Another Progressive’s Dilemma: - IA de Investigación especializada en el MIT

Another Progressive’s Dilemma:
Inmigración, the Radical Right
& Threats to Gender Equality

Rafaela Dancygier

Immigration and the diversity it brings have led to the emergence of the “progres-
sive’s dilemma” whereby open societies that take in immigrant outsiders may find it
difficult to maintain the solidarity required to sustain the welfare state. En este ensayo,
I address another progressive’s dilemma: Focusing on the case of Western Europe, I
argue that when open borders give rise to radical-right parties, immigration can in-
advertently also endanger progressive achievements in gender equality. Though xeno-
phobic policies frequently constitute their core message and the primary source of
their appeal, radical-right parties are also defenders of traditional family values
and outspoken critics of measures that promote the economic and political advance-
ment of women. Además, the composition of these parties, both in terms of vot-
ers and politicians, is disproportionately male. Como resultado, when radical-right, anti-
immigrant parties enter national parliaments, the descriptive and substantive repre-
sentation of women suffers, sometimes reversing long-held gains in gender equality.

P olitics in advanced democracies used to revolve around class cleavages,

with the large centrist parties on the left and the right offering competing
visions about redistribution and the size of the welfare state. Over the past
several decades, class politics has been supplemented with another, cross-cutting
cleavage, one centering around progressive social values and cosmopolitanism on
la una mano, and traditional values and ethnocentrism on the other. Political par-
ties on the left have made issues such as gender equality, LGBTQ rights, and open
borders critical parts of their platforms, while parties on the right have been more
likely to emphasize traditional family values and the cultural threats associated
with immigration.1

This restructuring of the political space, along with growing levels of ethnic
and cultural diversity, has led to the emergence of the “progressive’s dilemma”:
how can open societies that take in immigrant outsiders maintain the solidarity
required to sustain the welfare state? Answers to this question constitute an on-
going and unresolved debate.2 What has been overlooked in this debate, sin embargo,

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

mi
d
tu
d
a
mi
d
a
r
t
i
C
mi
–
pag
d

F
/

1
4
9
1
5
6
1
8
3
1
6
0
1
d
a
mi
d
_
a
_
0
1
7
7
3
pag
d

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

oh
norte
0
8
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

is that the dilemma is not just about marrying sociocultural diversity with eco-
nomic redistribution. Cada vez más, elements within the progressives’ sociocultural
agenda are also clashing.

En este ensayo, focusing on the case of Western Europe, I argue that immigration
not only threatens the sustainability of the welfare state, it can also inadvertently
endanger progressive achievements in gender equality via a strengthening radical
bien. Open borders and the ethnic diversity they generate have in many countries
given rise to powerful radical-right parties, with anti-immigration policies and xe-
nophobic rhetoric frequently their core message and the primary source of their
appeal.3 But they are also often defenders of traditional family values and outspo-
ken critics of measures that promote the economic and political advancement
of women. Además, the composition of these parties, both in terms of voters
and politicians, is disproportionately male.4 As a result, when radical-right, anti-
immigrant parties enter national parliaments, the descriptive and substantive
representation of women suffers.

To make these arguments, I present three threats that radical-right parties
pose to the advancement of women’s interest and gender equality in politics:
1) the overrepresentation of male-voter interests; 2) the pursuit of policies that
promote conservative gender roles and oppose measures to enhance gender equal-
idad; y 3) the small number of elected female candidates among radical-right
parties. I then address how a more recent rhetorical shift toward gender equali-
ty among some radical-right parties does not represent an actual change in poli-
cy positioning, but rather serves to discriminate against European Muslims. I con-
clude with a brief discussion about potential ways out of the progressive’s dilem-
ma surrounding immigration and gender.

E urope has been experiencing large-scale immigration for many decades. En

most West European countries, the foreign-born now constitute more than
10 percent of the population. En 2016 solo, two million non-EU citizens
migrated to the European Union, while EU countries granted citizenship to one
million persons.5 The inflow and settlement of a diverse mix of labor migrants,
asylum seekers, and their families have transformed European societies and la-
bor markets, and they have also had significant political ramifications. Uno de los
most salient electoral consequences has been the ascendance of radical-right par-
ties that campaign on fiercely xenophobic platforms. Though an uptick in immi-
gration does not automatically trigger a nativist backlash, the arrival and settle-
ment of large numbers of migrants has been a crucial ingredient in the emergence
and growth of contemporary radical-right parties in Europe.6

Relacionado, hostile views toward immigrants distinguish supporters of
radical-right parties from the rest of the electorate. Studies based on a wide
range of surveys and countries consistently find that ethnocentrism and a desire

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

mi
d
tu
d
a
mi
d
a
r
t
i
C
mi
–
pag
d

F
/

1
4
9
1
5
6
1
8
3
1
6
0
1
d
a
mi
d
_
a
_
0
1
7
7
3
pag
d

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

oh
norte
0
8
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

149 (1) Winter 2020Rafaela Dancygier

to reduce the number of immigrants help predict who casts votes for the radi-
cal right.7

The rise of the radical right in response to immigration and cosmopolitanism
presents a key facet of the much-discussed progressive’s dilemma: the notion that
ethnic diversity severs societal bonds of solidarity and weakens leftist political
forces, both of which are required to maintain robust welfare states.8 At least two
mechanisms can be at work: Some voters’ support for redistribution may decline
because they do not want to finance government transfers going to disliked im-
migrant minorities. Por el contrario, other voters may still cherish the welfare state,
but they first and foremost want to support a party that promises to end immigra-
ción, and they therefore cast their lot with radical-right parties. When such parties
also want to shrink the welfare state, curbing immigration and maintaining redis-
tribution can become incompatible goals among a significant number of voters.9
Debates about this version of the progressive’s dilemma are ongoing and
largely unresolved.10 Yet immigration–if it contributes to the electoral success of
radical-right forces–can also bring to the fore a much less widely recognized ten-
sion within the progressive camp. Whereas the focus until now has been on trade-
offs along two dimensions, pitting economic against sociocultural concerns, im-
migration and the accompanying growth of the radical right threatens to create
dilemmas within the left’s sociocultural agenda: when immigration causes an in-
crease in radical-right parliamentary representation, open border policies can un-
wittingly undermine gender equality.

