Akira Irie
Beyond imperialism: the new internationalism
Much has been said about the United
States having become, or having to be-
come, an empire. To provide the chaotic
world, especially in the wake of the Cold
Guerra, with some semblance of law and
orden, it has been asserted, the interna-
tional community needs a new world
orden, a global empire, a superpower that
can speak on behalf of all countries and
all peoples, a power willing to use its
military and economic resources to pro-
tect all against the forces of violence and
anarchy. There is only one nation that
can ful½ll the task: the United States. En
the twenty-½rst century, por lo tanto, hu-
mankind may be forced to choose be-
tween continued disorder and imperial
governance instituted by the United
Estados.
Akira Irie, Charles Warren Professor of Ameri-
can History at Harvard University, has written
widely on the history of international relations
and U.S. foreign affairs. His books include “Cul-
tural Internationalism and World Order” (1997),
“Japan and the Wider World: From the Mid-
Nineteenth Century to the Present” (1997), y
“Global Community: The Role of International
Organizations in the Making of the Contempo-
rary World” (2002). He has been a Fellow of the
American Academy since 1982.
© 2005 por la Academia Americana de las Artes
& Ciencias
So one side of the argument goes. Pero
others dispute this contention, insisting
that for practical or moral reasons the
United States should never take on an
imperial role.
A historian can only contribute to this
debate by historicizing it–that is, por
noting what empires and imperialism
have meant in the past, and by examin-
ing what these might mean in today’s
world. This essay seeks to put empires
and imperialism in the context of mod-
ern world affairs and to discuss how they
contributed, or failed to contribute, a
stabilizing international order.
It cannot be denied that there was a
time when empires provided some sort
of world order. In the ½rst half of the
siglo XIX, the globe was dotted
by huge territorial empires, incluido
the Ottoman, persa, Mughal (Mogul),
Russian, y chino (Qing). They pre-
sided over large, multiethnic popula-
tions and kept (with varying degrees of
success) local tensions under control.
These were traditional imperial states
under the rule of dynasties whose ori-
gins went back several centuries. Ellos
governed essentially contiguous territo-
ries, thereby establishing some sem-
blance of regional order. One might in-
clude the United States in this list as
108
Dædalus Spring 2005
yo
D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d
F
r
oh
metro
h
t
t
pag
:
/
/
d
i
r
mi
C
t
.
metro
i
t
.
/
mi
d
tu
d
a
mi
d
a
r
t
i
C
mi
–
pag
d
/
yo
F
/
/
/
/
/
1
3
4
2
1
0
8
1
8
2
8
9
1
9
0
0
1
1
5
2
6
0
5
3
8
8
7
3
9
2
pag
d
.
F
b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t
t
oh
norte
0
8
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3
Bueno: él, también, grew as a territorial empire
during the nineteenth century, expandir-
ing northward, westward, and south-
ward, with the central government es-
tablishing its authority over all parts
of its territory, at least after the Civil
Guerra.
These landed empires were joined by
the maritime empires of Britain, Francia,
España, and other European nations that
superimposed a commercial regime over
the vast, traditional empires of the Mid-
dle East, South Asia, and East Asia. El
relationship between the landed and
maritime empires was sometimes vio-
lent–for example, in India during the
1850s when Britain displaced the Mu-
ghal Empire with its own colonial re-
gime. On the whole, sin embargo, the tradi-
tional empires continued to function,
even as merchants, sailors, and mission-
aries from the maritime powers in½ltrat-
ed their lands.
Until the last decades of the nine-
teenth century, these territorial and mar-
itime empires constituted an interna-
tional order. The system of international
law that had originated in Europe in the
seventeenth century steadily spread to
other parts of the world, and all these
empires, as well as other independent
estados, entered into treaty relations with
one another. This was an age of multiple
empires. When we talk of empires today,
or of the United States having become
an empire, we obviously do not have in
mind such a situation. Bastante, many ob-
servers draw the analogy between em-
pire today and the British and other mar-
itime empires that emerged at the end of
the nineteenth century when a handful
of colonial regimes established near-
total control over most of the world’s
land and people. This distinction is im-
portant, since much depends on what
historical antecedent one is referring to
when one talks about an empire.
