a rival, as the power distribution
theory predicts.

The key problem for the FLN was that the movement was still fragmented,
and so its violent attacks continued to inspire internal condemnation and com-
petition, which inhibited strategic progress. The pitfalls of division were on
full display on the ªrst day of the uprising, as a French ethnologist thwarted
an FLN attack on the town of Arris by playing one pro-FLN Auresian tribe off
a non-FLN tribe.91 Indeed, the FLN expended far greater efforts killing fellow
Muslims than they did the French army or the colons. The FLN focused much
of its striking power on Messali’s group, renamed the Mouvement National
Algérien (MNA) soon after the FLN launched the revolt. The MNA, which was
unhappy with the uprising initially, had proceeded to form a new armed wing
to compete, which included a contingent of 500 ªghters in Kabylia. The FLN
massacred this unit in the summer of 1955. It killed 6,352 Muslim civilians in
the ªrst two years of the revolt, against only 1,035 Europeans civilians and far
fewer French soldiers.92 The discrepancy was not just quantitative. muchos de
the FLN’s worst atrocities were against internal enemies, which often hurt do-
mestic and international support while destroying potential movement
resources.

Por último, this organizational violence helped to bog down the revolt in the
ªrst few years. Por 1956 the FLN (and the movement) had not achieved the de-
sired popular insurrection against France; a negotiated end to the conºict was
not on the horizon; and most conventional accounts argue that the French had

90. Quoted in Robert Merle, Ben Bella, trans. Camilla Sykes (Londres: Michael Joseph, 1967), pag. 94.
91. Horne, A Savage War of Peace, pag. 92.
92. French interior ministry statistics note that from 1956 a 1961, attacks in France killed 3,957 Alabama-
gerians and 219 non-Algerian French. See Benjamin Stora, Ils Venaient d’Algérie: L’immigration
Algérienne en France [They came from Algeria: Algerian immigration in France] (París: Fayard,
1992), pag. 207; and Horne, A Savage War of Peace, páginas. 135–136.

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Seguridad Internacional 38:3 108

reclaimed the initiative militarily. Despite these seemingly dark signs, el
FLN’s strategy ªnally began to bear fruit internally. The structure of the na-
tional movement began to shift signiªcantly toward hegemony for the ªrst
tiempo, putting it—and the FLN—in position for strategic success.

ªghting to hegemony: the ºn and movement triumphant, 1958–62

The FLN managed to survive despite increasingly harsh French repression in
1954–56, which allowed the group to augment its forces with those of its com-
petitors. En general, the FLN struck a wise balance, working to integrate
Algerians of all ethnicities, religions, and ideologies—as long as they were
nationalist—who agreed to be absorbed into the FLN as individuals, not as al-
lied groups. By mid-1956, the FLN had absorbed and removed from the ªeld
three of the four other signiªcant Algerian groups in existence since the 1930s—
the UDMA, the NAC, and the AAU—not to mention some smaller groups such
as the Algerian Communist Party (PCA), with which the FLN’s ruthless but
shrewd push for hegemony was on full display.93 The movement was nearly
hegemonic; the only remaining rival was a weakening but deªant MNA.

Starting in 1956, the renewed presence of MNA forces alongside those of the
FLN meant that “the Aurès lapsed back substantially into fratricidal warfare,
contributing little to the common cause.”94 The FLN massacred MNA units
and supporting populations in Melouza, generating press coverage that led to
signiªcant popular backlash against the FLN both domestically and interna-
cionalmente. The group tried to claim that this massacre was a French attack, but to
no avail. This use of violence was certainly strategically counterproductive at
el tiempo, and had it continued in a similar pattern, it could have led to the
downfall of the revolt. Unlike the Palestinians, sin embargo, who had relied on
outbidding and limited feuds, the FLN was able to escape this cycle of inªght-
ing by destroying its rival through continued direct assaults.95 By 1958, el
FLN had eliminated the MNA as a signiªcant threat to its leadership of the na-

