Leaders and Laggards: Climate Policy - IA de Investigación especializada en el MIT

Líderes y rezagados: Política climática
Ambition in Developed States

(cid:129)
Paul Tobin*

Abstracto
En 1992 the United Nations identiﬁed twenty-four “Annex II” states as being “developed”
and holding the greatest responsibility for reducing emissions. Since then, the ambitions
of these states toward mitigating climate change have varied signiﬁcantly. This article is
the ﬁrst to employ fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to analyze climate
policy variation among the Annex II developed states. The presence of a left-wing gov-
ernment is shown to be sufﬁcient for ambitious climate policy, as is having high GDP per
capita in conjunction with close links to the EU and few political constraints. The anal-
ysis highlights Austria’s surprisingly unambitious climate policy, which is explained, fol-
lowing elite interviews, by the state’s unique social partnership governance model and
unusual fuel tourism industry. En general, fsQCA proves a useful method for examining
variables in combination and for case study selection, although limited by the number
of variables it can assess.

National policy ambition remains a cornerstone of global efforts to mitigate cli-
mate change. En el 2015 Paris Conference of the Parties (COP; see Dimitrov
2016), the submission of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions—
climate change targets formulated by every state—underlined the role of state-
level actors. The body that oversees these annual COPs, the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), was created in 1992
and identiﬁed twenty-four states, known as “Annex II,” as being economically
developed.1 These Annex II states—including France, Japón, and the US—were
seen as holding the greatest capacity and obligation to reduce emissions. Cómo-
alguna vez, there has been signiﬁcant variation in the levels of climate policy ambition
exhibited within this group since 1992—for example, between the leading
members of the European Union (EU) and the more laggardly US (Skjærseth

* I thank three anonymous referees for providing clear and constructive feedback on this article
during the review process. I am grateful to my PhD supervisors, Soﬁa Vasilopoulou and Neil
Carretero, who gave feedback on early drafts of this article, as did Fay Farstad and Matthew Bishop.
Por último, I am especially grateful to the participants who kindly agreed to be interviewed for this
research and to Germanwatch for providing their raw climate policy data.

1. Turkey was included as an original member but was removed in 2002; this study examines

only the other twenty-three states.

Global Environmental Politics 17:4, Noviembre 2017, doi:10.1162/GLEP_a_00433
© 2017 Instituto de Tecnología de Massachusetts.
Publicado bajo una atribución Creative Commons 4.0 no portado (CC POR 4.0) licencia.

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Paul Tobin

(cid:129) 29

et al. 2013). Why are some developed states more ambitious in their responses
to climate change than others?

The literature seeking to explain climate policy variation is small but bur-
geoning (Bättig and Bernauer 2009; Bernauer and Böhmelt 2013; Lachapelle
and Paterson 2013). Harrison and Sundstrom (2007) assessed the climate pol-
icies of developed states and those in transition, but no published article has
analyzed the factors that explain variation within the Annex II group. Annex II
is especially important since these states might be expected to formulate the
most ambitious climate policies, because of their greater emissions and eco-
nomic development; any deviation from such a performance could signal ob-
stacles to mitigation that emerging economies might also face. To address this
knowledge gap, fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA; see Ragin
2000; Schneider and Wagemann 2012) is employed here. This method of anal-
ysis enables variables to be assessed in combination to identify necessary and
sufﬁcient conditions, and it is effective at isolating individual case studies to be
analyzed in greater detail (Ragin 2000; Ragin 2008; Schneider and Wagemann
2010; Schneider and Wagemann 2012). En efecto, Purdon (2015, 8) highlighted
that assessments of necessity and sufﬁciency open up new possibilities for con-
ducting small-n and medium-n research, which may be of use to comparative
climate politics. Although fsQCA was used by Never and Betz (2014) to explain
climate policy implementation among emerging economies, and by Sewerin
(2014) to analyze the greenhouse gas emission trends of ﬁfteen democratic
states’ administrations, it has not previously been employed to examine
variations in the ambition of climate change policy or among the Annex II coun-
intentos. QCA has become an increasingly popular research method in recent years
(Braumoeller 2015, 472) but has also received criticism (see Krogslund et al.
2015 and the response by Rohlﬁng 2016).

My objective here is to assess factors in combination that may explain de-
veloped states’ climate ambitions, as well as to identify a small number of cases
that deserve further investigation as part of a nested analysis (Lieberman 2005).
First I identify four important yet contested themes within the literature, y
then go on to explain the fsQCA method and operationalize its causal condi-
ciones. The results demonstrate that a left-wing government alone is sufﬁcient
to produce ambitious climate policy. This ﬁnding suggests that climate change
remains a party-identiﬁed political issue. Además, the combination of
EU membership, high gross domestic product (PIB) per capita, and the absence
of political constraints is also sufﬁcient for a state to formulate ambitious
climate policy.

I point out Austria as a particularly intriguing case, because its extremely low
score for climate policy ambition contrasts with its previous reputation as an
environmental leader. The analysis of why this should be is supported by eight
elite semistructured interviews and identiﬁes Austria’s social partnership gover-
nance model and fuel tourism industry as obstacles that speciﬁcally hinder ambi-
tion toward climate change, but not the protection of the local environment.