Likewise signi½cant, in contemporary
discussions the ‘imperialism’ that is
most relevant is the ‘new imperialism’
that emerged in the last decades of the
nineteenth century and persisted only
through the ½rst decades of the twenti-
eth. A handful of nations whose empires
were both territorial and maritime exer-
cised the new imperialism; great mili-
tary powers such as Britain, Francia, Ger-
muchos, Russia, the United States, y
Japan incorporated overseas territory
into their respective domains, thereby
emerging as world powers. Most of Af-
rico, the Middle East, Asia, and the Pa-
ci½c were carved into their colonies and
spheres of influence. Once acquired,
these lands were governed by cadres of
administrators recruited both at home
and in the colonies; and these colonial
regimes were in turn protected by of½-
cers and men sent from the metropoles
and by troops and police recruited local-
ly. The new imperialists vied with one
another for control over land, resources,
and people, and in the process they
fought many colonial wars. Instead of
producing global chaos and anarchy as a
consequence, sin embargo, these empires at
times managed to establish some sort of
world order. They did so both by seeking
to stabilize their relationships with one
another and by making sure the people
they controlled would not threaten the
sistema.
The Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905)
and its aftermath serve as a good illustra-
ción. Ignited by Russia and Japan’s clash-
ing ambitions in northeast China (Man-
churia) and the Korean peninsula, este
½rst major war of the twentieth century
was a typically imperialistic war. Cuando
negotiations to de½ne their respective
spheres of domination failed, the two
countries fought on land and at sea, pero
not on Russian or Japanese soil; the Chi-
nese and Koreans themselves had no say
Beyond
imperialism:
el nuevo
enterrar-
nationalism
yo
D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d
F
r
oh
metro
h
t
t
pag
:
/
/
d
i
r
mi
C
t
.
metro
i
t
.
/
mi
d
tu
d
a
mi
d
a
r
t
i
C
mi
–
pag
d
/
yo
F
/
/
/
/
/
1
3
4
2
1
0
8
1
8
2
8
9
1
9
0
0
1
1
5
2
6
0
5
3
8
8
7
3
9
2
pag
d
.
F
b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t
t
oh
norte
0
8
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3
Dædalus Spring 2005
109
Akira Irie
en
imperialism
in this war that would determine their
nations’ futures. Victorious, Japan won
control over Korea and southern Man-
churia, turning the former into its col-
ony and the latter into its base of opera-
tion on the Chinese mainland. The oth-
er Great Powers, assuming their own
imperial domains would not be directly
threatened by the conflict or its eventual
outcome, did not intervene, but in the
end the United States offered mediation
with a view to preventing further blood-
shed and regional disorder. Within two
years of the war’s end, además, Russia
and Japan reconciled and agreed to di-
vide Manchuria (y luego, Inner Mon-
golia) between them.
The two empires had fought an impe-
rialistic war and, just as quickly, had de-
cided to preserve their imperial spheres
through cooperation. Such behavior was
typical in the age of the new imperial-
ismo. The other imperialists essentially
stood by, accepting the new status quo
in Asia, although the United States, con
its empire in the Paci½c, began to view
Japan’s growing power with alarm. Still,
the United States and Japan reached
agreement that they would not challenge
their respective empires: los unidos
States would not dispute Japanese con-
trol over Korea or southern Manchuria,
and Japan would not infringe on U.S.
sovereignty in the Philippines, Guam,
or Hawaii. The Japanese also accepted
French control over Indochina and
Dutch control over the East Indies, de-
spite the movements against colonialism
that were developing in those colonies.
Some of these movements’ leaders
looked to Japan, the only non-Western
Great Power, for support, but Japan
chose to identify itself with the other
imperialists.
At least for the time being, the imperi-
al powers colluded with one another to
keep their respective colonial popula-
tions under tight control. The world or-
der they established entailed a division
of humankind between the ruler and the
ruled, the powerful and the weak, el
‘civilized’ and the ‘uncivilized.’