W hen radical-right parties enter parliaments, they can undercut wom-

en’s representation in several ways. Primero, radical-right parties are
disproportionately supported by men. While there is disagreement
about the causes behind the growth of radical-right parties, the gender gap in
radical-right party support has been one of the most durable findings in the liter-
ature. It has even earned these parties the label of Männerparteien (parties for or
of men).11 As political scientist Cas Mudde has pointed out, gender “is the only
sociodemographic variable that is consistently relevant in practically all Europe-
an countries.”12 Examining the gender gap in twelve West European countries in
2010, social scientist Tim Immerzeel and colleagues found an average gap of 4.3
puntos, con 11.1 percent of men and 6.8 percent of women supporting radical-
right parties.13 In some instances, the difference is much higher, alcanzando 6.4,
9.0, y 13.3 percentage points in Switzerland, Austria, and Norway, respective-
ly. France is the only country where the gap has narrowed or even closed in some
elections.14 However, in none of these countries do female supporters of the radi-
cal right outnumber their male counterparts.

In addition to gendered voting patterns, party membership of radical-right
parties is also overwhelmingly male. Además, women are less likely than men

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

mi
d
tu
d
a
mi
d
a
r
t
i
C
mi
–
pag
d

F
/

1
4
9
1
5
6
1
8
3
1
6
0
1
d
a
mi
d
_
a
_
0
1
7
7
3
pag
d

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

oh
norte
0
8
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

Dédalo, la Revista de la Academia Estadounidense de las Artes & SciencesImmigration, the Radical Right & Threats to Gender Equality

to participate in radical-right politics on the basis of their ideological convic-
ciones. Research has found that women who are members of radical-right parties
and participate in activist circles are frequently pulled in by the men in their lives
–romantic partners, brothers–who are already active in the far-right milieu.15

Existing scholarship has identified a number of reasons for the male bias
among the radical-right’s core electorate. Some arguments relate to gendered la-
bor market positions: because men have traditionally been overrepresented in
blue-collar, industrial jobs, they are more likely to belong to the “losers of mod-
ernization” whose material well-being and social status have been threatened by
deindustrialization, offshoring, and immigration. The rise in postmaterial values,
gender egalitarianism, and ethnic diversity can compound these threats.16 Men’s
newly precarious position can make them susceptible to radical-right parties that
promise a return to the old order in which native, White men occupied the top of
the economic and social hierarchy.17

A related line of reasoning draws upon gender gaps in authoritarian attitudes.
Men tend to take a tougher stance than women toward criminal justice, y
radical-right parties commonly link immigration to crime and societal break-
abajo, vowing to restore law and order via deportation, immigration bans, y
more aggressive policing. This issue linkage helps radical-right parties formulate
a coherent issue agenda: concerns about crime have been found to be an impor-
tant predictor of fears over immigration, and large numbers of Europeans believe
that immigration contributes to crime.18 It also helps account for gendered radi-
cal-right voting patterns.19

Others have argued that while women and men do not differ too much in their
degree of anti-immigrant sentiment, women are less likely to accord immigration
high salience when it comes time to cast ballots. Gender differences in issue sa-
lience, rather than preferences per se, can therefore explain part of the gender gap.20
Irrespective of the causes behind the gender gap, so long as men and women
differ in their policy preferences and priorities (and radical-right parties in fact
represent the interests of their mostly male core electorate), the rise of radical-
right parties effectively reduces the substantive representation of women.21

S econd, the rise of the radical right can stall the advancement of feminist

causes. Radical-right parties frequently advocate for a return to tradition-
al family values and speak out against policies that aim to promote women’s
economic and political advancement. Their emphasis on family values is rooted
in part on the importance of motherhood, especially in the context of declining
birth rates: for the survival of the (ethnically pure) nación, it is critical that native
women prioritize their roles as mothers and caregivers. Como resultado, radical-right
parties have supported tax policies meant to incentivize women to bear more chil-
dren and to care for them at home. Tax breaks that rise with the number of chil-

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

mi
d
tu
d
a
mi
d
a
r
t
i
C
mi
–
pag
d

F
/

1
4
9
1
5
6
1
8
3
1
6
0
1
d
a
mi
d
_
a
_
0
1
7
7
3
pag
d

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

oh
norte
0
8
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

149 (1) Winter 2020Rafaela Dancygier

dren or direct compensation for “housewives” are part of their policy arsenal, como
are restrictions on women’s reproductive choices.22

Most European radical-right parties recognize that it is increasingly unrealistic
for women to remain outside the labor force altogether. In light of these realities,
and to broaden their appeal, some have explicitly stated their support for wom-
en’s economic independence.23 However, these parties nevertheless want to en-
sure that native women’s preoccupation with their careers does not replace their
desire for childbirth. De hecho, raising the fertility of native women is seen as an an-
tidote to immigration. As the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) stated in its 2011 pro-
gram: “Austria is not a country of immigration. This is why we pursue a fami-
ly policy centered around births.”24 Similarly, during the 2017 German general
election campaign, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) produced a poster prom-
inently displaying the pregnant belly of a (Blanco) woman and featuring the mes-
sage: “Merkel says we need immigrants. We say: ‘New Germans’? We make those
ourselves!"