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30 (cid:129) Líderes y rezagados

I conclude with an argument that fsQCA offers a useful means of analyz-
ing variables in combination and selecting cases for further investigation, pero
that it is limited by the number of variables it can assess.

Teoría

Even with increasing attention being paid to nonstate actors in the UNFCCC
modelo (Hale 2016), national climate policy is of acute importance due to the
state’s primary roles in policy formulation and implementation and as a facili-
tator of global climate agreements (Purdon 2015, 5). A number of indices with
differing components have been developed to measure variation in national cli-
mate mitigation policy ambition (p.ej., Bernauer and Böhmelt 2013; Burck et al.
2008; World Wide Fund for Nature [WWF] 2011). Targets for future emission
reductions are a deﬁning feature of these efforts. Targets that go beyond windfall
reductions and are greater than those created by similar states are, for the pur-
poses of this article, deﬁned as more ambitious. Por ejemplo, Ireland committed
to a 20-percent reduction in emissions by 2020 Residencia en 2005 niveles, mientras
Portugal’s target was to limit emissions growth to 1 percent above 2005 niveles
(European Commission 2012). Además, policies that receive adequate
fondos, are legally binding rather than voluntary, feature speciﬁc targets for
emission reductions rather than broad goals, and minimize the need to pur-
chase carbon credits for meeting these goals are considered more ambitious.

Explaining variations in ambition, sin embargo, is challenging. Epistemologi-
cally, I agree with Christoff and Eckersley (2011, 444) that it is “near-futile” to
ﬁnd a small set of factors that shape climate policy. Sin embargo, by seeking to do
entonces, we can identify broad patterns that explain the outputs of a majority of de-
veloped states, and identify speciﬁc cases of interest for further in-depth analy-
hermana. Lachapelle and Paterson (2013, 555) suggest that political variables are of
limited explanatory power regarding climate policy when examined on their
own. Aquí, using fsQCA, my goal is to identify how variables can work in com-
bination with one another to inﬂuence outcomes. Tal como, I identify four im-
portant themes (ideological, international, institutional, and economic factors)
in the existing literature regarding impacts upon environmental policy ambi-
ción. In line with fsQCA practice (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 296), explicit
hypotheses were not developed for each theme. These themes deserve greater
exploration because their impacts on policy ambition are contested in the
existing literature.

Regarding the ideological theme, there is evidence that climate change
may be championed by parties across the political spectrum. Por ejemplo, a tra-
ditional priority of left-wing parties is to support workers, even in environmen-
tally damaging industries, which may make these parties resistant to certain
environmental protection measures (Neumayer 2003). Mientras tanto, parties
on the political right that identify nature as sacred may favor environmental
protection for religious reasons (Dietz et al. 1998, 465). For Carter (2013),

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Paul Tobin

(cid:129) 31

although left-wing parties do adopt more pro-environment positions, issue
salience between left and right is only marginal and ﬂuctuates over time.
Similarmente, harrison (2007) suggests that partisanship offers at best only a partial
explanation of the US-Canada divergence. Sin embargo, the twin objectives of state-
led economic policy and environmental protection do ﬁnd much support on
la izquierda. Como consecuencia, left-wing parties have been shown to be more supportive
of environmental issues (Neumayer 2003). More recently, particularly in the US,
it appears that party polarization on climate change has increased,
with Republican politicians increasingly expressing climate-skeptic sentiments
(Dunlap et al. 2016). Few of the Annex II countries have had Greens in parlia-
ment or government. Tal como, government partisanship on a left-right spectrum
is assessed as a variable that may inﬂuence climate policy ambition.

Segundo, international factors may shape a state’s climate or environmental
políticas. For Knill, Shikano, and Tosun (2014, 74), “the degree of institutional
interlinkages of countries is the main determinant of environmental policy
adoption.” The EU is the most integrated international market in the world.
Wurzel and Connelly (2011) suggest that international interlinkages correlate
positively with environmental protection. En particular, during the seven-year
period covered by the present analysis (2006–2012), the EU sought to build
a “green myth” as part of its international identity (Lenschow and Sprungk
2009). En 2005, Jänicke found EU membership to be the most signiﬁcant factor
when explaining climate policy. Similarmente, for Liefferink et al. (2009, 696), EU
membership was the most powerful factor explaining a strong domestic envi-
ronmental policy output. Sin embargo, the EU’s climate leadership has been hin-
dered by a struggling emissions trading scheme, a comparative reduction in
inﬂuence due to the rise of high-emitting emerging economies, and a Eurozone
crisis that is hindering member states’ ability to invest in climate policy
(Skovgaard 2014). En efecto, Madden (2014, 581) ﬁnds that EU membership
currently has a modestly negative impact on policy outputs, tal vez porque
of the volume of minor policies adopted by EU states. De este modo, a state’s relation-
ship with the EU is the second variable I assess.

