Design Problems and
Design Paradoxes
Kees Dorst
Introducción
The problem-solving literature that arose in the 1960s and 1970s in
the promising and exciting field of artificial intelligence has had a
profound impact on Design Methodology. The introduction of these
theories in Design Methodology, at the start of the 1970s, helped
to systemize the models and methods of design existing then, y
link them to models of problem solving in other fields. Había
high hopes that the very nature of design could be captured in a
description that was based upon considering design the solution to
“ill-structured problems.”
Although there have been many developments since then,
the original work on problem solving and the nature of ill-structured
problemas, written by Herbert Simon, still looms large over the field
of design methodology. The rational problem-solving paradigm,
based on the conceptual framework that Simon introduced, is still a
dominant paradigm in the field.1 Design models and methods have
been developed within this paradigm; the conceptual framework
of rational problem solving has become the normal “language”
of thinking and talking about design. There also have been many
critiques of Simon’s problem-solving approach and its applicabil-
ity to the field of design, and many of the original statements in
the problem-solving theory that deal with design have since been
qualified and refined. Sin embargo, these critiques have not produced a
fundamentally different alternative to the conceptual framework.
In this piece, we will revisit the basic assumptions behind
Simon’s approach to design, notably the central concept of “ill-
structured problem,” and introduce some ideas that could lead to
an alternative conceptual framework for thinking about design prob-
lemas. Primero, we will revisit the original work by Simon at considerable
length, and unearth the assumptions that underlie the conceptual
framework that Simon uses to describe ill-structured problems.
Then we will deal with some more recent developments within the
problem-solving framework, and discuss some of the critiques on
the rational problem-solving approach to design—again concentrat-
ing on the central notion of ill-structured problems. We will use this
critique to propose a fledgling framework of alternative concepts
that could be used to augment our understanding of the nature of
1
C.H. Dorst, Describing Design: A
Comparison of Paradigms (thesis TUDelft,
1997).
4
© 2006 Instituto de Tecnología de Massachusetts
Design Issues: Volumen 22, Número 3 Verano 2006
Design Issues: Volumen 22, Número 3 Verano 2006
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“design problems.” We will end with some further reflections and
ideas for the development of an alternative framework for describ-
ing design.
The Core of Simon’s Theory
In describing the core of Simon’s conceptual framework, we first will
concentrate on his classic 1973 paper: “The Structure of Ill-structured
Problems.” Unless otherwise stated, all quotes used in this section
are taken from that paper. Por supuesto, the conceptual framework
that an author uses can be read from any paper, but this paper is
especially suited because it is nicely explicit in its application to the
field of design—although still broader in its orientation. The most
important conclusions have been checked with other (más tarde) documentos
by Simon.
Within Simon’s theory, the issue of the solution of design
problems takes the stage as an example of a wider category of
problems—what he terms “ill-structured problems.” In his paper,
Simon sets out to explore the relation between ill-structured prob-
lems and “well-structured problems.” He starts with the remark that
many kinds of problems that often are treated as well-structured
probably should be regarded as ill-structured. Even the limited
problemas (“limited” in the sense of taking place in an enclosed and
well-defined world) that are used as standard examples in problem
solving and AI literature, such as in playing chess, display elements
of ill-structuredness on closer scrutiny:
Even if we regard chess playing as a well-structured prob-
lem in the small, by most criteria it must be regarded as an
ill-structured problem in the large (over the course of the
juego).
The stated goal of his paper is to show that there is no real boundary
between well-structured problems and ill-structured problems, y
therefore no reason to assume that the solution of ill-structured prob-
lems would require new and hitherto unknown types of problem-
solving processes. To start the comparison, Simon lists the following
properties of well-structured problems:
1 There is a definite criterion for testing any proposed solu-
ción, and a mechanical process for applying the criterion.
2 There is at least one problem space in which it can be
represented as the initial problem state, the goal state, y
all other states that may be reached, or considered, en el
course of attempting a solution to the problem.
3 Attainable state changes (legal moves) can be represented
in a problem space, as transitions from given states to
the states directly attainable from them. But considerable
moves, whether legal or not, also can be represented—that
es, all transitions from one considerable state to another.