In line with its traditional conception of gender roles, the radical right typi-
cally strongly opposes gender quotas in all realms of society. Por ejemplo, in its
2017 manifesto, the AfD derides state-sponsored gender quotas as illegitimate,
arbitrary, and ultimately unconstitutional, and it campaigns for their repeal.25
The Swiss People’s Party (SVP) similarly rejects all “quota rules and so-called
gender-politics” and seeks to abolish all equal opportunity offices (Gleichstellungs-
büros).26 Even the SVP’s youth wing vehemently opposes “quota women” (Quoten-
frauen), viewing government quotas as tools employed by the lazy and the weak,
and by socialist feminists.27

Opposition to quotas also extends to radical-right parties in Scandinavian
countries, where gender equality measures have generally been more widely ac-
cepted. The Sweden Democrats explicitly reject gender quotas, as does the Danish
People’s Party and the Norwegian Progress Party.28 Though these parties usually
point out that they believe in the dignity of women and in their equal status before
la ley, they oppose gender quotas and gender mainstreaming, viewing them as
excessive and misguided efforts at equalization (Gleichmacherei). Not only do radi-
cal-right parties fear that measures aimed at creating equal opportunities between
the sexes hurt their male support bases, but for many, such policies also contra-
vene the “natural” order of things.29

F inally, consistent with their disproportionately male support bases and

their suspicion of feminist causes and gender quotas, radical-right parties
tend to produce mostly male candidates. I should note at the outset that,
compared with other parties, radical-right parties do not seem to be lagging be-
hind with respect to having women in visible leadership positions. Marine Le Pen
of the French National Rally, Pia Kjærsgaard of the Danish People’s Party, and Al-

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

mi
d
tu
d
a
mi
d
a
r
t
i
C
mi
–
pag
d

F
/

1
4
9
1
5
6
1
8
3
1
6
0
1
d
a
mi
d
_
a
_
0
1
7
7
3
pag
d

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

oh
norte
0
8
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

Dédalo, la Revista de la Academia Estadounidense de las Artes & SciencesImmigration, the Radical Right & Threats to Gender Equality

ice Weidel of the Alternative for Germany are among the prominent examples of
past and present radical-right women leaders. Sin embargo, when examining parlia-
mentary seats, men tend to outnumber women by significant margins. The grow-
ing strength of radical-right, anti-immigrant parties therefore tends to decrease
female representation in parliaments, especially since, where they exist in Eu-
rope, candidate gender quotas tend to be voluntarily adopted by parties, bastante
than mandated by law.30

To assess the magnitude of this development, I collected data on the gender
composition of all current West European national parliaments in which radical-
right parties have a significant presence: a saber, countries where these parties at-
tained a vote share of at least 10 percent in the most recent general election. El
results are displayed in Table 1. The gender gaps across party types are substan-
tial. Whereas, on average, just over one-quarter (26 por ciento) of radical-right par-
liamentarians are female, this number reaches 40 percent among all other parties.
In six out of nine cases, differences reach eighteen points or higher. Germany dis-
plays the largest gap: the share of female MPs is twenty-three percentage points
lower among radical-right parties when compared with all other parliamentary
parties. Switzerland and Sweden are close behind with a gap of twenty-two points.
If the national parliaments listed in Table 1 did not include radical-right par-
ties and kept their overall gender balance unchanged, female descriptive repre-
sentation would rise by three percentage points overall, ceteris paribus. In Swit-
zerland and Austria, where these parties are both particularly strong (tenencia 32.5
y 27.9 percent of seats, respectivamente) and particularly male, the share of wom-
en parliamentarians would rise by seven and five points, respectivamente. In only one
caso, Dinamarca, do we observe a positive difference: 41 percent of the seats held
by the Danish People’s Party are occupied by women compared with 38 por ciento
among all other parliamentary parties, a case I will return to briefly below.

It is important to note that in some cases, the share of women in radical-right
parties does not fall below that observed among more centrist right-wing par-
ties.31 But this fact does not negate the progressive’s dilemma: left parties almost
always feature a higher share of women. In cases in which immigration facilitates
the rise of the right and the decline of the left, female representation falls.

One of the youngest European radical-right parties, Alternative for Germany,
entered the German Bundestag for the first time in 2017, gaining over 12 por ciento de
the vote. It is nearly all male: solo 11 percent of the AfD’s ninety-four seats are held
by women. The rise of the AfD illustrates the progressive’s dilemma around immi-
gration and gender particularly well. The party owes its rapid ascent first and fore-
most to the sizable inflow of migrants that entered Germany in the years leading
up to the election. Well over one million refugees, many of them from Syria, Iraq,
and Afghanistan, arrived in the country, encouraged by Angela Merkel’s liberal
stance toward those fleeing violent conflict at home and seeking asylum in Ger-

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

mi
d
tu
d
a
mi
d
a
r
t
i
C
mi
–
pag
d

F
/

1
4
9
1
5
6
1
8
3
1
6
0
1
d
a
mi
d
_
a
_
0
1
7
7
3
pag
d

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

oh
norte
0
8
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

149 (1) Winter 2020Rafaela Dancygier

Mesa 1
Proportion of Female Politicians in National Parliaments by Party Type

Percent of Female Politicians in:

Parliamentary
Radical-Right
Parties

Alemania

Suiza

Suecia

Finland

Austria

Norway

Italia

Países Bajos

Dinamarca

Overall Averages

All Other
Parliamentary
Parties
34

Entire
Parliament
31

Percenage-Point
Diferencia
entre
Party Types

-23

-22

-19

-18

-8

-2

-14

Nota: This table refers to the composition of national parliaments in December 2018 (based
on data collected by the author). It includes all West European countries where radical-right,
anti-immigrant parties received at least 10 percent of the vote and are represented in parlia-
mento. The following parties are coded as radical-right and anti-immigrant: Alternative for
Alemania, Swiss People’s Party, Sweden Democrats, True Finns, Freedom Party Austria, Prog-
ress Party (Norway), Lega (Italia, Chamber of Deputies), Party for Freedom (Países Bajos), y
the Danish People’s Party.