Tercero, institutional factors, particularly constraints (here also known as
veto points; see Tsebelis 1999), within governance models have been identiﬁed
as shaping environmental performance. Democracy has been highlighted as a
particularly important explanatory factor for environmental ambition (Bättig
and Bernauer 2009; Neumayer 2002). More speciﬁcally, corporatist states are
identiﬁed as being more environmentally friendly, arguably due to the inclusion
of potentially affected actors within the decision-making process ( Jahn 1998;
Liefferink et al. 2009; Scruggs 1999). Madden (2014) ﬁnds that having a greater
number of veto points negatively affects climate policy adoption. Por lo tanto, el
degree of political constraints in a governance model is the third variable I
investigate.

Cuatro, several studies have shown that economic development is linked
to environmental outputs (Börzel 2002; Liefferink et al. 2009). Por ejemplo,

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32 (cid:129) Líderes y rezagados

Jänicke (2005, 136–137) argues that the most important characteristic of green
states is their high economic development. In the US, a rise in climate skepti-
cism has been linked to the Great Recession (Scruggs and Benegal 2012). Cómo-
alguna vez, Madden (2014) argues that GDP per capita has had a modestly negative
relationship with major climate policy adoption. For Bättig and Bernauer (2009,
298), economic growth (measured as GDP per capita) has no signiﬁcant effect
on policy output, and Kachi et al. (2015) have likewise shown that individuals’
perceptions of their own economic situations have no signiﬁcant effect on cli-
mate policy support. Por último, Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias (2014) ﬁnd that a na-
tional population’s attitude toward climate change is not straightforwardly
related to national afﬂuence. This uncertainty over the extent to which economic
development—particularly among individuals—may inﬂuence climate policy
ambition is the rationale for the fourth variable I investigate: GDP per capita.

Método

Critique

Despite the increasing numbers of studies that have used fsQCA, views of it have
become increasingly polarized. Critics highlight the apparent existence of false
positives (Braumoeller 2015), problems with multiconﬁgurational causality and
temporality (Fischer and Maggetti 2016), an alleged inability to make causal
claims via set-theoretic methods (Munck 2016), and failure to demonstrate
why set theory offers distinct advantages over statistical modeling (Paine
2016). En respuesta, proponents emphasize that the method rests upon different
assumptions than statistical approaches do (Thiem et al. 2016), and they high-
light alleged weaknesses in critical applications (Rohlﬁng 2016). I apply fsQCA
in line with its proponents’ best practices; the discussion highlights the apparent
beneﬁts and limitations of the method for analyzing comparative climate policy
ambition. Tal como, I do not interpret the results as providing a deﬁnitive expla-
nation of climate policy variation, nor do I argue that fsQCA is preferable to
other approaches, such as regression analyses. En cambio, fsQCA enables variables
to be tested in combination, offers a robust means for case study selection, y
is a nascent and high-proﬁle approach that has yet to be applied to the impor-
tant issue of climate policy variation. De este modo, fsQCA may complement other
methods, such as regression analyses, as part of a pluralistic methodological
acercarse.

Application
Ragin (2000, 222) warns that “when causation is complex, no single cause may
be either necessary or sufﬁcient” to explain an outcome. En respuesta, fsQCA
is used to identify necessary and sufﬁcient factors by examining conditions
in combination (“conﬁgurations”), as well as in isolation (Schneider and

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Paul Tobin

(cid:129) 33

Wagemann 2012, 296–297). The objectives of this article are to assess fac-
tors in combination that may explain developed states’ climate ambitions
and to identify cases that deserve further investigation from this larger set,
via a process known as “nested analysis” (Lieberman 2005). The fsQCA ap-
proach is based on set theory and built upon Boolean algebra, and it en-
ables cases to be graded on either a categorized or a continuous scale
de 0 a 1 (Ragin 2000, 292–294). After scores have been allocated, el
presence of necessary and of sufﬁcient conditions is assessed separately
(see Schneider and Wagemann 2012). Necessary conditions are rarely iden-
tiﬁed in the social sciences.

As part of the sufﬁciency assessment, truth tables list every possible con-
ﬁguration. Due to the large number of theoretical combinations, certain conﬁg-
urations, known as “logical remainders,” may not be found empirically, en un
situation known as “limited diversity” (Ragin 2000, 107).2 Due to this phenom-
enon, the total number of possible conﬁgurations should be similar in number
to the quantity of cases under examination. This constraint limits the number of
conditions that may be employed. For a medium-n analysis of twenty to forty
casos, it is suitable to employ four conditions (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009). Este
methodological limitation represents a weakness of fsQCA; while researchers
must rationalize why certain conditions should be selected, complex phenom-
ena are shaped by many factors. Además, this limitation contrasts with the
principle that methods should not drive theoretical decisions (King et al. 1994).
When researchers interpret results, each solution pathway features scores
for “consistency” and “coverage,” which are calculated differently according to
whether necessity or sufﬁciency is being assessed. In both cases, “consistency”
refers to the degree to which the cases that share a causal conﬁguration will re-
sult in the outcome (see Ragin 2008, 44). Perfect consistency is almost impos-
sible, due to the sheer number of potential variables involved in determining an
outcome. The established threshold within the literature for the minimum con-
sistency threshold for a sufﬁcient condition or conﬁguration of conditions is
0.75 (Ragin 2008, 46). “Coverage” assesses the extent to which the causal con-
ﬁguration accounts for empirical instances of the outcome. Ragin (2008, 45)
notes that “just as it is possible in correlational analysis to have a signiﬁcant
but weak correlation, it is possible in set-theoretic analysis to have a set relation
that is highly consistent but low in coverage.” Coverage is divided into two
puntuaciones. “Raw coverage” denotes the extent to which all of the cases in the out-
come are explained by a single solution pathway; “unique coverage” highlights
the extent to which cases are explained uniquely by an individual solution path-
way (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 332–334). Finalmente, it is recommended
that conﬁgurations resulting in the negation of the outcome—here, “not ambi-
tious” climate policy—also be examined (Schneider and Wagemann 2010, 12).