The world of the new empires had its
heyday at the beginning of the twentieth
siglo, but it disintegrated rapidly fol-
lowing the Great War. The German,
Austrian, and Ottoman Empires col-
lapsed after the four years of ½ghting,
while the Russian Empire, on the oppo-
site side of the conflict, was undone by
the revolutionaries who came to power
during the war. The empires of Britain,
Francia, Japón, and the United States did
not disappear, but they were no longer
capable of providing the globe with sys-
tem and order. They might have tried to
cooperate with one another to preserve
the new imperialism, but they had nei-
ther the will nor the resources to do so.
Imperialistic collusion broke down, y
Japan began challenging the existing em-
pires in Asia and the Paci½c in the 1930s.
Under Nazi leadership a new German
empire emerged, and Japan and Ger-
many in combination collided head-on
with the remaining empires of Europe
y los estados unidos.
En ese sentido, World War II was an im-
perialistic war, but it was also the begin-
ning of the end of all empires, new and
viejo. By seeking to destroy each other, el
empires had committed collective sui-
cide–but that was only one reason be-
hind the demise of imperialism. Más
fundamental was the emergence of anti-
imperialism as a major force in twenti-
eth-century world affairs.
Anti-imperialistic nationalism had
many sources–ideological, political, entonces-
cial, and racial–but above all, it was fos-
tered by the development of the transna-
tional forces that are usually identi½ed as
globalization. The age of the new impe-
110
Dædalus Spring 2005
yo
D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d
F
r
oh
metro
h
t
t
pag
:
/
/
d
i
r
mi
C
t
.
metro
i
t
.
/
mi
d
tu
d
a
mi
d
a
r
t
i
C
mi
–
pag
d
/
yo
F
/
/
/
/
/
1
3
4
2
1
0
8
1
8
2
8
9
1
9
0
0
1
1
5
2
6
0
5
3
8
8
7
3
9
2
pag
d
.
F
b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t
t
oh
norte
0
8
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3
rialism coincided with the quickening
tempo of technological change and of
international economic interchanges;
more and more quantities of goods and
capital crossed borders, and distances
between people of different countries
narrowed dramatically, thanks to the
development of the telegraph, the tele-
phone, the steamship, the automobile,
and many other devices.
These advances in science and tech-
nology at one level facilitated imperialis-
tic control over distant lands–and for
this reason most historians tend to claim
that imperialism and globalization went
hand in hand. Without the international
order sustained by the imperial powers
(En particular, by the British Empire), él
is often argued, economic globalization
would have been much more dif½cult, si
not impossible, to develop. The empire
provided a political and legal frame-
trabajar, backed up by military force, para
the economic transactions and techno-
logical developments of the day. The im-
perial administrators built roads, estab-
lished schools, and helped eradicate dis-
eases in their colonies and spheres of in-
fluence, thereby modernizing these ar-
eas and incorporating them into an in-
creasingly integrated globe. De este modo, if one
accepts such a perspective, it is possible
to say that imperialism and globalization
reinforced one another, even that they
were two sides of the same phenome-
non–something like the development of
a stable and interdependent world order.
But it is also clear that globalization
facilitated the growth of colonial resist-
ance to imperialist domination. To the
extent that globalization was an integra-
tive force, bringing people of all coun-
tries closer together, it undermined one
essential condition of imperialism: el
rigid separation of colonizer and colo-
nized. The blurring of the distinction
took many forms: mixed marriages be-
tween these two groups of people, com-
pradors acting as middlemen between
colonial administrators and the native
poblaciones, and the education of colo-
nial elite in the schools and universities
of the European metropoles. Imperial-
ism would have ceased to function if
such blurring continued–and that was
why, even while colonizer and colonized
were intermingling at one level, at an-
other a system of rigid social and cultur-
al distinction was maintained. Such dis-
tinction in turn aroused resistance and
opposition from the indigenous popula-
ciones, reinforcing anticolonialist senti-
mentos.
If globalization, in short, facilitated
the new imperialism, it also provided
favorable conditions for the emergence
of anti-imperialism. And in the end,
anti-imperialism proved to be a far
stronger imperative than imperialism.