Design Issues: Volumen 22, Número 3 Verano 2006
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4 Any knowledge that the problem solver can acquire about
the problem can be represented in one or more problem
spaces.
5 If the actual problem involves acting upon the external
world, then the definition of state-changes and of the
effect upon the state of applying any operator reflect with
complete accuracy in one or more problem spaces the laws
(laws of nature) that govern the external world.
6 All of these conditions hold in the strong sense that the
basic processes postulated require only practicable amounts
of computation, and the information postulated is effec-
tively available to the processes—i.e., available with the
help of only practicable amounts of search.
In the cases where all these rules apply, they allow such a well-
structured problem to be solved by a “general problem solver,” a
computer program that follows preset rules to arrive at a solution.
Simon later adds an extra criterion that further limits the actions that
are allowed within the problem-solving process:
What some notions of well-structuredness require,
sin embargo, is that these capabilities be defined in advance,
and that we do not allow the problem solver to introduce
new resources that “occur” to him in the course of his solu-
tion efforts. If this condition is imposed, a problem that
admits restructuring through the introduction of such new
resources would be an ill-structured problem. A problem
that is not solvable with reasonable amount of computation
when all knowledge must be expressed in terms of the orig-
inal problem space may be easily solvable if the problem
solver is allowed to use knowledge in another space.
Two important points can be picked up from these definitions.
Apparently, if the problem-solving effort involves learning, or the
redefinition of the problem, the problem cannot be considered well-
structured. And there is a methodological point to be made: appar-
ently, if we take item six in the definition of well-structured problems
seriously, the ill-structuredness of a problem depends on the solution
methods that are available to solve it. This opens up the way for
suspecting that the ill-structuredness of a problem may not be an a
priori property of the problem itself, but is linked to the capabilities
of the problem solver. In this way, the subject that does the problem
solving actually influences the very nature of the problem. Simón
goes on to explain that:
En general, the problems presented to problem solvers by
the world are best regarded as ill-structured problems.
6
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Sin embargo, Simon maintains that the problem-solving theory that
is based upon the solution of well-structured problems should serve
as the basis for all problem solving. He has been criticized for this
standpoint, and later concedes that:
… there is merit to the claim that much problem-solving
effort is directed at structuring problems, and only a frac-
tion of it at solving problems once they are structured.
There is a basic assumption here that even though well-structured
problems as such do not exist in the real world, the construction of
well-structured problems from ill-structured problems is the way to
solve an ill-structured problem. Simon then illustrates the solving
of ill-structured problems by taking an example from design. El
example involves designing a house, and concentrates on the tech-
nical problem of designing the layout of the house. En este caso, el
structuring actions that turn the ill-structured design problem into
a well-structured problem are done by the architect:
Additional specification will be obtained from the dialogue
between architect and client, but the totality of that
dialogue will still leave the design goals quite incompletely
specified. The more distinguished the architect, the less
expectation that the client should provide the constraints.
This is quite plausible, but Simon ignores the other conclusion one
could draw from this example: a saber, that even in the case of such
a technical problem, with clear variables that allow for technical
reasoning, and with the involvement of only one stakeholder, incluso
here subjectivity creeps into the problem-solving process by the
actions needed to construct a solvable problem. This means that,
for the problem-solving theory to hold up as a good basis for the
description of design, we now also need a detailed description of the
problem solver, including an account of the earlier knowledge that
the problem solver potentially brings to bear on this situation. Uno
could even conclude that an ill-structured problem can’t be modeled
without taking these properties of the problem solver into account.
The interpretation of the problem is important, even in the simple
example that Simon describes. Interpretation becomes even more
important when we see that design is a process of multiple steps,
not a one-off decision making situation. New interpretations will
be based upon the interpretation that has been taking place in the
earlier steps of the problem-solving process:
As a matter of fact, the whole procedure could be organized
as a system of productions, in which the elements already
invoked from memory and the aspects of the design situa-
tion already arrived at up to any given point, would serve
as the stimuli to evoke the next set of elements.