93. Tawªk al-Madani, the secretary-general of the AAU, joined the FLN along with many of the
members of his organization. The FLN rebuffed attempts at alliances from both the UDMA and
the PCA. In April 1956, Abbas dissolved the UDMA and brought its members into the FLN. Soon
después, the PCA’s armed wing was decimated by pro-French forces, likely the result of a tip-off from
the FLN, and the PCA was dissolved and its members absorbed into the FLN with open arms.
Horne, A Savage War of Peace, páginas. 137–138.
94. Ibídem., pag. 142.
95. The FLN’s effort to eclipse the MNA was also apparent in France. En 1954, the MNA was domi-
nant among the Algerians there. By 1957–58, the FLN had won the backing of the vast majority of
el 500,000 Algerians working in France (the FLN suggested 90 por ciento) through a combination
of violent intimidation, individual lobbying, and natural shifts in support stemming from the

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The Structure of Success 109

tional movement, and so created the hegemony that made strategic success far
more likely.96 From 1958 a 1959, the MNA suffered signiªcant defections from
its leadership and remaining ªghters to the FLN and the French, owing in part
to the perception that the FLN’s dominance meant that the MNA was no
longer a signiªcant actor in the conºict.97

Internationally, the hegemony of the FLN ensured that the movement spoke
with one voice and created a seller’s market for potential state support. Un
Arab summit of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Jordan declared total support
for the Algerian cause after the rise of the FLN in 1957. Además, the FLN
made contacts with the Soviet Union and China, and convinced the United
States to begin to abstain from rather than veto United Nations Security Coun-
cil resolutions concerning French actions in Algeria. These diplomatic gains
were enabled by the lack of a signiªcant foreign contingent of UDMA, NAC,
or MNA emissaries.

Budding hegemony also allowed the FLN to shift its focus from Algerian
to French enemies. The hegemonic structure helped shift incentives, cen-
tralize decisionmaking, and ensure better strategic coordination, but these
changes alone did not guarantee immediate strategic success. Uno de los
ªrst operations launched amid the FLN’s growing dominance—the Battle of
Algiers against the heart of French control and the colon population—ended in
defeat.98 The internal dominance of the FLN did not ensure that it could not
commit tactical mistakes—such as the call for a weeklong general strike that
could not be realized—but it did mean that the FLN could survive such errors,

FLN’s rise. This diaspora population contributed crucial funds to the FLN, totaling 600 millón
francs per year by 1958. Ibídem., pag. 237.
96. Horne trumpets the impact of hegemony, albeit not in so many words: “To the Muslim masses
of Algeria the mere appearance of this seemingly unrufºed, undivided, and unrelenting façade
was immeasurably heartening and encouraging, and probably did more to keep the ºame of
the revolution alight than a steady ºow of dozens of fresh katibas across the Morice Line would
have done.” Fortunately for the FLN, the hegemonic movement also helped provide dozens of
fresh kata’ib (battalions) to the dominant faction, as there simply was no substantial alternative
force within the Algerian national movement, the MNA having lost its last signiªcant armed wing
in July 1958. By that time, the FLN had 30,000 regulars and 30,000 irregulars in its Armée de
Libération Nationale (National Liberation Army or ALN). See Ibid., páginas. 255, 258, 408; and Martha
Crenshaw, “The Effectiveness of Terrorism in the Algerian War,” in Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism in
Context (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), pag. 477.
97. Jacques Valette, La Guerre d’Algérie des Messalistes, 1954–1962 [The Algerian War of the
Messalistes, 1954–1962] (París: L’Harmattan, 2001), páginas. 278–282; and Benjamin Stora, Messali Hadji
(París: Hachette, 2004), pag. 278.
98. The bombings against civilians and general strikes initiated by the FLN were designed to
make Algiers ungovernable and to coerce the French to withdraw. Intensive counterinsurgency
tactics, sin embargo, rolled up what had been an FLN network of 1,400 members by March 1957.