muchos. Parties on the left–the Social Democrats, the Greens, and the Left Party
–also strongly defended open borders and the right to asylum and continued to
do so even when the issue began to fracture the center-right. The AfD succeed-
ed in keeping the immigration issue in the headlines and in mobilizing many
voters who wanted to stop the inflow; the desire to reduce the number of immi-
grants was the most salient issue among voters who cast their ballot for the radical
party.32 And, as elsewhere, the majority of these voters were male. Whereas 9 por-
cent of German women voted for the AfD, 15 percent of German men did so.33

Though these gendered voting patterns have been widely recognized, qué
has been less appreciated is that the entry of the AfD in the German Bundestag
helped reverse a long-running trend in the steady rise in the number of parliamen-
tary seats occupied by women. Cifra 1 charts the percentage-point change in the
share of female Bundestag representatives since the 1960s (left y-axis) and seat

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

mi
d
tu
d
a
mi
d
a
r
t
i
C
mi
–
pag
d

F
/

1
4
9
1
5
6
1
8
3
1
6
0
1
d
a
mi
d
_
a
_
0
1
7
7
3
pag
d

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

oh
norte
0
8
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

Dédalo, la Revista de la Academia Estadounidense de las Artes & SciencesImmigration, the Radical Right & Threats to Gender Equality

Cifra 1
Seats Held by Women and by Radical-Right Parties in Germany’s
Federal Parliament (Bundestag)

norte
mi
metro
oh
W.

y
b
d
yo
mi
h
s
t
a
mi
S
norte
i
mi
gramo
norte
a
h
C
t
norte
i
oh
PAG
–
mi
gramo
a
t
norte
mi
C
r
mi
PAG

-5

s
mi
i
t
r
a
PAG
t
h
gramo
i
R
–
yo
a
C
i
d
a
R
y
b
d
yo
mi
h
s
t
a
mi
S
F
oh
t
norte
mi
C
r
mi
PAG

1960

1980

2000

2020

Percentage-Point Change in Seats Held by Women

Percent of Seats Held by Radical-Right Parties

Nota: This figure shows that the share of women has increased steadily since the mid-1970s,
with only two exceptions: a slight one-point drop in 2005 and a substantial six-point drop in
2017 when a radical-right party entered the Bundestag for the first time. Fuente: Michael F.
Feldkamp, “Deutscher Bundestag 1994 bis 2014: Parlaments- und Wahlstatistik für die 13. bis
18. Wahlperiode,” in Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, volumen 1 (Berlina: ZParl, 2014), 3-dieciséis; and Mi-
chael F. Feldkamp and Christa Sommer, Parlaments- und Wahlstatistik des Deutschen Bundestages
1949–2002/03 (Berlina: Deutscher Bundestag, 2003).

shares of radical-right parties (right y-axis) over the same time span. The share
of female politicians has been rising since the mid-1970s, reaching its highest val-
ue in 2013 (36.5 por ciento). Though there was a slight dip of one percentage point in
2005, an unprecedented six-percentage-point drop occurred in 2017. This descent
coincided with the entry of the AfD: eighty-four AfD men and ten AfD women
took seats in the Bundestag. To be sure, these losses in female representation are
not just of the AfD’s doing; other parties also featured fewer women than in the
previous Bundestag.34 But the entry of an almost exclusively male anti-immigrant

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

mi
d
tu
d
a
mi
d
a
r
t
i
C
mi
–
pag
d

F
/

1
4
9
1
5
6
1
8
3
1
6
0
1
d
a
mi
d
_
a
_
0
1
7
7
3
pag
d

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

oh
norte
0
8
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

149 (1) Winter 2020Rafaela Dancygier

party clearly put the brakes on the advancement of women candidates in Germa-
ny’s national parliament.

T he German example is particularly striking. It illustrates in stark terms the

potential trade-off between gender equality in politics and open immi-
gration policies. But developments in other countries suggest that there
might be signs of change. Denmark’s anti-immigrant People’s Party was long led
by a woman and includes more female than male members of parliament. El
Dutch Party for Freedom brands itself a defender of gender equality and nota-
bly voted against cuts in public childcare.35 In France, gendered voting patterns
among supporters of the National Rally are disappearing. One reason behind
this change is the increasing economic insecurity in the female-dominated ser-
vice sector.36 Another has to do with Marine Le Pen’s targeting of young wom-
en. Le Pen, herself twice divorced and having raised three children, acknowledges
the challenges of motherhood, especially among single women in precarious eco-
nomic circumstances. As the party is seeking to capture a younger, more modern,
and female electorate, its traditionally strong opposition to abortion–which her
party had previously called an “anti-French genocide”–is also weakening.37

Radical-right parties in Denmark, the Netherlands, and France have had a
much longer presence in local councils and national parliaments than has the Ger-
man AfD. Part of their longevity and success can be attributed to their modera-
ción, at least in some aspects of their agenda, which has helped them make inroads
among the female electorate.38

Do these developments signal a softening of the progressive’s dilemma?
Though these parties have remained stridently anti-immigrant, proposing ever
harsher immigration laws and tougher integration requirements, to be durable
and successful, they might have to modernize their views on gender relations.

Close observers of these parties would likely be skeptical of this interpretation.
The roots of the radical right’s repositioning on gender, critics have alleged, is not
to be found in their newfound ideological commitments to gender equality, y
neither is it sincere. Bastante, where radical-right parties have begun to adopt fem-
inist rhetoric, it has always been in connection to immigration. Específicamente, estos
parties have been campaigning on feminist issues to widen the gulf between Eu-
rope’s Muslim communities and the rest of society while simultaneously expos-
ing perceived failures of multiculturalism, one of the left’s blind spots.39

Muslims in Europe, while diverse in origin, religiosity, and cultural back-
grounds, tend to subscribe to more patriarchal social norms and traditional fam-
ily values than does the electorate at-large. As issues pertaining to sexual libera-
tion and feminism have gained more resonance among European voters, ellos son
confronted with an ethnoreligious minority group that is much less supportive of
gender equality in the private and public sphere. Como resultado, even cosmopolitan