Design Issues: Volumen 22, Número 3 Verano 2006
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This means that in a multistep problem-solving process, each prob-
lem solver will get the chance to pile interpretation upon interpre-
tation, and thus end up taking the problem-solving processes in
completely different directions. Por lo tanto, the use of memory and
subjective interpretation becomes a major influence on the problem-
solving behavior of designers. If we take this seriously, then it under-
mines the very idea of having one, knowable problem at the start of
the problem-solving process. But Simon misses this point:
… the architect will find himself working on a problem
cual, perhaps beginning in an ill-structured state, soon
converts itself through evocation from memory into a well-
structured problem.
This statement is not supported by the data provided by Simon in
his own example. Es, En realidad, a restatement of the assumption that
only well-structured problems can be solved. This is one of the major
points where the applicability of Simon’s problem-solving theory
to design has been questioned. It is important to note that, even if
we were to agree with Simon that design problem solving would be
based on the “normal” solution of well-structured problems, entonces
this step of conversion becomes a major part of the problem-solving
actividad. This should be specified for the problem-solving theory to
be complete. Simon later partially agreed to this by introducing an
unspecified “noticing- and-evoking mechanism,” speaking about the
need for an “indexed memory,” and placing the design process in an
“effective problem space”:
… the effective problem space will undergo continuing
change throughout the course of the game (nota del autor:
problem-solving activity,), moving from one subspace to
another of the large space defined by the contents of the
long-term memory.
Here again, the course of the problem-solving process and the very
structure of the ill-structured problem are determined by the possi-
bilities for action that the problem solver considers. These possibili-
ties for action are closely linked to the interpretation of the problem
and the content of the acting subject’s memory.
Simon concludes his paper:
… the boundary between well-structured and ill-structured
problem solving is indeed a vague and fluid boundary.
There appears to be no reason to suppose that concepts as
yet uninvented and unknown stand between us and the
fuller exploration of those domains that are most obvi-
ously and visibly ill-structured. It suggests that there may
be nothing other than the size of the knowledge base to
distinguish ill-structured problems from well-structured
problemas, and that general problem-solving mechanisms
8
Design Issues: Volumen 22, Número 3 Verano 2006
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that have shown themselves to be efficacious for handling
grande, albeit apparently well-structured domains should be
extendable to ill-structured domains without any need for
introducing qualitatively new components.
This conclusion is not supported by the data, and contains a logical
weakness: the fact that it is hard to draw a line that distinguishes
between well-structured problems and ill-structured problems
doesn’t mean that there is no difference. There may be elements
within the process of solving ill-structured problems that can actu-
ally be more or less straightforward steps (that can be considered
well-structured problems), but that doesn’t mean that the solving
of ill-structured problems can be reduced to these straightforward
steps. There is no evidence to support the claim that both kinds
of problem solving are the same. The problem here is that Simon
models well-structured problems and ill-structured problems in the
de la misma manera. He never escapes from the circularity in his argument,
and shoves aside the obvious differences between well-structured
problems and ill-structured problems.
Later Developments
The rational problem-solving paradigm has become a powerful tool
for the modeling of design, inspiring and permeating a large part of
design methodology. Sin embargo, the fundamental weaknesses in the
conceptual framework that were unearthed in the last section also
can be recognized in these later developments of the problem-solv-
ing approach to designing. The main thesis in this paper will be that
these weaknesses are such an integral part of the problem-solving
inheritance that they cannot easily be solved from within the ratio-
nal problem-solving paradigm. Two examples might illustrate this
punto.
In the substantial body of work on the “Function-Behavior-
Structure” model of design that has been developed by the research
group at the Key Centre for Design Computing and Cognition, bajo
the supervision of John Gero, we can find several echoes of the same
difficulties. Por ejemplo, the FBS model ascribes an equally large
role to the use of “design prototypes” in determining the “framing”
of the design problem, as Simon does to the “memory” and “expe-
rience” that a problem solver needs to transform an ill-structured
problem into a well-structured one. This large role for “experience”
and “prototypes” leads to grave methodological difficulties. Porque
of the very open-ended way in which the use of “design prototypes”
is described in the FBS model, they potentially make up a vital part
of the design process, actually bypassing the design process that is
modeled in the core FBS model.2 The neat and clear design process
model looses most of its value if it is preceded by a very messy and
overwhelmingly influential step called “the adoption of a proto-
type.”