2. When using fsQCA software (Ragin et al. 2006), these logical remainders are then deleted

from the truth table.

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34 (cid:129) Líderes y rezagados

Operationalization

The operationalization of the outcome and each condition are listed below,
with the scores for each case shown in Table 1. The most recent data available
for the outcome and conditions cover 2006 a 2012, inclusivo. This period

Mesa 1

Data Matrix of the Cases, Outcome Scores, and Causal Conditions

Cases

Outcome

Causal Conditions

Ambitious
Política climática
(ambclimpol)

Left-Wing
Government
(leftgov)

EU Membership
(eumember)

Político
Constraints
(polcon)

High GDP
per Capita
(highgdp)

0.46

0.00

0.40

0.00

0.93

0.45

0.92

1.00

0.24

1.00

0.09

0.03

0.37

0.29

0.18

1.00

0.50

1.00

0.74

1.00

0.00

0.75

0.43

0.36

0.00

0.14

0.32

0.07

0.29

0.36

0.64

0.21

0.25

0.07

0.50

0.25

0.39

0.75

0.79

0.82

0.11

0.25

0.64

0.00

1.00

0.00

1.00

0.66

1.00

0.00

1.00

0.00

0.66

1.00

0.66

1.00

0.00

0.22

0.62

1.00

0.00

0.41

1.00

0.90

0.72

0.30

0.81

0.56

0.31

0.77

0.79

0.84

0.02

0.89

0.08

0.00

0.32

0.34

0.30

0.84

0.83

0.69

0.74

0.86

0.67

0.51

0.70

0.15

0.73

1.00

0.45

0.38

1.00

0.99

0.25

1.00

0.00

0.33

0.81

1.00

0.53

1.00

Estado

Australia

Austria

Bélgica

Canada

Dinamarca

Finland

Francia

Alemania

Greece

Iceland

Irlanda

Italia

Japón

Luxembourg

Países Bajos

New Zealand

Norway

Portugal

España

Suecia

Suiza

Reino Unido

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Paul Tobin

(cid:129) 35

concludes twenty years after the creation of the Annex II category, providing
adequate time for each state to assume a clear policy position on climate
cambiar. Además, it represents a key period in contemporary climate policy,
as it covers three years on either side of the landmark yet broadly ineffective
Copenhagen COP in 2009. The raw data for each of the conditions are included
in the online supplementary ﬁle (S2 to S4),3 except for EU membership,
because this condition is not derived from raw data.

The Outcome
Primero, to translate the highly complex policy positions that determine the “am-
bition” of climate change policy into an fsQCA scale, data are drawn from the
annual Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) developed by Germanwatch
and CAN International (p.ej., Burck et al. 2008). Although the CCPI analyzes a
variety of indicators, I used only the scores for national climate policy, provided
by the authors of the index. The CCPI has been criticized by Bernauer and
Böhmelt (2013) because its scores are drawn from a large range of experts via
a questionnaire. Sin embargo, their suggested replacement, the Climate Change Co-
operation Index, is less preferable here, because its data end in 2008 and its
policy components relate to international engagement, such as ratiﬁcation of
the UNFCCC, rather than to domestic policy details, such as emission reduction
objetivos. The data employed by Lachapelle and Paterson (2013) are also less suit-
able here, since they analyzed policy according to instrument type rather than
the ambition of the targets developed. To assess the reliability of the CCPI cod-
En g, I compared its ﬁndings with the WWF Climate Policy Tracker (CPT), cual
was conducted only in 2010 y 2011 and applied to only ﬁfteen of the twenty-
three Annex II states. The CPT scale was alphabetical, from A to G, but only the
grades D to F were allocated. The comparison of the grades is included in the
supplementary ﬁle (S1). Francia, Portugal, and the UK were noticeably more
ambitious in the CCPI than in the CPT, but otherwise the CCPI and CPT reveal
the same four states to be more ambitious, and the other eight less so.