Before the Great War, anti-imperialists
in Tunisia, Egypt, India, Porcelana, Korea,
and elsewhere were already aware that
modern transportation and communica-
tions technology could serve their inter-
ests as well as they had served those of
their colonial masters. Anti-imperialists
could use railways and steamships to
travel long distances and organize resist-
ance movements; they could use the
mass media and circulate handbills and
newspapers among an increasingly liter-
ate populace; and they could even estab-
lish transnational connections and con-
vene international congresses against
imperialism.
Although some in the metropoles sup-
ported the anti-imperialist movement,
before the Great War it had not signi½-
cantly weakened or altered the structure
of imperial governance. Yet even as large
numbers of colonial troops were recruit-
ed to ½ght for their respective masters,
the war experience did nothing but en-
courage the growth of anti-imperialism.
Beyond
imperialism:
el nuevo
enterrar-
nationalism
yo
D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d
F
r
oh
metro
h
t
t
pag
:
/
/
d
i
r
mi
C
t
.
metro
i
t
.
/
mi
d
tu
d
a
mi
d
a
r
t
i
C
mi
–
pag
d
/
yo
F
/
/
/
/
/
1
3
4
2
1
0
8
1
8
2
8
9
1
9
0
0
1
1
5
2
6
0
5
3
8
8
7
3
9
2
pag
d
.
F
b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t
t
oh
norte
0
8
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3
Dædalus Spring 2005
111
Akira Irie
en
imperialism
Both the Bolshevik revolutionaries’ anti-
imperialist ideology and Woodrow Wil-
son’s conception of self-determination
indicated that even among the victori-
ous Allies the ranks of the imperialist
powers were breaking down. The pro-
cesses of globalization that had facilitat-
ed imperialism were now encouraging
the spread of anticolonial nationalism. Si
empires had de½ned the nineteenth cen-
tury, then nationalism would de½ne the
twentieth.
This became quite evident after the
Great War, when economic globaliza-
tion resumed, buttressed by such tech-
nological inventions as the airplane,
the radio, and the cinema. Imperialism,
sin embargo, was not reinforced by this pro-
cess but, on the contrary, was eclipsed
by an ever-more vociferous clamor for
national liberation all over the world.
When the remaining imperial powers
failed to respond in unison to such
voices, or to prevent another calamitous
war from breaking out between them-
selves, anti-imperialist movements grew
so strong that by the end of World War
II, nationalism had come to be seen as a
plausible alternative to imperialism as
the basis for reconstructing world order.
Instead of a handful of large and pow-
erful empires providing law and order
in the world, now, after World War II,
sovereign states were expected to act as
both the constituents and guardians of
el sistema internacional. The former
empires that were now shorn of colo-
nies, the newly decolonized countries,
and the countries that had been inde-
pendent but noncolonial states–all
would be equal players in the postwar
world order. They would ensure domes-
tic stability while at the same time coop-
erating with one another through the
United Nations, an organization whose
basic principle is national independence
and sovereignty. The so-called West-
phalian system of sovereign states that
had provided the normative framework
for European international affairs since
the seventeenth century would now be
applied to the entire globe, as country
after country achieved independence in
África, the Middle East, Asia, and else-
dónde. Global governance would no
longer be based on a vertical division
of the world into the ruling powers
and all the rest, but instead established
through a horizontal system of coop-
eration among nations of presumably
equal status.
The history of the world in the second
half of the twentieth century was to
espectáculo, sin embargo, that sovereign states
were no more capable of producing sta-
ble international order than the empires
had been: nearly as many lives were lost
in interstate and civil wars after 1945 como
in World War II. With rare exceptions,
the United Nations proved incapable of
preventing such conflict when national
interests collided, and few countries
were willing to give precedence to the
principle of international cooperation.
It is often argued that the postwar in-
ternational system was de½ned by the
cold war in which the United States and
the Soviet Union effectively divided the
globe into two counterbalancing spheres
of influence. The two countries, cual
controlled the domestic affairs of their
allies and client states to maintain local
orden, managed to prevent a third world
war from erupting. If we accept this
vista, we are in effect saying the United
States and the Soviet Union behaved like
erstwhile empires, as providers and sus-
tainers of local and international order.