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

mi
d
tu
d
a
mi
d
a
r
t
i
C
mi
–
pag
d

F
/

1
4
9
1
5
6
1
8
3
1
6
0
1
d
a
mi
d
_
a
_
0
1
7
7
3
pag
d

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

oh
norte
0
8
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

Dédalo, la Revista de la Academia Estadounidense de las Artes & SciencesImmigration, the Radical Right & Threats to Gender Equality

voters that typically favor liberal immigration policies have become uneasy about
the presence of Muslims in European cities.40

Seizing on this tension, radical-right parties have begun to instrumentalize
gender equality as a key strategy to differentiate the “modern majority” from the
“backwards, patriarchal” minority, with the hopes of peeling away voters from
mainstream parties that endorse immigration and multiculturalism.41 Issues
of veiling and the “headscarf debates” they spawn have been especially salient
among the radical right. Bans on veiling of various forms (in schools, public insti-
tutions, or even covering the entire public sphere) frequently feature prominent-
ly in their platforms. They allow radical-right parties to appear as backers of gen-
der equality while at the same time communicating that European nation-states
cannot accommodate Islam without fundamentally altering their cultural charac-
ter. As Geert Wilders, leader of the Dutch Freedom Party, has put it: “mass immi-
gration” and “Islamic gender apartheid” threaten to flush “decades of [women’s]
emancipation down the toilet.”42

Todavía, fiery rhetoric aside, policy proposals to combat gender inequities more
generally are typically absent.43 Radical-right party manifestos reveal this incon-
gruence quite clearly. Por ejemplo, when discussing gender equality in their 2018
election program, the Sweden Democrats briefly noted Sweden’s long-standing
tradition of gender egalitarianism, then quickly pivoted to the threats posed by
honor-related violence and female genital mutilation, before dismissing “gender
theories” and quotas as unnecessary and ineffective.44 Turning to Norway, el
very first page of the Norwegian Progress Party’s 2017 manifesto lists the banning
of “women-discriminating” garments like the burka and niqab as one of the par-
ty’s policy priorities. Much further down, on page twenty, the party also mentions
its categorical opposition to gender-based quotas.45 This type of inconsistent po-
sitioning is quite common. Examining the manifestos of six successful European
radical-right parties, social scientist Tjitske Akkerman has found that while they
vary in their degree of conservatism, none of them can be characterized as liberal
with regard to their positions on gender relations.46 Even the Danish People’s Par-
ty, with its disproportionate number of female parliamentarians and its empha-
sis on the Islamic threat to achievements in gender equality, ultimately advocates
for conservative family values and for policies that prioritize women’s caregiving
roles.47 Akkerman therefore concludes that while “support for gender equality
and women’s rights has now become widely spread over the whole political spec-
trum . . . only the radical-right parties [son] left to defend the last vestiges of (modificación-
ern) conservative family relations.”48

T he progressive’s dilemma around immigration and gender thus shows no

signs of abating. That the radical right’s nods to gender equality do not
represent actual policy shifts in the feminist direction should not come as

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

mi
d
tu
d
a
mi
d
a
r
t
i
C
mi
–
pag
d

F
/

1
4
9
1
5
6
1
8
3
1
6
0
1
d
a
mi
d
_
a
_
0
1
7
7
3
pag
d

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

oh
norte
0
8
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

149 (1) Winter 2020Rafaela Dancygier

a surprise. Después de todo, one of its main sources of strength lies in backlash politics:
a saber, its successful appeal to men suffering from status loss vis-à-vis not only
immigrant minorities, but also women.49 Moreover, so long as the promotion of
native women’s fertility rates remains one of the most appealing ways to reduce
future immigration and to maintain White dominance, traditional family values
and the valorization of motherhood will continue to be important aspects of the
radical right’s program.

En breve, the radical right cannot and will not help progressives resolve their di-
lemma around gender and immigration. A more realistic way out of this predica-
ment is a backlash to the backlash: if a sufficient number of previously unengaged
voters and potential candidates recognize that the rise of the radical right hinders
or even reverses progress on feminist causes, they might be motivated to engage
in politics. The example of the United States is instructive here. The election of a
radical-right, misogynistic president and his party’s attack on women’s reproduc-
tive rights has been widely credited for mobilizing sections of the female elector-
ate and for greatly enlarging the pool of women running for office.50 Similarly, en
several Scandinavian countries, feminist parties have sprung up in recent years
to address stalled efforts at advancing gender equality. In Denmark, the Feminist
Initiative (F!) runs on the slogan: “Out with the racists! In with the feminists!"
The party explicitly links the country’s preoccupation with immigration and the
associated success of the radical right with Denmark’s falling behind in global
gender equity rankings.51

The electoral success of feminist parties and candidates remains variable and
modest to date. But if these political forces succeed in raising awareness about the
fact that, notwithstanding their women-friendly rhetoric, radical-right parties
undercut all progressive achievements, their impact could be stronger than their
numbers suggest.

Sobre el Autor

Rafaela Dancygier is Associate Professor of Politics and Public Affairs at Prince-
ton University. She is the author of Immigration and Conflict in Europe (2010) and Di-
lemmas of Inclusion: Muslims in European Politics (2017).

notas finales

1 Pablo Beramendi, Silja Häusermann, Herbert Kitschelt, and Hanspeter Kriesi, The Pol-
itics of Advanced Capitalism (Nueva York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Ron-
ald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

mi
d
tu
d
a
mi
d
a
r
t
i
C
mi
–
pag
d

F
/

1
4
9
1
5
6
1
8
3
1
6
0
1
d
a
mi
d
_
a
_
0
1
7
7
3
pag
d

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

oh
norte
0
8
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

Dédalo, la Revista de la Academia Estadounidense de las Artes & SciencesImmigration, the Radical Right & Threats to Gender Equality

Publics (Princeton, NUEVA JERSEY.: Prensa de la Universidad de Princeton, 1977); and Hanspeter Kriesi, Ed-
gar Grande, Martin Dolezal, et al., Political Conflict in Western Europe (Nueva York: Leva-
bridge University Press, 2012).