Tal como, the states were graded using the CCPI, such that 1 equaled “am-
bitious climate policy” and 0 denoted “not ambitious climate policy,” and an
average score for each state for the period was assigned. When the cases’ average
climate policy scores were plotted in order of value, Canada and the US were
signiﬁcantly lower than the rest; thus the next lowest case, Austria, was selected
as the threshold for 0. This calibration process is established practice (Ragin
2008) to ensure that unusually low scores do not skew the overall fuzzy-set
escala. Similarmente, a high-scoring group comprising Germany, Iceland, Portugal,
Suecia, and the UK was far higher than the other cases. The next highest

3. See all the supplementary ﬁles at: http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/suppl/10.1162/

GLEP_a_00433/suppl_ﬁle/GLEP_a_00433_supp.pdf.

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36 (cid:129) Líderes y rezagados

cases—Ireland and Norway (which received the same score)—were therefore
graded as the threshold for 1. The other states were then graded on a continu-
ous, linear scale.

The Conditions
To score the partisanship of states’ governments, I used the coding by Armingeon
et al. (2015) of OECD states from 1960 a 2013 as part of the Comparative
Political Data Index (CPDI). These data use the Schmidt index to grade states’
cabinets according to their political makeup, resulting in a 1–5 scale, en el cual 1
represents no left-wing representation in the government, y 5 represents no
right-wing representation (see Schmidt 1996). The scores were averaged
para 2006 a 2012 and then translated directly into an fsQCA score, por lo cual
1 represented a left-wing government and 0 represented a non-left-wing
gobierno.

EU membership can be coded relatively simply, con 0 for nonmembers
y 1 for members. Sin embargo, the three states that are not members of the EU
but are members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in Annex II—
Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland—might be expected to formulate more
ambitious environmental legislation to facilitate trade. These three states were
therefore coded as 0.66 on a three-point fsQCA scale (0, 0.66, y 1), reﬂecting
that they are not full members of the EU but work closely with the organization
on many issues and are subject to the contents of the body of EU law, the acquis
communautaire.

Political constraints were coded using the Political Constraint Index
(POLCON) conjunto de datos (Henisz 2012), which builds upon the work of Henisz
(2002). The dataset codes the presence of constraints within states, such as an
additional chamber in the legislature, the dominance of a rival party within the
legislature, and the homogeneity of parties in opposition, among other factors.
Political constraints are coded 1, whereas the absence of constraints is 0. Cuando
the averages from the POLCON data were plotted, Spain’s score was distinctly
lower than the rest of the states, so the next lowest score, accorded to Canada,
was coded 0. The political constraints of Belgium placed it signiﬁcantly above
the other states; tal como, Finland’s score, the next highest, was selected as the
threshold for 1, with a continuous linear scale formulated from Canada to
Finland.

Finalmente, GDP per capita, sourced from OECD (2015), in US dollars at
constant prices and purchasing power parities, with a reference year of 2010,
operationalized the economic theme. These data were averaged for 2006 a
2012 so as to ﬁnd a value for the seven-year period. When plotted in order,
the US, Suiza, Norway, and Luxembourg were signiﬁcantly higher than
all of the other states, so Ireland’s next-highest score was selected as the thresh-
old for 1. No grouping of states toward the bottom of the scale was signiﬁcantly
lower than the others, so the lowest GDP per capita value in the set, that of

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Portugal, was coded 0. The other states’ scores were then calibrated along a con-
tinuous linear scale between the scores accorded to Portugal and Ireland. All the
coding is shown in Table 1.

Paul Tobin

(cid:129) 37

Results and Discussion
Two separate analyses were conducted to ascertain necessity and sufﬁciency. Como
esperado, none of the causal conditions passed the 0.9 necessity threshold
(Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 143). EU membership came very close to such
a deﬁnition, with a score of 0.89, whereas the other three conditions scored
abajo 0.8. Además, no conditions were necessary for the negation of the
outcome, a “not ambitious” climate policy. Both sets of results are included in the
supplementary ﬁle (S5 and S6).

Of the sixteen theoretically possible causal conﬁgurations that might be
sufﬁcient for ambitious climate policy, six were logical remainders, and ten were
found empirically (S7). The minimum consistency threshold for each of the
solutions was 0.75, as is recommended in the literature (Ragin 2008, 46). Aquí
only the parsimonious solution is reported, as is common in the literature
(p.ej., Sutton and Rudd 2015); parsimonious solutions include all logical
remainders without evaluation of their plausibility.4 The solution provides
two pathways that are sufﬁcient for ambitious climate policy in developed states
(Mesa 2). Both pathways are above the 0.75 límite. The overall solution cov-
erage is 0.67. More importantly, the overall solution consistency, 0.82, is also
over the 0.75 límite. These high scores are signiﬁcant: the solution is strongly
consistent and covers a large number of the cases.5

The analysis showed that Germany, Iceland, Irlanda, Norway, Portugal,
Suecia, and the UK formulated the most ambitious climate policies within
Annex II between 2006 y 2012, supporting existing research arguing that
these European states, and particularly Germany, Suecia, and the UK, are cli-
mate leaders (Bernauer and Böhmelt 2013; Jänicke 2005; Skjærseth et al.
2013; Tobin 2015). Future empirical studies of climate policy leadership would
be well served by examining these seven states. A diferencia de, Austria, Canada, y
the US were found to be the least ambitious. Austria’s surprising inclusion in this
group of laggards, having previously been an environmental leader (Börzel
2002), is explored below in a single case study analysis.