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Seguridad Internacional 38:3 110

self-evaluate, and strategically adjust its strategy without fear of losing its po-
posición. Had the movement been fragmented or united in late 1957 to early 1958,
the fallout from the Battle of Algiers could have been marked by extensive out-
bidding and inªghting, as competing signiªcant groups smelled opportunity
and the FLN felt the need to demonstrate its continued vitality in strategically
counterproductive ways. En cambio, despite some squabbling by top leaders in
the aftermath of the setback, FLN leader Benyoucef Benkhedda noted, "El
base of the pyramid held ªrm.”99 The FLN had the breathing room to learn
and implement the right lessons from the Battle of Algiers—that it could not
face French forces directly in the cities and instead should wear them down
en el campo, while ensuring that it remained the only Algerian force
with the capability to negotiate a resolution to the conºict.

After the French leadership and civilians began to resign themselves to a
withdrawal from Algeria in response to a combination of rising economic and
human costs spurred by the FLN, international pressure, and a growing dis-
taste with the conduct of the conºict, they looked to ªnd a suitable compro-
mise with a desirable Algerian counterpart. Unfortunately for the French, su
wish to end the conºict by granting as few strategic concessions as possi-
ble was thwarted by the total lack of an alternative Algerian force to the
FLN, which had maintained its same demands since its ªrst declaration on
Noviembre 1, 1954: full French withdrawal, full independence for Algeria, y
no dual citizenship for colons who remained.100

The writing was on the wall by the time of French Prime Minister Charles
de Gaulle’s speech on September 16, 1959,
in which he called for self-
determination for Algeria. Given the demographics, this plan all but ensured
Muslim rule. Sin embargo, de Gaulle kept looking for a Muslim “third force”
with which to negotiate, pero, ªnding none, he continued to move closer to
dealing with the FLN and giving in to its demands as the only option. The abil-
ity of the FLN to foresee this very development drove its uncompromising de-
struction and absorption of internal rivals, as it had instructed its units to
“liquidate all personalities who want to play the role of interlocuteur valable,"
or legitimate negotiator.101 Hegemony thus ensured that the FLN signals were

99. Quoted in Horne, A Savage War of Peace, pag. 229.
100. French attempts to prop up an alternative nationalist group failed, as MNA dissident Mo-
hammed Bellounis and his Armée Nationale Populaire Algérienne both met their end in 1958 después
having fought the FLN over the course of the previous year.
101. Ibídem., páginas. 135, 466; and Martha Crenshaw, Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954–
1962 (stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), pag. 37.

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The Structure of Success 111

clear; it was the only group with which to negotiate; and the French knew the
FLN could credibly threaten to continue the war and credibly guarantee an
end to violence.102

When the French ªnally turned to the FLN to negotiate their departure, el
hegemony of the Algerian national movement helped to ensure that the deal
would be consummated. After French intentions to grant Algerian independ-
ence became clear with the holding of a 1961 referendum in France that ap-
proved self-determination for the territory, a number of colons formed an
armed group of their own to spoil the peace, the Organisation de l’Armée
Secrète (OAS). The OAS launched attacks against French soldiers and Muslim
civilians alike in attempts to drive the parties apart and prevent a deal. As FLN
leader Benkhedda described, “Our greatest danger was that, debido a la
OAS, anybody treating with the French might be regarded as a traitor by his
own side.”103

Had the movement contained multiple signiªcant groups, OAS violence
would have made it less likely that the FLN could have negotiated with the
Francés, because the FLN would have been worried that a loss of legitimacy
would lead to its rival’s ascendance. Given that the movement was hegemonic,
sin embargo, the FLN knew that there was no viable alternative to beneªt from
any loss of face, so it proceeded with the negotiations amid the attacks.
The two sides agreed to the Evian accords, which called for a cease-ªre on
Marzo 18, 1962, to be veriªed by referenda in France and Algeria in June and
Julio. In response to increased OAS attempts to violently spoil the deal, the FLN
held off from retaliating for months. Employing logic that ªts perfectly with
the power distribution theory, Horne explains why: “Up to this point the FLN
in Algiers—secure in the knowledge it was about to inherit the earth—had
shown remarkable discipline and restraint.”104 The FLN’s eventual retaliation
in May remained limited, even though the OAS had killed three times as many
civilians in the Algiers area during the ªrst six months of 1962 as the FLN had
de 1956 a 1962 combined, including the Battle of Algiers. Sin embargo, el
FLN resisted colon spoiling and even negotiated a truce with the OAS in June.