Design Issues: Volumen 22, Número 3 Verano 2006
9
2
C.H. Dorst and P.E. Vermaas, “John Gero’s
Function-Behavior-Structure Model of
Designing: A Critical Analysis” Research
in Engineering Design 16 (2005): 17–26.
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In a recent paper, Dorst and Cross3 have tried to find a way
to arrive at a closer description of problem solving of ill-structured
problems by using an empirical study to analyze and describe the
design process as a “coevolution” of the design problem and the
design solution. This coevolution model of design is based on the
work by Maher et al.4
Based on their empirical study, they observe that the creation
of solutions to ill-structured design problems seems to be a very
gradual process—an evolution. Their analysis shows that creative
design is not a matter of first fixing the problem (through objec-
tive analysis or the imposition of a frame) and then searching for
a satisfactory solution concept. Creative design seems more to be a
matter of developing and refining together both the formulation of a
problem and ideas for a solution, with constant iteration of analysis,
synthesis, and evaluation processes between the two notional design
“spaces”—problem space and solution space. In creative design, el
designer is seeking to generate a matching problem-solution pair,
through a coevolution of the problem and the solution. Creative
design involves a period of exploration in which problem and solu-
tion spaces are evolving, and are unstable until (temporarily) fixed
by an emergent bridge, which identifies a problem-solution pairing.
The description of design as the coevolution of problem and solution
leads to the uneasy conclusion that, in describing design, we cannot
presuppose that there is something like a set “design problem” at
any point in the design process.
This leads to some very pertinent methodological questions.
Can we still describe design in terms of problem-solving theories
if we have to abandon the idea that the “design problem” can be
identified at all? What then is the meaning of saying that design is a
process running from “a problem” to “a solution”? We can probably
stick to the problem-solving theory of design only if we abandon
the idea that there is a definable problem at the start of the design
proceso, and postulate that it will be constructed later on. This then
begs the question how this problem is constructed, and whether
this process of “problem construction” can be modeled at all. También,
if this process of problem construction could be modeled, si
that modeling should be done within the rational problem-solving
paradigma, or outside of it.
In the next sections, we will introduce two different
approaches that already have been taken to tackle this problem.
Primero, we will consider the work of Dreyfus and Suchman, modelo-
ing design problems as situated problems; and then we will look at
Hatchuel’s ideas on “extended rationality.” Finally, we will use this
critique to present an idea for a fledgling model of design problems
based on a radically different set of concepts.
3
C.H. Dorst and N.G. Cruz, “Creativity
in the Design Process: Co-evolution of
Problem-solution,” Design Studies 22
(2001): 425–37.
4 M.L. Maher, j. Poon, and S. Boulanger,
“Formalizing Design Exploration as Co-
evolution: A Combined Gene Approach”
in Advances in Formal Design Methods
for CAD, J.S. Gero and F. Sudweeks, eds.
(Londres: Chapman and Hall, 1996).
10
Design Issues: Volumen 22, Número 3 Verano 2006
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New Approaches
The “rational problem-solving paradigm” developed in the 1960s
and ‘70s largely was inspired by developments in AI and the cogni-
tive sciences. The epic endeavor to build intelligent computer
systems focused on the ability of such a system to solve ill-structured
problems within an open context—somewhat comparable to design-
En g. These systems, based on a rational problem-solving approach,
represented the “relevant aspects” of the world, and set up formal
procedures to manipulate these representations in order to solve a
problema. This approach has failed.5 Alternative approaches were
developed based on situating problem-solving activity.6, 7, 8 Lo haremos
now explore whether considering design as situated problem solv-
ing will help us get closer to developing an alternative description
of design problem solving.
Situated Problem Solving
The description of design as a situated activity involves two impor-
tant shifts in standpoint. The first consideration in situated prob-
lem solving is the design problem as seen through the eyes of the
designer, in the design situation. This means that we concentrate
on the “local” design problem that a designer faces, and ignore the
“overall” design problem as something of an abstraction. Nosotros también
have to deal with the vagueness (es decir., lack of overview) y sujeto-
tivity inherent in local design actions and decisions. Seen from this
perspectiva, “the design problem” as such does not really exist as
an objective entity in the world. It is an amalgamation of different
problems centered on the basic challenge described in a design brief.