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4. The complex and intermediate solution pathways are identical and are also provided in the

supplementary ﬁle (S8).

5. It is prudent to also consider the solutions that are sufﬁcient for the negation of the outcome
(see Schneider and Wagemann 2010, 12). Only one solution pathway is sufﬁcient to result in a
climate policy that is not ambitious, which was identiﬁed by the complex, parsimonious, y
intermediate solutions: with a consistency score of 0.89, the combination of non-EU member-
barco, nonpolitical constraints, and a non-left-wing government is sufﬁcient for nonambitious
climate policy. This solution pathway has a raw and unique coverage score of 0.29 and is
included in the supplementary ﬁle (S9 and S10).

38 (cid:129) Líderes y rezagados

Mesa 2
Sufﬁcient Solution Pathways for Ambitious Climate Policy

Solution Pathways

Consistency

Raw Coverage

Unique Coverage

leftgov

eumember AND highgdp AND
not polcon

0.80

0.86

0.53

0.36

0.31

0.13

The overall solution coverage is 0.67, and the overall solution consistency is 0.82.

No condition was found necessary for either ambitious or “not ambitious”
climate policy. This ﬁnding is important, as it suggests that any state can be a
climate policy leader. Climate policy ambition was found to be “equiﬁnal”;
eso es, two solution pathways were sufﬁcient for ambitious climate policy.
Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 281) recommend highlighting which cases
in particular are explained or not explained (as is common in fsQCA, hence
the scores for coverage) by the overall sufﬁciency solution. Mesa 3 divides the
states into six possible categories, according to the outcome and the presence of
solution pathways, and lists the cases that were explained by each pathway.

Mesa 3
Extent to Which State Positions Are Explained by the Sufﬁcient Solution Pathways

Outcome

Solution Pathway

States Covered

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Ambitious climate policy

leftgov

Ambitious climate policy

Not ambitious climate
política

eumember AND
highgdp AND not polcon
Neither sufﬁcient solution
pathway
Neither sufﬁcient solution
pathway

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Iceland, Norway,
Portugal, the UK

Dinamarca, Suecia,
Suiza, the UK

Francia, Alemania, Irlanda

Austria, Bélgica, Canada,
Finland, Greece, Italia,
Japón, Países Bajos,
New Zealand, the US

Not ambitious climate
política

leftgov

eumember AND highgdp
AND not polcon

Australia

None

Paul Tobin

(cid:129) 39

Unexplained Cases

Luxembourg and Spain were omitted from the analysis due to their scores of
0.5 for left-wing government and climate policy ambition, respectivamente. Del
remaining twenty-one states in the analysis, four cases were not explained by
the analysis, as is common in fsQCA analyses. Francia, Alemania, and Ireland formu-
lated ambitious policy but possessed low scores for left-wing government and
high scores for political constraints, and thus were not explained by either
solution pathway. Tal como, further research will be needed to explain the am-
bitious climate policies of these three states. The fourth unexplained state,
Australia, possessed a left-wing government for the period but did not formu-
late ambitious climate policy. Australia’s governing center-left Labor Party
sought to create an emissions trading scheme in 2009, only for the Liberal
Party and the Green Party to block the bill in the Senate, in the latter party’s
case due to the proposal’s lack of ambition (Curran, 2011). De este modo, the ﬁnding
that left-wing government facilitates ambitious climate legislation is supported
by four cases (Iceland, Norway, Portugal, and the UK, explored below), mientras
Australia provides an unusual example of how climate legislation can be blocked
by a Green Party for not being ambitious enough, thus highlighting the need for
further research into the role of green parties.

Solution Pathway 1
The ﬁnding that having a left-wing government is sufﬁcient for ambitious cli-
mate policy helps explain the ambitious policy of Iceland, Norway, Portugal,
and the UK. Por ejemplo, it was under a center-left Labour government that
the UK passed its world-leading Climate Change Act in 2008. Carter and Jacobs
(2014) found that party competition, particularly “competitive consensus”
driven from the left, enabled the creation of this pioneering legislation. This ex-
planation may be applicable to other developed states; left-wing parties may be
challenged by green parties from the left and by pro-environment center parties
on the right. Left-wing government is only a sufﬁcient, rather than necessary,
condición, meaning that right-wing governments may also formulate ambitious
climate policy, as demonstrated in this study by Denmark, Francia, Alemania,
Irlanda, Suecia, and Switzerland. The US and Canada, which scored 0 for both
left-wing government and ambitious climate policy, highlight the prevalence of
climate change skepticism on the political right in these states (Dunlap et al.
2016). Our ﬁnding is noteworthy, since few empirical studies conducted previ-
ously have explored the impact of ideological factors on climate policy across a
medium-n number of states. En efecto, the identiﬁcation of left-wing government
as individually sufﬁcient for ambitious climate policy challenges Lachapelle and
Paterson’s (2013, 555) argument that political variables are of limited explan-
atory power regarding climate policy when examined on their own. This con-
trast may be due to Lachapelle and Paterson’s investigation having explored

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40 (cid:129) Líderes y rezagados

broader political factors, such as the presence of democracy, rather than the par-
tisan position of governing parties.