2 Ver, Por ejemplo, Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, “Immigration, Multiculturalism,
and the Welfare State,” Ethics and International Affairs 20 (3) (2006): 281–304; David
Goodhart, “Too Diverse?” Prospect magazine, Febrero 20, 2004, 30–37; and Ruud
Koopmans, “Trade-Offs between Equality and Difference: Immigrant Integration,
Multiculturalism and the Welfare State in Cross-National Perspective,” Journal of Eth-
nic and Migration Studies 36 (1) (2010): 1–26.

3 Kai Arzheimer, “Explaining Electoral Support for the Radical Right,” Oxford Handbook of
the Radical Right, ed. Jens Rydgren (Oxford: prensa de la Universidad de Oxford, 2018); Winston
Chou, Rafaela Dancygier, Naoki Egami, and Amaney Jamal, “The Illusion of Radical
Right Partisan Loyalty: How Party Positioning Affects Far-Right Voting in Germany,"
working paper (Princeton, NUEVA JERSEY.: Universidad de Princeton, 2018); and Elisabeth Ivarsflaten,
“What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe? Re-Examining Grievance
Mobilization Models in Seven Successful Cases,” Comparative Political Studies 41 (1)
(2008): 3–23.

4 Hilde Coffé, “Gender and the Radical Right,” in Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right, ed.
Rydgren; and Tim Immerzeel, Hilde Coffé, and Tanja van der Lippe, “Explaining the
Gender Gap in Radical Right Voting: A Cross-National Investigation in 12 Western Eu-
ropean Countries,” Comparative European Politics 13 (2) (2015): 263–286.

5 For recent statistics, see Eurostat, “Migration and Migrant Population Statistics,"
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_
migrant_population_statistics.

6 Kai Arzheimer, “Contextual Factors and the Extreme Right Vote in Western Europe,
1980–2002,” American Journal of Political Science 53 (2) (2009): 259–275; Rafaela Dan-
cygier, Immigration and Conflict in Europe (Nueva York: Cambridge University Press,
2010); Matt Golder, “Far Right Parties in Europe,” Annual Review of Political Science 19
(2016): 477–497; Chou et al., “The Illusion of Radical Right Partisan Loyalty”; Ivars-
flaten, “What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe?"; and Matthias Mader
and Harald Schoen, “The European Refugee Crisis, Party Competition, and Voters’ Re-
sponses in Germany,” West European Politics 42 (1) (2018): 67–90.

7 Chou et al., “The Illusion of Radical Right Partisan Loyalty”; Golder, “Far Right Parties
in Europe”; and Jens Rydgren, “Immigration Sceptics, Xenophobes or Racists? Radical
Right-Wing Voting in Six West European Countries,” European Journal of Political Re-
buscar 47 (6) (2008): 737–765.

8 Banting and Kymlicka, “Immigration, Multiculturalism, and the Welfare State”; y

Goodhart, “Too Diverse?"

9 John Roemer, Woojin Lee, and Karine van der Straeten, Racism, Xenophobia, and Distribu-
ción: Multi-Issue Politics in Advanced Democracies (Cambridge, Masa.: Harvard Universi-
ty Press, 2007), elaborates on these two mechanisms and labels the first one the “anti-
solidarity effect” and the second one the “policy bundle effect.”

10 For research critical of the empirical basis of the progressive’s dilemma, ver, for exam-
por ejemplo, David Brady and Ryan Finnigan, “Does Immigration Undermine Public Support
for Social Policy?” American Sociological Review 79 (1) (2014): 17–42; Bryan Burgoon,
Ferry Koster, and Marcel van Egmond, “Support for Redistribution and the Paradox

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

mi
d
tu
d
a
mi
d
a
r
t
i
C
mi
–
pag
d

F
/

1
4
9
1
5
6
1
8
3
1
6
0
1
d
a
mi
d
_
a
_
0
1
7
7
3
pag
d

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

oh
norte
0
8
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

149 (1) Winter 2020Rafaela Dancygier

of Immigration,” Journal of European Social Policy 22 (3) (2012): 288–304; y marcos
Crepaz and Regan Damron, “Constructing Tolerance: How the Welfare State Shapes
Attitudes about Immigrants,” Comparative Political Studies 42 (3) (2009): 437–463. Evi-
dence suggests that the dilemma is more salient in the context of racial diversity in the
United States than it is in the European case, in part because European radical-right,
anti-immigrant parties frequently do not intend to cut welfare state expenditures for
natives. See Joakim Kulin, Maureen A. Eger, and Mikael Hjerm, “Immigration or Wel-
tarifa? The Progressive’s Dilemma Revisited,” Socius 2 (2016): 1-15.

11 Arzheimer, “Explaining Electoral Support for the Radical Right”; Golder, “Far Right
Parties in Europe”; Terri E. Givens, “The Radical Right Gender Gap,” Comparative Po-
litical Studies 37 (1) (2004): 30–54; Immerzeel et al., “Explaining the Gender Gap in
Radical Right Voting”; and Niels Spierings, Andrej Zaslove, Liza M. Mügge, and Sarah
l. el largo, “Gender and Populist Radical-Right Politics: An Introduction,” Patterns of
Prejudice 49 (1–2) (2015): 3-15.

12 Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Nueva York: Cambridge University

Prensa, 2007), 111.

13 Immerzeel et al., “Explaining the Gender Gap in Radical Right Voting.”
14 In ibid. (usando 2010 datos), the French gender gap in support for the radical right stands at
zero, though it has been unstable in the last decade. En el 2017 presidential election, él
closed once more. Abdelkarim Amengay, Anja Durovic, and Nonna Mayer, “L’impact
du genre sur le vote Marine Le Pen,” Revue française de science politique 67 (6) (2017):
1067–1087, argues that Marine Le Pen has been able to draw on the support of women,
especially among younger cohorts of voters who came of political age after Jean-Marie
Le Pen, her father and the party’s more extremist founder and president, had left the
Front National.