102. En este punto, the greatest rivalry in the national movement was inside the FLN, en vez de
with competing groups. Local FLN wilaya commanders squabbled with each other and the FLN
leadership outside of Algeria over strategy and control of the organization. Sin embargo, no fac-
tion formed its own separate, signiªcant group that could challenge the FLN for leadership in the
movement or negotiate with the French.
103. Quoted in Horne, A Savage War of Peace, pag. 508.
104. Ibídem., pag. 530.

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Seguridad Internacional 38:3 112

The FLN celebrated Algeria’s independence with the rest of the movement on
Julio 5, 1962, its organizational and strategic goals achieved after the movement
structure had shifted to hegemony for the ªrst time in its history.

Alternative Explanations and Comparisons across Movements

Existing theories that suggest that united or fragmented national movements
are more successful in achieving their strategic objectives fare relatively poorly
in the Palestinian and Algerian cases at ªrst glance. From the Revolutionary
Command Council for the Liberation of Palestine to the Uniªed Command of
the Palestinian Resistance, from Algerian alliances in the mid-1940s to the
early 1950s, unity of all shapes and sizes met strategic failure again and again.
Hamas was not a part of unifying institutions during either the ªrst or second
intifada; the key difference was the increase in the group’s relative strength in
the interim and the impact this had on movement dynamics (more counterpro-
ductive violence) and outcomes (less strategic success). Institutions matter, pero
only when considered alongside the distribution of power.105 Further research
on nonstate organizations—including clearly deªning and differentiating fac-
ciones, grupos, alliances, fronts, and the like—is necessary to tap the full poten-
tial of the synergy between power and institutions in movements.

Periods of fragmentation consistently yielded campaigns of strategic failure
in both the Palestinian and the Algerian national movements. dicho eso, analy-
sis of these two movements suggests that the dynamic of states seeking more
moderate groups to negotiate with is a real and powerful one, as demonstrated
by the actions of President de Gaulle (who sought a moderate alternative to
the FLN) and the Israelis (who made concessions to Fatah when Hamas was
weaker, but are more hesitant to do so now that Hamas has the potential to in-
herit leadership of the movement). Power distribution theory may provide a
key scope condition to this mechanism: states will make concessions to more
moderate factions, but are more likely to do so with hegemonic movements
than with fragmented or united movements. States certainly seek to head off
extremist groups, but they are also wary of providing concessions to a moder-

105. There is potential common ground with Pearlman’s work concerning when and why groups
choose to unify and form collaborative institutions. This study suggests that alliances will be more
likely between strong and weak groups than among roughly equal signiªcant groups. This may
explain why stronger, centralized institutions that included the vast majority of Palestinian groups
emerged under a Fatah organization that was without strong, organized rivals in the late 1980s,
but not amid the signiªcant fragmentation of the 1960s and 1970s.

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The Structure of Success 113

ate group that may soon lose its place in the hierarchy, leaving an extremist
leader to operate from a newly strengthened position.106