But it must be recognized that unlike the
nineteenth-century empires, lo hicieron
not discourage nationalism.
The United States, después de todo, continued
to espouse the principle of national self-
112
Dædalus Spring 2005
yo
D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d
F
r
oh
metro
h
t
t
pag
:
/
/
d
i
r
mi
C
t
.
metro
i
t
.
/
mi
d
tu
d
a
mi
d
a
r
t
i
C
mi
–
pag
d
/
yo
F
/
/
/
/
/
1
3
4
2
1
0
8
1
8
2
8
9
1
9
0
0
1
1
5
2
6
0
5
3
8
8
7
3
9
2
pag
d
.
F
b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t
t
oh
norte
0
8
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3
determination, and the Soviet Union, para
its part, preached ideological anti-impe-
rialism. Both superpowers supported co-
lonial liberation movements, a pesar de
in practice they did not always ½nd them
compatible with their global strategies.
Mientras tanto, the independent states of
Asia, the Middle East, África, and Latin
America often refused to heed the dic-
tates of the Cold War antagonists. Na-
tionalism, once unleashed, could not be
contained even by the Cold War’s new
empires.
Globalization proceeded apace after
World War II, but this was not because
of the Cold War or postcolonial nation-
alism, but rather in spite of them. Eco-
nomic, social, and cultural bonds of in-
terdependence were strengthened across
nations by supranational entities (especialmente-
cially regional communities) and by
non-state actors (such as multinational
enterprises and international nongov-
ernmental organizations). Regional
communities, most notably the Euro-
pean Economic Community, sought to
subordinate separate national interests
to considerations of collective well-
ser. The idea had always been there
–after all, it was well recognized that
globalization implied some sort of trans-
nationally shared interest–but it was
not put into practice until a group of Eu-
ropean countries agreed to put an end to
their history of internecine wars and to
give up part of their respective sovereign
rights for the sake of regional peace and
solidarity.
The number of non-state actors grew
rapidly after World War II. Whereas in
the quarter century after 1945 the num-
ber of independent states nearly dou-
bled, international nongovernmental
organizations and multinational enter-
prises increased even more spectacular-
ly. While the superpowers worked to
advance their own geopolitical agendas,
and independent states continued to
look after their own parochial interests,
these non-state actors together promot-
ed globalization and a sense of transna-
tional interdependence.
The question, entonces, was whether the
non-state actors would be able to pro-
vide global order if this task could not be
entrusted to the superpowers or the sov-
ereign states.
This was the key question that had to
be addressed in the last three decades of
the twentieth century–and it remains
the key question today. En efecto, it is the
question at the heart of the contempo-
rary debate on empire.
During the 1970s and 1980s, as Cold
War tensions abated, fresh national ri-
valries were unleashed, fracturing Afri-
ca, the Middle East, Central Asia, y
Southeast Asia. Al mismo tiempo, forces
for transnational interconnectedness
were strengthened. The European Eco-
nomic Community, now joined by Brit-
ain, steadily effected regional integra-
ción, and its success encouraged similar,
if smaller-scale, arrangements else-
dónde, such as the Association of South-
east Asian Nations and the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Area.
Whether such regional entities would,
by themselves, succeed in establishing a
new international order remained to be
seen. If such communities developed as
exclusionary groupings, pursuing only
their internally shared interests, ellos
might end up dividing the world. Pero
other developments in the last decades
of the century tended to encourage
international and interregional coopera-
tion and to generate conditions for the
emergence of a new, stable order. During
the 1970s, por ejemplo, issues such as
environmental degradation and human
rights abuses were becoming so serious
that they would have to be solved
Beyond
imperialism:
el nuevo
enterrar-
nationalism
yo
D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d
F
r
oh
metro
h
t
t
pag
:
/
/
d
i
r
mi
C
t
.
metro
i
t
.
/
mi
d
tu
d
a
mi
d
a
r
t
i
C
mi
–
pag
d
/
yo
F
/
/
/
/
/
1
3
4
2
1
0
8
1
8
2
8
9
1
9
0
0
1
1
5
2
6
0
5
3
8
8
7
3
9
2
pag
d
.