15 For a discussion, see Renate Bitzan, “Geschlechterkonstruktionen und Geschlechterver-
hältnisse in der extremen Rechten,” in Handbuch Rechtsextremismus, ed. Fabian Vir-
chow, Martin Langebach, and Alexander Häusler (Wiesbaden, Alemania: Saltador,
2016), 325–373; Anette Linden and Bert Klandermans, “The Netherlands: Stigmatized
Outsiders,” in Extreme Right Activists in Europe: Through the Magnifying Glass, ed. Bert
Klandermans and Nonna Mayer (Londres: Routledge, 2006), 172–203; and Mudde,
Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 109. Joyce Marie Mushaben, “The Rise of Femi-
Nazis? Female Participation in Right-Extremist Movements in Unified Germany,"
German Politics 5 (2) (1996): 240–261, identifies several types of women who join far-
right causes. See also Cyntha Miller-Idriss and Hilary Pilkington, “Women are Joining
the Far Right–We Need to Understand Why,” The Guardian, Enero 24, 2019, cual
notes that women are increasingly joining far-right movements.

16 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Econom-
ic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash,” Perspectives on Politics 15 (2) (2017): 443–454.
17 Hans-Georg Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe (Nueva York: Calle. Martin’s,
1994); Noam Gidron and Peter A. Sala, “The Politics of Social Status: Economic and
Cultural Roots of the Populist Right,” The British Journal of Sociology 68 (S1): S57–S84;
Givens, “The Radical Right Gender Gap”; and Diana Mutz, “Status Threat, Not Eco-
nomic Hardship, Explains the 2016 Presidential Vote,” Proceedings of the National Acad-
emy of Sciences 115 (19) (2018): E4330–E4339.

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

mi
d
tu
d
a
mi
d
a
r
t
i
C
mi
–
pag
d

F
/

1
4
9
1
5
6
1
8
3
1
6
0
1
d
a
mi
d
_
a
_
0
1
7
7
3
pag
d

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

oh
norte
0
8
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

Dédalo, la Revista de la Academia Estadounidense de las Artes & SciencesImmigration, the Radical Right & Threats to Gender Equality

18 The evidence for the claim that immigration increases crime is mixed. See Jennifer Fitz-
gerald, k. Amber Curtis, and Catherine Corliss, “Anxious Publics: Worries about
Crime and Immigration,” Comparative Political Studies 45 (4) (2012): 477–506; and Mi-
chael Minkenberg, “The Radical Right in Public Office: Agenda-Setting and Policy Ef-
efectos,” West European Politics 24 (4) (2001): 1–21.

19 Coffé, “Gender and the Radical Right”; and Elisabeth Gidengil, Matthew Hennigar, Un-
dré Blais, and Neil Nevitte, “Explaining the Gender Gap in Support for the New Right:
The Case of Canada,” Comparative Political Studies 38 (10) (2005): 1171–1195.

20 Eelco Harteveld, Wouter Van Der Brug, Stefan Dahlberg, and Andrej Kokkonen, "El
Gender Gap in Populist Radical-Right Voting: Examining the Demand Side in West-
ern and Eastern Europe,” Patterns of Prejudice 49 (1–2) (2015): 103–134.

21 Other reasons include gender differences in church attendance and in personality traits.
For a more comprehensive review of the causes of the gender gap, see Coffé, “Gender
and the Radical Right”; and Nonna Mayer, “The Closing of the Radical Right Gender
Gap in France?” French Politics 13 (4) (2015): 391–414.

22 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe; Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kalt-
wasser, “Vox populi or vox masculini? Populism and Gender in Northern Europe and
South America,” Patterns of Prejudice 49 (1–2) (2015): 16–36; and Tjitske Akkerman,
“Gender and the Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Policy
Agendas,” Patterns of Prejudice (49) (1–2) (2015): 37–60.

23 Sarah de Lange and Liza M. Mügge, “Gender and Right-Wing Populism in the Low Coun-
intentos: Ideological Variations across Parties and Time,” Patterns of Prejudice 49 (1–2)
(2015): 61–80; and Mayer, “The Closing of the Radical Right Gender Gap in France?"

24 Cited in Akkerman, “Gender and the Radical Right in Western Europe," 54.
25 For the AfD’s 2017 general election manifesto, see Alternative für Deutschland, Pro-
gramm für Deutschland: Wahlprogramm der Alternative für Deutschland für die Wahl zum
Deutschen Bundestag am 24. Septiembre 2017 (Berlina: Alternative für Deutschland, 2017),
https://www.afd.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/111/2017/06/2017-06-01_AfD-Bunde
stagswahlprogramm_Onlinefassung.pdf.

26 Cited in the SVP’s 2015 election program, available at Schweizerischen Volkspartei,
“Unser Parteiprogramm 2019–2023,” https://www.svp.ch/partei/positionen/partei
programme/.

27 This harsh reaction was posted on the website of the Junge SVP (Youth SVP), which is no
longer available. It was prompted by the passing of legislation requiring large public
companies to meet gender quotas.

28 Under the gender quota heading listed on their website, the Sweden Democrats sim-
ply state “Sweden Democrats oppose quotas”; see Sverigedemokraterna, “A till Ö,"
https://sd.se/a-o/. See also Susi Meret and Birte Siim, “Gender, Populism and Poli-
tics of Belonging: Discourses of Right-Wing Populist Parties in Denmark, Norway and
Austria,” in Negotiating Gender and Diversity in an Emergent European Public Sphere, ed.
Birte Siim and Monika Mokre (Basingstoke, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan,
2013), 78–96.