This amalgamation of problems discovered by the designer in the
design process is partially created by the designer. The process of
“approaching a design problem” or “dealing with a problematic
situation” is a vital clue to understanding what design problems
son. The second fundamental shift in standpoint is that, for much
of the design project, the problem-solving steps can be quite logi-
California, rutina, and implicit; without any real choice by the designer.
Dreyfus holds that problematic situations are the result of a “break-
down” in this normal, fluent problem-solving behavior. (The prob-
lem becomes “at hand,” in Heidegger’s terms.) These “breakdowns”
are then the moments of real choice. It thus becomes very important
to distinguish and describe the nature of these breakdowns—the
critical situations in design.9 These breakdowns are the points that
Schön, in his work on reflective practice, describes as “surprises.”10
Schön describes them as the turning points in the designer’s reflec-
tive conversation with the situation. Please note that the definition of
a “design problem” has been narrowed, and limited to the situations
where routine problem solving has failed.
If we can be convinced by Dreyfus and others that there is
never a (complete) representation of the design problem in the head
of the designer, then the only thing left for us to study is the “local”
Design Issues: Volumen 22, Número 3 Verano 2006
11
5 H.L. Dreyfus, “Intelligence without
7
6
Representation: Merleau-Ponty’s
Critique of Mental Representation,"
Phenomenology and the Cognitive
Ciencias 1 (2002): 367–383.
F.J. Varela, mi. Thompson, and E. Rosch,
The Embodied Mind (Cambridge, MAMÁ:
CON prensa, 1991).
t. Winograd and F. Flores, Comprensión
Computers and Cognition (Norwood, Nueva Jersey:
Ablex Publishing, 1986).
L.A. Suchman, Plans and Situated Actions
(Cambridge: Prensa de la Universidad de Cambridge,
1987).
mi. Frankenberger and P. Badke-Schaub,
“Modeling Design Processes in Industry:
Empirical Investigations of Design Work
in Practice” in Proceedings of DMD’96, oh.
Akin et al., eds. (Istanbul, 1996).
10 D.A. Schön, The Reflective Practitioner
9
8
(Nueva York: Libros Básicos, 1983).
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network of links that a designer considers while tackling a design
problem in the design situation. The incompleteness and subjective
nature of this local network of problems means that we need a model
of how designers approach a problematic situation.
Problem Solving and Design
Hatchuel11 analyzes the work of Simon on design in its original
contexto, as part of Simon’s bigger project on the development of a
theory about “bounded rationality.” The aim of this project was to
“explain human behavior by simple and constrained, yet informed,
decision rules.” The bounded-rationality project spans Simon’s
work in economics, artificial intelligence, and design. This lifelong
background project can help us understand what Simon is trying to
achieve in his writings on design. It also explains the strong empha-
sis that Simon placed on the solid ground provided by well-struc-
tured problems, and the rules for solving them, that we have seen in
the section describing the core of Simon’s theory.
For Simon, creativity and discovery in science, arte, and design
were all potentially describable within the bounded rationality
perspectiva. In developing this perspective, Simon sees a strong
theory of design as crucial. The possibility to develop a strong
theory on design (the archetypal “science of the artificial”) dentro
this general framework of bounded rationality serves as a litmus
test for the bigger project itself. Simon’s drive to achieve this leads
to poetic statements:
The proper study of mankind is said to be man … If I have
made my case, then we can conclude that, in larger part, el
proper study of mankind is the science of design, not only
as the professional component of a technical education but
as a core discipline for every liberally educated person.12
Hatchuel argues that Simon is overeager in his efforts to incorpo-
rate design within the general bounded-rationality problem-solving
theory. Hatchuel illustrates the distinction that he thinks needs to be
made between design and problem solving by an example in which
two problem situations are compared. He pictures a group of friends
coming together on a Saturday night. The one problem situation is
that they are “looking for a good movie in town”; the other problem
situation is that they set out to “have a party.” The first situation is
considered to be “problem solving,” while the second situation is,
in Hatchuel’s terms, a real design project. Hatchuel argues that there
are three important differences between these situations:
A. The first difference is that the design situation includes the
(unexpected) expansion of the initial concepts in which
the situation is initially framed (“a party”). This makes the
solution process a “project” instead of a “problem.” There is
no dominant design for what a party should be, so imagina-
tion needs to be applied at this very fundamental level.