F
b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t
t
oh
norte
0
8
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3
Dædalus Spring 2005
113
Akira Irie
en
imperialism
through transnationally coordinated
acción. The United Nations sponsored
conferences to deal with them, y eso
was joined by newly formed nongovern-
mental organizations that were transna-
tional in character, such as Friends of the
Earth and Amnesty International. Acts
of international terrorism also aroused
global awareness, evoking calls for col-
lective response.
These issues were no longer con½ned
to speci½c countries or regions. It was no
accident, entonces, that international organi-
zations of all sorts, but especially of the
nongovernmental variety, grew spectac-
ularly in the last decades of the century.
At a time when sovereign states were
proving incapable of constructing a vi-
able international order, and when the
Cold War was ebbing, regional commu-
niidades, international organizations, y
non-state actors were actively seeking
an alternative–a global community that
did not rely for its viability on the exist-
ing governments and armed forces, pero
on the transnational activities of indi-
viduals and organizations. These were
all aspects of the globalizing trend of in-
ternational affairs.
Can such transnational forces and ac-
tivities somehow manage to combine
to establish a global structure of gover-
maricón? That is the major challenge
hoy.
A hundred years ago, globalization
had coincided with the new imperial-
ismo. By the late twentieth century, nueve-
teenth-century-style imperialism had
long since disappeared from the scene,
but the postcolonial states had proved
no more capable of establishing a stable
world order than the older nations that
had been in existence for a long time.
Would the regional communities pro-
vide the answer? If not, would transna-
tional non-state entities such as non-
governmental organizations and multi-
national enterprises be able to construct
a global civil society? How could non-
state bodies establish any sort of govern-
ing structure to provide law and order?
How would they de½ne their relation-
ship to the existing states?
These were serious questions to which
no satisfactory answer was readily avail-
capaz. It may have been for this reason
that some began to look back fondly on
empires as providers of international
orden. Two developments at the end of
the twentieth century and the beginning
of the twenty-½rst made the question of
effective world governance extremely
urgent. One was the frequency and geo-
graphical spread of international terror-
ismo, and the other, the proliferation of
nuclear, biological, and chemical weap-
ons across national boundaries.
Both were serious challenges to the
whole world, requiring an effective re-
sponse from all–states, international
organizaciones, regional communities,
and non-state actors. Such cooperation,
sin embargo, would take a long time to de-
velop, so in the meantime the United
States took it upon itself to punish ter-
rorist groups and the ‘rogue states’ sus-
pected of harboring weapons of mass
destruction. For those who believed that
international order must be buttressed
by a great military power willing to use
its resources for this purpose, los unidos
States provided the ready, and possibly
solo, respuesta. The nation would carry
out the functions that the earlier em-
pires had performed. It would be the
empire for the twenty-½rst century.
But today there is little tolerance for
any sort of imperialism anywhere in the
world. Although old-fashioned imperial-
ism is far from dead, it has no legitimacy
in the international community, cual
es, at least in theory, constructed on the
114
Dædalus Spring 2005
yo
D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d
F
r
oh
metro
h
t
t
pag
:
/
/
d
i
r
mi
C
t
.
metro
i
t
.
/
mi
d
tu
d
a
mi
d
a
r
t
i
C
mi
–
pag
d
/
yo
F
/
/
/
/
/
1
3
4
2
1
0
8
1
8
2
8
9
1
9
0
0
1
1
5
2
6
0
5
3
8
8
7
3
9
2
pag
d
.
F
b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t
t
oh
norte
0
8
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3
principles of national self-determination
and human rights. Además, the Atlan-
tic world, which dominated modern
international relations and of which the
United States was an integral part, poder
no longer claim the same degree of hege-
mony in world affairs.