Solution Pathway 2

EU membership plays a strong role in determining climate policy ambition,
since it received a high score for necessity and was featured alongside high
GDP per capita and the absence of political constraints in the second sufﬁciency
solution pathway. This solution pathway helps explain the ambitious climate
policies of Denmark, Suecia, Suiza, and the UK (the latter being ex-
plained by both solution pathways). Climate change was a ﬂagship issue for
the EU in the ﬁrst half of 2006–2012, as it provided a means for the bloc to
assert a global identity (Wurzel and Connelly 2011). Since this period, sin embargo,
the Eurozone crisis may have reduced the salience of climate change within the
EU (Burns and Tobin 2016; Skovgaard 2014). Further research should be con-
ducted on the impact of the crisis on climate policy in Europe since 2012. Más-
encima, EU member states also ranged in their scores for climate policy ambition
de 0 a 1, highlighting the importance of the two other conditions as addi-
tional necessary factors within the pathway.

The role of political constraints adds further nuance to Christoff and
Eckersley’s (2011, 444) claim that “[t]he veto player thesis can illuminate why
some states are climate laggards but it cannot explain why some states emerge
as climate leaders.” Madden (2014) emphasizes the importance of veto points
to climate policy in his study of twenty-three OECD states. The present article
furthers that work by arguing that states with high scores for political constraints
may still be climate leaders—for instance, Iceland and Norway—if they possess
left-wing governments. High GDP per capita is the third necessary component of
the second sufﬁciency solution pathway. As states become wealthier, there may be
greater pressure from increasingly postmaterialist citizens to create more ambi-
tious climate legislation (Recchia 2002). This ﬁnding challenges existing research
that has shown economic factors to have limited effect on climate policy ambi-
ción (Bättig and Bernauer 2009; Kachi et al. 2015; Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias
2014). En tono rimbombante, as only developed states were included in this study, emis-
sions may not have been reduced, but simply produced elsewhere, most likely in
emerging economies (Stern 2004). Tal como, further research will be needed to as-
certain whether increases in GDP per capita improve climate policy when all
states are examined, beyond the Annex II grouping.

Case Study Selection: Austria
Ten states qualiﬁed for neither solution pathway and also did not formulate
ambitious climate policy, thus supporting the two sufﬁcient-solution pathways.
Among these states, only Austria, Canada, and the US were graded 0 for climate
policy ambition. Previously seen as an environmental pioneer (Börzel 2002),

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Paul Tobin

(cid:129) 41

Austria represents a puzzling case to explain. Austria’s lack of ambition may be
explained by the inapplicability of either solution pathway, but the reasons for
its starkly low score of 0, which was much lower than those of other European
laggards, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, are unclear. Eight semistructured
interviews (Appendix I) were conducted in February 2014 with Austrian policy-
makers to assess and explain the state’s apparently low climate ambition.

Supporting the ﬁndings, one Green Party politician (interview 8), argumentó
that Austria’s climate policy over the period was “not ambitious at all.” In 2006,
funding for an existing feed-in tariff (FIT) scheme was cut from A260 million a
year to A17 million a year (Lofstedt 2008, 2230). Además, en 2005, one year
before the period under investigation, Austrian greenhouse gas emissions were
26 percent above 1990 niveles, far above the Kyoto Protocol target of a 13 por ciento
reduction over 2008–2012 (International Energy Agency [IEA] 2007, 25). Como
semejante, the state’s target under the EU Climate Package for 2013–2020—a 16 por-
cent reduction to these high 2005 levels—cannot be considered ambitious when
compared to pioneering European states. Por ejemplo, Sweden committed to a
17 percent reduction on 2005 niveles, having already reduced emissions signiﬁ-
cantly since 1990 (European Commission 2012). It appears, por lo tanto, eso
Austria was a laggard during 2006–2012, supporting the coding in this analysis
and adding conﬁdence to the reliability of the coding of the other states. Qué
explains Austria’s U-turn on its FIT scheme and its unambitious greenhouse
gas mitigation targets? Two key factors were identiﬁed by the interviewees.

Austria’s unique social partnership (Sozialpartnerschaft) corporatist gover-
nance model comprises three chambers—Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor—
plus the Trade Union Federation, which is a de facto member. The social part-
nership is designed to provide these varied interest groups with more direct
access to policy-making (Pelinka 1987). En 2004, an “alliance of payers,” com-
prising all four units of the social partnership, demanded a signiﬁcant reduction
in the value and quantity of FITs, arguing that the international competitiveness
of Austria was being jeopardized (Brand and Pawloff 2014, 788–790). Mientras
the Labor Chamber and unions depicted FITs as increasing electricity bills to
poorer Austrians, the Commerce Chamber perceived technological renewables
as an extra cost for business. The only pro-environment voice in the social part-
nership was the Chamber of Agriculture, pero, wishing to support rural voters, él
favored subsidies for biofuels rather than FITs for wind or solar power. De este modo,
none of the chambers favored FITs for renewables, and they lobbied hard and
effectively for the reduction in funding to the scheme. Since the production of
nuclear energy had been banned following a referendum in 1978 (Martinovsky
and Mareš 2012, 349–350), the weakening of FITs ensured that the state re-
mained dependent upon coal (9 por ciento), oil (2 por ciento), and gas (20 por ciento)
for its electricity production in 2010, hindering its ability to pursue ambitious
climate policies (IEA 2014).