11 A. Hatchuel, “Towards Design Theory and
Expandable Rationality: The Unfinished
Program of Herbert Simon," Diario de
Management and Governance 5:3–4
(2002).
12 H.A. Simón, Sciences of the Artificial
(Cambridge, MAMÁ: La prensa del MIT, 1992),
159.
12
Design Issues: Volumen 22, Número 3 Verano 2006
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B. A second difference is that the design situation requires
the design and use of “learning devices” in order to get to
una solución. These “learning devices” are sub-processes that
help us “learn about what has to be learned or should be
learned.” They include experiments and simulation tech-
niques.
C. Finalmente, in designing, the understanding and designing of
the social interactions is part of the design process itself.
The group of friends needs to develop a way of reaching a
solution that cannot be supposed to exist before the design
situation arises. This point comes very close to the work of
Louis Bucciarelli, who claims that: “Design is fundamentally
a social process.”13
From this comparison, we can conclude that design undoubt-
edly includes stretches of ill-structured problem solving, but that it
also contains other processes. For Hatchuel, design includes prob-
lem solving, but it cannot be reduced to problem solving. He states
that any model or description method that tries to reduce design to
problem solving is bound to miss important aspects of the design
actividad. This observation ties together our earlier conclusions, y
the remarks made on the modeling of design as coevolution and
situating design problem-solving activities.
All of this means that the very notion of “design problem”
becomes extremely problematic. If the “design problem” in general
is not knowable at any specific point in the design process;14 y
if it is evolving in the design process—at least until the creation
of the design concept, and possibly beyond that point;15 and if the
connotations of the very concepts that are used to describe a “design
problem” are shifting as a part of the design effort;16 entonces necesitamos
to radically reconsider our use of the term “design problem.” The
fundamental question that now presents itself is: What is the real
meaning the term “design problem,” and how we can use it in
design methodology?
To explore this, we will use a philosophical technique called
“bracketing” that was pioneered by the phenomenologist Husserl
in the early years of the twentieth century. In bracketing, we first
establish that the notion of design problem, though deceptively
simple, is just too complex and complicated to be useful in studying
diseño. We have tried to show in this paper that the notion of design
problem is so riddled with difficulties that it actually is obscuring
our vision of the phenomenon that it tries to cover. So we propose
to “bracket” the notion of design problem, meaning that we are
temporarily going to describe the underlying phenomenon without
using the term itself. Once we have this description and analysis
of the underlying phenomenon, the bracketed word can be reintro-
Design Issues: Volumen 22, Número 3 Verano 2006
13
13 L.L. Bucciarelli, Designing Engineers
(Cambridge, MAMÁ: CON prensa, 1994).
14 H.L. Dreyfus, “Intelligence without
Representation— Merleau-Ponty’s
Critique of Mental Representation,"
Phenomenology and the Cognitive
Ciencias 1 (2002): 367–383.
15 C.H. Dorst and N.G. Cruz, “Creativity
in the Design Process: Co-evolution of
Problem-solution,” Design Studies 22
(2001): 425–37.
16 A. Hatchuel, “Towards Design Theory and
Expandable Rationality: The Unfinished
Program of Herbert Simon," Diario de
Management and Governance 5:3–4
(2002).
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duced, in a way that it is better connected to the other terms that are
used to describe the phenomenon within the nomological network.
This latter step is important: if the bracketed word is widely used
in vernacular descriptions of the subject (as surely is the case for
“design problem”), then it would be foolish to ignore that use.
Paradoxes and the Modeling of Design as a Discursive Activity
En esta sección, we will attempt to create a new description of the
design situation without using “design problem,” while accom-
modating some of the difficulties that we have encountered in our
analysis of the use of the term within the rational problem-solving
paradigma. Setting up of an alternative conceptual framework is an
open-ended problem in itself: design can be described in numerous
maneras. For reasons that go beyond the scope of this paper, tenemos
chosen to develop a fledgling theory of design centered on “para-
dox” and “discourse.” The reader should take the description of
design that is presented in this subsection as one example of many
possible ways to describe the same phenomenon. We hope to inspire
the reader to develop additional ways.