29 Bitzan, “Geschlechterkonstruktionen und Geschlechterverhältnisse in der extremen

Rechten”; and Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

mi
d
tu
d
a
mi
d
a
r
t
i
C
mi
–
pag
d

F
/

1
4
9
1
5
6
1
8
3
1
6
0
1
d
a
mi
d
_
a
_
0
1
7
7
3
pag
d

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

oh
norte
0
8
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

149 (1) Winter 2020Rafaela Dancygier

30 In Sweden, the Social Democrats adopted these quotas partly in response to a drop in
female representation in the national parliament between 1988 y 1991. Interesting-
ly, some of this decline can be attributed to the entry of the far-right New Democrats.
I thank Olle Folke and Johanna Rickne for this insight. See also Timothy Besley, Olle
Folke, Torsten Persson, and Johanna Rickne, “Gender Quotas and the Crisis of the Me-
diocre Man: Theory and Evidence from Sweden,” American Economic Review 107 (8)
(2017): 2204–2242.

31 See also Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 108.
32 Chou et al., “The Illusion of Radical Right Partisan Loyalty”; and Mader and Schoen,
“The European Refugee Crisis, Party Competition, and Voters’ Responses in Germany.”
33 See ARD, “Bundestagswahl 2017: Deutschland,” https://wahl.tagesschau.de/wahlen/

2017-09-24-BT-DE/umfrage-werwas.shtml.

34 Losses were most pronounced among the Christian Democrats. The CDU/CSU’s share of

women fell from 24.8 a 19.9 por ciento.

35 Akkerman, “Gender and the Radical Right in Western Europe.”
36 Mayer, “The Closing of the Radical Right Gender Gap in France?"
37 Angelique Chrisafis, “‘We Feel Very Close to Her’: Can ‘Fake Feminist’ Marine Le Pen

Win the Female Vote?” The Guardian, Marzo 18, 2017.

38 David Art, Inside the Radical Right: The Development of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western

Europa (Nueva York: Prensa de la Universidad de Cambridge, 2011).

39 Tjitske Akkerman and Anniken Hagelund, “‘Women and Children First!’ Anti-Immigra-
tion Parties and Gender in Norway and the Netherlands,” Patterns of Prejudice 41 (2)
(2007): 197–214; and Meret and Siim, “Gender, Populism and Politics of Belonging.”
40 Claire Adida, David Laitin, and Marie-Anne Valfort, Why Muslim Integration Fails in Chris-
tian-Heritage Societies (Cambridge, Masa.: Prensa de la Universidad de Harvard, 2016); and Rafaela
Dancygier, Dilemmas of Inclusion: Muslims in European Politics (Princeton, NUEVA JERSEY.: Príncipe-
ton University Press, 2017).

41 Niels Spierings, Marcel Lubbers, and Andrej Zaslove, “‘Sexually Modern Nativist Vot-
ers’: Do They Exist and Do They Vote for the Populist Radical Right?” Gender and Ed-
ucation 29 (2) (2017): 216–237.

42 Prologue to the party’s 2010 party program, cited in Mudde and Kaltwasser, “Vox popu-

li or vox masculini?" 28.

43 Meret and Siim, “Gender, Populism and Politics of Belonging”; and Mudde and Kalt-

wasser, “Vox populi or vox masculini?"

44 See Sverigedemokraterna, Valplattform: Sverigedemokraternas valplattform 2018 (Existencias-
encina: Sverigedemokraterna, 2018), https://sd.se/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Val
plattform-2018-1.pdf.

45 See “Prinsipp- og handlingsprogram,” Fremskrittspartiet, https://www.frp.no/hva-vi

-mener/prinsipp-og-handlingsprogram.

46 Akkerman focuses on the following issues when measuring these parties’ stances on
gender relations in the family domain: “labor market participation, equal rights, ed-
ucational opportunities, political participation, public childcare, freedom of choice

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

mi
d
tu
d
a
mi
d
a
r
t
i
C
mi
–
pag
d

F
/

1
4
9
1
5
6
1
8
3
1
6
0
1
d
a
mi
d
_
a
_
0
1
7
7
3
pag
d

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

oh
norte
0
8
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

Dédalo, la Revista de la Academia Estadounidense de las Artes & SciencesImmigration, the Radical Right & Threats to Gender Equality

vis-à-vis family planning/abortion, and the equal status of same-sex partnerships.” Ak-
kerman, “Gender and the Radical Right in Western Europe," 42.

47 The Dutch Freedom Party (PVV) is the only radical-right party that appears neutral, bal-
ancing conservative with liberal stances, but Akkerman points out that it pays little at-
tention to issues pertaining to gender equality. Unlike other radical-right parties, es,
sin embargo, a clear supporter of gay rights. Ibídem.

48 Ibídem., 54.
49 Gidron and Hall, “The Politics of Social Status: Economic and Cultural Roots of the Pop-
ulist Right”; and Mutz, “Status Threat, Not Economic Hardship, Explains the 2016
Presidential Vote.”

50 Danny Hayes, “A Year after the Women’s March, a Record Number of Women are Run-
ning for Office. Will They Win?” The Washington Post, Enero 19, 2018; and Jennifer
Lawless and Richard Fox, The Trump Effect: Results from a Politico/American University/
Loyola Marymount University Survey of Potential Candidates (Washington, CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: Women
& Politics Institute, 2017).

51 Karis Hustad, “Denmark’s New Feminist Party Declares, ‘Out with the Racists! In with

the Feminists!’” GlobalPost, December 4, 2017.

D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d

F
r
oh
metro
h

t
t

pag

:
/
/

d
i
r
mi
C
t
.

metro

i
t
.

mi
d
tu
d
a
mi
d
a
r
t
i
C
mi
–
pag
d

F
/

1
4
9
1
5
6
1
8
3
1
6
0
1
d
a
mi
d
_
a
_
0
1
7
7
3
pag
d

b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t

oh
norte
0
8
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3

149 (1) Winter 2020Rafaela Dancygier
Descargar PDF