Segundo, Austria’s greenhouse gas emissions are elevated by another dis-
tinctively Austrian phenomenon. Fuel tourism (Tanktourismus) was identiﬁed

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42 (cid:129) Líderes y rezagados

as a key obstacle to ambitious climate legislation: consumers from neighboring
estados, particularly Germany and Italy, purchase vehicle fuel in Austria because
of its central location and deliberately low fuel prices. Both members of the
grand coalition government since 2006 favored the practice, such that “by the
late 2000s Austrian fuel taxes had failed to keep pace with larger increases in
many neighbouring countries” ( Wurzel et al. 2013, 145). During the period
considered here, 25–28 percent of motor fuel sales in Austria were attributed
to fuel tourism (IEA 2014, 78). As the sales were made within Austria’s borders,
they counted toward Austrian emissions, rendering road transport the state’s
second-highest source of emissions (IEA 2014, 43). De este modo, Austria failed to meet
its Kyoto Protocol emissions reduction target for 2008–2012 and was required
to buy A700 million of carbon credits to make up the shortfall. Todavía, with fuel
tourism generating around A1.3 billion each year (Steurer and Clar 2015, 100),
the practice was continued throughout 2006–2012. Tal como, although Austria
possesses ambitious policies that protect its local environment, the economic ap-
peal of fuel tourism and the lack of a pro-climate voice in the social partnership
have inhibited its transboundary environmental ambitions. These ﬁndings under-
score the challenge of addressing climate change even in “pro-environmental”
states and undermine Austria’s previous status as an environmental leader.

The Utility of fsQCA to Comparative Climate Politics

As well as an empirical contribution, this article provides some insights into the
suitability of fsQCA for measuring climate policy variation. Primero, by examining
conditions in combination, the approach provides a more nuanced understand-
ing of the ways in which variables that affect climate policy can interlink—as
shown by the second solution pathway. Segundo, the method is an effective tool
for case study selection (Lieberman 2005), as demonstrated by the identiﬁcation
and subsequent exploration of Austria as a perplexing case, cual, once ana-
lyzed, supported the coding employed earlier in the analysis and provided
new empirical data. Sin embargo, a particular limitation of fsQCA is its inability
to assess a large number of conditions and thus avoid limited diversity, dictated
by the number of conditions under investigation. Although proponents of the
method argue that this requirement underscores the importance of qualitative
knowledge by the researcher(s) on a subject area, this limitation is particularly
challenging when seeking to explore a topic as complex as variation in climate
policy ambition.

Conclusions
This is the ﬁrst analysis of climate policy variation within the Annex II group of
estados, as well as the ﬁrst to use fsQCA to explain climate policy variation. Este
investigation has analyzed conditions derived from four contested themes in
the literature to ﬁnd patterns that explain wide variations in climate policy

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Paul Tobin

(cid:129) 43

ambition among developed states. No condition was found necessary for either
ambitious or not-ambitious climate policy over 2006–2012, suggesting that
any state may be a pioneer, should it wish to pursue pro-climate policies. Cli-
mate policy was found to be a partisan issue, with the presence of a left-wing
government alone being sufﬁcient to result in ambitious climate policy. El
importance of examining variables in combination was demonstrated by the
ﬁnding that EU membership, high GDP per capita, and fewer political con-
straints are sufﬁcient, in conjunction, to predict ambitious climate policy. Fu-
ture research should be directed toward exploring further variables that may
affect climate policy variation and examining a wider number of cases beyond
developed states. Francia, Alemania, and Ireland should be explored in further
detail, to explain why they formulated more ambitious climate policy despite
ﬁtting within neither solution pathway. A case study was selected to follow up
on the fsQCA, as is good practice, and Austria’s unambitious climate policy was
attributed to its unique social partnership governance and pursuit of fuel tour-
ismo, which between them explain the state’s lack of climate policy ambition but
continued commitment to the local environment. Finalmente, fsQCA was found to
be an effective method for analyzing variables in combination and for selecting
case studies worthy of further research, but the approach is limited by its inabil-
ity to assess a large range of variables.

Referencias

Armingeon, Klaus, Christian Isler, Laura Knöpfel, David Weisstanner, and Sarah Engler.
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Apéndice

Interview 1: NEOS Party of Austria employee, 11.02.14.

Interview 2: Chamber of Agriculture of Austria employee, 11.02.14.

Interview 3: Klimafonds of Austria employee, 12.02.14.

Interview 4: Two Energy Agency of Austria employees, 21.02.14.

Interview 5: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management

employee, 13.02.14.

Interview 6: Chamber of Agriculture of Austria employee, 14.02.14.

Interview 7: Economic Chamber of Austria employee, 14.02.14.

Interview 8: Green Party of Austria MP, 18.02.14.

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