The use of the term “paradox” is inspired by the work of
Caroline Whitbeck. In her book Ethics in Engineering Practice and
Investigación, she remarks:
… The initial assumption [nota del autor: within moral
philosophy] that a conflict is irresolvable is misguided,
because it defeats any attempt to do what design engineers
often do so well, a saber, to satisfy potentially conflicting
considerations simultaneously.17
This description of paradoxical situations defines the nature of the
problematic relationship that designers and engineers are dealing
with through their design thinking.18 “Paradox” is used here in the
sense of a complex statement that consists of two or more conflicting
statements. In the initial state of the paradoxical problem situation,
all the statements that make up the paradox are true or valid, pero
they cannot be combined. A paradox, a real opposition of views,
standpoints, or requirements, thus requires a redefinition of the
problematic situation in order to create a solution. An example
from product design would be that a certain product, that cannot be
emocionado, needs to be there to perform its function at one moment in
tiempo, and it needs to be invisible and not take up space at another
moment in time. The creation of solutions to a paradoxical design
situation often requires the development and creative redefinition
of that situation.
The elementary statements that make up the paradox, y
the viewpoints and ways of thinking that underlie these state-
mentos, will now be described in terms of “discourses.” The term
“discourse” was introduced by the philosopher Michel Foucault,
most extensively in his book The Archaeology of Knowledge.19 He uses
17 C. Whitbeck, Ethics in Engineering
Practice and Research (Cambridge:
Prensa de la Universidad de Cambridge, 1998).
18 This situation of being hampered in
the normal, routine problem-solving
activity has been described in terms of
“surprises” (Schön, 1983), or “critical
situations” (Frankenberger, 1996).
19 METRO. Foucault, The Archeology of
Knowledge (Londres: Routledge, 1969,
1989).
14
Design Issues: Volumen 22, Número 3 Verano 2006
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this term to describe the complete structure of terms and relation-
ships that lie at the basis of the thinking and discussions within
an area of human activity. These terms and relationships can, para
instancia, be captured in textbooks and in well-known examples of
“the normal way of working.” Because the terms and relationships
within a discourse make up the very elements of human thought,
the discourse in a field spans the complete breadth of human thinking
within that domain. “Discourse” can be loosely compared to Kuhn’s
use of “paradigms,”20 but Foucault doesn’t support Kuhn’s idea of
the wholesale “revolutions” as the origin of these discourses. In his
own work, Foucault traces the changes in the meaning and use of
key concepts within a domain, rather than looking for revolutions.
In most design disciplines, there are many discourses that
somehow have to be linked in the creation of a design solution. En
product design practice, Por ejemplo, relevant discourses include the
bodies of thought about technology, form an aesthetics, ergonomics,
etc.. These are called the “aspects” of a design.21 Discourses also can
be embodied in a design situation by the roles and the value systems
of the different stakeholders involved in the project. The creation of
a solution to the paradoxical design situation thus also becomes a
social process.
The designer, in his/her paradoxical problematic situa-
ción, needs to construct a design that transcends or connects the
different discourses, in a general sense (by the construction of a
meta-discourse), or just in the concrete instance of the design-to-be-
desarrollado. Para hacer esto, the designer has to step out of the ways of
thinking embodied in the discourses. This step is likely to include
a strong intuitive element. Based upon a clear understanding of the
discourses, and upon earlier experiences with paradoxical situations,
a solution is created that needs to be evaluated from the standpoints
of all the different discourses (es decir., to see that the solution is valuable
within the relevant discourses). Designers use their understanding
of the ways of thinking within the different discourses to create a
framework in which a solution is possible for the paradoxical situ-
ación. The paradoxical problem situation works as both a trigger
to creative imagination and as a context for the evaluation of the
diseño. For the solution to be a solution, it needs to be recognized as
such in the contexts of all the relevant discourses. (En la práctica, este
often means, first and foremost, that it should be acceptable to all
the relevant stakeholders.)