Por un lado, European countries have
tended to move within the framework of
their regional community, quite inde-
pendently of the transatlantic ties. On
the other hand, Porcelana, India, y algunos
Latin American and Middle Eastern
countries are likely to develop as centers
of economic and even military power. A
the extent that the new imperialism of a
hundred years ago was largely a product
of Western civilization, today we must
reckon with the fact that non-Western
civilizations have grown in strength and
self-con½dence. If a new empire were to
emerge, por lo tanto, it would not be able
to function if it were identi½ed solely
with the West. Such an empire would
have to accommodate different civiliza-
tions from all regions of the Earth, y eso
would need to be mindful of the transna-
tional networks of goods, capital, ideas,
and individuals that constitute global
civil society.
En otras palabras, a new empire for the
new millennium would not be an empire
in any traditional sense.
What may have worked briefly a hun-
dred years ago cannot be expected to re-
appear and function in the same way to-
día. There is, sin embargo, another nine-
teenth-century legacy that might, in its
twenty-½rst-century incarnation, pro-
vide a more relevant solution to today’s
problemas: the legacy of international-
ismo.
It is sometimes forgotten that the age
of the new imperialism was also a time
when modern internationalism was vig-
orously promoted, by governments, pri-
vate organizations, and individuals. El
Olympic Games were one example, el
Permanent Court of Arbitration in the
la Haya, otro. The internationalists
established transnational organizations
and convened world congresses. Ellos
sought an alternative to a world order
that was dominated by the imperialists.
Yet the contest for influence between
imperialism and internationalism ap-
peared to be decided in the former’s
favor when, despite the international-
ists’ ardent pleas for peace and under-
standing among nations, el mundo
powers chose war.
But the Great War proved to be the
swan song of empires, and their certain
demise was implicit in the establishment
of the League of Nations, an internation-
alist project par excellence. Aunque el
League did little about the existing em-
pires besides placing Germany’s former
colonies and those of its wartime allies
under a system of mandates, and while it
proved powerless to check the aggressive
imperialism of Germany and Japan in
la década de 1930, its internationalist vision nev-
er died. The international body, assisted
by a host of nongovernmental organiza-
ciones, kept up the efforts–even during
the dark days of World War II–to de½ne
norms of behavior for nations and indi-
viduals, efforts that laid the ground for
conceptions of human rights, crimes
against humanity, and universal equality
and justice under the law. The United
States and Great Britain, even as they
fought against the Axis Powers, sin
hesitation embraced this internationalist
legacy that became the basis of the Unit-
ed Nations.
Even if somehow a new empire were
to emerge, that empire would have to
embody principles of human rights and
justice for all. It would have to be an em-
Beyond
imperialism:
el nuevo
enterrar-
nationalism
yo
D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d
F
r
oh
metro
h
t
t
pag
:
/
/
d
i
r
mi
C
t
.
metro
i
t
.
/
mi
d
tu
d
a
mi
d
a
r
t
i
C
mi
–
pag
d
/
yo
F
/
/
/
/
/
1
3
4
2
1
0
8
1
8
2
8
9
1
9
0
0
1
1
5
2
6
0
5
3
8
8
7
3
9
2
pag
d
.
F
b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t
t
oh
norte
0
8
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3
Dædalus Spring 2005
115
Akira Irie
en
imperialism
pire of freedom in support of the emer-
gent transnational institutions of global
civil society.
Since such a development is highly un-
likely, we would do better to explore the
alternativa. Después de todo, there actually are
other ways of securing international
orden. And there is no reason why the
internationalist legacy, rather than the
legacy of the briefly dominant new im-
perialism, should not serve humankind
hoy.
yo
D
oh
w
norte
oh
a
d
mi
d
F
r
oh
metro
h
t
t
pag
:
/
/
d
i
r
mi
C
t
.
metro
i
t
.
/
mi
d
tu
d
a
mi
d
a
r
t
i
C
mi
–
pag
d
/
yo
F
/
/
/
/
/
1
3
4
2
1
0
8
1
8
2
8
9
1
9
0
0
1
1
5
2
6
0
5
3
8
8
7
3
9
2
pag
d
.
F
b
y
gramo
tu
mi
s
t
t
oh
norte
0
8
S
mi
pag
mi
metro
b
mi
r
2
0
2
3
116
Dædalus Spring 2005
Descargar PDF