On a related note, why did hegemony for the Algerians yield greater strate-
gic success than for the Palestinians? Factors beyond movement structure cer-
tainly play a role in strategic outcomes. As previously noted, the state, es
tipo de régimen, and the strategic objective are largely constant within each move-
mento (and the latter two across movements).107 Potential state supporters cer-
tainly matter, especially in the Palestinian national movement. Regardless of
whether the Palestinian national movement was hegemonic, the broader Arab
national movement that engaged with Israel and the Palestinians generally
was not. Syria, Jordán, and Egypt in particular have had major roles to play
in claiming and controlling territory, poblaciones, and negotiations with
Israel, although as noted in power distribution theory, these states were more
able to hinder or inºuence the Palestinian national movement when it was
nonhegemonic. At times, these states competed with Palestinian groups
for movement leadership or were able to help create proxy groups that be-
came signiªcant players in the movement, o ambos. These either faded in inºu-
ence over time (Saiqa) or were captured by autonomous Palestinian groups
(the PLO), but they nonetheless demonstrate how states can inºuence the
structure of a national movement.

This ªnding helps to address another potential concern—namely, that strate-
gic success and failure drive movement structure, rather than the other way
alrededor. In addition to external state actions, exogenous factors that shape
movement structure include the geographic, étnico, religious, and economic
distribution of the popular base, the presence of natural resources, personal
clashes, and ideological differences. Hegemony preceded the greatest strategic
successes in both the Palestinian and the Algerian national movements, pero
strategic successes preceded hegemony, fragmentation, and attempts at unity,
whereas strategic failures preceded hegemony, fragmentation, and unity in
both movements. It was also not the case that hegemony came about because
the movement or its base thought that victory was just around the corner.108

106. It is also possible, as Cunningham suggests, that fragmented movements may generate a
number of smaller concessions offered from states seeking to buy off parts of the opposition, mientras
hegemonic movements are more likely to yield concessions that are larger but perhaps less fre-
quent. Cunningham, “Divide and Conquer or Divide and Concede.”
107. On the role of state structure in movement outcomes, see Hendrik Spruyt, Ending Empire:
Contested Sovereignty and Territorial Partition (Ítaca, N.Y.: Prensa de la Universidad de Cornell, 2005).
108. Hegemony may help movements succeed, but it necessitates the signiªcant weakening of all

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Seguridad Internacional 38:3 114

Fatah’s hegemony was established during some of the darkest days for the
Palestinian national movement, and FLN hegemony was achieved while
the French were winning militarily and French leaders were still claiming that
Algeria was part of France. We know what did not drive movement structure
in these cases (strategic success), but more research is necessary to pinpoint
what actually did.109

Conclusión

Amid an extended discussion of the history of the Palestinian national move-
mento, one member of the DFLP summed up the feelings of most groups when
he said: “I care not only about the size of the pie, but also what size slice I am
going to get.”110 His observation exposes the tension between strategic and or-
ganizational goals that is at the foundation of national movements. All mem-
bers of a movement share a strategic goal such as statehood, but member
groups seek to ensure their survival and maximize their strength above all
else. In hegemonic movements, the hegemon’s desire to cement its dominant
position will push the hegemon to achieve strategic success, and it is more
likely to do so as a credible coercer. In united or fragmented movements,
groups will focus on ªghting with others via outbidding, chain-ganging, spoil-
En g, and inªghting to better position themselves for organizational gains,
making strategic failure more likely. Hierarchical change may switch groups’
roles, but if a movement continues to contain multiple signiªcant groups, semejante
organizational successes and failures resemble a shifting of the deck chairs on
the proverbial strategic Titanic.

Power distribution theory makes ªve main contributions to the study of na-
tional movements. Primero, it makes the counterintuitive argument that alliances
seemingly pursued in the spirit of solidarity are not the best option for na-
tional movements seeking strategic success, but rather that the distribution of
power is the key factor in both the actions of groups and the effectiveness

groups but one. It must therefore likely be fought for, as few signiªcant groups will willingly put
themselves out of business.
109. One fruitful area for synergistic research on the origins of movement structure lies with stud-
ies of group splitting. See Paul Staniland, “Organizing Insurgency: Networks, Recursos, and Re-
bellion in South Asia,” Seguridad Internacional, volumen. 37, No. 1 (Verano 2012), páginas. 142–177; and Victor
Asal, Mitchell Brown, and Angela Dalton, “Why Split? Organizational Splits among Ethnopolitical
Organizations in the Middle East,” Journal of Conºict Resolution, volumen. 56, No. 1 (Febrero 2012),
páginas. 94–117.
110. Author interview with former DFLP member, 2010.