Discusión
In this last section, we have constructed a model of design in which
the nature of “design problems” is further specified. A “design prob-
lem” is taken as a paradox, made up out of the clash of conflicting
discourses. The nature of creative design is the forging of connec-
tions between these discourses, on a general level or in the concrete
diseño. It should be stressed that this is just a fledgling theory, meant
Design Issues: Volumen 22, Número 3 Verano 2006
15
20 T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (chicago: Universidad de
Chicago Press, 1962, 1969).
21 C.H. Dorst, Describing Design: A
Comparison of Paradigms (thesis TUDelft,
1997).
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to solve some methodological problems, but undoubtedly creating
new ones. At least it does shed some new light upon the three main
problems with the use of the term “design problems” in design
methodology identified earlier:
1. The “design problem” is not knowable at any specific point in the
design process.22 With the adoption of the design situation as
the unit of description, the question of defining the design
problem as a whole becomes irrelevant. The paradox that
drives the design process within a problematic situation,
at a certain moment in the design process, should be deter-
mined from the designers’ actions and words. The next task
we then encounter in the quest to really understand design
es, por supuesto, to define the structure of the discourses. Este
could be difficult, although Foucault has developed some
basic methodologies for this in his original work on the
history of the discourse on mental illness.
2. The “design problem” is hard to identify because it evolves in the
design process.23 This is partly covered above. We could add
that the discourses hardly evolve within a design project,
but that paradoxes (the point at which the discourses clash,
and the way in which they do) may evolve throughout the
design project.
3. The connotations of the very concepts that are used to describe a
“design problem” are shifting as a part of the design effort.24 The
central notions that make up the paradoxes the designers
are dealing with indeed are meant to shift in the course of
creating a solution. A clear view of the original discourses
that play a part in the design project will provide an
anchoring point for understanding these shifts.
This model needs to be extended much further, for instance by
defining the link between the notion of discourses and the aspects
of a design, the stakeholders involved in a design project, y el
designer’s level of expertise. But we must leave this here for now.
Concluding Remarks
We hope to have effectively argued that the conceptual framework
that underlies much of design methodology, while perhaps not
flawed, is full of assumptions that may be questioned. Algunos de los
problems inherent in Simon’s theory are inherited by people using
the conceptual framework that he introduced. Our argument has
focused on the term “design problem.” The widespread use of this
term in the vernacular discussions within and about design make
it one of the basic terms in a methodological description of design
activities. But we hope to have demonstrated that the term “design
problem” is very problematic in a scientific context. In the scientific
22 H.L. Dreyfus, “Intelligence without
Representation— Merleau-Ponty’s
Critique of Mental Representation,"
Phenomenology and the Cognitive
Ciencias 1 (2002): 367–383.
23 C.H. Dorst and N.G. Cruz, “Creativity
in the Design Process: Co-evolution of
Problem-solution,” Design Studies 22
(2001): 425–37.
24 A. Hatchuel, “Towards Design Theory and
Expandable Rationality: The Unfinished
Program of Herbert Simon," Diario de
Management and Governance 5:3–4
(2002).
16
Design Issues: Volumen 22, Número 3 Verano 2006
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study of design, we cannot say that the design activity consists
of reasoning from “a design problem” to “a solution”—at least it
becomes meaningless to say so if we cannot define the notion of
“design problem” or pin it down in empirical descriptions of design
actividad.
Temporarily bracketing the term “design problem” allows
new frames of reference and descriptions of the design activity to
emerge. Within this paper, that process has resulted is an alterna-
tive way to describe the design as the resolution of paradoxes between
discourses in a design situation. This alternative way of describing
design potentially sheds new light on the nature of design, and on
the kind of creativity that is part and parcel of design. The next step
would be to confront this new description of design with the exist-
ing models and methods within design methodology, and see if this
produces interesting insights into the nature of design.
Additional References
H.L. Dreyfus, What Computers Still Can’t Do (Cambridge, MAMÁ: CON
Prensa, 2002).
J.S. Gero, K.W. Tham, and H.S. Sotavento, “Behavior: A Link between
Function and Structure in Design” in Intelligent Computer-Aided
Diseño, D.C. Brown y cols., eds. (Ámsterdam: Elsevier, 1992), 193–
225.
H.A. Simón, “The Structure of Ill-structured Problems,” Artificial
Inteligencia 4 (1973): 181–201.
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Design Issues: Volumen 22, Número 3 Verano 2006