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The Structure of Success 115

of their movements. Segundo, the theory provides a simple but powerful
typology of national movements that builds on the impressive efforts of pre-
vious scholarship, accounting for group numbers and alliances while adding
the distribution of power overlooked by previous theories. Tercero, it helps
identify the conditions for prominent mechanisms in related literatures, sug-
gesting that outbidding spirals are more likely to emerge in nonhegemonic
movements and that radical ºanks are likely to have positive and negative ef-
fects when their movement is hegemonic and nonhegemonic, respectivamente.
Cuatro, the theory demonstrates how the currently disconnected unitary and
non-unitary approaches to the political effectiveness of nonstate violence can
be integrated to capitalize on their respective strengths by incorporating tradi-
tional variables such as objective, estrategia, signaling, and credibility into
disaggregated movement frameworks. Finalmente, power distribution theory asks
and addresses questions often ignored in studies of the effectiveness of
nonstate violence, such as when and why groups use violence to pursue strate-
gic goals in the ªrst place and what is the relationship between organizational
and strategic objectives.

There are several key policy implications of this study. Those policymakers,
Participantes, and supporters seeking to help national movements achieve stra-
tegic success should avoid trying to make groups altruistic allies and instead
work to change the movement power structure. Those trying to counter vio-
lent national movements should recognize the tension between preventing vi-
olence and preventing strategic progress. If a state wants to prevent violent
attacks, then it should push for a hegemonic movement adversary. If a state
wants to prevent the strategic progress of a movement, then it should push for
a fragmented movement adversary. Current thinking among scholars and
policymakers often addresses counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strat-
egy without appreciating these dual objectives and the inherent tension in
their achievement. For the Palestinian national movement and Syrian insur-
gency today, this study suggests that unity deals between Fatah and Hamas or
various Syrian factions will probably not be consummated among all
signiªcant groups, and they are far less relevant to the strategic success of the
movements than a change in the internal distribution of power.

Finalmente, this study raises two additional questions for future research. Primero,
how are campaigns linked within movements over time? Can some of the
short-term “counterproductive” mechanisms in one campaign actually lay
the foundation for strategic effectiveness in future campaigns, as appeared to
be the case with the FLN’s inªghting? Power distribution theory identiªes the

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Seguridad Internacional 38:3 116

conditions under which such mechanisms can aid strategic effectiveness in
the long term—when they make the movement hegemonic—but the theory
does not explain when and why such a systemic shift in power does or does
not occur. This represents a potential bridge to competing theories, as move-
ments may beneªt from periods of both fragmentation and hegemony, como el
former creates a competitive environment in which weaker challengers are se-
lected out, followed by a hegemon carrying the movement to victory. Semejante
evolution would ªt with the concept of stages that was central to the thinking
of the most prominent practitioners and theorists of nonstate violence, incluir-
ing Mao Zedong, Che Guevara, Carlos Marighella, Vo Ngyuen Giap, and Abu
Bakr Naji.

Segundo, does the power distribution theory apply to nonnational or nonvio-
lent movements? Although certain aspects are speciªc to violent, national
movimientos, many of the key mechanisms of the theory concerning the pursuit
of organizational and strategic objectives, counterproductive inªghting and
external meddling, as well as credibility and signaling should be applicable to
nonnational and nonviolent social movements. The movements in this study
suggest as much, as the Algerians and Palestinians were most strategically
successful when hegemonic, but the former was very violent and the latter
was more nonviolent than it had generally been at the time of its success.
Longitudinal analysis of other movements—national and nonnational, violent
and nonviolent—can help to determine the scope of the theory. In any case,
it is hoped that this study helps to further a growing subªeld with signif-
icant potential at the nexus of nonstate violence, national movements, and po-
litical outcomes.

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